Reconnaissance, Surveillance, And Target Acquisition Collection
Planning--Embedded Within The MEF Intelligence And Operations Cycles
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition
Collection Planning--Embedded Witliin the MEF
Intelligence and Operations Cycles
Authors: Intelligence Doctrine Working Group
Chairman: Major J.C. Dereschuk, United States Marine Corps
Members: Major R. H. Chase Major J. A. Day
(USMC) Major D. D. Cline Major J.G. O'Hagan
Thesis: Judicious employment of finite, high value RSTA resources to support myriad
battlespace activities demands top-down planning, unity of effort, and Commander's
synchronization of the intelligence and operations cycles.
Background: The emerging body of Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Targeting
Acquisition (RSTA) resources brings a powerfiil contribution to battlespace domination.
Diverse RSTA operations occur simultaneously within the battlespace--keyed to support
a range of users from decision makers to "shooters." In addition to collecting
information that develops situational awareness, RSTA assets contribute to many battle
space activities: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Indications and Warning,
situation development, force protection, Battle Damage Assessment, targeting and
collection queuing. Given this multi-dimensional capability, it is no longer desirable to
relegate RSTA assets solely to the realm of intelligence collection management. The
command and control of finite, high value RSTA resources is the Commander's
responsibility, one demanding top-down planning and unity of effort throughout the
MAGTF to achieve a synchronized intelligence-operations approach to RSTA
employment.
Recommendation: To oversee the coordination and tasking of RSTA missions
supporting battlespace domination, the Marine Corps must institutionalize a MEF-level
coordination board--the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition Board
(RSTAB). Under the Commander's direction, the Board's concerted efforts to plan,
coordinate, and task RSTA resources will embed RSTA collection planning within the
intelligence-operations cycles.
CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES iii
Chapter Page
I. SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW: RECONNAISSANCE,
SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION (RSTA)
PLANNING WITHIN ThE MAGTF TODAY 1-8
II. THE EXPANDED CHARTER FOR RSTA OPERATIONS 9-18
III. A NEW DIRECTION FOR MEF RSTA COORDINATION 19-33
IV. RSTAB PROCEDURES 34-38
V. EMBEDDING RSTA COLLECTION PLANNING WITHIN
THE INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS CYCLES 39-52
VI. CONCLUSIONS 53-56
Notes 57-59
Appendices
A. DIVERT SCENARIO FOR A PRE-PLANNED
UAV MISSION 60-64
B. THE INTELLIGENCE BATTALION WITHIN THE
NEW MEF SUPPORT GROUP 65-73
Bibliography 74-75
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
1. Intelligence Flow Within the MEF
(page 2)
2. G2 Combat Intelligence Center (CIC)
(Page 5)
3. Divert Scenario: UAV Detects Targets of
Opportunity Beyond the FSCL
(page 7)
4. RSTA Collection Planning Cycle--Embedded
Within MAGTF Planning Cycles
(page 34)
ABSTRACT
The emerging body of Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Targeting Acquisition
(RSTA) assets serves as a significant combat multiplier to a commander. In addition
to collecting information that helps develop situational awareness, RSTA assets
contribute to many battle space activities:
--Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)
--Indications and Warning (I&W)
--Situation Development
--Force Protection
--Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)
--Targeting, Target Acquisition, and Target Development
--Collection Queuing
--Battle Management
Given this multi-dimensional capability, it is no longer desirable to relegate RSTA
assets solely to the realm of intelligence collection management. The command and
control of finite, high value RSTA resources is the Commander's responsibility, one
demanding top-down planning and unity of effort throughout the MAGTF to achieve a
synchronized intelligence-operations approach to RSTA employment.
Not surprisingly, synchronizing diverse RSTA capabilities to support operations
involves complex coordination and planning considerations. During this process, the
Commander and his staff must ask themselves: Are these assets best employed in
general support of the MAGTF, direct support of subordinate units, or both? Will
these assets fall under G2 or G3 purview, or should a Commander-designated board
conduct oversight and management? What relationship must be established, what
coordination effected between organic and nonorganic RSTA assets and the
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC), the Combat Intelligence Center
(CIC), and the Combat Operations Center (COC)? Who orchestrates the coordination
for RSTA planning, and who provides the sanity check on how well the collection
strategy supports operations? Given that diverse RSTA operations occur
simultaneously within the battlespace--keyed to support a range of users from decision
makers to "shooters"--what parameters must define the information flow, and who
should oversee the dissemination process to ensure usable intelligence reaches the
Major Subordinate Commands?
RSTA assets provide a powerful contribution to battlespace domination. The
finite nature of RSTA platforms and the complexities inherent in planning and
executing their operations flag the RSTA collection process for commander's
responsibility. The management demands unity of effort, top-down planning, and
synchronization of the RSTA cycle. This paper proposes the formation of a MEF CE
coordination board--the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition Board
(RSTAB)--to oversee the prioritization, validation, coordination, and tasking of RSTA
missions. Key principal staff officers whose guidance is pivotal to synchronizing
intelligence and operations are dual-hatted to form the RSTAB. Under the
commander's direction, the Board's planning, coordination, and execution efforts
would embed RSTA collection planning within the intelligence-operations cycles.
RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND TARGET ACQUISITION
COLLECTION PLANNING--EMBEDDED WITHIN THE MEF
INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS CYCLES
CHAPTER 1
SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW: RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE,
TARGET ACQUISITION (RSTA) PLANNING WITHIN THE MAGTF TODAY
The Dilemma
As the spectrum of battlefield systems becomes more sophisticated and diverse,
intelligence requirements to support battlefield operations grow astronomically--from
collecting on and correlating battlefield activities to developing target packages; from
analyzing Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) to relaying information in near-real-time
(NRT) to a tactical commander.(1) General Clapper, Director of DIA, recently
commented on these demands placed on intelligence:
As a result, intelligence simply must situate itself within the operational cycle
rather than outside it...the intelligence collection, production and dissemination
cycle must be compressed so that it fits within the operational cycle for targeting
to support strike and restrike operations.(2)
The MAGTF intelligence collection cycle must be tailored to support the
operational cycle, and the entire spectrum of MAGTF operations and fires. The
diverse array of reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting acquisition (RSTA) sensors
and systems either organic, attached, or available to support a MAGTF challenges the
current way we do business. The G2 and G3 must expand their partnership to
Maximize the multidiscipline capability inherent in finite RSTA assets. Importantly,
synchronizing intelligence and operations planning to optimize RSTA advantages must
stand as one of the commander's priority concerns. The commander provides the
top-down direction ensuring unity of effort in intelligence and operations cycles.
To understand the intricacies of RSTA planning and collection management, and
how crucial coordinated staff planning is to successful RSTA operations, consider
what generally occurs at the MEF during a collection planning cycle. Historically,
the intelligence collection management process has often failed to integrate fully target
acquisition. It must be noted that each MEF currently employs different procedures
for collection planning and management, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center
(SARC) employment, and development of a dissemination architecture. The
following concept is based primarily on I MEF Command Element (CE) and
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Intelligence Group (SRIG) operations. See
Figure 1.
MAGTF Intelligence Collection Management Cycle
The commander has the ultimate responsibility to determine, direct, and
coordinate all intelligence collection through centralized, apportioned collection
management. The commander determines his Critical Information Requirements
(CCIR) for the operation, requirements that subsequently focus the collection process.
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Traditionally, the MEF G2 Collection Management Officer (CMO) and/or, Collection
Requirements Management Officer (CRMO) if assigned, work with the Commanding
Officer of the SRIG and his collection units to develop the MEF collection plan. The
plan is based on the MEF commander's intent and planning guidance, CCIRs, staff
Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR), and Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlespace (IPB). Through IPB--the underpinning for collection and RSTA
operations--the G2 forms a basis for determining possible enemy courses of action,
intent, capabilities, and critical vulnerabilities. Once the IPB process has begun, the
CMO (and usually the SRIG S3) participate in the MEF staff planning sessions that
produce the Event and Decision Support Templates--replete with Named Areas of
Interest (NAI), Target Areas of Interest (TAI), and Decision Points (DP).
Armed with this collection focus, the CMO meets with the G2's Human
Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) planners, the SRIG S3 and
representatives from his collection units, and CMOs of major subordinate commands
(MSC) to develop a comprehensive plan to cover NAIs, TAIs, CCIR, PIR, and
collection capability gaps. Before deciding on the need for new collection efforts, or
prior to validating requirements for fulfillment at higher echelons, the G2 CMO
confers with the MEF All Source Fusion Center (MAFC), Imagery Interpretation Unit
(IIU),and the Topographic Platoon to determine if off-the-shelf products are available
within the MEF to satisfy commander, staff, and MSC requirements. The CMO also
must be aware of the capabilities, limitations, and leadtime for tasking intelligence
collection assets and production agencies.
Once the gaps in organic intelligence products and collection capability are
determined, the CMO/CRMO registers, validates, and prioritizes collection,
exploitation, and dissemination requirements to satisfy the intelligence concerns of the
MEF and MSC commanders. Requisite theater and national assets and agencies will
be tasked through operational channels to support the MAGTF with collection
emphasis, coverage, and/or production.
As collection/production results flow into the MEF, the CMO/CRMO monitors
the overall satisfaction of command requirements and assesses the effectiveness of the
collection strategy. Different types of collection capabilities are employed so
information from one source can be validated by other sources or assets. The
collection strategy ensures redundancy so the loss or failure of one asset can be
compensated for by another of similar capability. The CMO strives for near
continuous surveillance on a target through synchronization of different and
complementary national, theater, and organic collection assets. This coordinated
planning also allows cross-cueing and tipoff among collectors, and provides a sensor-
to-shooter capability for exploitation of targets of opportunity. (3) Generally, data
collected are integrated within the MAFC for dissemination as all-source, finished
intelligence. However, when mission-essential, information is transmitted NRT to the
tactical level for immediate operational exploitation.
The MEF G3, or sometimes the Chief of Staff, reviews the final G2 collection
strategy. Once the plan has been approved, the SRIG S3 and representatives of
individual SRIG units commence detailed mission planning with appropriate MEF
staff sections (e.g., Force Reconnaissance Company confers with G3 Air for
insertions/extraction as required, and Force Fires for establisliment of RAO and NFA;
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Company consults with MEF and Air Combat
Element (ACE) air space management and control authorities; Human Intelligence
Company (HUMINT) teams work with the MEF HUMINT Branch (HIB) and the unit
they are directly supporting). These planners keep the CMO apprised of major
developments, but the CMO does not involve himself in the details unless there is
"finessing" required with MEF staff elements. When coordination is complete, the
SRIG units prepare their respective tabs for inclusion in Appendix 11 (the
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan) of Annex B (Intelligence) to the OPLAN, and
present them to the CMO for final approval.
SARC and G2 Operations. Once deployed, the SRIG establishes and mans the
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC), located in close proximity to the
MEF Combat Intelligence Center (CIC). See Figure (2), "The Combat Intelligence
Center." Note, with the exception of the MEF G2 Administration section, the entire
CIC, less the SARC, is situated within a field Special Compartmented Intelligence
Facility (SCIF) during most I MEF operations. In general, most SARC personnel do
not have the requisite Special Intelligence clearance for access within a SCIF.
Unfortunately, this precludes the SARC and CIC elements from conducting
uninterrupted fusion of genser (secret) and higher levels of classified material.
However, the SARC is located either immediately outside the SCIF wire, within easy
G2 access, or located in the area between the Combat Operations Center (COC) and
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CIC entry point (Figure 2). Both layouts have merit, although certainly the optimum
solution would be a SARC manned with SCI-cleared individuals, fully integrated
within the CIC, or alternatively, a CIC that in some manner allowed for co-existence
of both SCI and genser-only cleared individuals.(4)
The SRIG S3 normally is the OIC of the SARC. The SARC is under the staff
cognizance of the G2/CMO, who directs collection planning and operations through
the SARC OIC. While this situation generally provides for smooth operations, on
occasion, deconflicting multi-mission capable assets becomes a mild tug-of-war
between the G2, G3, and the Ground Combat Element (GCE). Final adjudication for
the prioritization of missions for these scarce resource rests with the Commanding
General.
Information Flow
Information from the deployed collection assets--Sensor Control and Management
Platoon (SCAMP), Force Reconnaissance, UAVs--flows into the SARC via doctrinal
nets. As an example, consider the UAV information flow. UAV voice reporting can
be available to the ACE, GCE, and Force Service Support Group (FSSG) over
various doctrinal nets, or a Remote Video Terminal (RVT) can be provided to the
unit being directly supported by the UAV. Perishable targeting data collected by the
UAV can be fed NRT to an MSC. Pre-planned UAV missions can be diverted to
support unfolding battlespace events. If time does not permit consulting the SARC
OIC and/or the G2 CMO for a divert mission, then divert authority can come
immediately from the MEF COC Watch Officer--the direct representative of the
Commander--through concurrence with G2 and G3 Watch Officers. Figure 3,
"Divert of a Pre-planned UAV Mission," depicts a UAV executing three collateral
missions while flying one preplanned orbit. Starting on a preplanned collection
mission, the UAV detects targets of opportunity and reports back to the SARC. This
activates a rapid targeting process involving the G2, G3, and Force Fires
Coordination Center (FFCC). The UAV stays on station to provide immediate post
strike BDA. This is an excellent example of intelligence and targeting synchronizing
operations to maximize a RSTA asset. Appendix A elaborates on the events involved
in a divert mission.
Ground sensor reports also feed into the SARC, are "analyzed" by the SCAMP
platoon element, and passed to the CIC/MAFC. Generally, since the SARC and CIC
are only a door apart, a hard copy report is hand-carried to the CIC. The CMO, G2
operations officer, the MEF All Source Fusion Center (MAFC) analysts, and/or the
target intelligence officer quickly review the report in the context of the current
battlespace. Based on its perishability and contents, a determination may be made to
pass the information immediately to the COC and FFCC/Targeting section for target
consideration. In some instances, the information may be further analyzed, integrated
with other sources, and folded into the next published MEF Intelligence Summary
(INTSUM). If the information is perishable and of vital concern to an MSC, the G2
Operations Officer directs immediate dissemination of the "information" to the
subordinate G2 via the most expeditious means: phone, radio net, Local Area
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Network (LAN), Intelligence Analysis Station (IAS), Joint Deployable Intelligence
Support System (JDISS), or courier.
Force Reconnaissance team reports either enter the SARC directly through the
doctrinal net or flow first (or simultaneously) to the adjacent Reconnaissance
Operations Center (ROC). The Force Reconnaissance Element manning the SARC
collates the data and passes it through the SARC to the CIC/MAFC. The same
process detailed above for SCAMP reports occurs: the report can receive immediate
action/forwarding to the G3/COC, be further analyzed with other sources, and/or can
be passed immediately to an MSC as perishable information.
During operations, the CMO and SARC OIC continuously update the collection
strategy based on the enemy situation, collections input, commander's guidance, focus
of main effort, scheme of maneuver, subordinate units' collection requirements, and
future operations. In conjunction with current doctrinal operations planning, the MEF
collection plan works on a 72 hour cycle, and is updated every 24 hours via record
message traffic as the MEF Collections Operations Message.
CHAPTER II
THE EXPANDED CHARTER FOR RSTA OPERATIONS
Impact of Service-Related and National-Level Developments
MEF Collection Management (CM) procedures described in Chapter I work fairly
well when the MEF G2 CMO deals solely with organic SRIG assets. However, over
the past few years numerous developments at the national level, and a major change
in the role assumed by the MEF Command Element during operations have expanded
significantly the charter for RSTA asset employment, and prompted a review of
RSTA management within the MEF:
--The MAGTF now operates frequently with joint and combined forces, gaming
valuable exposure to RSTA sensors and assets at Service, theater and national levels.
--I MEF functioned as a Unified Task Force (UTF) in Somalia, experiencing
unique RSTA planning during a combined, joint Humanitarian Operation.
--MAGTFs continue to exercise as JTFs or Component headquarters (MEF as the
Warfighter) during CINC and MEF-level exercises, capturing lessons learned in the
RSTA realm.
--The ongoing battle over roles and missions created an unexpected RSTA
windfall: many national collection platforms uniquely configured for reconnaissance
and surveillance during the heyday of the USSR are scrambling to redefine their role
in the current threat environment. Several collection platforms have broadened their
charter, increased accessibility to their assets, and have been more responsive to
Service interoperability concerns.(5)
--Post Operation DESERT STORM, theater and national assets and agencies
refocussed development of support measures from the strategic to the operational and
tactical level. National agencies endeavored to inculcate collection management
awareness at the Service and Component levels, assist Service collection planning and
operations with a pool of experts, and educate the Services regarding the capability of
the national community to support a combat commander. The desired end state being
Service/Components with the knowledge and expertise to tap into the theater and
national pipelines, subsequently enhancing the ability of the national intelligence
community to successfully support future operations.
--The latest national top-down strategy for RSTA acquisition and upgrades
stresses joint interoperability and streamlining the response time and accessibility of
RSTA sensors and assets. There is a major emphasis on sensor-to-shooter capability
in collection platforms, with NRT downlink to a common user ground station--one
that is fielded with each Service and is interoperable with a variety of RSTA
platforms.
--The Marine Corps Mid Range Threat Estimate 1995-2005 states there will be a
steady advance to UAV technology, with integration of multispectral sensor
technologies to increase target detection, identification, and acquisition.(6) This
means Marine Corps intelligence and operations planners must exercise greater
coordination to better utilize the enhanced potential. Moreover, as Near Real Time
(NRT), sensor-to-shooter capability increases, the demand and necessity to deliver
information directly to the tactical commander grows. The Marine Corps must build-
in, up front, the requirement for the requisite downlink modules, communications
equipment, and band width.
--Manning, training, and budgetary restraints compel Marine Corps leadership to
make hard choices regarding billets filled, training conducted, and dollars allocated
for special projects or capabilities. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps already is years
behind the other Services regarding organic collection capability, funding for
additional RSTA sensors, and trained collection management personnel. The Marine
Corps must relook priorities in this arena, making a firm commitment to plus-up
organic RSTA capability, and increase connectivity to and interoperability with other
Service and theater/national sensors. At a minimum, this should include developing a
core of Collection Managers within the Marine Corps, and participation in formal CM
training programs such as the excellent Army courses conducted at Ft. Huachuca,
Arizona.(7)
Noting these shortcomings, standard MAGTF collection management operating
procedures have reached overload and are inadequate to rapidly, judiciously, and
safely synchronize the employment of finite, high-value RSTA assets within the
operational sequence. New doctrinal procedures for the control, management, and
integration of RSTA assets within the MAGTF intelligence and operational cycles are
required. Vital to any implementation of doctrinal changes is commander and
operator awareness that the proposal is sound, corrects a defined problem and
contributes to more efficient mission accomplishment.
No matter how superb the informal working relationship is among the MEF
Command Element staff, the burgeoning complexities in RSTA and collection
synchronization mandate adoption of a new doctrinal approach. The significant
developments outlined in the preceding section highlight changes in the way the
national community approaches RSTA challenges, and the glaring requirement for the
Marine Corps to get in step with changes in collection asset acquisition, management,
and employment. There are specific areas within the MAGTF intelligence and
operations cycles that are impacted directly by the "RSTA revolution." These are the
areas that must receive optimum attention and focus.
MAGTF Target Areas
Communications and Intelligence Systems Architecture. The communications
architecture required to support intelligence operations (collection, reporting,
processing, and dissemination) has expanded greatly. New intelligence work
stations/systems and communications capabilities have increased access to varied
RSTA assets; but these advances also have increased requirements for interoperability
and connectivity. Often, doctrinal nets are overloaded as multiple users share finite
circuits. Hasty work-arounds are implemented to achieve connectivity during
peacetime operations that may not be feasible under combat operations. More than
ever, the G6 and G2 must combine efforts during development of the Intelligence
Systems Architecture to ensure high value, perishable information is received in the
appropriate form, by the appropriate user, in a timely fashion. Knowing the unique
communications requirements of attached and supporting RSTA platforms is critical to
ensuring compatibility and interoperability. Timely, multiparty dissemination of
various forms of information and intelligence over redundant communications paths
requires updating our intelligence systems architecture. Hard choices regarding finite
satellite channel access, band width, and communications assets (radios, receivers,
mobile ground stations, remote receive terminals) are a commander's responsibility
and will reflect his concept of operations, focus of main effort, and vision for
success.
Asset Allocation and Management. Top down planning must determine the
allocation of high-value, finite RSTA assets. A unity of effort at the MEF level is
required for responsible, judicious asset management. This must not be solely a G2
responsibility; rather, Commander's intent/guidance, coupled with future operations
planning, must frame the process, and the intelligence and operations planners must
share responsibility for synchronization. The complexities and simultaneity of RSTA
operations demand coordinated management to ensure successful, productive results
for the command.
Sound management covers both planning and execution phases. Rapidly unfolding
events in the battlespace requires decision maldng to keep pace if a commander hopes
to stay ahead of the enemy's observation, orientation, decision and action cycles. For
example, a responsive, flexible decision making capability is vital when weighing the
consequences of diverting a RSTA asset from a pre-assigned mission for support of
immediate target exploitation. This should not be an issue of operations over
intelligence; rather, a case of maximizing assets to accomplish the end state. Given
the scarcity and high value of RSTA assets, it is the commander's responsibility to
determine risk vs gain for their employment, based on his vision for success.
Asset Integration in Operational Cycles. Attached and/or supporting RSTA
platforms must be integrated completely into the intelligence and operations cycles,
with cognizant staff sections conducting requisite planning for each asset. For
example, it is virtually impossible for the G2 CMO to involve himself intimately in
the intricacies of air space management inherent in operational planning for an aerial
RSTA asset while still trying to orchestrate a redundant, multisource MEF collection
plan. Consider what is required to integrate an attached P3-C detachment into the
intelligence-operations cycles. The MEF commander, his staff, and the MSCs receive
an operational briefing from the P3 squadron to learn the capabilities and limitations
of the platform, and brainstorm ways to best integrate the RSTA asset into the
intelligence and operations cycles. Once a feasible concept is conceived, coordinating
planned P3-C operations with the MEF's battle space activities begins. Integration of
the P3-C demands full participation of the G3 Air Officer from the moment a request
through channels for asset support is formulated. The G3 Air Officer must ensure
that P3 pilots and crews are integrated into the operations planning and attend
requisite briefings. Optimumly, a liaison officer is exchanged or identified early on.
The G3 Air Officer conducts requisite planning/training ensuring P3-C crew
familiarization with: the MAGTF air command, control, and tasking system;
frequencies, call signs, air space restrictions, and control measures. All aviation
matters--fuel, refueling, bed down sites, supply and maintenance--are planned and
managed by the G3 Air Officer and the P3 LNO. The G6 and G2 Systems Officers
work closely with the P3 intelligence and communications representative to determine
unique communication requirements and plan for required nets, satellite channel, and
encryption requirements; establish connectivity at appropriate sites and ensure system
compatibility; and identify any additional MEF support required for successful P3-C
integrated operations. The G2 Operations Officer, the CMO, Systems Officer, and
G6 determine time sensitive dissemination requirements for the P3-C's NRT
information, as well as dissemination paths for fused intelligence derived from P3
collection efforts. The G2 apprises the P3 crew of unique USMC intelligence
collection and reporting requirements and procedures, provides intelligence briefs on
the Area of Responsibility and Interest (AOR), (AOI), and tasks the ACE G2 with the
conduct of P3-C pilot debriefs.(8)
The G2 CMO and SRIG coordinate requirements for imagery interpretation
support, and determine any requirement for photographic lab or tape dubbing
facilities/equipment. Physical security for the air platform and or crew may be an
issue. Depending where the platform stages from (a benign, low or high threat site),
the G2 may need to coordinate with other MAGTF agencies to establish a security
plan for the platform/crew.(9)
Obviously, planning for just this one resource involved every MEF staff section,
the SRIG, and MSCs to be supported. Only MEF level coordination of all the cycles
ensured successful synchronization of the RSTA resource within MAGTF operations.
OPSEC, OPDEC, and Targeting Synchronization. Once a RSTA collection
plan is drated, the G2 CMO must ensure it supports the commander's planning
guidance, answers critical information requirements, and supports current and future
operational requirements. This balancing act requires constant coordination,
prioritization, and deconfliction of collection, targeting, security, and other operations
plans. Assets pivotal for collection on one area of interest may be equally critical for
target acquisition or I&W in another area. Alternatively, use of a RSTA asset directed
against a specific collection area could adversely affect MEF operational security
(OPSEC) or operational deception (OPDEC) plans. Players must have situational
awareness, and coordinate daily RSTA scheduling to ensure maximum targeting value
is derived from assets; and that assets are considered to support a deception operation
or assist in OPSEC.
The Dangers of Staying Our Present Course
The "new wave" RSTA assets offer a tantalizing potential to the MAGTF
commander. However, their effective employment demands comprehensive MEF
staff coordination. Mission planning and execution considerations must be
coordinated, lest any one pivotal criteria is overlooked. In the past, the G2 CMO, the
SARC OIC, the SRIG S3, individual SRIG units, and/or the MEF G3 attempted to
coordinate the complexities and intricacies of RSTA operations in an ADHOC, "good
faith" manner. For various reasons, planning sometimes is conducted in a vacuum or
haphazardly. Key players may be left uninformed or only have pieces of the RSTA
strategy. This ultimately degrades mission execution. For example, improper
coordination could result in:
--No helo support arranged for extraction of a force reconnaissance team;
--No satellite communication channel allocated/available for a Special Operations
Force (SOF) team;
--No Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) plan developed, no
extraction plan coordinated;
--Air space deconfliction not conducted;
--Restricted Fire Areas (RFA) or Reconnaissance Operating Areas (ROA) not
disseminated to appropriate command and control activities;
--Unclear mission assignment or collection direction provided to RSTA assets;
--Insufficient band width or connectivity planned for delivery of information to an
MSC.
If current MEF collection planning and procedures do not adjust to meet the
challenge, the Marine Corps risks falling further behind other Services in developing
doctrine, systems, and capabilities to exploit new wave RSTA potential. Intelligence,
operations, and communications officers must be conditioned to synchronize
comprehensive RSTA collection planning. This ensures maximizing the commander's
resources for unity of effort in mission accomplishment; provides timely dissemination
of finished intelligence to the MAGTF, and allows perishable information to reach the
MSCs in NRT.
CHAPTER III
A NEW DIRECTION FOR MEF RSTA COORDINATION
Doctrinal Change
After consideration of RSTA developments from the national to the tactical level,
and having reviewed standing MEF collection management procedures, it is evident a
doctrinal change is required for the MEF's approach to RSTA collection planning. A
new doctrine must embed RSTA collection management within intelligence and
operations cycles. The proposed venue for accomplishing this is through
institutionalizing a MEF-level oversight, planning, and management board--the
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition Board or RSTAB. This standing
board should be comprised primarily of key staff members from the MEF Command
Element. This dual-hatting alleviates any requirement for additional staffing, and
imposes no extra layer of command and control.
Before considering the formation of a steering committee within a staff, are there
any existing structures on which to build? Two frameworks, used predominantly in
joint operations, exist: the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) and the Daily Aerial
Reconnaissance and Surveillance (DARS) Meeting. The RSTAB would combine the
purpose and activities of both--joining the operations of the JRC with the collection
management of the DARS--within a MEF level board. In both the short and long
term, this better prepares MAGTFs for joint, combined RSTA coordination and
management. Of overarching importance, the formation of a MEF level board that
mirror-images joint board fosters a working comprehension by Marine commanders
and staff with the intricacies of joint, combined RSTA collection process. In turn,
they are better prepared to articulate and secure Marine targeting and collection
requirements when faced with highly competitive brokering in a joint arena.
A brief overview of the JRC and DARS appears below. The RSTAB is presented
as an attractive alternative at little cost but much gain to the command.
The Joint Reconnaissance Center. In a joint environment, the function of the
Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) is to monitor the operational status of assigned or
supporting RSTA assets, establish priorities to support current or new collection
requirements, assign tasks to available RSTA systems, coordinate and deconflict
RSTA missions with other operations within the AOR, assess the mission risk versus
intelligence gain, and monitor ongoing operations.(10) In essence, the JRC is the
brain center for theater RSTA management. A JRC concept has not been
implemented at a MEF level; rather, the G3, SARC, and G2/CMO have fulfilled its
functions adhoc. However, the typical JRC activities are precisely those requiring
Commander's direction to achieve unity of effort in the intelligence and operations
cycles.
Another coordinating body for RSTA operations in the joint environment is the
Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), appointed by the Joint Force
Commander (JFC). The JFACC'S responsibilities normally include:
... planning, coordinating, allocating and tasking of apportioned airborne RSTA
assets made available, based on the JFC's apportionment decision. Following
the JFC's guidance, and in coordination with other Service Component
Commanders, the JFACC recommends to the JFC apportionment of air sorties....
For short-term arrangements, RSTA forces may also be attached to a
subordinate command to which tactical control (TACON) authority is
delegated.(11)
Marine commanders need to be sensitized to the JFACC role in RSTA management:
one of the three types of sorties that a MAGTF commander is directed to make
available to the JFC, for tasking through the JFACC, is long-range reconnaissance.
(12) When the Advanced Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System (ATARS) for the F-
18, and the medium and long range UAVs enter the Marine Corps inventory,
commanders must be cognizant of the organic RSTA capability they are providing to
the JFC. So that a JFC's tasking for these high value sorties support-to some
degree--MAGTF RSTA interests, Marine commanders and planners must understand
the RSTA platforms' capabilities and limitations, be eloquent and persistent in their
articulation of MAGTF RSTA requirements, and be prepared to demand additional
JFC RSTA capability if organic support is depleted.
The Daily Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Meeting (DARS). As
implemented during DESERT STORM, this collection management group was the
venue for prioritizing and coordinating joint collection and targeting requirements.
The DARS meeting brought together collectors (platform experts) and collection
management personnel on a daily basis to review the theater collection plan, assign
Components' access to theater collection platforms, and prioritize collection for
national collection systems. The meeting was scheduled after the daily Joint Target
Board (JTB) so that RSTA prioritization would include the JTB's imagery
nominations for prestrike validation, post strike BDA, and target development. The
DARS's end state was to maximize RSTA assets to support operational requirements
of the JFC and Components.
There were two drawbacks to the DARS. First, it generally concerned itself with
theater and national-level RSTA assets. The fact that all Components had organic
collection capability that could support the JTF was not fully exploited. To the credit
of joint collection managers participating in such subsequent peacetime training
exercises as the Air Force's Blue Flag series (a major air tasking and targeting
evolution), the concept of the DARS has expanded since Operation DESERT
STORM. Not only does an evolving DARS CONOPS validate and prioritize theater
air breather collection and national overhead reconnaissance requirements, but the
assembled CM group considers the collection operations and emphasis of each
Component, to include SOF. In this manner, units operating in close proximity,
knowing they have similar collection emphasis, can coordinate collection to maximize
assets and benefit from each other's RSTA missions.
The second shortfall of the DESERT STORM era DARS meeting was that its
major players were primarily intelligence personnel, with little participation from the
operations side of the house. Most RSTA planning developed at the DARS's
subsequently had to be coordinated and deconflicted with the J3 side. Better time
management would have been achieved if the key J2 and J3 planners attended the
same meeting and synchronized operations at that time.
Many intelligence personnel came away from the DESERT STORM DARS
experience with a healthy respect for the value of embedding RSTA planning within
the intelligence and operations cycles. However, as Marines who held this
operational experience rotated to other billets or retired, many of the valuable lessons
learned departed also. Thus it is MAGTFs now confront a brewing crisis regarding
RSTA coordination and planning. To preserve and build on the best principles of
RSTA oversight inherent within a JRC and DARS, the Marine Corps must
institutionalize synchronized intelligence-operations management of RSTA assets.
In both garrison training and operational deployments, MEF G2s continue to
expand on the DARS concept. However, Navy, Air Force, and Army operators often
are better versed and attune to RSTA planning rigors than Marine commanders and
operators. Whereas both collection managers and operators from other services
acquiesce to RSTA planning, all too often Marine operators want to leave it in the
G2's realm.(13)
The MEF RSTAB
The proposed MEF RSTAB would join and institutionalize the intelligence
collection and targeting oversight embodied by the DARS and the operational mission
planning inherent in the JRC. To replicate the planning cycles a MEF is likely to
experience in a joint arena, a daily RSTAB meeting will be scheduled after the MEF
Target Board (MTB) meets (Chapter IV details the process). The RSTAB (assuming
DARS and JRC responsibilities) fulfills the purpose of a MAGTF-styled DARS
meeting, and alleviates the need for a separate JRC-type structure at the MEF level.
The RSTAB will reap immediate command and control benefits for the MAGTF
commander. Through the Board, the Commander allocates judiciously limited
resources to maximize RSTA support for mission success. Solely from a staffing
view, institutionalizing the RSTAB will not be burdensome since the majority of all
players (with the exception of LNOs and SRIG personnel) are resident on the MEF
staff. Finally, by implementing a doctral approach to RSTA oversight within the
MAGTF, Marine commanders prepare themselves for the complexities of RSTA
mission management--via a JRC, DARS, and/or JFACC--in a joint or combined
environment.
To ensure that the RSTAB has the right people, in one place, at the correct time
for coordinating RSTA collection planning, the following board membership is
essential (In the interest of personal time management, attendance guidelines are
offered as notes below):
RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION BOARD
**DEPUTY G3, RSTAB CHAIRMAN **
SRIG CO (or INTELLIGENCE BATTALLION COMMANDER)
G3 AIR OFFICER
G3 FUTURE OPERATIONS OFFICER
G3/DEPUTY FORCE FIRES OFFICER, FORCE FIRES COORDINATION
CENTER
G3 TARGET INFORMATION OFFICER (Note 1)
DEPUTY G2 OR G2 OPERATIONS OFFICER (Note 2)
G2 PLANS OFFICER (Note 3)
G2 COLLECTION MANAGEMENT OFFICER
G2 TARGET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (Note 1)
G2 INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS/ARCHITECTURE OFFICER (Note 4)
G6 OPERATIONS OFFICER (Note 4)
RSTA RESOURCE LIAISON OFFICERS (Note 5)
LNOS OR COLLECTION MANAGERS FROM MSC OR ATTACHED UNITS
(Note 6)
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAM (NIST) REPRESENTATIVE
NOTE 1: Attendance of either the Target Information or Target Intelligence Officer is
acceptable to field targeting issues.
NOTE 2: Either the Deputy G2 or G2 Operations Officer may attend, depending on
which has the best situational awareness.
NOTE 3: The G2 Plans Officer augments G3 Future Operations during operational
planning, and does most of his coordination prior to the board meeting with the
CMO. Thus, his interests can be represented by the Deputy G3, Future Operations
and/or the G2 CMO.
NOTE 4: The G2 Systems Officer and G6 Operations Officer conduct joint
architecture planning; the one with the best grasp of intelligence-communications
planning for RSTA operations should attend.
Note 5: Each supporting or attached RSTA asset must provide an LNO.
Note 6: CMOs and/or LNOs from each MSC and/or attached units are encouraged to
attend.
RSTAB Membership
Deputy G3. The board will be chaired by the Deputy G3 to optimize integration
of intelligence and operations. The Deputy G3 provides the punch behind RSTAB
planning, coordination, and tasking. Importantly, key members of the RSTAB come
from within the G3 (Air, Force Fires, Target Information, and Future Operations
Officers). Specific direction and guidance from the Deputy G3 to the G3 staff will
reduce significantly the time and effort other Board members spend coordinating
intricate RSTA mission planning with various G3 sections. The Deputy G3
supervises MEF efforts to embed RSTA collection planning within the operations
cycle.
SRIG Commander or the Intelligence Battalion Commander. Pending
implementation of the Marine Corps' plan to reorganize the SRIG into the MEF
Support Group, either the SRIG commander and/or his S3 (under the old SRIG
concept), or the Intelligence Battalion Commander (under the new reorganization) will
be a standing RSTAB member. Note, the Intelligence Battalion concept has merit;
see Appendix B for a proposed mission statement and concept of command and
control for the new Intelligence Battalion.
The majority of the MEF's organic RSTA collection assets reside within the
SRIG. Moreover, either the SRIG S3 (old concept) or Intelligence Battalion CO (new
concept) function as the OIC of the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC).
As such, he will be intimately involved with the capabilities, limitations, and
operational status of organic collections assets. Additionally, LNOs for attached
RSTA assets may also be located within the SARC. The Commander determines
where attached RSTA platforms best support the MAGTF: in general support to the
MAGTF--and located in either the Combat Operations Center, Combat Intelligence
Center, or the SARC--or in direct support of an MSC. The SARC OIC represents his
units {Force Reconnaissance Company, Imagery Interpretation Unit (IIU),
Topographic Platoon, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Company, and Sensor Control
and Management Platoon (SCAMP)} at the RSTAB. Note, recent force structure
changes have placed the UAV Company within the Aviation structure. However,
Operational Control continues to reside with the MEF Commmander, exercised
through the staff cognizance of the MEF G2. UAV Company personnel will still
participate as part of the MEF-SRIG team. A UAV element will be fully
integrated into MEF RSTA planning and operations, and continue to man the
UAV downlink at the MEF SARC.(14)
G3 Air Officer. Many RSTA assets are either aerial platforms, or rely on air for
insertion, extraction, and targeting operations. The G3 Air Officer must be actively.
intimately involved in RSTA planning and implementation. As an example, he must
coordinate MAGTF aviation planning efforts to ensure: RSTA flights are scheduled
in a timely, coordinated fashion and appear on the ATO; air space restrictions are
deconflicted; requisite CEOI documentation--frequencies, communications shifts,
encryption guidance--is provided to RSTA crews/LNOs; air procedures are briefed to
RSTA pilots and crews; and aviation-peculiar support measures (such as fueling,
basing, and resupply issues) are coordinated fully. The G3 Air Officer's
participation on the Board embeds RSTA planning within the Air Tasking and
Operations cycles.
G3, Future Operations Officer. As a pivotal board player, the Future
Operations Officer forces RSTA planners to balance collection requirements for both
future and current operations. Future operations focus on possible course of
friendly/enemy action/reaction, thereby driving future RSTA collection planning. The
Future Operations Officer, working with the G2 Plans Officer, also coordinates
and/or deconflicts Operational Security (OPSEC) and Operational Deception
(OPDEC) operations with RSTA missions. His participation on the Board embeds
RSTA planning within the Future Operations cycle.
Deputy Force Fires Coordination Officer, G3. The Deputy Force Fires
Coordination Officer brings additional operational and targeting depth to the RSTAB.
During the meeting, the Force Fires Officer focuses on the scheduled RSTA
collection effort for close and deep operations. He acquaints himself with RSTA
assets that are on station throughout the day that could assist force fires planning and
reactive targeting. The establishment and deconfliction of Restricted Fire Areas,
Reconnaissance Operating Areas, and Protected Target Lists are other critical matters
that require Force Fires coordination and that will be briefed to the Board. The
participation of the FFC Officer on the RSTAB focuses members on the commander's
priority of targets, and provides RSTA situational awareness to MAGTF target
acquisition planning.
G3 Target Information Officer. This individual, in concert with the G2 Target
Intelligence Officer, brings depth to the targeting acquisition facets of RSTA, and
helps prioritize collection on target development, validation (pre-strike), and BDA.
His continuous coordination with the G2 TIO guarantees timely, accurate intelligence
will identity and satisfy fire support planning requirements. His participation on the
Board embeds the targeting cycle within RSTA planning.
Deputy G2 or G2 Operations Officer. Either the Deputy G2 or G2 Operations
Officer participates as the senior intelligence officer on the board, bringing situational
awareness of all G2 operations to each meeting.
G2 Plans Officer. The G2 Plans Officer coordinates with G3 Future Operations,
defining intelligence and collection requirements in support of future plans. This
officer also works closely with the G2 CMO, ensuring operations past 72 hours are
supported by RSTA collection operations.
G2 Collection Manager. The RSTAB is, after all, the proving ground for the
CMO's collection strategy. To streamline RSTAB coordination, and limit the length
of the daily RSTAB meeting, the CMO staff conducts continuous planning and
coordination with the staff (as well as the G2 branch). The centerpiece of the
RSTAB's daily agenda is review and coordination of the draft 72 hour RSTA
Collection Operations Message. Based on the Commander's daily guidance and
information requirements, this message assigns collection priorities and tasks for all
organic and attached RSTA assets; identifies specific collectibles per mission; assigns
exploitation/production responsibility; and details dissemination paths for collected
information and finished intelligence.(15) From this message, Board members derive
individual tasks, essential to mission accomplishment, they will coordinate. To
ensure this draft collections nrarching order reflects synchronized intelligence and
operations planning, the CMO must have continual situational awareness, and
thoroughly understand the Commander's intent and CIRs. The CMO ensures the
requirements of the MSCs and/or adjacent, attached units are tabled at the RSTAB,
and that the MEF collection plan considers MSC Priority Intelligence Requirements
(PIR) and collection gaps. The CMO identifies all gaps in the MEF RSTA collection
capability and forwards requirements up the chain of command. Additional RSTA
platforms, or the intelligence collected from a national asset that satisfies a MEF
requirement, may be requested. The CMO works with the G2 Operations and
Systems Officers to determine intelligence architecture requirements in support of
RSTA strategy; ensure interoperability between RSTA platforms and MEF systems;
and develop a dissemination plan to feed information RT or NRT to MSCs as
required, and finished intelligence to the MAGTF. In conjunction with the SARC
OIC and RSTA LNOs, the CMO maintains situational awareness of collection
platform availability and capability. The CMO embeds coflection planning within
the operations cycle.
G2 Target Intelligence Officer. With the G3 Target Information Officer, the G2
Target Intelligence Officer performs target analysis and maintains a fusion cell for all-
source BDA that includes integration of national-level collection/reporting. The G2
TIO helps determine what targeting products are required to support RSTA
operations. His participation on the RSTAB provides an emphasis on target
information collection planning.
The G2 Systems Officer. Without the coordination of the G2 Systems and G6
Operations Officers, RSTA planning can be squandered. These individuals examine
connectivity, interoperability, and compatibility issues associated with employment of
averse RSTA assets. They coordinate on such matters as the feasibility of providing
NRT feeds to an MSC or subordinate unit. They examine what communications path,
data link, or system the MAGTF requires to receive certain data, collection products,
and/or reports. Their participation on the RSTAB fosters continued awareness of
RSTA communications-intelligence requirements, and embeds C4I within the
operations cycles.
G6 Operations Officer. The G6 works closely with the G2 Systems Officer to
Ensure a robust, integrated, redundant Command, Control, Communications and
Computers Plan supports the RSTA collection cycle. The G6 and G2 ensure
appropriate coordination conducted during and after the meeting is reflected in the
Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions (CEOI) and other communications
planning; requisite band width, satellite channels, data links, secure LANs, etc. have
been identified in support of RSTA employment; and any potential show stoppers
have been flagged, with recommended alternatives or work-arounds tendered.
RSTA LNOs. The MEF CE requires a Liaison Officer for each attached or
supporting RSTA asset. The LNO identifies his platform's operational requirements
to MEF planners, and coordinates specific planning considerations (beddown sites,
refueling requirements, maintenance issues, mission planning criteria,
communications/intelligence architecture and processing requirements) with relavent
MEF staff. As a RSTAB member, the LNO briefs planners on the capabilities and
limitations of his platform to support a task.
MSC CMOs or LNOs. The MSCs submit their command requirements to the
G2 daily via their Collection Emphasis Message.(16) However, their presence at the
daily RSTAB meeting may clarify or refine their collection requirements and is to be
encouraged. Obviously, there will be times when the distance between headquarters
precludes their daily participation. Their participation on the Board embeds RSTA
planning with the intelligence and operations cycles of the MSCs.
National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). When a NIST augments a
MAGTF operation, a representative sits on the RSTAB. The NIST representative
observes the MAGTF RSTA collection planning process, understands the
Commander's focus of effort, and notes organic/attached collection potential. As the
G2 CMO identifies collection gaps, the NIST representative briefs the Board on the
availability and capability of national assets or collection/production efforts to support
MAGTF RSTA planning. He also acquaints the Board with the national collection
focus regarding the MAGTF operation, and indicates if other Service and theater
collection priorities compete with or could support MAGTF requirements. His
participation on the Board embeds situational awareness of the national collection
focus withing the MAGTF's RSTA planning process.
RSTAB: A Command and Control View
Organizing resources based on the task at hand is one of the functions of
command and control. The RSTAB is ideally suited to support organizational theory
(as defined in FMFRP 15-3) within the context of command and control. Likewise,
although not always considered as such, organization is an important tool of
command and control.(17) The RSTAB, as an "organization," becomes the
commander's tool for managing RSTA resources. The Board brings together the
specialized expertise of the MEF staff and LNOs to provide oversight and
coordination of RSTA missions while fulfilling Commander's guidance. Through the
RSTAB, the Commander establishes unity of command and unity of effort for RSTA
planning and operations. The Board has no authority in its own right; any delegated
authority to the Deputy G3 for day-to-day supervision and management comes from
the Commander. The Commander retains responsibility for RSTA management,
and is final arbitrator on the daily 72 hour RSTA Collection Operations Message.
CHAPTER IV
RSTAB PROCEDURES
A comprehensive schematic of RSTAG coordination and planning appears as
Figure 4 (foldout). This section elaborates on that planning cycle.
During operations, the RSTAB must meet daily to support RSTA coordination
and synchronization with all intelligence and operations cycles. The meeting should
be scheduled sometime after the MEF Targeting Board (MTB) completes its daily
planning, yet before the ATO cycle for the next 24-72 hours has progressed too far.
Generally, the MTB meets sometime in the morning. An hour or so thereafter
(allowing time for a break, coordination, and staff planning) would be the optimum
scheduled time for the daily RSTAB meeting. Note, in a joint environment, the
DARS meeting is scheduled soon after the JTB completes its meeting so that decisions
reached therein can be passed to the DARS for collection planning. Similarly, MTB
nominations for the next 24-72 hours must be incorporated in the RSTA collection
cycle--along with nominations for such activities as intelligence collection, I&W,
and/or deception operations.
The daily RSTAB meeting opens with an overview of RSTA results during the
past 24 hours. A G2 analyst provides a brief overview of the current enemy
situation; the G3 provides an overview of current and future operations. Updated
CCIR and PIR are briefed to focus planners on Commander's intent and to focus the
main collection effort. The G2 CMO briefs three RSTA planning cycles captured
within the draft 72 hour RSTA Collections Operations Message: RSTA operations
underway, those approved for 48 hours out, and those proposed for 72 hours out.
The CMO drafts the message prior to the meeting: this message serves as the stepping
off point for the daily agenda.
As the CMO briefs ongoing RSTA operations for the 24 hour period underway,
he notes any changes to the published message plan. Under the 72 hour planning
cycle, these RSTA operations were briefed to the board two days earlier and now,
fully coordinated and tasked, are in the execution phase. Next, the 48 hour RSTA
collection plan his briefed--a plan approved as the 72 hour plan by the RSTAB one day
earlier. Finally, the CMO presents the proposed RSTA plan for 72 hours out. This
one incorporates the latest Commander's intent, information requirements, future
operations, mission analysis, assumptions regarding potential enemy activity,
operational requirements-- such as OPDEC--MSC collection focus, and results from
previous collection.
RSTA Operations Under Way (24 hr). As the RSTA plan under execution is
briefed for the day, any RSTAB member who has reason to request a change may do
so. For example, the FFCC and MSC representatives request UAV's in direct
support of the GCE based on indications of heavy vehicular movement into the AOR
within 12 hours and the potential for enemy engagement. Or the G6 reports that
satellite access is unavailable for the next six-10 hours and that alternative
communications paths are being pursued for particular RSTA assets.
Two Day Plan (48 hr). After any adjustments to the 24 hour plan, the 48 hour
plan is discussed (the 72 hour plan approved the day prior). Each member working
to coordinate planning can indicate accomplishments, highlight problem areas
regarding his part in mission planning. For example, a supporting P3-C is scheduled
to fly a last-look, stand-off collection mission in support of a force reconnaissance
team insertion at twilight. A review of operations for the 48 hour plan ensures that
the P3-Cs are on the ATO, the weather is good, the insertion area/plan is the same;
and dissemination to the Reconnaissance Operations Center (ROC) has been obtained.
Additional RSTA requirements for the P3-C mission may be tabled.
Three Day Plan. Finally, the CMO presents the 72 hour collection strategy,
with a brief explanation of what factors drove the planning. At this stage, all RSTAB
players have input, any changes can be discussed, routes redirected, targets
reconsidered, insertion/extraction plans revisited, and risk vs gains considered for
each collection operation.
One of the key selling point of the RSTAB is that all the right planners and
operators are in one room at the same time, and coordinate such changes as ATO
schedules, and revised ROA and RFA. Cognizant staff members get their marching
orders directly, unequivocally, from the Commander, as passed by the RSTAB
Chairman, the Deputy G3. Once the meeting adjourns, Board members disperse for
further coordination: Force Fires and G3 Air make necessary adjustments to their
plans and notify requisite personnel/units of any changes; the G6 can adjust the
communications plan as required; and the SARC/Intelligence Battalion Commanding
Officer briefs collection units/issues orders based on the final decisions of the
RSTAB. The CMO makes necessary changes to the RSTA collections operations
messages before it goes to the Commander for final approval. Once approved, the
MAGTF knows that unity of Command and unity of effort are tied to the RSTA
planning and that coordination focused on sound resource management.
The purpose of the RSTAB meeting is not to conduct detailed, exhaustive mission
planning. Rather, members coordinate the broader issues such as examining the
validity and necessity of missions; or coordinating and/or deconflicting RSTA
operations with regard to OPSEC and OPDEC. Perhaps most importantly, the Board
provides the unity of effort for intelligence and operations cycles supported by RSTA
missions. As RSTA LNOs, SRIG representatives, and other Board members
coordinate finite mission planning, the focus of effort from the RSTAB meeting
permeates all layers of the MAGTF, and synchronization of operations and
intelligence is more readily realized.(18)
RSTAB in Non-Deployed Environment
The RSTAB's role is equally important during garrison planning. In a pre-
hostilities environment, Commander's guidance on OPLANS and CONPLANS
generates intelligence requirements and operational planning within the MAGTF.
The RSTAB's planning, and its analysis of operational and intelligence requirements,
Click here to view image
help define gaps in intelligence, and prioritize requirements to the CINC and
national level for satisfaction. Thus, the requisite agencies and collection resources
can be tasked to monitor, collect, and produce against validated MAGTF
requirements.
A Commander must ensure that prioritized intelligence requirements are validated
and tasked for collection/production in a timely fashion to the appropriate agency.
By tasking the RSTAB to develop Contingency Collection Problem Sets (CPS), the
Commander generates an off-the-shelf collection package, validated at the national
level, that can be "turned on" as required. These imagery target sets are keyed to
operational planning and deployment (The set also can be collected on in peacetime to
satisty more limited planning needs). As a crisis erupts, the CPS can be activated,
and full-fledged collection starts to run, based on prestated requirements. Thus,
before organic collection capability can be deployed, the national level resources
already are reacting to pre-registered requirements. The RSTAB, augmented with G4
and G5 planners, is the best conduit to develop standing MEF requirements that
reflect coordinated operational needs.
CHAPTER V
EMBEDDING RSTA COLLECTION PLANNING WITHIN
INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS CYCLES
The Commander must require that an RSTA and intelligence activities and
assets are applied in time, space, and purpose to support the operations plan.
This synchronization process occurs across the range of military operations to provide
timely, accurate intelligence keyed to achieve operational objectives. This
integration of intelligence and operations ensures the totality of effort against the
enemy's center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.(19)
Chapter II reviewed how MEF's historically have conducted collection planning
and the pitfalls encountered. Now, availed of the RSTAB structure, the Marine
Corps has the opportunity to revisit the process. Under the new philosophy, RSTA
management is the Commander's responsibility; he provides the top-down planning
guidance and focus of effort for judicious management of the resources. He exercises
his authority through the framework of the RSTAB that in turn sets in action the
synchronization of intelligence and operations. This chapter focusses on the
Commander's responsibility and the process required to embed RSTA planning within
intelligence and operations cycles.
Command and Control
Technological improvements in mobility, range, lethality and information-
gathering continue to compress time and space, necessitating higher operating
tempos and creating a greater demand for information. Military forces move
more quickly over greater distances...engaging the enemy at greater ranges... The
consequence...is a fluid, rapidly changing military situation... The more quickly
the situation changes, the greater the need for continuously updated information
and the greater the strain on command and control.(20)
One of the three basic elements of command and control is information.(21) One
form of information is intelligence about the enemy: getting it, judging the accuracy
of it, processing it, and disseminating it to the MAGTF. Without information to
provide the basis for his knowledge of the situation, the Commander cannot make
sound decisions. Acquiring information and intelligence for his command is the
Commander's responsibility.(22)
There is no better example of the criticality of RSTA to command and control
that its role within the "OODA" Loop: the Commander's Observe, Orient, Decide,
Action Loop.
OODA LOOP In the observation phase, a multi-discipline, multisoucce RSTA
plan--based on IPB and coordinated to support all phases of an operation--ensures
the Commander's observations will be timely and comprehensive. This also reduces
the possibility of successful enemy deception operations.
After observing the situation, the Commander orients on it. In response, the
Board fuses RSTA collection planning with all intelligence and operations efforts to
provide the Commander analysis on the meaning and impact of observed enemy
activity.
Once he has oriented on the situation, the Commander decides on a course of
action based on his perception of collection efforts and intelligence analysis, and an
assessment of the friendly situation and operation plan. The RSTAB coordinates
missions that both support the friendly course of action and develop the enemy
situation. Their RSTA plan ensures survivable, reliable, suitable, interoperable assets
are synchronized to provide continuous, overlapping coverage on enemy activity of
vital interest to the Commander.
Having decided on a plan, the Commander's executes his course of action,
while RSTA operations monitor enemy reaction, and provide RT targeting acquisition
and I&W. As the Commander observes RSTA collection efforts, the OODA loop
cycle begins again.
The essence of the OODA Loop is the overarching importance of generating
tempo in command and control.(23) Embedding multisource, multidiscipline RSTA
collection planning within intelligence and operations cycles helps generate the tempo
a Commander needs.
How can the Commander use the RSTAB as a command and control facilitator?
One goal of effective command and control is recognizing enemy intent, capability,
and critical vulnerabilities. The Commander has the best chance of achieving this
goal through judicious management and tasking of all available RSTA resources.
Effective RSTA employment serves as a combat multiplier, optimizing friendly
strengths, exploiting enemy weaknesses, and countering enemy strengths.
Commander's direction of the RSTA collection process provides requisite vision "to
create vigorous and harmonious action among the various elements of the force."(24)
Focus of Effort. The Commander's responsibility for RSTA management
provides focus of effort to the MAGTF. Viewing his array of resources, the
Commander concentrates RSTA assets where they best support the mission at a given
time. Within Commander's guidance lies his image of the battlespace, his vision for
success. This direction guides the RSTAB's efforts to concentrate, prioritize, and
coordinate RSTA missions.
The RSTA Objective
Intelligence is the basis of operations. It underpins effective planning.
Assembling an accurate picture of the battlespace requires centralized direction,
simultaneous action at all levels of command, and timely distribution of information
throughout the command.
The primary objective of RSTA operations is to support military operations across
the operational continuum. RSTA operations are performed not only by forces with
primary RSTA missions, but other resources with either collateral missions or the
capability to perform such.(25) RSTA resources include units in contact with the
adversary, patrols, air defense elements, intelligence units, reconnaissance units, and
attached liaison officers. Whether planning for aerial reconnaissance, sea
surveillance, or ground reconnaissance, the availability and capabilities of RSTA
resources are critical to the success of military operations. Commanders must be
aware of each asset's characteristics and thoroughly weigh risk to platform against
value of information obtained.(26)
The RSTAB Contribution
Carefully coordinated RSTA missions provide the necessary information to
develop plans and operations. As the Commander's RSTA resources manager, the
Board ensures:
--Commander's guidance and intent are reflected in the RSTA plan;
--Unity of effort throughout the MAGTF in planning/executing RSTA missions;
--Maximum, responsible use of supporting, attached, and organic RSTA
capability;
--Risk vs gain factored into asset employment;
--Coordination with OPSEC/OPDEC/Electronic Attack (EA) planning;
--Synchronization with air, targeting, intelligence, and future operations cycles.
Planning and Employment. RSTA operations provide Commanders with the
current information necessary for planning operations, including contingencies.
When planning RSTA missions, the Board seeks the necessary information to assess
enemy strengths and activity, defensive and offensive capabilities, and other factors
affecting plans and operations. The same missions that provide this information can
deliver I&W of a threat or impending attack in sufficient time for an appropriate
response. Board members are involved in adaptive real-time planning for current
operations as well as initial planning.
Operational Support. RSTA operational-level support includes:
--Monitoring centers of gravity and enemy OOB against which the Commander
must concentrate his operations.
--Collecting information on enemy offensive and defensive system capabilities,
locations, and other data bases.
--Collecting information on the conduct of combat or support operations.(27)
Tactical Support. RSTA tactical support provides the detailed information
(terrain, enemy disposition, OOB, movement, offensive and defensive capabilities) a
maneuver commander needs to plan for employment of forces. This support includes
providing tactical forces with target detection and acquisition, and RT/NRT
intelligence on enemy activity and intent.(28)
RSTA--Embedded within Intelligence and Operations Planning
Modern intelligence collection systems can accumulate vast amounts of
information. To be useful, the information must be relevant, accurate, analyzed,
properly formatted, and disseminated in a timely manner to the appropriate user.(29)
This is only achieved through synchronizing the RSTA collection cycle with
intelligence and operations cycles.
The RSTA Collection Process. The RSTA collection process
comprises:
--Direction: Commander's Intent and Guidance
--RSTA Collection Planning
--Execution of Collection Operations
--Processing, Evaluating Information; Analysis, Production
--Dissemination
--Review and Revalidation of Results and Requirements
Direction. The RSTA collection cycle supports the Commander as he formulates
his estimate of the situation, a concept of operations, and the operation plan. During
the staff planning process, the Commander conveys his intent and information
requirements to the Board. Through IPB--the underpinning for collection and RSTA
operations--the G2 forms a basis for determining possible enemy courses of action,
intent, capabilities, and critical vulnerabilities. Working with the Board, the CMO
validates and prioritizes collection and intelligence requirements, and focuses
the RSTA collection effort in support of the Commander's objectives. Here, it is
absolutely crucial that the RSTAB understand the Commander's combat intelligence
requirements and his vision for success. For example, the G3 Board members
focus on how RSTA missions can best support friendly operations as well as develop
information on the enemy situation; the G2 CMO identifies organic RSTA
capabilities and gaps, accesses theater andIor national systems to cover shortfalls,
and to provide redundancy and verification; and the G6 insures a robust intelligence-
systems architecture can support receipt and delivery of RSTA information.(30)
Once hostilities begin, the commander continues to provide the direction and guidance
that drive requirements, focus prioritization, and determine allocation of scarce assets.
A key to successful direction and execution of RSTA operations is unity of effort.
The Commander establishes command relationships for all assigned forces, including
RSTA resources. SRIG intelligence assets normally are in general support of the
MAGTF. The commander may determine a particular asset is better used in direct
support of an MSC for a given mission, and instruct the RSTAB to effect the requisite
planning.
Subordinate commanders employ organic intelligence capabilities to support their
assigned missions. However, should the MEF Commander decide an MSC's organic
intelligence assets could also support another unit, he may elect to task one MSC to
provide intelligence support to another.(31)
Planning. RSTAB planning never stops, extending throughout the 72 hour
planning cycle. Synthesizing Commander's objectives and guidance, enemy threat,
friendly force capabilities, and system availability challenges the Board. Only
thorough analysis and effective coordination among all members ensures RSTA
mission support will achieve the Commander's end state. As intelligence
requirements are pitted against collection capabilities, factors such as risk to RSTA
assets, timeliness of response, availability and suitability of assets, impacts of terrain,
and sensor capabilities affect the Board's selection and employment of resources.
While everyone preaches about timely and accurate information, the Board must
consider a broader range of factors. Before ever planning a RSTA mission, the
RSTAB first coordinates the assets' deployment, and determines all requisite
operational support requirements. Survivability must be assessed for the entire RSTA
system--the platforms, sensors, communications and data links, ground stations,
processing facilities, personnel, operators, etc. Not only are many RSTA assets
vulnerable, they are also scarce; careful mission planning, and intelligent tasking are
the primary ways of ensuring their survivability.(32) The RSTAB also considers
other operational parameters of available RSTA assets--range, endurance, and their
collection, processing and dissemination capabilities.
When developing the RSTA collection plan, the Board will combine multisource,
multisensor assets to provide accurate, reliable data, and ensure overlapping coverage
and verification of information. System tasking must be based on an asset's capability
and suitability within the context of the overall plan. For example, several assets may
be able to collect against one target, but only one RSTA asset has the unique
capability to collect against a second target. Good planning ensures the unique
platform is allocated against the second target. Suitability also applies to the format
of processed intelligence. The format and content must be what the MSC
needs/requested for mission accomplishment. Of overarching importance is how the
information will be received, processed, integrated, and disseminated.(33)
The RSTAB's G6 and G2 planners consider the interoperability, reliability, and
robustness of sensors, data links, ADP, and C4I systems. Proper planning is crucial
to the responsiveness, survivability, and overall combat effectiveness of RSTA
systems.
Throughout the planning phase, RSTA strategy must be closely coordinated with
Future Operations. For example, RSTA activities and communications must be so
structured as to not reveal indications of the primary mission to the enemy (OPSEC).
Along with OPSEC considerations are Operational Deception (OPDEC) concerns; and
RSTA missions have great potential to support OPDEC planning. For example,
RSTA resources may identify and locate enemy targets ripe for OPDEC. RSTA
operations may monitor enemy activity or reaction to friendly deception. Finally,
RSTA missions may be part of the Commander's deception plan: RSTA activity in
the deception area may deceive the enemy as to actual friendly intent.(34)
If theater and national RSTA systems are required, the Commander must
remember these assets are controlled by the national intelligence community. The
results from a tasked national level collection effort is received at the MAGTF via
organic Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP) systems.
In the Marine Corps, IMINT and SIGINT TENCAP allow receipt of imagery, raw
data, and processed reports. Timeliness varies, depending on the intelligence
discipline and competing national priorities. Also, the security of these systems and
their sources may require sanitization of the information before it can be made
available to an MSC. By establishing standing collection requirements for
contingencies, as well as making optimum use of the RSTA 72 hour planning cycle,
the Commander can provide theater and national collection/production agencies and
assets with advance notice of MAGTF intelligence requirements.
Collection Operations. This step of the cycle includes the actual physical
execution of RSTA missions, and the RT, NRT, and/or timely receipt of collected
information at processing and production sites. This requires close coordination
between operators, collectors, G2 Systems and G6 planners, and the CMO. As
directed earlier through the RSTAB, collectors and planners had minutely planned the
employment of RSTA systems to best satisfy operational maneuver and collection
requirements. Often, multisensor platforms/assets will be operating simultaneously to
provide overlapping, verifying target coverage. Targeting and Force Fires Officers in
particular are cognizant of the cuing potential this presents--for both target acquisition
and development. The Current Operations Officer and the MSCs must maintain
situational awareness of RSTA operations underway. Here, the intelligence-
communications architecture planned earlier proves pivotal, as RT receipt of
information at the tactical level becomes critical to I&W, maneuver potential, and
target acquisition.
As information from a RT RSTA mission feeds into the MAGTF, the RSTAB
briefs the Commander on collection opportunity and countermeasure tradeoffs. The
Board identifies and compares the longer term value of continued intelligence
collection against enemy elements with the immediate tactical value of destroying or
countering (EA) it. For example, having identified a division headquarters, should it
be immediately destroyed or, rather, subjected to continuing collection and
exploitation by SIGINT and HUMINT. The G2 Target Intelligence Officer and his
G3 counterpart monitor collection results against such targets, feed it back to the
RSTAB, and assist in determining whether a target should be nominated for attack.
The G2/G3 Targeting Officers may recommend a "no strike" or protected list of
targets for the Commander's approval.(35)
A recent joint warfare article aptly stated, "The need to identify, target, and
attack in near real-time is now a fact of life."(36) Parallel targeting and collection
are essential to economy of effort, and are essential tasks coordinated by the RSTAB.
Targeting plays a key role in the Commander's decision to employ forces. RSTA
collection readily supports all phases of the targeting cycle. For example, a RSTA
mission may detect potential targets, note unusual or undetermined activity, and
capture significant changes occurring at existing targets. The G3 Target Information
Officer and the G2 Target Intelligence Officer closely, continuously monitor "on
station" RSTA missions, prepared to exploit targeting opportunities.(37) Collection
redundancy by RSTA assets may be necessary to identify and verify targets under
development. Cuing from one RSTA asset to another also can further identify a
target. If a target is selected for destruction, RSTA assets may be tasked to
determine enemy reaction to the attack or provide BDA on an target struck by
MAGTF fires. The Targeting Officers then provide follow-up recommendations to
the Commander.
Processing and production. Either while a mission is underway, or after the
RSTA resource has returned to its operating base (be it land, air, or sea based),
receipt of collected information is a constant concern of the Board. Some RSTA
assets posses onboard data processing capabilities, which allows collected data to be
processed into raw intelligence (though further processing may be necessary to
produce finished intelligence). JSTARS is a good example. It can process the data it
obtains either onboard and data link to the requester, or data link raw data directly to
specific ground stations where processing is completed. In either case, the
information can be sent directly to a user with the requisite receive station at his
location. The results from the Board's earlier efforts to develop a robust intelligence-
systems architecture are evident now. Properly planned, NRT and RT information is
feeding into the correct user, in the right form, in a timely fashion.
Many systems do not deliver NRT information. However, retrieving their
information rapidly--to either deliver it to a user in unfinished form, or to let the All
Source Fusion sensor combine it with multisource intelligence--is a key step in
the RSTA cycle. The Board has already planned for timely receipt and dissemination
(either courier, computer, message, etc.) of this information. The goal is to ensure
that timely retrieval allows the data to be further analyzed, processed, and
incorporated with other intelligence disciplines to present a complete picture of the
battlespace to MAGTF forces.
Dissemination. Technological advances have enhanced dissemination potential
for the MAGTF. As discussed, some RSTA assets disseminate collected information
to consumers in RT or NRT. This is especially critical for those RSTA operations
supporting battlefield activities in which the situation may be evolving rapidly and
perishable information could lose its usefulness within a matter of minutes. Real-time
planning and targeting systems depend on these RSTA capabilities of interoperability
and connectivity.
The dissemination process requires continuous management. Collection is
irrelevant if CM do not ensure requested information and intelligence gets down to
the consumer. G2 and G6 Officers develop the dissemination network with the
Commander's and the MSC requirements foremost in their minds. Robust, redundant
networks are the goal.
There are myriad ways intelligence can be disseminated throughout the MAGTF:
tactical data systems, radio circuits, radio and satellite broadcasts, personal courier,
digital and analog media (magnetic tape and optical disks), video-teleconference,
telephones, FAX, messages, remote terminal access to computer data bases and direct
data transfers. However, an intelligence dissemination architecture must factor in the
consumer's ability to receive secure or nonsecure information; whether there are
dedicated or common-user communications available; or if raw or finished intelligence
will serve the consumer's needs. The diversity of forms and dissemination paths
reinforces the need for interoperability among C4I systems; the Board must consider
all avallable conduits to maximize the dissemination of collection results.(38)
Revalidation of Requirements. As information is received, processed and
analyzed, the RSTAB checks to see if collection, targeting, and other operational
requirements are being met. The cycle is not complete until the Collection
Requirements Management Officer reviews the information and/or intelligence
product, ensures that it has been received by the requesting consumer, and,
importantly, verifies that the consumer feels the requirement has been met.
Commander's guidance will refocus requirements on a daily basis. The daily
RSTAB meeting in his prime venue for ensuring unity and focus of effort for
RSTA missions.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The emergmg body of RSTA resources brings a powerful contribution to
battlespace domination. With multi-dimensional RSTA operations occurring
simultaneously within the battle space--keyed to support a range of users while
contributing to varied battle space activities--it is no longer desirable to relegate
RSTA management solely to the realm of intelligence. The command and control of
finite, high value RSTA resources is the Commander's responsibility, one demanding
top-down planning and unity of effort throughout the MAGTF to achieve a
synchronized intelligence-operations approach to RSTA planning.
Past efforts by the G2 CMO, SARC OIC, SRIG S3, individual SRIG units,
and/or the MEF G3 to coordinate the complexities and intricacies of RSTA operations
in an ADHOC, "good faith" manner often proved inadequate. Collection managers
have failed to integrate fully target acquisition within the collection process; multi-
asset resources have not been used to their maximum potential, to the detriment of
mission accomplishment. Yet the rapid pace of modern, joint operations dictates
synchronous targeting and collection cycles with near real time (NRT) capability; and
targeting data linked to planners and shooters, delivered in usable form, when
required, NRT.
MEF Collection Management (CM) procedures (described in Chapter I) worked
fairly well when the G2 CMO dealt solely with organic SRIG assets. However, over
the past few years numerous developments at the national level, major changes in the
role assumed by the MEF Command Element during operations, and technological
advancements that increase RSTA accessibility at the MAGTF level have expanded
significantly the charter for RSTA resource management. Moreover, as NRT, sensor-
to-shooter capability increases, the demand and necessity to deliver information
directly to the MSCs grows.
Standard MAGTF collection management operating procedures have reached
overload and are inadequate to rapidly, judiciously, and safely synchronize the
employment of finite, high-value RSTA assets within operations cycles. After
consideration of RSTA developments from the national to the tactical level, and
having reviewed standing MEF collection management procedures, it is evident a
doctrinal change is required for the MEF's approach to RSTA collection
planning. New doctrine must embed RSTA collection management within
intelligence and operations cycles. The proposed venue for accomplishing this, the
RSTAB, must be institutionalized within the Marine Corps. Ths standing board joins
and institutionalizes the intelligence collection and targeting oversight embodied by the
DARS structure, and the operational mission planning inherent in the JRC. In short,
the RSTAB fulfills the purpose of a MAGTF-styled DARS meeting, alleviates the
need for a separate JRC-type structure at the MEF level, and brings unity of
effort and focus to RSTA planning in support of a Commander's domination of
the ballespace.
In both the short and long term, implementing the MEF RSTAB structure better
prepares MAGTFs for joint operations. Of overarching importance, the formation of
a MEF Board that mirror-images joint boards with similar objectives imbues Marine
commanders and staff with a working knowledge of intricacies associated with a joint,
combined RSTA collection process. In turn, they are better prepared to articulate and
secure Marine targeting and collection requirements when faced with highly
competitive brokering in a joint arena.
Given that one of the three types of sorties a MAGTF commander makes available
to the JFC is long-range reconnaissance, Marine Commanders must be sensitized to
the JFACC role in RSTA management. When the Advanced Tactical Aerial
Reconnaisance System (ATARS) for the F-18, and the medium and long range
UAVs enter the Marine Corps inventory, Marine Commanders and planners must
understand the powerful RSTA potential of these resources to support battlespace
activities. The Commander must be eloquent and persistent in his articulation of
MAGTF RSTA requirements, and be prepared to demand additional JFC RSTA
capability if organic support is depleted.
Vital to any implementation of doctrinal changes--particularly one that confronts
intelligence and operations cycles--is Commander and operator awareness that the
proposal is sound, corrects a defined problem, and contributes to more efficient
mission accomplishment. Admittedly, the RSTAB is not a panacea for all that ails
RSTA resource planning within the MAGTF today. However, at the MAGTF level,
institutionalizing RSTAB is one big step a Commander can take that reaps
tangible benefits rapidly.
To manage the coordination and tasking of RSTA missions supporting battlespace
activities, the Marine Corps must embrace RSTAB as a cost-effective doctrinal
approach. Under the Commander's direction, the Board's concerted efforts to plan,
coordinate, and task RSTA resources will embed RSTA collection planning within the
intelligence and operations cycles.
On a broader front, the Marine Corps must relook its priorities in this arena,
making a firm commitment to enhance organic RSTA capability, and increase
connectivity to, and interoperability with, other Service and theater/national sensors.
NOTES
1 LtGen James R. Clapper, Jr., "Challenging Joint Military Intelligence," JFO,
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Spring 1994, no. 4), 94.
2 LtGen Clapper, 95.
3 Department of Defense, Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support
to Operations, (Washington, DC: GPO, October 1993), II-4, II-6.
4 Under unique deployment circumstances, I MEF established a non-SCIF CIC,
with the SARC located right next to the Collections and Targeting Officers. This was
an optimum set-up for coordination and provided excellent situational awareness of
RSTA assets. Unfortunately, given that the majority of SRIG personnel manning the
SARC are not cleared for SCI, physical integration of the organic MEF SARC into
the CIC generally will not occur. This must not preclude close coordination, and the
SARC must be located in the closest possible proximity to the COC and CIC to
ensure unity of RSTA efforts.
5 For example, P3-C's are scrambling to redefine their role in the Naval and
Joint areas. They are eager to conduct joint training with the MAGTF, and have
provided excellent opportunities for the MSCs to exercise with them. New stand-off
NRT video capability, that downlinks into the UAV RRS, is an excellent example of
the new wave RSTA potential.
6 Department of Defense, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Mid-
Range Threat Estimate. 1995-2005, (Quantico, Va: Marine Corps Intelligence
Activity, October 1994), 25-26.
7 The Marine Corps' Intelligence Road Map offers a step in the right
direction. However, the Corps must take advantage of the wealth of Army Collection
Management training--not just their basic intelligence training--if Marine CMOs ever
hope to hold their own in a joint world.
8 For example, if attached or supporting P3s or RF-4s are based with Marine
Air assets, then the MEF G2 tasks the ACE G2 to conduct mission debriefs and
forward pertinent information to the MEF. If the P3s are based remote from the
ACE, alternate debriefing procedures will be planned (e.g., debriefed by their
squadron S2; data provided to MEF via available communications paths).
9 For example, during Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, the EP3 crew
launched from Djibouti. A classified storage and communications capability was
available through proximity to the American Embassy. Additionally, since the crew
did not deploy from CONUS with personal weapons, the UTF U-2 ensured that
personnel weapons were checked out to each member from the UNITAF armory (I
MEF armory in this case). The potential always existed that the aircraft could go
down in transit to and from Somalia or in Somalia "bandit" country; it was imperative
that the crew be prepared to deal with this. Note, these are the other type
of coordination issues that fall under the rubric of RSTA planning.
10 Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-55, Doctrine for Reconnaissance.
Surveillance. and Target Acquisition Support for Joint Operations (RSTA),
(Washington, DC: GPO, April 1993), III-6, III-7.
11 IBID, III-3, III-4.
12 Department of Defense, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces
(UNAAF), (Washington, DC: GPO, August 1994), IV-6-7.
13 At the Air Force BLUE FLAG (BF) exercises held at Hurlbut Field, the
DARs has evolved into a major evolution. The focus in not only on theater and
national air breathers and overhead assets. Thanks to the persistence of the Marines,
Component collection assets are also briefed to the gathering. Moreover, at the last
BF I attended, a SOF representative even attended the DARS and provided a general
overview of operations. During the meeting, the duty experts on the platforms briefed
the committee on platform capabilities, limitations. Particularly welcome were the
JSTARS players-effectively replicating their system so that Component players could
use it in a sensor to shooter mode. The addition of SOF at the Blue Flag DARS was
a milestone, and the first time any of the regular CM personnel have had a clue
what the elusive SOF were up to. This information proved critical since on more
than one occasion, MARCENT players had planned for force reconnaissance
insertions that could have potentially comprised SOF. With the shared RSTA
planning, the Marines were able to go through the CINC, and task SOF to take on
our collection and reporting requirements in that particular area. This freed up one of
the MEF commander's RSTA assets, allowing him to insert the team an another
critical NAI.
14 The parameters of the UAV Company's move from SRIG to the ACE
appear to be a matter of discussion to many. It is in the best interests of the MAGTF
that any policies or doctrine reflect that the UAVs are ADCON to the Aircraft
Wing, still OPCON to the MEF, and under staff cognizance of the MEF G2.
Moreover, doctrine must ensure the UAV Company's continuing role within the
SARC (or Intel Bn), and their participation in RSTA planinng.
15 AS I MEF CMO, I developed an adaptive format for this message that was a
combination of the US Army's Collection Emphasis Message, a Joint Tactical Air
Request (JTAR), and free text to provide necessary guidance on mission, collection
priorities, dissemination, etc. The message also included any changes to Force
Reconnaissance team locations, additional ground sensor placement, and other
changes to the MEF RSTA collection plan.
16 The MSCs forward a similar, though less detailed, message to the MEF
daily, the Collection Emphasis Message. This is patterned after the US Army's
Collection Emphasis Message and provides the MEF CMO with the MSC's focus of
collection effort; identifies their collection requirements and gaps in collection
capability; and provides the MEF with situational awareness of the MSC's organic
collection assets.
17 Department of Defense, Fleet Marine Force, FMFRP 15-3, A Concept of
Command and Control, (Quantico, Va: MCCDC, August 1994), 30.
18 Theoretically, this allows the Intelligence Battalion Commander to leave the
meeting, tell his Force Reconnaissance Platoon leader that the mission as briefed has
been accepted by the Board. Completing all final details with the MEF staff should
meet no resistance since the RSTAB laid the groundwork for unity of effort and
focus, and the Commander approved the plan.
19 Joint Pub 2-0, IV-4.
20 FMFRP 15-3, 21.
21 IBID, 16-20.
22 Joint Pub 2-0, IV-3, IV-4.
23 FMFRP 15-3, 23-25.
24 IBID, 18.
25 Joint Pub 3-55, I-1.
26 IBID, Appendix A.
27 IBID, I-2, I-3, I-4.
28 IBID, I-3.
29 IBID, I-1.
30 Joint Pub 2-0, IV-3, IV-4.
31 IBID, IV-6, IV-7.
32 Joint Pub 3-55, II-10, II-11, II-12.
33 IBID, II-10, II-11.
34 IBID, I-4.
35 Joint Pub 2-0, II-7.
36 Frederick R. Strain, "The New Joint Warfare," JFQ, (Washington, DC:
NDU, Autumn 1993).
37 Clapper, 94.
38 Joint Pub 3-55, III-2, III-3.
APPENDIX A: DIVERT SCENARIO FOR PRE-PLANNED UAV MISSION
By capturing an appreciation of the advanced technologies and capabilities inherent
in today's weapon systems, the following scenario illustrates the dynamics of Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) level battlespace activities. To orchestrate these activities
a fully functional, integrated intelligence and operational planning/controlling cell is
required. The ability of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Command
Element to integrate the various activities and functions of the ground combat, aviation
combat, and combat service support elements--as well as the current and future battle--
determines operational success. The scenario below highlights the importance of the
MEF Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC) as well as the need for a
planning/controlling activity such as the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target
Acquisition Board (RSTAB).
The Divert
The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), nearing completion of a pre-planned, optical
intelligence mission (in general support of the MAGTF), is traveling along a designated
flight path from its terminal loiter area, and nearing the portable control station (PCS)
hand-over-control point. While not specified as a surveillance mission, the UAV's flight
path overflies terrain which is unfamiliar to ground control station (GCS) personnel. As
such, and in order to optimize their battlespace awareness, the UAV mission commander
advises both the internal pilot and the payload operator--a captain/9910 and sergeant/0861
respectively--to monitor the real-time (RT) video imaging product provided by the UAV's
day sensor device (a TV camera) and the GCS systems. Downlink telemetry reveals an
open terrain composite, generally flat, with little elevation relief and sparse vegetation.
Unexpectedly, the GCS video monitor displays the unmistakable dust signature of what
appears to be a formation of armored vehicles moving at a high rate of speed. Upon
detection, the UAV payload operator immediately signals the UAV via the primary
up-link control (C-band) radio link, and changes the day sensor field of view profile from
wide band to narrow band. Concurrently, the payload operator--a seasoned scout
observer, NCO--also activates the day sensor's zoom lens. While this unexpected ground
vehicle movement is occurring just slightly abeam the UAV's flight path, the immediate
actions of the payload operator fails to achieve anything more that a tentative
identification. Nonetheless, relying on an extensive forward observer background, the
payload operator knows the UAV has detected a choice target of opportunity and thus
advises both the UAV internal pilot and mission commander.
Recognizing that these suspected armored vehicles represent much more than a
simple target of opportunity, but rather, a very real threat to ground units operating just
a few kilometers away, the UAV mission commander inquires into the air vehicle's fuel
status and, with acknowledgment that sufficient fuel is onboard, orders the internal pilot
to immediately modify the UAV's flight path to allow continued surveillance of these
suspected armored vehicles.
In order to gain a positive target identification, the UAV mission commander
recognizes the need to loiter the UAV and that in doing so, the UAV will deviate from
its pre-planned loiter areas/surveillance routes. Thus, the mission commander initially
coordinates the UAV's revised positioning and altitude with both the Ground Combat
Element (GCE) Direct Air Support Center (DASC) and GCE Fire Support Coordination
Center (FSCC) and then advises the MEF SARC of the UAV's discovery.
The SARC watch officer acknowledges the message and advises the UAV mission
commander to continue as if an immediate tasking had been received. The SARC watch
officer conducts the requisite advisory with G-3/G-2 agencies, and using one of the two
remote receiving stations (RRS), monitors the identical real-time, video imaging product
available to the GCS. The UAV's reprogrammed flight plan is no sooner coordinated
with all concerned agencies and up-linked to the air vehicle when its first fly-by confims
what the payload operator suspected--this is a formation of four enemy armored vehicles
traveling at high speed.
With positive identification established, the UAV mission commander, located at the
GCS, provides the target description, location, direction of travel and estimated rate of
march to both the MEF SARC and GCE FSCC. Additionally, based on the advice of
the internal pilot, the UAV mission commander informs the SARC that the UAV has
constrained loiter time, due to limited fuel, and recommends transfer of target
observation responsibility to a manned, airborne platform.
The SARC watch officer informs the UAV mission commander that all concerned
want the target immediately engaged and directs that the GCE DASC/FSCC be contacted
in order to coordinate observation and attack responsibility. Surface observation is not
possible due to the extended range, just as attack via surface means, i.e., artillery/naval
surface fires, is impossible for the same reason. This fleeting target, not yet in range of
surface fires, requires an immediate air attack, or a target rich environment will be lost.
DASC and Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) coordination of two F/A-18s
returning from a combat air patrol (CAP) mission is accomplished, and these aircraft are
sortied-in to attack this target of opportunity. However, the inbound aircraft must
traverse 150 kilometers, then acquire the fast moving vehicles prior to attacking.
Fortunately, a Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) (TAC(A)) aircraft is operating nearby
and is diverted from its primary mission of coordinating close support to assist the
attacking F/A-18s. While not a forward air controller (airborne) (FAC(A)), the TAC(A)
is capable of acquiring the target and orienting the two F/A-18s.
Having confirmation that the TAC(A) has acquired the moving armored vehicles, the
DASC informs the UAV mission commander that observation pass-off is completed. So
ends the UAV's role in the acquisition and surveillance of this target. The two F/A-18s
roll-in on the enemy formation, deliver their ordnance and the TAC(A) reports four
armored vehicles destroyed.
APPENDIX B: MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE SUPPORT GROUP
OVERVIEW
The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Support Group (MSG) has been proposed
as a replacement concept for the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group
(SRIG). The observations and operating procedures included in this appendix are a
distillation of issues and recommendations proffered by various Marine Corps study
groups and publications. Its purpose is only to provide the reader with a limited structural
framework for suggested realignment of the organic reconnaissance, surveillance, and
target acquisition assets of the MEF. Additionally, it will demonstrate that the RSTAB
concept, as advanced in this paper, integrates freely with current organizational thought.
OBSERVATIONS
The centralized MSG provides the requisite Intelligence support to the MAGTF,
while amplifying the advantages of garrison centralized training and maintenance. The
challenge is similar to that confronting maneuver warfare strategists, "we do not wage
functional fights, but we do demand functional excellence. That search for excellence
requires striking a balance between centralized, sub-optimized, functional efficiency and
decentralized authority that subordinate commanders need in order to succeed."1
_________________________________________________________________________________________
1 This quote by a Col Whitlow who wrote this in a recent article in a defense
publication in discussions on the problems of JFACC procedures, an article since
misplaced/unlocated.
In garrison, Corps assets are enhanced by centralized maintenance and training of
detachments to ensure readiness at the level required for Marines to respond when called.
The advantages of maintenance centralization of like systems proved successful under the
SRIG concept. Any organizational changes must focus on the requirement to "free up"
currently over-burdened staff officers from the more tedious and routine tasks of
administration, maintenance, and MOS training of its components. Similarly, centralized,
top-down, planning optimizes the coordination and accomplishment of all training
standards, and must be continued and institutionalized.
As can be deduced above, challenges to the SRIG concept have not centered on
garrison administrative control. Rather, the accusations have revolved upon whether the
SRIG is a supporting element, akin to combat service support units, or a separate battalion
command, retaining command authority when deployed/operational. Misperceptions are
the result of non-consistent tri-MEF standard operating procedures (SOPs), resulting in
each MEF developing often contrasting and/or contradictory command relationships and
tasking procedures. Often the SOPs change, reflecting the personality of the current
commander's perception of his relationship with the MEF staff as a "commander."
As an example, when a MEF deploys, commanders with the perception that the
SRIG is a "separate battalion" have encumbered the intelligence cycle by adhering to a
parochial "I am a commander, I don't work for a staff officer" mentality. Rather then
concentrating on the designated mission of timely support and dissemination to the units
doing the fighting, they become obsessed with the protection of their "commander to
____________________________________________________________________________________________
2 Conversely, it is the need for such centralization of maintenance that has led to the
UAV Company being placed under aviation cognizance.
commander" relationship with the MEF. With such a parochial view, they demand and
contribute to an additional layer of staff planning and coordination to accomplish the
mission, requiring all requests be processed down through the SRIG staff for approval and
then re-distributed to the supporting element. The time lost can be significant and can
denigrate the process at the expense of the intelligence consumer. To avoid this, a clear
understanding of the operational command relationship--the SRIG in support of the MEF
staff--must be established and institutionalized.
The Marine Corps now recognizes, particularly in a time of downsizing and fiscal
challenges, there will never be sufficient assets that allow husbanding of resources by and
for the use of a single commander, staff element or even service. For the new MSG
organization to be successful, it must ensure that its functionality is not personality
dependent, its subordinate units must function under the staff cognizance of the designated
principal staff officer during operations. To accomplish this, C4I has proposed a
restructure of the existing SRIG. A further refinement on the C4I offering, one focused
on a clear delineation of responsibility and unity of effort for our finite assets, is provided
below. The bottom-line is developing doctrine tailored to clearly answer the question,
"who controls what when the shooting starts?"
REFINED MSG PROPOSAL
The proposed MSG consists of the following components:
-- Headquarters Company provides headquarters security, administration and
logistic support for subordinate headquarters and units. When the MEF is fully deployed
every attempt should be made to ensure this is a functioning HQ. This win allow the MSG
Commander to maintain operational readiness of the elements through a systematic
supervision and cycling of maintenance requirements.
-- Radio Battalion (RADBN)
-- Air, Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)
-- Intelligence Battalion (INTELLBN) (see below for organization).
-- Communications Battalion (COMMBN)
The crux of this reorganization of the MEF organic collection assets are those
located in the proposed Intelligence Battalion. Below, in standard FMFM format, is a
suggested plan for organization and command relationships for this unit.
INTELLIGENCE BATTALION
I. Purpose. The Intelligence Battalion (INTELLBN), MEF Support Group provides the
MEF and subordinate MAGTF's with an enhanced capability to coordinate and conduct
organic intelligence and counterintelligence collections, and to provide surveillance,
reconnaissance, human intelligence (HUMINT), and limited scale special operations
capability through task-organized detachments.
II. Mission. The mission of the INTELLBN is to ensure the coordinated, timely
employment and deployment of organic assets to the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF),
subordinate Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF's) and other commands as
directed, as part of an integrated collection strategy.
a. Tasks. The INTELLBN performs two essential tasks in its mission:
(1) Train and equip task-organized detachments for MAGTF employment
and deployment (or other designated commands) to execute integrated surveillance,
reconnaissance, intelligence, counterintelligence, photo imagery interpretation,
interrogator-translator, and topographic support as directed.
(2) Establish, man and operate the Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Center (SARC) to serve as the MAGTF Commander's center for the planning,
coordination, and tasking, of organic collection assets in accordance with the
Commander's requirements, priorities, and established doctrine.
III. Organization. The INTELLBN is subordinate to the MSG commander for
administrative purposes, but remains under the staff cognizance of the MEF G-2. Its
proposed organization consists of Force Reconnaissance Company (FORECON), Human
Intelligence Company (HUMINT), and an Intelligence Company (INTELL Co) comprised
of Topographic Platoon (TOPO), the Imagery Interpretation Unit (IIU), and Sensor
Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP). During operational planning and subsequent
deployment, the INTELLBN is augmented by a UAV Company Liaison detachment/team
from the Aviation Combat element.
a. Firepower. Organic firepower capability is limited to individual and
crew-served weapons maintained by subordinate elements.
b. Mobility. The basic means of ground mobility is organic vehicular
transportation; however, organic transportation cannot lift the entire INTELLBN and
must be planned for by the MSG.
c. Intelligence. With the exception of VMAQ, divisional reconnaissance
assets (LAR Bn, Regt Recon Co), and those technical assets (SIGINT/COMMINT) not
organic to the battalion, the INTELLBN consolidates most of the intelligence collection
capability of the MEF into one organization.
d. Special Operations. Special operations capabilities are limited to those
missions specified as inherent to the capabilities of the assigned Force Reconnaissance
Company. Augmentation of this company by other assets of the INTELLBN is mission
dependent. Tasking of INTELLBN units is based on the MEF Commander's specific
priorities and guidance, as exercised by the staff cognizance of the AC/S, G-2.
IV. Command Relationships.
A. Commanding Officer, INTELLBN. Reporting to the MSG commander as a
component element, the INTELLBN Commander remains under the staff cognizance of
the G-2 for operational tasking.
1. In garrison, the INTELLBN commander is--
(a) Responsible for organizing, equipping, and training
INTELLBN elements and detachments. The CO is accountable to the MEF G-2 for unit
performance when elements are assigned to the MEF and subordinate MAGTFs.
(b) Responsible for garrison intelligence support to all elements of
the MEF (CE, GCE, ACE, and CSSE). Requests for support must be validated through
MEF G-2 Operations and processed through the INTELLBN S-3 training section for
approval. This ensures requested support is integrated with mandatory/required training
of each of the component elements and higher headquarters requirements. The goal is to
maximize and cultivate the habitual relationship and "comfort level" between operating
units and those supported, while ensuring that all training needs are met by both the
supported and supporting units. Conflict resolution will be the responsibility of cognizant
MEF staff principals with the concurrence of the MEF Chief of Staff
2. When deployed, the INTELLBN commander--
(a) Serves as the MAGTF G-2's primary point of contact for all
matters affecting the INTELLBN as a unit.
(b) Is responsible for the health and comfort, morale and welfare,
administration and normal logistics support (less insertion/extraction) of INTELLBN
personnel, to include the proper care and maintenance of equipment.
(c) Ensures attachments are meeting the MEF's operational
requirements as tasked.
(d) Assumes responsibility as the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC) and will assist and advise the G-2 on the
employment and deployment of all MEF organic and attached collection assets. As a
commander, he is best able to advise the G-2 as to the training, resources, material and
operational readiness of all INTELLBN elements. When established, the SARC is
subordinate to the MEF G-2, and under the staff cognizance of the MEF G-2 Collections
Management Officer (CMO).
B. INTELLBN Unit Commanders. In MAGTF's smaller than MEF, units of
INTELLBN will be task organized in support of deployed units. Unit Commanders are
responsible to the INTELLBN Commanding Officer for the coordination of training and
preparedness of their element for deployment.
1. In garrison, each unit commander--
(a) Serves as a subordinate to, and the primary point of contact for,
the CO, INTELLBN in matters that effect the unit as a whole.
(b) Ensures the unit is prepared to meet the MEF operational
requirements through the conduct of mandatory Marine Corps training and MOS-specific
required training. This training will be coordinated through the S-3 training/operations
section of the INTELLBN headquarters staff
2. While deployed, each unit commander--
(a) Is in direct support of the assigned MAGTF, retaining
responsibility for logistics, morale and welfare, administration and health and comfort, and
proper care and maintenance of organizational equipment. OPCON of the unit is
exercised by the MEF component to which assigned.
(b) Assists and advises the cognizant MAGTF staff officer with the
integration of unit assets for security and operational requirements, ensuring that the unit
capability is not degraded or threatened. While working for the MAGTF commander as a
supporting element, the MAGTF command authority is exercised via the cognizant staff
member to which assigned.
(c) Coordinates with the INTELLBN staff to ensure the unit's
administrative and logistical requirements are met.
(d) Advises the MAGTF Commander and principals on the unit's
overall capabilities, limitations, readiness, and support requirements, as required.
(e) Conducts and supervises the preparation and planning for
missions directed by cognizant authority.
C. Operational Command and Control Relationships. For the purpose
of clarity, the INTELLBN command and control relationships parallel those applicable to
other service-related commands. In garrison, the INTELLBN enjoys the privileges and
responsibilities inherent to command, reporting to the MSG commander for matters of
accountability and administrative functioning. For operational tasking, staff cognizance
resides with the MEF G-2. Upon deployment, administrative and logistical control is
retained by the CO, INTELLBN while component units are tasked and controlled by the
MEF G-2. The INTELLBN commander retains command authority; retaining
responsibility for integrating his components into, for instance, the MEF Command
Element security scheme. Additionally, the CO, INTELLBN assumes responsibility as a
special staff officer, serving as a conduit for coordination at the SARC.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARC Professional Service Group. Command and Function Analysis for the Intelligence
Systems Architecture Assessment. Dumfries, Va: ARC Professional Service Group,
June 1991.
Boyd, Morris J. BG, USA, and Major Michael Woodgerd, USA. "Force XXI
Operations." Graphic presentation. Ft. Leavenworth, Ks.: USACGSC, November
1994.
Clapper, James R. Jr., LtGen, USAF. "Challenging Joint Military Intelligence." JFQ.
Washington, DC: National Defense University, Spring 1994, no. 4.
Department of Defense, Fleet Marine Force. FMFRP 15-3. A Concept of Command and
Control. PCN 140 150300 00, Quantico, Va.: MCCDC, August 1994.
____,Fleet Marine Force. FMFM 3-1. Command and Staff Action. Quantico, Va:
MCCDC, 1994.
____,Fleet Marine Force. FMFM 3-20. Commander's Guide to Intelligence. PCN 139
000220 00, Quantico, Va: MCCDC, February 1991.
____,Fleet Marine Force. FMFM 2-1. Ideas and Issues. Draft, Quantico, Va:
MCCDC, August 1994.
____,Fleet Marine Force. FMFM 3-21. MAGTF Intelligence Operations. PCN 139
000221 00, Quantico, Va.: MCCDC, May 1991.
____,Fleet Marine Force. FMFRP 3-28. Tri-MEF Standing Operating Procedures
for Field Intelligence Operations. PCN 140 3280000, Quantico, Va.: MCCDC
July 1989.
____,Fleet Marine Force. FMFM 3-22-1. UAV Company Operations. Quantico, Va:
MCCDC, 4 November 1993.
____.Joint Pub 1-02. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 1989.
____.Joint Pub 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. September 1993.
____.Joint Pub 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 28 October 1992.
____.Joint Pub 3-55. Doctrine For Reconnaissance, Surveillance. and
Target Acquisition Support for Joint Operations (RSTA). 14 April 1993.
____.Joint Pub 2-0. Joint Doctrine For Intelligence Support to Operations.
12 October 1993.
____.Joint Pub 3-05.5. Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning
Procedures. 10 August 1993.
____.Joint Pub 3-55.1. Joint Tactics. Techniques, and Procedures for Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles. 27 August 1993.
____.Joint Pub 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). 11 August 1994.
____.United States Marine Corps. USMC Mid-Range Threat Estimate. November 1994.
Faint, Donald R., LtCol, USA. "Contingency Intelligence." Military Review. Ft.
Leavenworth, Kn: USACGSC, July 1994.
Fitzsimonds, James R., and Jan M. Van Tol. "Revolutions in Military Affairs." JFQ.
Washington, DC: National Defense University, Spring 1994, no. 4.
Libicki, Martin C., and James A. Hazlett. "Do We Need an Information Corps?" JFQ.
Washington, DC: National Defense University, Autumn 1993.
Longion, Dana A., LtCol, USAF. Role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Future
Armed Conflict Scenarios. AU-ARI-92-12, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University
Press, December 1994.
McGinnis, Michael L. LtCol, USA, and Major George F. Stone III, USA. "Decision
Support Technology." Ft. Leavenworth, Ks.: USACGSC, November 1994.
Nelson, Michael A., and Douglas J. Katz. "Unity of Control." JFQ. Washington, DC:
NDU, Summer 1994.
Strain, Frederick R. "The New Joint Warfare." JFQ. Washington, DC: NDU, Autumn
1993.
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, And Target Acquisition Collection
Planning--Embedded Within The MEF Intelligence And Operations Cycles
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition
Collection Planning--Embedded Witliin the MEF
Intelligence and Operations Cycles
Authors: Intelligence Doctrine Working Group
Chairman: Major J.C. Dereschuk, United States Marine Corps
Members: Major R. H. Chase Major J. A. Day
(USMC) Major D. D. Cline Major J.G. O'Hagan
Thesis: Judicious employment of finite, high value RSTA resources to support myriad
battlespace activities demands top-down planning, unity of effort, and Commander's
synchronization of the intelligence and operations cycles.
Background: The emerging body of Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Targeting
Acquisition (RSTA) resources brings a powerfiil contribution to battlespace domination.
Diverse RSTA operations occur simultaneously within the battlespace--keyed to support
a range of users from decision makers to "shooters." In addition to collecting
information that develops situational awareness, RSTA assets contribute to many battle
space activities: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Indications and Warning,
situation development, force protection, Battle Damage Assessment, targeting and
collection queuing. Given this multi-dimensional capability, it is no longer desirable to
relegate RSTA assets solely to the realm of intelligence collection management. The
command and control of finite, high value RSTA resources is the Commander's
responsibility, one demanding top-down planning and unity of effort throughout the
MAGTF to achieve a synchronized intelligence-operations approach to RSTA
employment.
Recommendation: To oversee the coordination and tasking of RSTA missions
supporting battlespace domination, the Marine Corps must institutionalize a MEF-level
coordination board--the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition Board
(RSTAB). Under the Commander's direction, the Board's concerted efforts to plan,
coordinate, and task RSTA resources will embed RSTA collection planning within the
intelligence-operations cycles.
CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES iii
Chapter Page
I. SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW: RECONNAISSANCE,
SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION (RSTA)
PLANNING WITHIN ThE MAGTF TODAY 1-8
II. THE EXPANDED CHARTER FOR RSTA OPERATIONS 9-18
III. A NEW DIRECTION FOR MEF RSTA COORDINATION 19-33
IV. RSTAB PROCEDURES 34-38
V. EMBEDDING RSTA COLLECTION PLANNING WITHIN
THE INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS CYCLES 39-52
VI. CONCLUSIONS 53-56
Notes 57-59
Appendices
A. DIVERT SCENARIO FOR A PRE-PLANNED
UAV MISSION 60-64
B. THE INTELLIGENCE BATTALION WITHIN THE
NEW MEF SUPPORT GROUP 65-73
Bibliography 74-75
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
1. Intelligence Flow Within the MEF
(page 2)
2. G2 Combat Intelligence Center (CIC)
(Page 5)
3. Divert Scenario: UAV Detects Targets of
Opportunity Beyond the FSCL
(page 7)
4. RSTA Collection Planning Cycle--Embedded
Within MAGTF Planning Cycles
(page 34)
ABSTRACT
The emerging body of Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Targeting Acquisition
(RSTA) assets serves as a significant combat multiplier to a commander. In addition
to collecting information that helps develop situational awareness, RSTA assets
contribute to many battle space activities:
--Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)
--Indications and Warning (I&W)
--Situation Development
--Force Protection
--Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)
--Targeting, Target Acquisition, and Target Development
--Collection Queuing
--Battle Management
Given this multi-dimensional capability, it is no longer desirable to relegate RSTA
assets solely to the realm of intelligence collection management. The command and
control of finite, high value RSTA resources is the Commander's responsibility, one
demanding top-down planning and unity of effort throughout the MAGTF to achieve a
synchronized intelligence-operations approach to RSTA employment.
Not surprisingly, synchronizing diverse RSTA capabilities to support operations
involves complex coordination and planning considerations. During this process, the
Commander and his staff must ask themselves: Are these assets best employed in
general support of the MAGTF, direct support of subordinate units, or both? Will
these assets fall under G2 or G3 purview, or should a Commander-designated board
conduct oversight and management? What relationship must be established, what
coordination effected between organic and nonorganic RSTA assets and the
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC), the Combat Intelligence Center
(CIC), and the Combat Operations Center (COC)? Who orchestrates the coordination
for RSTA planning, and who provides the sanity check on how well the collection
strategy supports operations? Given that diverse RSTA operations occur
simultaneously within the battlespace--keyed to support a range of users from decision
makers to "shooters"--what parameters must define the information flow, and who
should oversee the dissemination process to ensure usable intelligence reaches the
Major Subordinate Commands?
RSTA assets provide a powerful contribution to battlespace domination. The
finite nature of RSTA platforms and the complexities inherent in planning and
executing their operations flag the RSTA collection process for commander's
responsibility. The management demands unity of effort, top-down planning, and
synchronization of the RSTA cycle. This paper proposes the formation of a MEF CE
coordination board--the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition Board
(RSTAB)--to oversee the prioritization, validation, coordination, and tasking of RSTA
missions. Key principal staff officers whose guidance is pivotal to synchronizing
intelligence and operations are dual-hatted to form the RSTAB. Under the
commander's direction, the Board's planning, coordination, and execution efforts
would embed RSTA collection planning within the intelligence-operations cycles.
RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND TARGET ACQUISITION
COLLECTION PLANNING--EMBEDDED WITHIN THE MEF
INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS CYCLES
CHAPTER 1
SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW: RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE,
TARGET ACQUISITION (RSTA) PLANNING WITHIN THE MAGTF TODAY
The Dilemma
As the spectrum of battlefield systems becomes more sophisticated and diverse,
intelligence requirements to support battlefield operations grow astronomically--from
collecting on and correlating battlefield activities to developing target packages; from
analyzing Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) to relaying information in near-real-time
(NRT) to a tactical commander.(1) General Clapper, Director of DIA, recently
commented on these demands placed on intelligence:
As a result, intelligence simply must situate itself within the operational cycle
rather than outside it...the intelligence collection, production and dissemination
cycle must be compressed so that it fits within the operational cycle for targeting
to support strike and restrike operations.(2)
The MAGTF intelligence collection cycle must be tailored to support the
operational cycle, and the entire spectrum of MAGTF operations and fires. The
diverse array of reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting acquisition (RSTA) sensors
and systems either organic, attached, or available to support a MAGTF challenges the
current way we do business. The G2 and G3 must expand their partnership to
Maximize the multidiscipline capability inherent in finite RSTA assets. Importantly,
synchronizing intelligence and operations planning to optimize RSTA advantages must
stand as one of the commander's priority concerns. The commander provides the
top-down direction ensuring unity of effort in intelligence and operations cycles.
To understand the intricacies of RSTA planning and collection management, and
how crucial coordinated staff planning is to successful RSTA operations, consider
what generally occurs at the MEF during a collection planning cycle. Historically,
the intelligence collection management process has often failed to integrate fully target
acquisition. It must be noted that each MEF currently employs different procedures
for collection planning and management, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center
(SARC) employment, and development of a dissemination architecture. The
following concept is based primarily on I MEF Command Element (CE) and
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Intelligence Group (SRIG) operations. See
Figure 1.
MAGTF Intelligence Collection Management Cycle
The commander has the ultimate responsibility to determine, direct, and
coordinate all intelligence collection through centralized, apportioned collection
management. The commander determines his Critical Information Requirements
(CCIR) for the operation, requirements that subsequently focus the collection process.
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Traditionally, the MEF G2 Collection Management Officer (CMO) and/or, Collection
Requirements Management Officer (CRMO) if assigned, work with the Commanding
Officer of the SRIG and his collection units to develop the MEF collection plan. The
plan is based on the MEF commander's intent and planning guidance, CCIRs, staff
Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR), and Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlespace (IPB). Through IPB--the underpinning for collection and RSTA
operations--the G2 forms a basis for determining possible enemy courses of action,
intent, capabilities, and critical vulnerabilities. Once the IPB process has begun, the
CMO (and usually the SRIG S3) participate in the MEF staff planning sessions that
produce the Event and Decision Support Templates--replete with Named Areas of
Interest (NAI), Target Areas of Interest (TAI), and Decision Points (DP).
Armed with this collection focus, the CMO meets with the G2's Human
Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) planners, the SRIG S3 and
representatives from his collection units, and CMOs of major subordinate commands
(MSC) to develop a comprehensive plan to cover NAIs, TAIs, CCIR, PIR, and
collection capability gaps. Before deciding on the need for new collection efforts, or
prior to validating requirements for fulfillment at higher echelons, the G2 CMO
confers with the MEF All Source Fusion Center (MAFC), Imagery Interpretation Unit
(IIU),and the Topographic Platoon to determine if off-the-shelf products are available
within the MEF to satisfy commander, staff, and MSC requirements. The CMO also
must be aware of the capabilities, limitations, and leadtime for tasking intelligence
collection assets and production agencies.
Once the gaps in organic intelligence products and collection capability are
determined, the CMO/CRMO registers, validates, and prioritizes collection,
exploitation, and dissemination requirements to satisfy the intelligence concerns of the
MEF and MSC commanders. Requisite theater and national assets and agencies will
be tasked through operational channels to support the MAGTF with collection
emphasis, coverage, and/or production.
As collection/production results flow into the MEF, the CMO/CRMO monitors
the overall satisfaction of command requirements and assesses the effectiveness of the
collection strategy. Different types of collection capabilities are employed so
information from one source can be validated by other sources or assets. The
collection strategy ensures redundancy so the loss or failure of one asset can be
compensated for by another of similar capability. The CMO strives for near
continuous surveillance on a target through synchronization of different and
complementary national, theater, and organic collection assets. This coordinated
planning also allows cross-cueing and tipoff among collectors, and provides a sensor-
to-shooter capability for exploitation of targets of opportunity. (3) Generally, data
collected are integrated within the MAFC for dissemination as all-source, finished
intelligence. However, when mission-essential, information is transmitted NRT to the
tactical level for immediate operational exploitation.
The MEF G3, or sometimes the Chief of Staff, reviews the final G2 collection
strategy. Once the plan has been approved, the SRIG S3 and representatives of
individual SRIG units commence detailed mission planning with appropriate MEF
staff sections (e.g., Force Reconnaissance Company confers with G3 Air for
insertions/extraction as required, and Force Fires for establisliment of RAO and NFA;
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Company consults with MEF and Air Combat
Element (ACE) air space management and control authorities; Human Intelligence
Company (HUMINT) teams work with the MEF HUMINT Branch (HIB) and the unit
they are directly supporting). These planners keep the CMO apprised of major
developments, but the CMO does not involve himself in the details unless there is
"finessing" required with MEF staff elements. When coordination is complete, the
SRIG units prepare their respective tabs for inclusion in Appendix 11 (the
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan) of Annex B (Intelligence) to the OPLAN, and
present them to the CMO for final approval.
SARC and G2 Operations. Once deployed, the SRIG establishes and mans the
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC), located in close proximity to the
MEF Combat Intelligence Center (CIC). See Figure (2), "The Combat Intelligence
Center." Note, with the exception of the MEF G2 Administration section, the entire
CIC, less the SARC, is situated within a field Special Compartmented Intelligence
Facility (SCIF) during most I MEF operations. In general, most SARC personnel do
not have the requisite Special Intelligence clearance for access within a SCIF.
Unfortunately, this precludes the SARC and CIC elements from conducting
uninterrupted fusion of genser (secret) and higher levels of classified material.
However, the SARC is located either immediately outside the SCIF wire, within easy
G2 access, or located in the area between the Combat Operations Center (COC) and
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CIC entry point (Figure 2). Both layouts have merit, although certainly the optimum
solution would be a SARC manned with SCI-cleared individuals, fully integrated
within the CIC, or alternatively, a CIC that in some manner allowed for co-existence
of both SCI and genser-only cleared individuals.(4)
The SRIG S3 normally is the OIC of the SARC. The SARC is under the staff
cognizance of the G2/CMO, who directs collection planning and operations through
the SARC OIC. While this situation generally provides for smooth operations, on
occasion, deconflicting multi-mission capable assets becomes a mild tug-of-war
between the G2, G3, and the Ground Combat Element (GCE). Final adjudication for
the prioritization of missions for these scarce resource rests with the Commanding
General.
Information Flow
Information from the deployed collection assets--Sensor Control and Management
Platoon (SCAMP), Force Reconnaissance, UAVs--flows into the SARC via doctrinal
nets. As an example, consider the UAV information flow. UAV voice reporting can
be available to the ACE, GCE, and Force Service Support Group (FSSG) over
various doctrinal nets, or a Remote Video Terminal (RVT) can be provided to the
unit being directly supported by the UAV. Perishable targeting data collected by the
UAV can be fed NRT to an MSC. Pre-planned UAV missions can be diverted to
support unfolding battlespace events. If time does not permit consulting the SARC
OIC and/or the G2 CMO for a divert mission, then divert authority can come
immediately from the MEF COC Watch Officer--the direct representative of the
Commander--through concurrence with G2 and G3 Watch Officers. Figure 3,
"Divert of a Pre-planned UAV Mission," depicts a UAV executing three collateral
missions while flying one preplanned orbit. Starting on a preplanned collection
mission, the UAV detects targets of opportunity and reports back to the SARC. This
activates a rapid targeting process involving the G2, G3, and Force Fires
Coordination Center (FFCC). The UAV stays on station to provide immediate post
strike BDA. This is an excellent example of intelligence and targeting synchronizing
operations to maximize a RSTA asset. Appendix A elaborates on the events involved
in a divert mission.
Ground sensor reports also feed into the SARC, are "analyzed" by the SCAMP
platoon element, and passed to the CIC/MAFC. Generally, since the SARC and CIC
are only a door apart, a hard copy report is hand-carried to the CIC. The CMO, G2
operations officer, the MEF All Source Fusion Center (MAFC) analysts, and/or the
target intelligence officer quickly review the report in the context of the current
battlespace. Based on its perishability and contents, a determination may be made to
pass the information immediately to the COC and FFCC/Targeting section for target
consideration. In some instances, the information may be further analyzed, integrated
with other sources, and folded into the next published MEF Intelligence Summary
(INTSUM). If the information is perishable and of vital concern to an MSC, the G2
Operations Officer directs immediate dissemination of the "information" to the
subordinate G2 via the most expeditious means: phone, radio net, Local Area
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Network (LAN), Intelligence Analysis Station (IAS), Joint Deployable Intelligence
Support System (JDISS), or courier.
Force Reconnaissance team reports either enter the SARC directly through the
doctrinal net or flow first (or simultaneously) to the adjacent Reconnaissance
Operations Center (ROC). The Force Reconnaissance Element manning the SARC
collates the data and passes it through the SARC to the CIC/MAFC. The same
process detailed above for SCAMP reports occurs: the report can receive immediate
action/forwarding to the G3/COC, be further analyzed with other sources, and/or can
be passed immediately to an MSC as perishable information.
During operations, the CMO and SARC OIC continuously update the collection
strategy based on the enemy situation, collections input, commander's guidance, focus
of main effort, scheme of maneuver, subordinate units' collection requirements, and
future operations. In conjunction with current doctrinal operations planning, the MEF
collection plan works on a 72 hour cycle, and is updated every 24 hours via record
message traffic as the MEF Collections Operations Message.
CHAPTER II
THE EXPANDED CHARTER FOR RSTA OPERATIONS
Impact of Service-Related and National-Level Developments
MEF Collection Management (CM) procedures described in Chapter I work fairly
well when the MEF G2 CMO deals solely with organic SRIG assets. However, over
the past few years numerous developments at the national level, and a major change
in the role assumed by the MEF Command Element during operations have expanded
significantly the charter for RSTA asset employment, and prompted a review of
RSTA management within the MEF:
--The MAGTF now operates frequently with joint and combined forces, gaming
valuable exposure to RSTA sensors and assets at Service, theater and national levels.
--I MEF functioned as a Unified Task Force (UTF) in Somalia, experiencing
unique RSTA planning during a combined, joint Humanitarian Operation.
--MAGTFs continue to exercise as JTFs or Component headquarters (MEF as the
Warfighter) during CINC and MEF-level exercises, capturing lessons learned in the
RSTA realm.
--The ongoing battle over roles and missions created an unexpected RSTA
windfall: many national collection platforms uniquely configured for reconnaissance
and surveillance during the heyday of the USSR are scrambling to redefine their role
in the current threat environment. Several collection platforms have broadened their
charter, increased accessibility to their assets, and have been more responsive to
Service interoperability concerns.(5)
--Post Operation DESERT STORM, theater and national assets and agencies
refocussed development of support measures from the strategic to the operational and
tactical level. National agencies endeavored to inculcate collection management
awareness at the Service and Component levels, assist Service collection planning and
operations with a pool of experts, and educate the Services regarding the capability of
the national community to support a combat commander. The desired end state being
Service/Components with the knowledge and expertise to tap into the theater and
national pipelines, subsequently enhancing the ability of the national intelligence
community to successfully support future operations.
--The latest national top-down strategy for RSTA acquisition and upgrades
stresses joint interoperability and streamlining the response time and accessibility of
RSTA sensors and assets. There is a major emphasis on sensor-to-shooter capability
in collection platforms, with NRT downlink to a common user ground station--one
that is fielded with each Service and is interoperable with a variety of RSTA
platforms.
--The Marine Corps Mid Range Threat Estimate 1995-2005 states there will be a
steady advance to UAV technology, with integration of multispectral sensor
technologies to increase target detection, identification, and acquisition.(6) This
means Marine Corps intelligence and operations planners must exercise greater
coordination to better utilize the enhanced potential. Moreover, as Near Real Time
(NRT), sensor-to-shooter capability increases, the demand and necessity to deliver
information directly to the tactical commander grows. The Marine Corps must build-
in, up front, the requirement for the requisite downlink modules, communications
equipment, and band width.
--Manning, training, and budgetary restraints compel Marine Corps leadership to
make hard choices regarding billets filled, training conducted, and dollars allocated
for special projects or capabilities. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps already is years
behind the other Services regarding organic collection capability, funding for
additional RSTA sensors, and trained collection management personnel. The Marine
Corps must relook priorities in this arena, making a firm commitment to plus-up
organic RSTA capability, and increase connectivity to and interoperability with other
Service and theater/national sensors. At a minimum, this should include developing a
core of Collection Managers within the Marine Corps, and participation in formal CM
training programs such as the excellent Army courses conducted at Ft. Huachuca,
Arizona.(7)
Noting these shortcomings, standard MAGTF collection management operating
procedures have reached overload and are inadequate to rapidly, judiciously, and
safely synchronize the employment of finite, high-value RSTA assets within the
operational sequence. New doctrinal procedures for the control, management, and
integration of RSTA assets within the MAGTF intelligence and operational cycles are
required. Vital to any implementation of doctrinal changes is commander and
operator awareness that the proposal is sound, corrects a defined problem and
contributes to more efficient mission accomplishment.
No matter how superb the informal working relationship is among the MEF
Command Element staff, the burgeoning complexities in RSTA and collection
synchronization mandate adoption of a new doctrinal approach. The significant
developments outlined in the preceding section highlight changes in the way the
national community approaches RSTA challenges, and the glaring requirement for the
Marine Corps to get in step with changes in collection asset acquisition, management,
and employment. There are specific areas within the MAGTF intelligence and
operations cycles that are impacted directly by the "RSTA revolution." These are the
areas that must receive optimum attention and focus.
MAGTF Target Areas
Communications and Intelligence Systems Architecture. The communications
architecture required to support intelligence operations (collection, reporting,
processing, and dissemination) has expanded greatly. New intelligence work
stations/systems and communications capabilities have increased access to varied
RSTA assets; but these advances also have increased requirements for interoperability
and connectivity. Often, doctrinal nets are overloaded as multiple users share finite
circuits. Hasty work-arounds are implemented to achieve connectivity during
peacetime operations that may not be feasible under combat operations. More than
ever, the G6 and G2 must combine efforts during development of the Intelligence
Systems Architecture to ensure high value, perishable information is received in the
appropriate form, by the appropriate user, in a timely fashion. Knowing the unique
communications requirements of attached and supporting RSTA platforms is critical to
ensuring compatibility and interoperability. Timely, multiparty dissemination of
various forms of information and intelligence over redundant communications paths
requires updating our intelligence systems architecture. Hard choices regarding finite
satellite channel access, band width, and communications assets (radios, receivers,
mobile ground stations, remote receive terminals) are a commander's responsibility
and will reflect his concept of operations, focus of main effort, and vision for
success.
Asset Allocation and Management. Top down planning must determine the
allocation of high-value, finite RSTA assets. A unity of effort at the MEF level is
required for responsible, judicious asset management. This must not be solely a G2
responsibility; rather, Commander's intent/guidance, coupled with future operations
planning, must frame the process, and the intelligence and operations planners must
share responsibility for synchronization. The complexities and simultaneity of RSTA
operations demand coordinated management to ensure successful, productive results
for the command.
Sound management covers both planning and execution phases. Rapidly unfolding
events in the battlespace requires decision maldng to keep pace if a commander hopes
to stay ahead of the enemy's observation, orientation, decision and action cycles. For
example, a responsive, flexible decision making capability is vital when weighing the
consequences of diverting a RSTA asset from a pre-assigned mission for support of
immediate target exploitation. This should not be an issue of operations over
intelligence; rather, a case of maximizing assets to accomplish the end state. Given
the scarcity and high value of RSTA assets, it is the commander's responsibility to
determine risk vs gain for their employment, based on his vision for success.
Asset Integration in Operational Cycles. Attached and/or supporting RSTA
platforms must be integrated completely into the intelligence and operations cycles,
with cognizant staff sections conducting requisite planning for each asset. For
example, it is virtually impossible for the G2 CMO to involve himself intimately in
the intricacies of air space management inherent in operational planning for an aerial
RSTA asset while still trying to orchestrate a redundant, multisource MEF collection
plan. Consider what is required to integrate an attached P3-C detachment into the
intelligence-operations cycles. The MEF commander, his staff, and the MSCs receive
an operational briefing from the P3 squadron to learn the capabilities and limitations
of the platform, and brainstorm ways to best integrate the RSTA asset into the
intelligence and operations cycles. Once a feasible concept is conceived, coordinating
planned P3-C operations with the MEF's battle space activities begins. Integration of
the P3-C demands full participation of the G3 Air Officer from the moment a request
through channels for asset support is formulated. The G3 Air Officer must ensure
that P3 pilots and crews are integrated into the operations planning and attend
requisite briefings. Optimumly, a liaison officer is exchanged or identified early on.
The G3 Air Officer conducts requisite planning/training ensuring P3-C crew
familiarization with: the MAGTF air command, control, and tasking system;
frequencies, call signs, air space restrictions, and control measures. All aviation
matters--fuel, refueling, bed down sites, supply and maintenance--are planned and
managed by the G3 Air Officer and the P3 LNO. The G6 and G2 Systems Officers
work closely with the P3 intelligence and communications representative to determine
unique communication requirements and plan for required nets, satellite channel, and
encryption requirements; establish connectivity at appropriate sites and ensure system
compatibility; and identify any additional MEF support required for successful P3-C
integrated operations. The G2 Operations Officer, the CMO, Systems Officer, and
G6 determine time sensitive dissemination requirements for the P3-C's NRT
information, as well as dissemination paths for fused intelligence derived from P3
collection efforts. The G2 apprises the P3 crew of unique USMC intelligence
collection and reporting requirements and procedures, provides intelligence briefs on
the Area of Responsibility and Interest (AOR), (AOI), and tasks the ACE G2 with the
conduct of P3-C pilot debriefs.(8)
The G2 CMO and SRIG coordinate requirements for imagery interpretation
support, and determine any requirement for photographic lab or tape dubbing
facilities/equipment. Physical security for the air platform and or crew may be an
issue. Depending where the platform stages from (a benign, low or high threat site),
the G2 may need to coordinate with other MAGTF agencies to establish a security
plan for the platform/crew.(9)
Obviously, planning for just this one resource involved every MEF staff section,
the SRIG, and MSCs to be supported. Only MEF level coordination of all the cycles
ensured successful synchronization of the RSTA resource within MAGTF operations.
OPSEC, OPDEC, and Targeting Synchronization. Once a RSTA collection
plan is drated, the G2 CMO must ensure it supports the commander's planning
guidance, answers critical information requirements, and supports current and future
operational requirements. This balancing act requires constant coordination,
prioritization, and deconfliction of collection, targeting, security, and other operations
plans. Assets pivotal for collection on one area of interest may be equally critical for
target acquisition or I&W in another area. Alternatively, use of a RSTA asset directed
against a specific collection area could adversely affect MEF operational security
(OPSEC) or operational deception (OPDEC) plans. Players must have situational
awareness, and coordinate daily RSTA scheduling to ensure maximum targeting value
is derived from assets; and that assets are considered to support a deception operation
or assist in OPSEC.
The Dangers of Staying Our Present Course
The "new wave" RSTA assets offer a tantalizing potential to the MAGTF
commander. However, their effective employment demands comprehensive MEF
staff coordination. Mission planning and execution considerations must be
coordinated, lest any one pivotal criteria is overlooked. In the past, the G2 CMO, the
SARC OIC, the SRIG S3, individual SRIG units, and/or the MEF G3 attempted to
coordinate the complexities and intricacies of RSTA operations in an ADHOC, "good
faith" manner. For various reasons, planning sometimes is conducted in a vacuum or
haphazardly. Key players may be left uninformed or only have pieces of the RSTA
strategy. This ultimately degrades mission execution. For example, improper
coordination could result in:
--No helo support arranged for extraction of a force reconnaissance team;
--No satellite communication channel allocated/available for a Special Operations
Force (SOF) team;
--No Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) plan developed, no
extraction plan coordinated;
--Air space deconfliction not conducted;
--Restricted Fire Areas (RFA) or Reconnaissance Operating Areas (ROA) not
disseminated to appropriate command and control activities;
--Unclear mission assignment or collection direction provided to RSTA assets;
--Insufficient band width or connectivity planned for delivery of information to an
MSC.
If current MEF collection planning and procedures do not adjust to meet the
challenge, the Marine Corps risks falling further behind other Services in developing
doctrine, systems, and capabilities to exploit new wave RSTA potential. Intelligence,
operations, and communications officers must be conditioned to synchronize
comprehensive RSTA collection planning. This ensures maximizing the commander's
resources for unity of effort in mission accomplishment; provides timely dissemination
of finished intelligence to the MAGTF, and allows perishable information to reach the
MSCs in NRT.
CHAPTER III
A NEW DIRECTION FOR MEF RSTA COORDINATION
Doctrinal Change
After consideration of RSTA developments from the national to the tactical level,
and having reviewed standing MEF collection management procedures, it is evident a
doctrinal change is required for the MEF's approach to RSTA collection planning. A
new doctrine must embed RSTA collection management within intelligence and
operations cycles. The proposed venue for accomplishing this is through
institutionalizing a MEF-level oversight, planning, and management board--the
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition Board or RSTAB. This standing
board should be comprised primarily of key staff members from the MEF Command
Element. This dual-hatting alleviates any requirement for additional staffing, and
imposes no extra layer of command and control.
Before considering the formation of a steering committee within a staff, are there
any existing structures on which to build? Two frameworks, used predominantly in
joint operations, exist: the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) and the Daily Aerial
Reconnaissance and Surveillance (DARS) Meeting. The RSTAB would combine the
purpose and activities of both--joining the operations of the JRC with the collection
management of the DARS--within a MEF level board. In both the short and long
term, this better prepares MAGTFs for joint, combined RSTA coordination and
management. Of overarching importance, the formation of a MEF level board that
mirror-images joint board fosters a working comprehension by Marine commanders
and staff with the intricacies of joint, combined RSTA collection process. In turn,
they are better prepared to articulate and secure Marine targeting and collection
requirements when faced with highly competitive brokering in a joint arena.
A brief overview of the JRC and DARS appears below. The RSTAB is presented
as an attractive alternative at little cost but much gain to the command.
The Joint Reconnaissance Center. In a joint environment, the function of the
Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) is to monitor the operational status of assigned or
supporting RSTA assets, establish priorities to support current or new collection
requirements, assign tasks to available RSTA systems, coordinate and deconflict
RSTA missions with other operations within the AOR, assess the mission risk versus
intelligence gain, and monitor ongoing operations.(10) In essence, the JRC is the
brain center for theater RSTA management. A JRC concept has not been
implemented at a MEF level; rather, the G3, SARC, and G2/CMO have fulfilled its
functions adhoc. However, the typical JRC activities are precisely those requiring
Commander's direction to achieve unity of effort in the intelligence and operations
cycles.
Another coordinating body for RSTA operations in the joint environment is the
Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), appointed by the Joint Force
Commander (JFC). The JFACC'S responsibilities normally include:
... planning, coordinating, allocating and tasking of apportioned airborne RSTA
assets made available, based on the JFC's apportionment decision. Following
the JFC's guidance, and in coordination with other Service Component
Commanders, the JFACC recommends to the JFC apportionment of air sorties....
For short-term arrangements, RSTA forces may also be attached to a
subordinate command to which tactical control (TACON) authority is
delegated.(11)
Marine commanders need to be sensitized to the JFACC role in RSTA management:
one of the three types of sorties that a MAGTF commander is directed to make
available to the JFC, for tasking through the JFACC, is long-range reconnaissance.
(12) When the Advanced Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System (ATARS) for the F-
18, and the medium and long range UAVs enter the Marine Corps inventory,
commanders must be cognizant of the organic RSTA capability they are providing to
the JFC. So that a JFC's tasking for these high value sorties support-to some
degree--MAGTF RSTA interests, Marine commanders and planners must understand
the RSTA platforms' capabilities and limitations, be eloquent and persistent in their
articulation of MAGTF RSTA requirements, and be prepared to demand additional
JFC RSTA capability if organic support is depleted.
The Daily Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Meeting (DARS). As
implemented during DESERT STORM, this collection management group was the
venue for prioritizing and coordinating joint collection and targeting requirements.
The DARS meeting brought together collectors (platform experts) and collection
management personnel on a daily basis to review the theater collection plan, assign
Components' access to theater collection platforms, and prioritize collection for
national collection systems. The meeting was scheduled after the daily Joint Target
Board (JTB) so that RSTA prioritization would include the JTB's imagery
nominations for prestrike validation, post strike BDA, and target development. The
DARS's end state was to maximize RSTA assets to support operational requirements
of the JFC and Components.
There were two drawbacks to the DARS. First, it generally concerned itself with
theater and national-level RSTA assets. The fact that all Components had organic
collection capability that could support the JTF was not fully exploited. To the credit
of joint collection managers participating in such subsequent peacetime training
exercises as the Air Force's Blue Flag series (a major air tasking and targeting
evolution), the concept of the DARS has expanded since Operation DESERT
STORM. Not only does an evolving DARS CONOPS validate and prioritize theater
air breather collection and national overhead reconnaissance requirements, but the
assembled CM group considers the collection operations and emphasis of each
Component, to include SOF. In this manner, units operating in close proximity,
knowing they have similar collection emphasis, can coordinate collection to maximize
assets and benefit from each other's RSTA missions.
The second shortfall of the DESERT STORM era DARS meeting was that its
major players were primarily intelligence personnel, with little participation from the
operations side of the house. Most RSTA planning developed at the DARS's
subsequently had to be coordinated and deconflicted with the J3 side. Better time
management would have been achieved if the key J2 and J3 planners attended the
same meeting and synchronized operations at that time.
Many intelligence personnel came away from the DESERT STORM DARS
experience with a healthy respect for the value of embedding RSTA planning within
the intelligence and operations cycles. However, as Marines who held this
operational experience rotated to other billets or retired, many of the valuable lessons
learned departed also. Thus it is MAGTFs now confront a brewing crisis regarding
RSTA coordination and planning. To preserve and build on the best principles of
RSTA oversight inherent within a JRC and DARS, the Marine Corps must
institutionalize synchronized intelligence-operations management of RSTA assets.
In both garrison training and operational deployments, MEF G2s continue to
expand on the DARS concept. However, Navy, Air Force, and Army operators often
are better versed and attune to RSTA planning rigors than Marine commanders and
operators. Whereas both collection managers and operators from other services
acquiesce to RSTA planning, all too often Marine operators want to leave it in the
G2's realm.(13)
The MEF RSTAB
The proposed MEF RSTAB would join and institutionalize the intelligence
collection and targeting oversight embodied by the DARS and the operational mission
planning inherent in the JRC. To replicate the planning cycles a MEF is likely to
experience in a joint arena, a daily RSTAB meeting will be scheduled after the MEF
Target Board (MTB) meets (Chapter IV details the process). The RSTAB (assuming
DARS and JRC responsibilities) fulfills the purpose of a MAGTF-styled DARS
meeting, and alleviates the need for a separate JRC-type structure at the MEF level.
The RSTAB will reap immediate command and control benefits for the MAGTF
commander. Through the Board, the Commander allocates judiciously limited
resources to maximize RSTA support for mission success. Solely from a staffing
view, institutionalizing the RSTAB will not be burdensome since the majority of all
players (with the exception of LNOs and SRIG personnel) are resident on the MEF
staff. Finally, by implementing a doctral approach to RSTA oversight within the
MAGTF, Marine commanders prepare themselves for the complexities of RSTA
mission management--via a JRC, DARS, and/or JFACC--in a joint or combined
environment.
To ensure that the RSTAB has the right people, in one place, at the correct time
for coordinating RSTA collection planning, the following board membership is
essential (In the interest of personal time management, attendance guidelines are
offered as notes below):
RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION BOARD
**DEPUTY G3, RSTAB CHAIRMAN **
SRIG CO (or INTELLIGENCE BATTALLION COMMANDER)
G3 AIR OFFICER
G3 FUTURE OPERATIONS OFFICER
G3/DEPUTY FORCE FIRES OFFICER, FORCE FIRES COORDINATION
CENTER
G3 TARGET INFORMATION OFFICER (Note 1)
DEPUTY G2 OR G2 OPERATIONS OFFICER (Note 2)
G2 PLANS OFFICER (Note 3)
G2 COLLECTION MANAGEMENT OFFICER
G2 TARGET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (Note 1)
G2 INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS/ARCHITECTURE OFFICER (Note 4)
G6 OPERATIONS OFFICER (Note 4)
RSTA RESOURCE LIAISON OFFICERS (Note 5)
LNOS OR COLLECTION MANAGERS FROM MSC OR ATTACHED UNITS
(Note 6)
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAM (NIST) REPRESENTATIVE
NOTE 1: Attendance of either the Target Information or Target Intelligence Officer is
acceptable to field targeting issues.
NOTE 2: Either the Deputy G2 or G2 Operations Officer may attend, depending on
which has the best situational awareness.
NOTE 3: The G2 Plans Officer augments G3 Future Operations during operational
planning, and does most of his coordination prior to the board meeting with the
CMO. Thus, his interests can be represented by the Deputy G3, Future Operations
and/or the G2 CMO.
NOTE 4: The G2 Systems Officer and G6 Operations Officer conduct joint
architecture planning; the one with the best grasp of intelligence-communications
planning for RSTA operations should attend.
Note 5: Each supporting or attached RSTA asset must provide an LNO.
Note 6: CMOs and/or LNOs from each MSC and/or attached units are encouraged to
attend.
RSTAB Membership
Deputy G3. The board will be chaired by the Deputy G3 to optimize integration
of intelligence and operations. The Deputy G3 provides the punch behind RSTAB
planning, coordination, and tasking. Importantly, key members of the RSTAB come
from within the G3 (Air, Force Fires, Target Information, and Future Operations
Officers). Specific direction and guidance from the Deputy G3 to the G3 staff will
reduce significantly the time and effort other Board members spend coordinating
intricate RSTA mission planning with various G3 sections. The Deputy G3
supervises MEF efforts to embed RSTA collection planning within the operations
cycle.
SRIG Commander or the Intelligence Battalion Commander. Pending
implementation of the Marine Corps' plan to reorganize the SRIG into the MEF
Support Group, either the SRIG commander and/or his S3 (under the old SRIG
concept), or the Intelligence Battalion Commander (under the new reorganization) will
be a standing RSTAB member. Note, the Intelligence Battalion concept has merit;
see Appendix B for a proposed mission statement and concept of command and
control for the new Intelligence Battalion.
The majority of the MEF's organic RSTA collection assets reside within the
SRIG. Moreover, either the SRIG S3 (old concept) or Intelligence Battalion CO (new
concept) function as the OIC of the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC).
As such, he will be intimately involved with the capabilities, limitations, and
operational status of organic collections assets. Additionally, LNOs for attached
RSTA assets may also be located within the SARC. The Commander determines
where attached RSTA platforms best support the MAGTF: in general support to the
MAGTF--and located in either the Combat Operations Center, Combat Intelligence
Center, or the SARC--or in direct support of an MSC. The SARC OIC represents his
units {Force Reconnaissance Company, Imagery Interpretation Unit (IIU),
Topographic Platoon, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Company, and Sensor Control
and Management Platoon (SCAMP)} at the RSTAB. Note, recent force structure
changes have placed the UAV Company within the Aviation structure. However,
Operational Control continues to reside with the MEF Commmander, exercised
through the staff cognizance of the MEF G2. UAV Company personnel will still
participate as part of the MEF-SRIG team. A UAV element will be fully
integrated into MEF RSTA planning and operations, and continue to man the
UAV downlink at the MEF SARC.(14)
G3 Air Officer. Many RSTA assets are either aerial platforms, or rely on air for
insertion, extraction, and targeting operations. The G3 Air Officer must be actively.
intimately involved in RSTA planning and implementation. As an example, he must
coordinate MAGTF aviation planning efforts to ensure: RSTA flights are scheduled
in a timely, coordinated fashion and appear on the ATO; air space restrictions are
deconflicted; requisite CEOI documentation--frequencies, communications shifts,
encryption guidance--is provided to RSTA crews/LNOs; air procedures are briefed to
RSTA pilots and crews; and aviation-peculiar support measures (such as fueling,
basing, and resupply issues) are coordinated fully. The G3 Air Officer's
participation on the Board embeds RSTA planning within the Air Tasking and
Operations cycles.
G3, Future Operations Officer. As a pivotal board player, the Future
Operations Officer forces RSTA planners to balance collection requirements for both
future and current operations. Future operations focus on possible course of
friendly/enemy action/reaction, thereby driving future RSTA collection planning. The
Future Operations Officer, working with the G2 Plans Officer, also coordinates
and/or deconflicts Operational Security (OPSEC) and Operational Deception
(OPDEC) operations with RSTA missions. His participation on the Board embeds
RSTA planning within the Future Operations cycle.
Deputy Force Fires Coordination Officer, G3. The Deputy Force Fires
Coordination Officer brings additional operational and targeting depth to the RSTAB.
During the meeting, the Force Fires Officer focuses on the scheduled RSTA
collection effort for close and deep operations. He acquaints himself with RSTA
assets that are on station throughout the day that could assist force fires planning and
reactive targeting. The establishment and deconfliction of Restricted Fire Areas,
Reconnaissance Operating Areas, and Protected Target Lists are other critical matters
that require Force Fires coordination and that will be briefed to the Board. The
participation of the FFC Officer on the RSTAB focuses members on the commander's
priority of targets, and provides RSTA situational awareness to MAGTF target
acquisition planning.
G3 Target Information Officer. This individual, in concert with the G2 Target
Intelligence Officer, brings depth to the targeting acquisition facets of RSTA, and
helps prioritize collection on target development, validation (pre-strike), and BDA.
His continuous coordination with the G2 TIO guarantees timely, accurate intelligence
will identity and satisfy fire support planning requirements. His participation on the
Board embeds the targeting cycle within RSTA planning.
Deputy G2 or G2 Operations Officer. Either the Deputy G2 or G2 Operations
Officer participates as the senior intelligence officer on the board, bringing situational
awareness of all G2 operations to each meeting.
G2 Plans Officer. The G2 Plans Officer coordinates with G3 Future Operations,
defining intelligence and collection requirements in support of future plans. This
officer also works closely with the G2 CMO, ensuring operations past 72 hours are
supported by RSTA collection operations.
G2 Collection Manager. The RSTAB is, after all, the proving ground for the
CMO's collection strategy. To streamline RSTAB coordination, and limit the length
of the daily RSTAB meeting, the CMO staff conducts continuous planning and
coordination with the staff (as well as the G2 branch). The centerpiece of the
RSTAB's daily agenda is review and coordination of the draft 72 hour RSTA
Collection Operations Message. Based on the Commander's daily guidance and
information requirements, this message assigns collection priorities and tasks for all
organic and attached RSTA assets; identifies specific collectibles per mission; assigns
exploitation/production responsibility; and details dissemination paths for collected
information and finished intelligence.(15) From this message, Board members derive
individual tasks, essential to mission accomplishment, they will coordinate. To
ensure this draft collections nrarching order reflects synchronized intelligence and
operations planning, the CMO must have continual situational awareness, and
thoroughly understand the Commander's intent and CIRs. The CMO ensures the
requirements of the MSCs and/or adjacent, attached units are tabled at the RSTAB,
and that the MEF collection plan considers MSC Priority Intelligence Requirements
(PIR) and collection gaps. The CMO identifies all gaps in the MEF RSTA collection
capability and forwards requirements up the chain of command. Additional RSTA
platforms, or the intelligence collected from a national asset that satisfies a MEF
requirement, may be requested. The CMO works with the G2 Operations and
Systems Officers to determine intelligence architecture requirements in support of
RSTA strategy; ensure interoperability between RSTA platforms and MEF systems;
and develop a dissemination plan to feed information RT or NRT to MSCs as
required, and finished intelligence to the MAGTF. In conjunction with the SARC
OIC and RSTA LNOs, the CMO maintains situational awareness of collection
platform availability and capability. The CMO embeds coflection planning within
the operations cycle.
G2 Target Intelligence Officer. With the G3 Target Information Officer, the G2
Target Intelligence Officer performs target analysis and maintains a fusion cell for all-
source BDA that includes integration of national-level collection/reporting. The G2
TIO helps determine what targeting products are required to support RSTA
operations. His participation on the RSTAB provides an emphasis on target
information collection planning.
The G2 Systems Officer. Without the coordination of the G2 Systems and G6
Operations Officers, RSTA planning can be squandered. These individuals examine
connectivity, interoperability, and compatibility issues associated with employment of
averse RSTA assets. They coordinate on such matters as the feasibility of providing
NRT feeds to an MSC or subordinate unit. They examine what communications path,
data link, or system the MAGTF requires to receive certain data, collection products,
and/or reports. Their participation on the RSTAB fosters continued awareness of
RSTA communications-intelligence requirements, and embeds C4I within the
operations cycles.
G6 Operations Officer. The G6 works closely with the G2 Systems Officer to
Ensure a robust, integrated, redundant Command, Control, Communications and
Computers Plan supports the RSTA collection cycle. The G6 and G2 ensure
appropriate coordination conducted during and after the meeting is reflected in the
Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions (CEOI) and other communications
planning; requisite band width, satellite channels, data links, secure LANs, etc. have
been identified in support of RSTA employment; and any potential show stoppers
have been flagged, with recommended alternatives or work-arounds tendered.
RSTA LNOs. The MEF CE requires a Liaison Officer for each attached or
supporting RSTA asset. The LNO identifies his platform's operational requirements
to MEF planners, and coordinates specific planning considerations (beddown sites,
refueling requirements, maintenance issues, mission planning criteria,
communications/intelligence architecture and processing requirements) with relavent
MEF staff. As a RSTAB member, the LNO briefs planners on the capabilities and
limitations of his platform to support a task.
MSC CMOs or LNOs. The MSCs submit their command requirements to the
G2 daily via their Collection Emphasis Message.(16) However, their presence at the
daily RSTAB meeting may clarify or refine their collection requirements and is to be
encouraged. Obviously, there will be times when the distance between headquarters
precludes their daily participation. Their participation on the Board embeds RSTA
planning with the intelligence and operations cycles of the MSCs.
National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). When a NIST augments a
MAGTF operation, a representative sits on the RSTAB. The NIST representative
observes the MAGTF RSTA collection planning process, understands the
Commander's focus of effort, and notes organic/attached collection potential. As the
G2 CMO identifies collection gaps, the NIST representative briefs the Board on the
availability and capability of national assets or collection/production efforts to support
MAGTF RSTA planning. He also acquaints the Board with the national collection
focus regarding the MAGTF operation, and indicates if other Service and theater
collection priorities compete with or could support MAGTF requirements. His
participation on the Board embeds situational awareness of the national collection
focus withing the MAGTF's RSTA planning process.
RSTAB: A Command and Control View
Organizing resources based on the task at hand is one of the functions of
command and control. The RSTAB is ideally suited to support organizational theory
(as defined in FMFRP 15-3) within the context of command and control. Likewise,
although not always considered as such, organization is an important tool of
command and control.(17) The RSTAB, as an "organization," becomes the
commander's tool for managing RSTA resources. The Board brings together the
specialized expertise of the MEF staff and LNOs to provide oversight and
coordination of RSTA missions while fulfilling Commander's guidance. Through the
RSTAB, the Commander establishes unity of command and unity of effort for RSTA
planning and operations. The Board has no authority in its own right; any delegated
authority to the Deputy G3 for day-to-day supervision and management comes from
the Commander. The Commander retains responsibility for RSTA management,
and is final arbitrator on the daily 72 hour RSTA Collection Operations Message.
CHAPTER IV
RSTAB PROCEDURES
A comprehensive schematic of RSTAG coordination and planning appears as
Figure 4 (foldout). This section elaborates on that planning cycle.
During operations, the RSTAB must meet daily to support RSTA coordination
and synchronization with all intelligence and operations cycles. The meeting should
be scheduled sometime after the MEF Targeting Board (MTB) completes its daily
planning, yet before the ATO cycle for the next 24-72 hours has progressed too far.
Generally, the MTB meets sometime in the morning. An hour or so thereafter
(allowing time for a break, coordination, and staff planning) would be the optimum
scheduled time for the daily RSTAB meeting. Note, in a joint environment, the
DARS meeting is scheduled soon after the JTB completes its meeting so that decisions
reached therein can be passed to the DARS for collection planning. Similarly, MTB
nominations for the next 24-72 hours must be incorporated in the RSTA collection
cycle--along with nominations for such activities as intelligence collection, I&W,
and/or deception operations.
The daily RSTAB meeting opens with an overview of RSTA results during the
past 24 hours. A G2 analyst provides a brief overview of the current enemy
situation; the G3 provides an overview of current and future operations. Updated
CCIR and PIR are briefed to focus planners on Commander's intent and to focus the
main collection effort. The G2 CMO briefs three RSTA planning cycles captured
within the draft 72 hour RSTA Collections Operations Message: RSTA operations
underway, those approved for 48 hours out, and those proposed for 72 hours out.
The CMO drafts the message prior to the meeting: this message serves as the stepping
off point for the daily agenda.
As the CMO briefs ongoing RSTA operations for the 24 hour period underway,
he notes any changes to the published message plan. Under the 72 hour planning
cycle, these RSTA operations were briefed to the board two days earlier and now,
fully coordinated and tasked, are in the execution phase. Next, the 48 hour RSTA
collection plan his briefed--a plan approved as the 72 hour plan by the RSTAB one day
earlier. Finally, the CMO presents the proposed RSTA plan for 72 hours out. This
one incorporates the latest Commander's intent, information requirements, future
operations, mission analysis, assumptions regarding potential enemy activity,
operational requirements-- such as OPDEC--MSC collection focus, and results from
previous collection.
RSTA Operations Under Way (24 hr). As the RSTA plan under execution is
briefed for the day, any RSTAB member who has reason to request a change may do
so. For example, the FFCC and MSC representatives request UAV's in direct
support of the GCE based on indications of heavy vehicular movement into the AOR
within 12 hours and the potential for enemy engagement. Or the G6 reports that
satellite access is unavailable for the next six-10 hours and that alternative
communications paths are being pursued for particular RSTA assets.
Two Day Plan (48 hr). After any adjustments to the 24 hour plan, the 48 hour
plan is discussed (the 72 hour plan approved the day prior). Each member working
to coordinate planning can indicate accomplishments, highlight problem areas
regarding his part in mission planning. For example, a supporting P3-C is scheduled
to fly a last-look, stand-off collection mission in support of a force reconnaissance
team insertion at twilight. A review of operations for the 48 hour plan ensures that
the P3-Cs are on the ATO, the weather is good, the insertion area/plan is the same;
and dissemination to the Reconnaissance Operations Center (ROC) has been obtained.
Additional RSTA requirements for the P3-C mission may be tabled.
Three Day Plan. Finally, the CMO presents the 72 hour collection strategy,
with a brief explanation of what factors drove the planning. At this stage, all RSTAB
players have input, any changes can be discussed, routes redirected, targets
reconsidered, insertion/extraction plans revisited, and risk vs gains considered for
each collection operation.
One of the key selling point of the RSTAB is that all the right planners and
operators are in one room at the same time, and coordinate such changes as ATO
schedules, and revised ROA and RFA. Cognizant staff members get their marching
orders directly, unequivocally, from the Commander, as passed by the RSTAB
Chairman, the Deputy G3. Once the meeting adjourns, Board members disperse for
further coordination: Force Fires and G3 Air make necessary adjustments to their
plans and notify requisite personnel/units of any changes; the G6 can adjust the
communications plan as required; and the SARC/Intelligence Battalion Commanding
Officer briefs collection units/issues orders based on the final decisions of the
RSTAB. The CMO makes necessary changes to the RSTA collections operations
messages before it goes to the Commander for final approval. Once approved, the
MAGTF knows that unity of Command and unity of effort are tied to the RSTA
planning and that coordination focused on sound resource management.
The purpose of the RSTAB meeting is not to conduct detailed, exhaustive mission
planning. Rather, members coordinate the broader issues such as examining the
validity and necessity of missions; or coordinating and/or deconflicting RSTA
operations with regard to OPSEC and OPDEC. Perhaps most importantly, the Board
provides the unity of effort for intelligence and operations cycles supported by RSTA
missions. As RSTA LNOs, SRIG representatives, and other Board members
coordinate finite mission planning, the focus of effort from the RSTAB meeting
permeates all layers of the MAGTF, and synchronization of operations and
intelligence is more readily realized.(18)
RSTAB in Non-Deployed Environment
The RSTAB's role is equally important during garrison planning. In a pre-
hostilities environment, Commander's guidance on OPLANS and CONPLANS
generates intelligence requirements and operational planning within the MAGTF.
The RSTAB's planning, and its analysis of operational and intelligence requirements,
Click here to view image
help define gaps in intelligence, and prioritize requirements to the CINC and
national level for satisfaction. Thus, the requisite agencies and collection resources
can be tasked to monitor, collect, and produce against validated MAGTF
requirements.
A Commander must ensure that prioritized intelligence requirements are validated
and tasked for collection/production in a timely fashion to the appropriate agency.
By tasking the RSTAB to develop Contingency Collection Problem Sets (CPS), the
Commander generates an off-the-shelf collection package, validated at the national
level, that can be "turned on" as required. These imagery target sets are keyed to
operational planning and deployment (The set also can be collected on in peacetime to
satisty more limited planning needs). As a crisis erupts, the CPS can be activated,
and full-fledged collection starts to run, based on prestated requirements. Thus,
before organic collection capability can be deployed, the national level resources
already are reacting to pre-registered requirements. The RSTAB, augmented with G4
and G5 planners, is the best conduit to develop standing MEF requirements that
reflect coordinated operational needs.
CHAPTER V
EMBEDDING RSTA COLLECTION PLANNING WITHIN
INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS CYCLES
The Commander must require that an RSTA and intelligence activities and
assets are applied in time, space, and purpose to support the operations plan.
This synchronization process occurs across the range of military operations to provide
timely, accurate intelligence keyed to achieve operational objectives. This
integration of intelligence and operations ensures the totality of effort against the
enemy's center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.(19)
Chapter II reviewed how MEF's historically have conducted collection planning
and the pitfalls encountered. Now, availed of the RSTAB structure, the Marine
Corps has the opportunity to revisit the process. Under the new philosophy, RSTA
management is the Commander's responsibility; he provides the top-down planning
guidance and focus of effort for judicious management of the resources. He exercises
his authority through the framework of the RSTAB that in turn sets in action the
synchronization of intelligence and operations. This chapter focusses on the
Commander's responsibility and the process required to embed RSTA planning within
intelligence and operations cycles.
Command and Control
Technological improvements in mobility, range, lethality and information-
gathering continue to compress time and space, necessitating higher operating
tempos and creating a greater demand for information. Military forces move
more quickly over greater distances...engaging the enemy at greater ranges... The
consequence...is a fluid, rapidly changing military situation... The more quickly
the situation changes, the greater the need for continuously updated information
and the greater the strain on command and control.(20)
One of the three basic elements of command and control is information.(21) One
form of information is intelligence about the enemy: getting it, judging the accuracy
of it, processing it, and disseminating it to the MAGTF. Without information to
provide the basis for his knowledge of the situation, the Commander cannot make
sound decisions. Acquiring information and intelligence for his command is the
Commander's responsibility.(22)
There is no better example of the criticality of RSTA to command and control
that its role within the "OODA" Loop: the Commander's Observe, Orient, Decide,
Action Loop.
OODA LOOP In the observation phase, a multi-discipline, multisoucce RSTA
plan--based on IPB and coordinated to support all phases of an operation--ensures
the Commander's observations will be timely and comprehensive. This also reduces
the possibility of successful enemy deception operations.
After observing the situation, the Commander orients on it. In response, the
Board fuses RSTA collection planning with all intelligence and operations efforts to
provide the Commander analysis on the meaning and impact of observed enemy
activity.
Once he has oriented on the situation, the Commander decides on a course of
action based on his perception of collection efforts and intelligence analysis, and an
assessment of the friendly situation and operation plan. The RSTAB coordinates
missions that both support the friendly course of action and develop the enemy
situation. Their RSTA plan ensures survivable, reliable, suitable, interoperable assets
are synchronized to provide continuous, overlapping coverage on enemy activity of
vital interest to the Commander.
Having decided on a plan, the Commander's executes his course of action,
while RSTA operations monitor enemy reaction, and provide RT targeting acquisition
and I&W. As the Commander observes RSTA collection efforts, the OODA loop
cycle begins again.
The essence of the OODA Loop is the overarching importance of generating
tempo in command and control.(23) Embedding multisource, multidiscipline RSTA
collection planning within intelligence and operations cycles helps generate the tempo
a Commander needs.
How can the Commander use the RSTAB as a command and control facilitator?
One goal of effective command and control is recognizing enemy intent, capability,
and critical vulnerabilities. The Commander has the best chance of achieving this
goal through judicious management and tasking of all available RSTA resources.
Effective RSTA employment serves as a combat multiplier, optimizing friendly
strengths, exploiting enemy weaknesses, and countering enemy strengths.
Commander's direction of the RSTA collection process provides requisite vision "to
create vigorous and harmonious action among the various elements of the force."(24)
Focus of Effort. The Commander's responsibility for RSTA management
provides focus of effort to the MAGTF. Viewing his array of resources, the
Commander concentrates RSTA assets where they best support the mission at a given
time. Within Commander's guidance lies his image of the battlespace, his vision for
success. This direction guides the RSTAB's efforts to concentrate, prioritize, and
coordinate RSTA missions.
The RSTA Objective
Intelligence is the basis of operations. It underpins effective planning.
Assembling an accurate picture of the battlespace requires centralized direction,
simultaneous action at all levels of command, and timely distribution of information
throughout the command.
The primary objective of RSTA operations is to support military operations across
the operational continuum. RSTA operations are performed not only by forces with
primary RSTA missions, but other resources with either collateral missions or the
capability to perform such.(25) RSTA resources include units in contact with the
adversary, patrols, air defense elements, intelligence units, reconnaissance units, and
attached liaison officers. Whether planning for aerial reconnaissance, sea
surveillance, or ground reconnaissance, the availability and capabilities of RSTA
resources are critical to the success of military operations. Commanders must be
aware of each asset's characteristics and thoroughly weigh risk to platform against
value of information obtained.(26)
The RSTAB Contribution
Carefully coordinated RSTA missions provide the necessary information to
develop plans and operations. As the Commander's RSTA resources manager, the
Board ensures:
--Commander's guidance and intent are reflected in the RSTA plan;
--Unity of effort throughout the MAGTF in planning/executing RSTA missions;
--Maximum, responsible use of supporting, attached, and organic RSTA
capability;
--Risk vs gain factored into asset employment;
--Coordination with OPSEC/OPDEC/Electronic Attack (EA) planning;
--Synchronization with air, targeting, intelligence, and future operations cycles.
Planning and Employment. RSTA operations provide Commanders with the
current information necessary for planning operations, including contingencies.
When planning RSTA missions, the Board seeks the necessary information to assess
enemy strengths and activity, defensive and offensive capabilities, and other factors
affecting plans and operations. The same missions that provide this information can
deliver I&W of a threat or impending attack in sufficient time for an appropriate
response. Board members are involved in adaptive real-time planning for current
operations as well as initial planning.
Operational Support. RSTA operational-level support includes:
--Monitoring centers of gravity and enemy OOB against which the Commander
must concentrate his operations.
--Collecting information on enemy offensive and defensive system capabilities,
locations, and other data bases.
--Collecting information on the conduct of combat or support operations.(27)
Tactical Support. RSTA tactical support provides the detailed information
(terrain, enemy disposition, OOB, movement, offensive and defensive capabilities) a
maneuver commander needs to plan for employment of forces. This support includes
providing tactical forces with target detection and acquisition, and RT/NRT
intelligence on enemy activity and intent.(28)
RSTA--Embedded within Intelligence and Operations Planning
Modern intelligence collection systems can accumulate vast amounts of
information. To be useful, the information must be relevant, accurate, analyzed,
properly formatted, and disseminated in a timely manner to the appropriate user.(29)
This is only achieved through synchronizing the RSTA collection cycle with
intelligence and operations cycles.
The RSTA Collection Process. The RSTA collection process
comprises:
--Direction: Commander's Intent and Guidance
--RSTA Collection Planning
--Execution of Collection Operations
--Processing, Evaluating Information; Analysis, Production
--Dissemination
--Review and Revalidation of Results and Requirements
Direction. The RSTA collection cycle supports the Commander as he formulates
his estimate of the situation, a concept of operations, and the operation plan. During
the staff planning process, the Commander conveys his intent and information
requirements to the Board. Through IPB--the underpinning for collection and RSTA
operations--the G2 forms a basis for determining possible enemy courses of action,
intent, capabilities, and critical vulnerabilities. Working with the Board, the CMO
validates and prioritizes collection and intelligence requirements, and focuses
the RSTA collection effort in support of the Commander's objectives. Here, it is
absolutely crucial that the RSTAB understand the Commander's combat intelligence
requirements and his vision for success. For example, the G3 Board members
focus on how RSTA missions can best support friendly operations as well as develop
information on the enemy situation; the G2 CMO identifies organic RSTA
capabilities and gaps, accesses theater andIor national systems to cover shortfalls,
and to provide redundancy and verification; and the G6 insures a robust intelligence-
systems architecture can support receipt and delivery of RSTA information.(30)
Once hostilities begin, the commander continues to provide the direction and guidance
that drive requirements, focus prioritization, and determine allocation of scarce assets.
A key to successful direction and execution of RSTA operations is unity of effort.
The Commander establishes command relationships for all assigned forces, including
RSTA resources. SRIG intelligence assets normally are in general support of the
MAGTF. The commander may determine a particular asset is better used in direct
support of an MSC for a given mission, and instruct the RSTAB to effect the requisite
planning.
Subordinate commanders employ organic intelligence capabilities to support their
assigned missions. However, should the MEF Commander decide an MSC's organic
intelligence assets could also support another unit, he may elect to task one MSC to
provide intelligence support to another.(31)
Planning. RSTAB planning never stops, extending throughout the 72 hour
planning cycle. Synthesizing Commander's objectives and guidance, enemy threat,
friendly force capabilities, and system availability challenges the Board. Only
thorough analysis and effective coordination among all members ensures RSTA
mission support will achieve the Commander's end state. As intelligence
requirements are pitted against collection capabilities, factors such as risk to RSTA
assets, timeliness of response, availability and suitability of assets, impacts of terrain,
and sensor capabilities affect the Board's selection and employment of resources.
While everyone preaches about timely and accurate information, the Board must
consider a broader range of factors. Before ever planning a RSTA mission, the
RSTAB first coordinates the assets' deployment, and determines all requisite
operational support requirements. Survivability must be assessed for the entire RSTA
system--the platforms, sensors, communications and data links, ground stations,
processing facilities, personnel, operators, etc. Not only are many RSTA assets
vulnerable, they are also scarce; careful mission planning, and intelligent tasking are
the primary ways of ensuring their survivability.(32) The RSTAB also considers
other operational parameters of available RSTA assets--range, endurance, and their
collection, processing and dissemination capabilities.
When developing the RSTA collection plan, the Board will combine multisource,
multisensor assets to provide accurate, reliable data, and ensure overlapping coverage
and verification of information. System tasking must be based on an asset's capability
and suitability within the context of the overall plan. For example, several assets may
be able to collect against one target, but only one RSTA asset has the unique
capability to collect against a second target. Good planning ensures the unique
platform is allocated against the second target. Suitability also applies to the format
of processed intelligence. The format and content must be what the MSC
needs/requested for mission accomplishment. Of overarching importance is how the
information will be received, processed, integrated, and disseminated.(33)
The RSTAB's G6 and G2 planners consider the interoperability, reliability, and
robustness of sensors, data links, ADP, and C4I systems. Proper planning is crucial
to the responsiveness, survivability, and overall combat effectiveness of RSTA
systems.
Throughout the planning phase, RSTA strategy must be closely coordinated with
Future Operations. For example, RSTA activities and communications must be so
structured as to not reveal indications of the primary mission to the enemy (OPSEC).
Along with OPSEC considerations are Operational Deception (OPDEC) concerns; and
RSTA missions have great potential to support OPDEC planning. For example,
RSTA resources may identify and locate enemy targets ripe for OPDEC. RSTA
operations may monitor enemy activity or reaction to friendly deception. Finally,
RSTA missions may be part of the Commander's deception plan: RSTA activity in
the deception area may deceive the enemy as to actual friendly intent.(34)
If theater and national RSTA systems are required, the Commander must
remember these assets are controlled by the national intelligence community. The
results from a tasked national level collection effort is received at the MAGTF via
organic Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP) systems.
In the Marine Corps, IMINT and SIGINT TENCAP allow receipt of imagery, raw
data, and processed reports. Timeliness varies, depending on the intelligence
discipline and competing national priorities. Also, the security of these systems and
their sources may require sanitization of the information before it can be made
available to an MSC. By establishing standing collection requirements for
contingencies, as well as making optimum use of the RSTA 72 hour planning cycle,
the Commander can provide theater and national collection/production agencies and
assets with advance notice of MAGTF intelligence requirements.
Collection Operations. This step of the cycle includes the actual physical
execution of RSTA missions, and the RT, NRT, and/or timely receipt of collected
information at processing and production sites. This requires close coordination
between operators, collectors, G2 Systems and G6 planners, and the CMO. As
directed earlier through the RSTAB, collectors and planners had minutely planned the
employment of RSTA systems to best satisfy operational maneuver and collection
requirements. Often, multisensor platforms/assets will be operating simultaneously to
provide overlapping, verifying target coverage. Targeting and Force Fires Officers in
particular are cognizant of the cuing potential this presents--for both target acquisition
and development. The Current Operations Officer and the MSCs must maintain
situational awareness of RSTA operations underway. Here, the intelligence-
communications architecture planned earlier proves pivotal, as RT receipt of
information at the tactical level becomes critical to I&W, maneuver potential, and
target acquisition.
As information from a RT RSTA mission feeds into the MAGTF, the RSTAB
briefs the Commander on collection opportunity and countermeasure tradeoffs. The
Board identifies and compares the longer term value of continued intelligence
collection against enemy elements with the immediate tactical value of destroying or
countering (EA) it. For example, having identified a division headquarters, should it
be immediately destroyed or, rather, subjected to continuing collection and
exploitation by SIGINT and HUMINT. The G2 Target Intelligence Officer and his
G3 counterpart monitor collection results against such targets, feed it back to the
RSTAB, and assist in determining whether a target should be nominated for attack.
The G2/G3 Targeting Officers may recommend a "no strike" or protected list of
targets for the Commander's approval.(35)
A recent joint warfare article aptly stated, "The need to identify, target, and
attack in near real-time is now a fact of life."(36) Parallel targeting and collection
are essential to economy of effort, and are essential tasks coordinated by the RSTAB.
Targeting plays a key role in the Commander's decision to employ forces. RSTA
collection readily supports all phases of the targeting cycle. For example, a RSTA
mission may detect potential targets, note unusual or undetermined activity, and
capture significant changes occurring at existing targets. The G3 Target Information
Officer and the G2 Target Intelligence Officer closely, continuously monitor "on
station" RSTA missions, prepared to exploit targeting opportunities.(37) Collection
redundancy by RSTA assets may be necessary to identify and verify targets under
development. Cuing from one RSTA asset to another also can further identify a
target. If a target is selected for destruction, RSTA assets may be tasked to
determine enemy reaction to the attack or provide BDA on an target struck by
MAGTF fires. The Targeting Officers then provide follow-up recommendations to
the Commander.
Processing and production. Either while a mission is underway, or after the
RSTA resource has returned to its operating base (be it land, air, or sea based),
receipt of collected information is a constant concern of the Board. Some RSTA
assets posses onboard data processing capabilities, which allows collected data to be
processed into raw intelligence (though further processing may be necessary to
produce finished intelligence). JSTARS is a good example. It can process the data it
obtains either onboard and data link to the requester, or data link raw data directly to
specific ground stations where processing is completed. In either case, the
information can be sent directly to a user with the requisite receive station at his
location. The results from the Board's earlier efforts to develop a robust intelligence-
systems architecture are evident now. Properly planned, NRT and RT information is
feeding into the correct user, in the right form, in a timely fashion.
Many systems do not deliver NRT information. However, retrieving their
information rapidly--to either deliver it to a user in unfinished form, or to let the All
Source Fusion sensor combine it with multisource intelligence--is a key step in
the RSTA cycle. The Board has already planned for timely receipt and dissemination
(either courier, computer, message, etc.) of this information. The goal is to ensure
that timely retrieval allows the data to be further analyzed, processed, and
incorporated with other intelligence disciplines to present a complete picture of the
battlespace to MAGTF forces.
Dissemination. Technological advances have enhanced dissemination potential
for the MAGTF. As discussed, some RSTA assets disseminate collected information
to consumers in RT or NRT. This is especially critical for those RSTA operations
supporting battlefield activities in which the situation may be evolving rapidly and
perishable information could lose its usefulness within a matter of minutes. Real-time
planning and targeting systems depend on these RSTA capabilities of interoperability
and connectivity.
The dissemination process requires continuous management. Collection is
irrelevant if CM do not ensure requested information and intelligence gets down to
the consumer. G2 and G6 Officers develop the dissemination network with the
Commander's and the MSC requirements foremost in their minds. Robust, redundant
networks are the goal.
There are myriad ways intelligence can be disseminated throughout the MAGTF:
tactical data systems, radio circuits, radio and satellite broadcasts, personal courier,
digital and analog media (magnetic tape and optical disks), video-teleconference,
telephones, FAX, messages, remote terminal access to computer data bases and direct
data transfers. However, an intelligence dissemination architecture must factor in the
consumer's ability to receive secure or nonsecure information; whether there are
dedicated or common-user communications available; or if raw or finished intelligence
will serve the consumer's needs. The diversity of forms and dissemination paths
reinforces the need for interoperability among C4I systems; the Board must consider
all avallable conduits to maximize the dissemination of collection results.(38)
Revalidation of Requirements. As information is received, processed and
analyzed, the RSTAB checks to see if collection, targeting, and other operational
requirements are being met. The cycle is not complete until the Collection
Requirements Management Officer reviews the information and/or intelligence
product, ensures that it has been received by the requesting consumer, and,
importantly, verifies that the consumer feels the requirement has been met.
Commander's guidance will refocus requirements on a daily basis. The daily
RSTAB meeting in his prime venue for ensuring unity and focus of effort for
RSTA missions.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The emergmg body of RSTA resources brings a powerful contribution to
battlespace domination. With multi-dimensional RSTA operations occurring
simultaneously within the battle space--keyed to support a range of users while
contributing to varied battle space activities--it is no longer desirable to relegate
RSTA management solely to the realm of intelligence. The command and control of
finite, high value RSTA resources is the Commander's responsibility, one demanding
top-down planning and unity of effort throughout the MAGTF to achieve a
synchronized intelligence-operations approach to RSTA planning.
Past efforts by the G2 CMO, SARC OIC, SRIG S3, individual SRIG units,
and/or the MEF G3 to coordinate the complexities and intricacies of RSTA operations
in an ADHOC, "good faith" manner often proved inadequate. Collection managers
have failed to integrate fully target acquisition within the collection process; multi-
asset resources have not been used to their maximum potential, to the detriment of
mission accomplishment. Yet the rapid pace of modern, joint operations dictates
synchronous targeting and collection cycles with near real time (NRT) capability; and
targeting data linked to planners and shooters, delivered in usable form, when
required, NRT.
MEF Collection Management (CM) procedures (described in Chapter I) worked
fairly well when the G2 CMO dealt solely with organic SRIG assets. However, over
the past few years numerous developments at the national level, major changes in the
role assumed by the MEF Command Element during operations, and technological
advancements that increase RSTA accessibility at the MAGTF level have expanded
significantly the charter for RSTA resource management. Moreover, as NRT, sensor-
to-shooter capability increases, the demand and necessity to deliver information
directly to the MSCs grows.
Standard MAGTF collection management operating procedures have reached
overload and are inadequate to rapidly, judiciously, and safely synchronize the
employment of finite, high-value RSTA assets within operations cycles. After
consideration of RSTA developments from the national to the tactical level, and
having reviewed standing MEF collection management procedures, it is evident a
doctrinal change is required for the MEF's approach to RSTA collection
planning. New doctrine must embed RSTA collection management within
intelligence and operations cycles. The proposed venue for accomplishing this, the
RSTAB, must be institutionalized within the Marine Corps. Ths standing board joins
and institutionalizes the intelligence collection and targeting oversight embodied by the
DARS structure, and the operational mission planning inherent in the JRC. In short,
the RSTAB fulfills the purpose of a MAGTF-styled DARS meeting, alleviates the
need for a separate JRC-type structure at the MEF level, and brings unity of
effort and focus to RSTA planning in support of a Commander's domination of
the ballespace.
In both the short and long term, implementing the MEF RSTAB structure better
prepares MAGTFs for joint operations. Of overarching importance, the formation of
a MEF Board that mirror-images joint boards with similar objectives imbues Marine
commanders and staff with a working knowledge of intricacies associated with a joint,
combined RSTA collection process. In turn, they are better prepared to articulate and
secure Marine targeting and collection requirements when faced with highly
competitive brokering in a joint arena.
Given that one of the three types of sorties a MAGTF commander makes available
to the JFC is long-range reconnaissance, Marine Commanders must be sensitized to
the JFACC role in RSTA management. When the Advanced Tactical Aerial
Reconnaisance System (ATARS) for the F-18, and the medium and long range
UAVs enter the Marine Corps inventory, Marine Commanders and planners must
understand the powerful RSTA potential of these resources to support battlespace
activities. The Commander must be eloquent and persistent in his articulation of
MAGTF RSTA requirements, and be prepared to demand additional JFC RSTA
capability if organic support is depleted.
Vital to any implementation of doctrinal changes--particularly one that confronts
intelligence and operations cycles--is Commander and operator awareness that the
proposal is sound, corrects a defined problem, and contributes to more efficient
mission accomplishment. Admittedly, the RSTAB is not a panacea for all that ails
RSTA resource planning within the MAGTF today. However, at the MAGTF level,
institutionalizing RSTAB is one big step a Commander can take that reaps
tangible benefits rapidly.
To manage the coordination and tasking of RSTA missions supporting battlespace
activities, the Marine Corps must embrace RSTAB as a cost-effective doctrinal
approach. Under the Commander's direction, the Board's concerted efforts to plan,
coordinate, and task RSTA resources will embed RSTA collection planning within the
intelligence and operations cycles.
On a broader front, the Marine Corps must relook its priorities in this arena,
making a firm commitment to enhance organic RSTA capability, and increase
connectivity to, and interoperability with, other Service and theater/national sensors.
NOTES
1 LtGen James R. Clapper, Jr., "Challenging Joint Military Intelligence," JFO,
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Spring 1994, no. 4), 94.
2 LtGen Clapper, 95.
3 Department of Defense, Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support
to Operations, (Washington, DC: GPO, October 1993), II-4, II-6.
4 Under unique deployment circumstances, I MEF established a non-SCIF CIC,
with the SARC located right next to the Collections and Targeting Officers. This was
an optimum set-up for coordination and provided excellent situational awareness of
RSTA assets. Unfortunately, given that the majority of SRIG personnel manning the
SARC are not cleared for SCI, physical integration of the organic MEF SARC into
the CIC generally will not occur. This must not preclude close coordination, and the
SARC must be located in the closest possible proximity to the COC and CIC to
ensure unity of RSTA efforts.
5 For example, P3-C's are scrambling to redefine their role in the Naval and
Joint areas. They are eager to conduct joint training with the MAGTF, and have
provided excellent opportunities for the MSCs to exercise with them. New stand-off
NRT video capability, that downlinks into the UAV RRS, is an excellent example of
the new wave RSTA potential.
6 Department of Defense, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Mid-
Range Threat Estimate. 1995-2005, (Quantico, Va: Marine Corps Intelligence
Activity, October 1994), 25-26.
7 The Marine Corps' Intelligence Road Map offers a step in the right
direction. However, the Corps must take advantage of the wealth of Army Collection
Management training--not just their basic intelligence training--if Marine CMOs ever
hope to hold their own in a joint world.
8 For example, if attached or supporting P3s or RF-4s are based with Marine
Air assets, then the MEF G2 tasks the ACE G2 to conduct mission debriefs and
forward pertinent information to the MEF. If the P3s are based remote from the
ACE, alternate debriefing procedures will be planned (e.g., debriefed by their
squadron S2; data provided to MEF via available communications paths).
9 For example, during Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, the EP3 crew
launched from Djibouti. A classified storage and communications capability was
available through proximity to the American Embassy. Additionally, since the crew
did not deploy from CONUS with personal weapons, the UTF U-2 ensured that
personnel weapons were checked out to each member from the UNITAF armory (I
MEF armory in this case). The potential always existed that the aircraft could go
down in transit to and from Somalia or in Somalia "bandit" country; it was imperative
that the crew be prepared to deal with this. Note, these are the other type
of coordination issues that fall under the rubric of RSTA planning.
10 Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-55, Doctrine for Reconnaissance.
Surveillance. and Target Acquisition Support for Joint Operations (RSTA),
(Washington, DC: GPO, April 1993), III-6, III-7.
11 IBID, III-3, III-4.
12 Department of Defense, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces
(UNAAF), (Washington, DC: GPO, August 1994), IV-6-7.
13 At the Air Force BLUE FLAG (BF) exercises held at Hurlbut Field, the
DARs has evolved into a major evolution. The focus in not only on theater and
national air breathers and overhead assets. Thanks to the persistence of the Marines,
Component collection assets are also briefed to the gathering. Moreover, at the last
BF I attended, a SOF representative even attended the DARS and provided a general
overview of operations. During the meeting, the duty experts on the platforms briefed
the committee on platform capabilities, limitations. Particularly welcome were the
JSTARS players-effectively replicating their system so that Component players could
use it in a sensor to shooter mode. The addition of SOF at the Blue Flag DARS was
a milestone, and the first time any of the regular CM personnel have had a clue
what the elusive SOF were up to. This information proved critical since on more
than one occasion, MARCENT players had planned for force reconnaissance
insertions that could have potentially comprised SOF. With the shared RSTA
planning, the Marines were able to go through the CINC, and task SOF to take on
our collection and reporting requirements in that particular area. This freed up one of
the MEF commander's RSTA assets, allowing him to insert the team an another
critical NAI.
14 The parameters of the UAV Company's move from SRIG to the ACE
appear to be a matter of discussion to many. It is in the best interests of the MAGTF
that any policies or doctrine reflect that the UAVs are ADCON to the Aircraft
Wing, still OPCON to the MEF, and under staff cognizance of the MEF G2.
Moreover, doctrine must ensure the UAV Company's continuing role within the
SARC (or Intel Bn), and their participation in RSTA planinng.
15 AS I MEF CMO, I developed an adaptive format for this message that was a
combination of the US Army's Collection Emphasis Message, a Joint Tactical Air
Request (JTAR), and free text to provide necessary guidance on mission, collection
priorities, dissemination, etc. The message also included any changes to Force
Reconnaissance team locations, additional ground sensor placement, and other
changes to the MEF RSTA collection plan.
16 The MSCs forward a similar, though less detailed, message to the MEF
daily, the Collection Emphasis Message. This is patterned after the US Army's
Collection Emphasis Message and provides the MEF CMO with the MSC's focus of
collection effort; identifies their collection requirements and gaps in collection
capability; and provides the MEF with situational awareness of the MSC's organic
collection assets.
17 Department of Defense, Fleet Marine Force, FMFRP 15-3, A Concept of
Command and Control, (Quantico, Va: MCCDC, August 1994), 30.
18 Theoretically, this allows the Intelligence Battalion Commander to leave the
meeting, tell his Force Reconnaissance Platoon leader that the mission as briefed has
been accepted by the Board. Completing all final details with the MEF staff should
meet no resistance since the RSTAB laid the groundwork for unity of effort and
focus, and the Commander approved the plan.
19 Joint Pub 2-0, IV-4.
20 FMFRP 15-3, 21.
21 IBID, 16-20.
22 Joint Pub 2-0, IV-3, IV-4.
23 FMFRP 15-3, 23-25.
24 IBID, 18.
25 Joint Pub 3-55, I-1.
26 IBID, Appendix A.
27 IBID, I-2, I-3, I-4.
28 IBID, I-3.
29 IBID, I-1.
30 Joint Pub 2-0, IV-3, IV-4.
31 IBID, IV-6, IV-7.
32 Joint Pub 3-55, II-10, II-11, II-12.
33 IBID, II-10, II-11.
34 IBID, I-4.
35 Joint Pub 2-0, II-7.
36 Frederick R. Strain, "The New Joint Warfare," JFQ, (Washington, DC:
NDU, Autumn 1993).
37 Clapper, 94.
38 Joint Pub 3-55, III-2, III-3.
APPENDIX A: DIVERT SCENARIO FOR PRE-PLANNED UAV MISSION
By capturing an appreciation of the advanced technologies and capabilities inherent
in today's weapon systems, the following scenario illustrates the dynamics of Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) level battlespace activities. To orchestrate these activities
a fully functional, integrated intelligence and operational planning/controlling cell is
required. The ability of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Command
Element to integrate the various activities and functions of the ground combat, aviation
combat, and combat service support elements--as well as the current and future battle--
determines operational success. The scenario below highlights the importance of the
MEF Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC) as well as the need for a
planning/controlling activity such as the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target
Acquisition Board (RSTAB).
The Divert
The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), nearing completion of a pre-planned, optical
intelligence mission (in general support of the MAGTF), is traveling along a designated
flight path from its terminal loiter area, and nearing the portable control station (PCS)
hand-over-control point. While not specified as a surveillance mission, the UAV's flight
path overflies terrain which is unfamiliar to ground control station (GCS) personnel. As
such, and in order to optimize their battlespace awareness, the UAV mission commander
advises both the internal pilot and the payload operator--a captain/9910 and sergeant/0861
respectively--to monitor the real-time (RT) video imaging product provided by the UAV's
day sensor device (a TV camera) and the GCS systems. Downlink telemetry reveals an
open terrain composite, generally flat, with little elevation relief and sparse vegetation.
Unexpectedly, the GCS video monitor displays the unmistakable dust signature of what
appears to be a formation of armored vehicles moving at a high rate of speed. Upon
detection, the UAV payload operator immediately signals the UAV via the primary
up-link control (C-band) radio link, and changes the day sensor field of view profile from
wide band to narrow band. Concurrently, the payload operator--a seasoned scout
observer, NCO--also activates the day sensor's zoom lens. While this unexpected ground
vehicle movement is occurring just slightly abeam the UAV's flight path, the immediate
actions of the payload operator fails to achieve anything more that a tentative
identification. Nonetheless, relying on an extensive forward observer background, the
payload operator knows the UAV has detected a choice target of opportunity and thus
advises both the UAV internal pilot and mission commander.
Recognizing that these suspected armored vehicles represent much more than a
simple target of opportunity, but rather, a very real threat to ground units operating just
a few kilometers away, the UAV mission commander inquires into the air vehicle's fuel
status and, with acknowledgment that sufficient fuel is onboard, orders the internal pilot
to immediately modify the UAV's flight path to allow continued surveillance of these
suspected armored vehicles.
In order to gain a positive target identification, the UAV mission commander
recognizes the need to loiter the UAV and that in doing so, the UAV will deviate from
its pre-planned loiter areas/surveillance routes. Thus, the mission commander initially
coordinates the UAV's revised positioning and altitude with both the Ground Combat
Element (GCE) Direct Air Support Center (DASC) and GCE Fire Support Coordination
Center (FSCC) and then advises the MEF SARC of the UAV's discovery.
The SARC watch officer acknowledges the message and advises the UAV mission
commander to continue as if an immediate tasking had been received. The SARC watch
officer conducts the requisite advisory with G-3/G-2 agencies, and using one of the two
remote receiving stations (RRS), monitors the identical real-time, video imaging product
available to the GCS. The UAV's reprogrammed flight plan is no sooner coordinated
with all concerned agencies and up-linked to the air vehicle when its first fly-by confims
what the payload operator suspected--this is a formation of four enemy armored vehicles
traveling at high speed.
With positive identification established, the UAV mission commander, located at the
GCS, provides the target description, location, direction of travel and estimated rate of
march to both the MEF SARC and GCE FSCC. Additionally, based on the advice of
the internal pilot, the UAV mission commander informs the SARC that the UAV has
constrained loiter time, due to limited fuel, and recommends transfer of target
observation responsibility to a manned, airborne platform.
The SARC watch officer informs the UAV mission commander that all concerned
want the target immediately engaged and directs that the GCE DASC/FSCC be contacted
in order to coordinate observation and attack responsibility. Surface observation is not
possible due to the extended range, just as attack via surface means, i.e., artillery/naval
surface fires, is impossible for the same reason. This fleeting target, not yet in range of
surface fires, requires an immediate air attack, or a target rich environment will be lost.
DASC and Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) coordination of two F/A-18s
returning from a combat air patrol (CAP) mission is accomplished, and these aircraft are
sortied-in to attack this target of opportunity. However, the inbound aircraft must
traverse 150 kilometers, then acquire the fast moving vehicles prior to attacking.
Fortunately, a Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) (TAC(A)) aircraft is operating nearby
and is diverted from its primary mission of coordinating close support to assist the
attacking F/A-18s. While not a forward air controller (airborne) (FAC(A)), the TAC(A)
is capable of acquiring the target and orienting the two F/A-18s.
Having confirmation that the TAC(A) has acquired the moving armored vehicles, the
DASC informs the UAV mission commander that observation pass-off is completed. So
ends the UAV's role in the acquisition and surveillance of this target. The two F/A-18s
roll-in on the enemy formation, deliver their ordnance and the TAC(A) reports four
armored vehicles destroyed.
APPENDIX B: MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE SUPPORT GROUP
OVERVIEW
The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Support Group (MSG) has been proposed
as a replacement concept for the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group
(SRIG). The observations and operating procedures included in this appendix are a
distillation of issues and recommendations proffered by various Marine Corps study
groups and publications. Its purpose is only to provide the reader with a limited structural
framework for suggested realignment of the organic reconnaissance, surveillance, and
target acquisition assets of the MEF. Additionally, it will demonstrate that the RSTAB
concept, as advanced in this paper, integrates freely with current organizational thought.
OBSERVATIONS
The centralized MSG provides the requisite Intelligence support to the MAGTF,
while amplifying the advantages of garrison centralized training and maintenance. The
challenge is similar to that confronting maneuver warfare strategists, "we do not wage
functional fights, but we do demand functional excellence. That search for excellence
requires striking a balance between centralized, sub-optimized, functional efficiency and
decentralized authority that subordinate commanders need in order to succeed."1
_________________________________________________________________________________________
1 This quote by a Col Whitlow who wrote this in a recent article in a defense
publication in discussions on the problems of JFACC procedures, an article since
misplaced/unlocated.
In garrison, Corps assets are enhanced by centralized maintenance and training of
detachments to ensure readiness at the level required for Marines to respond when called.
The advantages of maintenance centralization of like systems proved successful under the
SRIG concept. Any organizational changes must focus on the requirement to "free up"
currently over-burdened staff officers from the more tedious and routine tasks of
administration, maintenance, and MOS training of its components. Similarly, centralized,
top-down, planning optimizes the coordination and accomplishment of all training
standards, and must be continued and institutionalized.
As can be deduced above, challenges to the SRIG concept have not centered on
garrison administrative control. Rather, the accusations have revolved upon whether the
SRIG is a supporting element, akin to combat service support units, or a separate battalion
command, retaining command authority when deployed/operational. Misperceptions are
the result of non-consistent tri-MEF standard operating procedures (SOPs), resulting in
each MEF developing often contrasting and/or contradictory command relationships and
tasking procedures. Often the SOPs change, reflecting the personality of the current
commander's perception of his relationship with the MEF staff as a "commander."
As an example, when a MEF deploys, commanders with the perception that the
SRIG is a "separate battalion" have encumbered the intelligence cycle by adhering to a
parochial "I am a commander, I don't work for a staff officer" mentality. Rather then
concentrating on the designated mission of timely support and dissemination to the units
doing the fighting, they become obsessed with the protection of their "commander to
____________________________________________________________________________________________
2 Conversely, it is the need for such centralization of maintenance that has led to the
UAV Company being placed under aviation cognizance.
commander" relationship with the MEF. With such a parochial view, they demand and
contribute to an additional layer of staff planning and coordination to accomplish the
mission, requiring all requests be processed down through the SRIG staff for approval and
then re-distributed to the supporting element. The time lost can be significant and can
denigrate the process at the expense of the intelligence consumer. To avoid this, a clear
understanding of the operational command relationship--the SRIG in support of the MEF
staff--must be established and institutionalized.
The Marine Corps now recognizes, particularly in a time of downsizing and fiscal
challenges, there will never be sufficient assets that allow husbanding of resources by and
for the use of a single commander, staff element or even service. For the new MSG
organization to be successful, it must ensure that its functionality is not personality
dependent, its subordinate units must function under the staff cognizance of the designated
principal staff officer during operations. To accomplish this, C4I has proposed a
restructure of the existing SRIG. A further refinement on the C4I offering, one focused
on a clear delineation of responsibility and unity of effort for our finite assets, is provided
below. The bottom-line is developing doctrine tailored to clearly answer the question,
"who controls what when the shooting starts?"
REFINED MSG PROPOSAL
The proposed MSG consists of the following components:
-- Headquarters Company provides headquarters security, administration and
logistic support for subordinate headquarters and units. When the MEF is fully deployed
every attempt should be made to ensure this is a functioning HQ. This win allow the MSG
Commander to maintain operational readiness of the elements through a systematic
supervision and cycling of maintenance requirements.
-- Radio Battalion (RADBN)
-- Air, Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)
-- Intelligence Battalion (INTELLBN) (see below for organization).
-- Communications Battalion (COMMBN)
The crux of this reorganization of the MEF organic collection assets are those
located in the proposed Intelligence Battalion. Below, in standard FMFM format, is a
suggested plan for organization and command relationships for this unit.
INTELLIGENCE BATTALION
I. Purpose. The Intelligence Battalion (INTELLBN), MEF Support Group provides the
MEF and subordinate MAGTF's with an enhanced capability to coordinate and conduct
organic intelligence and counterintelligence collections, and to provide surveillance,
reconnaissance, human intelligence (HUMINT), and limited scale special operations
capability through task-organized detachments.
II. Mission. The mission of the INTELLBN is to ensure the coordinated, timely
employment and deployment of organic assets to the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF),
subordinate Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF's) and other commands as
directed, as part of an integrated collection strategy.
a. Tasks. The INTELLBN performs two essential tasks in its mission:
(1) Train and equip task-organized detachments for MAGTF employment
and deployment (or other designated commands) to execute integrated surveillance,
reconnaissance, intelligence, counterintelligence, photo imagery interpretation,
interrogator-translator, and topographic support as directed.
(2) Establish, man and operate the Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Center (SARC) to serve as the MAGTF Commander's center for the planning,
coordination, and tasking, of organic collection assets in accordance with the
Commander's requirements, priorities, and established doctrine.
III. Organization. The INTELLBN is subordinate to the MSG commander for
administrative purposes, but remains under the staff cognizance of the MEF G-2. Its
proposed organization consists of Force Reconnaissance Company (FORECON), Human
Intelligence Company (HUMINT), and an Intelligence Company (INTELL Co) comprised
of Topographic Platoon (TOPO), the Imagery Interpretation Unit (IIU), and Sensor
Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP). During operational planning and subsequent
deployment, the INTELLBN is augmented by a UAV Company Liaison detachment/team
from the Aviation Combat element.
a. Firepower. Organic firepower capability is limited to individual and
crew-served weapons maintained by subordinate elements.
b. Mobility. The basic means of ground mobility is organic vehicular
transportation; however, organic transportation cannot lift the entire INTELLBN and
must be planned for by the MSG.
c. Intelligence. With the exception of VMAQ, divisional reconnaissance
assets (LAR Bn, Regt Recon Co), and those technical assets (SIGINT/COMMINT) not
organic to the battalion, the INTELLBN consolidates most of the intelligence collection
capability of the MEF into one organization.
d. Special Operations. Special operations capabilities are limited to those
missions specified as inherent to the capabilities of the assigned Force Reconnaissance
Company. Augmentation of this company by other assets of the INTELLBN is mission
dependent. Tasking of INTELLBN units is based on the MEF Commander's specific
priorities and guidance, as exercised by the staff cognizance of the AC/S, G-2.
IV. Command Relationships.
A. Commanding Officer, INTELLBN. Reporting to the MSG commander as a
component element, the INTELLBN Commander remains under the staff cognizance of
the G-2 for operational tasking.
1. In garrison, the INTELLBN commander is--
(a) Responsible for organizing, equipping, and training
INTELLBN elements and detachments. The CO is accountable to the MEF G-2 for unit
performance when elements are assigned to the MEF and subordinate MAGTFs.
(b) Responsible for garrison intelligence support to all elements of
the MEF (CE, GCE, ACE, and CSSE). Requests for support must be validated through
MEF G-2 Operations and processed through the INTELLBN S-3 training section for
approval. This ensures requested support is integrated with mandatory/required training
of each of the component elements and higher headquarters requirements. The goal is to
maximize and cultivate the habitual relationship and "comfort level" between operating
units and those supported, while ensuring that all training needs are met by both the
supported and supporting units. Conflict resolution will be the responsibility of cognizant
MEF staff principals with the concurrence of the MEF Chief of Staff
2. When deployed, the INTELLBN commander--
(a) Serves as the MAGTF G-2's primary point of contact for all
matters affecting the INTELLBN as a unit.
(b) Is responsible for the health and comfort, morale and welfare,
administration and normal logistics support (less insertion/extraction) of INTELLBN
personnel, to include the proper care and maintenance of equipment.
(c) Ensures attachments are meeting the MEF's operational
requirements as tasked.
(d) Assumes responsibility as the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC) and will assist and advise the G-2 on the
employment and deployment of all MEF organic and attached collection assets. As a
commander, he is best able to advise the G-2 as to the training, resources, material and
operational readiness of all INTELLBN elements. When established, the SARC is
subordinate to the MEF G-2, and under the staff cognizance of the MEF G-2 Collections
Management Officer (CMO).
B. INTELLBN Unit Commanders. In MAGTF's smaller than MEF, units of
INTELLBN will be task organized in support of deployed units. Unit Commanders are
responsible to the INTELLBN Commanding Officer for the coordination of training and
preparedness of their element for deployment.
1. In garrison, each unit commander--
(a) Serves as a subordinate to, and the primary point of contact for,
the CO, INTELLBN in matters that effect the unit as a whole.
(b) Ensures the unit is prepared to meet the MEF operational
requirements through the conduct of mandatory Marine Corps training and MOS-specific
required training. This training will be coordinated through the S-3 training/operations
section of the INTELLBN headquarters staff
2. While deployed, each unit commander--
(a) Is in direct support of the assigned MAGTF, retaining
responsibility for logistics, morale and welfare, administration and health and comfort, and
proper care and maintenance of organizational equipment. OPCON of the unit is
exercised by the MEF component to which assigned.
(b) Assists and advises the cognizant MAGTF staff officer with the
integration of unit assets for security and operational requirements, ensuring that the unit
capability is not degraded or threatened. While working for the MAGTF commander as a
supporting element, the MAGTF command authority is exercised via the cognizant staff
member to which assigned.
(c) Coordinates with the INTELLBN staff to ensure the unit's
administrative and logistical requirements are met.
(d) Advises the MAGTF Commander and principals on the unit's
overall capabilities, limitations, readiness, and support requirements, as required.
(e) Conducts and supervises the preparation and planning for
missions directed by cognizant authority.
C. Operational Command and Control Relationships. For the purpose
of clarity, the INTELLBN command and control relationships parallel those applicable to
other service-related commands. In garrison, the INTELLBN enjoys the privileges and
responsibilities inherent to command, reporting to the MSG commander for matters of
accountability and administrative functioning. For operational tasking, staff cognizance
resides with the MEF G-2. Upon deployment, administrative and logistical control is
retained by the CO, INTELLBN while component units are tasked and controlled by the
MEF G-2. The INTELLBN commander retains command authority; retaining
responsibility for integrating his components into, for instance, the MEF Command
Element security scheme. Additionally, the CO, INTELLBN assumes responsibility as a
special staff officer, serving as a conduit for coordination at the SARC.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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