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Tactical Reconnaissance: Bringing Imagery Into Focus
CSC 1993
SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence
Title:  Tactical Reconnaissance: Bringing Imagery Into Focus
Author:  LCDR M.A. Dombrowski, United States Navy
Thesis:  The Navy and Marine Corps need to improve training and
procure enhanced digital technology for collection, processing
and transmission of tactical reconnaissance imagery.
Background:  Tactical reconnaissance for littoral warfare has been
left in the lurch by the Navy and Marines.  Adequate sensor
capability has been retired or will not be fielded for years.
Decision makers do not understand the role intelligence plays in
expeditionary warfare.  Analysts are too few and too seldom
trained.  Chemical processing is cumbersome and time-consuming.
Communications capabilities need to match the vast data rate
requirements for both transmission and processing of digitized
imagery.  All this must be done within current fiscal austerity.
Possible solutions include a switch to digital imagery, purchase
of off-the-shelf Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV's), enhanced
training for staffs and analysts, and improved communications
Recommendations:  Naval Services imagery intelligence should "go
digital", buy UAV's, increase communications bandwidth, and
redirect training to better support littoral warfare.
Thesis: Tactical reconnaissance for littoral warfare does not
meet the operational commanders' needs.  The Navy and Marine
Corps need to improve training, purchase low-cost interim
airplanes, and procure enhanced digital technology for
collection, processing and transmission of imagery.
I.	Tactical Reconnaissance in Littoral Warfare
	A.	Operational Scenario: We don't get the picture!
	B.	Imagery Requirements for the warfighter
		l.	Collection in all conditions
		2.	Fast, accurate analysis and processing
		3.	Quick transmission
II.	Problem Areas in Tactical Reconnaissance
	A.	Sensor Systems shortfalls
		l.	National:  Too little, too unresponsive
		2.	Organic:  Gapped capability
	B.	Chemical Processing is wasteful
	C.	Weak training for staffs and analysts
		l.	"Cultural" problems
		2.	Numbers too low
		3.	Focus of training is wrong
	D.	Imagery Transmission is slow and ineffective
III.	Solving Tactical Imagery deficiencies in the short term
	A.	Digitize sensors and processors
	B.	Buy UAV's
	C.	Improve staff and analyst training
	D.	Get more bandwidth
l.  Introduction.
     The tension in the War Room was palpable.  The Landing Force
Commander glared across the table at the Commodore.  "Jack, the
Navy is supposed to provide us with our intelligence until we
phase ashore.  We don't have any photos of the Landing Zones or
the Helo Landing Zones except for some six-week old satellite
'fuzzy grams' that tell us nothing!  How are we supposed to know
if the gunfire you laid on did anything, or if any new defenses
have been built?  How can we plan?  Commodore, do I have to go in
blind?  Don't we have any photo reconnaissance in the battle
     The Commodore in turn glared at his Intelligence Officer and
growled, "N-2, what do you mean, 'I don't have any photographs of
the target area'!?  What about the carrier's reconnaissance
planes? What about that fancy imagery transmission whazits in the
JIC?  I thought it could get me pictures of anywhere in the world
in a minute!"
     "Well, Commodore, I'm afraid the carrier was too far away,
so they couldn't help.  The national systems can't penetrate the
high cloud cover, and even if they could, we can't get more than
just a view of a single point target because there's no area
coverage and, you know, each picture takes a long time to
transmit, and, besides, we were the eighth priority on the list
behind the enemy capital and the Army's objectives and a bunch of
other guys.  I guess --- heh-heh --- we'll just have to do the
planning the way we did in the old days, without any imagery,
using just maps and 'best guess'."
"N-2," the Commodore responded, "my 'best guess' is you're
     The above scenario dramatizes a critical deficiency faced by
the Naval Services in littoral warfare:  The warfighter can't bet
imagery because afloat tactical reconnaissance is broken.  The
following reasons apply:
     -  Imagery interpretation skills are weak.
     -  Planners are untrained.
     -  Sensors do not meet collection or timeliness requirements.
     -  Processing is lagging far behind technology.
     -  Dissemination is slow and inefficient.
     The Navy and Marine Corps need to improve training and
procure enhanced digital technology for collection, processing
and transmission of imagery to overcome the shortfalls.
2.  Defining the Requirement.
     Why is imagery even an issue?  Put simply, in war as in any
other discipline, nothing answers a question as well as a
picture.  Imagery support is critical to the expeditionary
commander in determining opposing force composition and location,
detailing topographic and geographic features of operating areas
and lines of communication, and providing an accurate record of
action.1  Littoral warfare requires a high-resolution, all-
weather, day/night, broad-area, near-real-time imagery capability
to enable the three parts of the combat assessment (CA) process:
a) Targeting; b) Weaponeering and munitions effectiveness
assessment (MEA); and c) Battle-damage assessment (BDA).  This
capability must be responsive to short-fused tasking by tactical
commanders.2  Current national, theater and tactical imagery
systems cannot fulfill the Naval Services' requirements in a
major regional conflict.3  The shift away from open-ocean
operations and toward littoral warfare has accentuated these
deficiencies in imagery support to the warfighter.4
3.  Specific Problem Areas.
     A.  Sensors.
          l) National:  National sensors are a major source of
intelligence for national and theater customers, but are of
limited value to the tactical commander.  These sensors provide
information on denied areas (i.e. those which organic collection
assets cannot access due to rules of engagement, or high
personnel or political risk).5  Prior to Operation DESERT
SHIELD/STORM, the conventional wisdom was that national sensors
could fulfill the needs of the tactical commander.  Wartime
experience proved their inability to provide broad-area coverage,
and to meet enormous demands for collection from several
customers competing for limited assets.6  Due to their high cost,
funding for national systems will likely be reduced in the
future, further restricting their availability to a tactical
commander in a major regional conflict.7
          2) Tactical-Organic:  The Marine RF-4B, the USMC's only
tactical reconnaissance asset, was retired on the eve of the Gulf
War due to deteriorating material condition, low readiness, and
high maintenance.  At the time, a replacement was expected in
four years.  Stopgap reconnaissance pod systems for the AV-8B
were approved by Navy and OSD but were not funded by Congress.
Six 70mm cameras for the VMFA F/A-18's arrived in time for the
war, but were not used for various reasons, and have since been
     The Navy has the only current high-resolution, high-volume
imaging system available within the fleet today.  It is the
Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS), mounted on three
F-14 Tomcat fleet air superiority fighters per Carrier Air Wing.
TARPS was designed as a stopgap "band-aid" system to provide
baseline capability when the RA-5 and RF-8 were withdrawn from
service in the late 1970's.
     Like the RF-4B, TARPS is a photographic imaging system,
which requires extensive chemical and mechanical treatment; in
addition, it lacks standoff high-resolution and broad-area
capability.  The system is a) mounted on one of the scarce
fighter frames needed for CV self- and strike protection; b) the
low resolution forces the aircraft to be exposed to enemy air
defenses; and c) processing consumes a great deal of time and
material.  Carrier group commanders have until recently been
reluctant to provide extensive TARPS support to expeditionary
units when the CV is in a high-threat area, or when it has a
competing strike mission.8
     Potential successors have not yet reached the production
stage.  In 1985, SECNAV and SECAF agreed to pursue development of
an electro-optical system to follow TARPS, the F/A-l8's ATARS.
Initially scheduled for 1994, ATARS is now not due for
introduction to the fleet until 1998 at the earliest.  The only
other "organic support" available is a hand-held video or
photographic camera, which does not meet most expeditionary
     UAV's would be a practical and generally low-cost solution
for the tactical reconnaissance problem.  The two major obstacles
to rapid fielding of UAV's are:
	-	the political unviability of new system procurement
under current fiscal austerity.
	-	the congressional mandate placing all UAV development
and procurement under a joint program office.  After five years, the UAV
Joint Program Office has yet to field a single working airframe.  No new
afloat system has been approved.
     B.  Processing:  Chemical-mechanical processing is necessary
in any photographic system such as TARPS.  It requires trained
personnel and bulky, complicated and costly machinery; it poses
environmental and safety hazards; and it needs lots of water to
function properly.  This poses major sustainment problems aboard
ship and in remote locations.  Storage of large amounts of film
also places additional logistics demands on an already strained
     C.  Training:
          l) Staff Training:  A reconnaissance mission "will
never be better than its original tasking."9  During recent
operations including SHARP EDGE, DESERT STORM and RESTORE HOPE,
planning staffs ashore and afloat did not understand TARPS system
limitations or tactical requirements.  Even Air Wing staffs are
often unfamiliar with the planning requirements for
reconnaissance support to the ground mission.  Amphibious staffs
in the Pacific Fleet seldom train with their carrier
counterparts, with poor results in real-world operations.10
     The "customer" whom the upgrades would most benefit is
paradoxically one of the biggest obstacles.  The so-called
"operators" who control the purse strings have historically lent
lip service to tactical reconnaissance, but have done little to
support it.  They argue that "intelligence is not tactical"
because a collector does not physically put bombs on target.  In
an era of precision-guided munitions and limited funding, where
every shot has to count, the precise information which only
imagery can provide must be available at the tactical level.  A
cultural change is therefore just as necessary as a technological
     Wargames and exercises where these warfighting deficiencies
should become evident have failed to incorporate intelligence
collection and sensor capabilities into the decision process.
Currently, the role played by intelligence is restricted to
opposing force scenario creation and control, with little actual
play for sensor systems and collection management.  Commanders
and their staffs therefore assume that intelligence is a side
issue, which will be instantly available so they can decide their
weapons-system moves.  This peacetime-Navy artificiality leads to
a steep learning curve on intelligence asset management for both
the "operators" and intelligence officers when the commander is
faced with a real-world situation on deployment.
          2) Imagery Interpretation:  Imagery analysis and
exploitation are an integral part of the intelligence process.
Analysis requires highly trained interpreters with extensive
technical support.  There is currently a major shortfall in
adequately trained imagery analysts (IA's) in the Naval Service;
for example, Marine Fleet Imagery Interpretation Units (FIIU's)
are manned at  55% of end strength, and one of the three existing
FIIU's will be disestablished in FY94 due to force reductions.12
The Navy is hardly in better shape; CINCPACFLEET N2 has suggested
embarking USAF and USA interpreters to augment deploying units.13
Despite these shortages, the services have to provide
interpreters to Theater and National-level intelligence centers
to support CINCs and NCA, further straining the component's
ability to support the operator.  Additional interpreters are
made, not born; initial training requires fifteen weeks, with
frequent six-week refreshers.
     In addition to numbers, the problem is one of existing
training and specialization, since many of the Navy's imagery
interpreters were trained to read Soviet naval targets at the
expense of "Rest of the World" targets which are now of primary
interest.  They are skilled at strategic target readout but lack
adequate training in operational target analysis.  In some cases,
the required level of expertise may be beyond the capability of
schoolhouse training: CENTCOM requires USMC IA's to deploy on
carriers in their AOR because Navy IA's are reportedly unable to
understand scheme of maneuver and ground targets.14
     Community manpower management is also at fault: The Navy did
away with the Photo Interpreter (PI) rate in 1978, and created an
"Intelligence Specialist" (IS) rate.  The rating is better
defined as "Intelligence Generalist", since the breadth of
knowledge required for advancement even within the imagery
interpretation Navy Employment Code (NEC)15 forces the individual
to concentrate on areas other than his nominal area of expertise.
To make matters worse, photo interpretation is a highly
perishable skill, and the collateral duties of a sailor on a ship
make it difficult to do required training.16
     Reading out photographic imagery is physically demanding,
(eyestrain, exhaustion, back problems) and has changed very
little at the fleet level since its inception six decades ago.
The planned introduction of electro-optical (E-O) systems such as
ATARS, and of digitized imagery packages from theater
intelligence agencies will ease this somewhat - - - but not for the
next several years.
     D.  Connectivity:  For lack of anything better, a frequently
used method of imagery transfer is ship-to-ship or shore-to-ship
transfer of film packages by courier or airdrop, a costly and
time-consuming alternative.  It is also not feasible in rough
seas or when the ATF and CVBG are widely separated.
     Imagery transmission via radio circuits requires enormous
bandwidth17, and a high-quality printer at the receiving end.
The transmission process is slow (5-30 minutes/image) and there
is no dedicated circuit, so only a few images can be received
during the broadcast window.18  To transmit TARPS imagery to an
amphibious flagship (LHD, LHA, LPD or LPH classes), a carrier
must first develop the film, then digitize the images for
transmission via the Fleet Imagery Support Terminal (FIST).  Once
the "amphib" receives the image, the IA can manipulate and print
it.  Each step degrades resolution by about ten per cent for a
total of about forty per cent loss.  The result is often a
"fuzzygram" that is useless for planning, and time-late.
4.  Solutions.
     Answering operator requirements for imagery intelligence
will take creativity and careful judgment because of constrained
funding.  Most of the following proposed solutions would require
some initial cash outlay, but would eventually prove cheaper, and
provide better results.
     A.  Incorporation of Digital Technology.
          l) Collection Systems:  Airborne reconnaissance systems
must "go digital" now to save time, money, and image quality.20
This will require procurement of a new ship-launched and
retrieved low-cost system which does not compete directly with
ATARS development.  Only a UAV tailor-made for naval use would
meet all these requirements.  The congressional mandate forcing
all programs to undergo joint development must be rescinded to
allow greater flexibility by the service in the selection and
development process.  Off-the-shelf systems such as Teledyne-
Ryan's ARGUS which satisfy most requirements can be purchased
today at relatively low cost and made operationally capable
within eighteen months.
     UAV's present a compelling case.  They do not have the same
political or human risk as manned platforms.  They are organic to
the amphib user, rather than tied to a carrier, making them much
more responsive.  Recent advances in airframes and materials have
given them significantly increased range and endurance.
Miniaturized electronic components allow increased capability
with a small payload.  Opinion in OSD and Congress is quickly
moving in their favor.  The question about UAV's is no longer
"Why buy them?", but rather "Why haven't you bought them
          2)  Hand-held Systems:  In the hand-held arena, digital
systems can meet tactical requirements more effectively than
film-based systems, which they can replace promptly and at low
cost.  Both still and video digital cameras, with greatly
improved resolution over earlier models, are now available on the
market.  Each theater should purchase enough of these relatively
low-cost systems to ensure that deploying units are properly
     The Office of Naval Intelligence recently purchased one
video and three still cameras for deployment to Somalia for less
than $100,000.21  The equipment was compatible with CJTF
Somalia's intelligence computers, so the commander can display
and enhance his images instantly, transmit them via encrypted
channels to other units without quality degradation, and make
hardcopy quickly and cheaply on the system's printer.  Savings?
USS Tripoli, while processing the film for CJTF Somalia, required
$18,000 a month in supplies (not counting postage), uses large
amounts of scarce fresh water, produces copious chemical waste,
and takes 48 hours to process film due to personnel shortages and
exhaustion.  The product must be digitized before transmission,
with attendant degradation.  A photo lab ashore would have the
same requirements.  The digital system eliminates the recurring
expense, the water and chemical problem, the time delay and the
personnel requirement.
     The type of sensors and processors available also impacts
analysis personnel; digital processors remove much of the
guesswork from measurement and reduce operator exhaustion.  They
also allow great improvements in image manipulation and
enhancement.  Because digital sensors allow a transition to
digital processing without degradation, they would accelerate and
qualitatively improve analysis.  Advances in artificial
intelligence, such as pattern analysis programs, could
revolutionize the entire field and reduce manpower needs.
     B.  Improved Training.
          1)  Staff Education:  Pre-deployment staff training at
the Fleet Tactical Training Groups must bring together
intelligence representatives from all the deploying staffs.
Intelligence officers must educate their commanders and
"operator" colleagues about the combat-multiplier effect of
intelligence, and the role of intelligence in the planning
process and operational execution.22
     Joint and service military modeling and simulation need to
put intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination into the
wargaming and exercise process.  Some new automated systems
already include collection management and intelligence reporting.
Organizations that do not operate automated conflict-resolution
systems need to incorporate intelligence play into the process of
manual games as though it were another operational capability,
not a "given".
     Improved staff training and utilization methods can enhance
existing systems.  TARPS operations during PROVIDE COMFORT were
made more effective by planning teams which prepared entire
missions in advance for the aircrews, increased familiarity with
system parameters and reporting formats, and placing more
analysts at each workstation. (Whitworth: 36-37)
          2)  Imagery Analysis: The still-extant Cold War Navy
imagery interpretation training doctrine, centered on Soviet
naval and strategic targets, rather than on littoral targets,
must be changed.  Interpreters must be trained to recognize what
they are most likely to see --- Italian, French, British, and,
yes, U.S. ground, air and naval equipment --- in addition to
Soviet-style gear.  The Navy and Marine Intelligence Training
Center (NMITC) is making significant strides in this direction,
but additional improvement is required.
     To maintain the interpreters' level of expertise, the
Intelligence Specialist (IS) rating must be divided into at least
two rates: Imagery Interpreter and Intelligence Generalist.  A
less radical solution is to subdivide the IS rate along the same
lines as the Communications Technician (CT) rate, with sharply
defined technical specialization, rather than as it is now into
the more general Naval Employment Codes (NEC'S).  This would
preclude the current situation, where a highly trained specialist
performs unrelated administrative or technical tasks as his
principal assignments.
     A comprehensive afloat training package to keep these
perishable skills current will also improve efficiency.  A
project is under development by NMITC to compile a training
target-set using digital technology, allowing multiple views of a
single platform to be stored on a laser disc.  The trainee can
study ways to enhance an image, as well as process and report it,
while keeping up with recognition skills.  This system must be
embedded in the Naval Tactical Command System - Afloat (NTCS-A),
the backbone of naval shipboard automated systems, to ensure
fleet-wide dissemination, product support, and standardization.
     C.  Processing.
     Efficient digitization of TARPS film (to enable image
transmission) requires a $100,000 machine whose purchase is
currently under review.19  Such a digital-TARPS based solution
must be viewed strictly as a temporary "band-aid"; otherwise, it
could doom the troubled ATARS program and leave the services with
a stop-gap, second-rate imager based on an airframe which will be
obsolete by 1997.
     The Joint Services Imagery Processing System (JSIPS) and
NTCS-A Imagery Exploitation Work Station (NIEWS) are approved for
purchase and will be operational soon.  Together, they will
satisfy digital processing requirements afloat.  The Navy and
Marines must ensure that a digital imagery data base is created
from the current film-based systems by the imagery processing
centers at the Joint Intelligence Centers so that these machines
can be fully employed.
     D.  Dissemination.
     The Navy must drastically increase available bandwidth for
deployed units, by launching satellites and providing
communications antennas.  The intelligence and C4 communities
must work together to ensure future systems can process high data
rates.  Due to determined Marine Corps C4I and CNO N6/N2
prompting, a higher-bandwidth capable system (JDISS) and
supporting communications (4800 bps) are being installed on
deploying amphib flagships.23  The system is working far below
its capacity even with the higher transmission rate.
     A high-capacity satellite antenna has been programmed for
CV's and LHD's, but this alone will not solve the problem.  The
price of commercial satellite time ($80,000 plus a month per
9600bps channel), coupled with the increasing demand for high-
data-rate transmission, makes it imperative for the services to
deploy their own communications satellites soon.  Ideal
transmission capability would be a T1 line, which carries one
Megabit (a million bps) and could be shared by a multitude of
users.  Higher-bandwidth satellites would therefore support not
just imagery transmission, but also dozens of data-intensive
functions resident in NTCS-A and dedicated systems.
     All future imagery processing and dissemination systems
used by the different services must be interoperable to allow
free communication between them.  In the past, interoperability
standards have been repeatedly waived.  This solution will be
difficult and costly to implement at first, but it must be
rigidly adhered to.  The alternative is the same chaos that
occurred during DESERT STORM, when no less than eight different
systems were deployed.
     In conclusion, the solutions postulated here for the
tactical imagery problem range from the simple and relatively
inexpensive (hand-held digital cameras and improved training) to
the complex and costly (satellite launches).  The common thread
running through them is that they all cry out for immediate
implementation to remedy critical support deficiencies to the
littoral warfighter.
1.	FMFM  3-21,  MAGTF  Intelligence  Operations.  Quantico, VA:
Marine Corps Command Development Center, 91.  Chapters 9 and 10 state 
intelligence requirements to build an accurate intelligence estimate 
and carry out "intelligence preparation of the battlefield."  Without
organic imagery support, it would be extremely difficult to perform
either of these functions.
2.	Jenkins, MajGen Harry W., Jr. "Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities: Report From the Director of Intelligence." Marine  Corps
Gazette September 92: 17.
3.	Starr, Barbara. "TARPS Was Weak Link in BDA."  Jane's Defence
Weekly 3 August 91: 190.  The article quotes then Director of Naval 
Intelligence RADM T.A. Brooks as saying that TARPS was "totally inadequate", 
and cites the Pentagon's interim report to Congress as "highlighting the 
problems in gathering reconnaissance data".
4.	"De-Briefing on Naval Air Power in Gulf Shows Weapons Worked,
Recon Didn't." Article.  Inside the Navy 25 March 91: 2.
5.	Chandler, David L. "Satellites, Planes, Play Big Targeting Role." 
Boston Globe 14 February 91: 15.  The article quotes renegade author 
Jeffrey Richelson extensively, as he details capability estimates for
highly classified U.S. reconnaissance systems.
6.	Clayton, CWO2 Steven B.  "Marine Corps Imagery Support."  Marine 
Corps Gazette September 91: 26.  The actual quote reads, "For too many 
years our... officers have gone to such schools as Command and Staff College
and have been deceived... as to how much a national system can support the
ground commander."
7.	"Spooked Over Intelligence Cuts." Editorial. New York Times 18 March
93: 22.
8.	RADM Hancock, Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group ONE, briefed "RANGER'S
Last Ride," the first "expeditionary deployment of the '...From the Sea'
era" in the Pentagon on 5 March 1993.  He detailed the major role played by
TARPS throughout the deployment, especially in support of expeditionary 
forces in Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia.  RANGER also provided significant
imagery processing and distribution services for the landing forces ashore. 
At the time, RESTORE HOPE was the carrier's top operational priority, and 
the CV operated in a low-threat environment; its relief on-station, USS 
KITTY HAWK, departed the area shortly after arrival due to commitments
in the Persian Gulf, leaving the Landing Force with greatly reduced 
9.	Whitworth, LTJG F.D. "Improving Tactical Photo Reconnaissance... Today." 
Naval Intelligence Quarterly  Summer 92: 35.
10.	RADM Hancock stated in his 5 March 93 debrief that the PHIBRON staff
and the CJTF staff ashore "had no idea" how to plan the numerous TARPS 
missions the Air Wing flew in support of RESTORE HOPE, in large part because 
of lack of advance training.  The carrier staff had to "be imaginative" in 
its tasking and try to figure out on its own the collection requirements
of the amphibious staff.
11.	McTernan, LtCol Walter F. III. "Intelligence: You Get What You Pay
For." Marine Corps Gazette  March 92: 23.
12.	COL Mammarella of MCCDC presented these figures at a Community Management
Briefing during the USMC C4I Conference, held at the Sheraton National
Hotel, Arlington, VA 23-25 February 1993.
13.	CAPT Nelson Litsinger, CPF N2, in 4 March 1993 Pentagon discussion
with CDR Jim McKee of CNO N20 (Intelligence Plans, Policy, Programs and 
14.	Whitworth: 36, states assigning "a Marine or Army photo interpreter...to
the CVIC should be a prerequisite." LT Maria Lyles, CENTCOM (Rear) J20, in
phone conversation, 5 February 1993, stated that assignment of Marine IA's 
to CVIC's is now official CENTCOM policy.
15.	The USN equivalent of the USMC's Military Occupational Specialty
or MOS
16.	CDR Pete Hull, former CCDG N2A for RESTORE HOPE and CVW Intelligence
Officer for DESERT STORM, commented 18 March 1993 that collateral duties 
"like buffing decks often seemed to be the main job of the sailors and the
main priority of the CVIC officer."
17.	A minimum of 2400 bits per second (BPS), preferably via a low-interference
band such as UHF SATCOM.  HF-band use in the late 1970's and early 1980's
was highly unsatisfactory.  A major problem for afloat units is that most 
of their data circuits are 75bps, with only two or four 4800 or 2400 bps 
circuits aboard a major vessel.
18.	Imagery transmission to afloat units is usually on the Commander's 
Privacy Net, leading to constant frequency-share allocation turf battles.
19.	The Prototype Imagery Exploitation System (PIES) would be deployed
on all carriers.
20.	Putting digital backs on TARPS cameras, an idea advanced in an earlier 
solution paper, is not feasible because there is no aircraft-capable digital
tape recorder on the market with the required data rate (120-240 Megabits
per second).
21.	CAPT David Bishop, of JDISS Program Office at Naval Maritime 
Intelligence Center, phone call January 1993.
22.	 Recent assessment wargames have gone some way to correct this
deficiency; tactical reconnaissance assets were three of the top ten 
priorities for combat capability upgrades in the CNO- level Joint Littoral 
Warfare Assessment and the Surveillance Joint Mission Assessment for the
Navy, and figured prominently at the CNO/CMC/SECNAV "Force 2001"
Assessment in March 1993.
23.	JDISS is the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System, whose 
afloat version currently uses 4800 or 9600 bps of a 32K bps SHF circuit.
Programmed afloat versions will require up to a T1 line.
1.	"De-Briefing on Naval Air Power in Gulf Shows Weapons Worked,
Recon Didn't." Article.  Inside the Navy 25 March 91: 2.
2.	"Possible Enhancements to USMC Tactical Reconnaissance Capabilities".
Information Memorandum.  CMC/C4I. November 92.
3.	"Questions From The Assistant Chief of Staff C412 on Tactical
Reconnaissance." Information Paper.  CMC/APW-61 10 April 91.
4.	"Spooked Over Intelligence Cuts." Editorial.   New York Times 18 March 93: 22.
5.	Chandler, David L.  "Satellites, Planes, Play Targeting Role." Boston
Globe 14 February 91: 16.
6.	Clayton, CWO2 Steven B.  "Marine Corps Imagery Support."  Marine 
Corps Gazette September 91: 26.
7.	CNO/N889 (Tactical Reconnaissance) Program Office. "ATARS Programmatic
Options." Flag Officer Review Brief.  March 93.
8.	FMFM 3-21,  MAGTF Intelligence Operations.  Quantico, VA: Marine 
Corps Combat Development Command, 91.  Chapters 9 and 10.
9.	Fulghum, David A.  "Desert Storm Highlights Need for Rapid Tactical 
Intelligence."  Jane's Defence Weekly 11 February 91: 18-19
10.	Gutmann, Major Christopher P. "The Lessons Learned of Tactical
Reconnaissance." Marine Corps Gazzette September 91: 33-34.
11.	Hancock, RADM T.   "Ranger's Last Ride."  Post-deployment Debrief 
to CNO.  5 March 93.
12.	Holycross, COL Thomas.  "Joint Systems Imagery Processing System."
Information briefing.  Boston, MA: JSIPS PMO, 92.
13.	Intelligence Systems Handbook.  Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, March 93.
14.	Jenkins, MajGen Harry W., Jr. "Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities: Report From the Director of Intelligence",  Marine Corps
Gazette September 92: 17.
15.	Jenquin, Mike.  "Comparison of Film-based and Electro-optical
System Resolution." Monograph.  Pensacola, FL: Naval Air Training Center,
14 February 92.
16.	Keller, Major Russell A. "Intelligence Is a Team Sport." Marine
Corps Gazette March 92: 16.
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For."  Marine Corps Gazette  March 92: 23.
18.	Maynard, Lt Col Robert.  "Joint Deployable Intelligence Support
System: The Standard for Interoperability." Information Brief.  Suitland, MD:
JDISS Program Office, NAVMIC 10 February 93.
19.	Perkins, RADM J. "MPF Operations in RESTORE HOPE."  Post-deployment
Debrief to CNO. 1 February 93.
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Following personnel were interviewed or provided assistance for background 
material on this paper:
CNO/N2O (Intelligence Plans, Policy, Programs and Requirements):
	CDR James H. McKee (N20X1 Data & Surveillance Systems)
	LCDR Santiago R. Neville (N20X6, Expeditionary Warfare)
CNO/N889 (Tactical Reconnaissance):
	CAPT Larry Long, USMC
	CAPT Dave Bishop, USMC (ONI 7113)

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