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Intelligence

Intelligence Coordination In Support Of Central Command

 

CSC 1993

 

SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

Title: Intelligence Coordination in Support of Central Command

 

Author: LCDR Patrick F. Donohue, United States Navy

 

Thesis: The collection, processing, and production of intelligence in the CENTCOM AOR to

support CINC requirements is hampered by the lack of Army and Air Force component

participation in the JIC process, and the failure of PACOM, LANTCOM and CENTCOM JICs to

coordinate the intelligence preparation of forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR.

 

Background: The CINC's ability to successfully prosecute his responsibilities has been

degraded by the failure of the intelligence organizations of the Army and Air force components

to adequately support the JIC. This can be linked directly to the components' perception of the

JIC. The JIC concept is intended to address serious shortcomings in intelligence coordination

and duplication of effort between the service intelligence organizations. These shortcomings

include the lack of an integrated battlefield intelligence picture common to all components; a

centralized intelligence data base; and a centralized coordinating authority for component

requests for information (RFIs). However, the preoccupation each service component has with

what it perceives to be its own peculiar operating environment, service prejudices, and the lack

of common command and control systems has hampered the JIC's effectiveness. Another

concern is the failure of PACOM, LANTCOM and CENTCOM JICs to coordinate the

intelligence preparation of forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR, resulting in duplication of

effort and conflicting intelligence. Forces allocated to CENTCOM are primarily drawn from

PACOM and LANTCOM simultaneously, and the pre-deployment preparations of the forces are

accomplished by their respective CINCs. However, neither PACOM or LANTCOM possesses

the theater vision of CENTCOM, resulting in the production of pre-deployment intelligence

packages which do not adequately represent the true nature of the threats in the CENTCOM

AOR. Since these forces are only deployed to the theater for up to three months there is very

little time to develop any lessons-learned or adequate turnover packages. Consequently, any

lessons-learned by the deployed forces and the intelligence provided by CENTCOM are lost.

 

Recommendations: Modifying the JIC concept will make full participation in the JIC concept

much more attractive to the Army and Air Force components. The modification preserves the

components' intelligence organization's administrative autonomy, yet allows them to contribute

and share in the overall benefits of the JIC. Assigning sole responsibility for intelligence

preparation of forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR, to the CENTCOM JIC will eliminate

the duplication of effort and conflicting intelligence produced by the JICs in the preparation of

forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR.

 

 

OUTLINE

 

Thesis: The collection, processing, and production of intelligence in the CENTCOM AOR to

support CINC requirements is hampered by the lack of Army and Air Force component

participation in the JIC process, and the failure PACOM, LANTCOM and CENTCOM JICs to

coordinate the intelligence preparation of forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR.

 

I. CINC intelligence requirements

A. List of requirements

B. JIC responsibility in satisfying requirements

 

II. CINC responsibilities affected by intelligence requirement shortcomings

A. Force protection

B. Ability to transition to war

C. Developing the theater campaign

 

III. Shortcomings the JIC concept addresses

A. Lack of integrated battlefield intelligence picture

B. Lack of centralized intelligence data base

C. Lack of centralized coordinating authority for component RFIs

 

IV. Lack of Army and Air Force support for JIC

 

V. Modification of JIC concept to compel Army and Air Force support

A. Services retain responsibility for tactical intelligence

B. JIC would

1. Produce value-added intelligence

2. Synthesize the integrated battlefield intelligence picture

3. Maintain the centralized intelligence data base

4. Be the centralized coordinating authority for IIRs and RFIs

 

VI. Facilitating access to a centralized intelligence data ba

A. Description of communications architecture needed

B. Integration of service tactical intelligence processing systems

 

VII. JICs' preparation of forces deploying to CENTCOM AOR

A. Duplication of effort and conflicting intelligence

B. Lack of theater vision of PACOM and LANTCOM JICs

C. Lack of coordination between JICs

 

VII. Recommendations

A. Modify the JIC concept

B. Assign CENTCOM JIC responsibility for intelligence preparation of forces

deploying to CENTCOM AOR

 

 

INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION IN SUPPORT OF CENTRAL COMMAND

 

Regional Commanders in Chief (CINCs) configure their intelligence systems to ensure

 

that collecting, processing, and producing intelligence meet theater requirements. These

 

requirements include timely indications of threat changes and warnings; the current situation in

 

areas of high interest; maintenance of pertinent data bases; estimates for operational planning

 

and assessments for security assistance.1 The CINC's supporting Joint Intelligence Center (JIC)

 

maintains responsibility for accomplishing these tasks and does so by establishing links between

 

the National Intelligence Community, the CINC, other JICs, and the Component Commanders.

 

Cooperation among all elements in this process is critical to the accomplishment of the CINC's

 

theater requirements. In the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), this

 

process is hobbled by the lack of Army and Air Force component participation, and the failure

 

of Pacfic Command (PACOM), Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) and CENTCOM JICs to

 

coordinate the intelligence preparation of forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR. A

 

modification to the JIC concept, addressing each services functional capabilities, and the

 

assignment of sole responsibility to the CENTCOM JIC for intelligence preparation of deploying

 

forces, are critical adjustments necessary to relieve these shortcomings.

 

These problems affect many of the CINC's primary responsibilities. Force protection,

 

protecting forces from a wide range of threats, is one of the CINC's most important

 

responsibilities. The CINCs provide force protection by establishing measures and procedures

 

that preserve the combat power of their forces. These measures and procedures include

 

collection of intelligence for indicators and warnings.2 The CINC's ability to transition to war is

 

also affected. The CINC always organizes with the purpose of effecting an orderly, rapid

 

transition from a peacetime posture to wartime operations. The keys to a successful transition

 

process include timely, accurate intelligence and a command and control system with the agility

 

and flexibility to accommodate the uncertainties associated with any transition to war.3

 

Moreover, the CINC also relies on important aspects of operational art in developing the theater

 

campaign. These include operational intelligence and analysis of the range of the theater threats;

 

identifying enemy operational centers of gravity to be attacked or destabilized; friendly

 

operational centers of gravity to be protected; and critical lines of operation to be protected or

 

severed.4 A lack of intelligence coordination in any of these areas critically degrades the CINC's

 

ability to successfully prosecute his responsibilities.

 

The failure of the intelligence organizations of the Army and Air force components to

 

adequately support the CINC can be linked directly to their perception of the JIC concept. The

 

JIC concept is intended to address serious shortcomings in intelligence coordination and

 

duplication of effort between the service intelligence organizations. These shortcomings

 

included the lack of an integrated battlefield intelligence picture common to all components; a

 

centralized intelligence data base; and a centralized coordinating authority for component

 

requests for information (RFIs).

 

The lack of an integrated intelligence picture is directly attributable to the preoccupation

 

each service component has with what it perceives to be its own peculiar operating environment.

 

The expeditionary nature of the USMC requires it to operate in a combined maritime, air and

 

land environment. This requires the rapid build-up of combat power ashore, and maneuver to

 

defeat an opposing force. As a result, the USMC concentrated its intelligence collection efforts

 

on threats which could oppose its amphibious assault operations, and those intelligence

 

indicators which if successfully exploited would contribute to the USMC's synchronization of

 

maneuver, fire support, air defense, command and control, mobility and survivability, and

 

combat service support. These threats include possible attack by enemy aircraft, tactical ballistic

 

missiles and the opposing ground and naval forces.

 

The Army operates in an environment in which its forces are required to conduct

 

sustained ground combat operations on a much larger scale, geographic area and against a

 

potentially larger opposing force than the USMC. This environment normally does not include a

 

maritime component but embraces the air-land battle. Consequently, the Army concentrated its

 

intelligence collection efforts on threats which could oppose the full spectrum of its operations,

 

from low-to-high level intensity, and those intelligence indicators which if successfully

 

exploited contribute to the Army's ability to seize or retain the initiative through agility, and

 

synchronization. These threats include possible attack by enemy aircraft, tactical ballistic

 

missiles, and the opposing ground forces.

 

The Air Force operates in an environment in which the projection of air power is

 

paramount. This may run the full spectrum of conflict, and take the form of close air support for

 

ground combat operations, to strategic bombing. Consequently, the Air Force concentrated its

 

intelligence collection efforts on threats that impact on its ability to project air power. These

 

threats include enemy air defense forces and aircraft.

 

The Navy functions in a maritime environment in which its forces are required to operate

 

forward, from the sea, and conduct sustained naval operations in seaward and landward

 

segments of the littoral. This littoral region is frequently characterized by confined and

 

congested waters, and air-space, making identification of friend and foe difficult. Additionally,

 

the proliferation of sophisticated weapons systems in littoral third world countries, presents a

 

wide range of potential threats. As a result, the Navy concentrated its intelligence collection

 

efforts on threats which could oppose it's transit and forward operations, to include support for

 

amphibious assault operations, and those intelligence indicators which if successfully exploited

 

would contribute to the Navy's command-control-surveillance, battlespace dominance, power

 

projection and force sustainment. These threats include possible attacks from submarines

 

operating in shallow waters, surface craft, aircraft, coastal missile batteries, mines,

 

sea-skimming missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles.

 

The lack of an integrated battlefield intelligence picture is further compounded by

 

service prejudices, and the lack of common command and control systems, through which this

 

intelligence can be shared. This results in the service-specific intelligence produced by the

 

components being retained within their respective operational chains of command. The end

 

result is that the CINC and the components lack an integrated threat picture of the battlefield.

 

Additionally, this hampers the coordination of intelligence collection systems organic to the

 

components, and the integration of intelligence collection requirements to task national systems.

 

The centralized intelligence data base should be designed to be a dynamic tool for the

 

CINC to integrate the tactical service-specific intelligence produced by the components. A

 

centralized intelligence data base would provide each service component with a common

 

battlefield picture, and the associated geo-target locations and threat parameters upon which to

 

base operational planning. It would also allow each component to incorporate the intelligence

 

produced by the others and facilitate the identification and deconfliction of discrepancies in the

 

battlefield intelligence picture. Such a data base could ensure rapid dissemination of

 

intelligence to all service components and would provide the CINC a cross-component,

 

integrated intelligence picture upon which he can base his theater campaign planning and

 

prepare data bases for contingency target sets within his theater.

 

The centralized coordinating authority is intended to provide the CINC, and the service

 

components, a single point of contact in determining intelligence requirements and in responding

 

to component RFIs. Intelligence requirements for both peacetime and wartime must be

 

determined and prioritized in order to effectively plan collection and analytical efforts and

 

accurately allocate resources to these functions. The centralized coordinating authority would

 

also eliminate duplicative RFIs. Moreover, through a common data base, it permits component

 

commands to monitor the RFIs of the other components.5

 

As previously stated, the intelligence organizations of the Army and Air Force failed to

 

grasp the full potential of the JIC concept. Service participation, although directed by the

 

Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), has never been fully implemented. Specifically,

 

the services are directed to provide intelligence resources and personnel to the JIC, and to make

 

the JIC the primary source for the integration and dissemination of intelligence within it's

 

respective theater. The Army and Air Force both interpreted their mandate to include allocation

 

of manpower and joint capability in the event either service deploys to the CENTCOM theater.6

 

Although these forces are assigned to the JIC, the necessary command and control systems to

 

integrate the component's battlefield intelligence picture into the CINC's is not present. This

 

resulted in the intelligence efforts of the Army and Air Force components remaining within their

 

respective service's chain of command. In contrast, the Marine Corps and Navy recognized the

 

full potential of the JIC concept. Both services contributed manpower to the formation of the

 

JICs and coordinated the development and deployment of command and control systems for

 

intelligence integration. The Marine Corps and Navy accomplished this by consolidating the

 

Fleet Ocean Surveillance Intelligence Centers with the JICs. The Army and Air Force continue

 

to allow the issue of service autonomy to preclude their full participation.

 

To relieve Army and Air Force concern over this issue, a modification to the JIC concept

 

is necessary. This modification would allow each service intelligence organization to retain

 

responsibility for the production and analysis of service-specific intelligence for tactical

 

applications in front-line units, while contributing the intelligence to the JIC data base for further

 

dissemination and analysis. This arrangement builds on the strengths of the individual services

 

to do event-by-event collection and analysis using organic collection assets. The production of

 

value-added intelligence using national assets, and the synthesis of an integrated battlefield

 

intelligence picture for the CINC and services would be done by the JIC. Additionally, the JIC

 

would retain responsibility for maintaining the centralized intelligence data base, being the

 

centralized coordinating authority for determining intelligence requirements, and for responding

 

to component RFIs.

 

Access to a centralized intelligence data base could be facilitated through existing

 

communications systems. If properly modified, the individual services' tactical intelligence

 

processing systems could access DSNET-3, a wide area network (WAN), via super high

 

frequency (SHF) communication circuits, and access the JIC's and the Defense Intelligence

 

Agency's (DIA) data bases.7 Examples of tactical intelligence processing systems currently with

 

this capability include the Naval Tactical Command System Afloat (NTCSA) and the Marine

 

Corps Intelligence Analysis System (IAS). These systems would eventually communicate

 

through the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), a JCS/J2 program, linking

 

with a ground station and the WAN (see Figure). The Air Force and Army also possess tactical

 

intelligence processing systems. The Army has the All Source Analysis System (ASAS) and the

 

Air Force has the Command Tactical Application Planning System (CTAPS). These systems

 

lack the sophistication and organic data base that the previous two systems possess, and would

 

require much more extensive modification to be adapted to JDISS. The modification to the JIC

 

concept and the expenditure required to reconfigure the components' communications

 

architecture and tactical intelligence systems to support full access to the JIC centralized data

 

base, would require the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the service secretaries, and the

 

Chairman of the JCS (CJCS).

 

Another concern is the failure of PACOM, LANTCOM and CENTCOM JICs to

 

coordinate the intelligence preparation of forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR, resulting in

 

the duplication of effort and conflicting intelligence. Since forces allocated to CENTCOM are

 

primarily drawn from PACOM and LANTCOM simultaneously, pre-deployment preparations of

 

the forces are accomplished by their respective CINCs. However, neither PACOM or

 

LANTCOM possess the theater vision of CENTCOM. Consequently, PACOM and LANTCOM

 

JIC intelligence efforts are focused on the threats within their AORs. The preparation of the

 

pre-deployment intelligence packages for PACOM and LANTCOM forces deploying to the

 

CENTCOM AOR reflect this. Additionally, the pre-deployment intelligence packages produced

 

by the PACOM and LANTCOM JICs are not coordinated between the two CINCs or with

 

CENTCOM. The CENTCOM JIC can provide intelligence focused on the threats within the

 

CENTCOM AOR. As a result of this lack of coordination, forces deploying to the CENTCOM

 

AOR often do not possess CENTCOM's perception as to the nature of the threats that they may

 

encounter in the theater. Since these forces are only deployed to the theater for up to three

 

months there is very little time to develop any lessons-learned or adequate turnover packages.

 

Consequently, any lessons-learned by the deployed forces and the intelligence provided by

 

CENTCOM are lost. The assignment of sole responsibility for intelligence preparation of all

 

forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR to the CENTCOM JIC would alleviate this problem.

 

Cost of such a program is negligible and would require only CJCS approval and a memorandum

 

of understanding between the JICs regarding the division of labor and the production of

 

CENTCOM pre-deployment packages. These pre-deployment packages would include threat

 

summaries and historical analysis of the AOR; political and cultural background notes of the

 

littoral countries; lessons learned from previously deployed forces; biographies of the military

 

and civilian leaders; and a list of regularly recurring intelligence message traffic produced by the

 

CENTCOM JIC which the forces should expect to receive. Given sufficient notice by PACOM

 

and LANTCOM, CENTCOM JIC could transmit the package via message to the deploying

 

forces prior to their departure for review and the generation of specific RFIs.

 

The modification to the JIC concept and assigning the sole responsibility for intelligence

 

preparation of forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR, to the CENTCOM JIC, will make full

 

participation in the JIC concept much more attractive to the Army and Air Force components,

 

and eliminate the duplication of effort and conflicting intelligence produced by the JICs when

 

preparing forces for deployment to the CENTCOM AOR. The modification preserves the

 

components intelligence organization's administrative autonomy, yet allows them to contribute

 

and share in the overall benefits of the JIC. Once accomplished, these changes will ensure that

 

CENTCOM has the necessary assets to collect, process and produce intelligence to meet the

 

CINC's command requirements.

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

1. JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, (Washington,

D.C.: 1990) pp. II-10.

 

2. JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C.:

1990) pp. II-6.

 

3. JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, (Washington,

D.C.: 1990) pp.

II-11.

 

4. JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, (Washington,

D.C.: 1990) pp. III-6.

 

5. JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, (Washington,

D.C.: 1990) pp. IV- 4.

 

6. Personal interview with CDR James McKee, USN, Plans, Policy and Requirements,

N20X4, 09 Dec. 1992.

 

7. Personal interview with CDRs James McKee and Myer, USN, Plans, Policy

and Requirements, N20X4, 21 Jan. 1993.

 

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Intelligence Coordination In Support Of Central Command

Intelligence Coordination In Support Of Central Command

 

CSC 1993

 

SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

Title: Intelligence Coordination in Support of Central Command

 

Author: LCDR Patrick F. Donohue, United States Navy

 

Thesis: The collection, processing, and production of intelligence in the CENTCOM AOR to

support CINC requirements is hampered by the lack of Army and Air Force component

participation in the JIC process, and the failure of PACOM, LANTCOM and CENTCOM JICs to

coordinate the intelligence preparation of forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR.

 

Background: The CINC's ability to successfully prosecute his responsibilities has been

degraded by the failure of the intelligence organizations of the Army and Air force components

to adequately support the JIC. This can be linked directly to the components' perception of the

JIC. The JIC concept is intended to address serious shortcomings in intelligence coordination

and duplication of effort between the service intelligence organizations. These shortcomings

include the lack of an integrated battlefield intelligence picture common to all components; a

centralized intelligence data base; and a centralized coordinating authority for component

requests for information (RFIs). However, the preoccupation each service component has with

what it perceives to be its own peculiar operating environment, service prejudices, and the lack

of common command and control systems has hampered the JIC's effectiveness. Another

concern is the failure of PACOM, LANTCOM and CENTCOM JICs to coordinate the

intelligence preparation of forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR, resulting in duplication of

effort and conflicting intelligence. Forces allocated to CENTCOM are primarily drawn from

PACOM and LANTCOM simultaneously, and the pre-deployment preparations of the forces are

accomplished by their respective CINCs. However, neither PACOM or LANTCOM possesses

the theater vision of CENTCOM, resulting in the production of pre-deployment intelligence

packages which do not adequately represent the true nature of the threats in the CENTCOM

AOR. Since these forces are only deployed to the theater for up to three months there is very

little time to develop any lessons-learned or adequate turnover packages. Consequently, any

lessons-learned by the deployed forces and the intelligence provided by CENTCOM are lost.

 

Recommendations: Modifying the JIC concept will make full participation in the JIC concept

much more attractive to the Army and Air Force components. The modification preserves the

components' intelligence organization's administrative autonomy, yet allows them to contribute

and share in the overall benefits of the JIC. Assigning sole responsibility for intelligence

preparation of forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR, to the CENTCOM JIC will eliminate

the duplication of effort and conflicting intelligence produced by the JICs in the preparation of

forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR.

 

 

OUTLINE

 

Thesis: The collection, processing, and production of intelligence in the CENTCOM AOR to

support CINC requirements is hampered by the lack of Army and Air Force component

participation in the JIC process, and the failure PACOM, LANTCOM and CENTCOM JICs to

coordinate the intelligence preparation of forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR.

 

I. CINC intelligence requirements

A. List of requirements

B. JIC responsibility in satisfying requirements

 

II. CINC responsibilities affected by intelligence requirement shortcomings

A. Force protection

B. Ability to transition to war

C. Developing the theater campaign

 

III. Shortcomings the JIC concept addresses

A. Lack of integrated battlefield intelligence picture

B. Lack of centralized intelligence data base

C. Lack of centralized coordinating authority for component RFIs

 

IV. Lack of Army and Air Force support for JIC

 

V. Modification of JIC concept to compel Army and Air Force support

A. Services retain responsibility for tactical intelligence

B. JIC would

1. Produce value-added intelligence

2. Synthesize the integrated battlefield intelligence picture

3. Maintain the centralized intelligence data base

4. Be the centralized coordinating authority for IIRs and RFIs

 

VI. Facilitating access to a centralized intelligence data ba

A. Description of communications architecture needed

B. Integration of service tactical intelligence processing systems

 

VII. JICs' preparation of forces deploying to CENTCOM AOR

A. Duplication of effort and conflicting intelligence

B. Lack of theater vision of PACOM and LANTCOM JICs

C. Lack of coordination between JICs

 

VII. Recommendations

A. Modify the JIC concept

B. Assign CENTCOM JIC responsibility for intelligence preparation of forces

deploying to CENTCOM AOR

 

 

INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION IN SUPPORT OF CENTRAL COMMAND

 

Regional Commanders in Chief (CINCs) configure their intelligence systems to ensure

 

that collecting, processing, and producing intelligence meet theater requirements. These

 

requirements include timely indications of threat changes and warnings; the current situation in

 

areas of high interest; maintenance of pertinent data bases; estimates for operational planning

 

and assessments for security assistance.1 The CINC's supporting Joint Intelligence Center (JIC)

 

maintains responsibility for accomplishing these tasks and does so by establishing links between

 

the National Intelligence Community, the CINC, other JICs, and the Component Commanders.

 

Cooperation among all elements in this process is critical to the accomplishment of the CINC's

 

theater requirements. In the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), this

 

process is hobbled by the lack of Army and Air Force component participation, and the failure

 

of Pacfic Command (PACOM), Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) and CENTCOM JICs to

 

coordinate the intelligence preparation of forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR. A

 

modification to the JIC concept, addressing each services functional capabilities, and the

 

assignment of sole responsibility to the CENTCOM JIC for intelligence preparation of deploying

 

forces, are critical adjustments necessary to relieve these shortcomings.

 

These problems affect many of the CINC's primary responsibilities. Force protection,

 

protecting forces from a wide range of threats, is one of the CINC's most important

 

responsibilities. The CINCs provide force protection by establishing measures and procedures

 

that preserve the combat power of their forces. These measures and procedures include

 

collection of intelligence for indicators and warnings.2 The CINC's ability to transition to war is

 

also affected. The CINC always organizes with the purpose of effecting an orderly, rapid

 

transition from a peacetime posture to wartime operations. The keys to a successful transition

 

process include timely, accurate intelligence and a command and control system with the agility

 

and flexibility to accommodate the uncertainties associated with any transition to war.3

 

Moreover, the CINC also relies on important aspects of operational art in developing the theater

 

campaign. These include operational intelligence and analysis of the range of the theater threats;

 

identifying enemy operational centers of gravity to be attacked or destabilized; friendly

 

operational centers of gravity to be protected; and critical lines of operation to be protected or

 

severed.4 A lack of intelligence coordination in any of these areas critically degrades the CINC's

 

ability to successfully prosecute his responsibilities.

 

The failure of the intelligence organizations of the Army and Air force components to

 

adequately support the CINC can be linked directly to their perception of the JIC concept. The

 

JIC concept is intended to address serious shortcomings in intelligence coordination and

 

duplication of effort between the service intelligence organizations. These shortcomings

 

included the lack of an integrated battlefield intelligence picture common to all components; a

 

centralized intelligence data base; and a centralized coordinating authority for component

 

requests for information (RFIs).

 

The lack of an integrated intelligence picture is directly attributable to the preoccupation

 

each service component has with what it perceives to be its own peculiar operating environment.

 

The expeditionary nature of the USMC requires it to operate in a combined maritime, air and

 

land environment. This requires the rapid build-up of combat power ashore, and maneuver to

 

defeat an opposing force. As a result, the USMC concentrated its intelligence collection efforts

 

on threats which could oppose its amphibious assault operations, and those intelligence

 

indicators which if successfully exploited would contribute to the USMC's synchronization of

 

maneuver, fire support, air defense, command and control, mobility and survivability, and

 

combat service support. These threats include possible attack by enemy aircraft, tactical ballistic

 

missiles and the opposing ground and naval forces.

 

The Army operates in an environment in which its forces are required to conduct

 

sustained ground combat operations on a much larger scale, geographic area and against a

 

potentially larger opposing force than the USMC. This environment normally does not include a

 

maritime component but embraces the air-land battle. Consequently, the Army concentrated its

 

intelligence collection efforts on threats which could oppose the full spectrum of its operations,

 

from low-to-high level intensity, and those intelligence indicators which if successfully

 

exploited contribute to the Army's ability to seize or retain the initiative through agility, and

 

synchronization. These threats include possible attack by enemy aircraft, tactical ballistic

 

missiles, and the opposing ground forces.

 

The Air Force operates in an environment in which the projection of air power is

 

paramount. This may run the full spectrum of conflict, and take the form of close air support for

 

ground combat operations, to strategic bombing. Consequently, the Air Force concentrated its

 

intelligence collection efforts on threats that impact on its ability to project air power. These

 

threats include enemy air defense forces and aircraft.

 

The Navy functions in a maritime environment in which its forces are required to operate

 

forward, from the sea, and conduct sustained naval operations in seaward and landward

 

segments of the littoral. This littoral region is frequently characterized by confined and

 

congested waters, and air-space, making identification of friend and foe difficult. Additionally,

 

the proliferation of sophisticated weapons systems in littoral third world countries, presents a

 

wide range of potential threats. As a result, the Navy concentrated its intelligence collection

 

efforts on threats which could oppose it's transit and forward operations, to include support for

 

amphibious assault operations, and those intelligence indicators which if successfully exploited

 

would contribute to the Navy's command-control-surveillance, battlespace dominance, power

 

projection and force sustainment. These threats include possible attacks from submarines

 

operating in shallow waters, surface craft, aircraft, coastal missile batteries, mines,

 

sea-skimming missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles.

 

The lack of an integrated battlefield intelligence picture is further compounded by

 

service prejudices, and the lack of common command and control systems, through which this

 

intelligence can be shared. This results in the service-specific intelligence produced by the

 

components being retained within their respective operational chains of command. The end

 

result is that the CINC and the components lack an integrated threat picture of the battlefield.

 

Additionally, this hampers the coordination of intelligence collection systems organic to the

 

components, and the integration of intelligence collection requirements to task national systems.

 

The centralized intelligence data base should be designed to be a dynamic tool for the

 

CINC to integrate the tactical service-specific intelligence produced by the components. A

 

centralized intelligence data base would provide each service component with a common

 

battlefield picture, and the associated geo-target locations and threat parameters upon which to

 

base operational planning. It would also allow each component to incorporate the intelligence

 

produced by the others and facilitate the identification and deconfliction of discrepancies in the

 

battlefield intelligence picture. Such a data base could ensure rapid dissemination of

 

intelligence to all service components and would provide the CINC a cross-component,

 

integrated intelligence picture upon which he can base his theater campaign planning and

 

prepare data bases for contingency target sets within his theater.

 

The centralized coordinating authority is intended to provide the CINC, and the service

 

components, a single point of contact in determining intelligence requirements and in responding

 

to component RFIs. Intelligence requirements for both peacetime and wartime must be

 

determined and prioritized in order to effectively plan collection and analytical efforts and

 

accurately allocate resources to these functions. The centralized coordinating authority would

 

also eliminate duplicative RFIs. Moreover, through a common data base, it permits component

 

commands to monitor the RFIs of the other components.5

 

As previously stated, the intelligence organizations of the Army and Air Force failed to

 

grasp the full potential of the JIC concept. Service participation, although directed by the

 

Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), has never been fully implemented. Specifically,

 

the services are directed to provide intelligence resources and personnel to the JIC, and to make

 

the JIC the primary source for the integration and dissemination of intelligence within it's

 

respective theater. The Army and Air Force both interpreted their mandate to include allocation

 

of manpower and joint capability in the event either service deploys to the CENTCOM theater.6

 

Although these forces are assigned to the JIC, the necessary command and control systems to

 

integrate the component's battlefield intelligence picture into the CINC's is not present. This

 

resulted in the intelligence efforts of the Army and Air Force components remaining within their

 

respective service's chain of command. In contrast, the Marine Corps and Navy recognized the

 

full potential of the JIC concept. Both services contributed manpower to the formation of the

 

JICs and coordinated the development and deployment of command and control systems for

 

intelligence integration. The Marine Corps and Navy accomplished this by consolidating the

 

Fleet Ocean Surveillance Intelligence Centers with the JICs. The Army and Air Force continue

 

to allow the issue of service autonomy to preclude their full participation.

 

To relieve Army and Air Force concern over this issue, a modification to the JIC concept

 

is necessary. This modification would allow each service intelligence organization to retain

 

responsibility for the production and analysis of service-specific intelligence for tactical

 

applications in front-line units, while contributing the intelligence to the JIC data base for further

 

dissemination and analysis. This arrangement builds on the strengths of the individual services

 

to do event-by-event collection and analysis using organic collection assets. The production of

 

value-added intelligence using national assets, and the synthesis of an integrated battlefield

 

intelligence picture for the CINC and services would be done by the JIC. Additionally, the JIC

 

would retain responsibility for maintaining the centralized intelligence data base, being the

 

centralized coordinating authority for determining intelligence requirements, and for responding

 

to component RFIs.

 

Access to a centralized intelligence data base could be facilitated through existing

 

communications systems. If properly modified, the individual services' tactical intelligence

 

processing systems could access DSNET-3, a wide area network (WAN), via super high

 

frequency (SHF) communication circuits, and access the JIC's and the Defense Intelligence

 

Agency's (DIA) data bases.7 Examples of tactical intelligence processing systems currently with

 

this capability include the Naval Tactical Command System Afloat (NTCSA) and the Marine

 

Corps Intelligence Analysis System (IAS). These systems would eventually communicate

 

through the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), a JCS/J2 program, linking

 

with a ground station and the WAN (see Figure). The Air Force and Army also possess tactical

 

intelligence processing systems. The Army has the All Source Analysis System (ASAS) and the

 

Air Force has the Command Tactical Application Planning System (CTAPS). These systems

 

lack the sophistication and organic data base that the previous two systems possess, and would

 

require much more extensive modification to be adapted to JDISS. The modification to the JIC

 

concept and the expenditure required to reconfigure the components' communications

 

architecture and tactical intelligence systems to support full access to the JIC centralized data

 

base, would require the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the service secretaries, and the

 

Chairman of the JCS (CJCS).

 

Another concern is the failure of PACOM, LANTCOM and CENTCOM JICs to

 

coordinate the intelligence preparation of forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR, resulting in

 

the duplication of effort and conflicting intelligence. Since forces allocated to CENTCOM are

 

primarily drawn from PACOM and LANTCOM simultaneously, pre-deployment preparations of

 

the forces are accomplished by their respective CINCs. However, neither PACOM or

 

LANTCOM possess the theater vision of CENTCOM. Consequently, PACOM and LANTCOM

 

JIC intelligence efforts are focused on the threats within their AORs. The preparation of the

 

pre-deployment intelligence packages for PACOM and LANTCOM forces deploying to the

 

CENTCOM AOR reflect this. Additionally, the pre-deployment intelligence packages produced

 

by the PACOM and LANTCOM JICs are not coordinated between the two CINCs or with

 

CENTCOM. The CENTCOM JIC can provide intelligence focused on the threats within the

 

CENTCOM AOR. As a result of this lack of coordination, forces deploying to the CENTCOM

 

AOR often do not possess CENTCOM's perception as to the nature of the threats that they may

 

encounter in the theater. Since these forces are only deployed to the theater for up to three

 

months there is very little time to develop any lessons-learned or adequate turnover packages.

 

Consequently, any lessons-learned by the deployed forces and the intelligence provided by

 

CENTCOM are lost. The assignment of sole responsibility for intelligence preparation of all

 

forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR to the CENTCOM JIC would alleviate this problem.

 

Cost of such a program is negligible and would require only CJCS approval and a memorandum

 

of understanding between the JICs regarding the division of labor and the production of

 

CENTCOM pre-deployment packages. These pre-deployment packages would include threat

 

summaries and historical analysis of the AOR; political and cultural background notes of the

 

littoral countries; lessons learned from previously deployed forces; biographies of the military

 

and civilian leaders; and a list of regularly recurring intelligence message traffic produced by the

 

CENTCOM JIC which the forces should expect to receive. Given sufficient notice by PACOM

 

and LANTCOM, CENTCOM JIC could transmit the package via message to the deploying

 

forces prior to their departure for review and the generation of specific RFIs.

 

The modification to the JIC concept and assigning the sole responsibility for intelligence

 

preparation of forces deploying to the CENTCOM AOR, to the CENTCOM JIC, will make full

 

participation in the JIC concept much more attractive to the Army and Air Force components,

 

and eliminate the duplication of effort and conflicting intelligence produced by the JICs when

 

preparing forces for deployment to the CENTCOM AOR. The modification preserves the

 

components intelligence organization's administrative autonomy, yet allows them to contribute

 

and share in the overall benefits of the JIC. Once accomplished, these changes will ensure that

 

CENTCOM has the necessary assets to collect, process and produce intelligence to meet the

 

CINC's command requirements.

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

1. JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, (Washington,

D.C.: 1990) pp. II-10.

 

2. JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C.:

1990) pp. II-6.

 

3. JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, (Washington,

D.C.: 1990) pp.

II-11.

 

4. JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, (Washington,

D.C.: 1990) pp. III-6.

 

5. JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, (Washington,

D.C.: 1990) pp. IV- 4.

 

6. Personal interview with CDR James McKee, USN, Plans, Policy and Requirements,

N20X4, 09 Dec. 1992.

 

7. Personal interview with CDRs James McKee and Myer, USN, Plans, Policy

and Requirements, N20X4, 21 Jan. 1993.

 

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