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Real-Time Imagery--Merging Doctrine And Technology
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA Intelligence
Title:  Real-Time Imagery--Merging Doctrine And Technology
Author:  Major David A. Wright, United States Air Force
Thesis:  The need to effectively integrate today's new real-time imagery
sensors into the battlefield decision cycle is becoming fundamental to
the success of evolving service doctrines.
Background:  General Norman Schwarzkopf noted the "lack of timely
reconnaissance imagery" as one of the shortfalls of Operation Desert
Storm.  Film-based imagery simply takes too long to process and
distribute.  The latest revolution in aerial reconnaissance, real-time
digital imagery, offers a solution.  Aerial imaging systems such as
synthetic aperture radar, moving target indicators, and electro-optical
cameras can record images in digital form for immediate transmission to
ground stations in-theater.  Digital imagery can be quickly and
efficiently processed via powerful computer enhancement techniques.
Conceptually, it can then be transmitted via data transmission systems
to virtually anyone in-theater in minutes.
	Unfortunately, even though such systems were operating in the
Gulf, they fell far short of their potential.  Many real-time systems
were only "real-time" to remote ground stations where written reports
were disseminated instead of actual imagery.  Processing systems were
overwhelmed by the sheer volume of imagery being collected.  Further,
target coordinates passed by real-time systems were only as accurate as
the collection platform's navigation system.
	Despite the current shortcomings of real-time systems, emerging
service doctrines are attempting to cash in on this new technology.
Both the Army and the Marines recognize the more mobile, less dense,
non-linear battlefield of the future and the need to be able to
identify, in real-time, weaknesses in the enemy's armor.  Each
recognizes the critical importance of real-time intelligence as fleeting
opportunities occur for decisive operations.  Even proposed NATO
doctrine describes winning the "sensor duel" as a critical part of
shaping the battlefield with "fatal visibility."
Recommendations:  The lessons from Desert Storm were frustratingly
clear.  Doctrine and real-time imagery technology were not integrated
well.  A reliable imagery dissemination system is a must.  Image
exploitation work stations need to be designed to handle the volume of
image data generated in a wartime scenario.  Similarly, photo
interpreters need to train in peacetime to handle fast-paced wartime
requirements.  Collection platform navigation systems need upgrading to
provide reliable target coordinates to strike packages.  Finally, all
potential users and operators of real-time imaging systems need the
opportunity to train with the systems in peacetime exercises.
Thesis Statement:  The need to integrate today's new real-time imagery
sensors into the battlefield decision cycle is becoming fundamental to
the success of evolving service doctrines.
I.	Emergence of real-time, digital-data imagery systems
	A.	Real-time, digital imagery versus film-based imagery
	B.	Types of real-time imaging systems
		1.	Radar imaging systems
			a.	Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)
			b.	J-STARS Moving Target Indicator (MTI)
		2.	Electro-optical (EO) systems
			a.	The Charge-coupled Device (CCD) -
				the heart of EO
			b.	Computer enhancement
			c.	Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance
				System (ATARS)
	C.	Making Real-time imagery "real-time"
		1.	Lack  of real-time dissemination in Desert Storm
		2.	Joint Service Imagery Processing System (JSIPS)
II.	Doctrinal trends - cashing in on real-time imagery technology
	A.	Army AirLand Battle Future
		1.	Determining where/when to concentrate smaller forces
		2.	Capitalizing on long range lethality of weapons
		3.	Maneuver versus attrition warfare
	B.	Proposed NATO doctrine
		1.	Winning the sensor duel
		2.	Fatal visibility over the battlefield
	C.	Marine Corps Maneuver Warfare
		1.	Finding critical vulnerabilities
		2.	Surveillance Reconnaissance and Intel Group (SRIG)
	D.	Aerospace Doctrine - targeting of precision guided munitions
III.	Merging doctrine and technology - challenges for the future
	A.	Technologies
		1.	Operational JSIPS
		2.	Standardized image data formats
		3.	Ground station upgrades
		4.	Collection platform navigation system upgrades to
			improve targeting data accuracy
		5.	SAR guidance system on precision guided bombs
	B.	Training
		1.	Photo-interpreter (PI) training - wartime vs peacetime
		2.	Integration of systems into peacetime exercises
       The world has become forever interconnected by an ex-
plosion of information management technology and high-speed,
multiplex data transmission systems.  The very fiber and
essence of societies around the world have been altered by
an unprecedented flow of information.  The nature of society
has always shaped the nature of warfare in every age, and
the age of the "information revolution" is no exception.
The battlefield commander's ability to "see over the next
hill" in this era of emerging real-time sensors, datalinks,
and sophisticated command and control systems is unprece-
dented.  In fact, sensor technologies have allowed him to
literally see "over the curvature of the earth" with clarity
never before imagined.  In an effort to exploit this
technology, a revolution in military doctrine is also taking
place.  From the concept of maneuver warfare to the target-
ing of precision guided munitions, finding the weak spot in
the enemy's armor has become a critical task--one that de-
mands more than ever before accurate, timely imagery
collection, processing and dissemination. In Southwest Asia,
the new doctrines were there, and the new sensor technolo-
gies were there, but, in many cases, we failed to
effectively integrate the two.  Future warfare demands we
merge doctrine and technology in a manner that fully ex-
ploits the awesome capabilities available to today's
battlefield commander.  In particular, the need to effec-
tively integrate today's new real-time imagery sensors into
the battlefield decision cycle is becoming fundamental to
the success of evolving service doctrines.
     Optical cameras still give the highest resolution when
conditions are right, but they cannot provide the essential
day/night/all-weather cover, nor real-time reporting via datalink.
The development of. . . sensors which produce images that can be
recorded on videotape and transmitted by datalink to a ground
station is transforming the reconnaissance world. (14:833)
       General Norman Schwarzkopf noted the "lack of timely
reconnaissance imagery" as one of the shortfalls of Opera-
tion Desert Storm. (14:833)  One of the contributing factors
to this shortfall was the partial reliance on film-based
photography.  Conventional film-based imagery systems re-
quire time-consuming film developing and exploitation pro-
cesses that often render the product outdated by the time it
gets to the user.  Technology's revolutionary answer to this
problem is digital-based, real-time imagery systems that
allow on-board recording or immediate downlinking of images
to the ground followed by computer-assisted exploitation.
       Real-time imagery systems fall into two categories:
electro-optical (including infrared) and radar imaging sys-
tems.  Each category presents unique solutions to the
reconnaissance shortfalls experienced in the Gulf.  Each
category also has unique capabilities and limitations.
Currently, radar systems include Synthetic Aperture Radar
(SAR) systems and Moving Target Indicators (MTI).
       The principle behind Synthetic Aperture Radar imaging
is not unlike that of flash photography.  With a flash-
equipped camera, the target is illuminated by a flash of
light and the reflected image recorded on film.  SAR imaging
systems work basically the same by illuminating the target
with radar instead of light and recording the reflected
image as a digitized radar return.  The obvious advantage of
such a system is that it works at night and in all weather
conditions.  A major limitation of SAR is the "user un-
friendliness" of the image.  Hardcopy SAR imagery is often
referred to as "blobology" and requires that users be spe-
cifically trained in exploiting such products.  On the other
hand, softcopy SAR imagery, or SAR imagery as seen on the
high-resolution ground station monitors, is often near
film-based quality.  Unfortunately, few product users pres-
ently have access to such monitors.  Both the TR-1 (12:221)
and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) (5:2) employ Synthetic Aperture Radar Systems.
       The real hero of the JSTARS system in the Gulf, howev-
er, was the Moving Target Indicator.  MTI's detect moving
targets by searching for Doppler shift in any of the radar
returns.  The extreme sensitivity of the JSTARS MTI allows
the system, in a wide-area search mode, to detect targets
that would be too small or too far away to see for Fixed
Target Indicating (FTI) systems such as SAR operating in
wide-area search mode.  The major drawback of MTI is its
inability to identify exactly what it sees moving.  The
system does not produce an actual image of the target; it
simply "marks the spot" where it has detected something
moving.  For example, in the Gulf War, a suspected truck
convoy detected by JSTARS turned out to be barbed wire
blowing in the wind.  JSTARS must often cue other sensors on
other platforms to determine exactly what it is looking at.
One of these other sensors, the TR-1, also employs a MTI as
part of its SAR system. (1:695)
       The most recent and possibly the most revolutionary
innovation in aerial reconnaissance systems is electro-
optical (EO) imagery.  EO sensors produce downlink-capable
digitized products that more closely resemble conventional
film-based imagery versus the "blobology" associated with
radar imagery.  The heart and soul of EO technology is the
charge-coupled device or CCD.  The CCD chip is a line array
of between 2,000 and 10,000 small, light-sensitive elements,
or "pixels", normally measuring from 10 to 17 microns per
pixel.  The CCD is positioned where the film would be in a
conventional camera.  The CCD samples the image projected by
the camera lens several thousand times per second.  Each
pixel of the array produces an electrical signal which is
proportional to the strength of the incident light.  Using
the "push-broom" effect, the forward motion of the aircraft
allows the sensor to build up the picture one line at a
time.  The signals are either immediately transmitted to a
ground station via datalink or stored on tape for later
transmission if the aircraft is out of datalink range during
collection. (14:837)  The image is then processed into a
usable intelligence product at the ground station through
enhancement, enlargement, and annotation (explanatory
computer graphics such as direction of North, coordinates of
target, etc).
       The digital nature of an EO image facilitates the use
of powerful computer enhancement techniques that far exceed
the capabilities of conventional film-based image enhance-
ment.  Depending on the type of CCD employed, each line of
an EO image could contain as many as 10,000 pixels--much
more than even the highest resolution monitors can display.
To allow real-time monitoring of images being downlinked,
work station software samples only a fraction of the data
(every 10th pixel, for example) for real-time display and
stores the rest of the data for subsequent retrieval.
Should the photo interpreter (PI) wish to enlarge a small
segment of the image, the computer simply adds back in some
of the missing data as it enlarges the segment to fill the
screen.  This enlargement process can continue with very
little loss of resolution until the computer has added back
all the data for that particular segment of the image.
Further enlargement is possible through computer extrapola-
tion of the image data with an accompanying loss of resolu-
tion.  Obviously, the more pixels per line in the original
image, the higher the resolution that is possible with each
image enlargement.  Original image resolution is also a
function of lens power and pixel sensitivity.  As CCD
technology increases pixel density and sensitivity, the im-
plications for image resolution are obvious.
       The latest EO system currently under development for
use by multiple services is the Advanced Tactical Air
Reconnaissance System (ATARS).  The system consists of both
a low and medium altitude imaging sensor as well as an in-
frared line scanner for use during periods of reduced visi-
bility.  The images from these sensors can be immediately
reviewed in the cockpit and transmitted to ground stations
via wideband secure datalink for rapid exploitation.  Plans
call for employing ATARS aboard Navy and Marine F/A-18Ds,
Air Force RF-16s, and the Marine's mid-range unmanned aerial
vehicle (MR-UAV). (14:834)  Collecting the data and down-
linking is not the end of the process, however.
     Regardless of the amount of data collected, the targets
identified or the accuracies achieved, information has no value
unless the commanders and appropriate fire support elements
receive it in time to react, either through fire, maneuver or
both. (7:61)
       All these incredible capabilities are useless if the
product does not get to the customer in usable form.  During
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, one of the most serious indict-
ments against the reconnaissance community was its inability
to disseminate high quality imagery to those with the most
need for it--those tasked with actually striking targets,
breaching obstacles, or attacking enemy positions.  In most
cases, even so-called real-time imagery was only real-time
to a remote ground site where written reports were dissemi-
nated to users instead of actual imagery.  When aircrews
tasked with striking targets deep inside Iraq did receive
target imagery, it was often transmitted via facsimile ma-
chine producing nothing more than a poor quality copy of the
original.  Even original hard-copy prints from real-time
systems were often poor because of the inherent problems
associated with producing hard-copy print from digital
imagery.  Troops in the field reported receiving superb
quality film-based imagery, but it was often as much as ten
days old--ancient history in desert warfare where even the
terrain can change in ten days.  The real-time sensor revo-
lution currently lacks the one thing that will make it
complete--a reliable system of delivering its products to
the customer in quality form.
       The Joint Service Imagery Processing System or JSIPS
offers hope of providing this capability.
     JSIPS is a transportable, ground-processing facility designed
to receive and exploit soft copy Infrared and Electro-optical
imagery from tactical aerial reconnaissance systems.  It will also
receive and exploit imagery from national and theater sources.
Product improvement options include a Common Radar Processor
to process both tactical and theater radars, and an automated
capability to insert Mapping, Charting and Geodesy products into
JSIPS. (13:3-23)
In its mature form, JSIPS will provide near real-time access
to national level imagery; theater level imagery to include
EO, Synthetic Aperture Radar, and JSTARS; and tactical sys-
tems such as ATARS and UAV imagery.  The system is intended
for use by the Air Force, Marine Corps and Army.  The Navy
will also acquire certain components of the system.  The
system will provide a centralized imagery processing and
exploitation center that will be much more responsive to the
tactical requirements of the field commander.  It will make
near real-time imagery intelligence an integral part of the
operational commander's decision making process. (9:45)
       JSIPS will allow annotated imagery to be transmitted in
the digital data stream for near real-time use in the field.
Supporting communication networks will include satellite
communications, the Defense Data Network and tactical
communications systems.  Imagery will be collected, pro-
cessed and transmitted to Air Force fighter bases or other
appropriate locations in-theater in near real-time. (9:45)
       Capitalizing on the unprecedented ability to see the
enemy in real-time has become a common theme within
developing service doctrines.  Force reductions, non-linear
battlefields, maneuver style warfare and the longer range
lethality of weapons have all driven doctrine toward more
reliance on the unique capabilities offered by real-time
imaging systems.
       The Army's AirLand Battle Future, the next iteration of
AirLand Battle Doctrine currently under development by the
Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), reflects this
increased demand for real-time intelligence.  The Army sees
future battles being fought on less dense, more open
battlefields by much smaller armies.  Armies, including our
own, will field smaller forces due to arms control agree-
ments and the tremendous expense of modern military equip-
ment.  The result will be large gaps between forces,
requiring commanders to concentrate their forces in order to
conduct decisive operations.  Decisive operations then be-
come more risky as large areas are left uncovered. (11:3)
Knowing where and when to concentrate forces therefore be-
comes crucial to success.  Real-time imagery of enemy force
dispositions and movement will identify fleeting opportuni-
ties for decisive operations.
       A well defined picture of the enemy will also subject
him to the long range lethality of modern weapons.  Major
General Stephen Silvasy Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Con-
cepts, Doctrine and Developments, US Army TRADOC, describes
the lethality of future battlefields and real-time imagery's
contribution to that lethality:
     Besides being more open and fluid, future battlefields will
also be much more lethal.  Ironically, the growth in lethality
relates less to the enhanced capabilities of direct-fire systems
than it does to the tremendous advances in the ability of military
forces to acquire information about the enemy; to fuse and
distribute it on a real-time basis; and to engage high-value
targets at great distances with exceptional accuracy.  With these
capabilities, any force, friend or foe, whether deployed in
position for a significant time or on the move, can be detected
and attacked well before it gets within direct-fire range. (11:3)
J-STARS, backed up by other real-time systems in the Gulf,
gave us just such a capability:
     In one of the more startling of Joint STARS's Desert Storm
exploits, specially equipped radar aircraft detected an Iraqi
convoy carrying free rocket over ground (FROG), surface-to-
surface missiles fitted with chemical munitions . . .US officers
immediately targeted the convoy; it was destroyed by cluster bombs
dropped from F-16s. (4:38)
     From its beginning, the Joint STARS concept fit naturally
into the developing US AirLand Battle Doctrine of fighting fast
and fluidly, from the front lines to the enemy's rear echelons.
Joint STARS promises to help tie together a new generation of
weapons, from the Air Force's F-117A Stealth fighter to the Army's
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). (4:39)
       AirLand Battle Future, as it is currently envisioned,
will consist of four phases:  detection-preparation, estab-
lishing conditions for decisive operations, decisive opera-
tions, and reconstitution; (11:5)  The detection phase will
no doubt rely heavily on imaging systems to determine as
much about the enemy as possible to include where he is,
where he is not, and what his weakness are.
       AirLand Battle Future also emphasizes the importance of
maneuver versus the "head-to-head" attrition warfare of the
past.  It calls for attacks on the flank or rear and a focus
on the enemy instead of terrain. (11:3)  As a result, the
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process must
concentrate on the enemy more than it ever has before, and
it must be capable of responding to a fluid, constantly
changing battlefield.  Real-time imagery becomes vital to
this process in determining which flank is exposed, the best
way to get to the enemy's rear, etc.
       Even emerging NATO doctrine, in the wake of post-
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) force-reduction agree-
ments, relies heavily upon timely, accurate battlefield in-
telligence.  One possible direction proposed for NATO
doctrine is "Joint Precision Interdiction" (JPI), which em-
phasizes the capability to "locate, identify, outmaneuver
and outshoot enemy forces." (2:45)  This concept identifies
three conditions for success on the post-CFE battlefield:
- The ability to fight and win the sensor duel.  This duel will be
a reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance battle fought with
sensors as well as soldiers.  The outcome of the sensor duel
relates closely to the outcome of the entire battle because the
winner of the duel succeeds in shaping the battlefield.
- The ability to provide a "fatal visibility" over the battlefield.
We must be able to find the enemy and track him.  From this,
we can prejudge his actions and beat him to the punch.  We
can strike him first, at great range, and effectively disrupt his
- The ability to support the battlefield cycle of concentrate/attack/
disperse.  This cycle is similar to the way the Airborne Warning
and Control System (AWACS) manages the air battle.  You
disperse, you mass, you fight a short, synchronized fight and
then you disperse again.  The focus from beginning to end is on
the enemy force rather than on terrain. (2:45)
       The concept recognizes, as does AirLand Battle Future,
that future battlefields will require maneuver and selective
attack on a less dense, more mobile, non-linear battlefield,
with smaller forces.  The ability to see the enemy and
identify strengths, weaknesses, and intentions in real-time
are paramount to success in future conflicts.  Real-time
sensors such as JSTARS are fundamental components of JPI:
     We cannot attack all enemy movement, so senior commanders
must set priorities and be selective.  To do this, the commander
must see enemy movement deep, identify priority targets and attack
selected moving targets in near real-time.  This is the heart of JPI,
and it centers on JSTARS. (2:51)
       Even the Marine Corps, doctrinally opposed to "squan-
der(ing) opportunities while trying to gain more informa-
tion," (3:69) recognizes the emerging necessity of
integrating real-time intelligence sources into its command
decision cycle.  The Marine Corp's doctrine of Maneuver
Warfare prescribes "exploiting enemy weaknesses, creating
dilemmas through combined arms, and decentralized control
embodying mission-type orders," all with the goal of "un-
hinging the enemy's cohesion, his ability to react." (8:59)
It further prescribes focusing on "critical enemy
vulnerabilities" and exploiting "gaps" or weaknesses in the
enemy's force disposition. (3:73-74)  Identifying enemy
vulnerabilities and gaps thus becomes crucial to success in
maneuver warfare.  On a battlefield characterized by high
mobility and constant change, responsive reconnaissance
plays a key role in Maneuver Warfare:
     Due to the fluid nature of war, gaps will rarely be
permanent and will usually be fleeting.  To exploit them
demands flexibility and speed.  We must actively seek
out gaps by continuous and aggressive reconnaissance.
       To orchestrate the critical task of finding gaps and
critical vulnerabilities,  Marine Air Ground Task Forces
(MAGTFs) have organized Surveillance, Reconnaissance and
Intelligence Groups (SRIGs) at the MAGTF Command Element
level.  The SRIG includes a MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center
(MAFC) that integrates intelligence from all available
sources to fully support the decision cycle of the MAGTF
commander.  The SRIG also includes a Force Imagery Inter-
pretation Unit (FIIU) which will eventually include JSIPS
and its associated access to theater and national level
imagery as well as real-time processing of RPV and F/A-18D
ATARS products.  Such a capability is absolutely crucial
should a MAGTF ever become the core of a Joint Task Force--a
situation that is becoming more and more likely every day as
the prospects increase for smaller, regional conflicts re-
quiring the rapid, flexible response of U. S. Marine forces.
       Aerospace doctrine is becoming more and more reliant
upon real-time imagery as well.  The overwhelming success of
precision-guided munitions in the Gulf War highlighted fur-
ther the need for a timely flow of imagery down to the peo-
ple putting fire and steel on target.  It is no longer
adequate just to know the coordinates and general descrip-
tion of lucrative targets, particularly hardened targets and
those situated within civilian sectors.  The pilot tasked
with taking out a hardened command and control facility with
a laser-guided bomb needs to see high quality imagery of his
target to determine, within feet in some instances, exactly
where to deliver his weapon.  Pilots and planners may not
always have the luxury of waiting for film-based or national
level imagery of such critical targets.
       As real-time digital imagery becomes increasingly more
capable and prevalent, both user and machine must adapt to
each other.  Serious gaps still exist in the man-machine
interface process.  We must tailor exploitation and disse-
mination technology to insure the right people have access
to the right products in a timely manner.  At the same time,
we need to train the users of these products to insure they
are capable of taking full advantage of what digital imagery
has to offer.
       The JSIPS concept will go a long way towards filling
the gaps in the dissemination process.  Given enough ground
stations, dedicated data transfer networks and terminals to
receive the data, imagery from multiple sources can be in
the hands of a field commander or F-117 pilot in a matter of
hours.  Additionally, JSIPS technology may also improve the
quality of hard copy prints produced from digital imagery.
       However, standardization of data formats currently
represents a limitation to this concept.  For example, a
radar correlator is required with JSIPS to process Synthetic
Aperture Radar imagery since radar imagery data is formatted
differently than EO. (14:835)  There are currently a variety
of data formats for EO imagery, also.  One frame of EO
imagery represents a tremendous chunk of data--in some cases
more than conventional data transmission networks can han-
dle.  Therefore, in order to transmit EO imagery, the data
must often be reformatted and compressed using one of a va-
riety of compressed imagery transmission systems.  The data
is then "exploded" at its destination.  These reformatting
algorithms must be standardized to allow ground stations to
receive imagery from any source.
       To make real-time exploitation viable, ground station
upgrades are also necessary.  In the Gulf War, photo inter-
preters (PI's) were often overwhelmed by the sheer volume of
real-time imagery coming across their work station monitors.
Possible targets often had to be stored on tape for later
exploitation because all work stations were occupied at the
time with other targets.  Ground stations should contain at
least four operable work stations, one for a mission monitor
and three others for image enhancement/exploitation.
       Once a target is identified, imaging systems and
associated exploitation processes should be able to provide
accurate target coordinates that are compatible with strike
package navigation systems.  The inherent inaccuracies and
drift rates of inertial navigation systems (INS) on collec-
tion platforms induce errors into the coordinates of targets
that they identify.  This error is further compounded by the
inherent drift rates and inaccuracies in the INS on board
strike aircraft sent to attack the target.  In other words,
given the same set of coordinates, a TR-1 and an F-15E, both
equipped with an inertial navigation system, will likely
identify slightly different points on the ground with their
respective INS.  This disparity could be the difference be-
tween finding and missing the target.  Installing GPS on
board both collection platforms and strike aircraft will
alleviate this problem.  With both receiving navigation data
from the same source, GPS satellites, disparities in target
coordinates will likely be rare.
       Targeting accuracy will be further enhanced by improved
internal guidance systems on the weapons themselves.
Technology is currently under development to install small
Synthetic Aperature Radar systems inside new 2000 lb. Mark
84 precision-guided bombs.  The internal guidance systems on
these weapons, programmed with TR-1 or JSTARS imagery of a
particular target, can use their own SAR capabilities to
search for a target that exactly matches the TR-1/JSTARS
image, and then guide to it with pin-point accuracy.  In
fact, plans call for JSTARS to be able to transmit SAR
imagery directly to strike aircraft carrying the new Mk 84
allowing for in-flight programming of target data. (6:64-66)
       Finally, potential users of digital imagery products
must have the opportunity to train with the products in
peacetime.  PI's should know what it is like to exploit and
disseminate large volumes of imagery on a near real-time
basis under battle conditions.  Often PI's in the Gulf spent
too much time adding impressive graphics and annotations to
the products when the raw image would have sufficed under
the time constraints of the situation.  Similarly, field
commanders and other potential end-users of these products
must become familiar with them in peacetime.  As more sen-
sors and ground stations become available, they should be-
come an integral part of peacetime training exercises.
       During the Civil War, Thaddeus Lowe proposed using his
hot-air balloons for scouting Confederate troop positions in
Northern Virginia.  Lowe sold President Lincoln on the idea
and Lincoln sent Lowe to General Winfield Scott with a
presidential memo urging use of the balloons for reconnais-
sance purposes.  Scott refused several times to even talk to
Lowe about the idea.  It eventually took a personal visit
from President Lincoln himself to force Scott to listen to
Lowe.  Five days later, on 23 June, 1861, Lowe's balloon was
the first aircraft of any kind used in support of military
operations in the United States.  Over the next 2 days, ob-
servers in Lowe's balloon discovered enemy camps located
near Centreville and other parts of western Fairfax County.
(10:C3)  Since that reluctant beginning, aerial reconnais-
sance has been an integral part of U.S. military operations.
       Commanders are no longer reluctant to employ the latest
in technological means of "seeing over the next hill."  As
advances in electro-optics and radar imaging have made
real-time reconnaissance a reality, the Services have re-
vised doctrine and equipment accordingly to take advantage
of this tremendous capability.  Desert Storm represented our
first real attempt at employing the latest advances in
real-time reconnaissance.  However, the lessons from the
Gulf were frustratingly clear.  As capable as real-time
imaging systems are, they still do not fully satisfy the
reconnaissance needs of the battlefield commander.  Disse-
mination, data formats, ground station capabilities, and
targeting accuracy remain as temporary technical limitations
to a fully integrated system.  In addition to solving these
problems, exercising and training with real-time imagery
systems in peacetime are essential if we ever hope to fully
develop the potential of real-time imagery.
1.	Boatman, John.  "TR-1A's New Focus on Moving Targets."
Jane's Defence Weekly (19 October 1991), P. 695.
2.	Ellertson, Jack W., Lt Col, US Army, and Huffman, Alan K.,
US Air Force.  "Joint Precision Interdiction in the Post-CFE Environ-
ment."  Military Review (July 1991), pp. 45-54.
3.	FMFM 1 Warfighting, US Marine Corps, 6 March 1989.
4.	Grier, Peter.  "Joint Stars does its Stuff."  Air Force Magazine
(June 1991), pp. 38-42.
5.	"Joint Stars:  Eyes of the Storm."  Grummand Corporation
JSTARS Information Pamphlet.
6.	Klass, Philip J.  "SAR Seeker Seen as New Contender to Guide
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