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Intelligence

Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as a User of Intelligence

An Intelligence Monograph
by L. Britt Snider

``Ground rules on intelligence-sharing were agreed to in the 1970s, but none were written down, and over time these understandings often gave way in the continuing tussle between the overseers and the overseen. Twenty years later, the system still operates without formal rules of the road.''

CSI 97-10001
February 1997



Click Here for full report


The following are some key excerps from the report:

Few Members of Congress have expertise in national security matters at the time they are elected.

Members' time is necessarily spread across the gamut of public affairs, from local to national to international

Members of Congress, on the other hand, rarely have the time to keep abreast of day-to-day developments

Throughout the day, Members of Congress are bombarded with information: press clips and notes assembled by their staffs, staff briefings, hearings, conversations with their colleagues, phone calls from constituents, and so forth.

While some committee staffers and a few individual Members may attempt to keep up with the daily intelligence reporting on particular topics, the needs of most Members are likely to be episodic and reactive.

They are observers, rather than customers in the usual sense. They get energized once in a while.

"there are times--usually when crises occur--when [Congress's] appetite [for intelligence] is insatiable. It's during these times that they just about overwhelm us." Members' appetites invariably grow when they are faced with a vote on a national security issue that is politically controversial, such as whether to send US military forces into a hostile situation. Such votes sometimes arise on the spur of the moment--for example, when an amendment is offered unexpectedly on the floor--but more often they occur with sufficient advance notice that Members who want to educate themselves are able to do so.

One analyst interviewed for this study described a briefing he had provided to a particular Member of Congress who had no background in national security. At the end of the briefing, the Member told the analyst that "the American people need to know what you have just told me." When the analyst reminded the Member that the briefing was classified, she replied, "Well, I'm declassifying it." [In this case, staff was able to restrain the Member from disclosing the intelligence.]

Members constantly seek opportunities to get themselves and their positions before the public. Moreover, they are constantly sifting through the information that reaches them to find ammunition for use in their political battles.

If a Member becomes aware that the executive branch possesses intelligence that undermines the administration's position on a particular issue or lends credence to the Member's own position, he or she will be especially anxious to have it. And once in hand, the stronger the implications of such information for their position, the greater will be the temptation to use it. "The public," the Member will contend, "has a right to know."

Many interviewed for this study pointed out, however, that whether or not the needs of Congress are formally considered in setting requirements and priorities for collection or analysis, Congress can obtain "whatever it wants whenever it wants it" from the Intelligence Community.

Intelligence agencies also make no effort to screen the publications provided for content; if the publications are on the list to go to the committees, they go. At present, these publications include current intelligence, notably the National Intelligence Daily (NID) and DIA's Military Intelligence Digest (MID), as well as estimative intelligence, including all NIEs. In 1995 approximately 5,000 such publications were delivered to each of the intelligence committees.

In addition, both intelligence committees in 1996 installed computer terminals linking them to an Intelligence Community network (PolicyNet) that provides electronic access to most finished intelligence and, in some cases, to intelligence reports that are not provided in hard copy--for example, certain analysis done by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department. Daily digests of NSA SIGINT reporting--"single-source reports," referred to as "product" by NSA--also are available via PolicyNet. The committees expect to link up in the near future to another Intelligence Community computer network that will provide electronic access to an even broader range of reporting.

Generally speaking, though, Members and staff say they are too busy to read the voluminous number of intelligence reports that come in each day. As one staffer conceded, "I cannot, in good conscience, recommend to my Member that it is worth his time to come in here and read this stuff. Frankly, it is not even worth my time."

Staffers of the other national security committees also concede that they may or may not read the intelligence publications they request, depending upon circumstances at the time the requested publication arrives.

Congress also does not routinely see "raw" intelligence--unevaluated intelligence reporting, usually from a single source.

Intelligence officials note that, as a practical matter, the volume of "raw" intelligence is such that the intelligence committees would be incapable of storing it. They also justify the current policy on security grounds--the need to avoid jeopardizing sensitive source information--as well as on the grounds that it would be "dangerous" to give Congress unevaluated, single-source reporting that has not been placed in context by analysts who have "all-source" access. As one official noted, "It's bad enough that policymakers get this stuff and run with it. Can you imagine what would happen if we gave it to Congress?"

A former Congressional staffer was perhaps more realistic: "It's really irrelevant what kind of published intelligence is sent to the Hill. Nobody has time to read it anyway."

In a similar vein, one Congressional staffer thought that having access to intelligence at times had actually discouraged leaks of classified information. "If an agreement can be worked out [with the Intelligence Community]," the staffer noted, "with respect to what can be used in public and it gives both sides of an issue enough to go on, I think it actually discourages people [Members and staff] from resorting to leaks."

Several also noted that, because Congress has access to intelligence, it has sometimes managed to avoid irrational legislative responses to world events--responses that would undoubtedly have created serious diplomatic problems for the incumbent administration. As one current Member put it: "Because the leadership has had immediate access to intelligence reporting, they have sometimes been able to stop the panic and craziness up here."

A survey of lawmakers conducted by the CIA's Office of Congressional Affairs in late 1988 not surprisingly found them "overwhelmingly disinterested" in intelligence insofar as the execution of their legislative duties was concerned

A survey of lawmakers conducted by the CIA's Office of Congressional Affairs in late 1988 not surprisingly found them "overwhelmingly disinterested" in intelligence insofar as the execution of their legislative duties was concerned

Members' lack of interest can be attributed partly to the fact that intelligence does not lend itself to use in a public process. As one SFRC staff member noted: "We [the committee] are part of the public debate. We deal in the realm of the overt--in what actions other governments take and what actions they don't take. While it is still useful to understand what their plans or intent may be, most of what the committee needs to know can be obtained from the New York Times or CNN. And the committee will respond overtly to it."

Quite often intelligence will also figure into the consideration of legislation handled by these committees. Such legislative measures include:

  • Resolutions supporting or condemning the actions of foreign governments or international bodies.
  • Legislation imposing conditions on the executive branch regarding the conduct of foreign policy.
  • Legislation imposing diplomatic or trade sanctions on the governments of other countries.
  • Legislation to implement treaties and international agreements.
  • Legislation to commit, or fund the commitment of, US forces abroad.
  • Legislation to counter threats to US security emanating from outside the United States, such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  • Legislation providing advice and consent for US ratification of treaties (Senate only).
  • Legislation authorizing appropriations or appropriating funds to build and equip US military forces, provide security and economic assistance to other governments, and develop US intelligence capabilities.

Surprisingly, the intelligence analysts interviewed for this study tended to downplay their influence with Congress. Most seemed to believe that Members usually had their positions staked out and minds made up long before receiving an intelligence briefing. If the briefing lent itself to their views, the Members would take it on board. But few Members were seen by analysts as having changed their positions based on what they heard in an intelligence briefing.

Surprisingly, the intelligence analysts interviewed for this study tended to downplay their influence with Congress. Most seemed to believe that Members usually had their positions staked out and minds made up long before receiving an intelligence briefing. If the briefing lent itself to their views, the Members would take it on board. But few Members were seen by analysts as having changed their positions based on what they heard in an intelligence briefing.

A number of analysts also pointed to what appeared to be Congress's growing inclination to bring intelligence analysis out into the open, which the analysts saw as imposing additional (and unnecessary) burdens and strains. This occurs either when analysts are required to appear at public hearings of Congressional committees or when intelligence agencies are asked to "sanitize" classified analysis so that it can be made public by a committee or an individual Member (sometimes for a thinly veiled political purpose). Such requests, often couched in such terms as "the American people need to know this," are difficult for intelligence agencies to resist.

Requests to "sanitize" classified analysis for public release do not increase personal stress, but they do involve time and effort that, from the standpoint of an analyst, is unproductive and a diversion from more important work. Going to this extra effort is especially galling when it is seen only as allowing a Senator or Congressman to score a political point against an opponent.

Leakers of intelligence are rarely identified and even more rarely punished. As one Congressional staffer noted: "People here have the sense that, since no one enforces the rules, they are not to be taken all that seriously. It's like the tendency people have to speed up on a freeway if they never see a cop. Let me tell you, they aren't writing any tickets on this freeway

Members of Congress are protected by the "speech and debate" clause of the Constitution, which immunizes them from criminal prosecution for what they say on the floor of either House. Nevertheless, because they are elected officials, they must think twice before saying anything that might jeopardize their standing for the next election or subject them to criticism by their colleagues. For most Members, these are strong inhibiting forces.

In any case, some Members, when they see a chance to score political points, will be tempted to do so, regardless of the source of their information. Members and staff concede as much. While most Members take care to protect the intelligence they are given, some will seek a way to turn it to their political advantage without (in their view) endangering national security.

Intelligence agencies, interestingly enough, actually give Congress high marks for protecting intelligence information. Apart from a handful of widely reported and somewhat dated examples, no intelligence agency personnel interviewed for this study could point to instances of compromise by Members or their staffs. In any event, no one saw the "leak" problem as sufficiently serious or widespread to warrant executive branch reconsideration of the amount or sensitivity of the intelligence shared with the Hill.

Having access to, but not acting upon, information described in finished intelligence can become a source of embarrassment. This happened recently to the SSCI; its chairman publicly criticized the Secretary of Defense for failing to respond to finished intelligence reports indicating a security threat to the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, only to find that the SSCI had received the same intelligence reports and had done nothing with them prior to the bombing there in June 1996 that killed 19 US airmen.



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