Aerial Reconnaissance: A Dedicated Squadron
CSC 1993
SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Aerial Reconnaissance: A Dedicated Squadron
Author: Major Wayne E. Breakfield, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: Although the OV-10 Bronco must be replaced, the
Marine Observation Squadrons must be retained for the
support and expertise they provide.
Background: With the probability of confIict shifting
towards the low intensity end of the spectrum the
requirement for a dedicated observation squadron still
exists. The deactivation of Marine Observation Squadrons
creates a gap in aviation support to the MAGTF that attack
helicopter and fighter/attack squadrons can not fill.
Attack aircraft crews lack the expertise to accomplish the
mission and are already overtasked. Additionally, flight
characteristics of attack helicopters and fighter attack
jets make them unsuitable for the observation mission.
Recommendation: To ensure continued tactical aerial
reconnaissance and supporting arms coordination support,
Marine Observation Squadrons must not only be retained but
also equipped with modern aircrait designed to accomplish
the observation mission.
OUTLINE
Thesis: Although the OV-10 Bronco must be replaced, the
Marine Observation Squadrons must be retained for the
support and expertise they provide.
I. Marine Observation Squadrons support to the MAGTF
A. Tasks
B. Unique crew composition
II. lnability of attack helicopter and
fighter/attack squadrons to adequately
perform observation mission
A. Insufficient ground combat arms experience
B. Lower priority of observation mission
C. Fight characteristics of helicopters and jets
D. Improper avionics
Ill. Requirement for an observation squadron
A. Dedicated to the mission
B. Higher probability of low-to-mid intensity conflict
IV. V-10 replacement
A. Flight characteristics
B. Avionics
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE: A DEDICATED SQUADRON
The United States entered the age of aerial
reconnaissance during the Civil War. Both the Union and
Confederate armies used hydrogen balloons to provide
tactical reconnaissance to their commanders. By carrying a
telegraph line aloft, an observer could adjust artillery or
provide intelligence about troop movements. (8:12) After the
invention of airplanes. aerial reconnaissance became more
flexible during World War One. Observers, free to move over
the battlefield, provided information about enemy units,
defensive trenches, and massing of enemy forces for an
attack. The Marine Corps deployed Marine Observation
Squadron One to Nicaragua in 1927 to support 2nd Battalion,
5th Marines. In addition to providing aerial
reconnaissance, VMO-1 flew close air support. medevac, and
resupply missions.(5:101) Since their establishment, Marine
Observation Squadrons have reduced the commander' s
uncertainty by providing tactical, aerial furnishing
detailed information of critical times and places.
Marine Observation (VMO) Squadrons provide valuable
support to the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAG TF).
Support provided includes day and night aerial
reconnaissance, Forward air control airborne (FACA)
Tactical air coordinator airborne (TACA), artillery and naval
gunfire air spot, radio relay, light attack, and other
utility missions. Although the OV-10 bronco must be
replaced the Marine Observation Squadrons must be retained
for the support and expertise they provide. Deactivating
Observation squadrons will create serious deficiencies in
support provided by the wing to the MAGTF.
The deactivation of the Marine Observation squadrons
creates a gap in aviation support. Attack helicopter and
all weather fighter attack squadrons can not provide
adequate support because of lack of crew expertise, other
priority missions and aircraft unsuitability. Even a
cursory examination of existing missions and training
syllabi exposes the flawed concept of tasking these overly
committed airframes with more missions. Air frame
limitations of both strike aircraft and helicopters also
make them unsuitable as an OV-10 replacement.
One of the first points to consider is the VMO
squadron' s unique crew composition of a naval aviator and a
Supporting Arms Coordinator (SAC) or an Aerial Observer
(AO) . The crew furnishes expertise essential to
accomplishing the observation mission. Each SAC or AO
begins aviation training only after completing a ground
combat arms tour. His ground background combined with the
pilot's aviation expertise forms a team unparalleled in the
Marine Aircraft Wing. This crew, the smallest of MAGTFs,
often functions as a critical link between ground units and
aviation assets. The observation crew, drawing on their
combined expertise, matches the proper aviation support to
the situation.
Attack helicopters and strike aircraft crews do not
bring this same level of expertise to the observation
mission. Two pilots man the attack helicopter the AH-1W
Cobra. A naval aviator and a naval flight officer flew the
fighter/attack jet the F/A-18D Hornet. These Marines take
their responsibilities seriously and train diligently toward
their missions. However, no requirement exists for these
marines to serve a tour as a ground combat arms officer
prior to flight training. The training received at The
Basic School also does not develop the expertise in ground
operations acquired by an officer serving a tour in the
fleet Marine forces. Aviators without significant
experience in ground operations simply cannot provide the
detailed support available from an observation squadron.
Another factor to consider is primary tasking for
mission accomplishment. Observation squadrons fulfill their
mission by accomplishing two primary tasks: tactical aerial
reconnaissance and supporting arms coordination.(3:46) The
training and readiness (T&R) syllabus reflects the
squadrons priority by dedicating 56 percent of their
training toward these two tasks.(4:1122) Expertise in
performing this mission comes only long hours of dedicated
training conducted by a squadron focused on accomplishing
this mission. The VMO squadron trains for and performs
other assigned tasks, but its priority remains aerial
reconnaissance and supporting arms coordination.
FMFM 5-1, Organization and Functions of Marine
Aviation, tasks attack helicopter squadrons with performing
aerial reconnaissance and supporting arms coordination.
however, their primary mission is to provide anti-armor
support and close in fire suppression to the MAGTF.(3:4-17)
The squadron' s T&R syllabus reflects its priority by
allocating only six percent of the syllabus for observation
mission training. With so little training allocated to
performing aerial reconnaissance and supporting arms
coordination, the support provided by an attack helicopter
squadron will not compare favorably to similar support
furnished by a dedicated VMO squadron.
Like the attack helicopter squadron. the all weather
fiqhter/attack squadron's priorities are not aerial
reconnaissance and supporting arms coordination. FMFM 5-1
tasks them with providing day and night under the weather
offensive air support. Training for their primary mission
occupies 33% of the T&R syllabus. However only 7.2% of the
syllabus is devoted to the mission of supporting arms
coordination and visual reconnaissance. (4:121-122) By the
time aircrews finish air-to-air intercepts, low altitude
training, and carrier qualifications, little time remains
for developing expertise in supporting arms coordination and
reconnaissance. Limited numbers of fighter/attack squadrons,
performing critical and highly visible close air support
missions, will find it difficult to make time to train for
and accomplish the deactivated VMO squadron's mission.
Further, the observation mission requires an airframe
that can cruise at medium altitudes and medium airspeeds for
extended periods of time. The AH-1W and F/A-18Ds
limitations in speed, altitude, time-on-station, and
avionics make both aircraft poor replacements for the OV-10.
For example, the AH-1W is designed to fly low and
relatively slow. The AH-1W's maximum speea of 190 knots
makes it too slow to accomplish the observation mission and
survive. The AH-1W lacks sufficient speed to allow its crew
to dash into and safely out of areas requiring aerial
surveillance. The AH-1W flies too slowly to rapidly
relocate from one area on the battlefield to another. Also
as the AH-1W climbs, its maneuverability decreases making it
more susceptible to anti-aircraft weapons.
Like otner fighters, the F/A-18D is designed to fly at
super-sonIc speeds. In order to accomplish the observation
mission the F/A-18D would have to fly at an uncomfortably
slow speed limiting its maneuverability and increasing its
susceptibility to anti-aircraft weapons. Furthermore,
flying at medium altitudes will decrease the F/A-18D's
time-on-station through increased fuel consumption. Due to
decreased maneuverability and increased susceptibility,
neither of these aircraft would survive on the modern
battlefield attempting to perform the missions of the VMO
squadron.
Time on station is critical for accomplishing the
observation mission. Observation squadrons developed a
relationship with ground units by staying on station for
four or more hours. Neither the AH-1W nor the F/A-18D
remain airborne long enough to build the situational
awareness required to support ground units. The AH-1W
carrying a typical ordnance load can remain aloft for two
hours: the F/A-18D stays airborne one hour and 45
minutes.(2:360:439, 6, 7) The F/A-18D can extend its time
on station by aerial refueling, but the crew still loses
situational awareness when leaving to refuel. Trying to
replace the OV-10 with tne AH-1W or the F/A-18D will not
work because neither aircraft has sufficient on station
time.
The avionics in the OV-10D provide capabilities not
available with the AH-1W and F/A-18D. The OV-10 has four
radios: the AH-1W and F/A-18D each have only two radios and
neither is a high frequency radio necessary for
communicating on some supporting arms nets. Unlike the
OV-10, neither the AH-1W nor the F/A-18D is equipped with a
LASER designator for target marking. Further, the AH-1W and
F/A-:18D lack an integral Forward Looking Infrared (FLlR)
system and rely on the less capable night vision goggles for
night reconnaissance. The F/A-18D carries a FLIR pod, but
the squadrons have insufficient FLIR pods to equip all
aircraft (2:36O:439)
Does the Marine Corps need an observation squadron?
Why can not it accomplish the mission with the observation
support provided by the fighter/attack and attack helicopter
squadrons? Although all combat forces need sound tactical
intelligence, forces fighting low to mid-intensity conflicts
or executing peace-making or peace-keeping missions are even
more dependent on current, tactical information for mission
accomplishment. Observation squadron crews are dedicated to
providing the combat information commanders require for
making expeditious but sound decisions. Attack squadrons
provide observation support as a secondary or tertiary
mission: their primary mission, steel on target, takes
priority. The finely honed skills of observation crews will
save Marine s lives by providing timely combat intelligence
or supporting arms coordination.
Political unrest, illegal drug production and
smuggling, and ethnic wars indicate that no shortage of
potential conflicts. Disaster relief also provides
opportunities for Marines to be deployed to crisis areas.
Recent Marine deployments to Somalia, Bangledesh, Panama,
Greneda, and Iraq demonstrate America's resolve to continue
her role as a world leader. The United States, as a world
leader, must maintain the ability to respond with an
appropriate force across the spectrum of conflict.
The world is more unstable now than it was four years
ago. However, future conflicts will probably occur at the
low-to-medium level of the spectrum. The Vietnam War,
another low intensity conflict, validated the need for a
dedicated observation squadron and platform. Super-power
influence that prevented wars between satellite states, like
the war for control of Bosnia-Herzegovina, no longer exists.
An observation squadron enhances effective and efficient
employment of all MAGTF assets in low intensity conflicts.
The deactivation of the Marine Observation squadron
creates a gap in support for the MAGTF. Relegating the
functions of the VMO squadron as secondary tasks to heavily
tasked squadrons, like the all weather fighter/attack
squadrons and attack helicopter squadrons, ensures less than
optimum performance of the observation mission. Only a
squadron dedicated to the mission of tactical reconnaissance
and supporting arms coordination ensures proficient crews
dedicated to the accomplishment of the mission.
Just as the OV-10 was built with off-the-shelf
technology, its replacement, using current technology- could
be built and fielded at relatively low cost. Mission
parameters will dictate the aircraft's physical capabilities
and avionics. Mission accomplishment and survivability
require an aircraft with a cruise speed of 275 knots, a
loiter speed of 200 knots, a dash speed of 400 knots, on
station time 3.5 hours, and an aerial refueling
capability for self deployment. Like other Marine tactical
aircraft, this replacement must be ship-board compatible.
While mission parameters drive a modern aircraft's
performance characteristics, anti-aircraft weapons influence
an aircraft's design from a survivabilty perspective. To
perform the observation mission, an aircraft must fly in
harms way. Modern technology for reducing susceptability,
such as chaff/flare buckets, signature reduction, and
maneuverability must be designed in not added on. Also, to
reduce vulnerability, component placing and redundancy along
with shielding techniques, must be designed into modern
aircraft. Combat survivability must be built into any
aircraft expected to operate on the modern battlefield; the
OV-10s replacement can be no exception.(1:3-4)
The OV-10's replacement must also provide light attack
support and therefore must be capable of carrying a variety
of general purpose ordnance. Additionally, the airframe
must be capable of carrying laser-guided Hellfire or
Maverick Missiles. These weapons not only destroy enemy
equipment but can also be used as precision marks for strike
aircraft. The plane should also mount a 20mm cannon in place
of the OV-10's four 7.62mm machine guns.
Additionally, situational awareness is critical to
mission accomplishment. Modern avionics can provide the
communications capability, day and night optics, and
position information necessary for crews to maintain
situational awareness. Using off-the-shelf avionics
systems, a properly equipped aircraft will effectively
accomplish the observation mission well into the next
century.
The three AN/ARC-182 multi-band radios with appropriate
encryption devices and one enciphered high frequency radio
provide sufficient communications to accomplish the
observation mission. Integrated through a cockpit
management system, the aircrew can maintain a high degree of
situational awareness while coordinating supporting arms
with distant fire support coordination agencies. The system
would also support cross band and inband automatic radio
relay for ground or airborne units.
Modern electro-optics provide day and night, long range
target acquisition and identification. Combining a laser
designator for target marking with a FLIR/electro-optic
camera, allows the crew to provide enhanced support for day
and night visual reconnaissance and coordination of close
air support missions. A simple ground mapping radar would
enhance target location and all weather operations.
Avionics and human engineering combined into a modern
cockpit allow aircrews to effectively manage vast amounts of
information and provide effective support without becoming
bogged down in information overload.
With the probability of conflict shifting towards the
low intensity end of the spectrum, the requirement for a
dedicated observation squadron still exists. The
deactivation of Marine Observation squadrons creates a gap
in aviation support to the MAGTF that attack hel icopter and
fighter/attack squadrons can not fill. Attack aircraft
crews lack the expertise to accomplish the mission and are
already overtasked. Additionally, flight characteristics of
attack helicopters and fighter attack jets make them
unsuitable for the observation mission. To ensure continued
tactical aerial reconnaissance and supporting arms
coordination support, Marine Observation Squadrons must be
equipped with modern aircraft design to accomplish the
observation mission
Bibliography
1. Ball, Robert E. The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability
Analysis and Design. New York, New York: American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics, INC, 1985
2. Jane's All the World's Aircraft Coulsdon, Surrey, United Kingdom:
Jane's Information Group, 1991.
3. FMFM 5-1 Organization and Function of Marine Aviation. Quantico,
Virginia Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1991.
4. Marine Corps Order P35O0.15c Training and Readiness Manual Volume 3.
Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1991
5. Simmons, BGen Edwin H. The United States Marine Corps 1775-1975.
New York, New York: The Viking Press, Inc, 1976.
6. Speer, Maj Jeffery L. Interview, Command and Staff College, March
1993.
7. Stockwell, Maj Harmon A. Interview, Command and Staff College,
February and March 1993.
8. Timpe, Lt Col Earl W. "Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance in Decline,"
Marine Corps Gazette Dec 92: 12-14.
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