The Use Of Covert Paramilitary Activity As A Policy Tool: An Analysis Of Operations

Conducted By The United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951

SUBJECT AREA - National Security

CSC 95

                               EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Use of Covert Paramilitary Activity as a Policy Tool: An Analysis of

      Operations Conducted by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951

Author: Major D. H. Berger, USMC

Research Question: Was the return worth the investment for those covert paramilitary

operations conducted by the United States Central intelligence Agency at the outset of the Cold

War?

Discussion:

      This evaluation of covert paramilitary operations conducted by the CIA in the very early

years of the Cold War period is a combination of pure cost-benefit analysis and a more subjetive

evaluation of return on investment included is a collection of briefcase studies of OSS

operations during World War II, for they established the precedence for conducting similar

activity during the Cold War. There were significant differences, however, between the CIA's

"operating environment" in the late 1940's and early 1950's and the wartime situation OSS

officers operated within several years earlier. Success of post-war operations depended to a large

degree on the ability of US policy officials and CIA paramilitary specialists to recognize the

changes and adjust accordingly.

      The consensus among historians with an interest in covert operations is that paramilitary

activity conducted by the US Central intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Cold War did not

accomplish the objectives set forth for those operations; was not in line with the prevailing

national strategy or national policy; and, made no significant contributions to national security.

The fault in these generalizations is that critics too often failed to adequately consider the context

in which the activity occurred, especially during the period immediately following the end of

World War II. Americans at the outset of the Cold War believed that Stalin was preparing for a

military invasion of Western Europe. The Communists seemed intent on spreading their

ideology throughout the continent, while the "Western" European nations struggled to recover

economically from the recent war with Germany. Western Europe was vulnerable to Soviet

aggression, and the security of Western Europe was of vital interest to the United States.

      It was in this strategic environment that President Truman authorized the development of

a covert paramilitary organiztion within the newly created Central intelligence Agency. US

policy officials rccogned the drastic consequences of a war between the US and the Soviet

Union, and sought a means of countering the Russians while avoiding direct confrontation

between the two remaining global superpowers. In theory, the role of the perpetrator remains

concealed in a covert operation. Through covert paramilitary action, the US could pursue its

policy aims incognito. Covert paramilitary action also provided an opportunity for offensive

action-the chance to "roll back" the iron curtain--rather than rely exclusively on the defensive

strategy of containment. Additionally, some US policy officials saw covert paramilitary action

as a means of pursuing policy aims "on the cheap." The concept of training and supplying a

handful of guerrilla fighters to operate in Communist-controlled territory and keep the Soviets

off balance seemed a most efficient way of countering Moscow's aggression.

Conclusions:

      From a pure cost-benefit perspective, covert paramilitary action conducted by the CIA

between the end of World War II and the Korean conflict was a complete failure. CIA "project"

officers were not restricted in terms of funds available, in fact often were urged to spend more

than amounts requested. There was little in the way of accounting for expenditures within the

Agency, and the use of unvouchered funds eliminated the requirement to justify project costs to

Congress. Project officers, senior CIA officials, and policy officials in the State Department and

Department of Defense allowed numerous operations to continue beyond reasonable limits,

convinced that operatives could accomplish objectives despite overwhelming evidence to the

contrary.

      US covert paramilitary action during this period was, however, worth the effort.

Prevailing US national security strategy necessitated a reaction to counter Soviet aggression, yet

national policy stressed avoidance of direct confrontation. Administration officials faced with

this dilemma in the early Cold War years considered action--any action-better than inaction.

Cost was not a factor, and US policy officials felt that the need to maintain some form of

pressure on the Communists outweighed the risk of fallout from failed covert activity. Although

individual covert paramilitary operations failed to achieve objectives, the cumulative effect was

constant pressure on the Communist perimeter. These operations provided the CIA with a

wealth of lessons learned, which paramilitary officers applied in subsequent successfiil

paramilitary operations during the 1950's such as Guatemala and Iran.

Paramilitary operations are the noisiest of all covert actions. When they fail, they become

fiascoes and no official denials are plausible.

                                          Harry Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations

      Covert paramilitary operations have historically claimed more than their fair share of

public attention. President Thomas Jefferson in 1805 ordered a paramilitary operation to unseat

the ruler of the country now known as Libya; the phrase in the Marines' Hymn "to the shores of

Tripoli" serves as a constant reminder of that noteworthy operation. Governments, including the

US, have used covert operations to accomplish that which could not be attained through

diplomacy. Though long in lineage, covert paramilitary activity has its genesis as a policy tool

of the US in the latter stages of World War ll and the iminediate post-war period.

      This inquiry is an attempt to analyze the post-World War II evolution of US covert

paramilitary operations from two different perspectives. First is a pure cost-benefit analysis of

the major operations conducted by the CIA between the end of World War II and the Korean

conflict. Was the return worth the investment? What were the objectives of each operation, and

were they achieved? By objectively examining various US covert paramilitary operations and

drawing conclusions from the cumulative results of those operations I intend to answer these two

key questions.

      The second perspective is a subjective analysis, more qualitative in nature and requiring a

broader scope of reasoning than the cost-benefit analysis. For this portion of the examination I

have attempted to look beyond the immediate, short-term objectives and weigh the merits of

individual operations based upon their contribution to national security and conformance to the

prevailing national strategy. Context is germane to this portion of the analysis, in that we cannot

condenm an activity without considering the options available at the time (inactivity, for

example).

      From a pure cost-benefit analysis point of view, covert paramilitary operations conducted

by the US between the end of World War II and the Korean conflict were a dismal failure.

Manpower and money were allocated in tremendous amounts to the various operations, yet in

every case the objectives of creating and expanding a viable anti-Communist resistance effort

were not met. Soviet counterintelligence agents penetrated virtally at will the CIA-sponsored

resistance organizations and emigre' groups. Competing faction leaders used CIA-provided

equipment and training to further their own cause and consolidate their own political power

base, rather than direct their efforts against the Communists. The CIA allowed most covert

paramilitary operations to continue far beyond reason, unwilling to admit the futility of a

"project"' despite overwhelming evidence that stated objectives were no longer achievable.

      US covert paramilitary operations in the early Cold War period were not, however, a

"total" failure in the sense that there was no return on our investment. The US was doing

something, which in the early years of the Cold War was better than the alternative. By

experimenting, the US learned the limits of the utility of covert action. Used alone, covert

paramilitary action rarely accomplished significant objectives; when conducted simultaneously

and in close coordination with various other covert activities and diplomatic action, chances of

success increased dramatically. Operatives learned their trade, honing skills and refining

techniques that would prove more effective later in the 1950's in countries such as Guatemala

and Iran. Although not intended, the visibility of the various programs demonstrated US resolve

to Moscow, indicating that the West would not stand idly by while Stalin sought to expand his

empire.

      This paper consists of two distinct sets of case studies, separated by a discussion of the

legislative and national command authority action that directly impacted US capability and

authority to conduct covert paramilitary activity. The first portion of this inquiry contains an

analysis of several of the more significant covert paramilitary operations conducted by the US

during World War II. These abbreviated case studies provide a basis for comparison when

examining the post-war US covert paramilitary action case studies contained in the latter portion

of this paper. The reader should recognize the significant changes in the stategic geography and

operating environment following the end of World War II, and the impact of those changes on

US covert paramilitary operations. The fact that these changes were either not recognized or

simply ignored by US intelligence and foreign policy officials in the immediate post-war period

perhaps had more effect on operational results than any other single contributing factor. Between

the two sets of case studies is a discussion of several key presidential and National Security

Council (NSC) directives passed during the immediate post-war period relevant to the re-creation

within the CIA of a covert paramilitary capability.

      This inquiry required a combination of primary and secondary source documents,

although countless documents relative the topic and periods remain classified. Several former

OSS and CIA officers directly responsible for the planning and execution of the paramilitary

operations examined were generous in allowing personal interviews for this project. Their keen

insights and first-hand knowledge of operational details were invaluable in my efforts to "see the

whole picture."

      In retrospect, the record of CIA's post-war covert paramilitary operations is considered by

most historians to be "one of almost uniform failure."2 Historians so quick to categorize US

post-war covert paramilitary operations as failures too often have failed to adequately consider

the critical importance of context in their analyses. The threat of Soviet military forces driving

west across Europe was real to US officials and the public at large-by the late 1940's. Embassy

reports, reports from military officials in Europe, and CIA threat assessments verified Stalin's

capability to launch such an offensive. The iron curtain had proven virtually impenetrable,

preventing Western intelligence agencies from collecting within the Soviet block to assess

Stalin's intent. The prevailing attitude among American officials by the late 1940's that doing

something is better than doing nothing is somewhat more understandable when we consider the

circumstances--or "zeitgeist"-- of the time.

      Left unchecked, there seemed no limits to the expansion of Communism across Europe.

The efficiency of Soviet subjugation of indigents in the Baltics, the Balkans, and the Ukraine lent

credence to the arguinent that the remaining free populace of Europe was in jeopardy of suffering

a similar fate, powerless to offer any significant resistance to Stalin's apparent appetite for an

enlarged Soviet state. In retrospect, we can legitimately fault US policy makers for not

adequately considering the ramifications and long-term impact of covert paramilitary operations.

We must acknowledge, however, that these activities gave the US an opportunity and an

"acceptable" means to act at a time when action was deemed necessary. The void of intelligence

on the enemy made it impossible for US policy officials to accurately predict results, so why not

try covert paramilitary action? The dilemma in judging the merits of US covert paramilitary

action in the early Cold War period is deciding whether to accept these arguments as justification

for such activity, or dismiss them as mere rationalization.

      As early as 1946 President Truman, US military strategists, and most intelligence

analysts "had reluctantly concluded that recent actions of the Soviet Union endangered the

security of the United States."3 Planners recognized early on the need to avoid direct military

confrontation between the US and the USSR. Open conflict between the two remaining global

superpowers, in the absence of (external) constraint, would logically expand to nothing less than

total war. Confirmation by the US in 1949 that the Soviets had developed a nuclear capability

transformed overnight the consequences of unlimited war between the US and the USSR.

      During this post-war period, while the Soviets were building their conventional military

capability and developing a nuclear capability, US national focus had shifted to economic

stabilization and growth. This reprioritization had led to dramatic reductions in US conventional

military forces--maintaining a large standing army in times of peace has always been difficult to

justify. This left national security strategists with the dilemma of finding the proper means to

counter a growing strategic threat, without having the deterrent leverage of a credible

conventional military response capability. Faced with this dilemma, policy-makers in

Washington frantically searched for low-cost, low-risk options to deal with the evolving

Communist threat.

      The Central intelligence Agency (CIA) attempted to recreate in the post-war period a

capability that seemed to satisfy this requirement Covert paramilitary operations, in fact,

seemed ideally suited to the situation. Compared to maintaining a large standing military force,

the cost of conducting paramilitary operations would be negligible. Properly conducted, covert

operations would conceal the role of the US government, minimizing the possibility of direct

confrontation with the Communists. Within the framework of the defensive doctrine of

containment, covert paramilitary activity offered an offensive potential to "roll back," rather than

simply prevent the spread of Communism. Covert paramilitary operations, a capability which

the OSS during World War II had proven could produce significant results for a relatively small

investment, thus got a new lease on life.

      In the transition from World War II to the Cold War, however, the "operating

environment" had changed. The target was no longer simply a military force, as it had been

during the war. The new target was an ideology, based on the fundamental concept of political

indoctrination of the populace. In wartime, the assurance of pending Allied conventional

military operations to expel Axis occupation armies provided the necessary degree of motivation

for the various resistance groups. By the late 1940's the Communists were firmly entrenched in

Soviet-controlled territories; it was clear to those in the CIA with experience in partisan

operations that unseating the Communists in those areas would not be a simple affair. This

meant that resistance efforts in the Cold War period would be long-term operations, making it

difficult to sustain morale among resistance members.

      Most of the CIA, State, and Defense Department analysts recognized the changed

environment. Few, however, made the necessary adjustments in planning considerations and

operating procedures to account for the changes. According to former DCI William Colby, no

one in the CIA in the late 1940's considered that the "model we were using off the European

resistance against the Nazis might not be adequate in the face of a totalitarian threat that sought

to enlist and not merely subjugate the peoples it overran."4 Within the CIA, the tendency among

operators was to rely on those techniques that had worked so well for the OSS just a few years

earlier. State and Defense Department officials urged the Agency to take action--any

action--without realizing the political and diplomatic implications of the covert paramilitary

operations proposed. Given that the modus operandi of CIA's paramilitary operatives were not

well suited to the post-war situation, and that military and diplomatic officials enthusiastically

promoted means and ways without considering ends, the results are not altogether surprising. To

understand where and why the system broke down we must trace the roots of post-war CIA

paramilitary techniques and procedures to their source--the Office of Strategic Services.

                             THE OSS PRECEDENT

      A role for paramilitary operations in World War II

      President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Office of Coordiator of Information, the

United States' first independent intelligence organization, by his presidential order of 11 July

1941. General William J. Donovan, appointed Coordinator Of Information (COI) by Roosevelt,

had considered the subject of special operations as early as 10 October 1941.5 Donovan sent one

officer to England in November 1941 to study the organization, training, and operational

methods of the British intelligence organization SOE. Donovan established a special operations

branch--SA/G--to organize and execute morale and physical subversion, including sabotage and

guerrilla warfare. The primary function of SA/G was unorthodox warfare in support of military

operations. In a 22 December memo to the President, Donovan identified the two types of

guerrilla warfare missions SA/G would pursue: (1) establishment and support of small bands of

local origin under definite leaders, and (2) the formation in the United States of guerrilla forces

military in nature.6 All paramilitary activities pursued by the United States Government over the

following 50 years fall into one of these two basic categories identified by Donovan in 1941.

      The administration and organization of SA/G was along military lines and its first

personnel were drawn from the armed services, principally from the Army. Paramilitary training

for SA/G recruits focused on infiltration techniques such as parachuting and maritime (surface

craft and submarine) insertion and the skills necessary to organize and influence locally-recruited

dissidents. Demolitions, weapons, close combat, silent killing, and industrial sabotage training,

as well as instruction on coordinating supply efforts to local resistance groups rounded out the

training syllabus.

      The Deprtment of Interior secured the use of four training areas near Quantico, Virginia

and Catoctin, Maryland for the duration of the war for Donovan's use. These traning areas were

of sufficient size (nearly 20,000 total acres) to permit for their envisioned use in training larger

militarized guerrilla units in the United States which could then be inserted to operate behind

enemy lines. Lieutenant Colonel Garland Williams, a former director of the New York Bureau

of Narcotics, transferred from the War Department to COI in late fall 1941 to assumed command

of the new traing unit. During the preparation of training areas and facilities, Williams and his

trainers attended the British SOE school in Canada. The SA/G paramilitary training school at

Quantico opened in April 1942.7 On 13 June 1942 the COI was redesignated the Office of

Strategic Services (OSS); the SA/G branch was subsequently renamed the Special Operations

(SO) branch. The infantile SO Branch was less than a year old when General Donovan saw an

opportunity to employ the paramilitary tool against the Japanese occupation force in Burma.

      "Det 101"

      The legendary "Detachment 101" was the first OSS special operations effort of World

War II. The Kachins8 in Burma had been waging a determined struggle against occupying

Japanese military forces since early in World War II. Support of the Kachins began with an

airdrop of twenty-five British-trained operatives in mid-1942. The original members of

Detachment 101 were recruited, trained and dispatched to Burma in May of 1942. The first

leader of Det 101, Major Carl Eiffler, had been a Treasury agent operating on the Mexican border

before he was commissioned in the Army and subsequently assigned to OSS's predecessor COI

as the Far Eastern representative.9 Eiffler and his men trained the Kachins to conduct large-scale

ambush patrols and sabotage operations against Japanese occupation forces.

      Eiffler faced two principal challenges in Burma. In 1942 there was no projected date for

conventional Allied military operations against the Japanese in Burma. With Europe being the

dominant theater, the US was a long way from taking the offensive in the Pacific region. This

meant that Eiffler's paramilitary efforts had little chance of achieving decisive results by

themselves; the Kachins and the OSS were therefore in for a protracted guerrilla war. The

second challenge was answering to two headquarters: British and American. Continual

second-guessing by OSS and British SOE superiors far removed from the scene frustrated

Eiffler's attempts to secure the logistics support needed to generate the level of resistance

necessary to theaten the Japanese hold on Burma. The OSS eventually pulled Eiffler out of

Burma, then shuttled him around Washington and Europe to pass on lessons learned to

paramilitary officers throughout the OSS. The OSS was busy developing a large-scale

paramilitary program to support Eisenhower's military plan in the European theater, and those

operatives preparing to enter France would soon benefit from Eiffler's tactics, techniques, and

procedures for guerrilla and paramilitary warfare.

      OSS spccial operations in France

      OSS paramilitary operations in France were a supporting effort for planned Allied

conventional military operations. OSS activities were part of a joint British-American effort,

with the British SOE initially in charge. Two types of paramilitary elements operated in France:

three "Jedburgh" teams and larger units of thirty to forty men organized into "Operational

Groups." The OSS recruited its paramilitary agents from the Army and Navy, with the majority

coming from the Army. The Jedburghs parachuted into France from June through September of

1944, and much like the OG's conducted sabotage operations to impede the movement of

German military units within France.

      John Bross was the OSS officer in charge of employing Jedburgh teams in support of

operations OVERLORD and ANVIL, the Allied landings in France. The mission of the

three-man Jedburgh teams was to link up with the local French Resistance element upon

insertion into France, assist in organizing the Maquis for sabotage operations, then advise and

coordinate resupply for resistance units. The'Jedburghs did not attempt to supplant the local

resistance leadership - OSS agents advised and influenced within their capability, but were

careful not to threaten the command status of the Maquis leaders.

      William Colby, who would later rise within the Central Intelligence Agency to become

Director of Central Intelligence and head of the Agency, commanded Jedburgh team "Bruce."

Paramilitary operations in France, according to Colby, were designed to "wreak havoc in the

German rear and undermine German defense against the advancing Allied armies."10 The intent

was two-fold: prevent the employment of German units against the Allied landing forces and

prevent the retrograde of German forces out of France back into Germany. The concept of

employing Jedburghs was to insert a team approximately four to six weeks before Allied military

operations were expected to take place in the team's assigned area.11

      The larger Operational Groups (OG's) were trained, self-contained paramilitary units.

The OG's were essentially comparable to the British commandos, and were the forerunner of US.

Special Forces.12 These units differed significantly from Jedburghs in that OG's operated behind

enemy lines "with the object of direct attack on the enemy,"13 conducting ambushes and sabotage

operations against German units. Typical Jedburgh targets, on the other hand, consisted of rail

lines and bridges. The two types of paramilitary elements proved complementary, operating

independent of each other yet sharing the common goal of preventing the rapid redeployment of

German occupation forces within France. As the war progressed and the Allies presed toward

Germany, Hitler attempted to withdraw the rest of his army back for a final defense of the

homeland. General Donovan saw in Norway yet another opportunity to impede that withdrawal.

      Trapping the Germans in Norway

      The Russian army by mid-1944 had driven about 4OO,OOO German troops out of Finland

into northern Norway. Germany was in the process of bringing these troops south through

Norway to rejoin the battle in Germany. Rail was the Germans' primary means of moving its

troops through Norway. This reliance on the few existing north-south rail lines provided the

OSS with an ideal opportunity to make a significant, measurable contribution to the Allied war

effort through paramilitary operations.

      The Norwegian Special Operations Group (NORSO) was a group of about a hundred

Norwegian-Americans who had seen duty with the OSS in France, then reorganized and refit for

paramilitary operations in Norway. The mission of NORSO was to sabotage the Northland

Railway, over which the German were moving 150,000 troops south out of Norway toward the

final defense of the Third Reich homeland.14 Unlike paramilitary operations in France, however,

OSS officers in Norway were under strict orders to avoid all contact with the local populace.15

Whereas OSS paramilitary operations in France directly preceded the Allied invasion, there was

no set timetable or formalized plans for Allied military operations in Norway. The populace

would be subject to reprisals from German occupation forces for assisting OSS paramilitary

elements.

      William Colby, who had led Jedburgh Team Bruce in France, was given command of

operation Rype in northern Norway. Rype was somewhat typical of OSS paramilitary operations

in World War II--a rough beginning and a fortuitous ending. Colby's unit was delayed for

several months parachuting into Norway due to poor weather. When the air drop finally

occurred only half of the planes drops their load near the intended target due to inexperienced

pilots and poor aerial navigation.16 Despite a shaky start, Colby's and his surviving force of

nineteen men successfully sabotaged a key bridge and numerous rail lines to delay the movement

of German forces south. Colby was later to receive the Silver Star for gallantry in action as a

result of his service with the OSS in Norway.

      The Dilemma in Yugoslavia

      The German occupation of Yugoslavia in World War II largely overshadowed the

concurrent internal struggle between competing groups for postwar control of the country.17 The

Communist Partisans, led by Tito, intended to convert postwar Yugoslavia into a Marxist

federated republic. Draza Mihailovic's "Chetniks" opposed Tito's Partisans; the Chetniks were

struggling to restore the original Serbian monarchy and prevent a Communist takeover. The

American and British governments assessed Tito's element as the more effective force, and

committed paramilitary support to the Partisans, despite the Partisans' Communist ideals. The

Allies--keeping all options open--nevertheless maintained contact with the Chetniks, since they

shared the common goal of evicting the German occupation force. The OSS and British Special

Operations Executive (SOE) thus faced the challenge in Yugoslavia of maintaining the focus on

Germany without becoming involved in internal politics.

      In 1942 Stalin's government was in no condition to provide Tito with the necessary

support to sustain his forces. Tito's Partisans "would have preferred to receive weapons from the

Russians, but as this was not forthcoming they welcomed British and US support."18 Yugoslavia

was another cooperative paramilitary venture for the British and Americans, with the "senior"

British intelligence agency overseeing all special operations in the Balkans during the war. OSS

agents parachuting into Yugoslavia performed the same functions as their counterparts in France,

yet under vastly different circumstances. Allied conventional military operations were not a

near-term possibility in Yugoslavia in 1944 when the OSS initiated special operations in that

country. The divergent interests of the competing political elements and the violent ethnic hatred

between Serbs and Croats proved more than mere distractions to OSS operatives. Sustaining the

morale of resistance members in this type of operating environment was a formidable challenge

to successful paramilitary operations in Yugoslavia Franklin Lindsay was a State Department

Foreign Service Officer hired on by the OSS, then assigned to "Force 399" for operations in

Yugoslavia. Reflecting on the uphill struggle faced by the Partisans in 1944, Lindsay recalls that

the Partisans viewed OSS officers as "living proof that the major Western Allies, the Americans

and the British, are with us."19

      Lindsay is quick to note that operatives must have credibility to be effective. The

operative must gain the confidence of resistance leaders on the basis of guaranteed American

support. A perception of mixed loyalties on the part of the operative will detract from this

implicit trust. The OSS recruited a number of first-generation Yugoslav-Americans, primarily

for their language skills. As a general ruie, these immigrants proved unreliable as operatives.20

Returning to a country so recently their native homeland, they often took sides immediately with

one of the competing resistance groups. Their strung cultural ties prevented them fiom

remaining impartial. These operatives also found it difficult to earn the trust of the Partisans; the

Partisans believed that if someone was truly dedicated to the resistance effort, he would be a

Partisan and not an American. The Partisans wanted to deal with an American, not an ex-patriot

with mixed motivations.

      Tito's Partisans relied heavily on the OSS for support in the early stages of the

paramilitary program. The Partisans were initially motivated to work with the OSS by

anti-German and anti-Italian feelings because of the atrocities committed by the occupying forces

against civilians. Later in the war, as the outcome became more evident, the Partisan focus

began to shift toward elimination of the Chetniks. By early 1945 the Partisans were using

OSS-delivered weapons to build arms caches for use in the continuation of the Yugoslav civil

war.21 Fighting the Germans was no longer their priority, and the effectiveness of the OSS

paramilitary effort rapidly fell off as a result.

      The OSS Investment in Paramilitary Operations during World War II

      Special funds are "moneys, for which no voucher is submitted to the General Accounting

Office, to be employed in instances where the use of vouchered finds would divulge information

prejudicial to the public interest."22 From the earliest days of COI it was clear that paramilitary

operations required the use of unvouchered funds to satisfy the requirement for plausible

deniability. Hence the use of unvouchered funds became the "modus operandi" of all covert

activity, including paramilitary operations. The Special Funds Branch of the OSS had the

responsibility for devising and supervising a series of intricate procedures for the procurement

and disbursement of unvouchered funds so that the connection of OSS or its agents with a given

transaction was not revealed.

      The provisions of public law regulating the expenditure of ordinary government funds do

not apply to unvouchered funds. The COI received an initial allocation of $100,000 in

unvouchered funds in September 1941. The OSS received allotments totaling $13,000,000 in

unvouchered funds for fiscal year 1942-1943. These initial allotments were drawn from the

President's Emergency Fund. The OSS obtained its own appropriation from Congress for the

first time for fiscal year 1942-1943. Of the $21,000,000 appropriated, nearly $15,000,000 were

earmarked as unvouchered funds. The National War Appropriation Bill of 1945 authorized

$57,000,000 for the OSS, of which $37,000,000 were unvouchered funds. All but $2,000 of the

unvouchered flunds for 1944-1945 were accounted for "solely on the certificate of the Director of

the Office of the Strategic Services"23 Hence General Donovan had some $35,000,000 in

"signature" funds to operate with in 1944-1945. Expenditures up to that limit required no

justification or explanation outside of OSS, and were automatically reimbursed by the Treasury

Department provided Donovan had approved them.

      OSS paramilitary operations and espionage operations required unvouchered funds for

different reasons. Paramilitary (50 Branch) officers normally wore military uniforms in the field

to ensure credibility with resistance elements and facilitate their "uncovering" by conventional

Allied military forces in their advance through German-held territory. These officers did not

have the same need as their espionage counterparts in SI Branch to maintain a cover, hence most

paramilitary officers could be paid through normal vouchered funds. Unvouchered funds were

used extensively, however to finance various resistance groups supported by OSS. OSS made

the first large-scale distribution (1,500,000 francs) to the French Resistance on 7 December 1943.

Funds were distributed by OSS agents on the ground or airdropped to agent reception

committees. In the four-month period from March 1944 to June 1944 the OSS issued a total of

31,186,100 francs plus $38,000 in US currency to French Resistance groups in preparation for

the Normandy D-Day landings.

      OSS materiel requirements consisted mainly of weapons and ammunition, demolitions,

and communications equipment to support resistance elements. Since these items were readily

available through the military supply system, and there was no requirement to conceal the source

of supply, they were normally requisitioned and purchased through open channels. Materiel

costs for paramilitary operations, compared to US conventional military expenditures during

World War II, were relatively insignificant. The plan for special operations in the entire western

Mediterranean Area, submitted by OSS through the Joint Staff Planners to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff on 18 December 1942 contained a detailed list of supplies at an estimated total cost of only

$220,000.24

      OSS operations in France provide a clear example, however, of the level of effort

required to arm and resupply a viable resistance force. Early OSS operations in France consisted

only of supplying arms and materials and a few agents. By 1943 the airdrop effort had

expanded: the OSS delivered some 20,000 tons of ammunition, weapons, and food to the French

Resistance during the course of the year. In September of 1943 the OSS and SOE together

dropped 5,570 containers of arms to the Resistance, and averaged approximately 5,000

containers per month in the months preceding the Allied invasion at Normandy.25

      The personnel investment in OSS paramilitary operations was substantial considering the

zero-base start in late 1941. OSS paramility plans in 1942 called for 13 officers and 22 enlisted

men in the Western Mediterranean area.26 The OSS sent 523 officers, enlisted men and civilians

into France in 1944 to conduct paramilitary operations behind German lines. Of these, 83

officers were assigned to three-man Jedburgh teams, 355 operated in 22-man Operational Groups

(OG's), and the remaining 85 were SO agents' and radio operators in F-, DF-, and RF-Section

circuits. Cumulative casualties were 18 dead (3.4 percent), 17 missing or taken prisoner (3.3

percent), and 51 wounded or injured (9.8 percent).27

      Return on investment: The OSS contribution to the Allied War Effort

      Det 101 achieved remarkable results despite all the challenges faced by Eiffler and his

men. By the end of the war the original group of twenty-five operatives had expanded to some

566 paramilitary agents.28 Eiffler's strong character and firm support from Director of Strategic

Services General Donovan were the key elements to Det 101's operational success. Those

results are amplified in that Det 101 was the only OSS unit to receive a Presidential Citation,

acknowledging that Det 101 bad "met and routed out 10,000 Japanese throughout an area of

10,000 square miles, killed 1,247 while sustaining losses of 37, demolished or captured 4 large

dumps, destroyed the enemy motor transport, and inflicted extensive damage on communications

and installations."29 Perhaps Eiffler's greater contribution to the OSS paramilitary effort was the

extensive after-action report on Burma which he prepared and then briefed to various OSS

special operations agents in Washington DC and in the field as they developed plans for

paramilitary operations in other regions of the world.

      The success of the resistance movement in France supporting Operation Overlord is well

documented. The OSS War Report contains a detailed breakdown of sabotage activities in

France from June through August of 1944 and the statistics appear impressive. The report credits

the resistance with executing 885 successful rail cuts, destroying 322 locomotives, and downing

seven German aircraft during this period.30 The eight SO officers and six radio operators that

parachuted behind enemy lines into Brittany'as part of nine Jedburgh teams managed to arm and

organize more than 20,000 men.31 In addition to their paramilitary contribution the

OSS-supported resistance provided invaluable tactical intelligence support to Allied commanders

planning conventional military operations.

      Covert paramilitary operations in Norway were successful not only from a military

standpoint-CIA elements prevented up to 400,000 Third Reich troops from redeploying south to

Germany--but also validated the concept of covert paramilitary operations independent of

resistance support. The success of William Colby and other team leaders in Norway gave the

CIA a second employment option, whereby paramilitary elements inserted behind enemy lines

did not link up with partisans. This option appeared to have several advantages over the more

"traditional" operations conducted with partisans. William Colby's element neither relied upon

nor answered to local resistance leaders. Colby had only US objectives to pursue; he was not

constrained by potentially competing partisan priorities. Unit integrity and cohesion did not

suffer as a result of partisan-directed changes in organization, as was often the case when

operatives operated in support of partisans.

      The inevitable shift in Partisan priorities within Yugoslavia toward the end of the war

does not diminish the overall success of OSS's paramilitary effort in that country. Attacks

against the two key north-south rail lines in mid-June 1944 closed the alternate western line to

Vienna for at least a six-month period. It took the Germans six weeks to reopen the primary line

to Vienna.32 The OSS-supported Partisans maintained continuous pressure on the Germans

through sabotage of bridges, tunnels, and well-executed ambushes. Partisan activity throughout

Yugoslavia successfully tied down up to fifteen German Divisions, and the Partisans were

instrumental in the rescue and transport back to friendly lines of some 2,000 downed Allied

airmen.33

      The US should have drawn several key lessons from OSS paramilitary operations in

World War II. Generating and sustaining a viable resistance effort not supported by follow-on

conventional military operations will almost always be a long-term effort, with little chance of

achieving decisive results by themselves (at least in the short term). Short-term operations such

as the Jedburghs and OG's in France often provide a false picture of what paramilitary operations

can realistically accomplish. Paramilitary efforts such as those conducted in Yugoslavia and

Burma require an extensive infrastructure, with greater reliance on Partisans for supplies and

protection of operatives. The pre-existence of an organized resistance infrastructure and

subsequent Allied landings amplified the success of the paramilitary effort in France, perhaps

beyond reasonable proportions considering the optimal conditions.

      Emigre recruitment is a critical step in preparing for paramilitary operations. A lack of

quality control or failure to recognize potential conflicts of interest can result in unreliable

operatives in the field, as was the case in Yugoslavia. Operatives need credibility to be effective,

and ethnic or cultural ties must be scrutinized to minimize the possibility that such motivations

might outweigh an operative's affirmed allegiance and dedication to the assigned mission.

      The ideal situation is one of mutual support among resistance elements and paramilitary

operatives. Resistance members offer food and security to the operative, providing a protective

"screen" through their civilian-based intelligence network. Operatives provide the technical

advice, arms and equipment required to wage a successful paramilitary program. Frank Lindsay

spent seven months with Tito's Partisan's inside the Third Reich and was never caught in an

ambush, an amazing achievement considering Lindsay's Partisan element operated and lived

within a mile or two of German garrisons throughout the period. He believes he would not have

survived one week in Yugoslavia without being captured, had it not been for Partisan

protection.34 Rarely, however, are all resistance elements operating from a common political

base. Typically an internal conflict exists in which the various resistance elements are competing

for political control, attempting to consolidate their own gains and negate the impact of all other

groups. In this situation the resistance elements share a common enemy only as long as one

exists; when the external threat diminishes, the internal struggle becomes the predominant

motivation. As the external shared threat subsides and the internal political struggle resurfaces to

pervade the operating environment, the resistance elements and the paramilitary operatives will

have increasingly divergent interests. The resistance element becomes less concerned with

paramilitary activity and more concerned with political activity. The corollary to this scenario is

that the probability of success in a paramilitary operation diminishes in proportion to the decline

in resistance reliance on the operative's support.

      The Dissolution of the OSS

      A flood of magazine articles and several books released shortly after V-J Day detailed the

thrilling exploits of OSS agents during the war. Gary Cooper and James Cagney starred in

Hollywood portrayals of World War II special agents working behind enemy lines. The sudden

wave of publicity for activities kept so secret during the war served to accentuate OSS

accomplishments, glossing over the shortcomings and negative aspects of covert paramilitary

operations.

      The OSS consolidated its field offices, sending Richard Helms, Allen Dulles, and Frank

Wisner to Berlin as the emphasis shifted from supporting anti-Nazi resistance groups to

addressing the rapidly developing Soviet threat. The fact that the USSR was drifting further

away from the West came as no surprise to the OSS. Paramilitary and espionage agents

operating in France, Italy, and Yugoslavia had witnessed first-hand the expanding Communist

political base in those countries. The OSS was not to survive the post-war transformation period,

however, despite General Donovan's best efforts to justify sustaining a peacetime national

intelligence agency. When President Roosevelt died and was succeeded by Harry Truman,

Donovan lost the vital support necessary to keep his organization intact. Truman distrusted

General Donovan, whose tremendous influence in Washington and Republican status represented

a direct threat to Truman's political power base. Truman, seeing no need to maintain a peacetime

cloak-and-dagger spy agency, disbanded the OSS by Executive Order 9621 of 20 September

1945, effective 1 October 1945.35 The dissolution of the OSS marked the begining of a hiatus

in US covert paramilitary capability. When the need for such a capability resurfaced several

years later, the US attempted to pick up where it left off at the end of World War II, applying old

techniques in a vastly different environment. This error in judgment would prove costly in the

years that followed.

                              THE COLD WAR BEGINS

      Covert paramilitary operation: and containment

      On 12 March 1947 President Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress to

request military and economic aid for both Greece and Turkey in their struggle against

Communist insurgents. In a single sentence the Commander-in-Chief enunciated the new

direction of American foreign policy: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to

support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside

pressures."36 Truman's thinly-veiled reference to Communist expansion set the tone for the

post-war period, energizing American intelligence to develop a gameplan to counter the rapidly

developing Soviet threat. There were rules in this new contest that would restrict the available

options--solutions which might lead to open conflict between the US and USSR were

unacceptable. Intelligence officials looking for alternatives, many of whom had served with the

OSS in World War II, proposed reconstituting the paramilitary capability that seemed to work so

well during the war.

      Clearly both the CIA and the National Command Authorities during this period viewed

covert paramilitary operations as a policy tool in President Truman's national stategy of

containmnent. The Senate Select Committee reviewing CIA covert operations concluded in its 26

April 1976 Final Report that "Covert action projects were first designed to counter the Soviet

threat in Europe and were, at least initially, a limited and ad hoc response to an exceptional threat

to American security."37 The policy of containment espoused in 1947 was inherently defensive, a

reaction to Soviet initiatives. Covert paramilitary operations, on the other hand, are offensive by

nature, used to either prevent or cause the overthrow of a government in power. This dichotomy

allowed Truman and the CIA to pursue an offensive program designed to "roll back" the iron

curtain, while publicly maintaining the limited US objective of preventing Communist

expansion. The concept of such a program, however, is vastly different from the inherent

authority to pursue such a program. The basis for that authority has been disputed on repeated

occasions throughout the history of the CIA, and we must review the origins of the Agency itself

in order to trace its roots.

      Legislative authority for covert operations

      The National Security Act of 1947 (which established the Agency and the National

Security Council) contained no reference to secret operations, whether for intelligence collection

or covert action. In fact the term "covert action" was not in use at the time; such activities were

in 1947 referred to in intelligence circles as unconventional warfare. There is disagreement over

whether covert action was considered in the drafting of the bill. Former CIA legislative council

Walter Pforzheimer was one of the principal drafters of the CIA portion of the bill, and had the

additional task of clarifying the Agency-related portions of the bill to members of Congress

during the drafting and review process. Pforzheimer asserts that the drafters never considered

inclusion of any reference to covert action not by direction or intention, but because there was

not a recognized need for such a capability in the post-war period.38 The creation of the Agency

was in response to an identified need by the President for consolidation and centralization of the

national intelligence system within a single agency to provide him with timely and accurate

intelligence estimates. The Act of 1947 legislated the creation of such an agency.

      Former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, another drafter of portions of the Act of

1947, had a different recollection of intent with regard to covert activities when he appeared in

December 1975 before the US Senate Select Committee tasked with investigating US covert

activity:

      It was decided that the Act creating the Central Intelligence Agency should contain a

      "catch-all" clause to provide for unforeseen contingencies. Thus, it was written that the

      CIA should "perform such other fuctions and duties related to intelligence affecting the

      national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." It was

      under this clause that, early in the operation of the 1947 Act, covert activities were

      authorized.39

The Committee could find no evidence in the debates, committee reports, or legislative history of

the 1947 Act to show that Congress intended specifically to authorize covert operations. The

committee did suggest, however, that since the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic

Services (OSS), had conducted such activities, Congress in 1947 may have envisioned the

potential for such activity in the future.

      The legal authority of the CIA to conduct covert operations is not as clearly delineated as

one might assume. Shortly after the successful Communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia on

February 12, 1948, Secretary of Defense Forrestal met with DCI Admiral Hillenkotter to discuss

"what could be done" by the CIA to stem the tide of the Communist advances in Europe.

Elections in Italy loomed just around the corner; if the Communists were to win in Italy, they

would have such momentum in Europe that the rest of the continent seemed almost a fait

accompli to American policymakers.

      Admiral Hillenkotter, after conferring with his general counsel Lawrence Houston,

advised Secretary Forrestal that the wording contained in the National Security Act of 1947

contained no specific authorization to conduct covert operations. Secretary Forrestal pressed

Admiral Hillenkotter further on the subject: "Is there any other way?" When Hillenkotter posed

this follow-on question to his general council, Larry Houston told the DCI that "If the President

or the National Security Council directs us to do a certain action, and the Congress fluids it,

you've got no problem. Who is there left to object?" This rationale satisfied both the DCI and

the Secretary of Defense, and the era of post-war covert operations began in earnest.40

      It is perhaps ironic to note that to this day the CIA has no legislative authority to conduct

covert activity. The Agency continues to operate on the basis of the tacit congressional approval

as described by general counsel Larry Houston in 1948.41 The 1976 Senate Select

Committee--while disputing the CIA position that appropriation of funds constitutes

Congressional approval--acknowledged in it's final report that until the enactment in 1974 of the

Hughes-Ryan Amendment (to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), Congress could escape the

full responsibility for the CIA's covert actions. Congress, until 1974, granted themselves

absolution on the basis of ignorance of what the CIA was doing - they couldn't be blamed for

that which they had no knowledge of. Meanwhile the CIA charged ahead with impunity,

confident that Congressional appropriation and National Command Authority direction were

tantamount to the legal authorization to conduct covert activity.

      Post-war mission creep

      One could argue that the National Command Authorities forced the CIA into the business

of covert paralitary operations. In 1947 the debate over covert activity centered on

psychological warfare. Secretary of State George Marshall adamantly opposed State Department

responsibility for covert action. Marshall understood the tremendous negative political impact

that disclosure of US involvement in such activity would have on American credibility and

reliability. In June 1947 Marshall unveiled his sweeping European economic recovery plan

(which would later bear his name); exposure of State Department involvement in covert activity

would jeapardize the success of that recovery plan. On 17 December 1947 the National Security

Council (NSC), "taking cognizance of the vicious psychological efforts of the USSR, its satellite

countries and Communist groups,"42 assigned the CIA responsibility for covert psychological

activity: "The similarity of operational methods involved in covert psychological and intelligence

activities and the need to ensure their secrecy and obviate costly duplication renders the Central

Intelligence Agency the logical agency to conduct such operations."43 Whether the CIA actively

lobbied for this opportunity or the NSC simply directed the Agency to assume responsibility for

covert action is a topic still open for debate. In any case NSC 4-A is the US National Security

Council's initial directive authorizing a covert action program.

      DCI Hillenkotter on 2 March 1948 created the Special Procedures group within the

Office of Special Operations to carry out the psychological operations mandated in NSC 4-A.

The memorandum from Hillenkotter to his Assistant Director for Special Operations contained a

working definition of psychological operations, which would henceforth include "all measures of

information and persuasion short of physical in which the originating role of the United States

Government will always be kept concealed."44 This definition laid the groundwork for the

concept of plausible denial which would remain the cornerstone of all CIA covert operations in

years to come. In his memorandum the DCI clearly articulated the two purposes behind covert

psychological operations: (1) undermining the strength of foreign elements engaged in activities

hostile or unfavorable to the United States, and (2) influencing public opinion abroad in a

direction favorable to our national interests.45

      The accelerated pace of world events in 1948 led to a rapid expansion of the concept of

covert operations. In February 1948 the Communist party seized political control in

Czechoslovakia following a successful coup d'etat. In March 1948 General Lucius Clay,

commander of US military forces in Europe, sent an alarming telegram from Berlin noting a

"subtle change" in Soviet attitude, advising Washington that that war might come "with dramatic

suddenness."46 Against the backdrop of a rapidly spreading sense of panic among US policy

officials over the war scare, the National Security Council's issuance of NSC 10/2 on 18 June

1948 appears rational and timely. The Council, "taking cogizance of the vicious covert

activities of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the

aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers,"47 created in NSC 10/2 the

Office of Special Projects within the CIA to conduct a much expanded program of covert action.

The directive superseded NSC 4-A, broadening the scope of covert activity to include political,

economic, and paramilitary operations. NSC 10/2 also codified the concept of plausible

deniability introduced in NSC 4-A, directing that all cove activities "would be so planned and

executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons

and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."48

      DCI Hillenkotter, in a series of memos to the Assistant Executive Secretary of the

National Security Council, expressed-serious reservations about certain portions of the directive

during the drafting prccess.49 Hillenkotter's objections to the directive centered on the disconnect

between authority and responsibility for the conduct of covert operations. The Council directed

that the Chief of the Office of Special Projects report directly to the DCI, but specified that all

covert operations would be coordinated through the Departments of Defense and State. The

Council placed responsibility for the planning and conduct of all covert operations squarely on

the shoulders of the DCI, yet the Secretaries of State and Defense retained the final authority for

approval of such activities. The question of who retained direct control over the activities of the

new Office were open for debate for years after the Council issued the watershed directive. The

fact that all funds supporting covert operations were drawn from the CIA budget further fueled

the debate. CIA general council Lawrence Houston advised the DCI later in 1948 that since

NSC Executive Secretary Admiral Souers and George Kennan of State Department shared the

belief that the new office "must" take its policy direction and guidance from State and the

Defense Departments, the DCI was obligated to seek clarification from the Council and

amendment of the directive as required to consolidate responsibility and authority.50 DCI

Hillenkotter never resolved this dilemma and his analysis of the fundamental flaw in this

organizational concept would prove to be quite accurate; the new covert operations office

expanded activities at an exponential rate over the next three years with a wide open charter and

no requirement to coordinate with other concurrent intelligence operations.

      The National Security Council upped the ante for covert operations by issuing NSC 20 in

August 1948. George Kennan, then the Director of State Department's Policy and Planning

Staff, provided much of the input for the document. The directive described the ultimate

objective of American foreign policy as "the overthrow of Soviet power."51 The document

provided recommendations for supporting anti-Communist resistance efforts, suggesting that the

US pursue a program of broad-based rather than selective support for resistance groups.

      The muddled covert operation command relationship generated by NSC 10/2 continued

until General Smith, at his initial meeting with his staff as the new DCI in October 1950, asserted

his complete authority over the redesignated Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). The National

Security Council organized the Dulles-Jackson-Correa committee to study CIA operations and

the National Organization for intelligence. The committee report, dated 1 January 1949,

recommended the integration of CIA's Office of Special Operations--the espionage function--and

the OPC's--the covert operations function--under a single Operations Division. The committee

recognized the need for closer coordination between the two in operational matters. The

anomalous position of the OPC in the Agency continued, however, and the nearly 2-1/2 years of

divergence between responsibility and authority provided a fertile environment for the

development of covert programs. With the right leadership and adequate funding, the

opportunities for growth were virtually unlimited. Congress, it soon became evident, was more

than willing to loosen the purse strings in the name of anti-Communism. Leadership for a

national program of covert action came in the form of a distinguished University of Virginia law

school graduate named Frank Wisner.

      Wisner resurrects a paramilitary capability within OPC

      As head of OPC, Wisner was given a great deal of latitude by DCI Admiral Hillenkotter.

Hillenkotter was keenly aware, according to former CIA legislative council Walter Pforzheimer

that "if he [Hillenkotter] interfered, there would have been a call from the State Department."52

George Kennan, then head of State's Policy Planning Staff, had gone to great lengths to preserve

State Department oversight of OPC, and would not tolerate DCI interference. With State

Department backing, Wisner "would have run right over Hillenkotter,"53 had the DCI attempted

to assert his influence over the direction OPC was headed. Wisner had generated in Washington

considerable support for his program, including Secretary Forrestal who was fully supportive of

Wisner's lobbying efforts to expand covert operations.54 Consequently, Wisner had a "free

hand" to build OPC as he saw fit. Wisner needed money and people in large quantities to

support his ambitious plan for OPC expansion. Neither commodity was in short supply. By the

end of Wisner's first year running OPC he had three hundred employees assigned to seven

overseas field stations. Three years later OPC had personnel at 47 overseas stations. Between

fiscal years 1950 and 1951, OPC's personnel strength jumped from 584 to 1,531. Wisner

inherited unexpended funds from the dissolved Special Procedures Group totaling just over $2

million when he took over as head of OPC. By 1952 OPC had an annual budget of almost $200

million.55

      The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided an early task for Wisner's infant OPC, specifying two

related missions as part of the Defense Department's strategy for countering the expected Soviet

military invasion of Europe.56 The first mission was to establish a network of "stay-behind"

agents m Western Europe who would remain in place as Soviet forces attacked west. The second

assignment was to organize and support resistance groups in Eastern Europe and Russia that

could help retrd the advance of attacking Soviet forces. With a clearly defined mission from the

JCS and State Department advocating action, Wisner set into motion a program to probe the

Soviet perimeter, beginning with a tiny country along the Adriatic Sea.

      Albania - Operation Valuable

      Albania is widely considered the most ambitious partisan-building effort undertaken by

the CIA in the period immediately following World WarII.57 Enver Hoxha had been a

resistance leader in Albania during World War II. The British SOE had armed and advised

Hoxha and his men in their struggle against Axis occupying forces during the war. By 1946

Hoxha had consolidated power, declared himself president, and established a Communist

government in Albania with the support of Moscow.

      The country of Albania shares a common border with Yugoslavia to the north and Greece

to the south. President Tito and his Partisans had defeated the Chetniks in the violent civil war

within Yugoslavia, and Tito was unwilling to subjugate his newly formed government to the

authority of the Moscow Directorate. Tito broke with Stalin in 1948, maintaining a separate

Communist federal republic in Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, an unsuccessful rebellion which had

started in Greece in 1946 was nearing conclusion, the Communists unable to secure control of

the government. From the American perspective this gave strategic significance to tiny Albania,

in that it remained outside the perimeter of the Iron Curtain, isolated between non-Communist

Greece and a rebel YugoslaviL Albania, in 1949, appeared "ripe for an anti-Communist

operation."58

      British problems with Hoxha began in 1946 when British warships sailing off the coast

of Albania were fired upon; later two destroyers sank after striking mines in the three-mile wide

Corfu Channel off the Albanian coast. President Hoxha subsequently refused to accept an

International Court of justice decision implicating the Albanian government in the Corfu

Channel incident. The British government, frustrated by Hoxhas refusal to accept responsibility

for the incident and the demonstrated impotence of the international community in dealing with

one of Moscow's "puppet" governments, turned to its intelligence service for alternatives.

      British intelligence had established contact with Albanian emigres as early as 1946. The

SIS first inserted agents into Albania in 1947, hoping to fuel a civil war which could unseat

Hoxha's fledgling Communist government. If this could be accomplished, the British intended to

support a royalist anti-Communist government in central Albania. The British were unsuccessful

in enlisting support from Albania's neighbors. Tito had no desire to increase Soviet hostility by

acting against Albania. Greece, exhausted by its own civil war, could offer no substantial

assistance.

      Great Britain, in serious economic straits at the end of the war, approached the US for

financial support. William Hayter, a senior British intelligence officer, led a delegation of senior

SIS and Foreign Office officials to Washington in March 1949 to discuss with the CIA a

cooperative strategy in Albania.59 Wisner was enthusiastic about joining the British in their

Albanian operation, as was his deputy Franklin Lindsay. At an early meeting of the White

House-State Department-Pentagon group, General John Magruder from the Defense Department

argued against US covert operations in Albania, while Robert Joyce of State Depatment's Policy

Planning Staff supported the initiative. Magruder denied the strategic importance of Albania;

supporting a rebellion in Albania would only anger both Greece and Yugoslavia. Robert Joyce

countered with the State Department view that "slicing off" a Russian satellite would have a

propaganda impact justifying the risk.60 Joyce reminded Magruder of the agreement between

Hoxha and Moscow giving Stalin naval base rights at Volana, along the Albanian coast, in

return for aid from the Russians. Soviet access to a warm water port from which submarines

might operate would directly impact security in the Mediterranean. State Department prevailed,

and the "10/2"61 panel granted approval to commence operations. In a series of meetings the two

intelligence agencies outlined a program for joint paramilitary operations in Albania.

      James Macarger had been a Foreign Service officer working the Albania situation for the

State depament for over a year when the OPC first discussed formally in the spring of 1949 the

prospect of conducting paramilitary operations in Albania. Macarger's qualifications were not

overlooked by Wisner, and Macarger was soon transferred to OPC to head the Albanian project

for the CIA. The CIA's first step was to create a "legitimate" government-in-exile that would

have the support of the resistance members inside Albania. Among the various rival faction

leaders who had fled Albania when Hoxha seized power, none could claim the loyalty of all

partisans within Albania. Macarger and the CIA thus created the Albanian National Committee,

a coalition partisan government-in-exile with representatives from the two strongest faction

leaders, tribal warlord King Zog and Bali Kombetar. King Zog, leader of the Legaliteti political

movement, had seized power in a 1924 coup and made himself king in 1927. Bali's "National

Front" organization, centered in Rome and Athens in 1949, had collaborated with the Germans

and Italians during the war in addition to waging partisan warfare against them.

      The OPC-funded "Committee for a Free Europe" by 1949 had become a haven for exiled

leaders in Europe. The CIA, in their efforts to establish the legitimacy of the

government-in-exile, used Committee for a Free Europe funds to fly the Albanian National

Committee to the US. Escorted by Colonel Lowe of the CIA, the Committee "made the rounds"

in Washington DC, meeting with various members of the legislative and executive branches to

garner publicity and support for the Albanian cause. The Committee was received by Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State Llewelyn Thompson before heading north to New York to establish

the Committee headquarters. In all Macarger spent almost a full year laying the political

groundwork necessary to support a successful paralitary operation. For the operation itself

Macarger was assigned head of CIA's Southeast Europe region, which included all of the

Balkans plus Hungary. Macarger reported mostly to Franklin Lindsay, who at the time was chief

of CIA's Eastern European Division. On occasion Macarger dealt directly with Wisner. A group

of Army colonels on the OPC staff provided the technical advice for paramilitary operations.

      Contrary to most published accounts, the objective in Albania was not the overthrow of

the Hoxha Communist government.62 Macarger defines the Albanian operation as a probe to

determine the feasibility to support a full-blown partisan effort. Former CIA officer Harry

Rozitzke, on the other hand, categorizes Albanian operations as "positive intervention" designed

to unseat Hoxha Rozitzke contends that "[t]he Albanian operation was the first and only attempt

by Washington to unseat a Communist regime within the Soviet orbit by paramilitary means."63

Macarger's assessment appears more accurate, in light of the limited scale of operations

conducted. The CIA's paramilitary effort in Albania was intended to serve as an indicator of the

level of effort required to launch a more concerted and decisive program.

      Initial joint British-American operations into Albania were run out of Malta, a small

island in the Mediterranean south off the coast of Sicily. CIA officers at Malta set up emigre

training camps, readied the airfield for parachute operations, and established a joint headquarters

with their British counteparts. In 1949 OPC remained under the operational direction of the

State Department, outside the purview of DCI Hillenkotter. State Department, then, would call

the shots in Albania. The approved concept called for inserting trained emigres--"Pixies", as

they were called-- by boat, airdrop, and overland movement into Albania to establish contact

with resistance groups. The British provided the bulk of the manpower early in the operation.

British participation dropped off over the next two years, however, and by 1951 the operation

was entirely US-run.64

      Early British contact with the resistance indicated that although there was a large partisan

population, the Albanians were not optimistic about the probability of a successful coup. The

resistance also reported increased activity by President Hoxha's internal security forces. An early

British attempt to infiltrate emigres bore out this assessment, foreboding future operations into

Albania. The British boat Stormie Seas crossed the channel from Corfu on the night of 3 October

1949, carrying two groups totaling 26 Pixies. The Pixies, who had been training at Malta since

July, were ambushed upon reaching the Albanian coast. Government security forces had

apparently been tipped as to the location and time of the landing. Four Pixies were killed, the

rest escaped into Greece.65 Repeated attempts over the next two years to infiltrate paramilitary

elements met with similar consequences. Hoxha's security forces were waiting in drop zones,

along the coast, and at the border to intercept the perpetrators. The OPC eventually shifted its

base of operations to Greece; the results remained the same, however, as Hoxha's forces met each

sucessive infiltration party at the point of insertion.

      By 1951 it was clear that the operation had no chance of suceess, yet the probe continued.

One possible explanation for this is that upon taking over as DCI in October 1950, General

Walter Bedell Smith commenced a reorganization of CIA, pulling OPC back under the control of

the DCI. It is reasonable to assume that OPC field operations were allowed to continue during

reorganization until an accurate appraisal of each "project" was complete." Looking back,

however, there is no doubt that the program should have been terminated once it became clear

that no large-scale paramilitary effort was feasible in Albania.

      It is impossible to determine the total CIA investment in Albania. According to both

Macarger and Lindsay no cost studies were ever done and there was no requirement for accurate

accounting of expenditures.67 Macarger and others running the operation "never gave a second

thought to costs; money was not a problem."68 Macarger, in fact, was encouraged to spend more

than he requested. Wisner and State Department were eager to demonstrate the covert

capability of OPC against the "evil" Communist threat, and money was not a limiting factor at

the time. Macarger conservatively estimates costs for the first two years at approximately

$600-800 thousand; those costs rose significantly when the operation moved to Greece.69

      Macarger also disputes the popular notion that the root cause of failure in Albania was

Soviet double-agent Kim Philby.70 Philby was the British SIS's liaison with the CIA in

Washington during the Albanian operation, and was, as the CIA later discovered, under the

employment of the Soviet secret intelligence agency. Rositzke and others credit Philby with

passing to Moscow details of the Albanian operation. Moscow, according to this argument, then

passed the information on to Hoxha for use in employing his internal security force to meet the

intruders upon insertion Macarger, however, remains convinced that Philby did not have access

to such operational details as times and locations of insertions far enough in advance to pass that

information through Moscow to Hoxha in time to affect the insertions. Decisions affecting

insertion were often made just prior to launching the party because of changing weather and

support requirements. Lindsay concurs with Macarger's assessment, adding that "the Russians

would never have seriously considered risking Philby's cover with the British SIS over a country

as insignificant as Albania."71

      The emigre network, according to Macarger and Lindsay, was the principal cause of

failure in Albania.72 A breakdown in operational security allowed recruited emit to pass

detailed information on scheduled operations through the network, reaching Hoxha's security

officials in Tirana. The Soviets, unbeknownst to the CIA, had totally penetrated the Albanian

community. Emigre screening was minimal; the OPC had no means of verifying the loyalties

and motivations of those recruited. It is not surprising, therefore, that emigre camps were a

security sieve, as volunteers were quickly accepted for training with little in the way of

background checks.

      Macarger's explanation, however, is not the only possible cause of failure in Albania.

Thomas Powers, in his biography of Richard Helms, lists a third possible explanation for the

Albanian failure. Powers contends that the scope of the operation was simply too ambitious; the

CIA in 1949 was not prepared to undertake such an operation and see it through to completion.73

Completion, according to Powers and most other published accounts, meant unseating Hoxha

and emplacing a non-Communist government in Albania.  The extent of the US involvement in

Albania was limited from the beginning to paramilitary operations; achieving decisive results,

therefore, was an unrealistic objective from the outset Franklin Lindsay and a distinguished

collection of scholars from Harvard University studying covert operations nearly twenty years

later would reach the same conclusion, reporting that "[a]t best, a successful covert operation can

win time, forestall a coup, or otherwise create favorable conditions which will make it possible to

use overt means to finally achieve an important objective."74

      The evidence indicates that a Soviet-penetrated emigre network was the principal cause

of operational failure. If the objective was to unseat Hoxha, which is not altogether clear, then

the entire program was a dismal failure. If, however, one accepts Macarger's conviction that the

objective was to determine the feasibility of a full-blown partisan program m Albania then the

CIA's efforts were not an exercise in futility. Was Albania worth the investment? Macarger

believes it definitely was. Albania was where the CIA/OPC "cut its teeth" in covert paramilitary

operations. The CIA learned some valuable lessons--the importance of quality emigre

recruitment, for example--and the operators believed that what they were doing was vital to US

national security. National security was at stake and the OPC was actually doing something to

counter the Communist threat to the West. Had the CIA adotped the lesson; learned and

adjusted operations accordingly, the paramilitary effort in Albania would not have been in vain.

Unfortunately, this was not the case. Wisner and the OPC eagerly sought new opportunities

among the Soviet satellites to prove the value of the covert paramilitary tool, and the failure

within the CIA to modify operational techniques and procedures led to similar failures in Poland

and the Ukaine.

      Supporting the Freedom and Independence Movement In Poland

      In the summer of 1950, Poland was one of the Soviet satellites that appeared to have the

most potential for successful covert paramilitary operations. Polish emigration to the west was

strong following World War II, building an influential community in the US. Poland was also

important from the standpoint of strategic geography. A Soviet offensive into Western Europe,

much like World War II, would almost certainly pass through Poland. Building a strong

resistance network in Poland fit well with the Pentagon's objectives for the CIA; paramilitary

forces could interdict and delay advancing Soviet military forces, buying time for NATO to

deploy conventional military forces.

      The Germans had effectively destroyed the Polish resistance "Home Army" in the great

Warsaw uprising of 1944 as the Russians stood by outside the city. Stalin had post-war plans for

Poland; the nationalist-motivated resistance would be an obstacle to that process. If the Nazis

were intent on purging Poland of that resistance, Stalin in 1944 was certainly willing to oblige,

waiting patiently with his military forces to move in and take control once the Germans began

their withdrawal. What remained of the Home Army went underground once the Russians

moved in.

      By 1950 the Polish Political Council had established a headquarters in London as the

government-in-exile. What survived of the Home Army inside Poland reconstituted itself as the

Freedom and Independence Movement--known by the acronym WIN--and maintained limited

contact with the government-in-exile in London. WIN claimed a following of some 20,000

partially active resistance members inside Poland, with a total strength of 100,000 available for

action in the event of war.75 What the American and British intelligence officials did not know in

1950 was that a thorough security sweep by Soviet security forces (KGB) in 1947 had virtually

eradicated the remnants of WIN inside Poland.

      Following the 1947 KGB counterintelligence sweep a Pole claiming to be a WIN member

"escaped" to London and contacted former Polish officer General Wladyslaw Anders to enlist his

support for WIN. Anders subsequently approached both the CIA and British SIS for their

assistance. WIN provided the CIA with "smuggled" photos of destroyed Soviet tanks and

equipment that the resistance claimed to have destroyed, in order to verify the credibility and

commitment of the resistance movement. The counterespionage division of CIA, unconvinced of

WIN's credibility, advised against CIA involvement. Wisner had the more convincing argument,

however, and the CIA embarked on ajoint program of paramilitary support.

      A detailed accounting of the support provided by the CIA over the two year duration of

the Poland program is difficult to determine, since once again record-keeping was not a priority.

What is not disputed among the various accounts of the operation76 is that CIA support was

substantial, primarily consisting of money, military supplies, and communications equipment

airdrops into Poland.

      That is, until Polish official radio announced on 28 December 1952 that the Polish secret

intelligence agency (known in the West as UB) had uncovered a joint British-American

operation to support a rebellion within Poland. The surprise announcement sent shock waves

through American and British intelligence channels; an internal CIA investigation and

subsequent announcements from inside Poland revealed the true extent of the UB intelligence

coup. The CIA and SIS were actually the unwary victims of an elaborate sting operation at the

hands of the Polish secret intelligence.

      The UB, it was soon discovered, had captured in Poland and subsequently "turned" a

WIN leader named Seinko. Seinko thus provided the UB with a means of stimulating and

subsequently manipulating Western resistance support in the form of arms and equipment To

accomplish this, UB had Seinko maintain indirect contact with the CIA through a network of

couriers who themselves were unaware that UB was in control of WIN. The UB, through

Seinko, sent a continuous string of messages to the West portraying a dedicated and

strengthening WIN resistance movement within Poland. The CIA, lured by the "bait" Seinko

provided, continued the uninterrupted flow of arms and equipment into the country. While the

CIA mistakenly believed their support was building a credible paramilitary force in WIN, every

CIA shipment into Poland ended up in the hands of UB.

    The setback in Poland highlighted several faults in the CIA's evolving covert paramilitary

program. The failed operation brought to the surface the increasing disunity within the CIA.

Wisner, as Chief of OPC, had taken to heart the National Security Council's guidance for his

office in NSC Directive 10/2 to "operate independently of other components of Central

Intelligence Agency."77 Wisner dismissed the caution flag waved by the counterespionage

division as unsubstantiated pessimism when the CIA had initially considered involvement with

WIN back in 1950. He was not about to let some naysayer with no "operational experience"

stand in the way of his program. The incoherent intelligence framework in place since 1947

created the ideal environment for such discord; it was not until DCI Smith brought the OPC back

under his direct control in early 1952 that all elements of CIA answered to a single authority.

      Poland also brought to light the Communists' capability to penetrate a resistance network.

The CIA underestimated the effectiveness of the internal security measures put in place by

Moscow's secret intelligence in the satellite countries. The iron curtain, as the CIA was rapidly

discovering, proved nearly impenetrable from the outside, yet porous from the inside to the

extent that the Communists allowed controlled agents to pass information to Western intelligence

services. The CIA had little means of corroborating resistance information. When the CIA's

espionage division did report potential Soviet penetration of resistance movements, the OPC

rarely heeded the warnings.

      The most damning aspect of the failure in Poland was the inability of the CIA to cover its

tracks. The essence of all covert activity, including paramilitary, lies in establishing a program

by which the identity of the perpetrator of the action remains concealed. The possibility of

compromise can be minimized, but never completely eliminated. Harry Rositzke, an espionage

officer with the CIA in the early 1950's, calls Poland "the [CIA's] most substantial and disastrous

paramilitary effort inside the Soviet orbit."78 His assessment seems most accurate, in that the

CIA altogether failed to conceal the role of the US in Poland. Only the Bay of Pigs fiasco during

President Kennedy's term of office rivals the CIA's failure in Poland to guarantee the US

plausible deniability.

      The Ukraine

      Situated between Russia and the Balkan Republics is the Ukine. As Soviet security

forces consolidated control following the end of World War II, anti-Communist partisans in the

Ukraine withdrew, establishing their resistance operating-base in the rugged Carpathian

mountains. The Ukrainian Nationalists, meanwhile, established a government-in-exile in

Munich, Germany. Ukraine was significant to the West in that it contained one of the largest

concentration of anti-Communist elements at the end of the war.79 The Ukrainian partisans had

organized themselves into paramilitary units, and were actively conducting guerrilla warfare

operations against Communist forces by 1949. The harsh environment and aggressive security

sweeps by the Communists, however, were limiting partisan operations. The partisans rarely

ventured out of their underground caves in the winter; leaving tracks in the snow would have led

the Communists straight to their hideouts. The partisans spent much of the summer foraging for

food stocks that would carry them through the following winter. The result was a less than

all-out effort to expand paramilitary operations.

      British and US intelligence had initiated flights over the Carpathians shortly after the war

ended, first dropping propaganda material to the partisans denouncing Communist efforts and

encouraging the resistance to continue the fight. The risks for the US in providing aid to the

Ukrainian partisans were considerable. The Ukraine was more than just another satellite country

on the periphery of Russia, assigned to Stalin in the Paris peace accords for post-war

reconstruction. The Ukraine was an acknowledged part of the USSR. Thus, the Soviets could

legitimately consider any meddling in the internal affairs of the Ukraine by a third party

tantamount to war.

      The initial impetus for US involvement in the Ukraine was the need for intelligence.

When the Berlin Blockade went into effect, the West found itself totally locked out from an

intelligence perspective, unable to track the course of events inside the USSR. The CIA was

actively searching for any means to "look inside" the iron curtain to determine what direction

Stalin would take the USSR in the post-war period. The CIA initiated Ukrainian espionage

efforts in the fall of 1949.80 As Wisner got his paramility effort underway, however, the

disconnect between OPC and OSO (the CIA's espionage division) soon became apparent. A 24

April 1950 internal OPC memo from Mr. C. Offie to Frank Wisner described a probable security

breach within OSO regarding CIA plans for the Ukraine. Offie had apparently discovered that

the CIA was considering sponsorship of a Ukrainian National Committee, and that OSO plans to

send coded messages through the Voice of America to the Ukrainian underground resistance had

already "leaked" outside the CIA in New York. The obvious concern was that OSO might have

compromised the operation before OPC officers had begun developing their plan.

      According to Rositzke, the CIA's assessment in 1950 of the potential for resistance

support and covert paramilitary operations was that "the Ukrainian guerrillas could play no

serious paramilitary role."81 Wisner's former deputy Franklin Lindsay concurs, adding that by

1950 "the Soviet strength was so great, its political control and military controls were so great,

that [Ukrainian] resistance efforts stood little chance of success."82 Failures in Albania and

Poland provided US intelligence analysts with convincing evidence of the extent to which

Moscow dominated Soviet-controlled territories. Success in the Ukraine would require a

tremendous covert paramilitary and perhaps even overt military investment on the part of the US.

US policymakers in 1950 was unwilling to make such a commitment. Limited covert operations

were acceptable; the risk of provoking open conflict with the Soviets was not.

      The OPC, then, provided a trickle of support to the Ukrainian partisans for a period of

several years, enough to keep the movement alive but not enough to effect the outcome. Most

Ukrainians were unwilling to accept the risk of capture and imprisonment, especially when it was

clear that the Americans were not prepared to fully support their cause. The Soviets eventually

eliminated the underground in Ukraine by isolating the guerrillas from the populace, the

resistance left to wither away in the mountains. In the Ukraine the US did not commit the

paramilitary resources necessary for the resistance movement to succeed. If the US goal was to

build a viable resistance movement in the Ukrine--which certainly seems logical--then the

objective analysis indicates a wasted effort, doomed to failure from the very beginning.

      In his later observations on accepting risk in covert operations, Lindsay identifies timing

as the predominant factor in considering a course of action. According to Lindsay, "In a war or

near-war situation, much greater risks of exposure can be justified not only because of greater

need for the activity, but also because the penalties for exposure are far less."83 Much of the

war-scare mentality of the early.1950's was the result of ignorance, avoid of knowledge in the

West as to what was occurring in the USSR. From a strategic persective, the US was not in a

near-war situation with the Soviets in 1950, and could not justify the risk of exposure by

embarking on a large-scale paramilitary effort in the Ukraine.

      Strategic geography plays an equally important part in the decision to commit to covert

operations in a particular country. Ukraine's status as an integral part of the USSR meant that the

stakes were too high for a large-scale covert paramilitary operation. Probing the Soviet satellites

was one thing--throughout history, buffer states have served a vital function by "absorbing"

limited penetrations by the enemy. Within the international intelligence community such indirect

activity at the periphery is an expected, if not accepted occurrence. Ukraine, however, was not a

satellite; it was an integral component of the USSR Exposure of a US peacetime covert program

in the Ukraine would have much greater implications; the USSR would be fully justified in

taking all measures--including military response--to defend the sovereignty of her borders.

      One could say, based on the arguments presented above, that the CIA's decision to limit

its covert paramilitary program in the Ukraine was the logical choice. John Ranelagh, author of

arguably the most accurare historical account of the CIA, offers a different conclusion. Ranelagh

condemns the US for encouraging and supporting the Ukrainian resistance movement, alleging

that by doing so the Americans were simply encouraging the Ukrainians to their deaths.84 The

CIA knew fiom the beginning that the movement could not succeed, given the limited amount of

support the US planned to provide.

      Ranaelagh's analysis draws attention to one of the moral dilemmas faced by

decision-makers when considering the merits of a particular covert paramilitary operation. Is it

ethical or even rational to provide a degree of paramilitary assistance when all indicators suggest

that assistance in the amount planned will not sustain the resistance movement? In the context of

the early 1950's, when doing something was better than doing nothing, failure to weigh the

morality of supporting the Ukrainian underground resistance is understandable. From the CIA

perspective, ultimate responsibility for setting the moral standards used to determine whether a

particular covert operation is acceptable lies with the National Command Authority (NCA), since

every operation requires approval at that level. The NCA relies heavily on CIA assessments,

however, and so the responsibility is truly shared between the two.

      The results of the CIA's abortive involvement in the Ukraine should have provided the

US with an early indication that deciding to use covert paramilitary capability must be a highly

selective process. All factors must be considered, and if approved, an operation requires the

level of commitment necessary to have an acceptable probability of success. In its haste to be a

proactive deterrent, however, the CIA established unrealistic objectives for covert paramilitary

activity, believing it possible to prevent Communist expansion through limited means. The US

made the same mistake in 1951, believing that paramilitary activity alone might have a

significant impact on the Chinese Communist involvement in the Korean conflict.

      The OPC in Korea-Li Mi

      The US, in conformance with the fundamental precepts of the Truman Doctrine, had

provided significant military and financial aid to Chiang Kai-shek in his unsuccessful struggle to

prevent Mao Tse-tung's Communist forces from seizing political control of China. The Maoists

completed their takeover in 1949 when they overran Peking and southern China. As the

Communist forces swept across China, Chiang and most of his followers fled the mainland,

taking up residence across the straits on Formosa (Taiwan). The Chinese Nationalists, backed by

the US, vowed to continue the struggle with the goal of eventually returning to the mainland and

extricating Mao's Communists.

      General Li Mi had served under Chiang Kai-shek as an army commander in central China

prior to the Chinese takeover. Li Mi and about 1,500 of his troops, rather than attempt to flee

east toward Formosa, had withdrawn west through the Yunnan Province to the Chinese border.

Li Mi's force eventually made their way to Burma, though not with the consent of the Burmese

government. The Burmese were preoccupied at the time with containing an internal revolt of

their own, and could not commit the resources necessary to prevent Li Mi's force fiom spilling

over the border into Burma. Li Mi, despite Burmese government efforts to evict him and his

Chinese Nationalists, drafted Burmese tribesmen as laborers and continued in 1950 to rebuild

and refit his force in northern Burma.

      US officials in late 1950 failed to acknowledge indications of Chinese Communist

posturing along the North Korean border for an attack south into Korea. When the Communists

crossed the Yalu River and entered the Korean conflict, a surprised General MacArthur ordered

the withdrawal south of United Nations (UN) forces. The Truman administration in early 1951

frantically searched for a way to relieve the pressure on UN military forces backpedaling south in

the face of advancing Chinese Communist forces. The National Security Council discussed at an

early 1951 NSC meeting the possibility of using Chinese Nationalist forces to draw away

Chinese Communist elements from North Korea.85 The general concept presented was to insert

CIA-sponsored Chinese Nationalists into China from Burma, forcing the Communists to pull

forces out of Korea to deal with the incursion. If successful, this would cause Mao to redeploy

his Red Chinese forces, thereby relieving pressure against American and UN forces.

            DCI General Walter Bedell Smith, USA attended the NSC meeting, and immediately

voiced CIA opposition to the concept on the basis "[T]he Chinese Communists have so goddamn

many troops, you can't count 'em all; they won't pull anyone out of there."86 Secretary of State

Acheson and Secretary of Defense Johnson, however, both supported the proposal. US policy

was to avoid direct military conflict with the Communists inside Chinese borders, since there

was no guarantee that such action would not provoke a military response from the USSR. By

necessity, then, any intervention inside China would have to be covert in nature; the role of the

US could not be disclosed.

      In theory, the use of the Nationalists could achieve the objectives of both State and

Defense Departments. If successful, the operation would divert Chinese Communist military

forces from Korea and conceal the role of the US. The DCI was not a voting member of the

NSC, and the arguments of the two Secretaries convinced Truman to task the CIA with initiating

the covert paramilitary operation. Given his marching orders, General Smith tasked Wisner and

his OPC with developing a plan to infiltrate Nationalists forces back into China.

      The Chief of OPC's Far East division in 1951 was Dick Stilwell. Stilwell and his deputy,

Bill Depuis, put together the details of the plan and contacted General Li Mi to discuss the

operation. The CIA created a "front" commercial organization in Bangkok, Thailand called

Southeast Asia Supply Corporation, or SEA Supply. SEA Supply provided the necessary cover

for logistical and operational support. The basic concept was for Li Mi's force to cross the border

and enter the Yunnan Province through Burma--the back door into China. The CIA would

transport additional Nationalist paramilitary elements from Formosa to Burma, where they would

insert by parachute, then cross the border on foot into China.

      The Li Mi covert paramilitary program resulted in total failure. Counterintelligence

officers in OSO (Office of Special Operations--OPC's espionage/counterintelligence counterpart

in CIA) had suspected General Li Mi's chief radio operator of collaborating with the Chinese

Communists. The OSO investigation, prior to the Nationalist force crossing the border into

China, concluded that the chief radio operator was in fact a Chinese Communist agent. OPC,

still operating outside the direct control of the DCI, disregarded the OSO report and pressed

ahead with the operation. When Li Mi's Nationalist paramilitary element crossed the border into

the south Yunnan Province of China, they were met by an overwhelming Chinese Communist

military force and decimated. Some escaped with Li Mi back to Burma, while many scattered in

an area now known as the "Golden Triangle" to avoid certain death at the hands of the Maoists.

      The long-term diplomatic impact of the Li Mi failure is an even greater tragedy than the

operational failure to draw Chinese Communist forces out of Korea Li Mi attempted at least

two more incursions into the Yunnan with identical results. Many of the Nationalists that

invaded China blended into the Yunnan populace, in a region eventually to gain recognition as a

For world supplier of opium and its refined product heroin (hence the term "Golden Triangle").

The CIA was forced to mount a major effort in later years to transport many other surviving

Nationalists back to Taiwan, an effort the CIA was unsuccessful in concealing from the public

eye.

      The use of Burmese territory as a staging base for paramilitary operations into

neighboring China represented a real threat to Burmese national security. The threat of inciting

hostility from Peking toward Burma and possible retaliation as a result of such operations was

genuine. Burmese government officials had never sanctioned Li Mi's presence in Burma for that

reason. Li Mi would later become a direct threat to the government of Burma as his Nationalists

joined forces with Burmese tribesmen in their revolt against the government in Rangoon.

Burmese officials suspected US intervention in the operation, and later severed diplomatic ties

with the US when American officials refused to acknowledge any involvement with General Li

Mi and his Nationalist forces.

      Recognizing a changing environment: WW II to the Post-war period

      The Berlin blockade of May 1948 to May 1949 stimulated an immediate response from

the West to Stalin's Communist-imposed influence in Europe. The blockade was the first direct

confrontation between the US and the USSR, so recently allies in the Second World War.

Historians frequently identify the blockade and the subsequent US-sponsored airlift as the start of

the Cold War. When air samples collected over Russia by an American reconnaissance aircraft

in August 1949 confirmed that the Soviets had detonated a nuclear device, the stakes for future

direct military conflict between the US and the USSR raised dramatically. The US

underestimated the effectiveness of the measures taken by Moscow at the outset of the Cold War

to purge dissident populations through 'relocation', replacing them with communities of

dedicated Bolsheviks. This relocation effort effectively isolated remaining partisan elements,

facilitating the Soviet intelligence service's emplacement of agents into the partisan community

at will to use in manipulating Western intelligence agencies. The Nazis had been relatively

unsucessful in penetrating OSS covert operations during World War II. The Soviets, in

comparison, placed a high priority on counterintelligence and by 1950 had "seeded" KGB

operatives throughout the remaining partisan networks.

     Dealing with various resistance and emigre groups and governments-in-exile proved a

much greater challenge than most anticipated in the post-war period. Competition between

various groups vying for political clout and American backing diverted energy from a

paramilitary program. Groups sponsored by the CIA often spent more time and effort fighting

each other than against the Communists. Compounding this problem was tide tendency among

leaders of emigre and resistance groups to grossly exaggerate the size and degree of activism of

the groups they represented in order to bolster their chances with Western governments.

      During World War II, nationalism seemed to be a unifying factor in France and Norway,

the single focus of the resistance being the expulsion of Axis occupation forces. Few in the CIA

had the experience of Franklin Lindsay with Tito's Partisan in Yugoslavia to see first-hand the

deleterious effects that an internal struggle for power can have on a covert paramilitary program.

Consequently, many in the Agency dismissed Lindsay's conclusion as overly pessimistic that

partisan objectives will always supersede any objectives 'imposed' from the outside. Lindsay had

witnessed the erosion of American influence with Tito as the Partisan population focus returned

toward the end of World War II to post-war control of Yugoslavia. The US never adequately

addressed the impact of civil conflict-within a country, and several of the covert paramilitary

programs initiated by the CIA in the post-war period suffered as a result.

      One of the most significant differences in the operating environment following the end of

World War II was the intended object of the paramilitary action. Whereas the target of US

paramilitary activity in World War II was an army of occupation, the target in the post-war

period had become a political ideology. The difference had a tremendous impact on the

methodologies used by and ability of the CIA to sustain the focus and morale of the sponsored

resistance elements. The CIA struggled to find an appropriate and effective means of operating

in this new environment, and the results of its various covert paramilitary operations reflect the

challenges of the time.

      Paramilitary operations in the post-war period: were they worth it?

      As the Senate Select Committee concluded in l976, "Net judgments as to 'success' or

'failure' [of covert operations] are difficult to draw."87  The Committee used a set of five factors

in an attempt to determine the degree of success for the various covert operations they analyzed:

(1) executive command and control; (2) secrecy and deniability; (3) effectiveness; (4) propriety;

and (5) legislative oversight. The Committee found that as a general rule covert operations must

remain consistent with national policy and national strategy in order to have any chance of

success. The two principal criteria for success used by the Committee in its evaluation were

achievement of the policy goal and maintenance of deniability. The Committee concluded that

"On balance, in these terms, the evidence points toward the failure of paramilitary activity as a

technique of covert action."88

      Opinions vary among those who were actively involved in US covert operations

following World War II, yet most caution against judging the merits of those operations at face

value. Harry Rositzke, a CIA espionage officer in the 1950's, is one of those offering a

counterpoint to the popular notion that the results of the CIA's 'crash' covert paramilitary

program were simply not worth the effort. "No claim can be made for a significant return on the

heavy investment in these cross-border operations....To dismiss these operations as a total

failure, however, is perhaps too.......the first generation of CIA operations officers was

learning its trade by doing, by developing know-how, both in what to do and what not to do."89

            Rositzke, like so many former CIA officers, contends that results must be considered in

the context of the environment in which the operations took place--not the present period. In

retrospect, it is easy to categorize the entire US covert paramilitary program a complete disaster.

"At the time, however, when a Soviet military offensive was considered imminent, it was a

wartime investment whose cost was not measured by the Pentagon."90 Ideas for paramilitary

activity flowed from every level: overseas CIA station officers, embassy officials, State and

Defense Department executives, and the National Security Council all volunteered ideas for

potential "projects." All proposals by law required NCA approval-very few were returned

disapproved.

                                     NOTES

1      The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) in the CIA, under the direction of Frank

Wisner, used a "project" system of managing covert operations, assigning individual officers as

project managers. OPC officer performance evaluation was based to a large degree on the

number of projects initiated and directed, hence it became advantageous for OPC officers to

continue projects as long as possible. The 1976 "Church Committee" report to Congress

identified this fault as a primary organizational failure in the CIA during this period.

2     Harry Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and

Covert action, Westview Encore Edition. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 166.

3      John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947,

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 353.

4     William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA, (New York,

Simon and Schuster, 1978), 91.

5     History Project, Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, War

Department, War Report: Office of Strategic Services (OSS), (Washington, DC: GPO, 1949),

1:79.

6     History Project, 1:80.

7     History Project, 1:81.

8     "Kachin" is actually a collective term used to describe the Chingpaw and other allied

native Burmese tribes.

9     History Project, 1:84.

10    Colby, Honorable Men, 25.

11    William Colby, former Director of Central Intelligence, interview by author, 4 January

1995. Mr. Colby volunteered for active duty as a 2nd Lieutenant the US Army in August 1941

before transferring to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1943. His covert paramilitary

experience during World War II included operations in both France and Norway as a team leader.

Colby left the OSS at the end of the war, but returned to the CIA in 1950. Colby's career with

the Agency spanned three decades, and he retired after serving as Director of Central Intelligence

(DCI) from September 1973 to January 1976.

12    G. J. A. 0'Toole, Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and

Covert Action From the American Revolution to the CIA, (New York: The Atlantic Monthly

Press, 1991), 407.

13    Colby interview.

14    Colby, Honorable Men, 44.

15    Colby interview.

16    Colby, Honorable Men, 46.

17    Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisan's in Wartime

Yugoslavia, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), Author's preface, ix.

18    Lindsay, Beacons in the Night, 107.

19    Franklin Lindsay, former OSS and CIA officer, interview by author, 18 January 1995.

Mr Lindsay was an OSS officer when he parachuted into Yugoslavia in May of 1944 to work

with Tito's Partisans. Lindsay spent seven months "inside the Third Reich" with the Partisans,

and was in a unique position to observe first-hand the challenges of generating a paramilitary

operation in the midst of an ongoing civil war.

20    Lindsay interview.

21    Lindsay, Beacons in the Night, 194.

22    History Project, 1: 84. Whether this is the officials US Government definition for

unvouchered fluids or the CIA's interpretation is not clear. The passage nonetheless provided an

adequate working description of the concept of unvouchered funds for my analysis.

23    History Project, 1: 144.

24    History Project, 1:405.

25    Richard Dunlop, Donovan: America's Master Spy, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co,

1982), 438.

26    History Project, 1:406.

27   History Project, 2: 219-220.

28    O'Toole, Honorable Treachery, 407.

29    Tom Moon, This Grim and Savage Game: OSS and the Beginning of US. Covert

Operations in World War II; (Los Angeles: Burning Gate Press, 1991), 324-325.

30    History Project, 2:221.

31    History Project, 2:199.

32    Lindsay, Beacons in the Night, 104-106.

33    Moon, 204.

34    Lindsay interview.

35    Michael Warner, Ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman, (Washington DC: History Staff,

Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), 11.

36    Rositzke, 2.

37    U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With

Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on

Foreign and Military Intelligence, 94thCong., 2dsess., 1976. S. Rept. 94-755, 1:153.

38    Walter L. Pforzheimer, former CIG and CIA legislative council, interview by author, 3

February 1995. Pforzhieimer, a retired US Army colonel, joined the CIG in February 1946 as

legislative counsel. Colonel Pforzheimer stayed on with the CIA in the same capacity, serving as

legislative council through 1956. As legislative council, Colonel Pforzheimer was the principal

Agency official responsible for the drafting and passage through Congress of the CIA portions of

the National Security Act of 1947.

39     U.S. Congress, Final Report, 1: 144.

40     Pforzheimer interview. The Forrestal Diaries contain no specific reference to such a

conversation. Secretary Forrestal's appointment calendar was quite full during the days

immediately following the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, including at least one meeting

with DCI Hillenkotter. Colonel Pforzheimer, who was then Houston's assistant general counsel,

recalls the series of discussions taking place just after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia.

41     Pforzheimer interview.

42    Warner, 174.

43    Warner, 174.

44    Warner, 195.

45    Warner, 195.

46    Rositzke, 2-3.

47    Warner, 214.

48    Warner, 215-216

49    Warner, 201-205.

50    Warner,235-239.

51    Tom Bower, The Red Web: MI6 and the KGB Master Coup, (London: Aurum Press

Ltd., 1989), 89.

52    Pforzheimer interview.

53    Pforzheimer interview.

54     James Macarger, former CIA officer, interview by author, 20 December 1994. A State

Department foreign service officer, Macarger was drafted into the OPC by Frank Wisner based

on his background and expertise in Balkan and Central European affairs. Macarger had been

closely monitoring developments in Albania for the State Department, and was the logical

choice to head up an American contingent to the joint British SIS-CIA paramilitary effort.

Although Macarger did not stay with the project through to its conclusion, he was the officer in

charge during planning and the initial phases of execution.

55    US Congress, Final Report, 1:147, and 2: 31-32. The Senate Select Committe--more

commonly referred to as the "Church Committee" after Senator Church--conducted an exhaustive

investigation of all CIA covert activity since the inception of the Agency. Books one and four

detail the rapid expansion of OPC, including a personality sketch of the brilliant and

strong-willed Wisner.

56    Rositzke, 166.

57    Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA, (New

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 44.

58    Rositzke, 171-172.

59    Bower, 105.

60    Powers, 44-45.

61    The "10/2" panel, known by a variety of terms, was the panel established by the National

Security Council to oversee US covert activity. If the panel accepted a proposal, it forwarded a

recommendation to the President for final approval.

62    Macarger interview. On this point Macarger contradicts the majority of the published

accounts on Albania which identify the principal objective as unseating Hoxha. Macarger makes

the clear distinction in the case of Albania between inciting a rebellion and determining the

feasibility of inciting a rebellion. The distinction is more than simple semantics. There is a

significant difference in the level of effort and political ramifications between the two scenarios.

63    Rositzke, 173.

64    Macarger interview.

65    John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations From

World War II Through Iranscam, (New York: William Morrow,. 1986), 48.

66     This speculation was offered by James Macarger, and appears the most plausible

explanation. Macarger did not stay with the "project" until its termination, and therefore was not

privy to discussions concerning Albania as the effort tailed off.

67    Lindsay and Macarger interviews.      

68    Macarger interview.

69    Macarger interview.

70    Macarger interview.

71    Lindsay interview.

72    Lindsay and Macarger interviews.

73    Powers, 44-45.

74    Typescript digest of report by Franklin Lindsay, including members from Harvard Univ.,

Covert Operations of the United States Government, 1 December 1968, 3.

75    Rositzke, 169.

76    Bower's Red Web and Rositzke's The CIA's Secret Operations both contain descriptions

of the operation

77    Warner,214.

78    Rositzke, 169.

79    Rositzke, 168.

80    Rositzke, 168.

81    Rositzke, 169.

82    Lindsay interview. Lindsay left the OSS at the end of World War II, but was asked by

Frank Wisner to return to the CIA and join the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) as Chief of

Operations. With the expansion of OPC, Wisner reassigned Lindsay as the head of OPC's

Eastern European station. Lindsay was initially optimistic about operations in Eastern Europe.

In Lindsay's words, "[I]t was only after we got some bloody noses that I began to doubt that this

was the right thing to do."

83    Lindsay's typescript digest Covert Operations of the United States Government, 7.

84    John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, (New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1987), 137.

85     Sam Halperin, former CIA officer, interview by author, 13 January 1995. A former

research analysts with the OSS, Halperin spent 18 years with the SSU, CIG, then the CIA as an

opertions officer in the Far East . Much of this account on the OPC's paramilitary operation in

Korea is based on Halperin's recollection, since very little has been published to date. Prados'

Secret Wars, pp 73-77 contains a description of the operation, but is difficult to verify due to the

lack of cited sources on the details of the operation.

86     Halperin interview. Halperin was not present at the meeting, but was briefed shortly

afterward on the matters discussed and General Smith's response to the proposition on Korea.

87    U.S. Congress, Final Report, 1:154.

88    U.S. Congress, FinalReport, 1: 155.

89    Rositzke, 50.

90    Rositzke,37.

                                 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bower, Tom. The Red Web: MI6 and the KGB Master Coup. London: Aurum Press Ltd.,

     1989.

Castle, Timothy N. At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: US. Military Aid to the Royal Lao

     Government, 1961-1975. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

Colby, William. Former Director of Central Intellience. Interview by author, 4 January

     1995.

Colby, William and Forbath, Peter. Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA. New York: Simon

     and Schuster, 1978.

Duniop, Richard. Donovan: America's Master Spy. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co, 1982.

Etzold, Thomas H., and John Lewis Gaddis. Containment: Documents on American Policy

     and Strategy, 1945-1950. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.

Felix, Christopher. A Short Course in the Secret War. 2d rev. ed. Lanham: Madison Books,

     1992.

Gaddis, John Lewis. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. New

     York: Columbia University Press, 1972.

Halperin, Sam. Former CIA officer. Interview by author, 13 January 1995.

Helms, Richard. Former Director of Central intelligence. Telephone interview by author, 4

     January 1995.

History Project, Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, War

     Department War Report Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Vol. 1. Washington,

     DC: GPO, 1949.

History Project, Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Assistant Secretry of War, War

     Department War Report: Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Vol. 2. Washington,

     DC: GPO, 1949.

Kennan, George F. Memoirs: 1925 - 1950. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967.

____ Memoirs: 1950 - 1963. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972.

Knapp. The Central Intelligence Agency: The First Thirty Years 1947-1977. Washington

     DC: History Staff; Central Intelligence Agency

Leary, William M., ed. The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents. University:

     The University of Alabama Press, 1984.

Lindsay, Franklin. Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisan's in Wartime

     Yugoslavia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.

____ Covert Operations of the United States Government. Typescript digest of report by

     Franklin A. Lindsay, and including members from Harvard Univ., 1 Dec1968.

___ Former CIA officer Interview by author, 18 January 1995.

Macarger, James. Former CIA officer interview by author, 20 December 1994.

Millis, Walter, ed., The Forrestal Diaries. New York: The Viking Press, 1951.

Moon, Tom. This Grim and Savage Game: OSS and the Beginning of US. Covert

     Operations in World War II Los Angeles: Burning Gate Press, 1991

O'Toole, G. J. A. Honorable Treachery: A History of US Intelligence, Espionage, and

     Covert Action From the American Revolution to the CIA. New York: The Atlantic

     Monthly Press, 1991.

Pforzheimer, Walter L. CIG and CIA Legislative Counsel. Interview by author, 3 February

     1995.

Powers, Thomas. The Man Who Kept the Secrets, Richard Helms and the CIA. New York:

     Alfed A. Knopf, 1979.

Prados, John. Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations From World

     War II Through Iranscam. New York: William Morrow, 1986

Ranelagh, John. The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. New York: Simon &

     Schuster, 1987.

Rositzke, Harry. The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert

     Action Westview Encore Edition. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.

Treverton, Gregory F. Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention In the Postwar World. New

     York: Basic Books, Inc., 1987.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to

     Intelligence Activities. Foreign and Military Intelligence, Book I: Final Report on

     Foreign and Military Intelligence. 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976. S. Rept 94-755.

Wamer, Michael, Ed. The CIA Under Harry Truman. Washington DC: History Staff, Center

     for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994.

---

The Use Of Covert Paramilitary Activity As A Policy Tool: An Analysis Of Operations

Conducted By The United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951

SUBJECT AREA - National Security

CSC 95

                               EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Use of Covert Paramilitary Activity as a Policy Tool: An Analysis of

      Operations Conducted by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951

Author: Major D. H. Berger, USMC

Research Question: Was the return worth the investment for those covert paramilitary

operations conducted by the United States Central intelligence Agency at the outset of the Cold

War?

Discussion:

      This evaluation of covert paramilitary operations conducted by the CIA in the very early

years of the Cold War period is a combination of pure cost-benefit analysis and a more subjetive

evaluation of return on investment included is a collection of briefcase studies of OSS

operations during World War II, for they established the precedence for conducting similar

activity during the Cold War. There were significant differences, however, between the CIA's

"operating environment" in the late 1940's and early 1950's and the wartime situation OSS

officers operated within several years earlier. Success of post-war operations depended to a large

degree on the ability of US policy officials and CIA paramilitary specialists to recognize the

changes and adjust accordingly.

      The consensus among historians with an interest in covert operations is that paramilitary

activity conducted by the US Central intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Cold War did not

accomplish the objectives set forth for those operations; was not in line with the prevailing

national strategy or national policy; and, made no significant contributions to national security.

The fault in these generalizations is that critics too often failed to adequately consider the context

in which the activity occurred, especially during the period immediately following the end of

World War II. Americans at the outset of the Cold War believed that Stalin was preparing for a

military invasion of Western Europe. The Communists seemed intent on spreading their

ideology throughout the continent, while the "Western" European nations struggled to recover

economically from the recent war with Germany. Western Europe was vulnerable to Soviet

aggression, and the security of Western Europe was of vital interest to the United States.

      It was in this strategic environment that President Truman authorized the development of

a covert paramilitary organiztion within the newly created Central intelligence Agency. US

policy officials rccogned the drastic consequences of a war between the US and the Soviet

Union, and sought a means of countering the Russians while avoiding direct confrontation

between the two remaining global superpowers. In theory, the role of the perpetrator remains

concealed in a covert operation. Through covert paramilitary action, the US could pursue its

policy aims incognito. Covert paramilitary action also provided an opportunity for offensive

action-the chance to "roll back" the iron curtain--rather than rely exclusively on the defensive

strategy of containment. Additionally, some US policy officials saw covert paramilitary action

as a means of pursuing policy aims "on the cheap." The concept of training and supplying a

handful of guerrilla fighters to operate in Communist-controlled territory and keep the Soviets

off balance seemed a most efficient way of countering Moscow's aggression.

Conclusions:

      From a pure cost-benefit perspective, covert paramilitary action conducted by the CIA

between the end of World War II and the Korean conflict was a complete failure. CIA "project"

officers were not restricted in terms of funds available, in fact often were urged to spend more

than amounts requested. There was little in the way of accounting for expenditures within the

Agency, and the use of unvouchered funds eliminated the requirement to justify project costs to

Congress. Project officers, senior CIA officials, and policy officials in the State Department and

Department of Defense allowed numerous operations to continue beyond reasonable limits,

convinced that operatives could accomplish objectives despite overwhelming evidence to the

contrary.

      US covert paramilitary action during this period was, however, worth the effort.

Prevailing US national security strategy necessitated a reaction to counter Soviet aggression, yet

national policy stressed avoidance of direct confrontation. Administration officials faced with

this dilemma in the early Cold War years considered action--any action-better than inaction.

Cost was not a factor, and US policy officials felt that the need to maintain some form of

pressure on the Communists outweighed the risk of fallout from failed covert activity. Although

individual covert paramilitary operations failed to achieve objectives, the cumulative effect was

constant pressure on the Communist perimeter. These operations provided the CIA with a

wealth of lessons learned, which paramilitary officers applied in subsequent successfiil

paramilitary operations during the 1950's such as Guatemala and Iran.

Paramilitary operations are the noisiest of all covert actions. When they fail, they become

fiascoes and no official denials are plausible.

                                          Harry Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations

      Covert paramilitary operations have historically claimed more than their fair share of

public attention. President Thomas Jefferson in 1805 ordered a paramilitary operation to unseat

the ruler of the country now known as Libya; the phrase in the Marines' Hymn "to the shores of

Tripoli" serves as a constant reminder of that noteworthy operation. Governments, including the

US, have used covert operations to accomplish that which could not be attained through

diplomacy. Though long in lineage, covert paramilitary activity has its genesis as a policy tool

of the US in the latter stages of World War ll and the iminediate post-war period.

      This inquiry is an attempt to analyze the post-World War II evolution of US covert

paramilitary operations from two different perspectives. First is a pure cost-benefit analysis of

the major operations conducted by the CIA between the end of World War II and the Korean

conflict. Was the return worth the investment? What were the objectives of each operation, and

were they achieved? By objectively examining various US covert paramilitary operations and

drawing conclusions from the cumulative results of those operations I intend to answer these two

key questions.

      The second perspective is a subjective analysis, more qualitative in nature and requiring a

broader scope of reasoning than the cost-benefit analysis. For this portion of the examination I

have attempted to look beyond the immediate, short-term objectives and weigh the merits of

individual operations based upon their contribution to national security and conformance to the

prevailing national strategy. Context is germane to this portion of the analysis, in that we cannot

condenm an activity without considering the options available at the time (inactivity, for

example).

      From a pure cost-benefit analysis point of view, covert paramilitary operations conducted

by the US between the end of World War II and the Korean conflict were a dismal failure.

Manpower and money were allocated in tremendous amounts to the various operations, yet in

every case the objectives of creating and expanding a viable anti-Communist resistance effort

were not met. Soviet counterintelligence agents penetrated virtally at will the CIA-sponsored

resistance organizations and emigre' groups. Competing faction leaders used CIA-provided

equipment and training to further their own cause and consolidate their own political power

base, rather than direct their efforts against the Communists. The CIA allowed most covert

paramilitary operations to continue far beyond reason, unwilling to admit the futility of a

"project"' despite overwhelming evidence that stated objectives were no longer achievable.

      US covert paramilitary operations in the early Cold War period were not, however, a

"total" failure in the sense that there was no return on our investment. The US was doing

something, which in the early years of the Cold War was better than the alternative. By

experimenting, the US learned the limits of the utility of covert action. Used alone, covert

paramilitary action rarely accomplished significant objectives; when conducted simultaneously

and in close coordination with various other covert activities and diplomatic action, chances of

success increased dramatically. Operatives learned their trade, honing skills and refining

techniques that would prove more effective later in the 1950's in countries such as Guatemala

and Iran. Although not intended, the visibility of the various programs demonstrated US resolve

to Moscow, indicating that the West would not stand idly by while Stalin sought to expand his

empire.

      This paper consists of two distinct sets of case studies, separated by a discussion of the

legislative and national command authority action that directly impacted US capability and

authority to conduct covert paramilitary activity. The first portion of this inquiry contains an

analysis of several of the more significant covert paramilitary operations conducted by the US

during World War II. These abbreviated case studies provide a basis for comparison when

examining the post-war US covert paramilitary action case studies contained in the latter portion

of this paper. The reader should recognize the significant changes in the stategic geography and

operating environment following the end of World War II, and the impact of those changes on

US covert paramilitary operations. The fact that these changes were either not recognized or

simply ignored by US intelligence and foreign policy officials in the immediate post-war period

perhaps had more effect on operational results than any other single contributing factor. Between

the two sets of case studies is a discussion of several key presidential and National Security

Council (NSC) directives passed during the immediate post-war period relevant to the re-creation

within the CIA of a covert paramilitary capability.

      This inquiry required a combination of primary and secondary source documents,

although countless documents relative the topic and periods remain classified. Several former

OSS and CIA officers directly responsible for the planning and execution of the paramilitary

operations examined were generous in allowing personal interviews for this project. Their keen

insights and first-hand knowledge of operational details were invaluable in my efforts to "see the

whole picture."

      In retrospect, the record of CIA's post-war covert paramilitary operations is considered by

most historians to be "one of almost uniform failure."2 Historians so quick to categorize US

post-war covert paramilitary operations as failures too often have failed to adequately consider

the critical importance of context in their analyses. The threat of Soviet military forces driving

west across Europe was real to US officials and the public at large-by the late 1940's. Embassy

reports, reports from military officials in Europe, and CIA threat assessments verified Stalin's

capability to launch such an offensive. The iron curtain had proven virtually impenetrable,

preventing Western intelligence agencies from collecting within the Soviet block to assess

Stalin's intent. The prevailing attitude among American officials by the late 1940's that doing

something is better than doing nothing is somewhat more understandable when we consider the

circumstances--or "zeitgeist"-- of the time.

      Left unchecked, there seemed no limits to the expansion of Communism across Europe.

The efficiency of Soviet subjugation of indigents in the Baltics, the Balkans, and the Ukraine lent

credence to the arguinent that the remaining free populace of Europe was in jeopardy of suffering

a similar fate, powerless to offer any significant resistance to Stalin's apparent appetite for an

enlarged Soviet state. In retrospect, we can legitimately fault US policy makers for not

adequately considering the ramifications and long-term impact of covert paramilitary operations.

We must acknowledge, however, that these activities gave the US an opportunity and an

"acceptable" means to act at a time when action was deemed necessary. The void of intelligence

on the enemy made it impossible for US policy officials to accurately predict results, so why not

try covert paramilitary action? The dilemma in judging the merits of US covert paramilitary

action in the early Cold War period is deciding whether to accept these arguments as justification

for such activity, or dismiss them as mere rationalization.

      As early as 1946 President Truman, US military strategists, and most intelligence

analysts "had reluctantly concluded that recent actions of the Soviet Union endangered the

security of the United States."3 Planners recognized early on the need to avoid direct military

confrontation between the US and the USSR. Open conflict between the two remaining global

superpowers, in the absence of (external) constraint, would logically expand to nothing less than

total war. Confirmation by the US in 1949 that the Soviets had developed a nuclear capability

transformed overnight the consequences of unlimited war between the US and the USSR.

      During this post-war period, while the Soviets were building their conventional military

capability and developing a nuclear capability, US national focus had shifted to economic

stabilization and growth. This reprioritization had led to dramatic reductions in US conventional

military forces--maintaining a large standing army in times of peace has always been difficult to

justify. This left national security strategists with the dilemma of finding the proper means to

counter a growing strategic threat, without having the deterrent leverage of a credible

conventional military response capability. Faced with this dilemma, policy-makers in

Washington frantically searched for low-cost, low-risk options to deal with the evolving

Communist threat.

      The Central intelligence Agency (CIA) attempted to recreate in the post-war period a

capability that seemed to satisfy this requirement Covert paramilitary operations, in fact,

seemed ideally suited to the situation. Compared to maintaining a large standing military force,

the cost of conducting paramilitary operations would be negligible. Properly conducted, covert

operations would conceal the role of the US government, minimizing the possibility of direct

confrontation with the Communists. Within the framework of the defensive doctrine of

containment, covert paramilitary activity offered an offensive potential to "roll back," rather than

simply prevent the spread of Communism. Covert paramilitary operations, a capability which

the OSS during World War II had proven could produce significant results for a relatively small

investment, thus got a new lease on life.

      In the transition from World War II to the Cold War, however, the "operating

environment" had changed. The target was no longer simply a military force, as it had been

during the war. The new target was an ideology, based on the fundamental concept of political

indoctrination of the populace. In wartime, the assurance of pending Allied conventional

military operations to expel Axis occupation armies provided the necessary degree of motivation

for the various resistance groups. By the late 1940's the Communists were firmly entrenched in

Soviet-controlled territories; it was clear to those in the CIA with experience in partisan

operations that unseating the Communists in those areas would not be a simple affair. This

meant that resistance efforts in the Cold War period would be long-term operations, making it

difficult to sustain morale among resistance members.

      Most of the CIA, State, and Defense Department analysts recognized the changed

environment. Few, however, made the necessary adjustments in planning considerations and

operating procedures to account for the changes. According to former DCI William Colby, no

one in the CIA in the late 1940's considered that the "model we were using off the European

resistance against the Nazis might not be adequate in the face of a totalitarian threat that sought

to enlist and not merely subjugate the peoples it overran."4 Within the CIA, the tendency among

operators was to rely on those techniques that had worked so well for the OSS just a few years

earlier. State and Defense Department officials urged the Agency to take action--any

action--without realizing the political and diplomatic implications of the covert paramilitary

operations proposed. Given that the modus operandi of CIA's paramilitary operatives were not

well suited to the post-war situation, and that military and diplomatic officials enthusiastically

promoted means and ways without considering ends, the results are not altogether surprising. To

understand where and why the system broke down we must trace the roots of post-war CIA

paramilitary techniques and procedures to their source--the Office of Strategic Services.

                             THE OSS PRECEDENT

      A role for paramilitary operations in World War II

      President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Office of Coordiator of Information, the

United States' first independent intelligence organization, by his presidential order of 11 July

1941. General William J. Donovan, appointed Coordinator Of Information (COI) by Roosevelt,

had considered the subject of special operations as early as 10 October 1941.5 Donovan sent one

officer to England in November 1941 to study the organization, training, and operational

methods of the British intelligence organization SOE. Donovan established a special operations

branch--SA/G--to organize and execute morale and physical subversion, including sabotage and

guerrilla warfare. The primary function of SA/G was unorthodox warfare in support of military

operations. In a 22 December memo to the President, Donovan identified the two types of

guerrilla warfare missions SA/G would pursue: (1) establishment and support of small bands of

local origin under definite leaders, and (2) the formation in the United States of guerrilla forces

military in nature.6 All paramilitary activities pursued by the United States Government over the

following 50 years fall into one of these two basic categories identified by Donovan in 1941.

      The administration and organization of SA/G was along military lines and its first

personnel were drawn from the armed services, principally from the Army. Paramilitary training

for SA/G recruits focused on infiltration techniques such as parachuting and maritime (surface

craft and submarine) insertion and the skills necessary to organize and influence locally-recruited

dissidents. Demolitions, weapons, close combat, silent killing, and industrial sabotage training,

as well as instruction on coordinating supply efforts to local resistance groups rounded out the

training syllabus.

      The Deprtment of Interior secured the use of four training areas near Quantico, Virginia

and Catoctin, Maryland for the duration of the war for Donovan's use. These traning areas were

of sufficient size (nearly 20,000 total acres) to permit for their envisioned use in training larger

militarized guerrilla units in the United States which could then be inserted to operate behind

enemy lines. Lieutenant Colonel Garland Williams, a former director of the New York Bureau

of Narcotics, transferred from the War Department to COI in late fall 1941 to assumed command

of the new traing unit. During the preparation of training areas and facilities, Williams and his

trainers attended the British SOE school in Canada. The SA/G paramilitary training school at

Quantico opened in April 1942.7 On 13 June 1942 the COI was redesignated the Office of

Strategic Services (OSS); the SA/G branch was subsequently renamed the Special Operations

(SO) branch. The infantile SO Branch was less than a year old when General Donovan saw an

opportunity to employ the paramilitary tool against the Japanese occupation force in Burma.

      "Det 101"

      The legendary "Detachment 101" was the first OSS special operations effort of World

War II. The Kachins8 in Burma had been waging a determined struggle against occupying

Japanese military forces since early in World War II. Support of the Kachins began with an

airdrop of twenty-five British-trained operatives in mid-1942. The original members of

Detachment 101 were recruited, trained and dispatched to Burma in May of 1942. The first

leader of Det 101, Major Carl Eiffler, had been a Treasury agent operating on the Mexican border

before he was commissioned in the Army and subsequently assigned to OSS's predecessor COI

as the Far Eastern representative.9 Eiffler and his men trained the Kachins to conduct large-scale

ambush patrols and sabotage operations against Japanese occupation forces.

      Eiffler faced two principal challenges in Burma. In 1942 there was no projected date for

conventional Allied military operations against the Japanese in Burma. With Europe being the

dominant theater, the US was a long way from taking the offensive in the Pacific region. This

meant that Eiffler's paramilitary efforts had little chance of achieving decisive results by

themselves; the Kachins and the OSS were therefore in for a protracted guerrilla war. The

second challenge was answering to two headquarters: British and American. Continual

second-guessing by OSS and British SOE superiors far removed from the scene frustrated

Eiffler's attempts to secure the logistics support needed to generate the level of resistance

necessary to theaten the Japanese hold on Burma. The OSS eventually pulled Eiffler out of

Burma, then shuttled him around Washington and Europe to pass on lessons learned to

paramilitary officers throughout the OSS. The OSS was busy developing a large-scale

paramilitary program to support Eisenhower's military plan in the European theater, and those

operatives preparing to enter France would soon benefit from Eiffler's tactics, techniques, and

procedures for guerrilla and paramilitary warfare.

      OSS spccial operations in France

      OSS paramilitary operations in France were a supporting effort for planned Allied

conventional military operations. OSS activities were part of a joint British-American effort,

with the British SOE initially in charge. Two types of paramilitary elements operated in France:

three "Jedburgh" teams and larger units of thirty to forty men organized into "Operational

Groups." The OSS recruited its paramilitary agents from the Army and Navy, with the majority

coming from the Army. The Jedburghs parachuted into France from June through September of

1944, and much like the OG's conducted sabotage operations to impede the movement of

German military units within France.

      John Bross was the OSS officer in charge of employing Jedburgh teams in support of

operations OVERLORD and ANVIL, the Allied landings in France. The mission of the

three-man Jedburgh teams was to link up with the local French Resistance element upon

insertion into France, assist in organizing the Maquis for sabotage operations, then advise and

coordinate resupply for resistance units. The'Jedburghs did not attempt to supplant the local

resistance leadership - OSS agents advised and influenced within their capability, but were

careful not to threaten the command status of the Maquis leaders.

      William Colby, who would later rise within the Central Intelligence Agency to become

Director of Central Intelligence and head of the Agency, commanded Jedburgh team "Bruce."

Paramilitary operations in France, according to Colby, were designed to "wreak havoc in the

German rear and undermine German defense against the advancing Allied armies."10 The intent

was two-fold: prevent the employment of German units against the Allied landing forces and

prevent the retrograde of German forces out of France back into Germany. The concept of

employing Jedburghs was to insert a team approximately four to six weeks before Allied military

operations were expected to take place in the team's assigned area.11

      The larger Operational Groups (OG's) were trained, self-contained paramilitary units.

The OG's were essentially comparable to the British commandos, and were the forerunner of US.

Special Forces.12 These units differed significantly from Jedburghs in that OG's operated behind

enemy lines "with the object of direct attack on the enemy,"13 conducting ambushes and sabotage

operations against German units. Typical Jedburgh targets, on the other hand, consisted of rail

lines and bridges. The two types of paramilitary elements proved complementary, operating

independent of each other yet sharing the common goal of preventing the rapid redeployment of

German occupation forces within France. As the war progressed and the Allies presed toward

Germany, Hitler attempted to withdraw the rest of his army back for a final defense of the

homeland. General Donovan saw in Norway yet another opportunity to impede that withdrawal.

      Trapping the Germans in Norway

      The Russian army by mid-1944 had driven about 4OO,OOO German troops out of Finland

into northern Norway. Germany was in the process of bringing these troops south through

Norway to rejoin the battle in Germany. Rail was the Germans' primary means of moving its

troops through Norway. This reliance on the few existing north-south rail lines provided the

OSS with an ideal opportunity to make a significant, measurable contribution to the Allied war

effort through paramilitary operations.

      The Norwegian Special Operations Group (NORSO) was a group of about a hundred

Norwegian-Americans who had seen duty with the OSS in France, then reorganized and refit for

paramilitary operations in Norway. The mission of NORSO was to sabotage the Northland

Railway, over which the German were moving 150,000 troops south out of Norway toward the

final defense of the Third Reich homeland.14 Unlike paramilitary operations in France, however,

OSS officers in Norway were under strict orders to avoid all contact with the local populace.15

Whereas OSS paramilitary operations in France directly preceded the Allied invasion, there was

no set timetable or formalized plans for Allied military operations in Norway. The populace

would be subject to reprisals from German occupation forces for assisting OSS paramilitary

elements.

      William Colby, who had led Jedburgh Team Bruce in France, was given command of

operation Rype in northern Norway. Rype was somewhat typical of OSS paramilitary operations

in World War II--a rough beginning and a fortuitous ending. Colby's unit was delayed for

several months parachuting into Norway due to poor weather. When the air drop finally

occurred only half of the planes drops their load near the intended target due to inexperienced

pilots and poor aerial navigation.16 Despite a shaky start, Colby's and his surviving force of

nineteen men successfully sabotaged a key bridge and numerous rail lines to delay the movement

of German forces south. Colby was later to receive the Silver Star for gallantry in action as a

result of his service with the OSS in Norway.

      The Dilemma in Yugoslavia

      The German occupation of Yugoslavia in World War II largely overshadowed the

concurrent internal struggle between competing groups for postwar control of the country.17 The

Communist Partisans, led by Tito, intended to convert postwar Yugoslavia into a Marxist

federated republic. Draza Mihailovic's "Chetniks" opposed Tito's Partisans; the Chetniks were

struggling to restore the original Serbian monarchy and prevent a Communist takeover. The

American and British governments assessed Tito's element as the more effective force, and

committed paramilitary support to the Partisans, despite the Partisans' Communist ideals. The

Allies--keeping all options open--nevertheless maintained contact with the Chetniks, since they

shared the common goal of evicting the German occupation force. The OSS and British Special

Operations Executive (SOE) thus faced the challenge in Yugoslavia of maintaining the focus on

Germany without becoming involved in internal politics.

      In 1942 Stalin's government was in no condition to provide Tito with the necessary

support to sustain his forces. Tito's Partisans "would have preferred to receive weapons from the

Russians, but as this was not forthcoming they welcomed British and US support."18 Yugoslavia

was another cooperative paramilitary venture for the British and Americans, with the "senior"

British intelligence agency overseeing all special operations in the Balkans during the war. OSS

agents parachuting into Yugoslavia performed the same functions as their counterparts in France,

yet under vastly different circumstances. Allied conventional military operations were not a

near-term possibility in Yugoslavia in 1944 when the OSS initiated special operations in that

country. The divergent interests of the competing political elements and the violent ethnic hatred

between Serbs and Croats proved more than mere distractions to OSS operatives. Sustaining the

morale of resistance members in this type of operating environment was a formidable challenge

to successful paramilitary operations in Yugoslavia Franklin Lindsay was a State Department

Foreign Service Officer hired on by the OSS, then assigned to "Force 399" for operations in

Yugoslavia. Reflecting on the uphill struggle faced by the Partisans in 1944, Lindsay recalls that

the Partisans viewed OSS officers as "living proof that the major Western Allies, the Americans

and the British, are with us."19

      Lindsay is quick to note that operatives must have credibility to be effective. The

operative must gain the confidence of resistance leaders on the basis of guaranteed American

support. A perception of mixed loyalties on the part of the operative will detract from this

implicit trust. The OSS recruited a number of first-generation Yugoslav-Americans, primarily

for their language skills. As a general ruie, these immigrants proved unreliable as operatives.20

Returning to a country so recently their native homeland, they often took sides immediately with

one of the competing resistance groups. Their strung cultural ties prevented them fiom

remaining impartial. These operatives also found it difficult to earn the trust of the Partisans; the

Partisans believed that if someone was truly dedicated to the resistance effort, he would be a

Partisan and not an American. The Partisans wanted to deal with an American, not an ex-patriot

with mixed motivations.

      Tito's Partisans relied heavily on the OSS for support in the early stages of the

paramilitary program. The Partisans were initially motivated to work with the OSS by

anti-German and anti-Italian feelings because of the atrocities committed by the occupying forces

against civilians. Later in the war, as the outcome became more evident, the Partisan focus

began to shift toward elimination of the Chetniks. By early 1945 the Partisans were using

OSS-delivered weapons to build arms caches for use in the continuation of the Yugoslav civil

war.21 Fighting the Germans was no longer their priority, and the effectiveness of the OSS

paramilitary effort rapidly fell off as a result.

      The OSS Investment in Paramilitary Operations during World War II

      Special funds are "moneys, for which no voucher is submitted to the General Accounting

Office, to be employed in instances where the use of vouchered finds would divulge information

prejudicial to the public interest."22 From the earliest days of COI it was clear that paramilitary

operations required the use of unvouchered funds to satisfy the requirement for plausible

deniability. Hence the use of unvouchered funds became the "modus operandi" of all covert

activity, including paramilitary operations. The Special Funds Branch of the OSS had the

responsibility for devising and supervising a series of intricate procedures for the procurement

and disbursement of unvouchered funds so that the connection of OSS or its agents with a given

transaction was not revealed.

      The provisions of public law regulating the expenditure of ordinary government funds do

not apply to unvouchered funds. The COI received an initial allocation of $100,000 in

unvouchered funds in September 1941. The OSS received allotments totaling $13,000,000 in

unvouchered funds for fiscal year 1942-1943. These initial allotments were drawn from the

President's Emergency Fund. The OSS obtained its own appropriation from Congress for the

first time for fiscal year 1942-1943. Of the $21,000,000 appropriated, nearly $15,000,000 were

earmarked as unvouchered funds. The National War Appropriation Bill of 1945 authorized

$57,000,000 for the OSS, of which $37,000,000 were unvouchered funds. All but $2,000 of the

unvouchered flunds for 1944-1945 were accounted for "solely on the certificate of the Director of

the Office of the Strategic Services"23 Hence General Donovan had some $35,000,000 in

"signature" funds to operate with in 1944-1945. Expenditures up to that limit required no

justification or explanation outside of OSS, and were automatically reimbursed by the Treasury

Department provided Donovan had approved them.

      OSS paramilitary operations and espionage operations required unvouchered funds for

different reasons. Paramilitary (50 Branch) officers normally wore military uniforms in the field

to ensure credibility with resistance elements and facilitate their "uncovering" by conventional

Allied military forces in their advance through German-held territory. These officers did not

have the same need as their espionage counterparts in SI Branch to maintain a cover, hence most

paramilitary officers could be paid through normal vouchered funds. Unvouchered funds were

used extensively, however to finance various resistance groups supported by OSS. OSS made

the first large-scale distribution (1,500,000 francs) to the French Resistance on 7 December 1943.

Funds were distributed by OSS agents on the ground or airdropped to agent reception

committees. In the four-month period from March 1944 to June 1944 the OSS issued a total of

31,186,100 francs plus $38,000 in US currency to French Resistance groups in preparation for

the Normandy D-Day landings.

      OSS materiel requirements consisted mainly of weapons and ammunition, demolitions,

and communications equipment to support resistance elements. Since these items were readily

available through the military supply system, and there was no requirement to conceal the source

of supply, they were normally requisitioned and purchased through open channels. Materiel

costs for paramilitary operations, compared to US conventional military expenditures during

World War II, were relatively insignificant. The plan for special operations in the entire western

Mediterranean Area, submitted by OSS through the Joint Staff Planners to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff on 18 December 1942 contained a detailed list of supplies at an estimated total cost of only

$220,000.24

      OSS operations in France provide a clear example, however, of the level of effort

required to arm and resupply a viable resistance force. Early OSS operations in France consisted

only of supplying arms and materials and a few agents. By 1943 the airdrop effort had

expanded: the OSS delivered some 20,000 tons of ammunition, weapons, and food to the French

Resistance during the course of the year. In September of 1943 the OSS and SOE together

dropped 5,570 containers of arms to the Resistance, and averaged approximately 5,000

containers per month in the months preceding the Allied invasion at Normandy.25

      The personnel investment in OSS paramilitary operations was substantial considering the

zero-base start in late 1941. OSS paramility plans in 1942 called for 13 officers and 22 enlisted

men in the Western Mediterranean area.26 The OSS sent 523 officers, enlisted men and civilians

into France in 1944 to conduct paramilitary operations behind German lines. Of these, 83

officers were assigned to three-man Jedburgh teams, 355 operated in 22-man Operational Groups

(OG's), and the remaining 85 were SO agents' and radio operators in F-, DF-, and RF-Section

circuits. Cumulative casualties were 18 dead (3.4 percent), 17 missing or taken prisoner (3.3

percent), and 51 wounded or injured (9.8 percent).27

      Return on investment: The OSS contribution to the Allied War Effort

      Det 101 achieved remarkable results despite all the challenges faced by Eiffler and his

men. By the end of the war the original group of twenty-five operatives had expanded to some

566 paramilitary agents.28 Eiffler's strong character and firm support from Director of Strategic

Services General Donovan were the key elements to Det 101's operational success. Those

results are amplified in that Det 101 was the only OSS unit to receive a Presidential Citation,

acknowledging that Det 101 bad "met and routed out 10,000 Japanese throughout an area of

10,000 square miles, killed 1,247 while sustaining losses of 37, demolished or captured 4 large

dumps, destroyed the enemy motor transport, and inflicted extensive damage on communications

and installations."29 Perhaps Eiffler's greater contribution to the OSS paramilitary effort was the

extensive after-action report on Burma which he prepared and then briefed to various OSS

special operations agents in Washington DC and in the field as they developed plans for

paramilitary operations in other regions of the world.

      The success of the resistance movement in France supporting Operation Overlord is well

documented. The OSS War Report contains a detailed breakdown of sabotage activities in

France from June through August of 1944 and the statistics appear impressive. The report credits

the resistance with executing 885 successful rail cuts, destroying 322 locomotives, and downing

seven German aircraft during this period.30 The eight SO officers and six radio operators that

parachuted behind enemy lines into Brittany'as part of nine Jedburgh teams managed to arm and

organize more than 20,000 men.31 In addition to their paramilitary contribution the

OSS-supported resistance provided invaluable tactical intelligence support to Allied commanders

planning conventional military operations.

      Covert paramilitary operations in Norway were successful not only from a military

standpoint-CIA elements prevented up to 400,000 Third Reich troops from redeploying south to

Germany--but also validated the concept of covert paramilitary operations independent of

resistance support. The success of William Colby and other team leaders in Norway gave the

CIA a second employment option, whereby paramilitary elements inserted behind enemy lines

did not link up with partisans. This option appeared to have several advantages over the more

"traditional" operations conducted with partisans. William Colby's element neither relied upon

nor answered to local resistance leaders. Colby had only US objectives to pursue; he was not

constrained by potentially competing partisan priorities. Unit integrity and cohesion did not

suffer as a result of partisan-directed changes in organization, as was often the case when

operatives operated in support of partisans.

      The inevitable shift in Partisan priorities within Yugoslavia toward the end of the war

does not diminish the overall success of OSS's paramilitary effort in that country. Attacks

against the two key north-south rail lines in mid-June 1944 closed the alternate western line to

Vienna for at least a six-month period. It took the Germans six weeks to reopen the primary line

to Vienna.32 The OSS-supported Partisans maintained continuous pressure on the Germans

through sabotage of bridges, tunnels, and well-executed ambushes. Partisan activity throughout

Yugoslavia successfully tied down up to fifteen German Divisions, and the Partisans were

instrumental in the rescue and transport back to friendly lines of some 2,000 downed Allied

airmen.33

      The US should have drawn several key lessons from OSS paramilitary operations in

World War II. Generating and sustaining a viable resistance effort not supported by follow-on

conventional military operations will almost always be a long-term effort, with little chance of

achieving decisive results by themselves (at least in the short term). Short-term operations such

as the Jedburghs and OG's in France often provide a false picture of what paramilitary operations

can realistically accomplish. Paramilitary efforts such as those conducted in Yugoslavia and

Burma require an extensive infrastructure, with greater reliance on Partisans for supplies and

protection of operatives. The pre-existence of an organized resistance infrastructure and

subsequent Allied landings amplified the success of the paramilitary effort in France, perhaps

beyond reasonable proportions considering the optimal conditions.

      Emigre recruitment is a critical step in preparing for paramilitary operations. A lack of

quality control or failure to recognize potential conflicts of interest can result in unreliable

operatives in the field, as was the case in Yugoslavia. Operatives need credibility to be effective,

and ethnic or cultural ties must be scrutinized to minimize the possibility that such motivations

might outweigh an operative's affirmed allegiance and dedication to the assigned mission.

      The ideal situation is one of mutual support among resistance elements and paramilitary

operatives. Resistance members offer food and security to the operative, providing a protective

"screen" through their civilian-based intelligence network. Operatives provide the technical

advice, arms and equipment required to wage a successful paramilitary program. Frank Lindsay

spent seven months with Tito's Partisan's inside the Third Reich and was never caught in an

ambush, an amazing achievement considering Lindsay's Partisan element operated and lived

within a mile or two of German garrisons throughout the period. He believes he would not have

survived one week in Yugoslavia without being captured, had it not been for Partisan

protection.34 Rarely, however, are all resistance elements operating from a common political

base. Typically an internal conflict exists in which the various resistance elements are competing

for political control, attempting to consolidate their own gains and negate the impact of all other

groups. In this situation the resistance elements share a common enemy only as long as one

exists; when the external threat diminishes, the internal struggle becomes the predominant

motivation. As the external shared threat subsides and the internal political struggle resurfaces to

pervade the operating environment, the resistance elements and the paramilitary operatives will

have increasingly divergent interests. The resistance element becomes less concerned with

paramilitary activity and more concerned with political activity. The corollary to this scenario is

that the probability of success in a paramilitary operation diminishes in proportion to the decline

in resistance reliance on the operative's support.

      The Dissolution of the OSS

      A flood of magazine articles and several books released shortly after V-J Day detailed the

thrilling exploits of OSS agents during the war. Gary Cooper and James Cagney starred in

Hollywood portrayals of World War II special agents working behind enemy lines. The sudden

wave of publicity for activities kept so secret during the war served to accentuate OSS

accomplishments, glossing over the shortcomings and negative aspects of covert paramilitary

operations.

      The OSS consolidated its field offices, sending Richard Helms, Allen Dulles, and Frank

Wisner to Berlin as the emphasis shifted from supporting anti-Nazi resistance groups to

addressing the rapidly developing Soviet threat. The fact that the USSR was drifting further

away from the West came as no surprise to the OSS. Paramilitary and espionage agents

operating in France, Italy, and Yugoslavia had witnessed first-hand the expanding Communist

political base in those countries. The OSS was not to survive the post-war transformation period,

however, despite General Donovan's best efforts to justify sustaining a peacetime national

intelligence agency. When President Roosevelt died and was succeeded by Harry Truman,

Donovan lost the vital support necessary to keep his organization intact. Truman distrusted

General Donovan, whose tremendous influence in Washington and Republican status represented

a direct threat to Truman's political power base. Truman, seeing no need to maintain a peacetime

cloak-and-dagger spy agency, disbanded the OSS by Executive Order 9621 of 20 September

1945, effective 1 October 1945.35 The dissolution of the OSS marked the begining of a hiatus

in US covert paramilitary capability. When the need for such a capability resurfaced several

years later, the US attempted to pick up where it left off at the end of World War II, applying old

techniques in a vastly different environment. This error in judgment would prove costly in the

years that followed.

                              THE COLD WAR BEGINS

      Covert paramilitary operation: and containment

      On 12 March 1947 President Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress to

request military and economic aid for both Greece and Turkey in their struggle against

Communist insurgents. In a single sentence the Commander-in-Chief enunciated the new

direction of American foreign policy: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to

support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside

pressures."36 Truman's thinly-veiled reference to Communist expansion set the tone for the

post-war period, energizing American intelligence to develop a gameplan to counter the rapidly

developing Soviet threat. There were rules in this new contest that would restrict the available

options--solutions which might lead to open conflict between the US and USSR were

unacceptable. Intelligence officials looking for alternatives, many of whom had served with the

OSS in World War II, proposed reconstituting the paramilitary capability that seemed to work so

well during the war.

      Clearly both the CIA and the National Command Authorities during this period viewed

covert paramilitary operations as a policy tool in President Truman's national stategy of

containmnent. The Senate Select Committee reviewing CIA covert operations concluded in its 26

April 1976 Final Report that "Covert action projects were first designed to counter the Soviet

threat in Europe and were, at least initially, a limited and ad hoc response to an exceptional threat

to American security."37 The policy of containment espoused in 1947 was inherently defensive, a

reaction to Soviet initiatives. Covert paramilitary operations, on the other hand, are offensive by

nature, used to either prevent or cause the overthrow of a government in power. This dichotomy

allowed Truman and the CIA to pursue an offensive program designed to "roll back" the iron

curtain, while publicly maintaining the limited US objective of preventing Communist

expansion. The concept of such a program, however, is vastly different from the inherent

authority to pursue such a program. The basis for that authority has been disputed on repeated

occasions throughout the history of the CIA, and we must review the origins of the Agency itself

in order to trace its roots.

      Legislative authority for covert operations

      The National Security Act of 1947 (which established the Agency and the National

Security Council) contained no reference to secret operations, whether for intelligence collection

or covert action. In fact the term "covert action" was not in use at the time; such activities were

in 1947 referred to in intelligence circles as unconventional warfare. There is disagreement over

whether covert action was considered in the drafting of the bill. Former CIA legislative council

Walter Pforzheimer was one of the principal drafters of the CIA portion of the bill, and had the

additional task of clarifying the Agency-related portions of the bill to members of Congress

during the drafting and review process. Pforzheimer asserts that the drafters never considered

inclusion of any reference to covert action not by direction or intention, but because there was

not a recognized need for such a capability in the post-war period.38 The creation of the Agency

was in response to an identified need by the President for consolidation and centralization of the

national intelligence system within a single agency to provide him with timely and accurate

intelligence estimates. The Act of 1947 legislated the creation of such an agency.

      Former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, another drafter of portions of the Act of

1947, had a different recollection of intent with regard to covert activities when he appeared in

December 1975 before the US Senate Select Committee tasked with investigating US covert

activity:

      It was decided that the Act creating the Central Intelligence Agency should contain a

      "catch-all" clause to provide for unforeseen contingencies. Thus, it was written that the

      CIA should "perform such other fuctions and duties related to intelligence affecting the

      national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." It was

      under this clause that, early in the operation of the 1947 Act, covert activities were

      authorized.39

The Committee could find no evidence in the debates, committee reports, or legislative history of

the 1947 Act to show that Congress intended specifically to authorize covert operations. The

committee did suggest, however, that since the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic

Services (OSS), had conducted such activities, Congress in 1947 may have envisioned the

potential for such activity in the future.

      The legal authority of the CIA to conduct covert operations is not as clearly delineated as

one might assume. Shortly after the successful Communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia on

February 12, 1948, Secretary of Defense Forrestal met with DCI Admiral Hillenkotter to discuss

"what could be done" by the CIA to stem the tide of the Communist advances in Europe.

Elections in Italy loomed just around the corner; if the Communists were to win in Italy, they

would have such momentum in Europe that the rest of the continent seemed almost a fait

accompli to American policymakers.

      Admiral Hillenkotter, after conferring with his general counsel Lawrence Houston,

advised Secretary Forrestal that the wording contained in the National Security Act of 1947

contained no specific authorization to conduct covert operations. Secretary Forrestal pressed

Admiral Hillenkotter further on the subject: "Is there any other way?" When Hillenkotter posed

this follow-on question to his general council, Larry Houston told the DCI that "If the President

or the National Security Council directs us to do a certain action, and the Congress fluids it,

you've got no problem. Who is there left to object?" This rationale satisfied both the DCI and

the Secretary of Defense, and the era of post-war covert operations began in earnest.40

      It is perhaps ironic to note that to this day the CIA has no legislative authority to conduct

covert activity. The Agency continues to operate on the basis of the tacit congressional approval

as described by general counsel Larry Houston in 1948.41 The 1976 Senate Select

Committee--while disputing the CIA position that appropriation of funds constitutes

Congressional approval--acknowledged in it's final report that until the enactment in 1974 of the

Hughes-Ryan Amendment (to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), Congress could escape the

full responsibility for the CIA's covert actions. Congress, until 1974, granted themselves

absolution on the basis of ignorance of what the CIA was doing - they couldn't be blamed for

that which they had no knowledge of. Meanwhile the CIA charged ahead with impunity,

confident that Congressional appropriation and National Command Authority direction were

tantamount to the legal authorization to conduct covert activity.

      Post-war mission creep

      One could argue that the National Command Authorities forced the CIA into the business

of covert paralitary operations. In 1947 the debate over covert activity centered on

psychological warfare. Secretary of State George Marshall adamantly opposed State Department

responsibility for covert action. Marshall understood the tremendous negative political impact

that disclosure of US involvement in such activity would have on American credibility and

reliability. In June 1947 Marshall unveiled his sweeping European economic recovery plan

(which would later bear his name); exposure of State Department involvement in covert activity

would jeapardize the success of that recovery plan. On 17 December 1947 the National Security

Council (NSC), "taking cognizance of the vicious psychological efforts of the USSR, its satellite

countries and Communist groups,"42 assigned the CIA responsibility for covert psychological

activity: "The similarity of operational methods involved in covert psychological and intelligence

activities and the need to ensure their secrecy and obviate costly duplication renders the Central

Intelligence Agency the logical agency to conduct such operations."43 Whether the CIA actively

lobbied for this opportunity or the NSC simply directed the Agency to assume responsibility for

covert action is a topic still open for debate. In any case NSC 4-A is the US National Security

Council's initial directive authorizing a covert action program.

      DCI Hillenkotter on 2 March 1948 created the Special Procedures group within the

Office of Special Operations to carry out the psychological operations mandated in NSC 4-A.

The memorandum from Hillenkotter to his Assistant Director for Special Operations contained a

working definition of psychological operations, which would henceforth include "all measures of

information and persuasion short of physical in which the originating role of the United States

Government will always be kept concealed."44 This definition laid the groundwork for the

concept of plausible denial which would remain the cornerstone of all CIA covert operations in

years to come. In his memorandum the DCI clearly articulated the two purposes behind covert

psychological operations: (1) undermining the strength of foreign elements engaged in activities

hostile or unfavorable to the United States, and (2) influencing public opinion abroad in a

direction favorable to our national interests.45

      The accelerated pace of world events in 1948 led to a rapid expansion of the concept of

covert operations. In February 1948 the Communist party seized political control in

Czechoslovakia following a successful coup d'etat. In March 1948 General Lucius Clay,

commander of US military forces in Europe, sent an alarming telegram from Berlin noting a

"subtle change" in Soviet attitude, advising Washington that that war might come "with dramatic

suddenness."46 Against the backdrop of a rapidly spreading sense of panic among US policy

officials over the war scare, the National Security Council's issuance of NSC 10/2 on 18 June

1948 appears rational and timely. The Council, "taking cogizance of the vicious covert

activities of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the

aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers,"47 created in NSC 10/2 the

Office of Special Projects within the CIA to conduct a much expanded program of covert action.

The directive superseded NSC 4-A, broadening the scope of covert activity to include political,

economic, and paramilitary operations. NSC 10/2 also codified the concept of plausible

deniability introduced in NSC 4-A, directing that all cove activities "would be so planned and

executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons

and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."48

      DCI Hillenkotter, in a series of memos to the Assistant Executive Secretary of the

National Security Council, expressed-serious reservations about certain portions of the directive

during the drafting prccess.49 Hillenkotter's objections to the directive centered on the disconnect

between authority and responsibility for the conduct of covert operations. The Council directed

that the Chief of the Office of Special Projects report directly to the DCI, but specified that all

covert operations would be coordinated through the Departments of Defense and State. The

Council placed responsibility for the planning and conduct of all covert operations squarely on

the shoulders of the DCI, yet the Secretaries of State and Defense retained the final authority for

approval of such activities. The question of who retained direct control over the activities of the

new Office were open for debate for years after the Council issued the watershed directive. The

fact that all funds supporting covert operations were drawn from the CIA budget further fueled

the debate. CIA general council Lawrence Houston advised the DCI later in 1948 that since

NSC Executive Secretary Admiral Souers and George Kennan of State Department shared the

belief that the new office "must" take its policy direction and guidance from State and the

Defense Departments, the DCI was obligated to seek clarification from the Council and

amendment of the directive as required to consolidate responsibility and authority.50 DCI

Hillenkotter never resolved this dilemma and his analysis of the fundamental flaw in this

organizational concept would prove to be quite accurate; the new covert operations office

expanded activities at an exponential rate over the next three years with a wide open charter and

no requirement to coordinate with other concurrent intelligence operations.

      The National Security Council upped the ante for covert operations by issuing NSC 20 in

August 1948. George Kennan, then the Director of State Department's Policy and Planning

Staff, provided much of the input for the document. The directive described the ultimate

objective of American foreign policy as "the overthrow of Soviet power."51 The document

provided recommendations for supporting anti-Communist resistance efforts, suggesting that the

US pursue a program of broad-based rather than selective support for resistance groups.

      The muddled covert operation command relationship generated by NSC 10/2 continued

until General Smith, at his initial meeting with his staff as the new DCI in October 1950, asserted

his complete authority over the redesignated Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). The National

Security Council organized the Dulles-Jackson-Correa committee to study CIA operations and

the National Organization for intelligence. The committee report, dated 1 January 1949,

recommended the integration of CIA's Office of Special Operations--the espionage function--and

the OPC's--the covert operations function--under a single Operations Division. The committee

recognized the need for closer coordination between the two in operational matters. The

anomalous position of the OPC in the Agency continued, however, and the nearly 2-1/2 years of

divergence between responsibility and authority provided a fertile environment for the

development of covert programs. With the right leadership and adequate funding, the

opportunities for growth were virtually unlimited. Congress, it soon became evident, was more

than willing to loosen the purse strings in the name of anti-Communism. Leadership for a

national program of covert action came in the form of a distinguished University of Virginia law

school graduate named Frank Wisner.

      Wisner resurrects a paramilitary capability within OPC

      As head of OPC, Wisner was given a great deal of latitude by DCI Admiral Hillenkotter.

Hillenkotter was keenly aware, according to former CIA legislative council Walter Pforzheimer

that "if he [Hillenkotter] interfered, there would have been a call from the State Department."52

George Kennan, then head of State's Policy Planning Staff, had gone to great lengths to preserve

State Department oversight of OPC, and would not tolerate DCI interference. With State

Department backing, Wisner "would have run right over Hillenkotter,"53 had the DCI attempted

to assert his influence over the direction OPC was headed. Wisner had generated in Washington

considerable support for his program, including Secretary Forrestal who was fully supportive of

Wisner's lobbying efforts to expand covert operations.54 Consequently, Wisner had a "free

hand" to build OPC as he saw fit. Wisner needed money and people in large quantities to

support his ambitious plan for OPC expansion. Neither commodity was in short supply. By the

end of Wisner's first year running OPC he had three hundred employees assigned to seven

overseas field stations. Three years later OPC had personnel at 47 overseas stations. Between

fiscal years 1950 and 1951, OPC's personnel strength jumped from 584 to 1,531. Wisner

inherited unexpended funds from the dissolved Special Procedures Group totaling just over $2

million when he took over as head of OPC. By 1952 OPC had an annual budget of almost $200

million.55

      The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided an early task for Wisner's infant OPC, specifying two

related missions as part of the Defense Department's strategy for countering the expected Soviet

military invasion of Europe.56 The first mission was to establish a network of "stay-behind"

agents m Western Europe who would remain in place as Soviet forces attacked west. The second

assignment was to organize and support resistance groups in Eastern Europe and Russia that

could help retrd the advance of attacking Soviet forces. With a clearly defined mission from the

JCS and State Department advocating action, Wisner set into motion a program to probe the

Soviet perimeter, beginning with a tiny country along the Adriatic Sea.

      Albania - Operation Valuable

      Albania is widely considered the most ambitious partisan-building effort undertaken by

the CIA in the period immediately following World WarII.57 Enver Hoxha had been a

resistance leader in Albania during World War II. The British SOE had armed and advised

Hoxha and his men in their struggle against Axis occupying forces during the war. By 1946

Hoxha had consolidated power, declared himself president, and established a Communist

government in Albania with the support of Moscow.

      The country of Albania shares a common border with Yugoslavia to the north and Greece

to the south. President Tito and his Partisans had defeated the Chetniks in the violent civil war

within Yugoslavia, and Tito was unwilling to subjugate his newly formed government to the

authority of the Moscow Directorate. Tito broke with Stalin in 1948, maintaining a separate

Communist federal republic in Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, an unsuccessful rebellion which had

started in Greece in 1946 was nearing conclusion, the Communists unable to secure control of

the government. From the American perspective this gave strategic significance to tiny Albania,

in that it remained outside the perimeter of the Iron Curtain, isolated between non-Communist

Greece and a rebel YugoslaviL Albania, in 1949, appeared "ripe for an anti-Communist

operation."58

      British problems with Hoxha began in 1946 when British warships sailing off the coast

of Albania were fired upon; later two destroyers sank after striking mines in the three-mile wide

Corfu Channel off the Albanian coast. President Hoxha subsequently refused to accept an

International Court of justice decision implicating the Albanian government in the Corfu

Channel incident. The British government, frustrated by Hoxhas refusal to accept responsibility

for the incident and the demonstrated impotence of the international community in dealing with

one of Moscow's "puppet" governments, turned to its intelligence service for alternatives.

      British intelligence had established contact with Albanian emigres as early as 1946. The

SIS first inserted agents into Albania in 1947, hoping to fuel a civil war which could unseat

Hoxha's fledgling Communist government. If this could be accomplished, the British intended to

support a royalist anti-Communist government in central Albania. The British were unsuccessful

in enlisting support from Albania's neighbors. Tito had no desire to increase Soviet hostility by

acting against Albania. Greece, exhausted by its own civil war, could offer no substantial

assistance.

      Great Britain, in serious economic straits at the end of the war, approached the US for

financial support. William Hayter, a senior British intelligence officer, led a delegation of senior

SIS and Foreign Office officials to Washington in March 1949 to discuss with the CIA a

cooperative strategy in Albania.59 Wisner was enthusiastic about joining the British in their

Albanian operation, as was his deputy Franklin Lindsay. At an early meeting of the White

House-State Department-Pentagon group, General John Magruder from the Defense Department

argued against US covert operations in Albania, while Robert Joyce of State Depatment's Policy

Planning Staff supported the initiative. Magruder denied the strategic importance of Albania;

supporting a rebellion in Albania would only anger both Greece and Yugoslavia. Robert Joyce

countered with the State Department view that "slicing off" a Russian satellite would have a

propaganda impact justifying the risk.60 Joyce reminded Magruder of the agreement between

Hoxha and Moscow giving Stalin naval base rights at Volana, along the Albanian coast, in

return for aid from the Russians. Soviet access to a warm water port from which submarines

might operate would directly impact security in the Mediterranean. State Department prevailed,

and the "10/2"61 panel granted approval to commence operations. In a series of meetings the two

intelligence agencies outlined a program for joint paramilitary operations in Albania.

      James Macarger had been a Foreign Service officer working the Albania situation for the

State depament for over a year when the OPC first discussed formally in the spring of 1949 the

prospect of conducting paramilitary operations in Albania. Macarger's qualifications were not

overlooked by Wisner, and Macarger was soon transferred to OPC to head the Albanian project

for the CIA. The CIA's first step was to create a "legitimate" government-in-exile that would

have the support of the resistance members inside Albania. Among the various rival faction

leaders who had fled Albania when Hoxha seized power, none could claim the loyalty of all

partisans within Albania. Macarger and the CIA thus created the Albanian National Committee,

a coalition partisan government-in-exile with representatives from the two strongest faction

leaders, tribal warlord King Zog and Bali Kombetar. King Zog, leader of the Legaliteti political

movement, had seized power in a 1924 coup and made himself king in 1927. Bali's "National

Front" organization, centered in Rome and Athens in 1949, had collaborated with the Germans

and Italians during the war in addition to waging partisan warfare against them.

      The OPC-funded "Committee for a Free Europe" by 1949 had become a haven for exiled

leaders in Europe. The CIA, in their efforts to establish the legitimacy of the

government-in-exile, used Committee for a Free Europe funds to fly the Albanian National

Committee to the US. Escorted by Colonel Lowe of the CIA, the Committee "made the rounds"

in Washington DC, meeting with various members of the legislative and executive branches to

garner publicity and support for the Albanian cause. The Committee was received by Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State Llewelyn Thompson before heading north to New York to establish

the Committee headquarters. In all Macarger spent almost a full year laying the political

groundwork necessary to support a successful paralitary operation. For the operation itself

Macarger was assigned head of CIA's Southeast Europe region, which included all of the

Balkans plus Hungary. Macarger reported mostly to Franklin Lindsay, who at the time was chief

of CIA's Eastern European Division. On occasion Macarger dealt directly with Wisner. A group

of Army colonels on the OPC staff provided the technical advice for paramilitary operations.

      Contrary to most published accounts, the objective in Albania was not the overthrow of

the Hoxha Communist government.62 Macarger defines the Albanian operation as a probe to

determine the feasibility to support a full-blown partisan effort. Former CIA officer Harry

Rozitzke, on the other hand, categorizes Albanian operations as "positive intervention" designed

to unseat Hoxha Rozitzke contends that "[t]he Albanian operation was the first and only attempt

by Washington to unseat a Communist regime within the Soviet orbit by paramilitary means."63

Macarger's assessment appears more accurate, in light of the limited scale of operations

conducted. The CIA's paramilitary effort in Albania was intended to serve as an indicator of the

level of effort required to launch a more concerted and decisive program.

      Initial joint British-American operations into Albania were run out of Malta, a small

island in the Mediterranean south off the coast of Sicily. CIA officers at Malta set up emigre

training camps, readied the airfield for parachute operations, and established a joint headquarters

with their British counteparts. In 1949 OPC remained under the operational direction of the

State Department, outside the purview of DCI Hillenkotter. State Department, then, would call

the shots in Albania. The approved concept called for inserting trained emigres--"Pixies", as

they were called-- by boat, airdrop, and overland movement into Albania to establish contact

with resistance groups. The British provided the bulk of the manpower early in the operation.

British participation dropped off over the next two years, however, and by 1951 the operation

was entirely US-run.64

      Early British contact with the resistance indicated that although there was a large partisan

population, the Albanians were not optimistic about the probability of a successful coup. The

resistance also reported increased activity by President Hoxha's internal security forces. An early

British attempt to infiltrate emigres bore out this assessment, foreboding future operations into

Albania. The British boat Stormie Seas crossed the channel from Corfu on the night of 3 October

1949, carrying two groups totaling 26 Pixies. The Pixies, who had been training at Malta since

July, were ambushed upon reaching the Albanian coast. Government security forces had

apparently been tipped as to the location and time of the landing. Four Pixies were killed, the

rest escaped into Greece.65 Repeated attempts over the next two years to infiltrate paramilitary

elements met with similar consequences. Hoxha's security forces were waiting in drop zones,

along the coast, and at the border to intercept the perpetrators. The OPC eventually shifted its

base of operations to Greece; the results remained the same, however, as Hoxha's forces met each

sucessive infiltration party at the point of insertion.

      By 1951 it was clear that the operation had no chance of suceess, yet the probe continued.

One possible explanation for this is that upon taking over as DCI in October 1950, General

Walter Bedell Smith commenced a reorganization of CIA, pulling OPC back under the control of

the DCI. It is reasonable to assume that OPC field operations were allowed to continue during

reorganization until an accurate appraisal of each "project" was complete." Looking back,

however, there is no doubt that the program should have been terminated once it became clear

that no large-scale paramilitary effort was feasible in Albania.

      It is impossible to determine the total CIA investment in Albania. According to both

Macarger and Lindsay no cost studies were ever done and there was no requirement for accurate

accounting of expenditures.67 Macarger and others running the operation "never gave a second

thought to costs; money was not a problem."68 Macarger, in fact, was encouraged to spend more

than he requested. Wisner and State Department were eager to demonstrate the covert

capability of OPC against the "evil" Communist threat, and money was not a limiting factor at

the time. Macarger conservatively estimates costs for the first two years at approximately

$600-800 thousand; those costs rose significantly when the operation moved to Greece.69

      Macarger also disputes the popular notion that the root cause of failure in Albania was

Soviet double-agent Kim Philby.70 Philby was the British SIS's liaison with the CIA in

Washington during the Albanian operation, and was, as the CIA later discovered, under the

employment of the Soviet secret intelligence agency. Rositzke and others credit Philby with

passing to Moscow details of the Albanian operation. Moscow, according to this argument, then

passed the information on to Hoxha for use in employing his internal security force to meet the

intruders upon insertion Macarger, however, remains convinced that Philby did not have access

to such operational details as times and locations of insertions far enough in advance to pass that

information through Moscow to Hoxha in time to affect the insertions. Decisions affecting

insertion were often made just prior to launching the party because of changing weather and

support requirements. Lindsay concurs with Macarger's assessment, adding that "the Russians

would never have seriously considered risking Philby's cover with the British SIS over a country

as insignificant as Albania."71

      The emigre network, according to Macarger and Lindsay, was the principal cause of

failure in Albania.72 A breakdown in operational security allowed recruited emit to pass

detailed information on scheduled operations through the network, reaching Hoxha's security

officials in Tirana. The Soviets, unbeknownst to the CIA, had totally penetrated the Albanian

community. Emigre screening was minimal; the OPC had no means of verifying the loyalties

and motivations of those recruited. It is not surprising, therefore, that emigre camps were a

security sieve, as volunteers were quickly accepted for training with little in the way of

background checks.

      Macarger's explanation, however, is not the only possible cause of failure in Albania.

Thomas Powers, in his biography of Richard Helms, lists a third possible explanation for the

Albanian failure. Powers contends that the scope of the operation was simply too ambitious; the

CIA in 1949 was not prepared to undertake such an operation and see it through to completion.73

Completion, according to Powers and most other published accounts, meant unseating Hoxha

and emplacing a non-Communist government in Albania.  The extent of the US involvement in

Albania was limited from the beginning to paramilitary operations; achieving decisive results,

therefore, was an unrealistic objective from the outset Franklin Lindsay and a distinguished

collection of scholars from Harvard University studying covert operations nearly twenty years

later would reach the same conclusion, reporting that "[a]t best, a successful covert operation can

win time, forestall a coup, or otherwise create favorable conditions which will make it possible to

use overt means to finally achieve an important objective."74

      The evidence indicates that a Soviet-penetrated emigre network was the principal cause

of operational failure. If the objective was to unseat Hoxha, which is not altogether clear, then

the entire program was a dismal failure. If, however, one accepts Macarger's conviction that the

objective was to determine the feasibility of a full-blown partisan program m Albania then the

CIA's efforts were not an exercise in futility. Was Albania worth the investment? Macarger

believes it definitely was. Albania was where the CIA/OPC "cut its teeth" in covert paramilitary

operations. The CIA learned some valuable lessons--the importance of quality emigre

recruitment, for example--and the operators believed that what they were doing was vital to US

national security. National security was at stake and the OPC was actually doing something to

counter the Communist threat to the West. Had the CIA adotped the lesson; learned and

adjusted operations accordingly, the paramilitary effort in Albania would not have been in vain.

Unfortunately, this was not the case. Wisner and the OPC eagerly sought new opportunities

among the Soviet satellites to prove the value of the covert paramilitary tool, and the failure

within the CIA to modify operational techniques and procedures led to similar failures in Poland

and the Ukaine.

      Supporting the Freedom and Independence Movement In Poland

      In the summer of 1950, Poland was one of the Soviet satellites that appeared to have the

most potential for successful covert paramilitary operations. Polish emigration to the west was

strong following World War II, building an influential community in the US. Poland was also

important from the standpoint of strategic geography. A Soviet offensive into Western Europe,

much like World War II, would almost certainly pass through Poland. Building a strong

resistance network in Poland fit well with the Pentagon's objectives for the CIA; paramilitary

forces could interdict and delay advancing Soviet military forces, buying time for NATO to

deploy conventional military forces.

      The Germans had effectively destroyed the Polish resistance "Home Army" in the great

Warsaw uprising of 1944 as the Russians stood by outside the city. Stalin had post-war plans for

Poland; the nationalist-motivated resistance would be an obstacle to that process. If the Nazis

were intent on purging Poland of that resistance, Stalin in 1944 was certainly willing to oblige,

waiting patiently with his military forces to move in and take control once the Germans began

their withdrawal. What remained of the Home Army went underground once the Russians

moved in.

      By 1950 the Polish Political Council had established a headquarters in London as the

government-in-exile. What survived of the Home Army inside Poland reconstituted itself as the

Freedom and Independence Movement--known by the acronym WIN--and maintained limited

contact with the government-in-exile in London. WIN claimed a following of some 20,000

partially active resistance members inside Poland, with a total strength of 100,000 available for

action in the event of war.75 What the American and British intelligence officials did not know in

1950 was that a thorough security sweep by Soviet security forces (KGB) in 1947 had virtually

eradicated the remnants of WIN inside Poland.

      Following the 1947 KGB counterintelligence sweep a Pole claiming to be a WIN member

"escaped" to London and contacted former Polish officer General Wladyslaw Anders to enlist his

support for WIN. Anders subsequently approached both the CIA and British SIS for their

assistance. WIN provided the CIA with "smuggled" photos of destroyed Soviet tanks and

equipment that the resistance claimed to have destroyed, in order to verify the credibility and

commitment of the resistance movement. The counterespionage division of CIA, unconvinced of

WIN's credibility, advised against CIA involvement. Wisner had the more convincing argument,

however, and the CIA embarked on ajoint program of paramilitary support.

      A detailed accounting of the support provided by the CIA over the two year duration of

the Poland program is difficult to determine, since once again record-keeping was not a priority.

What is not disputed among the various accounts of the operation76 is that CIA support was

substantial, primarily consisting of money, military supplies, and communications equipment

airdrops into Poland.

      That is, until Polish official radio announced on 28 December 1952 that the Polish secret

intelligence agency (known in the West as UB) had uncovered a joint British-American

operation to support a rebellion within Poland. The surprise announcement sent shock waves

through American and British intelligence channels; an internal CIA investigation and

subsequent announcements from inside Poland revealed the true extent of the UB intelligence

coup. The CIA and SIS were actually the unwary victims of an elaborate sting operation at the

hands of the Polish secret intelligence.

      The UB, it was soon discovered, had captured in Poland and subsequently "turned" a

WIN leader named Seinko. Seinko thus provided the UB with a means of stimulating and

subsequently manipulating Western resistance support in the form of arms and equipment To

accomplish this, UB had Seinko maintain indirect contact with the CIA through a network of

couriers who themselves were unaware that UB was in control of WIN. The UB, through

Seinko, sent a continuous string of messages to the West portraying a dedicated and

strengthening WIN resistance movement within Poland. The CIA, lured by the "bait" Seinko

provided, continued the uninterrupted flow of arms and equipment into the country. While the

CIA mistakenly believed their support was building a credible paramilitary force in WIN, every

CIA shipment into Poland ended up in the hands of UB.

    The setback in Poland highlighted several faults in the CIA's evolving covert paramilitary

program. The failed operation brought to the surface the increasing disunity within the CIA.

Wisner, as Chief of OPC, had taken to heart the National Security Council's guidance for his

office in NSC Directive 10/2 to "operate independently of other components of Central

Intelligence Agency."77 Wisner dismissed the caution flag waved by the counterespionage

division as unsubstantiated pessimism when the CIA had initially considered involvement with

WIN back in 1950. He was not about to let some naysayer with no "operational experience"

stand in the way of his program. The incoherent intelligence framework in place since 1947

created the ideal environment for such discord; it was not until DCI Smith brought the OPC back

under his direct control in early 1952 that all elements of CIA answered to a single authority.

      Poland also brought to light the Communists' capability to penetrate a resistance network.

The CIA underestimated the effectiveness of the internal security measures put in place by

Moscow's secret intelligence in the satellite countries. The iron curtain, as the CIA was rapidly

discovering, proved nearly impenetrable from the outside, yet porous from the inside to the

extent that the Communists allowed controlled agents to pass information to Western intelligence

services. The CIA had little means of corroborating resistance information. When the CIA's

espionage division did report potential Soviet penetration of resistance movements, the OPC

rarely heeded the warnings.

      The most damning aspect of the failure in Poland was the inability of the CIA to cover its

tracks. The essence of all covert activity, including paramilitary, lies in establishing a program

by which the identity of the perpetrator of the action remains concealed. The possibility of

compromise can be minimized, but never completely eliminated. Harry Rositzke, an espionage

officer with the CIA in the early 1950's, calls Poland "the [CIA's] most substantial and disastrous

paramilitary effort inside the Soviet orbit."78 His assessment seems most accurate, in that the

CIA altogether failed to conceal the role of the US in Poland. Only the Bay of Pigs fiasco during

President Kennedy's term of office rivals the CIA's failure in Poland to guarantee the US

plausible deniability.

      The Ukraine

      Situated between Russia and the Balkan Republics is the Ukine. As Soviet security

forces consolidated control following the end of World War II, anti-Communist partisans in the

Ukraine withdrew, establishing their resistance operating-base in the rugged Carpathian

mountains. The Ukrainian Nationalists, meanwhile, established a government-in-exile in

Munich, Germany. Ukraine was significant to the West in that it contained one of the largest

concentration of anti-Communist elements at the end of the war.79 The Ukrainian partisans had

organized themselves into paramilitary units, and were actively conducting guerrilla warfare

operations against Communist forces by 1949. The harsh environment and aggressive security

sweeps by the Communists, however, were limiting partisan operations. The partisans rarely

ventured out of their underground caves in the winter; leaving tracks in the snow would have led

the Communists straight to their hideouts. The partisans spent much of the summer foraging for

food stocks that would carry them through the following winter. The result was a less than

all-out effort to expand paramilitary operations.

      British and US intelligence had initiated flights over the Carpathians shortly after the war

ended, first dropping propaganda material to the partisans denouncing Communist efforts and

encouraging the resistance to continue the fight. The risks for the US in providing aid to the

Ukrainian partisans were considerable. The Ukraine was more than just another satellite country

on the periphery of Russia, assigned to Stalin in the Paris peace accords for post-war

reconstruction. The Ukraine was an acknowledged part of the USSR. Thus, the Soviets could

legitimately consider any meddling in the internal affairs of the Ukraine by a third party

tantamount to war.

      The initial impetus for US involvement in the Ukraine was the need for intelligence.

When the Berlin Blockade went into effect, the West found itself totally locked out from an

intelligence perspective, unable to track the course of events inside the USSR. The CIA was

actively searching for any means to "look inside" the iron curtain to determine what direction

Stalin would take the USSR in the post-war period. The CIA initiated Ukrainian espionage

efforts in the fall of 1949.80 As Wisner got his paramility effort underway, however, the

disconnect between OPC and OSO (the CIA's espionage division) soon became apparent. A 24

April 1950 internal OPC memo from Mr. C. Offie to Frank Wisner described a probable security

breach within OSO regarding CIA plans for the Ukraine. Offie had apparently discovered that

the CIA was considering sponsorship of a Ukrainian National Committee, and that OSO plans to

send coded messages through the Voice of America to the Ukrainian underground resistance had

already "leaked" outside the CIA in New York. The obvious concern was that OSO might have

compromised the operation before OPC officers had begun developing their plan.

      According to Rositzke, the CIA's assessment in 1950 of the potential for resistance

support and covert paramilitary operations was that "the Ukrainian guerrillas could play no

serious paramilitary role."81 Wisner's former deputy Franklin Lindsay concurs, adding that by

1950 "the Soviet strength was so great, its political control and military controls were so great,

that [Ukrainian] resistance efforts stood little chance of success."82 Failures in Albania and

Poland provided US intelligence analysts with convincing evidence of the extent to which

Moscow dominated Soviet-controlled territories. Success in the Ukraine would require a

tremendous covert paramilitary and perhaps even overt military investment on the part of the US.

US policymakers in 1950 was unwilling to make such a commitment. Limited covert operations

were acceptable; the risk of provoking open conflict with the Soviets was not.

      The OPC, then, provided a trickle of support to the Ukrainian partisans for a period of

several years, enough to keep the movement alive but not enough to effect the outcome. Most

Ukrainians were unwilling to accept the risk of capture and imprisonment, especially when it was

clear that the Americans were not prepared to fully support their cause. The Soviets eventually

eliminated the underground in Ukraine by isolating the guerrillas from the populace, the

resistance left to wither away in the mountains. In the Ukraine the US did not commit the

paramilitary resources necessary for the resistance movement to succeed. If the US goal was to

build a viable resistance movement in the Ukrine--which certainly seems logical--then the

objective analysis indicates a wasted effort, doomed to failure from the very beginning.

      In his later observations on accepting risk in covert operations, Lindsay identifies timing

as the predominant factor in considering a course of action. According to Lindsay, "In a war or

near-war situation, much greater risks of exposure can be justified not only because of greater

need for the activity, but also because the penalties for exposure are far less."83 Much of the

war-scare mentality of the early.1950's was the result of ignorance, avoid of knowledge in the

West as to what was occurring in the USSR. From a strategic persective, the US was not in a

near-war situation with the Soviets in 1950, and could not justify the risk of exposure by

embarking on a large-scale paramilitary effort in the Ukraine.

      Strategic geography plays an equally important part in the decision to commit to covert

operations in a particular country. Ukraine's status as an integral part of the USSR meant that the

stakes were too high for a large-scale covert paramilitary operation. Probing the Soviet satellites

was one thing--throughout history, buffer states have served a vital function by "absorbing"

limited penetrations by the enemy. Within the international intelligence community such indirect

activity at the periphery is an expected, if not accepted occurrence. Ukraine, however, was not a

satellite; it was an integral component of the USSR Exposure of a US peacetime covert program

in the Ukraine would have much greater implications; the USSR would be fully justified in

taking all measures--including military response--to defend the sovereignty of her borders.

      One could say, based on the arguments presented above, that the CIA's decision to limit

its covert paramilitary program in the Ukraine was the logical choice. John Ranelagh, author of

arguably the most accurare historical account of the CIA, offers a different conclusion. Ranelagh

condemns the US for encouraging and supporting the Ukrainian resistance movement, alleging

that by doing so the Americans were simply encouraging the Ukrainians to their deaths.84 The

CIA knew fiom the beginning that the movement could not succeed, given the limited amount of

support the US planned to provide.

      Ranaelagh's analysis draws attention to one of the moral dilemmas faced by

decision-makers when considering the merits of a particular covert paramilitary operation. Is it

ethical or even rational to provide a degree of paramilitary assistance when all indicators suggest

that assistance in the amount planned will not sustain the resistance movement? In the context of

the early 1950's, when doing something was better than doing nothing, failure to weigh the

morality of supporting the Ukrainian underground resistance is understandable. From the CIA

perspective, ultimate responsibility for setting the moral standards used to determine whether a

particular covert operation is acceptable lies with the National Command Authority (NCA), since

every operation requires approval at that level. The NCA relies heavily on CIA assessments,

however, and so the responsibility is truly shared between the two.

      The results of the CIA's abortive involvement in the Ukraine should have provided the

US with an early indication that deciding to use covert paramilitary capability must be a highly

selective process. All factors must be considered, and if approved, an operation requires the

level of commitment necessary to have an acceptable probability of success. In its haste to be a

proactive deterrent, however, the CIA established unrealistic objectives for covert paramilitary

activity, believing it possible to prevent Communist expansion through limited means. The US

made the same mistake in 1951, believing that paramilitary activity alone might have a

significant impact on the Chinese Communist involvement in the Korean conflict.

      The OPC in Korea-Li Mi

      The US, in conformance with the fundamental precepts of the Truman Doctrine, had

provided significant military and financial aid to Chiang Kai-shek in his unsuccessful struggle to

prevent Mao Tse-tung's Communist forces from seizing political control of China. The Maoists

completed their takeover in 1949 when they overran Peking and southern China. As the

Communist forces swept across China, Chiang and most of his followers fled the mainland,

taking up residence across the straits on Formosa (Taiwan). The Chinese Nationalists, backed by

the US, vowed to continue the struggle with the goal of eventually returning to the mainland and

extricating Mao's Communists.

      General Li Mi had served under Chiang Kai-shek as an army commander in central China

prior to the Chinese takeover. Li Mi and about 1,500 of his troops, rather than attempt to flee

east toward Formosa, had withdrawn west through the Yunnan Province to the Chinese border.

Li Mi's force eventually made their way to Burma, though not with the consent of the Burmese

government. The Burmese were preoccupied at the time with containing an internal revolt of

their own, and could not commit the resources necessary to prevent Li Mi's force fiom spilling

over the border into Burma. Li Mi, despite Burmese government efforts to evict him and his

Chinese Nationalists, drafted Burmese tribesmen as laborers and continued in 1950 to rebuild

and refit his force in northern Burma.

      US officials in late 1950 failed to acknowledge indications of Chinese Communist

posturing along the North Korean border for an attack south into Korea. When the Communists

crossed the Yalu River and entered the Korean conflict, a surprised General MacArthur ordered

the withdrawal south of United Nations (UN) forces. The Truman administration in early 1951

frantically searched for a way to relieve the pressure on UN military forces backpedaling south in

the face of advancing Chinese Communist forces. The National Security Council discussed at an

early 1951 NSC meeting the possibility of using Chinese Nationalist forces to draw away

Chinese Communist elements from North Korea.85 The general concept presented was to insert

CIA-sponsored Chinese Nationalists into China from Burma, forcing the Communists to pull

forces out of Korea to deal with the incursion. If successful, this would cause Mao to redeploy

his Red Chinese forces, thereby relieving pressure against American and UN forces.

            DCI General Walter Bedell Smith, USA attended the NSC meeting, and immediately

voiced CIA opposition to the concept on the basis "[T]he Chinese Communists have so goddamn

many troops, you can't count 'em all; they won't pull anyone out of there."86 Secretary of State

Acheson and Secretary of Defense Johnson, however, both supported the proposal. US policy

was to avoid direct military conflict with the Communists inside Chinese borders, since there

was no guarantee that such action would not provoke a military response from the USSR. By

necessity, then, any intervention inside China would have to be covert in nature; the role of the

US could not be disclosed.

      In theory, the use of the Nationalists could achieve the objectives of both State and

Defense Departments. If successful, the operation would divert Chinese Communist military

forces from Korea and conceal the role of the US. The DCI was not a voting member of the

NSC, and the arguments of the two Secretaries convinced Truman to task the CIA with initiating

the covert paramilitary operation. Given his marching orders, General Smith tasked Wisner and

his OPC with developing a plan to infiltrate Nationalists forces back into China.

      The Chief of OPC's Far East division in 1951 was Dick Stilwell. Stilwell and his deputy,

Bill Depuis, put together the details of the plan and contacted General Li Mi to discuss the

operation. The CIA created a "front" commercial organization in Bangkok, Thailand called

Southeast Asia Supply Corporation, or SEA Supply. SEA Supply provided the necessary cover

for logistical and operational support. The basic concept was for Li Mi's force to cross the border

and enter the Yunnan Province through Burma--the back door into China. The CIA would

transport additional Nationalist paramilitary elements from Formosa to Burma, where they would

insert by parachute, then cross the border on foot into China.

      The Li Mi covert paramilitary program resulted in total failure. Counterintelligence

officers in OSO (Office of Special Operations--OPC's espionage/counterintelligence counterpart

in CIA) had suspected General Li Mi's chief radio operator of collaborating with the Chinese

Communists. The OSO investigation, prior to the Nationalist force crossing the border into

China, concluded that the chief radio operator was in fact a Chinese Communist agent. OPC,

still operating outside the direct control of the DCI, disregarded the OSO report and pressed

ahead with the operation. When Li Mi's Nationalist paramilitary element crossed the border into

the south Yunnan Province of China, they were met by an overwhelming Chinese Communist

military force and decimated. Some escaped with Li Mi back to Burma, while many scattered in

an area now known as the "Golden Triangle" to avoid certain death at the hands of the Maoists.

      The long-term diplomatic impact of the Li Mi failure is an even greater tragedy than the

operational failure to draw Chinese Communist forces out of Korea Li Mi attempted at least

two more incursions into the Yunnan with identical results. Many of the Nationalists that

invaded China blended into the Yunnan populace, in a region eventually to gain recognition as a

For world supplier of opium and its refined product heroin (hence the term "Golden Triangle").

The CIA was forced to mount a major effort in later years to transport many other surviving

Nationalists back to Taiwan, an effort the CIA was unsuccessful in concealing from the public

eye.

      The use of Burmese territory as a staging base for paramilitary operations into

neighboring China represented a real threat to Burmese national security. The threat of inciting

hostility from Peking toward Burma and possible retaliation as a result of such operations was

genuine. Burmese government officials had never sanctioned Li Mi's presence in Burma for that

reason. Li Mi would later become a direct threat to the government of Burma as his Nationalists

joined forces with Burmese tribesmen in their revolt against the government in Rangoon.

Burmese officials suspected US intervention in the operation, and later severed diplomatic ties

with the US when American officials refused to acknowledge any involvement with General Li

Mi and his Nationalist forces.

      Recognizing a changing environment: WW II to the Post-war period

      The Berlin blockade of May 1948 to May 1949 stimulated an immediate response from

the West to Stalin's Communist-imposed influence in Europe. The blockade was the first direct

confrontation between the US and the USSR, so recently allies in the Second World War.

Historians frequently identify the blockade and the subsequent US-sponsored airlift as the start of

the Cold War. When air samples collected over Russia by an American reconnaissance aircraft

in August 1949 confirmed that the Soviets had detonated a nuclear device, the stakes for future

direct military conflict between the US and the USSR raised dramatically. The US

underestimated the effectiveness of the measures taken by Moscow at the outset of the Cold War

to purge dissident populations through 'relocation', replacing them with communities of

dedicated Bolsheviks. This relocation effort effectively isolated remaining partisan elements,

facilitating the Soviet intelligence service's emplacement of agents into the partisan community

at will to use in manipulating Western intelligence agencies. The Nazis had been relatively

unsucessful in penetrating OSS covert operations during World War II. The Soviets, in

comparison, placed a high priority on counterintelligence and by 1950 had "seeded" KGB

operatives throughout the remaining partisan networks.

     Dealing with various resistance and emigre groups and governments-in-exile proved a

much greater challenge than most anticipated in the post-war period. Competition between

various groups vying for political clout and American backing diverted energy from a

paramilitary program. Groups sponsored by the CIA often spent more time and effort fighting

each other than against the Communists. Compounding this problem was tide tendency among

leaders of emigre and resistance groups to grossly exaggerate the size and degree of activism of

the groups they represented in order to bolster their chances with Western governments.

      During World War II, nationalism seemed to be a unifying factor in France and Norway,

the single focus of the resistance being the expulsion of Axis occupation forces. Few in the CIA

had the experience of Franklin Lindsay with Tito's Partisan in Yugoslavia to see first-hand the

deleterious effects that an internal struggle for power can have on a covert paramilitary program.

Consequently, many in the Agency dismissed Lindsay's conclusion as overly pessimistic that

partisan objectives will always supersede any objectives 'imposed' from the outside. Lindsay had

witnessed the erosion of American influence with Tito as the Partisan population focus returned

toward the end of World War II to post-war control of Yugoslavia. The US never adequately

addressed the impact of civil conflict-within a country, and several of the covert paramilitary

programs initiated by the CIA in the post-war period suffered as a result.

      One of the most significant differences in the operating environment following the end of

World War II was the intended object of the paramilitary action. Whereas the target of US

paramilitary activity in World War II was an army of occupation, the target in the post-war

period had become a political ideology. The difference had a tremendous impact on the

methodologies used by and ability of the CIA to sustain the focus and morale of the sponsored

resistance elements. The CIA struggled to find an appropriate and effective means of operating

in this new environment, and the results of its various covert paramilitary operations reflect the

challenges of the time.

      Paramilitary operations in the post-war period: were they worth it?

      As the Senate Select Committee concluded in l976, "Net judgments as to 'success' or

'failure' [of covert operations] are difficult to draw."87  The Committee used a set of five factors

in an attempt to determine the degree of success for the various covert operations they analyzed:

(1) executive command and control; (2) secrecy and deniability; (3) effectiveness; (4) propriety;

and (5) legislative oversight. The Committee found that as a general rule covert operations must

remain consistent with national policy and national strategy in order to have any chance of

success. The two principal criteria for success used by the Committee in its evaluation were

achievement of the policy goal and maintenance of deniability. The Committee concluded that

"On balance, in these terms, the evidence points toward the failure of paramilitary activity as a

technique of covert action."88

      Opinions vary among those who were actively involved in US covert operations

following World War II, yet most caution against judging the merits of those operations at face

value. Harry Rositzke, a CIA espionage officer in the 1950's, is one of those offering a

counterpoint to the popular notion that the results of the CIA's 'crash' covert paramilitary

program were simply not worth the effort. "No claim can be made for a significant return on the

heavy investment in these cross-border operations....To dismiss these operations as a total

failure, however, is perhaps too.......the first generation of CIA operations officers was

learning its trade by doing, by developing know-how, both in what to do and what not to do."89

            Rositzke, like so many former CIA officers, contends that results must be considered in

the context of the environment in which the operations took place--not the present period. In

retrospect, it is easy to categorize the entire US covert paramilitary program a complete disaster.

"At the time, however, when a Soviet military offensive was considered imminent, it was a

wartime investment whose cost was not measured by the Pentagon."90 Ideas for paramilitary

activity flowed from every level: overseas CIA station officers, embassy officials, State and

Defense Department executives, and the National Security Council all volunteered ideas for

potential "projects." All proposals by law required NCA approval-very few were returned

disapproved.

                                     NOTES

1      The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) in the CIA, under the direction of Frank

Wisner, used a "project" system of managing covert operations, assigning individual officers as

project managers. OPC officer performance evaluation was based to a large degree on the

number of projects initiated and directed, hence it became advantageous for OPC officers to

continue projects as long as possible. The 1976 "Church Committee" report to Congress

identified this fault as a primary organizational failure in the CIA during this period.

2     Harry Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and

Covert action, Westview Encore Edition. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 166.

3      John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947,

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 353.

4     William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA, (New York,

Simon and Schuster, 1978), 91.

5     History Project, Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, War

Department, War Report: Office of Strategic Services (OSS), (Washington, DC: GPO, 1949),

1:79.

6     History Project, 1:80.

7     History Project, 1:81.

8     "Kachin" is actually a collective term used to describe the Chingpaw and other allied

native Burmese tribes.

9     History Project, 1:84.

10    Colby, Honorable Men, 25.

11    William Colby, former Director of Central Intelligence, interview by author, 4 January

1995. Mr. Colby volunteered for active duty as a 2nd Lieutenant the US Army in August 1941

before transferring to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1943. His covert paramilitary

experience during World War II included operations in both France and Norway as a team leader.

Colby left the OSS at the end of the war, but returned to the CIA in 1950. Colby's career with

the Agency spanned three decades, and he retired after serving as Director of Central Intelligence

(DCI) from September 1973 to January 1976.

12    G. J. A. 0'Toole, Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and

Covert Action From the American Revolution to the CIA, (New York: The Atlantic Monthly

Press, 1991), 407.

13    Colby interview.

14    Colby, Honorable Men, 44.

15    Colby interview.

16    Colby, Honorable Men, 46.

17    Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisan's in Wartime

Yugoslavia, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), Author's preface, ix.

18    Lindsay, Beacons in the Night, 107.

19    Franklin Lindsay, former OSS and CIA officer, interview by author, 18 January 1995.

Mr Lindsay was an OSS officer when he parachuted into Yugoslavia in May of 1944 to work

with Tito's Partisans. Lindsay spent seven months "inside the Third Reich" with the Partisans,

and was in a unique position to observe first-hand the challenges of generating a paramilitary

operation in the midst of an ongoing civil war.

20    Lindsay interview.

21    Lindsay, Beacons in the Night, 194.

22    History Project, 1: 84. Whether this is the officials US Government definition for

unvouchered fluids or the CIA's interpretation is not clear. The passage nonetheless provided an

adequate working description of the concept of unvouchered funds for my analysis.

23    History Project, 1: 144.

24    History Project, 1:405.

25    Richard Dunlop, Donovan: America's Master Spy, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co,

1982), 438.

26    History Project, 1:406.

27   History Project, 2: 219-220.

28    O'Toole, Honorable Treachery, 407.

29    Tom Moon, This Grim and Savage Game: OSS and the Beginning of US. Covert

Operations in World War II; (Los Angeles: Burning Gate Press, 1991), 324-325.

30    History Project, 2:221.

31    History Project, 2:199.

32    Lindsay, Beacons in the Night, 104-106.

33    Moon, 204.

34    Lindsay interview.

35    Michael Warner, Ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman, (Washington DC: History Staff,

Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), 11.

36    Rositzke, 2.

37    U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With

Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on

Foreign and Military Intelligence, 94thCong., 2dsess., 1976. S. Rept. 94-755, 1:153.

38    Walter L. Pforzheimer, former CIG and CIA legislative council, interview by author, 3

February 1995. Pforzhieimer, a retired US Army colonel, joined the CIG in February 1946 as

legislative counsel. Colonel Pforzheimer stayed on with the CIA in the same capacity, serving as

legislative council through 1956. As legislative council, Colonel Pforzheimer was the principal

Agency official responsible for the drafting and passage through Congress of the CIA portions of

the National Security Act of 1947.

39     U.S. Congress, Final Report, 1: 144.

40     Pforzheimer interview. The Forrestal Diaries contain no specific reference to such a

conversation. Secretary Forrestal's appointment calendar was quite full during the days

immediately following the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, including at least one meeting

with DCI Hillenkotter. Colonel Pforzheimer, who was then Houston's assistant general counsel,

recalls the series of discussions taking place just after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia.

41     Pforzheimer interview.

42    Warner, 174.

43    Warner, 174.

44    Warner, 195.

45    Warner, 195.

46    Rositzke, 2-3.

47    Warner, 214.

48    Warner, 215-216

49    Warner, 201-205.

50    Warner,235-239.

51    Tom Bower, The Red Web: MI6 and the KGB Master Coup, (London: Aurum Press

Ltd., 1989), 89.

52    Pforzheimer interview.

53    Pforzheimer interview.

54     James Macarger, former CIA officer, interview by author, 20 December 1994. A State

Department foreign service officer, Macarger was drafted into the OPC by Frank Wisner based

on his background and expertise in Balkan and Central European affairs. Macarger had been

closely monitoring developments in Albania for the State Department, and was the logical

choice to head up an American contingent to the joint British SIS-CIA paramilitary effort.

Although Macarger did not stay with the project through to its conclusion, he was the officer in

charge during planning and the initial phases of execution.

55    US Congress, Final Report, 1:147, and 2: 31-32. The Senate Select Committe--more

commonly referred to as the "Church Committee" after Senator Church--conducted an exhaustive

investigation of all CIA covert activity since the inception of the Agency. Books one and four

detail the rapid expansion of OPC, including a personality sketch of the brilliant and

strong-willed Wisner.

56    Rositzke, 166.

57    Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA, (New

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 44.

58    Rositzke, 171-172.

59    Bower, 105.

60    Powers, 44-45.

61    The "10/2" panel, known by a variety of terms, was the panel established by the National

Security Council to oversee US covert activity. If the panel accepted a proposal, it forwarded a

recommendation to the President for final approval.

62    Macarger interview. On this point Macarger contradicts the majority of the published

accounts on Albania which identify the principal objective as unseating Hoxha. Macarger makes

the clear distinction in the case of Albania between inciting a rebellion and determining the

feasibility of inciting a rebellion. The distinction is more than simple semantics. There is a

significant difference in the level of effort and political ramifications between the two scenarios.

63    Rositzke, 173.

64    Macarger interview.

65    John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations From

World War II Through Iranscam, (New York: William Morrow,. 1986), 48.

66     This speculation was offered by James Macarger, and appears the most plausible

explanation. Macarger did not stay with the "project" until its termination, and therefore was not

privy to discussions concerning Albania as the effort tailed off.

67    Lindsay and Macarger interviews.      

68    Macarger interview.

69    Macarger interview.

70    Macarger interview.

71    Lindsay interview.

72    Lindsay and Macarger interviews.

73    Powers, 44-45.

74    Typescript digest of report by Franklin Lindsay, including members from Harvard Univ.,

Covert Operations of the United States Government, 1 December 1968, 3.

75    Rositzke, 169.

76    Bower's Red Web and Rositzke's The CIA's Secret Operations both contain descriptions

of the operation

77    Warner,214.

78    Rositzke, 169.

79    Rositzke, 168.

80    Rositzke, 168.

81    Rositzke, 169.

82    Lindsay interview. Lindsay left the OSS at the end of World War II, but was asked by

Frank Wisner to return to the CIA and join the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) as Chief of

Operations. With the expansion of OPC, Wisner reassigned Lindsay as the head of OPC's

Eastern European station. Lindsay was initially optimistic about operations in Eastern Europe.

In Lindsay's words, "[I]t was only after we got some bloody noses that I began to doubt that this

was the right thing to do."

83    Lindsay's typescript digest Covert Operations of the United States Government, 7.

84    John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, (New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1987), 137.

85     Sam Halperin, former CIA officer, interview by author, 13 January 1995. A former

research analysts with the OSS, Halperin spent 18 years with the SSU, CIG, then the CIA as an

opertions officer in the Far East . Much of this account on the OPC's paramilitary operation in

Korea is based on Halperin's recollection, since very little has been published to date. Prados'

Secret Wars, pp 73-77 contains a description of the operation, but is difficult to verify due to the

lack of cited sources on the details of the operation.

86     Halperin interview. Halperin was not present at the meeting, but was briefed shortly

afterward on the matters discussed and General Smith's response to the proposition on Korea.

87    U.S. Congress, Final Report, 1:154.

88    U.S. Congress, FinalReport, 1: 155.

89    Rositzke, 50.

90    Rositzke,37.

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