Threat Intelligence: A Critical Element Of TAMPS
AUTHOR Major Roy D. Bryant, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THREAT INTELLIGENCE: A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF TAMPS
While air power is glamorous and sensational, a tremend-
ous amount of detailed, time-consuming planning takes place
before each mission is flown. The focus of this preparation
is the enemy's Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The
Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System (TAMPS) is a
computerized tool that helps shorten the planning process.
It is essential that the TAMPS data base contains the
most up-to-date information available concerning the locations
of enemy weapon systems. The actical Electronic Reconnais-
sance Processing and Evaluation System (TERPES),
developed to aid Marine EA-6 aircrews in mission preparation
and post-mission analysis, maintains just such a data base
which is kept up-to-date by the fusion of data from a variety
of intelligence sources. At the present, the Marine Corps does
not have a timely and reliable method to keep the TAMPS threat
location data base current. However, the information to update
TAMPS is resident within TERPES and we need to fully develop
a computer-to-computer communications interface between
TAMPS and TERPES to pass that information.
A major flaw in TAMPS is the way the threat data base is
maintained. It is updated monthly by computer tape but relys
on manual updates for any changes that occur in between tape
deliveries. We needs to keep the TAMPS threat data current
with real-time or near-real-time information.
TERPES has developed the capability of being a data fusion
center, combining intelligence data gathered from multiple
sources to produce a more accurate threat data base for the
area of interest. We need to be able to electronically transfer
this information from TERPES to TAMPS in a form that can
be readily used.
In July of 1990, a proof of concept test was conducted in
which data was successfully transferred between TAMPS and TERPES
through a direct wire interface. While this would need to be
developed into something more robust, it is a starting point. A
logical follow on to the direct wire interface between TAMPS and
TERPES would be a communications interface that would allow
an information exchange between TAMPS and TERPES systems
that were not collocated.
Capabilities that currently exist in TERPES make it a logical
choice to provide data base updates to TAMPS, but we need to connect
the two systems through a communications interface and capitalize on
these capabilities.
THREAT INTELLIGENCE: A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF TAMPS
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. At the present, the Marine Corps does not
have a timely and reliable method to keep the TAMPS threat
location data base current. However, the information to
update TAMPS is resident within TERPES and we need to fully
develop a computer-to-computer communications interface
between TAMPS and TERPES to pass that information.
I. PENETRATING ENEMY INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE (IADS)
A. Function of IADS
B. Proper Mission Planning
1. Time Consuming Process
2. TAMPS: Computerized Planning
Tool
II. THREAT DATA BASE
A. Need for Accurate Threat Data
B. Current Data Base Maintenance
C. Need for Near-Real-Time Updates
III. TERPES CAPABILITIES
A. TERPES Development
B. TERPES-TRE Interface
C. Data Fusion Center
IV. TAMPS-TERPES INTERFACE
A. Proof of Concept
B. Future Communications Interface
Air power, without a doubt, is the most glamorous and
sensational of modern combat forces. During the opening
days of Operation Desert Storm, the world watched in awe as
allied air forces bombarded their targets with intimidating
accuracy and devastating lethality. However, there is much
more to an air strike than that which occurs between take-
off and landing. A tremendous amount of detailed planning
takes place before each mission is flown. The focus of this
intense preparation is the enemy's Integrated Air Defense
System (IADS) whose primary responsibility will be the
elimination of our ability to fly into enemy airspace. With
the recent addition of the Tactical Aircraft Mission
Planning System (TAMPS) to the inventory, Marine aircrews
now have a computerized tool to aid in this time-consuming
planning process.
Yet, while TAMPS can cut the required planning time
tremendously, the solutions obtained are only as good as the
information used. The adage "garbage in/garbage out"
certainly applies. It is absolutely essential that the
TAMPS data base contains the most accurate and up-to-date
information available concerning the locations of enemy
weapon systems. The Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance
Processing and Evaluation System (TERPES), developed to aid
Marine EA-6 aircrews in the preparation and the post-mission
analysis of their missions, maintains just such a data base
which is kept up-to-date by the fusion of data from a
variety of intelligence sources. (1) At the present, the
Marine Corps does not have a timely and reliable method to
keep the TAMPS threat location data base current.(5)
However, the information to update TAMPS is resident within
TERPES and we need to fully develop a computer-to-computer
communications interface between TAMPS and TERPES to pass
that information.
Because of the tremendous power available in the
aggregate air forces of all branches of the United States
military, any sophisticated enemy that we will face will
posses an IADS intent on neutralizing our air power. This
IADS will include a network of early warning RADARs,
reporting stations, Surface to Air Missile (SAM) sites,
Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) sites, and fighter air bases
that are linked to his command and control system. The
primary mission of friendly strike groups will be to
penetrate enemy air space to destroy assigned targets. At
the same time, the focus of the enemy's IADS will be on
shooting these aircraft down.
Although we have an impressive ability to jam enemy
RADARs and degrade the ability of the IADS to function, one
of the best ways to defeat an enemy's air defense is through
the proper planning of the mission. A mission commander
will greatly enhance the survivability of his strike package
if he selects a route of flight that avoids enemy weapon
systems to the extent possible and uses terrain masking to
exploit weakness in the enemy's defenses. If the enemy
can't see you, he can't shoot you. However, just the
procedure of plotting enemy weapon system locations on a
chart and computing the areas where these systems are
"blinded" because of the surrounding terrain can consume a
considerable amount of valuable time. The speed of a
computer is a superb asset in this process. TAMPS
represents a concept that is long overdue.
But, more important than reducing the required planning
time is ensuring that the intelligence data used in
constructing the plan is timely and accurate. No matter how
quickly a strike mission is planned, it is of little or no
value if the enemy Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) and
Missile Order of Battle (MOB) that are used are out of date
and inaccurate. The quality of any mission plan hinges on
the planner knowing the types and locations of his threats.
A major flaw in TAMPS is the way in which the threat
location data base is maintained. TAMPS is an offshoot of
the computerized mission planning system that was developed
for cruise missiles. Being a strategic asset, the cruise
missile planners receive their threat data via the
Consolidated Air Defense Order of Battle (CADOB) data base,
a Strategic Air Command (SAC) intelligence product. Because
of the developmental ties between TAMPS and the cruise
missile program, CADOB is also the primary source of threat
intelligence data for TAMPS. (5) This information is
received on a monthly basis via magnetic tape and is used to
bring the TAMPS data base up to a "current" status.
Unfortunately, given the time required to gather the
intelligence, build the data base tape, and distribute the
product, the information is already dated the day the tape
is received.
Rather than relying on monthly tape deliveries, Marine
aviation needs some method of keeping the TAMPS threat data
base current with real-time or near-real-time information.
Unfortunately, this does not exist. In an age of high-tech
data links and instant information flow, the TAMPS system
manager must resort to manually entering any changes that
occur in the enemy's EOB/MOB. What's worse is that he won't
even know that his system is "broken" unless he sifts
through a pile of secret message traffic and discovers that
something has moved. The worst possible indication that the
TAMPS data base is not current would be for a pilot to
report back that his wingman was shot down by an uncharted
SAM. In today's highly mobile battlefield, mission planners
should expect that even the "fixed site" weapon systems will
be moving to alternate prepared positions.
Intelligence information that is such a vital element
to the effectiveness of TAMPS is being collected and
processed almost continuously by a variety of platforms. As
one might well expect, technology is in place to disseminate
the resulting product to the intelligence community. The
key is to be able to rapidly pass the most current EOB/MOB
data to the mission commander on the TAMPS machine as soon
as it is available.
For a solution to this problem, let's look to the
electronic warfare assets of the wing, the EA-6 community,
and their primary computer support system.
TERPES is a support system that was originally
developed in the 970's to process intelligence data
gathered during both Electronic Surveillance Measures (ESM)
missions and RADAR jamming missions conducted by Marine
EA-6's. Even more than TAMPS users, EA-6 mission planners
using TERPES need to have the clearest possible picture of
the enemy's EOB. In that effort, TERPES receives data tapes
produced by the Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS)
that are very similar in content and distribution schedule
as the CADOB tapes used by TAMPS.(1) Additionally, TERPES
has the immediate benefit of the intelligence gathered
during local EA-6 ESM missions.
More significant is the recent increase in intelligence
capabilities gained through the incorporation of the
Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) into the TERPES suite.
Through data-link technology, TRE provides near-real-time
threat data that has been collected by a variety of
intelligence gathering platforms. This near-real-time
intelligence is ported into TERPES via a recently
operational TERPES-TRE interface. This information allows
the TERPES signal intelligence analysts to rapidly update
the threat data bases in a much timelier fashion.
Thus, TERPES has developed the capability of being a
data fusion center, combining intelligence data gathered
from multiple sources to produce a more accurate threat data
base for the area of interest.(1) Armed with this
information, aircrews can plan their missions with a much
clearer picture of the current battlefield.
Yet, to benefit TAMPS users, we still need to be able
to electronically transfer this information from TERPES to
TAMPS in a form that he can readily use.
During July of 1990, a proof of concept test was
conducted at the Pacific Missile Test Center, Pt. Mugu,
CA.(4) Among other demonstrations in this test, a TAMPS and
a TERPES were connected through a direct wire interface.
EOB data was successfully passed from TERPES to TAMPS and
used to update the threat data base in TAMPS. Similarly,
strike mission flight path routing was passed from TAMPS to
TERPES. While this interface would need to be developed
into something more robust, it provides a starting point in
the solution of a very real problem. It is much more
responsive than transporting the updated information via
magnetic tape. And it is light years ahead of updating the
data base with information on a computer printout that has
to be manually entered.
A logical follow on to the direct wire interface
between TAMPS and TERPES would be a communications interface
that would allow an information exchange between TAMPS and
TERPES systems that were not collocated.
While TAMPS is a positive move toward easing the
mission planner's workload and increasing the survivability
of Marine aviation, we must ensure that the TAMPS threat
data bases are accurately maintained. Capabilities that
currently exist in TERPES make it a logical choice to
provide data base updates to TAMPS, but we need to connect
the two systems through a communications interface. Marine
aviators deserve the most current threat data available when
they plan their missions. We just need to capitalize on
current capabilities.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Carter, T. L., CWO-2 USMC, OIC TERPES Weapons System
Support Activity, Pacific Missile Test Center, Pt. Mugu, CA. Personal
interview about TERPES developmental issues, April 1, 1991.
2. Cruise Missile Project (PMA-281), NAVAIRSYSCOM, Washington,
D.C., "Modified Interface Requirements Specification for the TAMPS,
TEAMS, TERPES Interface," (Draft), prepared by Science Applications
International Corporation, May 1990.
3. Fry, D. R., LtCol USMC, Head, Intelligence Section, MAGTF
Integration Team, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, notes from
TAMPS Advisory Group Meeting, May 1-3 1990.
4. Rowell, M. O. Maj USMC, Marine Corps Liason Officer to EA-6B
Software Support Activity, Pacific Missile Test Center, Pt. Mugu, CA.
Personal interview about TERPES/TEAMS developmental issues, February
12, 1991.
5. Womble, A.M., Capt USMC, Chairman, TAMPS Fleet Project
Team, Naval Strike Warfare Center, NAS Fallon, NV. Personal
interview about TAMPS developmental issues, April 1, 1991.
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