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President Johnson's Effect On U.S. Intelligence
AUTHOR Major Kevin G. Donaleski, USMC
CSC 1989
                          EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
     Lyndon B. Johnson became President after the tragic death
of John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963.  His five years as
President will be seen as some of the most troubling days in
modern history.
     President Johnson was confronted with an overwhelming
desire to create a Great Society.  His hopes of this major
domestic initiative were consumed by the complexities of the
Vietnam War and the competition between the United States and
the Soviet Union.
     Even though President Johnson did inherit Vietnam and the
Soviet containment policy from Kennedy, it was President
Johnson's lack of interest in foreign affairs coupled with his
policy of giving broad grants of authority to others which
caused serious problems in the intelligence community.  During
his administration, President Johnson misused the intelligence
community.  He continually used the community as his private
staff instead of a support staff.  The lack of oversight by the
NSC, PFIAB and Congress added to the misuse of the intelligence
community, especially in the area of collection.
     President Johnson's suspicious nature and the fact that he
relied on a small inner circle of key advisors contributed to
the lack of critical questions being asked with regard to
foreign policy and the conduct of United States Intelligence
     The results of President Johnson's impact on the
intelligence community can be best illustrated by the sweeping
changes made as a result of the Church and Pike Commission,
that investigated the improper use of the system, much of which
occurred during President Johnson's administration.
                        KEVIN G. DONALESKI
                Major/United States Marine Corps
                        TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION                                             1-2
CHAPTER I      The Nation and President Johnson          3-7
CHAPTER II     Containing Commumism                      8-10
CHAPTER III    Intelligence During the Johnson Era       11-19
CHAPTER IV     Conclusion                                20-21
ENDNOTES                                                 22-23
BIBLIOGRAPHY                                             24-26
     Lyndon B. Johnson will be remembered for more than being the
thirty-sixth president of the United States.  His five year
tenure as President will be associated with some of the most
troubling days of modern American history.
     On November 22, 1963, Lyndon B. Johnson was thrust into the
main political spotlight - the Presidency of the United States.
When he assumed that office, after that tragic day in Dallas,
Texas when John F. Kennedy was assassinated, he envisioned his
dream of the "Great Society" becoming a reality for all
Americans.  However, President Johnson's one great dream was
consumed by an overwhelming theme - the Vietnam War.
     During the years of his Presidency, Lyndon B. Johnson was
confronted by a great deal of turbulence affecting domestic
issues, as well as foreign affairs.  The Great Society, Vietnam,
in fact the entire presidency of Johnson was a major turning
point in American history.  This turmoil brought about, for the
first time, a close examination of the inner workings of senior
level policy and decision making.  This included questioning the
credibility of the President, Congress and the intelligence
community.  Prior to President Johnson's Administration, many of the
functions and methods of decision making and intelligence operations
were silent and invisible - not to be held up for public scrunity.
It was his administration that initially caused the American people,
that included the press, to publicly question the decisions of the
President, his advisor and the intelligence community.
     This paper will examine the relationship between President
Johnson's preference for domestic affairs over foreign affairs
and how the effects of the Vietnamese War affected this
relationship.  An historical perspective will first be presented,
illustrating the mood of the nation and the circumstances which
initially confronted President Johnson.  This will be followed
by a discussion of the effects that the preoccupation with
Vietnam had on President Johnson and its influence on the
intelligence community, both foreign and domestic.  This paper
will focus on the effects of President Johnson's perspectives
on the intelligence community.
     It should be noted that this paper will deal with locally
available, open-source material.  Specific works dealing with
President Johnson and his direct relationship with the U.S.
Intelligence Community were virtually non-existent in the
metropolitan D.C. area.  In my search for information, I
discovered that a valuable research center exists.  This is the
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, located in Austin, Texas.  Although
this library was not utilized for this paper, due to geographic
location and lack of research time, it should be mentioned.
To begin our discussion, we must look at the mood of the country
when President Johnson became the thirty-sixth President.
           CHAPTER I.  The Nation and President Johnson
     In a dramatic event that shocked the world, President John
F. Kennedy was assassinated and Vice President Lyndon Johnson
was catapulated into the Presidency.  Johnson follwed an
enormously popular and controversial president, who was in the
process of campaigning for a second term.
     The Kennedy administration was a spark which ignited many
deep feelings within the American people.  At the onset of his
administration, the country stood up and noticed their ambitious
and charismatic leader.  Even though there was a concern about
his religion, family influence and liberal politics, the
American people found him to be the leader who could excite the
nation.  He challenged the imagination of America with images of
space travel to the moon.  He raised the conscience of America
with civil rights issues and he instilled strength and pride in
America by dealing firmly with the Soviets during the Cuban
Missile Crisis and while negotiating with the Nuclear Test Ban
     With Kennedy as President, a new vigor and excitement took
hold, especially after the seemingly gray days of the recent
Eisenhower administration.  Technological advances in space,
medicine and communications brought new horizons.  Coupled with
this excitement was the reality of the Cold War and the threat
of nuclear was with the Soviets.  The American public was very
mindful of the cost of a global war, especially since World War II
and the Korean War were still fresh in their minds.  It was because
of these memories and the associated fears that the American
people believed war should be averted and America should, by
virture of her morale and military strength, act as a global
policeman.  America became this force which attempted to contain
rising Soviet expansionism and ebb the tide of communism.1   Even
though the nation was concerned about the future, there was a
feeling of better days ahead.  This new sense of the future
revitalized the nation.  The Kennedy Administration was in part
responsible for this new era and John F. Kennedy personified it.
     However, prior to his assassination, the brief thirty-five
months of the Kennedy Presidency was not considered to be overly
successful.  In the foreign affairs arena, the fiasco with the
Bay of Pigs and the limited progress made in Vietnam did nothing
to heighten the credibility of his administration.  In domestic
affairs, four important legislative proposals - civil rights,
tax reduction, Medicare, and federal aid to education - were all
without Congressional approval at the end of the Kennedy
administration. 2  In fact, prior to his assassination, there
was widespread criticism of his administration.  In the month
before that fateful day in Dallas, the Kennedy approval rating
in the polls was down to 59%, from a one time high of 83%3
The mood across the nation was restless and impatient.  The
nation as a whole was experiencing many changes, facing new
issues and frontiers.  With his death, an uncertainty about the
future was pervasive among the American people.
     President Johnson was faced with a myriad of complex issues,
both foreign and domestic, during his initial days as president.
Some of these issues he handled with success, others would
eventually overwhelm him.  In retrospect, President Johnson was
an able and astute leader, whose reputation of being a tough,
competitive politician earned him a great deal of respect as a
Congressman and Senator.  He was so energetic and ingenious as
a Congressman that observers called him "the best Congressman
for a district that ever was."  He ran numerous times for
political office totally unopposed.4   In fact, it was Johnson
who fought Kennedy for the Democratic presidential nomination
in 1960 and, in an effort to ensure a Democratic victory,
Johnson was brought on as the Vice Presidential cnadidate. As
Vice President, he was very active; he was sent to twenty-six
foreign countries on good will or fact finding missions and
was appointed Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal
Opportunity and the National Aeronautics and Space Council.5
     Johnson was quite comfortable in this active Vice
Presidential role, although he longed to be president.  "He
never doubted that if given the opportunity, he would be a great
one."6  While Vice President, his exposure to foreign affairs
was limited, and he was able to focus much of his attention on
domestic issues.  Domestic issues were always a keen concern of
his.  Johnson perceived himself in the same vein as Franklin D.
Roosevelt, who greatly influenced Johnson in his early political
life.  This influence coupled with his rural upbringing in the
difficult years of the 1920's and 1930's gave Johnson his focus
on domestic issues and a desire to create a better society for
all of America.  In his book, My Hope for America, written in
1964, President Johnson expressed a deep concern and hope for
the American people and society in general and explained how
his "Great Society" was to evolve.7   He also remembered, while
growing up, that his neighbors in Texas lived at a level so low
that Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal could not reach far enough
down to benefit them.8   Johnson shared the dreams of Roosevelt
and Kennedy in creating a Great Society and was determined to
achieve it.9   However, his first priority upon assuming office
was to assure the American people, as well as the world, that
the United States' policy would continue and the country would
remain politically stable.  One of the primary ways of
maintaining this confidence was to retain Kennedy's senior
national security advisors.  This arrangement not only let
Kennedy's principal advisors stay involved in foreign affairs,
but also let Johnson devote his time to his primary interest of
domestic politics and policy.
     Over the course of his administration, President Johnson
replaced some of Kennedy's advisors with his own advisors.  In
the mid-1960's, when McGeorge Bundy left the White House, Walt
Rostow moved in as the new National Security Advisor.  William
Bundy also moved to Assistant Secretary of State for the Far
East.  Both men exerted a great deal of influence in the foreign
affairs arena and both were convinced that a military solution
in Vietnam was possible.10  President Johnson was quite
comfortable with this arrangement, which eventually removed him
more from the decision making process and gave his advisors a
broad grant of authority.
                  CHAPTER II.  Containing Communism
     American interest in Vietnam did not begin with President
Johnson.  The appreciation of Asia's vulnerability can be seen
in President Truman's Administration.  It was President Truman
who added a new thrust to American policy:  the containment of
Communism in Asia.  In late 1949, Dean Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary
of State, announced that the resources of the United States would
be deployed to preserve Indochina and Southeast Asia from further
Communist encroachment.11
     It was the success of the United States foreign policy in
Europe that blocked the Soviets there and brought about a Soviet
shift toward Asia.  The Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization were extremely effective, but
there were no such doctrines, plans, or organizations to prevent
communist expansion in Asia.  With the Communist Chinese and
Soviets increasing their influence, and the western powers
losing influence in the Far East, a vacuum was created by this
lack of western presence which was filled by the Communists.12
     At this time, the United States was beginning to discuss the
"Domino Theory".  It stated that if Indochina fell to communism,
so too would the other countries of Southeast Asia.  Since the
Soviet Union and China both recognized the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam, United States' first priorty in dealing with
Vietnam was to thwart the Soviet Union and China there.  On
September 8, 1954, the first concrete response to providing
security to Asia against communist agression was established 
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).  Thus, the
conditions for military response has been established and with
its increased tensions, Vietnam would soon become the country
where the United States would test its resolve.
     In 1959, President Eisenhower, in a speech delivered at
Gettysburg College in Pennsylvania, heightened Vietnam priorty
when he stated:
           "Strategically, South Vietnam's capture by the
Communist would bring their power several hundred miles into
a hitherto free region.  The remaining countries in Southeast
Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement....We reach
the inescapable conclusion that our national interest demands
some help from us in sustaining in Vietnam the morale, economic
progress, and the military strength necessary to its continued
existence in freedom."13
     This thinking continued into the Kennedy Administration.
At the outset, President Kennedy expressed his feelings about
Communist expansion when he said at his inauguration "Let every
nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay
any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any
friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of
liberty." 14
     It is not surprising that President Johnson also perceived
the same dangers surrounding Southeast Asia and communist
expansion.  Not only was he committed to a strong response to
communism, but his commitment was even more strengthened by his
loyalty to Kennedy's policies.  President Johnson inherited a
large American commitment to Vietnam, which was not working.
From its beginning, his Administration was in a never-ending
attempt to decide what to do about it.15
     During the Johnson Administration , Vietnam was the main
focus of the United States foreign policy, but there were other
events around the world which also played a significant role in
his administration.  The crises in Panama, Guantanano Bay, the
Dominican Republic and the Six Day War in the Middle East
brought about a great deal of concern.  The foreign affairs
problems increasingly took time, energy, and attention away from
President Johnson's main agenda - that of domestic issues.16
He became increasingly perplexed by the Vietnam War and the time
it was taking to find a solution.  The frustrations with the
war, threats of communist expansion, and the changing mood in
America, with regard to domestic issues, brought about changes
throughout the Johnson Administration which directly affected
the intelligence community
         CHAPTER III. Intelligence During The Johnson Era
     In researching President Johnson's impact on the
intelligence community, there are few detailed facts that could
illustrate any specific changes or new directions given to the
intelligence community during his administration.  In fact there
were a lack of Presidential mandates governing the community.
Rather than long-range planning, requirements were levied with
little advance notice.  This chapter will briefly deal with the
highlights concerning the direction, operations, and the limited
oversight of the intelligence community during the Johnson era.
     For the most part, President Johnson let the intelligence
community have a free reign in collecting and processing
intelligence information that could be used by senior policy
makers.  He was appreciative and impressed with the capabilities
of the intelligence community.17    He was also aware of its
limitations, as he witnessed President Kennedy's fiasco with the
Bay of Pigs, an incident for which the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) drew most of the blame.
     During the 1960's the United States intelligence community
was dominated by two significant events.  These were the increase
in the volume of technical intelligence and the increasing
involvement of the United States in Vietnam.18
     As noted in Chapter I, President Johnson's first priorty
was to give an image of continuity and political stability.
This was achieved by continuing President Kennedy's policies and
retaining his advisers.  A key adviser who remained was John
McCone.  A rich and conservative Republican,  McCone was the
first outsider to head the CIA.  McCone was well-acquainted with
private industry and Washington Politics.  He served as Under
Secretary of the Air Force and later as Chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission.  He was the only Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) who ever took his role of providing
substantive intelligence analysis and estimates to the President
as his first priorty.  During his tenure as DCI. McCone focused
on improving the CIA's intelligence product, developing new
technical collection systems, and attempting to coordinate the
total United States foreign intelligence effort.19
     Even though he was quite effective in reorganizing the CIA
and providing sound intelligence, McCone continually became an
irritant to President Johnson.  President Johnson had two major
difficulties with McCone.  First, he continually stated that the
gradually escalating air strikes against North Vietnam and the
mission of our ground troops would be an active role, was too
little, and too late.  Second, he had close ties with Robert F.
Kennedy, with whom President Johnson did not get along. 20
     Upon McClone's resignation, due to falling from the
President's favor, a major search for replacement was undertaken.
President Johnson wanted Richard Helms, who headed the CIA's
Directorate for Plans, the clandestine service side of the CIA.
Johnson knew he would have a difficult time in getting a career
intelligence officer confirmed by the Congress, so he selected
Admiral William Rayborn.  President Johnson wanted to give
Richard Helms at least a year to prepare himself and to build a
solid reputation with the elected officials on Capitol Hill.
After approximately 13 months, Rayborn resigned and Helms became
the new DCI.  Due to his acceptance by President Johnson, Helms
became a part of the White House inner circle.  He was one of
a dozen top officials on whom the President depended.  Helms
quickly  won the confidence of the President which had eluded his
predecessor, McCone. 21
     His acceptance at the Tuesday luncheons was especially
important, since these lunches effectively substituted for the
formal National Security Council (NSC) meetings.  Even though
the NSC met frequently, President Johnson preferred to discuss
issues of national security outside the NSC system.  These
informal meetings increased as President Johnson faced increased
political pressure.
     Although Helms was considered to be an outsider, President
Johnson viewed him and the CIA primarily as an instrument for
the execution of White House wishes by secret methods.  The
President really did not comprehend or care to learn the
structure of the intelligence community, and as a result, CIA's
influence in policymaking deteriorated. 22  It became apparent
to Helms that President Johnson selectively
intelligence estimates, usually leaning toward reports furnished
by the military which tended to be more optimistic than the
reports by the CIA.  On one occasion, Helms seemed to bend to
White House influence concerning intelligence reporting.  Helms
signed a report entitled "Capabilities of the Vietnamese
Communist for Fighting In South Vietnam," thus approving its
content.  The estimate of enemy order of battle that was quoted
by the military was deflated in order to present a more
favorable impression to the senior policy makers.  Helms was
fully aware that the military figures were extremely low and
were contrary to the figures his agency estimated.  Nonetheless,
Helms signed the document and stated he do so because he did not
want to confront the military, supported by Walt Rostow and
the White House.23  It seemed as though Helms was right in not
confronting Rostow and the other advisors.  By keeping on the
good side of President Johnson he still was able to direct some
influence, however limited it was.
     Overall, Vietnam presented serious problems in the analysis
and production of intelligence.  The CIA continually battled
with the proponents of bombing North Vietnam, mainly Defense,
which had a serious effect on the nature of intelligence
estimates, especially toward the late 196O's.24  It is
important to note that the CIA was consistent throughout the
war in presenting a less optimistic view than the Defense
Department, particularly those of McNamara, who was always
predicting  victory.  Due to his preoccupation with the
Vietnam War, President Johnson ultimately mismanaged the proper
use of his NSC staff and the intelligence community, using it
as his private staff instead of a supporting staff, thus
eliminating the procedure to formulate a consensus on foreign
     The overall direction given to the intelligence community
was dictated by the President's policy of containing the
communist threat, especially the Soviets.  President Johnson and
his close advisors saw Soviet involvement confronting the United
States on both the foreign and domestic fronts.  Since President
Johnson used the intelligence community as his provate staff,
there was some confusion in dealing with the Soviet threat in a
comprehensive manner.  This was especially true in dealing in
the domestic area.  At first a number of questions were raised
of bureaucratic jurisdiction between the CIA and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  In 1966, there was a formal
agreement between the FBI and the CIA dealing with jurisdiction
overlap.  The FBI retained jurisdiction over domestic
counterintelligence.  The CIA was required to coordinate with
the FBI, as did the military services, when special situations
inside the United States presented problems.26
     This agreement was more of proper management of assets than
it was of control of the intelligence community's operations.
Throughout the Johnson era, the White House directed numerous
actions to be undertaken, mostly involving counterintelligence
operations in the United States.  At this time, there was an
impression given to the intelligence community of "get the job
done" regardless of the methods.27  The CIA's CHAOS, which began
in 1967, was a foreign intelligence operation requested by the
President.  He was very concerned about the protest over
Vietnam being linked to other dissident groups who were under
Soviet influence.  While CHAOS was concerned with foreign
influences on internal political activities, its basic direction
was overseas.  In another domestic operation, the CIA
infiltrated the activities of demonstrators protesting in
Washington, D.C. in 1967 and 1968.  The CIA employed about a
dozen private citizens to join activist organizations and report
on their plans, organization and financial backing.28
     In 1967, President Johnson requested a detailed study be
done on the "Restless Youth".  This was due to President
Johnson's suspicions that a conspiracy of some sort lie behind
the unrest in Newark, New Jersey and Detroit, Michigan.  He was
convinced, by his own feelings and by J. Edgar Hoover, Dean Rusk
and Walt Rostow, that North Vietnam, Cuba and the Soviet Union
were not only supporting, but somehow directing, these types of
     The FBI during this time had also initiated a specialized
Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO).  Their objective was
simply the destruction, exposure and neutralization of the
Subversive groups' activities.  These subversive groups included
the Communist Party, U.S.A., Socialist Workers Party, White Hate
Groups, Black Extremists, and the New Left.30   It should be
noted that even though a good deal of effort was put forth toward
domestic targets, both the CIA and FBI continued to target foreign
communist organizations and the individuals connected with them.
     Additionally, the CIA was very active overseas during this
period.  The Agency, through various means, attempted to
influence foreign government to be in line with a more pro-
western way of thinking.   These operations took place in
Eucador, Chile, the Congo, Cuba, Greece, Laos, Peru and Vietnam.
They were in part successful and benefited the United States in
balance of power with the Soviets.
     However effective the intelligence community was during
this time, a seriou  problem seemed to develop when the White
House began to utilize the community as its support staff,
especially in the domestic arena.  Abuses began to occur at the
direction of senior officials or by their unwillingness to
control the intelligence community.   They included: President
Johnson using the FBI for purely political intelligence on
critics and political opponents; FBI warrantless wiretaps on
civic and social leaders; the National Security Agency's Watch
List Activity which targeted certain U.S. citizens; Internal
Revenue Service conducting tax investigations based on political
criteria; FBI infiltration of the Women's Liberation Movement.
and the CIA's funding of nearly 80 percent of the National
Student Association from 1952 until 1966, in order to gain
influence over activities of student organizations.31  It
seemed as though the intelligence community and the senior White
House officials took full advantage of all their opportunities.
     Intelligence oversight during the Johnson Era and before,
was, for the most part, left to the Executive Branch and the
intelligence agencies themselves.  There were, however,
organizations such as the NSC and the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in place, but they had
limited effect under President Johnson.
     The PFIAB, which was established in 1956, was comprised of
distinguished citizens from outside the government to make
recommendations for actions to enhance the intelligence of the
United States.  It also had an independent watchdog role, a role
which it was not allowed to fulfill because it lacked authority.
In fact, President Johnson had little use for the PFIAB.  When
President Johnson left his first meeting of the PFIAB, he confided
to Marvin Watson, then Special Assistant to the President, "The
grass grows too tall in there."  That was almost the last meeting
President Johnson had with the PFIAB.32
     The NSC was another possible oversight organization, but it
is an instrument of the President and not an entity with authority
of its own.  Additionally, since President Johnson used his
"Tuesday Lunch" group in lieu of the NSC to formulate his
foreign policy decisions, the NSC lost its limited oversight
     There was limited Congressional oversight of the CIA
conducted by separate subcommittees of the House and Senate
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.  However, Congress
generally had a supportive attitude toward the Cold War policies
of the President and to the intelligence community.33    To
illustrate this fact, in July 1966, a roll call vote rejected a
proposal to permit members of the Foreign Relations Committee to
participate directly in Senate Oversight of U.S. Intelligence
operations.34  This pervasive attitude continued throughout the
entire term of President Johnson, effectively nullifying any
critical oversight by Legislative and Executive branches of the
                       CHAPTER IV.  Conclusion
     Based on the discussions throughout this paper, it is
evident that President Johnson did have a major impact on the
intelligence community.  Due to his suspicious nature and his
management style, he misused the intelligence community to suit
his personal needs, not in the way it was intended to function.
At times the overwhelming preoccupation with the Cold War, Vietnam
and his failures on domestic issues, found President Johnson
using McCarthy Era tactics in dealing with these problems.
     President Johnson ignored the oversight mechanisms, the NSC
and the PFIAB, by relying heavily on his inner circle of
advisors who shared his same suspicious feelings about those
outside their "Tuesday Lunch" group.  As seen in Chapter III,
this eyen affected the intelligence provided by the DCI, Richard
Helms, who avoided confrontation with McNamara and Rostow by
giving in on occasion on his agency's position.
     It is true, President Johnson did inherit Vietnam and the
Cold War theme from President Kennedy and others; however, it
was President Johnson's lack of interest in foreign affairs and
his propensity to delegate and give broad grants of authority
to others which caused serious problems in the intelligence
community.  There was no restrictive legislation passed nor was
there any concern expressed by the Johnson administration about
occurring abuses.
     It can be stated that a president mirrors the American
society, to an extent.  The American people were preoccupied
with Vietnam and suspicious of the Soviet intentions, but not to
the extent that President Johnson was affected.  Additionally,
the lack of concern, oversight and strict control exhibited by
the other two branches of government contributed to the
intelligence community's problems.   These problems which
occurred prior to President Johnson grew throughout his
presidency and were eventually addressed during the Church and
Pike Committee Hearings in 1975, resulting in sweeping changes
within the intelligence community.
1.  Spanier, John W., American Foreign Policy Since World War II
(New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1985). pp. 17-51.
2.  Goldman, Eric F., The Tragedy of Lyndon B. Johnson (New York:
Alfred A. Knof, 1969). p. 13.
3.  Ibid., p. 14.
4.  Caro, Robert A., The Path to Power (New York: Alfred A.
Knof, 19830, p. 532.
5.  Johnson, Lyndon B., Vantage Point (New York: Alfred A.
Knof, 1983) p. 4.
6.  Goldman, op. cit., p. 20.
7.  Johnson, Lyndon B., My Hope For America (New York: Random
House, 1964), pp. 49-60.
8.  Caro, op. cit., p. 498.
9.  Johnson, Lyndon B., My Hope For America (New York: Random
House, 1964), pp. 49-60.
10. Kayfman, Daniel J., U.S. National Security (Lexington,
Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1985), pp. 557-8.
11. Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking,
1983), p. 169.
12. Spanier, op. cit., pp. 50-51
13. Johnson, Lyndon B., Vantage Point(New York: Alfred A.
Knof, 1983), p. 51.
14. Ibid., p. 52.
15. Powers, Thomas, The Man Who Kept Secrets (New York: Alfred
A.  Knof, 1979), p. 165.
16. Johnson, Lyndon B., Vantage Point (New York: Alfred A.
Knof, 1983), p. 324.
17. Ibid., p. 324.
18. Fain, Tyrus G., The Intelligence Community (New York: R.R.
Bowher, 1977), p. 20.
19.  Cline, Ray S., Secrets, Spies and Scholars (Washington.
D.C., Acropolis Books, 1976), pp. 192-214. 192-214.
20.  Power, op. cit., pp. 166-7.
21.  Johnson, Lyndon B. , Vantage Point (New York: Alfred A.
Knof, 1983), pp. 329-330.
22.  Cline, op. cit., p. 216.
23.  Powers, op. cit., pp. 186-9.
24.  Fain, op. cit., p. 21.
25.  Cline, op. cit., pp. 199-202.
26.  Senate.  Senate Select Committee to Study  Government
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Senate
Report 94-755  (94th Congress, Second Session, 1976) p. 97.
27.  Johnson, Lyndon B., Vantage Point (New York: Alfred A.
Knof, 1983), p. 341.
28.  Breckinridge, Scott D., The CIA and the U.S. Intelligence
System  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 193-202.
29.  Powers, op. cit., pp. 245-6.
30.  Fain, op. cit., pp. 390-410.
31.  Ibid., pp. 392-398
32.  Godson, Roy., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's:
Intelligence Policy (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books,
1986), p. 33.
33.  Breckinridge, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
34.  "CIA Oversight." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,
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     Goldman, ERic F.  The Tragedy of Lyndon B. Johnson. New
York:  Alfred A. Knof, 1969.
    Johnson, Lyndon B.  My Hope for America.  New York:  Random
House, 1984.
    Johnson, Lyndon B.  Vantage Point.  New York:  Alfred A.
Knof, 1979
    Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam:  A History. New York: Viking,
     Kaufman, Daniel J.  U.S. National Security.  Lexington,
Massachusetts:  Lexington Books, 1983.
     Oseth, John M. Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations.
Lexington, Kentucky:  University of Kentucky, 1985.
    Powers, Thomas.  The Man Who Kept Secrets.  New York:
Alfred A. Knof, 1979.
    Snepp, Frank W.  Decent Interval. New York:  Random Housed
     Spanier, John W.  American Foreign Policy Since World War II.
New York:  Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1985.
     "CIA" Oversight."  Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.
July 22, 1966, pp. 1578-80.
     Handleman, Howard.  "Another U.S. Problem That Just Will Not
Go Away."  U.S. News and World Report,  February 28, 1966, p. 52.
     "Intelligence Community Remains a Problem for Congress."
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, November 15, 1963, pp.
     "LBJ and Congress."  U.S. News and World Report, August 23,
1965, pp. 30-31.
     Pinkerton, Roy H.  "The Role of Intelligence in Policymaking."
Military Review, July 1966, pp. 40-51.
    Stern, Sol.  "NSA and the CIA:  U.S. National Student
Association."  Ramparts, March, 1967, pp. 29-38.
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World Report, September 9, 1963, p. 66.
     "Watching the CIA at Work Around the World."  U.S. News and
World Report, March 6, 1967, pp. 28-30.
     "What Next In Vietnam?"  U.S. News and World Report, August 9,
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     Beecher, William.  "Johnson and Vietnam."  Wall Street
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     Large, Arlen J.  "Shadowboxing."  Wall Street Journal,
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                      GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
     House of Representatives.  Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.  Compilation of Intelligence Laws and Related Laws
and Executive Orders of Interest to the National Intelligence
Community.  Committee Print.  99th Congress, First Session,
    Senate.  Senate Select Committee to Study Government
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.  Senate
Report 94-755.  94th Congress, Second Session, 1976.

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