Real-Time Imagery--Merging Doctrine And Technology CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Intelligence EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Real-Time Imagery--Merging Doctrine And Technology Author: Major David A. Wright, United States Air Force Thesis: The need to effectively integrate today's new real-time imagery sensors into the battlefield decision cycle is becoming fundamental to the success of evolving service doctrines. Background: General Norman Schwarzkopf noted the "lack of timely reconnaissance imagery" as one of the shortfalls of Operation Desert Storm. Film-based imagery simply takes too long to process and distribute. The latest revolution in aerial reconnaissance, real-time digital imagery, offers a solution. Aerial imaging systems such as synthetic aperture radar, moving target indicators, and electro-optical cameras can record images in digital form for immediate transmission to ground stations in-theater. Digital imagery can be quickly and efficiently processed via powerful computer enhancement techniques. Conceptually, it can then be transmitted via data transmission systems to virtually anyone in-theater in minutes. Unfortunately, even though such systems were operating in the Gulf, they fell far short of their potential. Many real-time systems were only "real-time" to remote ground stations where written reports were disseminated instead of actual imagery. Processing systems were overwhelmed by the sheer volume of imagery being collected. Further, target coordinates passed by real-time systems were only as accurate as the collection platform's navigation system. Despite the current shortcomings of real-time systems, emerging service doctrines are attempting to cash in on this new technology. Both the Army and the Marines recognize the more mobile, less dense, non-linear battlefield of the future and the need to be able to identify, in real-time, weaknesses in the enemy's armor. Each recognizes the critical importance of real-time intelligence as fleeting opportunities occur for decisive operations. Even proposed NATO doctrine describes winning the "sensor duel" as a critical part of shaping the battlefield with "fatal visibility." Recommendations: The lessons from Desert Storm were frustratingly clear. Doctrine and real-time imagery technology were not integrated well. A reliable imagery dissemination system is a must. Image exploitation work stations need to be designed to handle the volume of image data generated in a wartime scenario. Similarly, photo interpreters need to train in peacetime to handle fast-paced wartime requirements. Collection platform navigation systems need upgrading to provide reliable target coordinates to strike packages. Finally, all potential users and operators of real-time imaging systems need the opportunity to train with the systems in peacetime exercises. REAL-TIME IMAGERY--MERGING DOCTRINE AND TECHNOLOGY OUTLINE Thesis Statement: The need to integrate today's new real-time imagery sensors into the battlefield decision cycle is becoming fundamental to the success of evolving service doctrines. I. Emergence of real-time, digital-data imagery systems A. Real-time, digital imagery versus film-based imagery B. Types of real-time imaging systems 1. Radar imaging systems a. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) b. J-STARS Moving Target Indicator (MTI) 2. Electro-optical (EO) systems a. The Charge-coupled Device (CCD) - the heart of EO b. Computer enhancement c. Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS) C. Making Real-time imagery "real-time" 1. Lack of real-time dissemination in Desert Storm 2. Joint Service Imagery Processing System (JSIPS) II. Doctrinal trends - cashing in on real-time imagery technology A. Army AirLand Battle Future 1. Determining where/when to concentrate smaller forces 2. Capitalizing on long range lethality of weapons 3. Maneuver versus attrition warfare B. Proposed NATO doctrine 1. Winning the sensor duel 2. Fatal visibility over the battlefield C. Marine Corps Maneuver Warfare 1. Finding critical vulnerabilities 2. Surveillance Reconnaissance and Intel Group (SRIG) D. Aerospace Doctrine - targeting of precision guided munitions III. Merging doctrine and technology - challenges for the future A. Technologies 1. Operational JSIPS 2. Standardized image data formats 3. Ground station upgrades 4. Collection platform navigation system upgrades to improve targeting data accuracy 5. SAR guidance system on precision guided bombs B. Training 1. Photo-interpreter (PI) training - wartime vs peacetime exploitation 2. Integration of systems into peacetime exercises REAL-TIME IMAGERY--MERGING DOCTRINE AND TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION The world has become forever interconnected by an ex- plosion of information management technology and high-speed, multiplex data transmission systems. The very fiber and essence of societies around the world have been altered by an unprecedented flow of information. The nature of society has always shaped the nature of warfare in every age, and the age of the "information revolution" is no exception. The battlefield commander's ability to "see over the next hill" in this era of emerging real-time sensors, datalinks, and sophisticated command and control systems is unprece- dented. In fact, sensor technologies have allowed him to literally see "over the curvature of the earth" with clarity never before imagined. In an effort to exploit this technology, a revolution in military doctrine is also taking place. From the concept of maneuver warfare to the target- ing of precision guided munitions, finding the weak spot in the enemy's armor has become a critical task--one that de- mands more than ever before accurate, timely imagery collection, processing and dissemination. In Southwest Asia, the new doctrines were there, and the new sensor technolo- gies were there, but, in many cases, we failed to effectively integrate the two. Future warfare demands we merge doctrine and technology in a manner that fully ex- ploits the awesome capabilities available to today's battlefield commander. In particular, the need to effec- tively integrate today's new real-time imagery sensors into the battlefield decision cycle is becoming fundamental to the success of evolving service doctrines. REAL-TIME, DIGITAL IMAGERY - THE NEW "EYE OF THE STORM" Optical cameras still give the highest resolution when conditions are right, but they cannot provide the essential day/night/all-weather cover, nor real-time reporting via datalink. The development of. . . sensors which produce images that can be recorded on videotape and transmitted by datalink to a ground station is transforming the reconnaissance world. (14:833) General Norman Schwarzkopf noted the "lack of timely reconnaissance imagery" as one of the shortfalls of Opera- tion Desert Storm. (14:833) One of the contributing factors to this shortfall was the partial reliance on film-based photography. Conventional film-based imagery systems re- quire time-consuming film developing and exploitation pro- cesses that often render the product outdated by the time it gets to the user. Technology's revolutionary answer to this problem is digital-based, real-time imagery systems that allow on-board recording or immediate downlinking of images to the ground followed by computer-assisted exploitation. Real-time imagery systems fall into two categories: electro-optical (including infrared) and radar imaging sys- tems. Each category presents unique solutions to the reconnaissance shortfalls experienced in the Gulf. Each category also has unique capabilities and limitations. Currently, radar systems include Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) systems and Moving Target Indicators (MTI). The principle behind Synthetic Aperture Radar imaging is not unlike that of flash photography. With a flash- equipped camera, the target is illuminated by a flash of light and the reflected image recorded on film. SAR imaging systems work basically the same by illuminating the target with radar instead of light and recording the reflected image as a digitized radar return. The obvious advantage of such a system is that it works at night and in all weather conditions. A major limitation of SAR is the "user un- friendliness" of the image. Hardcopy SAR imagery is often referred to as "blobology" and requires that users be spe- cifically trained in exploiting such products. On the other hand, softcopy SAR imagery, or SAR imagery as seen on the high-resolution ground station monitors, is often near film-based quality. Unfortunately, few product users pres- ently have access to such monitors. Both the TR-1 (12:221) and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) (5:2) employ Synthetic Aperture Radar Systems. The real hero of the JSTARS system in the Gulf, howev- er, was the Moving Target Indicator. MTI's detect moving targets by searching for Doppler shift in any of the radar returns. The extreme sensitivity of the JSTARS MTI allows the system, in a wide-area search mode, to detect targets that would be too small or too far away to see for Fixed Target Indicating (FTI) systems such as SAR operating in wide-area search mode. The major drawback of MTI is its inability to identify exactly what it sees moving. The system does not produce an actual image of the target; it simply "marks the spot" where it has detected something moving. For example, in the Gulf War, a suspected truck convoy detected by JSTARS turned out to be barbed wire blowing in the wind. JSTARS must often cue other sensors on other platforms to determine exactly what it is looking at. One of these other sensors, the TR-1, also employs a MTI as part of its SAR system. (1:695) The most recent and possibly the most revolutionary innovation in aerial reconnaissance systems is electro- optical (EO) imagery. EO sensors produce downlink-capable digitized products that more closely resemble conventional film-based imagery versus the "blobology" associated with radar imagery. The heart and soul of EO technology is the charge-coupled device or CCD. The CCD chip is a line array of between 2,000 and 10,000 small, light-sensitive elements, or "pixels", normally measuring from 10 to 17 microns per pixel. The CCD is positioned where the film would be in a conventional camera. The CCD samples the image projected by the camera lens several thousand times per second. Each pixel of the array produces an electrical signal which is proportional to the strength of the incident light. Using the "push-broom" effect, the forward motion of the aircraft allows the sensor to build up the picture one line at a time. The signals are either immediately transmitted to a ground station via datalink or stored on tape for later transmission if the aircraft is out of datalink range during collection. (14:837) The image is then processed into a usable intelligence product at the ground station through enhancement, enlargement, and annotation (explanatory computer graphics such as direction of North, coordinates of target, etc). The digital nature of an EO image facilitates the use of powerful computer enhancement techniques that far exceed the capabilities of conventional film-based image enhance- ment. Depending on the type of CCD employed, each line of an EO image could contain as many as 10,000 pixels--much more than even the highest resolution monitors can display. To allow real-time monitoring of images being downlinked, work station software samples only a fraction of the data (every 10th pixel, for example) for real-time display and stores the rest of the data for subsequent retrieval. Should the photo interpreter (PI) wish to enlarge a small segment of the image, the computer simply adds back in some of the missing data as it enlarges the segment to fill the screen. This enlargement process can continue with very little loss of resolution until the computer has added back all the data for that particular segment of the image. Further enlargement is possible through computer extrapola- tion of the image data with an accompanying loss of resolu- tion. Obviously, the more pixels per line in the original image, the higher the resolution that is possible with each image enlargement. Original image resolution is also a function of lens power and pixel sensitivity. As CCD technology increases pixel density and sensitivity, the im- plications for image resolution are obvious. The latest EO system currently under development for use by multiple services is the Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS). The system consists of both a low and medium altitude imaging sensor as well as an in- frared line scanner for use during periods of reduced visi- bility. The images from these sensors can be immediately reviewed in the cockpit and transmitted to ground stations via wideband secure datalink for rapid exploitation. Plans call for employing ATARS aboard Navy and Marine F/A-18Ds, Air Force RF-16s, and the Marine's mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (MR-UAV). (14:834) Collecting the data and down- linking is not the end of the process, however. MAKING REAL-TIME IMAGERY "REAL-TIME" Regardless of the amount of data collected, the targets identified or the accuracies achieved, information has no value unless the commanders and appropriate fire support elements receive it in time to react, either through fire, maneuver or both. (7:61) All these incredible capabilities are useless if the product does not get to the customer in usable form. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, one of the most serious indict- ments against the reconnaissance community was its inability to disseminate high quality imagery to those with the most need for it--those tasked with actually striking targets, breaching obstacles, or attacking enemy positions. In most cases, even so-called real-time imagery was only real-time to a remote ground site where written reports were dissemi- nated to users instead of actual imagery. When aircrews tasked with striking targets deep inside Iraq did receive target imagery, it was often transmitted via facsimile ma- chine producing nothing more than a poor quality copy of the original. Even original hard-copy prints from real-time systems were often poor because of the inherent problems associated with producing hard-copy print from digital imagery. Troops in the field reported receiving superb quality film-based imagery, but it was often as much as ten days old--ancient history in desert warfare where even the terrain can change in ten days. The real-time sensor revo- lution currently lacks the one thing that will make it complete--a reliable system of delivering its products to the customer in quality form. The Joint Service Imagery Processing System or JSIPS offers hope of providing this capability. JSIPS is a transportable, ground-processing facility designed to receive and exploit soft copy Infrared and Electro-optical imagery from tactical aerial reconnaissance systems. It will also receive and exploit imagery from national and theater sources. Product improvement options include a Common Radar Processor to process both tactical and theater radars, and an automated capability to insert Mapping, Charting and Geodesy products into JSIPS. (13:3-23) In its mature form, JSIPS will provide near real-time access to national level imagery; theater level imagery to include EO, Synthetic Aperture Radar, and JSTARS; and tactical sys- tems such as ATARS and UAV imagery. The system is intended for use by the Air Force, Marine Corps and Army. The Navy will also acquire certain components of the system. The system will provide a centralized imagery processing and exploitation center that will be much more responsive to the tactical requirements of the field commander. It will make near real-time imagery intelligence an integral part of the operational commander's decision making process. (9:45) JSIPS will allow annotated imagery to be transmitted in the digital data stream for near real-time use in the field. Supporting communication networks will include satellite communications, the Defense Data Network and tactical communications systems. Imagery will be collected, pro- cessed and transmitted to Air Force fighter bases or other appropriate locations in-theater in near real-time. (9:45) DOCTRINAL DIVIDENDS--CASHING IN ON TECHNOLOGY Capitalizing on the unprecedented ability to see the enemy in real-time has become a common theme within developing service doctrines. Force reductions, non-linear battlefields, maneuver style warfare and the longer range lethality of weapons have all driven doctrine toward more reliance on the unique capabilities offered by real-time imaging systems. The Army's AirLand Battle Future, the next iteration of AirLand Battle Doctrine currently under development by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), reflects this increased demand for real-time intelligence. The Army sees future battles being fought on less dense, more open battlefields by much smaller armies. Armies, including our own, will field smaller forces due to arms control agree- ments and the tremendous expense of modern military equip- ment. The result will be large gaps between forces, requiring commanders to concentrate their forces in order to conduct decisive operations. Decisive operations then be- come more risky as large areas are left uncovered. (11:3) Knowing where and when to concentrate forces therefore be- comes crucial to success. Real-time imagery of enemy force dispositions and movement will identify fleeting opportuni- ties for decisive operations. A well defined picture of the enemy will also subject him to the long range lethality of modern weapons. Major General Stephen Silvasy Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Con- cepts, Doctrine and Developments, US Army TRADOC, describes the lethality of future battlefields and real-time imagery's contribution to that lethality: Besides being more open and fluid, future battlefields will also be much more lethal. Ironically, the growth in lethality relates less to the enhanced capabilities of direct-fire systems than it does to the tremendous advances in the ability of military forces to acquire information about the enemy; to fuse and distribute it on a real-time basis; and to engage high-value targets at great distances with exceptional accuracy. With these capabilities, any force, friend or foe, whether deployed in position for a significant time or on the move, can be detected and attacked well before it gets within direct-fire range. (11:3) J-STARS, backed up by other real-time systems in the Gulf, gave us just such a capability: In one of the more startling of Joint STARS's Desert Storm exploits, specially equipped radar aircraft detected an Iraqi convoy carrying free rocket over ground (FROG), surface-to- surface missiles fitted with chemical munitions . . .US officers immediately targeted the convoy; it was destroyed by cluster bombs dropped from F-16s. (4:38) From its beginning, the Joint STARS concept fit naturally into the developing US AirLand Battle Doctrine of fighting fast and fluidly, from the front lines to the enemy's rear echelons. Joint STARS promises to help tie together a new generation of weapons, from the Air Force's F-117A Stealth fighter to the Army's Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). (4:39) AirLand Battle Future, as it is currently envisioned, will consist of four phases: detection-preparation, estab- lishing conditions for decisive operations, decisive opera- tions, and reconstitution; (11:5) The detection phase will no doubt rely heavily on imaging systems to determine as much about the enemy as possible to include where he is, where he is not, and what his weakness are. AirLand Battle Future also emphasizes the importance of maneuver versus the "head-to-head" attrition warfare of the past. It calls for attacks on the flank or rear and a focus on the enemy instead of terrain. (11:3) As a result, the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process must concentrate on the enemy more than it ever has before, and it must be capable of responding to a fluid, constantly changing battlefield. Real-time imagery becomes vital to this process in determining which flank is exposed, the best way to get to the enemy's rear, etc. Even emerging NATO doctrine, in the wake of post- Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) force-reduction agree- ments, relies heavily upon timely, accurate battlefield in- telligence. One possible direction proposed for NATO doctrine is "Joint Precision Interdiction" (JPI), which em- phasizes the capability to "locate, identify, outmaneuver and outshoot enemy forces." (2:45) This concept identifies three conditions for success on the post-CFE battlefield: - The ability to fight and win the sensor duel. This duel will be a reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance battle fought with sensors as well as soldiers. The outcome of the sensor duel relates closely to the outcome of the entire battle because the winner of the duel succeeds in shaping the battlefield. - The ability to provide a "fatal visibility" over the battlefield. We must be able to find the enemy and track him. From this, we can prejudge his actions and beat him to the punch. We can strike him first, at great range, and effectively disrupt his plans. - The ability to support the battlefield cycle of concentrate/attack/ disperse. This cycle is similar to the way the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) manages the air battle. You disperse, you mass, you fight a short, synchronized fight and then you disperse again. The focus from beginning to end is on the enemy force rather than on terrain. (2:45) The concept recognizes, as does AirLand Battle Future, that future battlefields will require maneuver and selective attack on a less dense, more mobile, non-linear battlefield, with smaller forces. The ability to see the enemy and identify strengths, weaknesses, and intentions in real-time are paramount to success in future conflicts. Real-time sensors such as JSTARS are fundamental components of JPI: We cannot attack all enemy movement, so senior commanders must set priorities and be selective. To do this, the commander must see enemy movement deep, identify priority targets and attack selected moving targets in near real-time. This is the heart of JPI, and it centers on JSTARS. (2:51) Even the Marine Corps, doctrinally opposed to "squan- der(ing) opportunities while trying to gain more informa- tion," (3:69) recognizes the emerging necessity of integrating real-time intelligence sources into its command decision cycle. The Marine Corp's doctrine of Maneuver Warfare prescribes "exploiting enemy weaknesses, creating dilemmas through combined arms, and decentralized control embodying mission-type orders," all with the goal of "un- hinging the enemy's cohesion, his ability to react." (8:59) It further prescribes focusing on "critical enemy vulnerabilities" and exploiting "gaps" or weaknesses in the enemy's force disposition. (3:73-74) Identifying enemy vulnerabilities and gaps thus becomes crucial to success in maneuver warfare. On a battlefield characterized by high mobility and constant change, responsive reconnaissance plays a key role in Maneuver Warfare: Due to the fluid nature of war, gaps will rarely be permanent and will usually be fleeting. To exploit them demands flexibility and speed. We must actively seek out gaps by continuous and aggressive reconnaissance. (3:75) To orchestrate the critical task of finding gaps and critical vulnerabilities, Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) have organized Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Groups (SRIGs) at the MAGTF Command Element level. The SRIG includes a MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center (MAFC) that integrates intelligence from all available sources to fully support the decision cycle of the MAGTF commander. The SRIG also includes a Force Imagery Inter- pretation Unit (FIIU) which will eventually include JSIPS and its associated access to theater and national level imagery as well as real-time processing of RPV and F/A-18D ATARS products. Such a capability is absolutely crucial should a MAGTF ever become the core of a Joint Task Force--a situation that is becoming more and more likely every day as the prospects increase for smaller, regional conflicts re- quiring the rapid, flexible response of U. S. Marine forces. Aerospace doctrine is becoming more and more reliant upon real-time imagery as well. The overwhelming success of precision-guided munitions in the Gulf War highlighted fur- ther the need for a timely flow of imagery down to the peo- ple putting fire and steel on target. It is no longer adequate just to know the coordinates and general descrip- tion of lucrative targets, particularly hardened targets and those situated within civilian sectors. The pilot tasked with taking out a hardened command and control facility with a laser-guided bomb needs to see high quality imagery of his target to determine, within feet in some instances, exactly where to deliver his weapon. Pilots and planners may not always have the luxury of waiting for film-based or national level imagery of such critical targets. MERGING DOCTRINE AND TECHNOLOGY--SMOOTHING THE ROUGH EDGES As real-time digital imagery becomes increasingly more capable and prevalent, both user and machine must adapt to each other. Serious gaps still exist in the man-machine interface process. We must tailor exploitation and disse- mination technology to insure the right people have access to the right products in a timely manner. At the same time, we need to train the users of these products to insure they are capable of taking full advantage of what digital imagery has to offer. The JSIPS concept will go a long way towards filling the gaps in the dissemination process. Given enough ground stations, dedicated data transfer networks and terminals to receive the data, imagery from multiple sources can be in the hands of a field commander or F-117 pilot in a matter of hours. Additionally, JSIPS technology may also improve the quality of hard copy prints produced from digital imagery. However, standardization of data formats currently represents a limitation to this concept. For example, a radar correlator is required with JSIPS to process Synthetic Aperture Radar imagery since radar imagery data is formatted differently than EO. (14:835) There are currently a variety of data formats for EO imagery, also. One frame of EO imagery represents a tremendous chunk of data--in some cases more than conventional data transmission networks can han- dle. Therefore, in order to transmit EO imagery, the data must often be reformatted and compressed using one of a va- riety of compressed imagery transmission systems. The data is then "exploded" at its destination. These reformatting algorithms must be standardized to allow ground stations to receive imagery from any source. To make real-time exploitation viable, ground station upgrades are also necessary. In the Gulf War, photo inter- preters (PI's) were often overwhelmed by the sheer volume of real-time imagery coming across their work station monitors. Possible targets often had to be stored on tape for later exploitation because all work stations were occupied at the time with other targets. Ground stations should contain at least four operable work stations, one for a mission monitor and three others for image enhancement/exploitation. Once a target is identified, imaging systems and associated exploitation processes should be able to provide accurate target coordinates that are compatible with strike package navigation systems. The inherent inaccuracies and drift rates of inertial navigation systems (INS) on collec- tion platforms induce errors into the coordinates of targets that they identify. This error is further compounded by the inherent drift rates and inaccuracies in the INS on board strike aircraft sent to attack the target. In other words, given the same set of coordinates, a TR-1 and an F-15E, both equipped with an inertial navigation system, will likely identify slightly different points on the ground with their respective INS. This disparity could be the difference be- tween finding and missing the target. Installing GPS on board both collection platforms and strike aircraft will alleviate this problem. With both receiving navigation data from the same source, GPS satellites, disparities in target coordinates will likely be rare. Targeting accuracy will be further enhanced by improved internal guidance systems on the weapons themselves. Technology is currently under development to install small Synthetic Aperature Radar systems inside new 2000 lb. Mark 84 precision-guided bombs. The internal guidance systems on these weapons, programmed with TR-1 or JSTARS imagery of a particular target, can use their own SAR capabilities to search for a target that exactly matches the TR-1/JSTARS image, and then guide to it with pin-point accuracy. In fact, plans call for JSTARS to be able to transmit SAR imagery directly to strike aircraft carrying the new Mk 84 allowing for in-flight programming of target data. (6:64-66) Finally, potential users of digital imagery products must have the opportunity to train with the products in peacetime. PI's should know what it is like to exploit and disseminate large volumes of imagery on a near real-time basis under battle conditions. Often PI's in the Gulf spent too much time adding impressive graphics and annotations to the products when the raw image would have sufficed under the time constraints of the situation. Similarly, field commanders and other potential end-users of these products must become familiar with them in peacetime. As more sen- sors and ground stations become available, they should be- come an integral part of peacetime training exercises. CONCLUSIONS During the Civil War, Thaddeus Lowe proposed using his hot-air balloons for scouting Confederate troop positions in Northern Virginia. Lowe sold President Lincoln on the idea and Lincoln sent Lowe to General Winfield Scott with a presidential memo urging use of the balloons for reconnais- sance purposes. Scott refused several times to even talk to Lowe about the idea. It eventually took a personal visit from President Lincoln himself to force Scott to listen to Lowe. Five days later, on 23 June, 1861, Lowe's balloon was the first aircraft of any kind used in support of military operations in the United States. Over the next 2 days, ob- servers in Lowe's balloon discovered enemy camps located near Centreville and other parts of western Fairfax County. (10:C3) Since that reluctant beginning, aerial reconnais- sance has been an integral part of U.S. military operations. Commanders are no longer reluctant to employ the latest in technological means of "seeing over the next hill." As advances in electro-optics and radar imaging have made real-time reconnaissance a reality, the Services have re- vised doctrine and equipment accordingly to take advantage of this tremendous capability. Desert Storm represented our first real attempt at employing the latest advances in real-time reconnaissance. However, the lessons from the Gulf were frustratingly clear. As capable as real-time imaging systems are, they still do not fully satisfy the reconnaissance needs of the battlefield commander. Disse- mination, data formats, ground station capabilities, and targeting accuracy remain as temporary technical limitations to a fully integrated system. In addition to solving these problems, exercising and training with real-time imagery systems in peacetime are essential if we ever hope to fully develop the potential of real-time imagery. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Boatman, John. "TR-1A's New Focus on Moving Targets." Jane's Defence Weekly (19 October 1991), P. 695. 2. Ellertson, Jack W., Lt Col, US Army, and Huffman, Alan K., US Air Force. "Joint Precision Interdiction in the Post-CFE Environ- ment." Military Review (July 1991), pp. 45-54. 3. FMFM 1 Warfighting, US Marine Corps, 6 March 1989. 4. Grier, Peter. "Joint Stars does its Stuff." Air Force Magazine (June 1991), pp. 38-42. 5. "Joint Stars: Eyes of the Storm." Grummand Corporation JSTARS Information Pamphlet. 6. Klass, Philip J. "SAR Seeker Seen as New Contender to Guide 2000 Lb. Mk 84 Bomb." Aviation Week and Space Technology (30 March 1992), pp. 64-66. 7. Menoher, Paul E., Jr., MGen USA. "Responsive Communications Key to Army Intelligence." Signal (October 1991), pp. 61-62. 8. Moore, Scott R., Major, USMC. "Finding the Gaps: Intelligence and MAGTF Warfare." Marine Corps Gazette (March 1991), pp. 59-65. 9. "Processing and Displays Open Imagery Exploitation." Signal (September 1990), p. 45. 10. Robinson, June. "Lowe's Enterprise Got Aeronautic Corps Up, Up and Away." The Washington Times. 1 February 1992, p. C3. 11. Silvasy, Stephen Jr., MGen, USA. "AirLand Battle Future: The Tactical Battlefield." Military Review (February 1991), pp. 2-12. 12. "Techint V Humint: The Unseen War." Jane's Defence Weekly (16 February 1991), p. 221. 13. United States Marine Corps Concepts and Issues, 1991. 14. Wanstall, Brian. "Realtime Images for Post-Gulf TacR." International Defense Review (August 1991), pp. 833-839.
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