Intelligence In Coalition Operations
SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence
INTELLIGENCE IN COALITION OPERATIONS
Roger R. Royston., 514-60-5003
Research Paper submitted to the Faculty
of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and
do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government
Title: Intelligence in Coalition Operations
Author: Major Roger R. Royston, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The Marine Corps is not adequately considering the impact of coalition
warfare on tactical intelligence requirements and can not accomplish coordination
tasks without an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure.
Background: The intelligence community often makes changes to its structure
and or policies due to deficiencies or failures that come to light during a conflict.
The Gulf War highlighted shortfalls in the intelligence community's ability to
quickly establish cooperative intelligence arrangements between the foreign forces
that make up a multinational coalition. In 1993, the Department of Defense
published Joint Doctrine that established an intelligence architecture which fulfills
requirements for the coordination and sharing of intelligence between
multinational forces. The Department of Defense is also creating Joint Doctrine
that establishes guidelines and delineates authority for the sanitization of
intelligence for release to foreign forces. The current and developing doctrine
only address functional requirements down to the CINC level. The tactical
commander will also have to interact with and fulfill coordination requirements
with foreign forces. By exclusion, the current doctrine places limitations and
restriction on the tactical commander in the functional area of intelligence
operations. The Marine Corps has not created any doctrine which recognizes
these restrictions and fully considers the implications of operational employment
with foreign forces. By not considering the likelihood of coalition operations, the
Marine Corps may discover tactical intelligence shortfalls through failure rather
than by foresight.
Recommendations: The Marine Corps should write service doctrine that will
address the requirements and restrictions attendant to intelligence operations in a
coalition environment. Additionally, when the Marine Corps conducts the
semi-annual Mission Area Analysis (MAA) on intelligence functions, subject
matter experts should consider coalition impacts when formulating potential
requirements for doctrinal, organization, training, equipment, and support
corrections and opportunities.
Intelligence in Coalition Operations
After World War II, the United States began developing an intelligence
community to address and overcome shortfalls highlighted by the surprise
bombing of Pearl Harbor. The National Security Act of 1947 began the formal
establishment of a cohesive intelligence community that has continually matured
through expansion of organizations, creation of agencies, adjustments in
responsibilities, and the refinement of procedures. As with the creation of the
community, many of the substantial changes that have occurred were driven by
changes in technology and often determined through failures rather than
forethought and analysis.1 The intelligence community is currently pursuing
correctional changes in the area of sharing intelligence between U.S. and foreign
military forces that are part of an ad hoc coalition.
The basic requirement for sharing intelligence with foreign forces is not a new
concept and was a highlighted attribute to U.S. and British efforts during WW II.2
The community and services still routinely share intelligence with foreign services
but within the confines of well established alliances. The most notable exchanges
occur within alliances that represent national commitment and include the forward
deployment of U.S. forces, such as in the bi-lateral relationship with Korea. The
principles and procedures for sharing intelligence in alliances typically have a
regional focus and did not require or create institutional procedures within service
or joint doctrine. More relative, the intelligence community did not use the
experience gained in alliances as a foundation for considering requirements in
ad-hoc coalition operations.3 As a result of this oversight, the coalition force
created for the conduct of the Gulf War did not have an established pre-planned
system or mechanism to release essential intelligence information to coalition
partners accept for traditional allies.4 Despite ultimate success, once again the
intelligence community needed to make changes and adjustments because of
failing to anticipate a likely event; ad hoc coalition warfare. To avoid potential
failures within tactical intelligence, the Marine Corps must consider implications
of a coalition environment. Marine Corps consideration necessitates a participant
understanding in emerging doctrinal fixes contained in existing and developing
Ad Hoc Coalition.
Department of Defense efforts embrace the assumption that future conflicts, in
which the United States will become involved, will most likely be bilateral or
multinational rather than unilateral. This assumption is echoed in Joint Pub I
There is a good probability that any military operations undertaken
by the United States of America will have multinational aspects, so
extensive is the network of alliances, friendships, and mutual
interests established by our nation around the world.5
Since the Revolutionary War, the assumption of coalition involvement holds true
as the major conflicts the Unites States participated did not take the form of
unilateral actions.6 The end of the cold war further reduces the probability that the
United States will enter a significant unilateral conflict. With the demise of the
Soviet Union and the United States remaining as the sole military superpower it is
not likely that we will conduct a unilateral use of military forces due to political
sensitivities. It is a fair assumption that any significant military operations
involving the United States will most likely be with allies as part of a combined or
coalition force.7 Although the services have maintained experience through
participation in alliances, the characteristics of an ad hoc coalition require
A coalition is a term that is often applied to relationships formed expressly for
prosecution of a war or conflict that has already begun. More precisely, coalitions
are wartime associations. Desert Shield demonstrates this trait as the political and
military relationships that defined the coalition were not established until after Iraq
attacked Kuwait. Coalitions are generally characterized as an ad hoc relationship
since they are reactive in nature and created to fight a particular war or counter a
specific threat. Although the relationship is temporary, an effective coalition still
requires cooperative arrangements, to include sharing of intelligence. To establish
cooperative arrangements, coalitions often attempt to apply the basic principals
used in effective alliances. By definition, a coalition has a narrow focus of effort
that is attendant to the specific purpose and limited time. Given this narrow focus
of effort, nations that are part of the coalition may have opposing interests in many
areas on the peripheral of the main effort.8 This is an important aspect of
coalitions, particularly in considering sharing of intelligence, since ad hoc
alliances do not necessarily generate from nor translate into friendships.
As a basic premise of the definition of an alliance or coalition, military forces
of nations are still ultimately responsible and accountable to their parent states.
Along with the benefit of an alliance comes substantial drawbacks, the biggest of
which is a loss of complete sovereignty over a nations actions.9 By sharing
intelligence with other nations a state concedes information and potentially
capabilities that would not normally or otherwise be provided. As such, coalitions
often carry a requirement for compromise in the area of the security of a nation's
secrets. Not all nations will bring the same level of robust and technically
sophisticated intelligence capabilities to a cooperative effort. While a coalition
aggregates the capabilities of military forces, the operational cohesion requires
mutually supporting the intelligence capabilities and products provided by
participating nations.10 The nation with the most capable intelligence structure and
resources can expect to compromise more since they will provide more than they
receive in return. This can be especially true when a coalition includes third world
countries that can neither sustain nor support development of expensive and
sophisticated collection and processing systems. Despite variances in capabilities
and structure, a coalition should exploit any unique contribution of supporting
nations, often human intelligence, for the common goal of the union of national
efforts.11 A nation will maintain its' sovereignty and security by only providing
intelligence deemed necessary for the conduct of the coalition and by protecting
the sources and methods of intelligence that is shared.
DIA and Security.
When considering intelligence security, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
is one of two key players in coalition operations. When Secretary of Defense
McNamara created the DIA in 1961, to overcome parochial intelligence estimates
from the services, he established a centralized position within the intelligence
community to satisfy DoD interests.12 Similar to the WW II Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), DIA provides a focal point for national and DoD efforts in the
process of collection, production, and dissemination of defense related
intelligence.13 DIA's central position also fulfills DoD's requirements, through
coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), to establish
guidelines and oversight measures to protect intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure.
The CINC is the other key player in establishing effective intelligence
operations within an ad hoc coalition. By establishing the CINC as regionally
responsible for projecting national power, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 facilitates orienting the intelligence
community from a global to a regional focus. The CINC fulfills a critical role by
establishing a structure which translates a regional intelligence focus into a
cooperative effort. The CINC established structure and attendant architecture
must also provide a conduit for the flow of intelligence products to coalition
members. It is the combination of recognizing the CINC as a focus of national
effort and the DIA's central position within the intelligence community that allows
bringing to bear the full capabilities of national and theater assets to a regional
Joint Doctrine for Dissemination.
As stated earlier, after the conclusion of the Gulf War, the U.S. intelligence
community did not return to its' historical practice of returning to an inward focus
but began to apply the lessons learned from coalition operations. The Department
of Defense first applied lessons learned by adjusting joint doctrine on intelligence
support to operations, Joint Pub 2-0 published in October 1993. The doctrine
depicts two key elements required for effective coordination; a multinational
intelligence architecture and attendant communications structure.15
The development of the multinational intelligence architecture uses the
Coalition Coordination and Communication Integration Center (C3IC), developed
by CINCCENT, as a backdrop for lessons learned. The tether between the joint
doctrine and the C3IC is most readily apparent in reviewing the principles cited for
consideration when dealing with multinational forces as part of coalition
Adjust National Differences Among Nations
Unity of Effort Against Common Threat
Determining and Planning Intelligence Special Arrangements
Full Exchange of Intelligence Sharing
Complementary Intelligence Operations
Combined Intelligence Center
Besides reaffirming responsibilities of various intelligence agencies, the joint
doctrine specifically addresses the functional linkage between DIA, supported
CINC, and military forces of coalition members. Of service concern, the joint
doctrine does not address the functional role and linkage of the tactical
commanders subordinate to the CINC.
Use of non-service systems.
Supporting the architecture, the doctrine also depicts the communications paths
and methods attendant to the functional responsibilities. Again the document is
tied to and clearly reflects the lessons learned by operations of the C3IC. By
specifying methods of communications the doctrine incorporates the
communication systems and work stations developed to overcome shortfalls noted,
particularly in the dissemination of imagery.17 The document also assists in
organizational planning by citing areas that will likely require courier or liaison
services. As a carryover from the Gulf Conflict, the joint doctrine additionally
focuses on satisfying the CINC's intelligence and processing requirements. The
architecture reflects the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), a
non-service system, as a key element in the dissemination of intelligence which
reinforces a CINC focus.18 While the document does address the potential for the
establishment of a Joint Force Commander, the lowest authoritative level remains
with the CINC. As with the structural architecture, Joint Pub 2-0 does not address
subordinate commands and linkage requirements to service communications
Joint Doctrine for Sanitization and Security.
A concurrent and ongoing effort is the development of proposed doctrine, Joint
Pub 2-0 1, that addresses the sanitization requirements posed by working as part of
a multinational force. The central theme that runs throughout the document is
providing timely and responsive, yet controlled, intelligence to other members of a
multinational force. The dilemma that the document addresses is being able to
quickly transition from peacetime and working with security manuals to a wartime
position.19 During the Gulf War, DIA developed the DIA Handbook for Analysts
to facilitate sanitization and dissemination of intelligence to the multinational
forces. The handbook also provides the basic format and principles used in the
proposed doctrine. As practiced during Desert Storm, the doctrine separates
responsibility of sanitization and dissemination into two broad areas, based around
national and theater assets.
DIA as focal point.
Within the doctrine, DIA is clearly the designated focal point for sanitization
authority and efforts. DIA's role as a focal point is reinforced by providing the
CINCs with a DIA Guide to Foreign Disclosure and by performing an interaction
function with other intelligence agencies. In seeking to assist the combatant
commander, DIA will work with national level agencies to seek exemptions to
national security policy if required by operational necessity.20 It is likely DIA will
sanitize the collection from national assets and provide appropriately marked
intelligence products tailored to CINC requirements that are releasable to a
multinational force. The basic direction of DIA guidance and efforts is clearly to
remove as much sanitization burden as possible from the CINC.
While DIA is the focal point for overall sanitization efforts the CINC is clearly
the responsible agent within a theater. Specifically, the doctrine recognizes the
challenges faced by the CINC's intelligence officer, the J-2, in carrying out
sanitization and dissemination responsibilities. As a guide for the J-2, the doctrine
underscores the fact that a multinational organization can and will create unique
releasability problems. The documents also recognize that J-2s are typically not
knowledgeable and practiced. in the sanitization and release procedures, due to a
lack of practice and peacetime requirements. As a subset, the document points out
that the sharing of US intelligence, while also protecting sources and methods, can
be a key to sustaining a multinational force (MNF).21 The specific considerations
listed for the J2 are: "(1) eligibility of recipient countries; (2) need to know; (3)
gain outweigh risks; (4) level of control necessary; and (5) organization receiving
afford some protection."22 The driving point behind these considerations is that
the combatant commander is ultimately responsible and accountable for the release
of intelligence to foreign forces. While the document provides various
considerations, the DIA Guide to Foreign Disclosure, provided to each combatant
commander, gives specific guidance to the CINC's J-2.23 The CINC's intelligence
staff will use the guide in executing sanitization and dissemination authority to
protect the sources and methods of intelligence gathered primarily from theater
resources. Probably the majority of the sanitization efforts of the combatant
commander will be executed under the auspices of the DIA representative on the
Tactical coordination with foreign forces.
Current and developing doctrine is oriented around the in theater
responsibilities of the CINC to provide a centralized effort of a multinational force
which appropriately includes a responsive level of intelligence support. The
documents do not address the need for the cooperative and coordination
requirements that will exist below the combatant commander. Tactical
commanders below the CINC can and should anticipate they will either have
forces from different nations attached or adjacent to their command. In either case
the tactical commander should plan for coordination requirements that include
sharing of intelligence.
Liaison and communication.
Per doctrinal considerations, the combatant commander will provide liaison
teams to multinational commands below the staff levels that are directly linked
within a CINC level architecture, as practiced in Desert Storm.24 These teams
consist of S2 through S4 staff elements and supported by a robust signal element.
Although they possess a signal element, the teams will not focus solely on
providing intelligence support redundant to higher levels of coordination. As these
liaison teams will address a CINC's efforts, the tactical commander will need to
provide complementary assets at almost every level of command. Additionally,
cooperative integration of the CINC's and tactical commander's liaison teams is
necessary to attain unity and preclude the potential for contradictory efforts.25
Beside providing support in flank coordination and experience in operations above
brigade level, the teams will naturally function as a conduit for critical intelligence
on the enemy equal to that available to U.S. forces. While passing of time critical
combat intelligence is an inherent capability, the communication capabilities of
liaison teams are usually not so robust that they can fully replicate the various
functional nets within a communication architecture.26 To prevent intelligence
shortfalls, the tactical commander must also anticipate having to share unique and
tactical intelligence products not exchanged by the liaison elements at higher
Foreign Service Communication.
Although doctrine now describes and addresses a structural conduit for
intelligence to multinational forces at the CINC level, the communications
structure of coalition partners will not always be responsive to their subordinate
units. This may force the interaction of tactical commanders with adjacent forces,
both directly and through liaison personnel to include provision of intelligence
material that is marked and ready for release to multination forces is dependent
on the senior agencies with components confined to instructions for
dissemination.27 The procedures for creating external markings and related
dissemination instructions allows the tactical commander to quickly relay marked
material to foreign forces with minimal administrative burdens. If not anticipated
and pre-planned, the commander may also find the throughput requirements will
quickly exceed a typical liaison communications architecture.
As stated earlier, tactical commanders are not automatically given the
sanitization authority that includes the release of intelligence product to
multinational forces but are rather given dissemination guidance for product
received. Department of Defense documents currently restrict service components
to sanitization guidance and authority that is confined to single service or joint
operations.28 The lack of authorization for the tactical commander must therefore
presume one of two scenarios. Either the intelligence flow from higher authorities
is sufficient for expected coalition and U.S. interaction or interaction is not
anticipated. The tactical commander does have some authority to release
intelligence to coalition partners but the authority is conditional and only applies
to combat critical intelligence of a fleeting nature. By strict interpretation, the
conditional authority precludes foreign forces from viewing any unmarked tactical
intelligence used in initial planning prior to engagement of forces. Developing
doctrine highlights the requirement for appropriately marked material.
Specifically, the doctrine reaffirms a basic security principle that intelligence not
marked with the no foreign (NOFORN) caveat does equal releaseability criteria.
Limited by higher echelons.
Without sanitization authority, that includes the release to multinational forces,
the tactical commander is reliant upon the services of higher echelons of
command. As described earlier, DIA and the CINC intelligence structures conduct
the sanitization of intelligence products. In providing the in-theater service, the
CINC's Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) will likely orient its' efforts to create
products that satisfy CINC requirements. In many areas the JIC products will still
accommodate tactical requirements, such as establishing of enemy force lay
downs. JIC products should also encompass any tactical requirements, previously
submitted to higher authorities, that are beyond the capabilities of organic assets.
What it may exclude are those requirements of interest solely of the tactical
commander that are satisfied by the collection efforts of organic assets.
CINC oriented product.
The tactical commander should always anticipate that there will be competition
for scarce tactical, theater, and national resources in intelligence operations. To
complement organic collection and to fill intelligence gaps, the tactical commander
will have to request intelligence support from theater and national systems. While
requested support may be validated, the tactical commander's submitted
requirements typically fall low on the CINC's priority list. Many of the tactical
commanders requirements will not be satisfied due to their relative low priority
coupled with limited theater and national systems available for tasking.29 This will
confine the tactical commander to working with sanitized intelligence derived
from CINC tasking and tailored to support the CINC. This was the case in Deserts
Storm where the intelligence that was generated to support the CINC was too
broad to fulfill the level of detail needed for tactical planning, with the exception
of targeting templates.30 While subordinate tactical U.S. commanders will receive
the tailored and sanitized intelligence, the received product may not contribute to
tactical planning and of little shared value to coalition partners.
Evoke combat essential authority.
The tactical commander must strive to fill all of his intelligence and
coordination requirements through organic resources if products received from
higher echelons are not responsive. If successful, the tactical commander does not
possess the guidance to process, track, and mark locally generated products for
release to coalition partners. Many of the intelligence products that serve the
interests of the tactical commander are also of interest and beneficial to an
adjacent or subordinate coalition unit. Without the availability of senior
headquarters processing, the only resources a tactical commander has is to either
withhold the intelligence or consider it at combat essential. In either regard, the
mechanism to account for and track what and what is not released to coalition
partners will not be a part of normal procedures or practices.
National & Theater Support.
A combinations of reliance and ready access to national theater produced
intelligence may compound a tactical commander's dilemma in whether to release
unmarked intelligence or protect national capabilities. The contribution and
relative dependence upon national theater assets is not new and a highlight of the
Persian Gulf Conflict. In response to CINC intelligence requirements, the
intelligence community will quickly orient available assets and staffs to focus on a
given threat. While supporting agencies will undoubtedly have to make some
internal adjustments, the doctrinal linkage between the intelligence community
through DIA to supported a CINC eases the flow and responsiveness of
intelligence support.31 The doctrinal inclusion of an architecture, that overcomes
communications deficiencies, further supports timely transmission of intelligence,
to include participation within a newly formed coalition. As national and theater
resources continue to improve through technological development it is logical to
assume responsible agencies will continue to recognize and exploit improvements
in capabilities to support a CINC.
Improvements in connectivity and responsiveness.
Efforts to improve national and theater asset connectivity and responsiveness to
warfighting elements, to both command structures and weapons systems,
compliments recognition of their potential contribution. The ultimate goal is a
capability for intelligence sensors to provide processed information directly to the
shooter. Even if attained, the information must still be provided to activities that
support military planners, to include tactical commanders. It is also logical to
assume intelligence activities that support military planners are the first areas that
will benefit from development efforts. Information received directly from sensors
is not generally considered finished and evaluated product. Technological
developments that improve the flow of information from national and theater
sources will also bypass the funnel of sanitization conducted by higher
Risk of unauthorized disclosure.
As the tactical commander gains access to more intelligence the risk for
unauthorized disclosure increases. The intelligence community should expect that
operational considerations for the safety of the coalition as a whole will drive a
less concerted effort to track all bits of intelligence that are passed by the
components. As a byproduct, only the DIA and CINC staffs that conduct
sanitization will, in essence, be able to account for intelligence shared with a
multinational force. Components will likely confine their efforts to assuring that
hardcopy intelligence passed to coalition partners bear appropriate markings and
will attempt to sanitize organic products to an appropriate level during briefs
attended by coalition members. The intelligence community should not arbitrarily
expect components to structure or organize their staffs to account for a level of
dissemination control which is beyond their scope of authority. Many of the
disclosures are not confined to intelligence sources and methods but include
information gained from simply operating as part of a coalition force. Foreign
intelligence forces of a coalition can easily gain and potentially exploit intelligence
on operational capabilities, tactics, techniques, and limitations to include areas of
intelligence.32 Observing U.S. forces in the execution of doctrine, and technology,
available through sharing intelligence, provides information and effectiveness of
U.S. intelligence capabilities.33 The danger of fully demonstrating or providing
examples of U.S. intelligence characteristics and capabilities is in other
intelligence agencies using the information to establish, refine, and advance their
own military capabilities and planning in such a way that it minimizes the
effectiveness of U.S. intelligence capabilities. Regardless of the inherent future
danger of working as part of a coalition, the Gulf War clearly demonstrates that
the intelligence community must fully prepare to conduct operations as part of a
The structure and documentation created to support coalition considerations
revolve around both DIA and the supported combatant commander. With the
overall focus of national and theater assets as well as sanitization authority
directed towards the CINC, subordinate components are somewhat restricted to
what is provided by higher echelons of command. By confining
institutionalization of the lessons learned from the Gulf War, the potential exists to
not consider future developments and more active involvement by service
The Marine Corps currently evaluates various functional areas on a bi-annual
basis by conducting a Mission Area Analysis (MAA) lead by subject matter
experts. The MAA uses a concept which considers the elements of doctrine,
organization, training, equipment, and support (DOTES) as a basis to how best
achieve operational and functional requirements and resolve identified shortfalls.
To fully address future requirements, the application of the DOTES concept must
go beyond own service and joint considerations. The analysis on the functional
area of intelligence must also recognize and acknowledge the impact of coalition
operations. An important aspect in using the DOTES acronym, in addressing
functional requirements, is attaining symmetry among the various elements.
Symmetry must not only be obtained within a service but also with joint and
national efforts as well as expected operational employment.
If Marine Corps doctrine on intelligence operations consider coalitions, it must
reflect constraints imposed by limits reflected in joint doctrine. A current
reflection will recognize that the CINC is a key element in providing intelligence
within a multinational force. Without significant changes, the doctrine must also
reflect that component should not expect sanitization authority that allows release
of products to foreign forces. In execution of an operation this situation either
limits component interaction with multinational forces or creates a dilemma on
how to deal with classified intelligence obtained from organic resources. As seen
in the Gulf War, the Marine Corps can and should expect to interact with adjacent
coalition forces. By not having sanitization guidance and authority the current and
developing joint doctrine restricts tactical commanders to exercising unguided
authority as well as placing limits on support to planning requirements.34 Lack of
a systematic sanitization process that recognizes a multinational force caveat will
also inhibit accountability of what intelligence was released to coalition partners to
assess potential disclosures damaging to future operations. The doctrinal
adjustments of intelligence architectures to accommodate coalition requirements
also impose adjustments in the organizational portion of DOTES.
The organizational impacts of coalition warfare can be twofold. While a
service component may not have a requirement for an integrated combined staff
the headquarters elements may have to accommodate visits by coalition members
to include areas which reflect intelligence awareness of the enemy. During the
Gulf War, the SCIF was the predominate exclusion area not accessible by coalition
members. Whether self imposed or planned, the organization impact can include
both personnel and material required to monitor and control the degree that a units
staff structure is open to coalition partners. If the sanitization for release to
coalition forces is confined to a DoD and CINC JIC, the requirements are
primarily document control and accounting. As the intelligence moves toward
automated systems for processing and passing of intelligence to subordinate units,
the function may still require additional manpower for a system that will most
likely require a robust courier service. Thus, even if a component command does
not expand it's intelligence processing functions to include sanitization for release
to multinational forces there will be additional burdens on staff functions.
The second organizational impact would be 'in the knowledgeable processing of
intelligence, whether organic, theater, or national, for release to a coalition. While
DIA has a standing organizational structure chartered and familiar with
sanitization of intelligence for release to foreign military forces, the services do
not. The sanitization of intelligence by higher headquarters will most likely rely
on communications paths rather than forwarding of experienced teams.
organizational adjustment to serve component commands could be obtained
through realignment in the major force program (MFP). The Marine Corps, as
well as other services, have billets that fall under the MFP III whose manpower
costs are programmed and paid for by the DCI, vice the representative service. A
realignment of billets to allow for active analyst participation in DIA's foreign
disclosure branch would establish a deployable cadre of experience for wartime
augmentation. The attainment of experience in ad hoc coalitions is possibly the
most difficult and embraces the training subset of DOTES.
The closest training for coalitions in a real-world environment is through
participation in alliances. Exposure to intelligence operations within an alliance
allows for exposure to established practices and procedures developed to ensure
effective intelligence sharing. While the exposure is beneficial, it only tends to
reinforce the tenets embraced by the developing doctrine on multinational
coalitions. A more effective training measure requires going through the process
to create capabilities and relationships that are not resident at the outset of an
operation. A more effective training mechanism for coalition operations is an
expansion of the political-military exercises that are currently participated in by
the MEFs. The majority of these exercises are focused on integration of combat
power to the exclusion of intelligence. While intelligence will be included it is
typically canned to facilitate operational maneuver within a limited time frame.
The area that has the most potential for unplanned impact on coalition is in the
area of equipment. One of the lessons of effective intelligence is that
"...development of new weapons systems must be planned in a way that ensures
that they will not require more intelligence support than will be available."35 A
comparison is citing operational employment and interaction with forces from
other nations must be planned in a way that ensures that they will not require more
intelligence support than will be available. To meet these ends, the current
development of intelligence systems are striving toward an architecture that will
allow for "sensor to shooter" support. While this may be an eventual reality for
particular types of intelligence, the most likely intermediate achievement will be
sensor to intelligence producer, to include the intelligence staffs of components.
As technology and communications capabilities attain this level of interaction the
DoD and CINC JIC processing of national and theater collection will become
more transparent to component commanders. For the sanitization of intelligence,
the potential and risk of disclosure of capabilities will increase as the
filtering system of a pyramid hierarchy, that excludes components, begin to flatten. The
most apparent application of equipment adjustment which can reflect the
consideration of coalitions is in the area of intelligence analysis and processing,
such as the Intelligence Analysis System (IAS). If coalition considerations are an
inherent part of system development the system may be develop with a product
that is in concert with dissemination limitations imposed by security constraints.
As mentioned under discussion of doctrinal implications, the infrastructure
required to accommodate coalition considerations may expand material
requirements. The majority of current service Standard Operating Procedures only
consider parent units and unilateral requirements. Accommodation of coalition
forces while providing access control to intelligence facilities will require
additional structures to a command post.
Over the past fifty years the U.S. intelligence community has matured to the
point that it acknowledges and is beginning to address intelligence requirements
attendant to ad hoc coalition conflicts. Current efforts to protect sources and
methods while allowing for mission execution tend to limit the active involvement
of forces below the combatant commander. The Marine Corps role as an
expeditionary force and probable Joint Task Force involvement mandates
consideration of the implications of coalitions to intelligence operations. If not
planned, ad hoc efforts to protect sources and methods will impede overall
intelligence functions, increase the risk of inadvertent disclosures, and challenge
efforts for material accountability. To totally ignore responsibilities in protecting
sources and methods under the guise of combat essential requirements is a failure
of integrity with potential long term implications in future conflicts. The current
steps taken to address intelligence within coalition operations dictates procedures
that do not develop component internal requirements. To effectively move into the
future with doctrine, organization, equipment, training, and support, the Marine
Corps must consider the implications of coalition conflict to intelligence
The Marine Corps should work within the intelligence community to either
obtain documented sanitization and dissemination authority at the tactical level or
assure a responsive mechanism is in place. The Marine Corps needs to develop
baseline service doctrine that will address the requirements and restrictions
attendant to intelligence operations in a coalition environment. When the Marine
Corps conducts the semi-annual Mission Area Analysis (MAA) of the intelligence
functions, subject matter experts should consider coalition impacts when
formulating potential requirements for doctrinal, organization, training, equipment,
and support corrections and opportunities. The Marine Corps can not retreat into a
parochial and unilateral shell and expect to remain a responsive and viable force in
an era of multinational involvement. To do so invites learning through mistakes
and failures rather than concerted foresight.
1 The failure of the intelligence community to promptly detect and warn
national authorities of the North Korean threat created additional offices within
DIA as well as refine intelligence estimates.
2 Numerous books have been written on the British ability to read the
communications of the German high command, codeword ULTRA. The books
highlight not only the contribution of ULTRA to various campaigns but also the
steps that occurred when the British decided to share the secret with their U.S.
3 General Robert W. RisCassi, USA, Doctrine for Joint Operations in a
Combined Environment, Military Review (Nov 93), 20.
4 Terry J. Pudas, Preparing Future Coalition Commanders, FJQ, Joint Force
Quarterly no 3 (Winter 93-94), 41.
5 Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces: Joint Warfare is Team
Warfare, National Defense University Press, 11 November 1991, 41.
6 The alliances the U.S. has been a part of have been successful as they have
not been challenged with the actual conduct of war.
7 Maj. John D. Becker, USA, "Combined and Coalition Warfighting: The
American Experience", U.S. Army, Military Review, Nov 93, 25.
8 Brassey's (US), Inc., International Military and Defense Encyclopedia,
Washington, New York, 1993, 117.
9 Maj. Jeffery W. Yeager, U.S. Army, Coalition Warfare: Surrendering
Sovereignty, Military Review, Nov 93. 52.
10 MajGen Waldo D. Freeman, US Army; Cdr Randall J. Hess, U.S. Navy;
and LtCol Manuel Faria, Portuguese Army, The Challenges of Combined
Operations, Military Review (Nov 92), 8.
11 MajGen Waldo D. Freeman, US Army; Cdr Randall J. Hess, U.S. Navy;
and LtCol Manuel Faria, Portuguese Army, The Challenges of Combined
Operations, Military Review (Nov 92), 7-8.
12 J Thompson Strong, The Defense Intelligence Community in The Military
Intelligence Community, Gerald W. Hopple and Bruce W. Watson, ed al, (Boulder
and London: Westview Press 1986), 17.
13 The OSS was created, along with a Joint Intelligence Center, to serve the
intelligence needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the outset of WW II in 1942. The
OSS focus was to assure the intelligence assets were mutually supportive and not
14 The DCI is ultimately responsible for protecting intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure per the National Security Act of 1947.
DoD typically provides sanitization guidance to the services through the issuance
of DoD instructions. Current DoD instructions do not include sanitization
guidance for release to foreign entities.
15 Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine For Intelligence Support to Operations,
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 12 October 1993), VIII-2.
16 Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine For Intelligence Support to Operations,
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 12 October 1993), VIII-3.
17 The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), cited in the
doctrine, was initially developed to overcome imagery requirements. The
capabilities of the MISS have availed it to satisfy more robust requirements and
communications tether between intelligence agencies. The combination of JWICS
and JDISS provide secure, high-speed, multimedia transmission for the
dissemination of intelligence.
18 While the JDISS is not a service system the Marine Corps Intelligence
Analysis System (IAS) can be loaded with JDISS software. The MEF IAS, which
includes a 5-D processor for imagery, can functionally provide the same level of
functionality as a JDISS if provided the sufficient bandwidth. Loading of JDISS
software onto IAS would reduce the number of IAS workstations available to the
19 Joint Pub 2-01, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Chapter VI, on Security,
SECRET NOFORN, Washington, DC: Department of Defense proposed
20 (S/NF) Joint Pub 2-01, VI-5.
21 (S/NF) Joint Pub 2-01, VI-2.
22 (S/NF) Joint Pub 2-01, VI-7-8.
23 (S/NF) Joint Pub 2-01, VI-5.
24 ARCENT provided liaison teams to Joint Forces Command-North (JFC-N)
and JFC-E (east).
25 Yates, Mark B., LtCol., Coalition Warfare in Desert Storm. Military
Review (Oct 93), 50.
26 The communications connectivity between I MEF and their liaison team
assigned to Arab forces was via a voice net. While the communications path was
capable of providing time critical intelligence, the majority of sharing of
intelligence between I MEF and Arab forces was handled through courier. Mike Decker,
Deputy Assistant COS, CIS, HQMC. Interview, SECRET, by author, 30 Dec 1994.
27 Ed Valentine, DIAC, DIA Rep to CINCCENT during Desert Shield/Storm.
Phone interview by author, 9 Feb 1995.
28 DOD 5105.21-M-2. "SCI Security Manual, COMINT Policy, " TS/SI, July
1985 and DOD 5105.21-M-3. "SCI Security Manual, TK Policy, " TS/SI/SAO,
November 1985 contain policy and guidance for sanitization authority of SCI. The
guidance does not include consideration of multinational forces and confined to
U.S. only forces. Automatic sanitization authorization is also delineated for
certain conditions and not always available.
29 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Pursuant to Title
V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits
Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 92, 340.
30 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Pursuant to Title
V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits
Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 92, 342.
31 DIA increased intelligence processing capabilities by activating an
Intelligence Task Force (ITF) in the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC)
and through augmenting the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC) at the
Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC), Bolling Air Force Base, DC.
Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Pursuant to Title V of
the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act
of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 92, appendix C, 335.
32 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim
Report to Congress, Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental
Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), 15-4.
33 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim
Report to Congress, Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental
Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), 22-1.
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Desert Storm, Foreign Disclosures Branch, Foreign Exchanges and Disclosure
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