UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!

Intelligence

Intelligence In Coalition Operations

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE IN COALITION OPERATIONS

by

Roger R. Royston., 514-60-5003

Major, USMC

Research Paper submitted to the Faculty

of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and

do not reflect the official policy or position of the

Department of Defense or the U.S. Government

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Intelligence in Coalition Operations

Author: Major Roger R. Royston, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The Marine Corps is not adequately considering the impact of coalition

warfare on tactical intelligence requirements and can not accomplish coordination

tasks without an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure.

Background: The intelligence community often makes changes to its structure

and or policies due to deficiencies or failures that come to light during a conflict.

The Gulf War highlighted shortfalls in the intelligence community's ability to

quickly establish cooperative intelligence arrangements between the foreign forces

that make up a multinational coalition. In 1993, the Department of Defense

published Joint Doctrine that established an intelligence architecture which fulfills

requirements for the coordination and sharing of intelligence between

multinational forces. The Department of Defense is also creating Joint Doctrine

that establishes guidelines and delineates authority for the sanitization of

intelligence for release to foreign forces. The current and developing doctrine

only address functional requirements down to the CINC level. The tactical

commander will also have to interact with and fulfill coordination requirements

with foreign forces. By exclusion, the current doctrine places limitations and

restriction on the tactical commander in the functional area of intelligence

operations. The Marine Corps has not created any doctrine which recognizes

these restrictions and fully considers the implications of operational employment

with foreign forces. By not considering the likelihood of coalition operations, the

Marine Corps may discover tactical intelligence shortfalls through failure rather

than by foresight.

Recommendations: The Marine Corps should write service doctrine that will

address the requirements and restrictions attendant to intelligence operations in a

coalition environment. Additionally, when the Marine Corps conducts the

semi-annual Mission Area Analysis (MAA) on intelligence functions, subject

matter experts should consider coalition impacts when formulating potential

requirements for doctrinal, organization, training, equipment, and support

corrections and opportunities.

Intelligence in Coalition Operations

After World War II, the United States began developing an intelligence

community to address and overcome shortfalls highlighted by the surprise

bombing of Pearl Harbor. The National Security Act of 1947 began the formal

establishment of a cohesive intelligence community that has continually matured

through expansion of organizations, creation of agencies, adjustments in

responsibilities, and the refinement of procedures. As with the creation of the

community, many of the substantial changes that have occurred were driven by

changes in technology and often determined through failures rather than

forethought and analysis.1 The intelligence community is currently pursuing

correctional changes in the area of sharing intelligence between U.S. and foreign

military forces that are part of an ad hoc coalition.

The basic requirement for sharing intelligence with foreign forces is not a new

concept and was a highlighted attribute to U.S. and British efforts during WW II.2

The community and services still routinely share intelligence with foreign services

but within the confines of well established alliances. The most notable exchanges

occur within alliances that represent national commitment and include the forward

deployment of U.S. forces, such as in the bi-lateral relationship with Korea. The

principles and procedures for sharing intelligence in alliances typically have a

regional focus and did not require or create institutional procedures within service

or joint doctrine. More relative, the intelligence community did not use the

experience gained in alliances as a foundation for considering requirements in

ad-hoc coalition operations.3 As a result of this oversight, the coalition force

created for the conduct of the Gulf War did not have an established pre-planned

system or mechanism to release essential intelligence information to coalition

partners accept for traditional allies.4 Despite ultimate success, once again the

intelligence community needed to make changes and adjustments because of

failing to anticipate a likely event; ad hoc coalition warfare. To avoid potential

failures within tactical intelligence, the Marine Corps must consider implications

of a coalition environment. Marine Corps consideration necessitates a participant

understanding in emerging doctrinal fixes contained in existing and developing

Joint Doctrine.

Ad Hoc Coalition.

Department of Defense efforts embrace the assumption that future conflicts, in

which the United States will become involved, will most likely be bilateral or

multinational rather than unilateral. This assumption is echoed in Joint Pub I

which states;

There is a good probability that any military operations undertaken

by the United States of America will have multinational aspects, so

extensive is the network of alliances, friendships, and mutual

interests established by our nation around the world.5

Since the Revolutionary War, the assumption of coalition involvement holds true

as the major conflicts the Unites States participated did not take the form of

unilateral actions.6 The end of the cold war further reduces the probability that the

United States will enter a significant unilateral conflict. With the demise of the

Soviet Union and the United States remaining as the sole military superpower it is

not likely that we will conduct a unilateral use of military forces due to political

sensitivities. It is a fair assumption that any significant military operations

involving the United States will most likely be with allies as part of a combined or

coalition force.7 Although the services have maintained experience through

participation in alliances, the characteristics of an ad hoc coalition require

additional considerations.

Coordination.

A coalition is a term that is often applied to relationships formed expressly for

prosecution of a war or conflict that has already begun. More precisely, coalitions

are wartime associations. Desert Shield demonstrates this trait as the political and

military relationships that defined the coalition were not established until after Iraq

attacked Kuwait. Coalitions are generally characterized as an ad hoc relationship

since they are reactive in nature and created to fight a particular war or counter a

specific threat. Although the relationship is temporary, an effective coalition still

requires cooperative arrangements, to include sharing of intelligence. To establish

cooperative arrangements, coalitions often attempt to apply the basic principals

used in effective alliances. By definition, a coalition has a narrow focus of effort

that is attendant to the specific purpose and limited time. Given this narrow focus

of effort, nations that are part of the coalition may have opposing interests in many

areas on the peripheral of the main effort.8 This is an important aspect of

coalitions, particularly in considering sharing of intelligence, since ad hoc

alliances do not necessarily generate from nor translate into friendships.

Security.

As a basic premise of the definition of an alliance or coalition, military forces

of nations are still ultimately responsible and accountable to their parent states.

Along with the benefit of an alliance comes substantial drawbacks, the biggest of

which is a loss of complete sovereignty over a nations actions.9 By sharing

intelligence with other nations a state concedes information and potentially

capabilities that would not normally or otherwise be provided. As such, coalitions

often carry a requirement for compromise in the area of the security of a nation's

secrets. Not all nations will bring the same level of robust and technically

sophisticated intelligence capabilities to a cooperative effort. While a coalition

aggregates the capabilities of military forces, the operational cohesion requires

mutually supporting the intelligence capabilities and products provided by

participating nations.10 The nation with the most capable intelligence structure and

resources can expect to compromise more since they will provide more than they

receive in return. This can be especially true when a coalition includes third world

countries that can neither sustain nor support development of expensive and

sophisticated collection and processing systems. Despite variances in capabilities

and structure, a coalition should exploit any unique contribution of supporting

nations, often human intelligence, for the common goal of the union of national

efforts.11 A nation will maintain its' sovereignty and security by only providing

intelligence deemed necessary for the conduct of the coalition and by protecting

the sources and methods of intelligence that is shared.

DIA and Security.

When considering intelligence security, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

is one of two key players in coalition operations. When Secretary of Defense

McNamara created the DIA in 1961, to overcome parochial intelligence estimates

from the services, he established a centralized position within the intelligence

community to satisfy DoD interests.12 Similar to the WW II Office of Strategic

Services (OSS), DIA provides a focal point for national and DoD efforts in the

process of collection, production, and dissemination of defense related

intelligence.13 DIA's central position also fulfills DoD's requirements, through

coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), to establish

guidelines and oversight measures to protect intelligence sources and methods

from unauthorized disclosure.

CINC Coordination.

The CINC is the other key player in establishing effective intelligence

operations within an ad hoc coalition. By establishing the CINC as regionally

responsible for projecting national power, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 facilitates orienting the intelligence

community from a global to a regional focus. The CINC fulfills a critical role by

establishing a structure which translates a regional intelligence focus into a

cooperative effort. The CINC established structure and attendant architecture

must also provide a conduit for the flow of intelligence products to coalition

members. It is the combination of recognizing the CINC as a focus of national

effort and the DIA's central position within the intelligence community that allows

bringing to bear the full capabilities of national and theater assets to a regional

coalition conflict.

Joint Doctrine for Dissemination.

As stated earlier, after the conclusion of the Gulf War, the U.S. intelligence

community did not return to its' historical practice of returning to an inward focus

but began to apply the lessons learned from coalition operations. The Department

of Defense first applied lessons learned by adjusting joint doctrine on intelligence

support to operations, Joint Pub 2-0 published in October 1993. The doctrine

depicts two key elements required for effective coordination; a multinational

intelligence architecture and attendant communications structure.15

The development of the multinational intelligence architecture uses the

Coalition Coordination and Communication Integration Center (C3IC), developed

by CINCCENT, as a backdrop for lessons learned. The tether between the joint

doctrine and the C3IC is most readily apparent in reviewing the principles cited for

consideration when dealing with multinational forces as part of coalition

operations.

Adjust National Differences Among Nations

Unity of Effort Against Common Threat

Determining and Planning Intelligence Special Arrangements

Full Exchange of Intelligence Sharing

Complementary Intelligence Operations

Combined Intelligence Center

Liaison Exchange16

Besides reaffirming responsibilities of various intelligence agencies, the joint

doctrine specifically addresses the functional linkage between DIA, supported

CINC, and military forces of coalition members. Of service concern, the joint

doctrine does not address the functional role and linkage of the tactical

commanders subordinate to the CINC.

Use of non-service systems.

Supporting the architecture, the doctrine also depicts the communications paths

and methods attendant to the functional responsibilities. Again the document is

tied to and clearly reflects the lessons learned by operations of the C3IC. By

specifying methods of communications the doctrine incorporates the

communication systems and work stations developed to overcome shortfalls noted,

particularly in the dissemination of imagery.17 The document also assists in

organizational planning by citing areas that will likely require courier or liaison

services. As a carryover from the Gulf Conflict, the joint doctrine additionally

focuses on satisfying the CINC's intelligence and processing requirements. The

architecture reflects the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), a

non-service system, as a key element in the dissemination of intelligence which

reinforces a CINC focus.18 While the document does address the potential for the

establishment of a Joint Force Commander, the lowest authoritative level remains

with the CINC. As with the structural architecture, Joint Pub 2-0 does not address

subordinate commands and linkage requirements to service communications

systems.

Joint Doctrine for Sanitization and Security.

A concurrent and ongoing effort is the development of proposed doctrine, Joint

Pub 2-0 1, that addresses the sanitization requirements posed by working as part of

a multinational force. The central theme that runs throughout the document is

providing timely and responsive, yet controlled, intelligence to other members of a

multinational force. The dilemma that the document addresses is being able to

quickly transition from peacetime and working with security manuals to a wartime

position.19 During the Gulf War, DIA developed the DIA Handbook for Analysts

to facilitate sanitization and dissemination of intelligence to the multinational

forces. The handbook also provides the basic format and principles used in the

proposed doctrine. As practiced during Desert Storm, the doctrine separates

responsibility of sanitization and dissemination into two broad areas, based around

national and theater assets.

DIA as focal point.

Within the doctrine, DIA is clearly the designated focal point for sanitization

authority and efforts. DIA's role as a focal point is reinforced by providing the

CINCs with a DIA Guide to Foreign Disclosure and by performing an interaction

function with other intelligence agencies. In seeking to assist the combatant

commander, DIA will work with national level agencies to seek exemptions to

national security policy if required by operational necessity.20 It is likely DIA will

sanitize the collection from national assets and provide appropriately marked

intelligence products tailored to CINC requirements that are releasable to a

multinational force. The basic direction of DIA guidance and efforts is clearly to

remove as much sanitization burden as possible from the CINC.

CINC Authority.

While DIA is the focal point for overall sanitization efforts the CINC is clearly

the responsible agent within a theater. Specifically, the doctrine recognizes the

challenges faced by the CINC's intelligence officer, the J-2, in carrying out

sanitization and dissemination responsibilities. As a guide for the J-2, the doctrine

underscores the fact that a multinational organization can and will create unique

releasability problems. The documents also recognize that J-2s are typically not

knowledgeable and practiced. in the sanitization and release procedures, due to a

lack of practice and peacetime requirements. As a subset, the document points out

that the sharing of US intelligence, while also protecting sources and methods, can

be a key to sustaining a multinational force (MNF).21 The specific considerations

listed for the J2 are: "(1) eligibility of recipient countries; (2) need to know; (3)

gain outweigh risks; (4) level of control necessary; and (5) organization receiving

afford some protection."22 The driving point behind these considerations is that

the combatant commander is ultimately responsible and accountable for the release

of intelligence to foreign forces. While the document provides various

considerations, the DIA Guide to Foreign Disclosure, provided to each combatant

commander, gives specific guidance to the CINC's J-2.23 The CINC's intelligence

staff will use the guide in executing sanitization and dissemination authority to

protect the sources and methods of intelligence gathered primarily from theater

resources. Probably the majority of the sanitization efforts of the combatant

commander will be executed under the auspices of the DIA representative on the

CINC's staff.

Tactical coordination with foreign forces.

Current and developing doctrine is oriented around the in theater

responsibilities of the CINC to provide a centralized effort of a multinational force

which appropriately includes a responsive level of intelligence support. The

documents do not address the need for the cooperative and coordination

requirements that will exist below the combatant commander. Tactical

commanders below the CINC can and should anticipate they will either have

forces from different nations attached or adjacent to their command. In either case

the tactical commander should plan for coordination requirements that include

sharing of intelligence.

Liaison and communication.

Per doctrinal considerations, the combatant commander will provide liaison

teams to multinational commands below the staff levels that are directly linked

within a CINC level architecture, as practiced in Desert Storm.24 These teams

consist of S2 through S4 staff elements and supported by a robust signal element.

Although they possess a signal element, the teams will not focus solely on

providing intelligence support redundant to higher levels of coordination. As these

liaison teams will address a CINC's efforts, the tactical commander will need to

provide complementary assets at almost every level of command. Additionally,

cooperative integration of the CINC's and tactical commander's liaison teams is

necessary to attain unity and preclude the potential for contradictory efforts.25

Beside providing support in flank coordination and experience in operations above

brigade level, the teams will naturally function as a conduit for critical intelligence

on the enemy equal to that available to U.S. forces. While passing of time critical

combat intelligence is an inherent capability, the communication capabilities of

liaison teams are usually not so robust that they can fully replicate the various

functional nets within a communication architecture.26 To prevent intelligence

shortfalls, the tactical commander must also anticipate having to share unique and

tactical intelligence products not exchanged by the liaison elements at higher

headquarters.

Foreign Service Communication.

Although doctrine now describes and addresses a structural conduit for

intelligence to multinational forces at the CINC level, the communications

structure of coalition partners will not always be responsive to their subordinate

units. This may force the interaction of tactical commanders with adjacent forces,

both directly and through liaison personnel to include provision of intelligence

material that is marked and ready for release to multination forces is dependent

on the senior agencies with components confined to instructions for

dissemination.27 The procedures for creating external markings and related

dissemination instructions allows the tactical commander to quickly relay marked

material to foreign forces with minimal administrative burdens. If not anticipated

and pre-planned, the commander may also find the throughput requirements will

quickly exceed a typical liaison communications architecture.

Confined sanitization.

As stated earlier, tactical commanders are not automatically given the

sanitization authority that includes the release of intelligence product to

multinational forces but are rather given dissemination guidance for product

received. Department of Defense documents currently restrict service components

to sanitization guidance and authority that is confined to single service or joint

operations.28 The lack of authorization for the tactical commander must therefore

presume one of two scenarios. Either the intelligence flow from higher authorities

is sufficient for expected coalition and U.S. interaction or interaction is not

anticipated. The tactical commander does have some authority to release

intelligence to coalition partners but the authority is conditional and only applies

to combat critical intelligence of a fleeting nature. By strict interpretation, the

conditional authority precludes foreign forces from viewing any unmarked tactical

intelligence used in initial planning prior to engagement of forces. Developing

doctrine highlights the requirement for appropriately marked material.

Specifically, the doctrine reaffirms a basic security principle that intelligence not

marked with the no foreign (NOFORN) caveat does equal releaseability criteria.

Limited by higher echelons.

Without sanitization authority, that includes the release to multinational forces,

the tactical commander is reliant upon the services of higher echelons of

command. As described earlier, DIA and the CINC intelligence structures conduct

the sanitization of intelligence products. In providing the in-theater service, the

CINC's Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) will likely orient its' efforts to create

products that satisfy CINC requirements. In many areas the JIC products will still

accommodate tactical requirements, such as establishing of enemy force lay

downs. JIC products should also encompass any tactical requirements, previously

submitted to higher authorities, that are beyond the capabilities of organic assets.

What it may exclude are those requirements of interest solely of the tactical

commander that are satisfied by the collection efforts of organic assets.

CINC oriented product.

The tactical commander should always anticipate that there will be competition

for scarce tactical, theater, and national resources in intelligence operations. To

complement organic collection and to fill intelligence gaps, the tactical commander

will have to request intelligence support from theater and national systems. While

requested support may be validated, the tactical commander's submitted

requirements typically fall low on the CINC's priority list. Many of the tactical

commanders requirements will not be satisfied due to their relative low priority

coupled with limited theater and national systems available for tasking.29 This will

confine the tactical commander to working with sanitized intelligence derived

from CINC tasking and tailored to support the CINC. This was the case in Deserts

Storm where the intelligence that was generated to support the CINC was too

broad to fulfill the level of detail needed for tactical planning, with the exception

of targeting templates.30 While subordinate tactical U.S. commanders will receive

the tailored and sanitized intelligence, the received product may not contribute to

tactical planning and of little shared value to coalition partners.

Evoke combat essential authority.

The tactical commander must strive to fill all of his intelligence and

coordination requirements through organic resources if products received from

higher echelons are not responsive. If successful, the tactical commander does not

possess the guidance to process, track, and mark locally generated products for

release to coalition partners. Many of the intelligence products that serve the

interests of the tactical commander are also of interest and beneficial to an

adjacent or subordinate coalition unit. Without the availability of senior

headquarters processing, the only resources a tactical commander has is to either

withhold the intelligence or consider it at combat essential. In either regard, the

mechanism to account for and track what and what is not released to coalition

partners will not be a part of normal procedures or practices.

National & Theater Support.

A combinations of reliance and ready access to national theater produced

intelligence may compound a tactical commander's dilemma in whether to release

unmarked intelligence or protect national capabilities. The contribution and

relative dependence upon national theater assets is not new and a highlight of the

Persian Gulf Conflict. In response to CINC intelligence requirements, the

intelligence community will quickly orient available assets and staffs to focus on a

given threat. While supporting agencies will undoubtedly have to make some

internal adjustments, the doctrinal linkage between the intelligence community

through DIA to supported a CINC eases the flow and responsiveness of

intelligence support.31 The doctrinal inclusion of an architecture, that overcomes

communications deficiencies, further supports timely transmission of intelligence,

to include participation within a newly formed coalition. As national and theater

resources continue to improve through technological development it is logical to

assume responsible agencies will continue to recognize and exploit improvements

in capabilities to support a CINC.

Improvements in connectivity and responsiveness.

Efforts to improve national and theater asset connectivity and responsiveness to

warfighting elements, to both command structures and weapons systems,

compliments recognition of their potential contribution. The ultimate goal is a

capability for intelligence sensors to provide processed information directly to the

shooter. Even if attained, the information must still be provided to activities that

support military planners, to include tactical commanders. It is also logical to

assume intelligence activities that support military planners are the first areas that

will benefit from development efforts. Information received directly from sensors

is not generally considered finished and evaluated product. Technological

developments that improve the flow of information from national and theater

sources will also bypass the funnel of sanitization conducted by higher

headquarters.

Risk of unauthorized disclosure.

As the tactical commander gains access to more intelligence the risk for

unauthorized disclosure increases. The intelligence community should expect that

operational considerations for the safety of the coalition as a whole will drive a

less concerted effort to track all bits of intelligence that are passed by the

components. As a byproduct, only the DIA and CINC staffs that conduct

sanitization will, in essence, be able to account for intelligence shared with a

multinational force. Components will likely confine their efforts to assuring that

hardcopy intelligence passed to coalition partners bear appropriate markings and

will attempt to sanitize organic products to an appropriate level during briefs

attended by coalition members. The intelligence community should not arbitrarily

expect components to structure or organize their staffs to account for a level of

dissemination control which is beyond their scope of authority. Many of the

disclosures are not confined to intelligence sources and methods but include

information gained from simply operating as part of a coalition force. Foreign

intelligence forces of a coalition can easily gain and potentially exploit intelligence

on operational capabilities, tactics, techniques, and limitations to include areas of

intelligence.32 Observing U.S. forces in the execution of doctrine, and technology,

available through sharing intelligence, provides information and effectiveness of

U.S. intelligence capabilities.33 The danger of fully demonstrating or providing

examples of U.S. intelligence characteristics and capabilities is in other

intelligence agencies using the information to establish, refine, and advance their

own military capabilities and planning in such a way that it minimizes the

effectiveness of U.S. intelligence capabilities. Regardless of the inherent future

danger of working as part of a coalition, the Gulf War clearly demonstrates that

the intelligence community must fully prepare to conduct operations as part of a

coalition.

DOTES.

The structure and documentation created to support coalition considerations

revolve around both DIA and the supported combatant commander. With the

overall focus of national and theater assets as well as sanitization authority

directed towards the CINC, subordinate components are somewhat restricted to

what is provided by higher echelons of command. By confining

institutionalization of the lessons learned from the Gulf War, the potential exists to

not consider future developments and more active involvement by service

components.

The Marine Corps currently evaluates various functional areas on a bi-annual

basis by conducting a Mission Area Analysis (MAA) lead by subject matter

experts. The MAA uses a concept which considers the elements of doctrine,

organization, training, equipment, and support (DOTES) as a basis to how best

achieve operational and functional requirements and resolve identified shortfalls.

To fully address future requirements, the application of the DOTES concept must

go beyond own service and joint considerations. The analysis on the functional

area of intelligence must also recognize and acknowledge the impact of coalition

operations. An important aspect in using the DOTES acronym, in addressing

functional requirements, is attaining symmetry among the various elements.

Symmetry must not only be obtained within a service but also with joint and

national efforts as well as expected operational employment.

Doctrine.

If Marine Corps doctrine on intelligence operations consider coalitions, it must

reflect constraints imposed by limits reflected in joint doctrine. A current

reflection will recognize that the CINC is a key element in providing intelligence

within a multinational force. Without significant changes, the doctrine must also

reflect that component should not expect sanitization authority that allows release

of products to foreign forces. In execution of an operation this situation either

limits component interaction with multinational forces or creates a dilemma on

how to deal with classified intelligence obtained from organic resources. As seen

in the Gulf War, the Marine Corps can and should expect to interact with adjacent

coalition forces. By not having sanitization guidance and authority the current and

developing joint doctrine restricts tactical commanders to exercising unguided

authority as well as placing limits on support to planning requirements.34 Lack of

a systematic sanitization process that recognizes a multinational force caveat will

also inhibit accountability of what intelligence was released to coalition partners to

assess potential disclosures damaging to future operations. The doctrinal

adjustments of intelligence architectures to accommodate coalition requirements

also impose adjustments in the organizational portion of DOTES.

Organization.

The organizational impacts of coalition warfare can be twofold. While a

service component may not have a requirement for an integrated combined staff

the headquarters elements may have to accommodate visits by coalition members

to include areas which reflect intelligence awareness of the enemy. During the

Gulf War, the SCIF was the predominate exclusion area not accessible by coalition

members. Whether self imposed or planned, the organization impact can include

both personnel and material required to monitor and control the degree that a units

staff structure is open to coalition partners. If the sanitization for release to

coalition forces is confined to a DoD and CINC JIC, the requirements are

primarily document control and accounting. As the intelligence moves toward

automated systems for processing and passing of intelligence to subordinate units,

the function may still require additional manpower for a system that will most

likely require a robust courier service. Thus, even if a component command does

not expand it's intelligence processing functions to include sanitization for release

to multinational forces there will be additional burdens on staff functions.

The second organizational impact would be 'in the knowledgeable processing of

intelligence, whether organic, theater, or national, for release to a coalition. While

DIA has a standing organizational structure chartered and familiar with

sanitization of intelligence for release to foreign military forces, the services do

not. The sanitization of intelligence by higher headquarters will most likely rely

on communications paths rather than forwarding of experienced teams.

organizational adjustment to serve component commands could be obtained

through realignment in the major force program (MFP). The Marine Corps, as

well as other services, have billets that fall under the MFP III whose manpower

costs are programmed and paid for by the DCI, vice the representative service. A

realignment of billets to allow for active analyst participation in DIA's foreign

disclosure branch would establish a deployable cadre of experience for wartime

augmentation. The attainment of experience in ad hoc coalitions is possibly the

most difficult and embraces the training subset of DOTES.

Training.

The closest training for coalitions in a real-world environment is through

participation in alliances. Exposure to intelligence operations within an alliance

allows for exposure to established practices and procedures developed to ensure

effective intelligence sharing. While the exposure is beneficial, it only tends to

reinforce the tenets embraced by the developing doctrine on multinational

coalitions. A more effective training measure requires going through the process

to create capabilities and relationships that are not resident at the outset of an

operation. A more effective training mechanism for coalition operations is an

expansion of the political-military exercises that are currently participated in by

the MEFs. The majority of these exercises are focused on integration of combat

power to the exclusion of intelligence. While intelligence will be included it is

typically canned to facilitate operational maneuver within a limited time frame.

Equipment.

The area that has the most potential for unplanned impact on coalition is in the

area of equipment. One of the lessons of effective intelligence is that

"...development of new weapons systems must be planned in a way that ensures

that they will not require more intelligence support than will be available."35 A

comparison is citing operational employment and interaction with forces from

other nations must be planned in a way that ensures that they will not require more

intelligence support than will be available. To meet these ends, the current

development of intelligence systems are striving toward an architecture that will

allow for "sensor to shooter" support. While this may be an eventual reality for

particular types of intelligence, the most likely intermediate achievement will be

sensor to intelligence producer, to include the intelligence staffs of components.

As technology and communications capabilities attain this level of interaction the

DoD and CINC JIC processing of national and theater collection will become

more transparent to component commanders. For the sanitization of intelligence,

the potential and risk of disclosure of capabilities will increase as the

filtering system of a pyramid hierarchy, that excludes components, begin to flatten. The

most apparent application of equipment adjustment which can reflect the

consideration of coalitions is in the area of intelligence analysis and processing,

such as the Intelligence Analysis System (IAS). If coalition considerations are an

inherent part of system development the system may be develop with a product

that is in concert with dissemination limitations imposed by security constraints.

Support.

As mentioned under discussion of doctrinal implications, the infrastructure

required to accommodate coalition considerations may expand material

requirements. The majority of current service Standard Operating Procedures only

consider parent units and unilateral requirements. Accommodation of coalition

forces while providing access control to intelligence facilities will require

additional structures to a command post.

Conclusion.

Over the past fifty years the U.S. intelligence community has matured to the

point that it acknowledges and is beginning to address intelligence requirements

attendant to ad hoc coalition conflicts. Current efforts to protect sources and

methods while allowing for mission execution tend to limit the active involvement

of forces below the combatant commander. The Marine Corps role as an

expeditionary force and probable Joint Task Force involvement mandates

consideration of the implications of coalitions to intelligence operations. If not

planned, ad hoc efforts to protect sources and methods will impede overall

intelligence functions, increase the risk of inadvertent disclosures, and challenge

efforts for material accountability. To totally ignore responsibilities in protecting

sources and methods under the guise of combat essential requirements is a failure

of integrity with potential long term implications in future conflicts. The current

steps taken to address intelligence within coalition operations dictates procedures

that do not develop component internal requirements. To effectively move into the

future with doctrine, organization, equipment, training, and support, the Marine

Corps must consider the implications of coalition conflict to intelligence

operations.

The Marine Corps should work within the intelligence community to either

obtain documented sanitization and dissemination authority at the tactical level or

assure a responsive mechanism is in place. The Marine Corps needs to develop

baseline service doctrine that will address the requirements and restrictions

attendant to intelligence operations in a coalition environment. When the Marine

Corps conducts the semi-annual Mission Area Analysis (MAA) of the intelligence

functions, subject matter experts should consider coalition impacts when

formulating potential requirements for doctrinal, organization, training, equipment,

and support corrections and opportunities. The Marine Corps can not retreat into a

parochial and unilateral shell and expect to remain a responsive and viable force in

an era of multinational involvement. To do so invites learning through mistakes

and failures rather than concerted foresight.

1 The failure of the intelligence community to promptly detect and warn

national authorities of the North Korean threat created additional offices within

DIA as well as refine intelligence estimates.

2 Numerous books have been written on the British ability to read the

communications of the German high command, codeword ULTRA. The books

highlight not only the contribution of ULTRA to various campaigns but also the

steps that occurred when the British decided to share the secret with their U.S.

allies.

3 General Robert W. RisCassi, USA, Doctrine for Joint Operations in a

Combined Environment, Military Review (Nov 93), 20.

4 Terry J. Pudas, Preparing Future Coalition Commanders, FJQ, Joint Force

Quarterly no 3 (Winter 93-94), 41.

5 Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces: Joint Warfare is Team

Warfare, National Defense University Press, 11 November 1991, 41.

6 The alliances the U.S. has been a part of have been successful as they have

not been challenged with the actual conduct of war.

7 Maj. John D. Becker, USA, "Combined and Coalition Warfighting: The

American Experience", U.S. Army, Military Review, Nov 93, 25.

8 Brassey's (US), Inc., International Military and Defense Encyclopedia,

Washington, New York, 1993, 117.

9 Maj. Jeffery W. Yeager, U.S. Army, Coalition Warfare: Surrendering

Sovereignty, Military Review, Nov 93. 52.

10 MajGen Waldo D. Freeman, US Army; Cdr Randall J. Hess, U.S. Navy;

and LtCol Manuel Faria, Portuguese Army, The Challenges of Combined

Operations, Military Review (Nov 92), 8.

11 MajGen Waldo D. Freeman, US Army; Cdr Randall J. Hess, U.S. Navy;

and LtCol Manuel Faria, Portuguese Army, The Challenges of Combined

Operations, Military Review (Nov 92), 7-8.

12 J Thompson Strong, The Defense Intelligence Community in The Military

Intelligence Community, Gerald W. Hopple and Bruce W. Watson, ed al, (Boulder

and London: Westview Press 1986), 17.

13 The OSS was created, along with a Joint Intelligence Center, to serve the

intelligence needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the outset of WW II in 1942. The

OSS focus was to assure the intelligence assets were mutually supportive and not

independent efforts.

14 The DCI is ultimately responsible for protecting intelligence sources and

methods from unauthorized disclosure per the National Security Act of 1947.

DoD typically provides sanitization guidance to the services through the issuance

of DoD instructions. Current DoD instructions do not include sanitization

guidance for release to foreign entities.

15 Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine For Intelligence Support to Operations,

(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 12 October 1993), VIII-2.

16 Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine For Intelligence Support to Operations,

(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 12 October 1993), VIII-3.

17 The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), cited in the

doctrine, was initially developed to overcome imagery requirements. The

capabilities of the MISS have availed it to satisfy more robust requirements and

communications tether between intelligence agencies. The combination of JWICS

and JDISS provide secure, high-speed, multimedia transmission for the

dissemination of intelligence.

18 While the JDISS is not a service system the Marine Corps Intelligence

Analysis System (IAS) can be loaded with JDISS software. The MEF IAS, which

includes a 5-D processor for imagery, can functionally provide the same level of

functionality as a JDISS if provided the sufficient bandwidth. Loading of JDISS

software onto IAS would reduce the number of IAS workstations available to the

MEF commander.

19 Joint Pub 2-01, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Chapter VI, on Security,

SECRET NOFORN, Washington, DC: Department of Defense proposed

publication, VI-1.

20 (S/NF) Joint Pub 2-01, VI-5.

21 (S/NF) Joint Pub 2-01, VI-2.

22 (S/NF) Joint Pub 2-01, VI-7-8.

23 (S/NF) Joint Pub 2-01, VI-5.

24 ARCENT provided liaison teams to Joint Forces Command-North (JFC-N)

and JFC-E (east).

25 Yates, Mark B., LtCol., Coalition Warfare in Desert Storm. Military

Review (Oct 93), 50.

26 The communications connectivity between I MEF and their liaison team

assigned to Arab forces was via a voice net. While the communications path was

capable of providing time critical intelligence, the majority of sharing of

intelligence between I MEF and Arab forces was handled through courier. Mike Decker,

Deputy Assistant COS, CIS, HQMC. Interview, SECRET, by author, 30 Dec 1994.

27 Ed Valentine, DIAC, DIA Rep to CINCCENT during Desert Shield/Storm.

Phone interview by author, 9 Feb 1995.

28 DOD 5105.21-M-2. "SCI Security Manual, COMINT Policy, " TS/SI, July

1985 and DOD 5105.21-M-3. "SCI Security Manual, TK Policy, " TS/SI/SAO,

November 1985 contain policy and guidance for sanitization authority of SCI. The

guidance does not include consideration of multinational forces and confined to

U.S. only forces. Automatic sanitization authorization is also delineated for

certain conditions and not always available.

29 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Pursuant to Title

V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits

Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 92, 340.

30 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Pursuant to Title

V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits

Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 92, 342.

31 DIA increased intelligence processing capabilities by activating an

Intelligence Task Force (ITF) in the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC)

and through augmenting the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC) at the

Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC), Bolling Air Force Base, DC.

Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Pursuant to Title V of

the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act

of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 92, appendix C, 335.

32 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim

Report to Congress, Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental

Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), 15-4.

33 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim

Report to Congress, Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental

Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), 22-1.

34 Defense Intelligence Agency, Foreign Disclosure Handbook for Analyst-

Desert Storm, Foreign Disclosures Branch, Foreign Exchanges and Disclosure

Division, Directorate for External Relations. SECRET NOFORN, Defense

Intelligence Agency December 1990, 4.

35 Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allen E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for

American National Security, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,

1989), 180.

Bibliography

Books:

Bamford, James. The Puzzle Palace. Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1982.

Berkowitz, Bruce D. and Goodman, Allen. Strategic Intelligence for American

National Security. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,

1989.

Calvacoressi, Peter. TOP SECRET ULTRA. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.

D'Este, Carlo. Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome. New York, NY:

Harper Collins Publishers, 1992.

Doll, William J., and Steven Metz. The Army and Multi-national Peace

Operations: Problems and Solutions. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 29, 1993, 27 pp.

Dupuy, Trevor., Col., USA Rd ed., et al. International Military and Defense

Encyclopedia. Washington, DC: Brassey's 1993.

Hopple, Gerald., and Bruce W. Watson ed., et al. The Military Intelligence

Community. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986.

Komer, R. W.. Needed: Preparation for Coalition War. Santa Monica, CA:

Rand Corporation, P-507, August 1976, 2.

Lowenthal, Mark M.. U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy. Westport, CT:

2nd Ed, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Praeger Publishers,

1992.

Newsome, Thomas L., Jr.. Cause and Effect of the 1971 Reorganization of the

US Intelligence Community. Air War College, Air University United

States Air Force Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, No 5708. April 1975.

Winterbotham, F.W. The ULTP,4 Secret., New York, San Francisco, London:

Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974.

White Paper: Intelligence Support To Operations Other Than War. Carlisle

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1993, 33 pp.

Defense Intelligence Agencey. Foreign Disclosure Handbook for Analysts-

Desert Storm, Washington, DC: Foreign Disclosure Branch, Foreign

Exchanges and Disclosure Division, directorate for External Relations,

SECRET NOFORN, December 1990.

Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support To Operations.

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 12 October 1993.

Joint Pub 2-01, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Chapter VI Security. Washington,

DC: Department of Defense, proposed publicatons.

Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, Washington, DC:

Department of Defense, 11 November 1991

DOD 5105.2 1 -M-2. "SCI Security Manual, COMBINE Policy, " TS/SI,

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 1985.

DOD 5105.2 1 -M-3. "SCI Security Manual, TK Policy, " TS/SI/SAO, Washington,

DC: Department of Defense, November 1985.

Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel

Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), Conduct of the Persian Gulf

War: Final Report to Congress. April 1992.

Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel

Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), Conduct of the Persian Gulf

War: An Interim Report to Congress. April 1992.

Periodicals:

Baker, James H. Policy Challenges of UN Peace Operations Parameters, Vol. 1

(Spring 1994) 13-26.

Becker, John. Combined and Coalition Warfighting: The American Experience.

Military Review (Nov 93) 25-29.

Campen, Alan D., Col., USAF (Ret.). Intelligence Leads Renaissance In Military

Thinking Signal Volume 48, Number 12, (August 94) 17-18.

Clapper, James R., Challenging Joint Military Intelligence. Joint Force Quarterly

no 4 (Spring 1994) 92-99.

Dixon, Anne M., The Whats and Whys of Coalitions Joint Force Quarterly

(Winter 1993-94) 26-28.

Dougherty, William A., Vice Admiral. Storm From Space. Naval Institute

Proceeding 118 no 8 (Aug 92) 48-52.

Freeman, Waldo D., MajGen., USA., Hess, Radall J., Cdr., USN, & Faria,

Manuel., LtCol.,Portuguese Army., The Challenges of Combined

Operations. Military Review (Nov 1992) 2-10.

Michaelis, Marc., LtCol., US Army., The Importance of Communications in

Coalition Warfare. Military Review (Nov 1992) 40-50.

Pudas, Terry. Preparing Future Coalition Commanders. Joint Force Quarterly

(Winter 1994-94) 40-46.

RisCassi, Robert W., Gen., U.S. Army. Doctrine for Joint Operation in a

Combined Environment A Necessity, Military Review (June 1993) 20-37.

Smith, Jeffrey H. and Ryan, Daniel J. Commission Advocates Risk Management

to Meet Changing World Conditions Signal Volume 48, number 10,

(Jun 94) 59-61.

Yates, Mark B., LtCol., Coalition Warfare in Desert Storm. Military Review

(Oct 93), 46-52.

Yeager, Jeffery W., Maj. Coalition Warfare: Surrendering Sovereignty. Military

Review (November 1992) 51-63.

Interviews:

Decker, Mike. Deputy Assistant COS, CIS, HQMC. Interview, SECRET, by

author, 30 Dec 1994.

Dolan, Karen., Analyst at Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Quantico, VA.

Interview, SECRET, by author, 12 Jan 1994.

Moran, Mrs., DIA Foreign Disclosure PSF-2. Interview, SECRET, by author, 3

Feb 1995.

Moser, Michael D., GySgt., I MEF SSO Chief Interview, SECRET, by author, 16

Dec 1994.

Valentine, Ed. DIAC, DIA Rep to CINCCENT during Desert Shield/Storm.

Phone interview by author, 9 Feb 1995.

Click here to view image




Intelligence In Coalition Operations

Intelligence In Coalition Operations

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE IN COALITION OPERATIONS

by

Roger R. Royston., 514-60-5003

Major, USMC

Research Paper submitted to the Faculty

of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and

do not reflect the official policy or position of the

Department of Defense or the U.S. Government

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Intelligence in Coalition Operations

Author: Major Roger R. Royston, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The Marine Corps is not adequately considering the impact of coalition

warfare on tactical intelligence requirements and can not accomplish coordination

tasks without an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure.

Background: The intelligence community often makes changes to its structure

and or policies due to deficiencies or failures that come to light during a conflict.

The Gulf War highlighted shortfalls in the intelligence community's ability to

quickly establish cooperative intelligence arrangements between the foreign forces

that make up a multinational coalition. In 1993, the Department of Defense

published Joint Doctrine that established an intelligence architecture which fulfills

requirements for the coordination and sharing of intelligence between

multinational forces. The Department of Defense is also creating Joint Doctrine

that establishes guidelines and delineates authority for the sanitization of

intelligence for release to foreign forces. The current and developing doctrine

only address functional requirements down to the CINC level. The tactical

commander will also have to interact with and fulfill coordination requirements

with foreign forces. By exclusion, the current doctrine places limitations and

restriction on the tactical commander in the functional area of intelligence

operations. The Marine Corps has not created any doctrine which recognizes

these restrictions and fully considers the implications of operational employment

with foreign forces. By not considering the likelihood of coalition operations, the

Marine Corps may discover tactical intelligence shortfalls through failure rather

than by foresight.

Recommendations: The Marine Corps should write service doctrine that will

address the requirements and restrictions attendant to intelligence operations in a

coalition environment. Additionally, when the Marine Corps conducts the

semi-annual Mission Area Analysis (MAA) on intelligence functions, subject

matter experts should consider coalition impacts when formulating potential

requirements for doctrinal, organization, training, equipment, and support

corrections and opportunities.

Intelligence in Coalition Operations

After World War II, the United States began developing an intelligence

community to address and overcome shortfalls highlighted by the surprise

bombing of Pearl Harbor. The National Security Act of 1947 began the formal

establishment of a cohesive intelligence community that has continually matured

through expansion of organizations, creation of agencies, adjustments in

responsibilities, and the refinement of procedures. As with the creation of the

community, many of the substantial changes that have occurred were driven by

changes in technology and often determined through failures rather than

forethought and analysis.1 The intelligence community is currently pursuing

correctional changes in the area of sharing intelligence between U.S. and foreign

military forces that are part of an ad hoc coalition.

The basic requirement for sharing intelligence with foreign forces is not a new

concept and was a highlighted attribute to U.S. and British efforts during WW II.2

The community and services still routinely share intelligence with foreign services

but within the confines of well established alliances. The most notable exchanges

occur within alliances that represent national commitment and include the forward

deployment of U.S. forces, such as in the bi-lateral relationship with Korea. The

principles and procedures for sharing intelligence in alliances typically have a

regional focus and did not require or create institutional procedures within service

or joint doctrine. More relative, the intelligence community did not use the

experience gained in alliances as a foundation for considering requirements in

ad-hoc coalition operations.3 As a result of this oversight, the coalition force

created for the conduct of the Gulf War did not have an established pre-planned

system or mechanism to release essential intelligence information to coalition

partners accept for traditional allies.4 Despite ultimate success, once again the

intelligence community needed to make changes and adjustments because of

failing to anticipate a likely event; ad hoc coalition warfare. To avoid potential

failures within tactical intelligence, the Marine Corps must consider implications

of a coalition environment. Marine Corps consideration necessitates a participant

understanding in emerging doctrinal fixes contained in existing and developing

Joint Doctrine.

Ad Hoc Coalition.

Department of Defense efforts embrace the assumption that future conflicts, in

which the United States will become involved, will most likely be bilateral or

multinational rather than unilateral. This assumption is echoed in Joint Pub I

which states;

There is a good probability that any military operations undertaken

by the United States of America will have multinational aspects, so

extensive is the network of alliances, friendships, and mutual

interests established by our nation around the world.5

Since the Revolutionary War, the assumption of coalition involvement holds true

as the major conflicts the Unites States participated did not take the form of

unilateral actions.6 The end of the cold war further reduces the probability that the

United States will enter a significant unilateral conflict. With the demise of the

Soviet Union and the United States remaining as the sole military superpower it is

not likely that we will conduct a unilateral use of military forces due to political

sensitivities. It is a fair assumption that any significant military operations

involving the United States will most likely be with allies as part of a combined or

coalition force.7 Although the services have maintained experience through

participation in alliances, the characteristics of an ad hoc coalition require

additional considerations.

Coordination.

A coalition is a term that is often applied to relationships formed expressly for

prosecution of a war or conflict that has already begun. More precisely, coalitions

are wartime associations. Desert Shield demonstrates this trait as the political and

military relationships that defined the coalition were not established until after Iraq

attacked Kuwait. Coalitions are generally characterized as an ad hoc relationship

since they are reactive in nature and created to fight a particular war or counter a

specific threat. Although the relationship is temporary, an effective coalition still

requires cooperative arrangements, to include sharing of intelligence. To establish

cooperative arrangements, coalitions often attempt to apply the basic principals

used in effective alliances. By definition, a coalition has a narrow focus of effort

that is attendant to the specific purpose and limited time. Given this narrow focus

of effort, nations that are part of the coalition may have opposing interests in many

areas on the peripheral of the main effort.8 This is an important aspect of

coalitions, particularly in considering sharing of intelligence, since ad hoc

alliances do not necessarily generate from nor translate into friendships.

Security.

As a basic premise of the definition of an alliance or coalition, military forces

of nations are still ultimately responsible and accountable to their parent states.

Along with the benefit of an alliance comes substantial drawbacks, the biggest of

which is a loss of complete sovereignty over a nations actions.9 By sharing

intelligence with other nations a state concedes information and potentially

capabilities that would not normally or otherwise be provided. As such, coalitions

often carry a requirement for compromise in the area of the security of a nation's

secrets. Not all nations will bring the same level of robust and technically

sophisticated intelligence capabilities to a cooperative effort. While a coalition

aggregates the capabilities of military forces, the operational cohesion requires

mutually supporting the intelligence capabilities and products provided by

participating nations.10 The nation with the most capable intelligence structure and

resources can expect to compromise more since they will provide more than they

receive in return. This can be especially true when a coalition includes third world

countries that can neither sustain nor support development of expensive and

sophisticated collection and processing systems. Despite variances in capabilities

and structure, a coalition should exploit any unique contribution of supporting

nations, often human intelligence, for the common goal of the union of national

efforts.11 A nation will maintain its' sovereignty and security by only providing

intelligence deemed necessary for the conduct of the coalition and by protecting

the sources and methods of intelligence that is shared.

DIA and Security.

When considering intelligence security, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

is one of two key players in coalition operations. When Secretary of Defense

McNamara created the DIA in 1961, to overcome parochial intelligence estimates

from the services, he established a centralized position within the intelligence

community to satisfy DoD interests.12 Similar to the WW II Office of Strategic

Services (OSS), DIA provides a focal point for national and DoD efforts in the

process of collection, production, and dissemination of defense related

intelligence.13 DIA's central position also fulfills DoD's requirements, through

coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), to establish

guidelines and oversight measures to protect intelligence sources and methods

from unauthorized disclosure.

CINC Coordination.

The CINC is the other key player in establishing effective intelligence

operations within an ad hoc coalition. By establishing the CINC as regionally

responsible for projecting national power, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 facilitates orienting the intelligence

community from a global to a regional focus. The CINC fulfills a critical role by

establishing a structure which translates a regional intelligence focus into a

cooperative effort. The CINC established structure and attendant architecture

must also provide a conduit for the flow of intelligence products to coalition

members. It is the combination of recognizing the CINC as a focus of national

effort and the DIA's central position within the intelligence community that allows

bringing to bear the full capabilities of national and theater assets to a regional

coalition conflict.

Joint Doctrine for Dissemination.

As stated earlier, after the conclusion of the Gulf War, the U.S. intelligence

community did not return to its' historical practice of returning to an inward focus

but began to apply the lessons learned from coalition operations. The Department

of Defense first applied lessons learned by adjusting joint doctrine on intelligence

support to operations, Joint Pub 2-0 published in October 1993. The doctrine

depicts two key elements required for effective coordination; a multinational

intelligence architecture and attendant communications structure.15

The development of the multinational intelligence architecture uses the

Coalition Coordination and Communication Integration Center (C3IC), developed

by CINCCENT, as a backdrop for lessons learned. The tether between the joint

doctrine and the C3IC is most readily apparent in reviewing the principles cited for

consideration when dealing with multinational forces as part of coalition

operations.

Adjust National Differences Among Nations

Unity of Effort Against Common Threat

Determining and Planning Intelligence Special Arrangements

Full Exchange of Intelligence Sharing

Complementary Intelligence Operations

Combined Intelligence Center

Liaison Exchange16

Besides reaffirming responsibilities of various intelligence agencies, the joint

doctrine specifically addresses the functional linkage between DIA, supported

CINC, and military forces of coalition members. Of service concern, the joint

doctrine does not address the functional role and linkage of the tactical

commanders subordinate to the CINC.

Use of non-service systems.

Supporting the architecture, the doctrine also depicts the communications paths

and methods attendant to the functional responsibilities. Again the document is

tied to and clearly reflects the lessons learned by operations of the C3IC. By

specifying methods of communications the doctrine incorporates the

communication systems and work stations developed to overcome shortfalls noted,

particularly in the dissemination of imagery.17 The document also assists in

organizational planning by citing areas that will likely require courier or liaison

services. As a carryover from the Gulf Conflict, the joint doctrine additionally

focuses on satisfying the CINC's intelligence and processing requirements. The

architecture reflects the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), a

non-service system, as a key element in the dissemination of intelligence which

reinforces a CINC focus.18 While the document does address the potential for the

establishment of a Joint Force Commander, the lowest authoritative level remains

with the CINC. As with the structural architecture, Joint Pub 2-0 does not address

subordinate commands and linkage requirements to service communications

systems.

Joint Doctrine for Sanitization and Security.

A concurrent and ongoing effort is the development of proposed doctrine, Joint

Pub 2-0 1, that addresses the sanitization requirements posed by working as part of

a multinational force. The central theme that runs throughout the document is

providing timely and responsive, yet controlled, intelligence to other members of a

multinational force. The dilemma that the document addresses is being able to

quickly transition from peacetime and working with security manuals to a wartime

position.19 During the Gulf War, DIA developed the DIA Handbook for Analysts

to facilitate sanitization and dissemination of intelligence to the multinational

forces. The handbook also provides the basic format and principles used in the

proposed doctrine. As practiced during Desert Storm, the doctrine separates

responsibility of sanitization and dissemination into two broad areas, based around

national and theater assets.

DIA as focal point.

Within the doctrine, DIA is clearly the designated focal point for sanitization

authority and efforts. DIA's role as a focal point is reinforced by providing the

CINCs with a DIA Guide to Foreign Disclosure and by performing an interaction

function with other intelligence agencies. In seeking to assist the combatant

commander, DIA will work with national level agencies to seek exemptions to

national security policy if required by operational necessity.20 It is likely DIA will

sanitize the collection from national assets and provide appropriately marked

intelligence products tailored to CINC requirements that are releasable to a

multinational force. The basic direction of DIA guidance and efforts is clearly to

remove as much sanitization burden as possible from the CINC.

CINC Authority.

While DIA is the focal point for overall sanitization efforts the CINC is clearly

the responsible agent within a theater. Specifically, the doctrine recognizes the

challenges faced by the CINC's intelligence officer, the J-2, in carrying out

sanitization and dissemination responsibilities. As a guide for the J-2, the doctrine

underscores the fact that a multinational organization can and will create unique

releasability problems. The documents also recognize that J-2s are typically not

knowledgeable and practiced. in the sanitization and release procedures, due to a

lack of practice and peacetime requirements. As a subset, the document points out

that the sharing of US intelligence, while also protecting sources and methods, can

be a key to sustaining a multinational force (MNF).21 The specific considerations

listed for the J2 are: "(1) eligibility of recipient countries; (2) need to know; (3)

gain outweigh risks; (4) level of control necessary; and (5) organization receiving

afford some protection."22 The driving point behind these considerations is that

the combatant commander is ultimately responsible and accountable for the release

of intelligence to foreign forces. While the document provides various

considerations, the DIA Guide to Foreign Disclosure, provided to each combatant

commander, gives specific guidance to the CINC's J-2.23 The CINC's intelligence

staff will use the guide in executing sanitization and dissemination authority to

protect the sources and methods of intelligence gathered primarily from theater

resources. Probably the majority of the sanitization efforts of the combatant

commander will be executed under the auspices of the DIA representative on the

CINC's staff.

Tactical coordination with foreign forces.

Current and developing doctrine is oriented around the in theater

responsibilities of the CINC to provide a centralized effort of a multinational force

which appropriately includes a responsive level of intelligence support. The

documents do not address the need for the cooperative and coordination

requirements that will exist below the combatant commander. Tactical

commanders below the CINC can and should anticipate they will either have

forces from different nations attached or adjacent to their command. In either case

the tactical commander should plan for coordination requirements that include

sharing of intelligence.

Liaison and communication.

Per doctrinal considerations, the combatant commander will provide liaison

teams to multinational commands below the staff levels that are directly linked

within a CINC level architecture, as practiced in Desert Storm.24 These teams

consist of S2 through S4 staff elements and supported by a robust signal element.

Although they possess a signal element, the teams will not focus solely on

providing intelligence support redundant to higher levels of coordination. As these

liaison teams will address a CINC's efforts, the tactical commander will need to

provide complementary assets at almost every level of command. Additionally,

cooperative integration of the CINC's and tactical commander's liaison teams is

necessary to attain unity and preclude the potential for contradictory efforts.25

Beside providing support in flank coordination and experience in operations above

brigade level, the teams will naturally function as a conduit for critical intelligence

on the enemy equal to that available to U.S. forces. While passing of time critical

combat intelligence is an inherent capability, the communication capabilities of

liaison teams are usually not so robust that they can fully replicate the various

functional nets within a communication architecture.26 To prevent intelligence

shortfalls, the tactical commander must also anticipate having to share unique and

tactical intelligence products not exchanged by the liaison elements at higher

headquarters.

Foreign Service Communication.

Although doctrine now describes and addresses a structural conduit for

intelligence to multinational forces at the CINC level, the communications

structure of coalition partners will not always be responsive to their subordinate

units. This may force the interaction of tactical commanders with adjacent forces,

both directly and through liaison personnel to include provision of intelligence

material that is marked and ready for release to multination forces is dependent

on the senior agencies with components confined to instructions for

dissemination.27 The procedures for creating external markings and related

dissemination instructions allows the tactical commander to quickly relay marked

material to foreign forces with minimal administrative burdens. If not anticipated

and pre-planned, the commander may also find the throughput requirements will

quickly exceed a typical liaison communications architecture.

Confined sanitization.

As stated earlier, tactical commanders are not automatically given the

sanitization authority that includes the release of intelligence product to

multinational forces but are rather given dissemination guidance for product

received. Department of Defense documents currently restrict service components

to sanitization guidance and authority that is confined to single service or joint

operations.28 The lack of authorization for the tactical commander must therefore

presume one of two scenarios. Either the intelligence flow from higher authorities

is sufficient for expected coalition and U.S. interaction or interaction is not

anticipated. The tactical commander does have some authority to release

intelligence to coalition partners but the authority is conditional and only applies

to combat critical intelligence of a fleeting nature. By strict interpretation, the

conditional authority precludes foreign forces from viewing any unmarked tactical

intelligence used in initial planning prior to engagement of forces. Developing

doctrine highlights the requirement for appropriately marked material.

Specifically, the doctrine reaffirms a basic security principle that intelligence not

marked with the no foreign (NOFORN) caveat does equal releaseability criteria.

Limited by higher echelons.

Without sanitization authority, that includes the release to multinational forces,

the tactical commander is reliant upon the services of higher echelons of

command. As described earlier, DIA and the CINC intelligence structures conduct

the sanitization of intelligence products. In providing the in-theater service, the

CINC's Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) will likely orient its' efforts to create

products that satisfy CINC requirements. In many areas the JIC products will still

accommodate tactical requirements, such as establishing of enemy force lay

downs. JIC products should also encompass any tactical requirements, previously

submitted to higher authorities, that are beyond the capabilities of organic assets.

What it may exclude are those requirements of interest solely of the tactical

commander that are satisfied by the collection efforts of organic assets.

CINC oriented product.

The tactical commander should always anticipate that there will be competition

for scarce tactical, theater, and national resources in intelligence operations. To

complement organic collection and to fill intelligence gaps, the tactical commander

will have to request intelligence support from theater and national systems. While

requested support may be validated, the tactical commander's submitted

requirements typically fall low on the CINC's priority list. Many of the tactical

commanders requirements will not be satisfied due to their relative low priority

coupled with limited theater and national systems available for tasking.29 This will

confine the tactical commander to working with sanitized intelligence derived

from CINC tasking and tailored to support the CINC. This was the case in Deserts

Storm where the intelligence that was generated to support the CINC was too

broad to fulfill the level of detail needed for tactical planning, with the exception

of targeting templates.30 While subordinate tactical U.S. commanders will receive

the tailored and sanitized intelligence, the received product may not contribute to

tactical planning and of little shared value to coalition partners.

Evoke combat essential authority.

The tactical commander must strive to fill all of his intelligence and

coordination requirements through organic resources if products received from

higher echelons are not responsive. If successful, the tactical commander does not

possess the guidance to process, track, and mark locally generated products for

release to coalition partners. Many of the intelligence products that serve the

interests of the tactical commander are also of interest and beneficial to an

adjacent or subordinate coalition unit. Without the availability of senior

headquarters processing, the only resources a tactical commander has is to either

withhold the intelligence or consider it at combat essential. In either regard, the

mechanism to account for and track what and what is not released to coalition

partners will not be a part of normal procedures or practices.

National & Theater Support.

A combinations of reliance and ready access to national theater produced

intelligence may compound a tactical commander's dilemma in whether to release

unmarked intelligence or protect national capabilities. The contribution and

relative dependence upon national theater assets is not new and a highlight of the

Persian Gulf Conflict. In response to CINC intelligence requirements, the

intelligence community will quickly orient available assets and staffs to focus on a

given threat. While supporting agencies will undoubtedly have to make some

internal adjustments, the doctrinal linkage between the intelligence community

through DIA to supported a CINC eases the flow and responsiveness of

intelligence support.31 The doctrinal inclusion of an architecture, that overcomes

communications deficiencies, further supports timely transmission of intelligence,

to include participation within a newly formed coalition. As national and theater

resources continue to improve through technological development it is logical to

assume responsible agencies will continue to recognize and exploit improvements

in capabilities to support a CINC.

Improvements in connectivity and responsiveness.

Efforts to improve national and theater asset connectivity and responsiveness to

warfighting elements, to both command structures and weapons systems,

compliments recognition of their potential contribution. The ultimate goal is a

capability for intelligence sensors to provide processed information directly to the

shooter. Even if attained, the information must still be provided to activities that

support military planners, to include tactical commanders. It is also logical to

assume intelligence activities that support military planners are the first areas that

will benefit from development efforts. Information received directly from sensors

is not generally considered finished and evaluated product. Technological

developments that improve the flow of information from national and theater

sources will also bypass the funnel of sanitization conducted by higher

headquarters.

Risk of unauthorized disclosure.

As the tactical commander gains access to more intelligence the risk for

unauthorized disclosure increases. The intelligence community should expect that

operational considerations for the safety of the coalition as a whole will drive a

less concerted effort to track all bits of intelligence that are passed by the

components. As a byproduct, only the DIA and CINC staffs that conduct

sanitization will, in essence, be able to account for intelligence shared with a

multinational force. Components will likely confine their efforts to assuring that

hardcopy intelligence passed to coalition partners bear appropriate markings and

will attempt to sanitize organic products to an appropriate level during briefs

attended by coalition members. The intelligence community should not arbitrarily

expect components to structure or organize their staffs to account for a level of

dissemination control which is beyond their scope of authority. Many of the

disclosures are not confined to intelligence sources and methods but include

information gained from simply operating as part of a coalition force. Foreign

intelligence forces of a coalition can easily gain and potentially exploit intelligence

on operational capabilities, tactics, techniques, and limitations to include areas of

intelligence.32 Observing U.S. forces in the execution of doctrine, and technology,

available through sharing intelligence, provides information and effectiveness of

U.S. intelligence capabilities.33 The danger of fully demonstrating or providing

examples of U.S. intelligence characteristics and capabilities is in other

intelligence agencies using the information to establish, refine, and advance their

own military capabilities and planning in such a way that it minimizes the

effectiveness of U.S. intelligence capabilities. Regardless of the inherent future

danger of working as part of a coalition, the Gulf War clearly demonstrates that

the intelligence community must fully prepare to conduct operations as part of a

coalition.

DOTES.

The structure and documentation created to support coalition considerations

revolve around both DIA and the supported combatant commander. With the

overall focus of national and theater assets as well as sanitization authority

directed towards the CINC, subordinate components are somewhat restricted to

what is provided by higher echelons of command. By confining

institutionalization of the lessons learned from the Gulf War, the potential exists to

not consider future developments and more active involvement by service

components.

The Marine Corps currently evaluates various functional areas on a bi-annual

basis by conducting a Mission Area Analysis (MAA) lead by subject matter

experts. The MAA uses a concept which considers the elements of doctrine,

organization, training, equipment, and support (DOTES) as a basis to how best

achieve operational and functional requirements and resolve identified shortfalls.

To fully address future requirements, the application of the DOTES concept must

go beyond own service and joint considerations. The analysis on the functional

area of intelligence must also recognize and acknowledge the impact of coalition

operations. An important aspect in using the DOTES acronym, in addressing

functional requirements, is attaining symmetry among the various elements.

Symmetry must not only be obtained within a service but also with joint and

national efforts as well as expected operational employment.

Doctrine.

If Marine Corps doctrine on intelligence operations consider coalitions, it must

reflect constraints imposed by limits reflected in joint doctrine. A current

reflection will recognize that the CINC is a key element in providing intelligence

within a multinational force. Without significant changes, the doctrine must also

reflect that component should not expect sanitization authority that allows release

of products to foreign forces. In execution of an operation this situation either

limits component interaction with multinational forces or creates a dilemma on

how to deal with classified intelligence obtained from organic resources. As seen

in the Gulf War, the Marine Corps can and should expect to interact with adjacent

coalition forces. By not having sanitization guidance and authority the current and

developing joint doctrine restricts tactical commanders to exercising unguided

authority as well as placing limits on support to planning requirements.34 Lack of

a systematic sanitization process that recognizes a multinational force caveat will

also inhibit accountability of what intelligence was released to coalition partners to

assess potential disclosures damaging to future operations. The doctrinal

adjustments of intelligence architectures to accommodate coalition requirements

also impose adjustments in the organizational portion of DOTES.

Organization.

The organizational impacts of coalition warfare can be twofold. While a

service component may not have a requirement for an integrated combined staff

the headquarters elements may have to accommodate visits by coalition members

to include areas which reflect intelligence awareness of the enemy. During the

Gulf War, the SCIF was the predominate exclusion area not accessible by coalition

members. Whether self imposed or planned, the organization impact can include

both personnel and material required to monitor and control the degree that a units

staff structure is open to coalition partners. If the sanitization for release to

coalition forces is confined to a DoD and CINC JIC, the requirements are

primarily document control and accounting. As the intelligence moves toward

automated systems for processing and passing of intelligence to subordinate units,

the function may still require additional manpower for a system that will most

likely require a robust courier service. Thus, even if a component command does

not expand it's intelligence processing functions to include sanitization for release

to multinational forces there will be additional burdens on staff functions.

The second organizational impact would be 'in the knowledgeable processing of

intelligence, whether organic, theater, or national, for release to a coalition. While

DIA has a standing organizational structure chartered and familiar with

sanitization of intelligence for release to foreign military forces, the services do

not. The sanitization of intelligence by higher headquarters will most likely rely

on communications paths rather than forwarding of experienced teams.

organizational adjustment to serve component commands could be obtained

through realignment in the major force program (MFP). The Marine Corps, as

well as other services, have billets that fall under the MFP III whose manpower

costs are programmed and paid for by the DCI, vice the representative service. A

realignment of billets to allow for active analyst participation in DIA's foreign

disclosure branch would establish a deployable cadre of experience for wartime

augmentation. The attainment of experience in ad hoc coalitions is possibly the

most difficult and embraces the training subset of DOTES.

Training.

The closest training for coalitions in a real-world environment is through

participation in alliances. Exposure to intelligence operations within an alliance

allows for exposure to established practices and procedures developed to ensure

effective intelligence sharing. While the exposure is beneficial, it only tends to

reinforce the tenets embraced by the developing doctrine on multinational

coalitions. A more effective training measure requires going through the process

to create capabilities and relationships that are not resident at the outset of an

operation. A more effective training mechanism for coalition operations is an

expansion of the political-military exercises that are currently participated in by

the MEFs. The majority of these exercises are focused on integration of combat

power to the exclusion of intelligence. While intelligence will be included it is

typically canned to facilitate operational maneuver within a limited time frame.

Equipment.

The area that has the most potential for unplanned impact on coalition is in the

area of equipment. One of the lessons of effective intelligence is that

"...development of new weapons systems must be planned in a way that ensures

that they will not require more intelligence support than will be available."35 A

comparison is citing operational employment and interaction with forces from

other nations must be planned in a way that ensures that they will not require more

intelligence support than will be available. To meet these ends, the current

development of intelligence systems are striving toward an architecture that will

allow for "sensor to shooter" support. While this may be an eventual reality for

particular types of intelligence, the most likely intermediate achievement will be

sensor to intelligence producer, to include the intelligence staffs of components.

As technology and communications capabilities attain this level of interaction the

DoD and CINC JIC processing of national and theater collection will become

more transparent to component commanders. For the sanitization of intelligence,

the potential and risk of disclosure of capabilities will increase as the

filtering system of a pyramid hierarchy, that excludes components, begin to flatten. The

most apparent application of equipment adjustment which can reflect the

consideration of coalitions is in the area of intelligence analysis and processing,

such as the Intelligence Analysis System (IAS). If coalition considerations are an

inherent part of system development the system may be develop with a product

that is in concert with dissemination limitations imposed by security constraints.

Support.

As mentioned under discussion of doctrinal implications, the infrastructure

required to accommodate coalition considerations may expand material

requirements. The majority of current service Standard Operating Procedures only

consider parent units and unilateral requirements. Accommodation of coalition

forces while providing access control to intelligence facilities will require

additional structures to a command post.

Conclusion.

Over the past fifty years the U.S. intelligence community has matured to the

point that it acknowledges and is beginning to address intelligence requirements

attendant to ad hoc coalition conflicts. Current efforts to protect sources and

methods while allowing for mission execution tend to limit the active involvement

of forces below the combatant commander. The Marine Corps role as an

expeditionary force and probable Joint Task Force involvement mandates

consideration of the implications of coalitions to intelligence operations. If not

planned, ad hoc efforts to protect sources and methods will impede overall

intelligence functions, increase the risk of inadvertent disclosures, and challenge

efforts for material accountability. To totally ignore responsibilities in protecting

sources and methods under the guise of combat essential requirements is a failure

of integrity with potential long term implications in future conflicts. The current

steps taken to address intelligence within coalition operations dictates procedures

that do not develop component internal requirements. To effectively move into the

future with doctrine, organization, equipment, training, and support, the Marine

Corps must consider the implications of coalition conflict to intelligence

operations.

The Marine Corps should work within the intelligence community to either

obtain documented sanitization and dissemination authority at the tactical level or

assure a responsive mechanism is in place. The Marine Corps needs to develop

baseline service doctrine that will address the requirements and restrictions

attendant to intelligence operations in a coalition environment. When the Marine

Corps conducts the semi-annual Mission Area Analysis (MAA) of the intelligence

functions, subject matter experts should consider coalition impacts when

formulating potential requirements for doctrinal, organization, training, equipment,

and support corrections and opportunities. The Marine Corps can not retreat into a

parochial and unilateral shell and expect to remain a responsive and viable force in

an era of multinational involvement. To do so invites learning through mistakes

and failures rather than concerted foresight.

1 The failure of the intelligence community to promptly detect and warn

national authorities of the North Korean threat created additional offices within

DIA as well as refine intelligence estimates.

2 Numerous books have been written on the British ability to read the

communications of the German high command, codeword ULTRA. The books

highlight not only the contribution of ULTRA to various campaigns but also the

steps that occurred when the British decided to share the secret with their U.S.

allies.

3 General Robert W. RisCassi, USA, Doctrine for Joint Operations in a

Combined Environment, Military Review (Nov 93), 20.

4 Terry J. Pudas, Preparing Future Coalition Commanders, FJQ, Joint Force

Quarterly no 3 (Winter 93-94), 41.

5 Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces: Joint Warfare is Team

Warfare, National Defense University Press, 11 November 1991, 41.

6 The alliances the U.S. has been a part of have been successful as they have

not been challenged with the actual conduct of war.

7 Maj. John D. Becker, USA, "Combined and Coalition Warfighting: The

American Experience", U.S. Army, Military Review, Nov 93, 25.

8 Brassey's (US), Inc., International Military and Defense Encyclopedia,

Washington, New York, 1993, 117.

9 Maj. Jeffery W. Yeager, U.S. Army, Coalition Warfare: Surrendering

Sovereignty, Military Review, Nov 93. 52.

10 MajGen Waldo D. Freeman, US Army; Cdr Randall J. Hess, U.S. Navy;

and LtCol Manuel Faria, Portuguese Army, The Challenges of Combined

Operations, Military Review (Nov 92), 8.

11 MajGen Waldo D. Freeman, US Army; Cdr Randall J. Hess, U.S. Navy;

and LtCol Manuel Faria, Portuguese Army, The Challenges of Combined

Operations, Military Review (Nov 92), 7-8.

12 J Thompson Strong, The Defense Intelligence Community in The Military

Intelligence Community, Gerald W. Hopple and Bruce W. Watson, ed al, (Boulder

and London: Westview Press 1986), 17.

13 The OSS was created, along with a Joint Intelligence Center, to serve the

intelligence needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the outset of WW II in 1942. The

OSS focus was to assure the intelligence assets were mutually supportive and not

independent efforts.

14 The DCI is ultimately responsible for protecting intelligence sources and

methods from unauthorized disclosure per the National Security Act of 1947.

DoD typically provides sanitization guidance to the services through the issuance

of DoD instructions. Current DoD instructions do not include sanitization

guidance for release to foreign entities.

15 Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine For Intelligence Support to Operations,

(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 12 October 1993), VIII-2.

16 Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine For Intelligence Support to Operations,

(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 12 October 1993), VIII-3.

17 The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), cited in the

doctrine, was initially developed to overcome imagery requirements. The

capabilities of the MISS have availed it to satisfy more robust requirements and

communications tether between intelligence agencies. The combination of JWICS

and JDISS provide secure, high-speed, multimedia transmission for the

dissemination of intelligence.

18 While the JDISS is not a service system the Marine Corps Intelligence

Analysis System (IAS) can be loaded with JDISS software. The MEF IAS, which

includes a 5-D processor for imagery, can functionally provide the same level of

functionality as a JDISS if provided the sufficient bandwidth. Loading of JDISS

software onto IAS would reduce the number of IAS workstations available to the

MEF commander.

19 Joint Pub 2-01, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Chapter VI, on Security,

SECRET NOFORN, Washington, DC: Department of Defense proposed

publication, VI-1.

20 (S/NF) Joint Pub 2-01, VI-5.

21 (S/NF) Joint Pub 2-01, VI-2.

22 (S/NF) Joint Pub 2-01, VI-7-8.

23 (S/NF) Joint Pub 2-01, VI-5.

24 ARCENT provided liaison teams to Joint Forces Command-North (JFC-N)

and JFC-E (east).

25 Yates, Mark B., LtCol., Coalition Warfare in Desert Storm. Military

Review (Oct 93), 50.

26 The communications connectivity between I MEF and their liaison team

assigned to Arab forces was via a voice net. While the communications path was

capable of providing time critical intelligence, the majority of sharing of

intelligence between I MEF and Arab forces was handled through courier. Mike Decker,

Deputy Assistant COS, CIS, HQMC. Interview, SECRET, by author, 30 Dec 1994.

27 Ed Valentine, DIAC, DIA Rep to CINCCENT during Desert Shield/Storm.

Phone interview by author, 9 Feb 1995.

28 DOD 5105.21-M-2. "SCI Security Manual, COMINT Policy, " TS/SI, July

1985 and DOD 5105.21-M-3. "SCI Security Manual, TK Policy, " TS/SI/SAO,

November 1985 contain policy and guidance for sanitization authority of SCI. The

guidance does not include consideration of multinational forces and confined to

U.S. only forces. Automatic sanitization authorization is also delineated for

certain conditions and not always available.

29 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Pursuant to Title

V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits

Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 92, 340.

30 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Pursuant to Title

V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits

Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 92, 342.

31 DIA increased intelligence processing capabilities by activating an

Intelligence Task Force (ITF) in the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC)

and through augmenting the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC) at the

Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC), Bolling Air Force Base, DC.

Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Pursuant to Title V of

the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act

of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 92, appendix C, 335.

32 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim

Report to Congress, Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental

Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), 15-4.

33 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim

Report to Congress, Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental

Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), 22-1.

34 Defense Intelligence Agency, Foreign Disclosure Handbook for Analyst-

Desert Storm, Foreign Disclosures Branch, Foreign Exchanges and Disclosure

Division, Directorate for External Relations. SECRET NOFORN, Defense

Intelligence Agency December 1990, 4.

35 Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allen E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for

American National Security, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,

1989), 180.

Bibliography

Books:

Bamford, James. The Puzzle Palace. Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1982.

Berkowitz, Bruce D. and Goodman, Allen. Strategic Intelligence for American

National Security. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,

1989.

Calvacoressi, Peter. TOP SECRET ULTRA. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.

D'Este, Carlo. Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome. New York, NY:

Harper Collins Publishers, 1992.

Doll, William J., and Steven Metz. The Army and Multi-national Peace

Operations: Problems and Solutions. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 29, 1993, 27 pp.

Dupuy, Trevor., Col., USA Rd ed., et al. International Military and Defense

Encyclopedia. Washington, DC: Brassey's 1993.

Hopple, Gerald., and Bruce W. Watson ed., et al. The Military Intelligence

Community. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986.

Komer, R. W.. Needed: Preparation for Coalition War. Santa Monica, CA:

Rand Corporation, P-507, August 1976, 2.

Lowenthal, Mark M.. U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy. Westport, CT:

2nd Ed, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Praeger Publishers,

1992.

Newsome, Thomas L., Jr.. Cause and Effect of the 1971 Reorganization of the

US Intelligence Community. Air War College, Air University United

States Air Force Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, No 5708. April 1975.

Winterbotham, F.W. The ULTP,4 Secret., New York, San Francisco, London:

Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974.

White Paper: Intelligence Support To Operations Other Than War. Carlisle

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1993, 33 pp.

Defense Intelligence Agencey. Foreign Disclosure Handbook for Analysts-

Desert Storm, Washington, DC: Foreign Disclosure Branch, Foreign

Exchanges and Disclosure Division, directorate for External Relations,

SECRET NOFORN, December 1990.

Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support To Operations.

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 12 October 1993.

Joint Pub 2-01, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Chapter VI Security. Washington,

DC: Department of Defense, proposed publicatons.

Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, Washington, DC:

Department of Defense, 11 November 1991

DOD 5105.2 1 -M-2. "SCI Security Manual, COMBINE Policy, " TS/SI,

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 1985.

DOD 5105.2 1 -M-3. "SCI Security Manual, TK Policy, " TS/SI/SAO, Washington,

DC: Department of Defense, November 1985.

Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel

Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), Conduct of the Persian Gulf

War: Final Report to Congress. April 1992.

Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel

Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), Conduct of the Persian Gulf

War: An Interim Report to Congress. April 1992.

Periodicals:

Baker, James H. Policy Challenges of UN Peace Operations Parameters, Vol. 1

(Spring 1994) 13-26.

Becker, John. Combined and Coalition Warfighting: The American Experience.

Military Review (Nov 93) 25-29.

Campen, Alan D., Col., USAF (Ret.). Intelligence Leads Renaissance In Military

Thinking Signal Volume 48, Number 12, (August 94) 17-18.

Clapper, James R., Challenging Joint Military Intelligence. Joint Force Quarterly

no 4 (Spring 1994) 92-99.

Dixon, Anne M., The Whats and Whys of Coalitions Joint Force Quarterly

(Winter 1993-94) 26-28.

Dougherty, William A., Vice Admiral. Storm From Space. Naval Institute

Proceeding 118 no 8 (Aug 92) 48-52.

Freeman, Waldo D., MajGen., USA., Hess, Radall J., Cdr., USN, & Faria,

Manuel., LtCol.,Portuguese Army., The Challenges of Combined

Operations. Military Review (Nov 1992) 2-10.

Michaelis, Marc., LtCol., US Army., The Importance of Communications in

Coalition Warfare. Military Review (Nov 1992) 40-50.

Pudas, Terry. Preparing Future Coalition Commanders. Joint Force Quarterly

(Winter 1994-94) 40-46.

RisCassi, Robert W., Gen., U.S. Army. Doctrine for Joint Operation in a

Combined Environment A Necessity, Military Review (June 1993) 20-37.

Smith, Jeffrey H. and Ryan, Daniel J. Commission Advocates Risk Management

to Meet Changing World Conditions Signal Volume 48, number 10,

(Jun 94) 59-61.

Yates, Mark B., LtCol., Coalition Warfare in Desert Storm. Military Review

(Oct 93), 46-52.

Yeager, Jeffery W., Maj. Coalition Warfare: Surrendering Sovereignty. Military

Review (November 1992) 51-63.

Interviews:

Decker, Mike. Deputy Assistant COS, CIS, HQMC. Interview, SECRET, by

author, 30 Dec 1994.

Dolan, Karen., Analyst at Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Quantico, VA.

Interview, SECRET, by author, 12 Jan 1994.

Moran, Mrs., DIA Foreign Disclosure PSF-2. Interview, SECRET, by author, 3

Feb 1995.

Moser, Michael D., GySgt., I MEF SSO Chief Interview, SECRET, by author, 16

Dec 1994.

Valentine, Ed. DIAC, DIA Rep to CINCCENT during Desert Shield/Storm.

Phone interview by author, 9 Feb 1995.



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list