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MOS Organization And Training For Tactical SIGINT Modernization
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA Electronic Warfare
Title:  MOS Organization and Training for Tactical SIGINT Modernization
Author:  Major Joseph A. Bruder, IV, United States Marine Corps
Thesis:  The Marine Corps must reorganize and retrain the SIGINT/
Ground Electronic Warfare military occupational specialty or it
will effectively lose its tactical SIGINT capability in the
coming decade.
Background:  The Fleet Marine Force, Radio Battalion plays a
vital role in tactical intelligence by collecting, processing,
and reporting intellignece information derived from enemy
electro-magnetic emissions.  Signals Intelligence information
(SIGINT) is often the most timely and reliable source of
information on enemy capabilites, dispositions, and intentions
produced by intelligence units organic to the FMF.  SIGINT
operations have changed little from the Corps' early involvement
with communications intercept in China during the 1920's.  Target
communication links that a linguist could have prosecuted with
headphones and a generic receiver ten years ago are being
upgraded with digital technology and may shortly require a highly
technical search effort to detect and geolocate, and another
highly technical analytic effort to demodulate.  All of this must
happen before the information can be put into a format that a
linguist or analyst can exploit.  The key to past Marine success
has been the extraordinary efforts of a few well trained Marines
who have made the best of marginal equipment.  Future success
against digital signals will again depend upon well trained
Recommendation:  The Marine Corps must rapidly implement a
tactical SIGINT modernization plan that addresses tactical unit
organization, SIGINT methodology, equipment procurement, and MOS
orgnization and training.
      A.   Loss of Tactical  SIGINT Capability
      B.   New Methodology
      C    Occfield Structure and Training
      A.   Tactical  Signals Targets
              1. Analog technology
              2. Digital  technology
              3. Paradox of scale
              4. Signal  diversity and EW
      B.   Marine Corps Cryptologic Activities
              1. Ground EW
              2. Air EW
      C.   Current Occfield structure
      A.   Ground EW Operator
      B.   Signals Analyst
      C.   Cryptolinguist
      D.   Cryptologic Communicator
      E.   SIGINT Analyst
      F.   SIGINT/Ground EW Operations Chief
      G.   Cryptologic Communications and Admin Chief
      H.   MOS Chart
      I.   Cryptologic Training
      A.   Budget
              1. Manpower
              2. Training
              3. Equipment
      B.   Manpower Management
              1. Promotion pyramid
              2. Top 5 Ratio
              3. Occfield maturity:  Retention and Promotion
      C.   Training  Issues
       A.    New targets-new methodology
         B.  Importance of Signals Analysis
       C.    Manpower and Training
VI.  Bibliography
VII.  Acknowledgments
                       MOS Organization and Training for
                        Tactical SIGINT Modernization
     The Marine Corps has successfully prosecuted tactical
Signals  Intelligence  (SIGINT)  targets for the better part of
this century while enjoying a comfortable lead in technology.
Within the next decade,  however,  the fielding of tactical
digital  communication systems  wiIl  make us  ineffective at
tactical SIGINT.  We must develop a methodology to attack the
digital signals environment.  The reorganizing and retraining
of the enlisted SIGINT/Ground Electronic Warfare Military
Occupational Specialty  (MOS)  is the critical  step in
implementing a  new methodology.   If  we  fail  to change,  our
increasingly obsolete SIGINT efforts will  be relegated to
targeting the insignificant emissions of a dwindling number
of residual analog systems.
     The methodology starts with more comprehensive search and
development operations.   Broadband receivers must map the
electro-magnetic spectrum while,  detecting,  identifying,  and
geolocating enemy emissions.   Non-communications signals must
be reported in real  time to automated Electronic Counter
Measures  (ECM)  systems while automated files are created and
stored for subsequent analysis.   Technical  signals analysis
must then be conducted on communications signals of  interest
(SOI)  to facilitate demodulation.   Only then,  can  linguists
work on the demodulated signal,  be it voice,  fax,  or data.
SIGINT analysts can correlate the results of the translation
effort with their own analysis of enemy emissions to produce
SIGINT products and potential ECM targets.   This methodology
will,  however,  require a  new set of MOS skills.
     Here is  how  we can shape the MOS to support these
changes.   Start with a new entry- level MOS and a revised
occfield basic course.   This would produce a 2621,  Ground
Electronic Warfare Operator.  Candidates for the first-term
and intermediate level MOS's,  2631,  Signals Analyst,  2651,
Special  Intelligence Communicator, and 2671-75,  Crypto-
linguist,  would be drawn from the 2621s.   The 2629,  SIGINT
Analyst,  MOS would be redesignated as an additional MOS for
intermediate and career  level Marines.   MOS 2691 would be
retained as SIGINT/EW Operations Chief,  while 2692,  Special
Security Communications and Administration Chief,  would be
created to recognize the unique skills required of senior
cryptologic communicators.
     When matched with a comprehensive training program,  this
MOS structure can  give us  the force needed to conduct
tactical SIGINT in the digital age.
     The Fleet Marine Force,  Radio Battalion  (FMF,  Radio
Battalion)  plays a vital  role in tactical  intelligence by
collecting,  processing,  and reporting intelligence informa-
tion derived from enemy electro-magnetic emissions.   Signals
Intelligence information,  dubbed SIGINT,  is often the most
timely and reliable organic intelligence source concerning
enemy capabilities,  dispositions,  and intentions.   SIGINT
operations have changed  little from the Corps'  earliest
involvement  with communications intercept  in China during the
1920's.  (12:1)   Then,  a trained  linguist needed only a radio
receiver and a pair of headphones to produce Communications
Intelligence  (COMINT).   Today,  however,  the target signals
have changed.   Gerard Turbe pointed out in 1989 that the days
of headset signal  monitoring are passed.  (13:173)   Marine
tactical  SIGINT/EW operators face a new world of challenges
in the wake of  the current revolution in communications
     For most of this century,  information (usually voice or
text)  was transformed by electro-mechanical  devices  (such as
microphones and teletypes)  into electrical  waveforms that
were analogous to the input signals.   These analog signals
were then placed on wire or radio carriers by using
techniques such as amplitude modulation (AM),  frequency
modulation (FM),  and phase modulation  (PM).   More efficient
use of  individual  carriers was made with the introduction of
new techniques such as single side band suppressed carrier
(SSBSC)  AM modulation or time and frequency division
multiplexing  (TDM/FDM).   Special modulation techniques  were
developed to support machine generated signals.
      It was found that machine output signals could be reduced
to binary codes  (hence the term digital).   These coded
signals,  when transmitted with new modulations such as Pulse
Amplitude Modulation (PAM) or Pulse Position Modulation
(PPM),  yielded significantly reduced error rates and
increased data transmission speeds.   During the 1980's these
relatively simple electromechanical  techniques were eclipsed,
but not totally replaced,  with the introduction of a  new
generation of electronic terminal devices such as computer
modems,  digital  telephones, and facsimile machines.  The
output signals of these new devices are digital.
     A subsequent generation of techniques has  been developed
to place these digital signals onto carriers.   Management of
radio frequencies has also evol ved with the introduction of
code-based frequency utilization schemes such as direct
sequence spread spectrum,  frequency hopping,  and code divis-
ion multiple access (CDMA).
     Adaptive frequency management techniques such as  free
channel  search and meteor burst transmission are now being
fielded.  Radio networks managed by microprocessors can
accommodate the agile frequency usage patterns of cellular
telephones and packet switching devices.   In addition to  wire
and radio,  new carriers such as fiber-optic cable and free
space optical  have been employed.
     For the first  time in our history,  the commercial com-
munications infrastructure is now both more capable, and more
portable than any tactical communications system.   As an
example,  Motorola's "Iridium" satellite-based cellular phone
system promises to blanket the globe with hip-pocket  tele-
phone coverage by 1995.  (4:B1)   We should expect that
tactical  targets will make increasing use of this rapidly
expanding commercial  infrastructure.
     Finally,  the distinction between communications and
weapons-related emissions  is continuing to blur.   Greater
analytic effort will  be required to isolate and identify
non-communication signals.
     The greatest  irony of the digital  revolution is that
advanced digital equipment is most  likely to fielded first by
smaller countries,  para-military forces,  and international
criminal  organizations.   Not surprisingly,  these entities  are
the most  likely targets of Marine operations  in  the coming
decade.   This paradox  is caused by economics.   It is cheaper
for a small  organization to replace its entire communications
system than to maintain old equipment.   Large organizations
find it cheaper to build their own maintenance capability.
Therefore,  they use old technology  longer.   Tactical SIGINT
units,  however,  must identify the most valuable targets and
be prepared to exploit as many of  these new signals as
      In the analog electro-mechanical  world,  it was a simple
matter to guess what kind of modulation techniques  we would
encounter  in tactical  SIGINT collection operations.   In the
digital  electronic world,  it is very difficult to identify
which modulations schemes  we will  encounter on a given
operation.   The depth of this problem is highlighted by the
recent FBI  request for telephone companies to redesign their
digital networks to facilitate wiretapping.  (9:A13, 10:C1)
If an organization with the technical  background of the FBI
requires phone company assistance to conduct fixed plant
wiretaps,  the prospects for continued tactical  SIGINT success
are not good.
     Two key attributes of both the present and future
tactical  SIGINT environment are the increased volume of
communications and the increased diversity of signal and
carrier types.   Target signals that a linguist could have
prosecuted with a generic receiver ten years ago may shortly
require a highly technical  search effort to detect and
geolocate,  and another highly technical  analytic effort to
demodulate,  all  before the  information can be put into a
format that a linguist or analyst can exploit.
      In gross terms,  the value of any one signal  as an
intelligence target will diminish at the same time that the
difficulty of exploiting any particular signal will  increase.
This  leads us to an important conclusion.   We must become
much more selective about which signals  we target  for
exploitation and  we must be more  inclined to target signals
for Electronic Counter Measures  (ECM)  such as automated
Imitative Communications Deception (ICD)  or  jamming.
     The Radio Battalion,  however,  is currently not well
suited to conduct ECM operations.   Not only is considerable
effort needed to modernize ground based ECM equipment against
new communication techniques and smart weapons such as  laser,
thermal and  IR guided munitions,  but there is a more basic
need to refocus Ground Electronic Warfare  (EW) expertise in
the battalion.   It  is immaterial  whether the Radio Battalion
is organized with units that perform single functions
(Functional  T/O),  or with units that are task organized to
perform all  SIGINT/EW functions  (Mirror Image T/O).   What is
relevant,  is the need for a ground EW capability be matched
by a dedicated structure.
     The aviation community has  long recognized the importance
of a dedicated electronic warfare capability.   It  is  resident
in the Marine Air Wing's Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare
Squadron  (VMAQ).   Furthermore,  because processing delays
could cost  lives and equipment,  ESM and ECM equipment is
organic to most airframes and tactical  electronic
intelligence  (TACELINT) is deliver directly to key nodes  in
the Marine Air Command and Control  System (MACCS).   The
Wing's EW philosophy could serve well as a model  for the
reorganization of tactical  SIGINT/EW support to the MAGTF.
     The current manning problems within the  FMF,  Radio
Battalion are further  impetus for changing the organization
of  the 2600 occfield.   The Radio Battalion commander,  who in
addition to his SIGINT mission has a Ground EW and a
Communications Security  (COMSEC)  monitoring mission,  has no
personnel  trained specifically to accomplish either.  (15:7-3)
As ECM grows in its relative importance,  this shortfall  will
become more critical.
     Currently 2621s are Manual  Morse  Intercept Operators.
They are the backbone of the Radio Battalion.   Their primary
MOS skill,  manual-Morse intercept,  drives the national
cryptologic training pipeline,  but goes  largely unused in the
FMF.   These Marines,  with minimal  formal  training,  accomplish
the EW and COMSEC missions.   The  new Multi-Mode Operator
designation for this MOS,  while a step in the right
direction,  does not impart the multitude of skills that these
Marines  need.   Conversely, the proposed elimination of  the
2631,  Non-Morse Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)  Intercept
Operator/Analyst in favor of the 2621 Multi-Mode Operator
saddles 2612's with more skill  requirements than they can
reasonably be expected to master.
     The 2651 Special  Intelligence Communicators man Defense
Special Security Communications System (DSSCS) circuits that
support FMF and base installations.   DSSCS communications
involve radically different equipment and procedures than
AUTODIN communications.   While there has been a suggestion
that 2651s can be merged with the 2542,  Communications Center
Operator field,  it is simply too much to ask a DSSCS
communications center supervisor to be proficient in the
details of both AUTODIN and DSSCS formats.   Additionally,
cryptologic communicators  below the rank of Sergeant have
been in critically short supply for the past several years,
while 2651 Staff NCO's have extremely limited promotion
     The 267X occfields are Cryptologic Linguists (crypto-
liguists) trained in critical  (high-density)  foreign
languages.   Their training is focused on aural  recognition
and translation.   They are not trained to fluency in other
(global)  language skills.   There has been a chronic shortage
of skilled cryptolinguists in the Marine Corps.   The
requirement for formal  training to maintain and improve
language skills competes with the need to man billets in
deploying units.   The  lack of global  language skills among
267Xs  is proving to be a  false economy.  New communications
systems allow the user greater flexibility and thus present
cryptolinguists with styles and formats that they are poorly
trained to handle.
     The current  intermediate  level  occfield, 2629,  Signals
Intelligence Analyst,  is basically sound.  However,  these
Marines,  and 2691 SIGINT/EW Chiefs need a better foundation
in general  intelligence matters and Marine Corps doctrine and
     The Marine Corps must meet the challenges of the digital
signals environment with an integrated solution that
simultaneously addresses occfield structure and training,
unit organization,  methodology,  and equipment.  Unit reorgan-
ization is relatively easy to accomplish.   Methodology is an
arbitrary and,  therefore,  highly flexible variable.   Equip-
ment modernization has often been a stumbling block.   As our
experience with radio reconnaissance has shown,  money does
not necessarily buy  total  solutions.   If we are willing to
work around some shortfalls,  many equipment problems can be
overcome.   However,  the most rapid progress can be achieved
in occfield structure and training.   Furthermore,  if the  lead
is not taken with our Marines,  gains facilitated by unit
reorganization and equipment modernization cannot be
realized.   My solution for a restructured MOS follows.
	MOS 2621,  Ground Electronic Warfare Operator
                                (GySgt to Pvt)
     The Ground Electronic Warfare Operator forms the backbone
of the SIGINT/Ground Electronic Warfare MOS.   The EW Operator
is trained at the Basic Ground Electronic Warfare Operators
Course in EW techniques,  basic DSSCS procedures and
equipment,  Marine Corps common communications equipment and
procedure,  motor vehicle operation and maintenance,  computer
operation and programming,  communications security monitoring
and reporting,  and intelligence oversight regulations.   This
MOS provides the manpower  and expertise for tactical ESM,
ECM,  ECCM,  and COMSEC support to the ground elements of the
MAGTF.   After completion of the EW Operator's initial  tour at
an FMF,  Radio Battalion a lateral move may be requested or
directed to MOS 2631,  2651,  or 267X.   Senior 2621's assist in
EW planning at the MAGTF level.
	MOS 2631,  Signals Analyst (GySgt to LCpl)
     The Signals Analyst receives basic training in the
analysis and demodulation of communication and non-communica-
tion signals and is responsible for the operation of signals
search,  analysis,  and demodulation equipment.   At the rank of
Sergeant to Staff Sergeant the Signals Analyst receives
advanced training in modulation theory and signal analysis
techniques.   Senior Signals Analysts are responsible for the
design and implementation  of signals search,  development,  and
exploitation plans.
	MOS 2651,  Special  Intelligence Communicator
                                (GySgt to LCpl)
     The Special  Intelligence Communicator builds on skills
learned in the Basic Ground Electronic Warfare Operator
Course or those acquired from practical experience gained as
a communications watchstander.   The 2651 receives formal
training as DSSCS communications watch supervisor and is
proficient in DSSCS protocols,  cryptographic security
procedures,  and  special  security administration.
	MOS 2671-5,  Cryptologic Linguist  (GySgt to LCpl)
     The Cryptologic Linguist is trained in one of several
designated high-density foreign languages.   The 267X is given
global  language training with an emphasis on passive
translation skills.   Training in more than one high-density
language is discouraged.   Training is permitted in one
additional  low-density language.   Cryptolinguists will
receive frequent  language maintenance training.  No formal
secondary MOS will be reserved for cryptolinguists in
low-density languages.  These skills will be referenced by
the appropriate DLPT score.   Training  in one  of the  low-
density languages is open to all 26XX Marines (Staff Sergeant
and below).   Manual Morse Code proficiency will be treated as
a low density language.   Language proficiency must  be
maintained through the rank of Master Sergeant.
              MOS 2629,  SIGINT Analyst (MSgt to Sgt)
     The SIGINT Analyst specialty is a required additional MOS
for Marines in the 2621,  2631,  and 267X fields above the rank
of Sergeant.   Marines in the 2651  field may transition to the
2629 MOS.   The 2629  will  receive formal  training in the
analysis and fusion reporting of COMINT,  ELINT,  and FISINT
(Foreign Instrumentation Signals)  information.   SIGINT
Analysts are responsible for development and implementation
of SIGINT collection management plans in coordination with
the general  intelligence effort of the MAGTF.
	MOS 2691,  SIGINT/Ground Electronic Warfare
		Operations Chief  (MGySgt to MSgt)
            The MOS 2691 SIGINT/Ground Electronic Warfare Chief  is
drawn from the 2629 MOS pipeline.   MOS 2691 Marines are
trained to plan and supervise tactical SIGINT and ground EW
operations within the FMF Radio Battalion.   The 2629 may also
be assigned to a MAGTF or Joint staff to assist in planning
SIGINT/EW operations.
	MOS 2692,  Special Security Communications and
		Administration Chief  (MGySgt to MSgt)
      The MOS 2692 Special Security Communications and
Administration Chief  is drawn from the 2651 pipeline.   The
2692 plans and supervises SCI communications.   The 2692 is
also  trained  in  special  security  administration  and
supervises implementation  of special  security regulations.
      The other occfields currently listed in the MOS manual,
2643 Cryptologic Translator,  2649 Cryptanalyst,  and 2669
Cryptologic Support Specialist,  although still needed skills,
have lost their utility as personnel management tools.   The
automated Manpower Management System (MMS) can accurately
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reflect language skill by language,  test score,  and test
date.   MMS can also reflect specific schools attended,
current security investigation status,  and previous
assignment to cryptologic billets.   This obviates the need
for multiple secondary MOS designators.   Specialized skills
can now be more effectively managed through MMS than through
additional MOS designators.
     The benefit  in  forming one entry level MOS is the
potential of a common MOS basic course to produce a large
group of 2600's with needed skills in a shorter training
pipeline.  The 2621 occfield provides a dedicated track for EW
specialists while providing a relatively large pool of
economically trained Marines to man the Radio Battalion.  The
candidates for the hard skills --language,  signals analysis,
and communication -- can be recruited from first-term 2621s,
or from Marines moving  laterally from outside the 2600 field
who successfully complete the 2600 Basic course.   Hard skill
training should be tied to  long service obligations as it is
today.   The proposed hard skill  specialties are matched to
the proposed reorganization and methodology of the Radio
Battalion.   These hard skills,  especially signals analysis,
will  require extensive modification of current cryptologic
instruction.   Marines already in the 2621 and 2631 pipelines
will also require retraining.   Finally,  there is a pressing
need for professional  training for 2600 Staff NCOs.   These
Staff NCOs must better understand the role of tactical SIGINT
and EW in MAGTF operations.
     Any change within a military organization has its costs.
The primary expenses for the proposes changes are in training
and equipment.
     Funding for Marine cryptologic operations and training is
dispersed under a number of programs within the Department of
Defense budget.   The Marine Support Battalion is the national
level counterpart of the Radio Battalion.  Its billets are
paid for by the Consolidated Cryptologic Program  (CCP)  which
is a subset of the National Foreign  Intelligence Program
(NFIP) which,  in turn,   fal under Program  III  (Intelligence
and Communications)  of  the overalI  DOD budget.   These funds
are  fenced so  that the Marine Corps may neither add nor
subtract Marine Support Battalion billets,  nor may the Marine
Corps  divert these funds to other uses.   FMF  billets,  such as
Radio Battalion billets and the various MAGTF command element
billets are funded by the Tactical Cryptologic Program (TCP)
under TIARA (Tactical  Intelligence and Related Activities)
which in turn is grouped under Program  II  (General  Purpose
Forces)  of  the  DOD budget.   While TIARA is managed by the
Secretary of  Defense through OASD (C3I),  NSA supervises  the
expenditure of TCP funds.   Cryptologic training is covered by
Program VIII  (Training,  Medical and . . . )  of the DOD budget.
NSA acts as executive agent for cryptologic training by
supervising the programs of  instruction and allocating
student and instructor billets.   Finally,  HQMC billets are
funded under Program IX (Administration and Associated
Activities).  (7)
     Equipment modernization is an ongoing process.  We must
ensure that  the equipment procured will support the method-
ology,  and training of the Radio Battalion.   We can make the
best use of our manpower by focusing our procurement on
manual signals analysis and demodulation equipment.  This
type  of equipment is currently available on the commercial
market.   Eventually,  equipment capable of adaptive signals
processing will be fielded to automate the analysis and
demodulation process.   If,  however,  we  wait for this next
generation of equipment to be fielded,  we will never build
the tactical expertise needed to employ it properly.
     While the Marine Corps is  free to make substantive
changes in the organization of its cryptologic occfield,  the
related changes in cryptologic training must be sponsored by
NSA and funded by the Training section of OASD (C3I).   Since
basic cryptologic training is consolidated at the national
level,  changes in the program of instruction impact all  the
services.   This makes reform of occfield structure and
training a difficult process.
     To modernize tactical SIGINT in the Marine Corps  we must
also balance the competing objectives of Marine Corps
manpower  management policy and the National Security Agency's
charter as executive agent for cryptologic training.   Each
system seeks to reduce costs,  but  they  often work in
     Marine Corps MOS occfields are structured and managed to
provide adequate numbers of trained personnel  to  the  FMF and
the supporting establishment while providing promotion and
retention opportunities to career Marines.   To do this MOS
occfields are structured as pyramids.   Manpower planners  look
critically at the ratio of Marines in the top five ranks
(MGySgt  to  Sgt)  to  the  total  enlisted  population.   The Top
Five ratio in the Marine Corps is approximately 31.6 %.   The
2600 field is surprisingly close to the Corps as a whole with
a Top Five ratio of 39.6%.  (14)
     A series of planning guidelines instituted in 1985,  under
the title  of Career Force Controls,  assist in managing the
overall  enlisted population.   The 2600 occfield has
historically been faster than the Corps'  promotion goals.
While promotions  in the  lower ranks may still  be rapid,  Staff
NCO promotions  are  slowing drastically.
     There is a direct relationship between promotions and
retention.   As retention increases promotion must slow down.
The  benefit  is a more mature,  hence more experienced and more
highly skilled,  enlisted force.    While 2600 retention may
exceed manpower goals,  the attrition of  trained and
experienced 2600s still  causes critical  shortages  in key
operational  billets.   One note of caution must be observed
With a more stable career force we must become more selective
in approving  reenlistees.   If  we do not,  some of our best
Marines  will  be forced out for want  of reenlistment quotas.
     At this point it is necessary to place these different
factors  in balance.   The 2600 field,  because of  its
requirement for extensive formal  training,  benefits from a
more mature enlisted population.   At the Radio Battalion
there is,  however,  a requirement for a  large population of
Marines with only basic training in SIGINT/EW skills.  By
using EW Operators to perform a multitude of  tasks  in the
Radio Battalion we can reduce our basic training pipeline and
reserve our critical  school  seats  in the hard skill  areas of
Language,  Signals Analysis,  and DSSCS communications for
Marines who have a better SIGINT/EW foundation and who are
willing to commit to a Marine career.   I  believe that
Marines, who  are  intelIigent and aggressive enough to
complete this training,  will  be willing to  live  with  the
reduced promotion opportunities  that  a  more  mature  force
implies.   I  also  submit  that,  if  necessary,  we  should  support
training requirements at the expense of FMF and other
supporting establishment requirements.   Our commonwealth
partners have repeatedly shown us,  a small,  but highly
trained effort can be many times more productive than the
mass type effort that we attempt to field.
     Tactical  SIGINT targets have already begun to change as a
result of the digital  communications-electronics revolution.
Without major changes to unit organization,  methodology,
equipment,  and occupational field organization and training
Marine Corps tactical  SIGINT capability  will  erode  rapidly in
the  coming  decade.   Key  factors  include  the  greater
difficulty  of  exploiting  an  increasing  number  of  digital
signals  and  the  proliferation  of  weapons-related  emissions.
This  will  result  in  a  greater need  for  ECM  operations  based
on  more  systematic  signal  search  and  analysis  techniques.
While  adaptive  processing  techniques  may  eventually  reduce
the  burden  of  manual  signals  analysis,  the  most  expedient
solution  for  the  five-year  to  ten-year  time  frame  will
require  a  more  highly trained force.
     The Marine 2600 occfield should be restructured with one
entry level MOS: 2621 Ground EW Operator;  three first term
MOS's: 2631 Signals Analyst,  2651 Special  Intelligence
Communicator,  and 267X Cryptolinguist; one career  level
secondary MOS: 2629 SIGINT Analyst,  and two career  level
primary MOS's 2691 SIGINT/Ground EW Operations Chief and 2692
Special Security Communications and Administration Chief.
AlI other current MOS have been made obsolete as manpower
management tools by improvements to the on-line Manpower
Management System and should be discontinued.   Marine Corps
manpower policy wiIl accommodate these changes.   The
cryptologic training process will  not.  The Marine Corps must
convince NSA,  OASD (C3I),  and the other services that
enlisted cryptologic training must be substantially revised
to protect our tactical SIGINT capability.
     Our enlisted Marines are our best SIGINT resource.   We
have done a poor  job of tapping their potential.   If we do
not reorganize and retrain them,  we will not succeed in the
digital  SIGINT era.
1.   Acker,  David  D.,  and Ainsley,  Robert J.,  "Role  of
     Technology  In Communication," Program Manager,  May-June
     1990,  pp.14-57.
2    "Battle of the Airwaves." Jane's Defence Weekly,
     February 9, 1991,  pp.  186-7.
3.   Boyle, Dan,  and Sundaram,  Gowri,  "Future Combat Radios;
      The Key Lies  In Digitization,"  International  Defense
      Review,  May,  1991,  pp.  427-432.
4.   Burgess,  John.  "International  Group Backs Global
     Satellite Phone Plan;  U.S. Firms Could Be Top Suppliers
     of  New Technology," The Washington Post,  March 4,  1992,
     Section B.,  p. 1.
5.   Curtis, Ian.  "New Political  and Technological  Realities
     Are Forcing Changes  in C3I,  But is anyone Out there
     Paying Attention," Defense & Foreign Affairs, July
     1990,  pp.  22-5.
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     This paper is an independent proposal  for the
reorganization of the Marine 2600 Military Occupational
Specialty field.   It does not represent the official
positions of  the individuals and organizations that have
assisted me with my research.   Many have been kind enough
to point out the shortcomings of my proposals.   I  was,
unfortunately,  not able to address all of the factors that
impact on occfield reorganization.   Frankly,  I  doubt that
all  of  these factors can be addressed at once as the
structuring of an occfield  is more the art of compromise
than it is the science of management.  This paper does,
however,  attempt to advance a concept for  the modernization
of tactical  SIGINT operations in the Marine Corps.  I  wish
to thank the following  individuals and organizations for
their assistance.
Headquarters Marine Corps:  Capt J.  Wheeler, Capt J. Peterson,
	MSgt.  V.  Hines,  MSgt Kowalski, Sgt Tanner
MAGTF Instruction Team; Capt R.  White
NSA;  Lt Col. B.  Meluson USAF,  Capt A.  Kinslow, GySgt M. Willmann
Lt Col  R.  W.  Carrick,  Lt Col  K.  Donaleski.  Maj. D. Witmer,
      Maj. J.  Aldrich

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