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The Intelligence Link--Unmanned Aerial Vehicles And The Battlefield Commander
AUTHOR Major Kenneth S. Smith Jr, USAF
CSC 1990
                EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE:  The Intelligence Link--Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and
the Battlefield Commander
THESIS:  There is a genuine need for the development and
acquisition of a family of unmanned aerial vehicles to
augment and enhance the intelligence network, especially as
it applies to the battlefield commander.
BACKGROUND:  The future of land warfare is anyone's guess,
but it is safe to assume that technological advancements in
arms and equipment will exert an increasing influence on
planning and conducting war.  One advancement that is
receiving the attention of battlefield tacticians is the
Remotely-piloted Vehicle (RPV).  There are many examples
throughout the history of armed conflict which indicate, as
far back as 7th century China, the use of unmanned weapons.
However, the true impact of these weapons has yet to be felt.
Today's war strategists, armed with a Congressional mandate,
are seeking the design and implementation of several
inexpensive, survivable unmanned aerial vehicles.  There are
many reasons for this, but, the chief motivating factor seems
to be that war has become too lethal for men and too
expensive for manned machines.  No longer regarded as a
novelty, RPV employment on future battlefields is inevitable.
RECOMMENDATIONS:  The RPV, when correctly employed, can fill
several gaps in the intelligence network.  Among the many
missions planned for these unmanned aircraft are
reconnaissance, target acquisition and spotting, search and
rescue, communication enhancement, and battle damage
assessment.  Most importantly, though, is the potential
benefit to the front-line battlefield commander in providing
valuable intellignece information not available from other
means.  It is a complicated process to introduce a new weapon
system into the `tried and true' tactics of warfighting.
Therefore, it is extremely important for each commander to
learn, understand, and utilize this new and valuable system.
The doctrine and tactics practiced today must be both
flexible and adaptable to meet the needs of the future as
well as the weapons of the future.
CONCLUSIONS:  The age of the unmanned, remotely-operated
weapon is upon us.  In spite of the hurdles ahead, such as
the decreasing defense dollar and inflation, we have the
opportunity to give our battlefield commanders a low-cost,
far-reaching warfighting tool which will greatly influence
the battle--in our favor.
               THE INTELLIGENCE LINK--
THESIS STATEMENT:  To help ensure our success in future
military conflicts, we must fund, develop, and acquire a
family of unmanned aerial vehicles to augment and enhance our
intelligence network.
  I.  History of RPV use on the battlefield
      A. Myth or reality
      B. Historical influence on today's RPV designs
 II.  Why remotely-piloted vehicles?
      A. Advantages and disadvantages
III.  RPV employment on the battlefield
      A. Potential RPV missions
      B. Lessons learned
      C. Limitations
      D. Smart employment
          "Intelligence is a luxury, sometimes useless,
     sometimes fatal.  It is a torch or firebrand according
     to the use one makes of it."--CABALLERO
     Throughout the history of armed conflict, battlefield
commanders have attempted to learn as much about their enemy
as possible.  Indeed, the need for current and accurate
intelligence information is paramount to achieving success.
Today's battlefield commander, through intricate and
sometimes complex command, control, and communication
systems, constantly seeks information on the enemy hoping to
gain the advantage.  However, gaining the advantage is only
half of the battle.  The commander must also maintain the
advantage if he is going to be truly successful.  The
sophistication of weapon systems available today have done
much to help the commander maintain the advantage.  The shear
lethality of these weapons has made every battlefield
decision one of extreme import and implication requiring each
decision to be both timely and informed.  This is why
accurate and timely battlefield intelligence is so important.
     While today's intelligence gathering procedures and
equipment are good, the capabilities are, in many areas,
inadequate and could be improved.  One improvement that is
receiving the attention of battlefield tacticians is the
Remotely-piloted Vehicle (RPV).  Department of Defense
planners are currently studying how gaps in the intelligence
network can be filled by using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAV).  These planners believe that UAVs can, not only,
collect high-resolution imagery and data-link this
information to the battlefield commander in real-time, but
also, help direct weapons fire on enemy targets with extreme
     Unmanned weapons and reconnaissance platforms are on the
verge of proliferating our military.  No longer regarded as a
novelty, RPV employment on future battlefields is inevitable.
Tasks that have become simply too lethal for men and too
expensive for manned machines, such as, mine clearance,
battlefield reconnaissance, and artillery spotting, are soon
to be the responsibility of highly efficient, technologically
advanced unmanned aerial vehicles.  Their use in tomorrows'
wars will be limited only by the imagination of the user  But
if historical accounts are an indicator, then the use of RPVs
could very well be the key to battlefield success.
          "The ancient Greeks wrote that their god of fire,
     Hephaestus, brought to life a giant bronze statue to
     guard the island of Crete for King Minos.  A similar
     Greek legend told of the statue of Talos being animated
     by Daedalus to protect the island of Thera from Jason
     and his Argonauts."1
     Chinese writings of a thousand years ago discuss the use
of large kites to bomb defenders of a walled city.  Whether
fact or fantasy, it emphasized for the first time that
unmanned systems were capable of attacking an enemy without
placing ones' own soldiers at risk.  The use of RPVs on the
battlefield is not a new concept.  The first historically
documented unmanned weapon system was Frenchman Charles
Rogier's aerial balloon system in 1818.  This lighter-than-
air unmanned vehicle utilized a delayed-action fusing device
which, while hovering over an enemy position, would launch a
barrage of rockets.  The accuracy and lethality of this
weapon was questionable at best, but as a psychological
weapon it definately played upon the enemys' fears.
     There are literally hundreds of examples in history of
unmanned, remotely-positioned weapons being developed and
used in wartime.  While some may have been shrouded in myth,
others became viable, capable weapon systems.  Many made it
past the drawing board.  By the 1890's, U.S. Army researchers
were experimenting with a kite-mounted aerial photography
system.  At about the same time British scientists were
testing remotely controlled torpedoes to be used in harbor
defenses.  Robotic weaponry took a dramatic leap forward at
the onset of World War I.  In an effort to reduce the
increasingly heavy casualties of their pilots and to provide
a means to intercept German Zeppelin airships, the British
initiated a program to design a pilotless aircraft capable of
maneuvering to a target and exploding on impact.  Several
test flights proved promising, however, it was never proven
in battle due to the war's end.
     By World War II, the unmanned aerial vehicle had reached
a new state of lethality and notoriety.  The V-1 buzz bomb,
developed by the Germans, proved both deadly and accurate in
spite of many mechanical difficulties.  "Only one-fourth of
all V-1 buzz bombs launched against England (appoximately
2500) survived mechanical failure or British air defenses.
The 25 percent that did get through, however, inflicted some
14,665 casualties."2  The development of the V-1 was a
technological wonder and a psychological terror, but its
greatest influence was on Soviet and U.S. cruise missile
research following the war.
     By the 1960's, RPV's had developed into sophisticated and
survivable aerial delivery systems.  Unknown to many casual
military historians, unmanned reconnaissance drones were used
extensively in the Vietnam War between 1964 and 1975 with
great success.  They were invaluable in identifying enemy
strongpoints, troop assembly areas, air defense locations and
battlefield damage.  They provided the front-line commander
with near-real-time intelligence information which quite
probably saved hundreds, if not thousands, of American lives.
     In spite of the success of unmanned reconnaissance
drones in Vietnam, five years after the war the U.S. had not
one single RPV in its inventory.  Proponents of RPV use could
not convince the military that unmanned aerial vehicles had
proven their worth, both monetarily and militarily.  Other
countries, to include Great Britain, Belgium, Israel, and
the USSR, continued to develop and improve these systems.  In
several remarkable instances, to be discussed later, Israel
successfully applied RPV technology in a battlefield
     The major U.S. emphasis on unmanned aircraft in the
1970's continued to be in the area of cruise missiles, which
could be launched from ground, air, and sea platforms.  The
Army was finally able to fund the Aquila RPV program in the
late 1970's.  With a small budget and little high level
support, the program did not gain momentum until the Israelis
demonstrated phenomenal success with the RPV.  Since then RPV
research and development proliferated in the United States.
     It appears that as we enter a new decade, RPV programs
will continue to grow in the U.S.  Proponents believe that
they are the weapon system of the future.  The economics and
ferocity of warfighting, today and tomorrow, make the
unmanned aerial platform look very attractive.  The question
to be answered is why?  Why RPVs?  What potential benefits
can today's battlefield commander gain from their use?  The
answers are easy.
          "It is DoD intent to provide needed non-lethal UAV
     operational capabilities to commanders."3
     On the face of it, remotely-piloted aircraft have many
sound arguments in their favor.  They can be developed,
produced, and operated at a fraction of the cost of manned
aircraft.  The relative savings in engines, airframes, fuel
consumption, pilot training, logistics, and maintenance would
save the Defense Department millions if not billions of
dollars--a prospect that is very attractive given today's
fiscal constaints.  But, perhaps, the most visible advantage
with RPVs is the human risk factor is virtually eliminated.
     Over 5000 Americans lost their lives in the Vietnam War
because their aircraft were shot down.  Among the most
dangerous missions were reconnaissance flights.  Of all our
prisoners of war, 90 per cent were downed pilots or crewmen.
In 1982, the US Navy risked the lives of two crewmen in a 40
million dollar F-14 to obtain non-real time photographic
intelligence of targets in Lebanon.  This was followed by an
air strike, in which the Navy lost two aircraft out of 28, a
third damaged, one pilot killed, and one crewman taken
prisoner.4  Could these missions have been carried out by
remotely guided aerial vehicles?  Many of today's military
planners believe so.  There is little doubt that using
unmanned reconnaissance aircraft would have been cheaper
and would have produced real-time intelligence, and, most
importantly, it would not have exposed our pilots to the
inherant dangers of the air war.
     Another important advantage of RPVs is their
survivability.  Consider these two quotations:
     "This...target was...flown against the concentrated
     gunfire of the (British) Home Fleet during an exercise
     in the Mediterranean.  For two hours, every gun in the
     fleet tried in vain to destroy the lone, slow and
     fragile target, but it was recovered safely."5
     "Thousands of rounds of radar-directed fire from a
     sophisticated air defense gun, as well as hundreds of
     rounds of fifty caliber, were expended on an unmanned
     vehicle flying well within range.  The unmanned vehicle
     flew on without a scratch."6
     These quotes are noteworthy not only as an indicator of
survivability but because between the two incidents there is
a span of 47 years. (The first was logged in 1933 by an
ancient Fairey Queen biplane, the second was quoted during a
US government hearing in 1980.)   Further proof of RPV
survivability can be found in the Vietnam War.  Between 1964
and 1975, the Air Force flew a total of 3,435 operational
reconnaissance drone sorties in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
Of these, 2,873 drones, or 84 per cent, came back from their
missions successfully.  From 1972, as more sophisticated
models were introduced, survival rates were well in excess of
90 per cent.7
     Perhaps the Israelis have best demonstrated the use of
RPVs on the battlefield.  The Israeli Air Force first
recognised the value of RPVs in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.
They were able to reduce their manned aircraft losses by
saturating heavy Egyptian air defenses with unmanned drones
along the Suez canal.  Using the inexpensive Chukar drone the
SAM batteries were deceived into activating their radars
while Israeli fighters remained just out of range.  Once
exposed, the Egyptian SAM batteries were easy targets for the
Israeli aircraft.  Shortly after the war, the Israeli Defense
Forces began the development of small, versatile, low-
signature RPVs, able to send back real-time intelligence by
direct video link.  These UAVs would be capable of being
operated in the field by ordinary soldiers after only three
to six months training.
     By 1982, when the Israelis launched its "Peace for
Galilee" offensive against Syrian troops in Lebanon, the RPV
would play a significant role in Israels' military tactics.
Using unmanned drones equipped with radar reflectors designed
to simulate full size aircraft, these small RPVs would draw
fire from the Syrian anti-air missile batteries.  Other
drones carrying explosives remained undetected by Syrian
radar enabling them to home in on the radars' emissions and
destroy them on impact.  The Syrian air defense batteries,
now stripped of their capability to see, were virtually wiped
out by manned strike aircraft.  An excellent use of combined
manned and unmanned aircraft, not one single Israeli pilot
was lost.
     On the technological side, the most promising military
mission for RPVs still seems to be reconnaissance and data
gathering.  While state-of-the-art technology is now
available and can be applied to RPV requirements, more
research and development is needed to improve the
effectiveness and reliability of data links, especially over
long distances, and to facilitate payload integration.
Unmanned aerial platforms equipped with television cameras or
forward looking infrared (FLIR) sensors have already been
developed and tested, both in the U.S. and abroad.  In one
test conducted by the Navy in 1986, a television equipped
Pioneer RPV accurately controlled sixteen-inch naval gunfire
for over two hours using the on-board camera and data link.8
Improvements in such areas as camera resolution, compact
navigation equipment, increased range, and communication
down-link with ground controllers have greatly increased the
attactiveness and marketability of the RPV system.
     Another distinct advantage of UAVs is their cost
effectiveness.  Remotely-piloted or unmanned aerial vehicles
are definately cheaper to procure, operate, and maintain than
manned aircraft.  Compare the average cost of an RPV at
$40,000 per unit (mission payload capabilities can add from
$500,000 to $2 million to the value of the aerial package) to
the $14-30 million per manned, fighter-type aircraft and the
savings is evident.9  However, real dollar savings is hard to
precisely gauge when one of the chief advantages of RPVs is
that they save lives.  It is safe to assume that the higher
the probability that a reconnaissance platform, be it manned
or unmanned, will be lost to enemy fire, or the greater the
cost difference between UAVs and manned aircraft, the more
attractive the UAV appears.
     The many advantages of unmanned aircraft have caught the
attention of Congress and the Department of Defense.  In
1987, Congress mandated the military services to work toward
the joint development and acquisition of a family of
survivable, non-lethal UAVs.  To this end, the Pentagon
established the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Joint Program Office
(JPO) tasked with consolidating the needs of the services
with the technology offered by the contractors.  The JPO
master plan for the acquisition of UAVs calls for a vehicle
with the radius of action approximately 300 km from the
forward line of troops with a loiter time of three to six
hours desired.  "Payloads in order of priority include SIGINT
(signals intelligence), communications relay, imaging
sensors, meteorological sensors, nuclear/biological/nuclear
monitors, and MASINT (measurement/ signals intelligence)."10
At this point in time it is not a question of "will we buy"
but "when will we buy".
     As each component service grapples with its peculiar
requirements, it is inevitable that a wide array of RPV
weapon systems will be tested.  For example the Air Force is
currently exploring designs for an unmanned hypersonic drone
that could fly to any continent in less than an hour to
perform surveillance or military strikes.  The drone would be
capable of flying as fast as Mach 20 to outrun even the most
advanced Soviet defenses.11  The U.S. Navy has been actively
testing ship-launched, medium range RPVs, deployable from
battleships, to aid in fire control and reconnaissance.  The
Army and Marine Corps have been working closely to develop an
RPV system which can be operated at the front lines by ground
troops that is capable of providing real-time imagery of
enemy target locations, reconnaissance, battle damage
assessment, and search and rescue assistance.  It is this
last area of application--use on the battlefield--which
will be explored next.
          "In battle after battle since antiquity the victor
     was the commander who could most quickly recognize his
     enemys' key vulnerabilities and exploit those miscues in
     a timely manner."12
     The unmanned aerial vehicle offers a uniquely flexible
means of gathering information on the enemy and relaying this
information in real-time.  This capability can fill a
critical gap in the intelligence network.  That is, providing
the front-line commander an instantaneous source of
intelligence allowing him to better envision the battlefield,
make informed decisions and exploit the full range of
supporting weapons against the enemy.  DoD planners, as part
of the Pentagon's master plan, have identified seven mission
categories for UAV deployment and utilization.  They are:
1) reconnaissance and surveillance, 2) target acquisition,
3) target spotting, 4) command and control, 5) meteorological
data collection, 6) nuclear, biological, and chemical
detection, and 7) disruption and deception.  The first three
missions are, perhaps, the most adaptable to the RPV using
off-the-shelf technology available today , while the
remaining four missions will require more research and
development to fully integrate the RPV into the battlefield
commanders' resources.  How can the front-line commander
deploy and utilize this technology?  Even more important, how
can this new technology help the battlefield commander in his
prosecution of battle plans?
     Of the four DoD classes of UAVs, medium range, short
range, endurance, and close range, it is the close range (CR)
and medium range (MR) classes of UAVs that are relatively
unsophisticated, inexpensive, operationally controlled at the
lowest level, and used in support of small forces.  CR and MR
RPVs are relatively simple systems that would be operated by
company or battalion size units and would require minimum
coordination with higher command echelons.
     The most obvious mission for these RPVs, as has already
been alluded to, is reconnaissance and surveillance which
broadly translates into the visual observation of the enemy.
More specifically, a commander would, among other things, be
able to survey approaches to friendly lines, patrol routes of
movement, discover potential choke points, and study
hydrographic and geographic data not available from maps.
Both the Army and Marine Corps have had the opportunity to
test these and other RPV capabilities during exercises.  In
one after action report (AAR), the commander, 5th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), stated, "RPVs proved to be a
superior intelligence collection agency, providing key
Essential Elements of Information that aided in beach
selection during this major amphibious exercise (Kernel Blitz
88-1)."13  RPVs were also used during the USCINCLANT exercise
Solid Shield 89.  The commander, 4th MEB, in his AAR stated,
"The RPV is an excellent collections asset, especially when
used in pre-assault or advance force operations...targeting
and fire support adjustments."14  These are but a few of the
many positive reports on the use of RPVs in a battlefield
     Another important application of RPV systems on the
battlefield has been in the area of target acquisition and
target spotting.  Using the same RPVs that earlier located
the enemy position during reconnaissance flights, an
artillery fire control center could now direct fire at a
target with precision.  Advanced imagery technology is
available today to spot and identify enemy targets in day or
night, and with targets obscured by smoke, fog, haze, or
light precipitation.  These RPVs can be data-linked to fire
support observers who, located safe from enemy fire, would
provide accurate adjustment and analysis of artillery or
naval gunfire.  Small infantry units, perhaps as small as the
company level, equipped with RPVs could immediately spot and
adjust their own mortar fires throughout their tactical area
of responsibility without direct ground observation or
without relying on manned aircraft.
     There are many other proposed missions for unmanned
aerial systems.  Among the most popular are providing support
for rear area security, assist in search and rescue
operations, helicopter landing zone reconnaissance, and
battle damage assessment.  A future mission may see the RPV
providing airborne communication-relay to distant units on
the battlefield.  Additionally, RPVs could be equipped with
expendable electronic counter-measure devices to augment
existing electronic warfare capabilities.
     While it may seem at first glance that we have found the
perfect weapon system for the battlefield it should be
pointed out that there are several critical limitations to
unmanned aerial vehicles.  First and foremost are the
environmental factors that must be considered.  RPVs cannot
be operated in icing conditions, certain meteorological
conditions and battlefield obscurants can seriously degrade
video quality, and wind limitations for launch and recovery
are 16 knots steady/25 knots gusting.  Another limitation is
that line-of-sight transmission must be maintained between
the RPV and ground control/receiving station if real-time
intelligence information is to be received.  RPV's can be
operated beyond line-of-sight transmissions if equipped with
internal navigation units, then, fly pre-programmed
waypoints, record the video information and return to an area
within radio contact for recovery.
     RPVs require a large (aprox. 30 X 130 meters),
relatively flat area for launch and recovery, although
vertical takeoff and landing RPVs are being tested which
would reduce this area.  Other limitations may include
special non-military fuel requirements, transportation
peculiarities, and unique maintenance considerations.  At
present, video signals sent by the RPV are nonencrypted and,
as such, are capable of being interrupted or exploited by any
force with compatible equipment.  Additionally the RPV is not
a hardened target making it susceptible to enemy fire,
although, as has already been pointed out, RPVs are extremely
difficult to see and shoot down.  Finally, since normal RPV
operations require that a ground control station be in
contact with the aerial vehicle, at least some of the time,
radio emissions make the system susceptible to enemy
electronic warfare actions.
     In spite of these limitations, the RPV system
is a viable, economical, and resilient tool for the
battlefield.  Most importantly, though, is its potential
benefit to the battlefield commander in providing valuable
intelligence information not available from other means.  It
therefore becomes extremely important for the commander to
fully understand both the limitations and benefits of the RPV
if he is going to get the best use out of the system.  An
example may help to emphasize this point.  During the Marine
Corps exercise Solid Shield-89, the 2nd RPV Company was
tasked to support the Ground Combat Elements (GCE) of the 6th
and 8th Marines.  While supporting the GCE, the only assigned
RPV mission was as an intelligence collection asset.  Because
of this narrow mission the RPV company was not able to
perform any of the other tasks as outlined in the Marine
Corps Operational Handbook (OH) 2-2.  There were many lost
opportunities to conduct supporting arms fire and rear area
security missions.  This was due partially to the lack of
coordination between the intelligence and fire support
agencies but mainly due to the restrictive mission given the
RPV unit.  In OH 2-2 it is stated that the, "commander will
assign the RPV unit a tactical mission of either direct or
general support."15  It behooves the commander tasked with
writing a mission statement to utilize his resources to the
fullest; the RPV system is no different.  The RPV mission
statement must allow for the full integration of its
capabilities in order to support the force as a whole.
     Intelligent employment of the RPV system on the
battlefield, once a viable mission has been assigned, becomes
the most important step toward successful application.  The
command, control, and communications complexities of today's
battlefield make the introduction of yet another weapon
system all the more difficult to integrate.  In that light,
it is extremely important to include an RPV representative at
all mission planning conferences to ensure the system is used
to its fullest.  The RPV commander can be assigned as a
special staff officer advising the commander on the best
employment of the RPV.  Additionally, it will be necessary to
locate an RPV liaison team, having positive communications to
all supported units, to the fire support coordination center
or tactical operations center.  Also, RPV operations must
either be closely coordinated with manned aircraft missions
or the airspace over the battle area must be used very
judiciously to avoid conflicts with each system.
     An adequate number of ground control stations must be
strategically located to provide the best coverage of the
area of operations.  Down-link receiver stations must be
located at all command centers tasked with the prosecution of
the battle plan--from the task force commander down to the
battalion commander, and perhaps lower.  All must have access
to the real-time intelligence information and all must be
able to utilize the fire support capabilities provided by the
RPV.  There must be enough RPV units available to provide
decentralized control and the authority to change or divert
missions must be kept at the lowest possible level to give
flexibility to the system.  On paper it sounds simple enough
but in reality it will take years of training and practice to
fully introduce and integrate the RPV into our war fighting
          "The age of robotic weaponry has been lifted
     off the pages of science fiction and is being
     placed in real world research facilities as well as
     on the battlefield."16
     It is the opinion of many Defense Department officials
that unmanned aerial vehicles are here to stay.  RPVs are
quickly proliferating the arsenal of the U.S. military for no
better reason than the tasks of war have become simply too
lethal for men and too expensive for manned machines.
Missions such as mine clearing, battlefield reconnaissance,
artillery spotting, and short-range attack missions are being
taken over by these technologically advanced, highly
specialized unmanned aircraft.  On the face of it, RPVs have
many sound arguments in their favor.  Most notably, they can
be developed, produced, and operated at a fraction of the
cost of other systems.  "They can be made smaller, more
maneuverable, more available, and above all more survivable,
all without putting a single human operator at risk."17
     Commanders at all levels, but especially at the first
echelon of committed units, need timely and effective
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition to
execute their responsibilities on the battlefield.  The speed
with which today's battles are fought and the time
sensitivity of the front-line commanders' decisions dictate
immediate and accurate responsiveness.  The technology
available today for the non-lethal UAV allows for the
satisfaction of many long standing battlefield deficiencies
for each echelon of command.
     In its development of suitable RPV systems, the UAV
Joint Program Office has its work cut out for them,
especially in light of decreasing defense budgets.  More
research and development is needed to improve the
effectiveness, range, and reliability of data-links.  Design
engineers must continue to improve and enhance the
capabilities of unmanned platforms with emphasis on multi-
mission payloads.  If these efforts are to be successful,
however, military planners must also be good historians.  The
trends of the past and the lessons learned from the history
of RPV use will provide the foundation for projecting into
the future.
     In spite of the hurdles ahead, we have the opportunity
to give our battlefield commanders a low-cost, far-reaching
warfighting tool which will greatly influence the battle--in
our favor.  Therefore we need to continue the research,
development, and acquisition of a family of multi-purpose
remotely-piloted vehicles.
    1 Steven M. Shaker, "Robots in Warfare: From Ancient Myth
to Modern Weapon," Army, April 1989, p.68.
    2 Ibid., p.71.
    3 DoD Joint Program Master Plan, UAV Joint Program
Office, (Pentagon, Washington D.C., Government Printing
Office, 1988), p.1.
    4 James Bryan Miller, "Unmanned Air Vehicles--Real Time
Intelligence Without the Risk," (Masters Thesis, Defense
Technical Information Center, March 1988), p.36.
    5 Kenneth Munson, World Unmanned Aircraft, (United
Kingdom: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1988), p.7.
    6 Ibid.
    7 William Wagner, Lightning Bugs and Other Reconnaissance
Drones, (Armed Forces Journal International, 1982), p.105.
    8 Miller, "Unmanned Air Vehicles," p.60.
    9 Ibid., p. 57.
   10 Joseph A. Lovece, "Joint UAV Program Office Pushes to
Meet Its Charter," Armed Forces Journal International, April
1989, p.53.
   11 "Air Force Seeks Designs For Mach 20 Strike, Spy
Drone,"  Defense News, 8 January 1990, p.1.
   12 Gary W. Anderson, "When Maneuver Fails,"  Marine Corps
Gazette, April 1989, p.49.
   13 US Marine Corps, After Action Report, "Remotely Piloted
Vehicle Employment," 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Kernal
Blitz 88-1, 15 February 1988, p.26.
   14 US Atlantic Command, After Action Report, "Remotely
Piloted Vehicle Employment Considerations,"  USCINCLANT, 4th
Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Solid Shield-89, 19 May 1989,
   15 US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 2-2, "Remotely
Piloted Vehicle Employment," (Marine Corps Development and
Education Command, Quantico, Virginia, April 1987), p.3-14.
   16 Shaker, "Robots in Warfare," p.68.
   17 Munson, World Unmanned Aircraft, p.7.
Anderson, Gary W. "When Maneuver Fails." Marine Corps Gazette
      (April 1989): 47-49.
Amouyal, Barbara. "Scrutiny Expected to Fall on the Need for
      Manned Craft." Air Force Times (22 January 1990) p.32.
Bornick, Bruce K. "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Support." Military
      Review (August 1989): 44-49.
Department of Defense UAV Joint Program Office. "DoD Joint
      Program Master Plan."  Pentagon, Washington D.C.:
      Government Printing Office, 1988.
Fahlstrom, Paul. "Seeing Over the Next Hill."  Amphibious
      Warfare Review, Vol.6, No.2 (Spring 1988): 25-47.
Finnegan, Philip. "Air Force Seeks Designs for Mach 20 Strike
      Spy Drone."  Defense News (8 January 1990) p.1.
Karch, Lawrence G. and McGrath, James R. "Remotely Piloted
      Vehicles for Company and Battalion Size Units."  Marine
      Corps Gazette (January 1989): 22-24.
Karch, Lawrence G. "CAS, SEAD, and UAVs." Marine Corps
      Gazette (February 1990): 44-52.
Lockett, Gregory P. "Remotely Piloted Decoys: Expendable
      Assets."  Proceedings (November 1989): 111-112.
Lovece, Joseph A. "Joint UAV Program Office Pushes to Make
      Its Charter." Armed Forces Journal International (April
      1989): 49-53.
Miller, James Bryan. "Unmanned Air Vehicles--Real Time
      Intelligence Without the Risk."  Masters Thesis,
      Defense Technical Information Center, March 1988.
Munson, Kenneth.  World Unmanned Aircraft.  United Kingdom:
      Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1988.
Shaker, Steven M.  "Robots in Warfare: From Ancient Myth to
      Modern Weapon." Army (April 1989): 68-76.
Sweetman, Bill. "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Part 2:
      Developments in the US." International Defense Review
      (May 1989): 599-604.
US Marine Corps Operational Handbook 2-2.  "Remotely Piloted
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Wagner, William.  Lightning Bugs and Other Reconnaissance
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      Note:  Valuable additional information on RPVs and
their employment on the battlefield was found in the Marine
Corps' Lesson Learned System (MCLLS) in the form of after
action reports from various exercises.

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