A New Pair Of Dimes For The Intelligence Community
CSC 1993
SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: A New Pair of Dimes for the Intelligence Community
Author: Major Richard W. Britton, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The real issue concerning the community is its
failure to properly support the commander with timely and useful
information by adopting the concepts of maneuver warfare. The
solution, therefore, is to change the doctrine of the
intelligence community to reflect the concepts of maneuver
warfare thereby supporting the commander with timely and useful
information.
Background: In reviewing lessons learned from recent
military operations, a common theme among most commanders is the
lack of intelligence support. The intelligence community can
change this situation by:
a. Refining the intelligence doctrine to reflect the
concepts of maneuver warfare.
b. Adopting the principles of the logistic community which
emphasize providing the commander with timely support.
c. Adopting the concept of the logistical combat service
support detachments which provides task organized support to a
designated unit.
The intelligence needed to win on today's modern battlefield is
obtainable, but currently it doesn't always get to the right
person, at the right place, at the right time.
Recommendation: The Marine Corps should refine the
doctrine for intelligence to reflect the concepts of maneuver
warfare.
A NEW PAIR OF DIMES FOR THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
OUTLINE
Thesis: The real issue concerning the intelligence
community is its failure to properly support the commander with
timely and useful information by adopting the concepts of
maneuver warfare. The solution, therefore, is to change the
doctrine of the intelligence community to reflect the concepts of
maneuver warfare thereby supporting the commander with timely and
useful information.
I. Correct view of the intelligence community
A. Brigadier General Van Riper's statement
B. Rene' Descartes' method of inquiry
C. Defining intelligence community's objective
II. Review of doctrinal statements in FMFM 3-21 Marine Air
Ground Tactical Force Intelligence Operations
A. Foundation of intelligence
B. Intelligence as combat support
C. Objective for intelligence
D. Mission of intelligence
III. Compare principles of intelligence and logistics
A. Responsiveness
B. Usefulness
C. Simplicity
D. Timeliness
E. Flexibility
F. magination
G. Economy
H. Attainability
I. Sustainability
J. Security
K. Survivability
IV. Concept of intelligence support detachments
A. Logistical system of combat service support detachments
B. Intelligence use of support detachments
V. Refinement of doctrine for intelligence community
A. Intelligence community needs to think about re-writing its doctrine
B. Doctrine Center should help intelligence community re-write its doctrine
A NEW PAIR OF DIMES FOR THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
After every major conflict there is always a debate over
what really were the lessons learned. Operation Desert Storm
is not any different in that regard from any previous conflict.
One of the major debates resulting from Desert Storm concerns
tactical intelligence.
In 1991, Brigadier General Van Riper published an article
in the Marine Corps Gazette stating, "... the weakest area that
he observed (in Operation Desert Storm) was tactical
intelligence."(14:30) This article has brought about a
flourish of additional articles, all explaining why Brigadier
General Van Riper's assessment of the situation was either
slightly or totally flawed. Although all the articles had some
merit and ideas that should be taken into account, they all
missed the real issue concerning intelligence within the Marine
Corps. The real issue concerning the intelligence community is
its failure to properly support the commander with timely and
useful information by adopting the concepts of maneuver
warfare. The solution therefore is to change the doctrine of
the intelligence community to reflect the concepts of maneuver
warfare thereby supporting the commander with timely and useful
information. By giving the intelligence community a new
paradigm to work with, the Doctrine Center will provide the
intelligence community the proper focus it needs in order to
operate in future military operations.
The discussion about what the intelligence community needs
to change or refine in its doctrine will be in four distinct
parts. The first part will be a very brief and basic
discussion of the nature of war, the basic objective of the
commander in combat using the concepts of maneuver warfare, and
how the intelligence community can help the commander achieve
his objective. The second part of the discussion will be about
doctrinal statements that do not aid the intelligence community
in supporting the commander in combat using the concepts of
maneuver warfare. The third part of the discussion will be a
comparison of intelligence and logistical principles and how
adopting the principles of the logistical community might help
facilitate the intelligence community in adopting the concepts
of maneuver warfare to better support the commander in combat.
The fourth part of the discussion is the concept of task
organized intelligence support detachments that will facilitate
the dissemination of timely and useful information to the unit
that is the focus of the main effort during combat operations.
PART ONE
NATURE OF WAR
The intelligence community will need to use a method of
inquiry to guide it in its search for the development of
certain "truths" on which to base its doctrine. One proven
method of inquiry is the concept developed by Rene' Descartes,
a 17th century philosopher, in his work titled Rules for the
Direction of the Mind.(15:35) Several of Descartes' rules will
be used in developing the following discussion of the need to
change the doctrine for the intelligence community.
War is very complex. To try to rewrite the entire doctrine
for the intelligence community supporting the commander in war
would be an undertaking beyond the scope of this discussion.
The discussion will, therefore, concentrate on changing a few
doctrinal statements and the current principles of the
intelligence community to provide the community with a better
focus in supporting the commander. As the first rule of
Descartes states, "The end of study should be to direct the
mind toward the enunciation of sound and correct judgments on
all matters that come before it."(l5:35) It is the hope of the
author that the recommended changes to the doctrine of the
intelligence community direct it to sound and correct
judgements.
In order for the intelligence community to properly
understand the role it plays in supporting the commander, it
must first understand the basic nature of war and what the
commander is trying to accomplish in war. As Descartes once
wrote,
We ought to turn the whole force of our minds
to the smallest and simplest things, and to
stop there for a long time, until we become
accustomed clearly and distinctly to intuit the
truth. (10:40)
By understanding the basic concepts of war the intelligence
community can "clearly and distinctly" define the role it plays
in supporting the commander on the battlefield. By
understanding the "smallest and simplest" concepts of war, the
intelligence community will be able to correctly change its
doctrine to properly support the commander using the concepts
of maneuver warfare.
In trying to understand the smallest and simplest concepts
of war, the place to start the inquiry is to define war. The
intelligence community can use the definition of war as stated
in FMFM-1 Warfighting. War is defined, in Warfighting, as,
... a state of hostilities that exists between
or among nations, characterized by the use of
military force. The essence of war is a
violent clash between two hostile, independent,
and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose
itself on the other.(4:3)
This definition is certainly adequate for the intelligence
community to use as a starting point in its inquiry to
understand the nature of war in order to properly develop its
doctrine.
Following Descartes' method of inquiry the next step is,
To distinguish the simplest things from those
which are complex, and to follow them out in
order, it is necessary, in every sequence of
things in which we have directly deduced
certain truths from others, to observe what
constituent has the greatest simplicity, and in
what way all the others are more or less or
equally removed from it.(10:26)
Equipped with a definition of war, the next step in, the "...
sequence of things in which we directly deduce certain truths
..," is to determine what the commander is trying to
accomplish in war. Clausewitz defined the commander's
objective in war as the act of force to compel our enemy to do
our will.(3:75) The commander's focus of effort throughout the
continuum of the operation or campaign is thus to compel the
enemy to do his will. By understanding this basic concept, the
intelligence community can start to determine what information
is useful to the commander when he is determining actions
required to compel the enemy to do his will.
The next concept the intelligence community needs to
understand in, "... the sequence of things...," is the manner
in which the commander is going to compel the enemy to do his
will. The Marine Corps, according to FMFM-1 Warfighting, plans
on using the concepts of maneuver warfare to compel the enemy
to do its will.(4:58)
Maneuver warfare is defined as, "the generation of a faster
operational tempo than the enemy to gain a temporal
advantage."(4:58) It is through maneuver in both dimensions
(time and space) that an inferior force can achieve decisive
superiority at the necessary time and place. The essence then
of maneuver warfare is to defeat the enemy by forcing him to
react to our actions in a manner most advantageous to us. Sun
Tzu best described this concept as, "... those skilled in war
bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought
there by him. "(13:96)
The next concept in, "... the sequence of things ...", the
intelligence community needs to understand is exactly how the
commander executes the concept of maneuver in time and space
to, ". . bring the enemy to the field of battle." The
commander maneuvers through time and space in order to defeat
the enemy by outthinking his opponent and then taking advantage
of situations as they are presented. If warfare could be
simplified to one simple concept, it would be that war is a
contest of the intellect. FMFM-1 Warfighting best states this
concept as,
The essence of the problem (for the commander
in war) is to select a promising course of
action (based on timely and useful information
provided by intelligence) with an acceptable
degree of risk, and to do it more quickly than
our foe.(4:70)
The objective, therefore, for the intelligence community is to
provide the commander with timely and useful information in
order for him to outthink his opponent in both dimensions of
time and space or as FMFM-1 Warfighting best states this as,
"fighting smart."(4:77) The concept of fighting smart is the
essence of what the doctrine of the intelligence community
needs to reflect.
The objective of the intelligence community is to aid the
commander to fight smart. A quick review of lessons learned
from recent military operations reveal that most commanders
perceive the intelligence community as not adequately
supporting them in their objective of fighting smart. (8:103)
One of the contributory causes to this situation is the
doctrine of the intelligence community. The doctrine does not
properly focus on supporting the commander with timely and
useful information in order for him to outthink his opponent in
both dimensions of time and space. Thus the current doctrine
of the intelligence community directly leads to the situation
of the intelligence community not providing adequate support to
the commander.
PART TWO
INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE
FMFM 3-21, Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
Intelligence Operations, contains a discussion of the doctrine
for intelligence. The doctrine for intelligence does not
reflect the concepts of maneuver warfare that the rest of the
Marine Corps has adopted. The following will be a brief
discussion of a few doctrinal statements that should be refined
to facilitate the operation of the intelligence community in
supporting the commander, who is using the concepts of maneuver
warfare, during combat operations.
On page 1-1 of FMFM 3-21, MAGTF Intelligence Operations,
paragraph 1001, states, "Intelligence is the foundation on
which the operational effort is built." This statement seems
to be in direct conflict with Clausewitz who proposes the
operational effort is built on the political effort.(3:90)
FMFM-1 Warfighting states, "The policy aim is the motive for
war must also be the foremost determinant for the conduct of
war."(4:19) Intelligence should support the commander in his
pursuit of the conduct of war and is not the foundation on
which the operational effort is built. The statement,
"Intelligence is the foundation on which the operational effort
is built," should be eliminated because it does not directly
reflect the concepts of maneuver warfare.
The second sentence of the previously mentioned paragraph
states, "Intelligence is not a combat support function." This
sentence obviously contributes to the perceptions most
commanders have of the intelligence community, especially if
the community strongly expounds this concept that it is not a
support function. The intelligence community needs to drop
this line of thinking and adopt one more like the philosophy of
the logistical community.
FMFM 4-1, Combat Support Operations states,
Logistics is the science of planning and
effecting the development, deployment, and
sustainability of national and/or multinational
military resources in support of national
policy, strategy and objectives. (7:2)
For the intelligence community a comparable statement could be,
intelligence is the science of collecting, analyzing and
disseminating useful information affecting the development,
deployment and employment of national and/or multinational
military forces in support of national policy, strategy and
objectives.
In adopting a statement like this in its doctrine, the
intelligence community would be able to start changing the
perceptions held by most commanders concerning the intelligence
community. Most commanders in the Marine Corps do not doubt
the intent of the logistical community to provide support and
one of the reasons is the logistical community does not have a
statement in its doctrine stating it is not a combat support
function. The intelligence community needs to drop the
attitude that it is not a combat support function and adopt a
philosophy more in line with the logistical community.
On page 1-1 of FMFM 3-21, MAGTF Intelligence Operations,
paragraph 1003 states,
The first intelligence objective is to keep the
MAGTF commander and senior, adjacent, and
subordinate commanders informed on the
characteristics of the enemy, weather, and
terrain within the area of operations (AO).
This statement does not properly focus the intelligence
community on its real objective; to support the commander with
timely and useful information with which to select a promising
course of action with an acceptable degree of risk and to do it
more quickly than his opponent. This statement leads to the
tendency of the intelligence community to provide the commander
with every data point known to mankind about the AO. This
approach, providing volumes of information to the commander,
usually just overloads him with information that does not
directly contribute to helping the commander select a course of
action. Because the intelligence community just overloads the
commander with trivial information, the intelligence community
does not directly aid the commander. This situation leads to
the image that the intelligence community is the weakest
actical area in the Marine Corps. If the intelligence
community wants to change its perceived image it needs to
change its doctrine to reflect concepts that are more in
harmony with those of the commander; maneuver warfare.
The objective is the most crucial aspect of war.
Everything that is done in war must be done to support the
objective. Admiral C. R. Brown best states this concept as,
... the objective is unquestionably the most
important of all principles of war. It is the
connecting link which, alone, can impart
coherence to war... Without the objective, all
other principles are pointless. (8:218)
The objective of the current doctrine for the intelligence
community needs to be changed in order to adequately reflect
the type of support the commander wants.
The support the commander wants is not just information
alone on the characteristics of the enemy, weather and terrain
within his AO. What the commander wants is information on the
characteristics of the enemy, weather and terrain within his AO
that aids him in outthinking his opponent in both dimensions of
time and space. The commander does not want a description of
the enemy's command and control system and hourly updates on
which transmitters are active. An example of the type of
information a commander is looking for is the location of
critical command and control nodes that if destroyed or
disrupted would create the greatest amount of disruption in the
enemy's command and control system. FMFM-1 Warfighting states
this concept as, "a philosophy for generating the greatest
decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to
ourselves - a philosophy of fighting smart."(4:77)
The objective of the intelligence community should reflect the
concept that the commander wants timely and useful information
on the characteristics of the enemy, the terrain, and the
weather to aid the commander in "fighting smart."
On page 1-1, paragraph 1005, of FMFM 3-21, MAGTF
Intelligence Operations states, "Intelligence support is based
on the mission." This statement is misleading because
intelligence support should be based on the objective. The
commander is going to outthink his opponent in the dimensions
of time and space to achieve his objective. The mission is the
"vehicle" the commander will use to obtain his objective. The
mission and the objective are many times considered as to be
one and the same; they are not. The objective is the "what"
and the mission is part of "how" the commander plans to
accomplish it.
f the intelligence community would adopt the concepts of
maneuver warfare it would view the battlefield in the same
manner as the commander. As stated in FMFM-1 Warfighting,
"...doctrine provides she basis for harmonious actions and
mutual understanding. "(4:43) Currently, the intelligence
community does not understand what the commander is trying to
accomplish, therefore providing the commander with information
that he finds useless. Thus the situation that most commanders
believe the intelligence community is tactically the weakest
area. The dichotomy in viewing the battlefield by the
commander and the intelligence community starts with not having
a common doctrine. The intelligence community should change
its doctrine to read, "Intelligence support is based on the
objective as defined by the commander." This revised doctrine
will lead the intelligence community and the commander to
harmonious actions and mutual understandings.
PART THREE
INTELLIGENCE AND LOGISTICAL
PRINCIPLES
Most commanders do not doubt the intentions of the
logistical community of providing him with support. The
intelligence community, unfortunately, does not enjoy this same
high regard concerning its support. In reviewing the
principles of both the intelligence and logistical communities,
a difference in attitude toward providing support to the
commander is detected. The following discussion will be a
comparison between the principles of intelligence and
logistical communities and a recommendation of which principles
the intelligence community should adopt to facilitate the
application of the concepts of maneuver warfare (See Fig 1).
Responsiveness: The intelligence community should drop the
principle of interdependence and adopt the logistical principle
of responsiveness. Responsiveness as stated in Figure 1 is,
"... the provision of the right support, at the right time, and
in the right place." The intelligence community could
eliminate a lot of perceptions concerning the intelligence
community if it adopted the attitude of providing the right
support at the right time and in the right place. A quick
review of lessons learned from recent military operations
reveals most commanders do not believe intelligence support is
very responsive. (11:95)
Simplicity: The principle of usefulness of the intelligent
community is a good principle to keep. However the
intelligence community could probably better serve the
commander by not only providing useful information, but also by
keeping the process as simple as possible. The intelligence
community could incorporate the logistical principle of
simplicity which states, "simplicity is the avoidance of
complexity," in with the principle of usefulness.
If the intelligence community would adopt the principle of
simplicity it would be able to provide better support to the
commander. Currently the intelligence community operates under
the concept that more information is better support. This
concept has exactly the opposite effect. The intelligence
community inundates the commander with so much information
concerning every data point known to man that instead of
supporting the commander the information just baffles him. All
the information the intelligence community tries to provide the
commander is usually so voluminous that instead of helping the
commander it usually just overloads the commander's
communication circuits.
A Marine Lieutenant Colonel, remarked on intelligence
support for Marines of the First Marine Expeditionary Force,
during Operation Desert Storm, "that is was so voluminous that
the headquarters could not process the 6,000 messages it
received hourly on intelligence."(9) This bottleneck of
message traffic when finally processed was outdated information
leaving the commanders with the impression that for all of the
sophistication on today's modern battlefield the intelligence
community has not changed since the time of Clausewitz who
wrote, "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory;
even more are false and most are uncertain."(3:117)
The intelligence community could better support the
commander with useful information by keeping the support as
simple as possible. By knowing the objective and the
commander's intent, the intelligence community could determine
the simplest support required to provide the most useful
information in aiding the commander in outthinking his
opponent. An example of this concept of simplicity in
intelligence support would be to get timely and useful
information to the commander, he would only need a picture
updated daily, a few Intelligence Summaries (INTSUMS) every six
to twelve hours, open source material concerning weather and
terrain, and all Human Intelligence (HUMINT) reports of the AO.
By keeping the intelligence support as simple as possible,
focused on the objective, the information would be useful,
easier to transmit, receive and disseminate to higher,
adjacent, and subordinate units then the voluminous message
traffic that contributes minimum results. In adopting the
principle of simplicity, the intelligence community would
better serve the commander with more useful and timely
information.
Timeliness: The principle of simplicity also facilitates
the intelligence principle of timeliness. By keeping the
intelligence support process as simple as possible, the
intelligence community will be able to speed up the
dissemination process thus providing the commander with more
timely information. Sun Tzu said, "Speed is the essence of
war."(13:134) A modern translation of this concept by an
unidentified Marine fighter pilot is "Speed is life." If the
principle of simplicity speeds up the intelligence community in
providing more useful and timely information then it should be
immediately adopted.
Flexibility: The principle of flexibility is important.
However, the principle of flexibility written by the
intelligence community should be dropped and replaced with the
principle of flexibility written by the logistical community.
The intelligence community could better serve the commander if
it had the ability to adopt structures and procedures to
changing situations, missions and concepts of operations. As
stated in FMFM-1 Warfighting, "Success depends in large part on
the ability to adapt to a constantly changing situation."(4:8)
The intelligence community if it wants to successfully support
the commander should retain the ability to adapt to a
constantly changing situation by adopting the logistical
principle of flexibility.
Imagination: The intelligence community should drop the
principle of imagination. The principle of imagination reads as
if someone needed a space filler and lacked the imagination of
writing something useful to fill it. In 1885 Nietzche stated
it best, "Man shall be framed for War, and Woman for the
entertainment of the Warrior, all else is folly."(8:363)
Although interesting, Nietzche's statement is as much folly as
the principle of imagination and recommend both should be
dropped.
Ecomony: The intelligence community could replace the
principle of imagination with the logistical principle of
economy. The "resources available" that the intelligence
community needs to economize are communication assets.
Communication assets are always going to be scarce wherever the
intelligence community deploys and this concept needs to be
recognized "up front." All the time and communication assets
the intelligence community use in trying to receive and
disseminate every data point known to man does not help support
the commander in trying to outthink his opponent in the
dimensions of time and space. By simply adopting the
logistical principle of economy, the intelligence community
would be able to provide responsive, useful, and timely
information to the commander in a constantly changing
environment.
Attainability: The intelligence community needs to adopt
the logistical principle of attainability. The manner in which
the principle of attainability could read for the intelligence
community is; "attainability is the ability to provide
essential information required to conduct military operations."
The intelligence community in using more open source material
could make more information attainable throughout the command.
Sustainability: Another logistical principle the
intelligence community should adopt is the logistical principle
of sustainability. It is critical for the intelligence
community to be able to sustain the commander throughout the
continuum of operations with timely, responsive, useful, and
attainable information. The principle of sustainability for
the intelligence community could read word for word as it does
for the logistical community.
Security: The principle of security that the intelligence
community uses does not need to be changed. It is vital for
the intelligence community to keep the intelligence information
secured, The intelligence community by applying the principle
of simplicity throughout the intelligence process will be able
to keep the security process as simple as possible so as to not
hamper the attainability and sustainability of the information
to the commander and the command.
Survivability: The logistical principle of survivability
does not apply to the intelligence community. The intelligence
community in applying the principle of security already
provides for the survivability of the systems.
PART FOUR
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
DETACHMENTS
Another concept the intelligence community could borrow
from the logistics community is the concept of Combat Service
Support Detachment (CSSD). A CSSD is a tasked organized unit
formed for the purpose of providing support to a designated
subordinate unit.(7:D-6) The intelligence community could
solve several problems with dissemination by forming
intelligence support detachments focused on supporting
designated subordinate units. The British used this process
very successfully during World War II. The British used
Special Liaison Units from Blecthley Park (the British
Intelligence Center) and assigned these units to work for a
specific commander to insure the commander would obtain the
information he wanted.(2:60)
The concept of intelligence support detachments facilitate
the employment of the concept of top-down planning. As stated
in FMFM 2-1, the Marine Corps will use top-down planning to,
"focus and allocate resources toward accomplishing the most
critical functions to succeed in combat."(5:1-13) The
intelligence community could provide intelligence support to
subordinate units and staffs with detachments thereby enhancing
the rapid dissemination of information to units who are the
focus of effort. The rapid dissemination of information will
greatly aid the command in "accomplishing the most critical
functions to succeed in combat."
An example of where the intelligence community could have
used the concept of intelligence support detachments to
subordinate units that were the focus of effort was during
Operation Desert Storm. During the air campaign, the First
Marine Expeditionary Force had a National Military Intelligence
Support Team (NMIST) at their headquarters to correlate Battle
Damage Assessments (BDA) reports. The air wing, flying air
strikes into Iraq and Kuwait, was located in Bahrain and was
not directly tied into the NMIST network. Because the air wing
was not receiving timely intelligence data through the NMIST
network, several air strikes were launched that were not
required. If an intelligence support team had deployed to
Bahrain to aid in the rapid dissemination of critical
intelligence information from the NMIST network, a more
effective air campaign could have been orchestrated.
SUMMARY
Descartes built a system of thought that once shook the
monolith of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy to its core with
the words, "I think - therefore I am."(15:174) The
intelligence community should seriously think about changing
its doctrine to reflect concepts more in line with the Marine
Corps philosophy of maneuver warfare if it wants to shake loose
from the perceptions held by most commanders and be useful to
the commander other than just his "whipping boy." The
intelligence community keying in on principles of
responsiveness and simplicity will be able to be more flexible
in attaining and sustaining the timely flow of useful
information through the economical and secure use of scarce
resources; communication assets and personnel. By rapidly
disseminating useful information the intelligence community
will be better able to support the commander in outthinking his
opponent in both dimensions of time and space or as FMFM-1
Warfighting describes this as, "fighting smart."(4:77)
Today's commanders only want from the intelligence
community the same information as in the days of the Duke of
Wellington who said, "(all I want to know) is beyond the next
hill."(8:161) This information could be supplied by the
intelligence community with a simple picture or simply enough
information to paint a picture of what is beyond the next hill.
But in trying to get a picture of the next hill or target most
commanders are currently left totally frustrated and muttering
some form of Shakespeare that sounds like, "...my kingdom for a
picture!" In Operation Desert Storm, two Marine divisional
commanders solved their problem of lack of intelligence support
by sending individuals all the way back to Washington, D.C. in
order to get pictures of minefields the divisions were going to
soon breach.(l:40) Clausewitz once wrote, "Everything in war
is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult."(3:119)
The simple truth of the matter is the intelligence community
needs to change its doctrine to better support the commander.
In the future, commanders simply may not have the luxury of
time to send individuals back to Washington, D.C. to "trade
kingdoms" in order to get a picture of the next hill,
objective, or target.
The intelligence needed to win on today's modern
battlefield is obtainable, but is doesn't always get to the
right person, at the right place, at the right time. As the
Marine Corps shrinks in both size and budget, the criticality
of intelligence for success on the battlefield
disproportionately increases. The Marine Corps Doctrine Center
at Quantico, Virginia could greatly increase the chance for
success on the battlefield by providing the intelligence
community with new doctrine that supports the rapid
dissemination of information throughout the command structure.
The doctrine for the intelligence community does not need to be
re-invented, but it does need to be refined to incorporate the
Marine Corps philosophy on "fighting smart." The Doctrine
Center could solve several problems for the intelligence
community by rewriting its doctrine to integrate it better with
the concepts of maneuver warfare. The intelligence community
needs a new paradigm to work with or be forever doomed to after
action reports that read, "tactical intelligence was the
weakest area observed."
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