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Intelligence Support Of Forward Deployed MAGTF's
CSC 1984
SUBJECT AREA Intelligence
                 Submitted to
           Rudolph V. Wiggins, Ph.D.
     In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
           for Written Communications
   The Marine Corps Command and Staff College
               Quantico, Virginia
                Major B.E. BRUNN
           United States Marine Corps
                 April 6, 1984
Thesis sentence:  Intelligence support of forward deployed
                  MAGTF's can be significantly improved
                  through better utilizing current collection
                  assets, enhancing external intelligence
                  support, and augmenting the MAGTF with
                  additional assets during crisis periods.
   I.  Introduction
     A.  Historical problems with intelligence support
     B.  Scope of solutions evaluated to improve intelli-
         gence support
         1.  Better utilization of current assets
         2.  Enhancement of external support to the MAGTF
         3.  Augmentation of MAGTF intelligence assets
   II. Factors affecting intelligence support of MAGTF's
     A.  Size and organization of forward deployed MAGTF's
     B.  Missions
     C.  Geographical areas of responsibility
     D.  Concept of employment
     E.  Intelligence requirements
III.   Analysis of current problems of intelligence  support
     A.  Limitations of external intelligence support
     B.  Limitations of organic MAU intelligence assets
     C.  The bureaucracy
   IV. Enhancement of intelligence support
     A.  Formation of the Direct Support Unit to enhance
         external support
     B.  Increased utilization of MAGTF units
     C.  Augmentation of MAGTF assets during crisis periods
   V.  Conclusion
      Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) doctrine states
categorically that "intelligence is the keystone of every 
MAGTF operations."1  Yet in spite of the importance attri-
buted to intelligence, recent events in Beirut and Grenada
have vividly highlighted the deficiencies of intelligence
support of our forward deployed MAGTF's.  In Beirut, inade-
quate evaluation of the threat and the lack of advance warn-
ing were the leading causes of over 241 deaths and numerous
injuries of MAGTF personnel.  When the 22d Marine Amphibious
Unit assaulted Grenada, the Marines had little or no know-
ledge of the tactical dispositions of the Cubans or the Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Army.  Only luck and the incompetence of
the Grenadian fighters precluded heavier casualties to the
MAGTF.  As a major element of our nation's foreign policy and
the spearhead in any future conflict, our forward deployed
MAGTF's deserve better intelligence support than what we have
historically provided to them.
	While there are many people who complain about the
quality of intelligence support, few Marines have offered
any viable solutions to the problem.  Admittedly, govern-
ment bureaucracy, budget and manpower restrictions, and tech-
nology limitations are formidable obstacles to most long term
solutions.  In the short term, however, there are several ways
that Marines can overcome bureaucratic obstacles to increase
the quality of intelligence support for our forward deployed
MAGTF's.  It is in this area of informal solutions which can
be quickly implemented at little or no monetary cost which
will be my primary focus in this resarch paper.  I intend
to show that intelligence support of forward deployed MAGTF's
can be significantly improved by better utilizing current
collection assets, enhancing external intelligence support,
and augmenting the MAGTF with additional assets during crisis
	One of the greatest limiting factors to operations by
our forward deployed MAGTF's is the unit's size and organi-
zation.  Operating most of the time independently, the usual
Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) is composed of a headquarters
element, a battalion landing team (BLT), a composite heli-
copter squadron and a service support group.  Intelligence
support for the MAU is orchestrated by the MAU S-2 section,
consisting of one or two officers and a few enlisted person-
nel.  Occasionally two forward deployed MAU's will combine
to form a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) for a specific
operation, but these hastily formed MAB"s lack both the intel-
ligence production capability and the collection assets usually
associated with the normal task organized MAB.  Whether
MAU or MAB, foward deployed MAGTF's will initially depend
on sources external to the MAGTF for virtually all intelli-
gence requried for planning amphibious operations.2
	Another factor affecting intelligence support of our for-
ward deployed MAGTF's is the wide variety of missions that
the MAGTF may be required to perform.  MAGTF doctine lists
the following missions which may be assigned to MAU's 
	-Commitment as an advance force of a follow-on larger MAGTF.
	-Conduct of amphibious assault operations of limited duration.
	-Conduct of amphibious raids.
	-Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
	-Protection/evacuation of noncombatants or installations.
	-Reinforcing role by surface or airlift
	-Air support, fire support, combat service support or
	 other military assistance.3
	 In addition to the wide variety of missions, intelligence
planners must also cover an immense geographical area.  For-
ward deployed MAGTF's must frequently plan for contingencies
spanning a quarter of the world's coastal areas.  The tacti-
cal maps for these contingencies normally exceed forty cargo
pallets for the average MAU.  As Grenada proved, however, the
MAU must also be prepared to conduct operations in areas where
there are no contingency plans, maps, or encyclopedic intell-
igence data.  Besides missions and geographic factors, the 
concept of employment also affects planning for intelligence
     The concept of employment of forward deployed MAGTF's
is dependent on the mission and the intensity of the enemy
threat.  The most likely employment of a MAU would be in a
low intensity threat scenario.  This scenario involves MAU
operations in nations where combat is of a limited duration
and the enemy threat is neither large nor sophisticated.
Mid and high intensity conflicts involve rapidly escalating
levels of force, lethality, and sophistication.  Although
forward deployed MAGTF's have a role in mid and high intensity
enviroments, they normally conduct operations as a subordinate
element of a major unified command operation.  While intelli-
gence operations in such a sophisticated enviroment are beyond
both the scope and classification of this paper, many of the
principles and techniques of enhancing intelligence support
in low intensity conflicts will also apply to the higher threat
     Marine Corps doctrine for intelligence lists more than
sixty general items of information required to conduct am-
phibious operations.4  The Potomac General Research Group
has developed these general requirements into between 1,400
and 2,500 specific information requirements depending on the
scenario.5  Those situations involving unconventional warfare,
adverse terrain, or extreme climates substantially increase
the quantity of information required.  Furthermore, the in-
formation required is largely independent of the size of the
MAGTF conducting the operation.  Consequently, the small MAU
intelligence staff has to collect, analyze, process, and dis-
seminate roughly the same amount of intelligence information
that a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) does in the largest
amphibious operation.  A more detailed analysis of the pro-
blems involved with the collection, analysis, and dissemina-
tion of these intelligence requirements will identify those
areas in the intelligence cycle where improvement is needed.
     Amphibious doctrine states that it is the responsibility
of the initiating authority to provide adequate intelligence
support to the amphibious task force (ATF), to include the
tasking of external collection agencies.5  For most forward
deployed MAGTF's, the initiating authority is a unified com-
mand, most often CINPAC, CINCLANT, or CINCEUR.  Unfortunate-
ly, the amphibious expertise on these enormous staffs is
usually minimal, resulting in intelligence support that is
both general and reactive in nature.  Those staffs with the
amphibious expertise (Marine divisions, MAF/MAB staffs, and
amphibious groups) are seldom in the operational chain of
command.  The requirement for timely, specific, and detailed
intelligence support is further disrupted by compartmentaliza-
tion of highly classified information and an over-burdened
communication system.  Often, essential elements of intelli-
gence are simply lost in the 300-plus messages generated
each day in a crisis situation.7
     As previously noted, the MAU must rely almost entirely
on external collection agencies for intelligence prior to an
amphibious operation.  Although the unified commander has the
responsibility for providing these assets, he is handicapped
by the fact that he seldom controls or owns these collection
assets.  Because of security, sophistication, cost, and
limited numbers, our best intelligence collection assets are
centrally owned and controlled by the National Command
Authority.  Like the unified commander's staff, these national
collection agencies also lack resident expertise on the de-
tailed information required to support amphibious operations.
This results in excessive delays in intelligence support
when the MAU/ATF must send detailed collection and tasking
requests through lengthy chains of command.  In the unlikely
event the information requirements are collected in a timely
manner, it is extremely difficult for the small MAU/ATF intel-
ligence staff to rapidly process the enormous amounts of de-
tailed information and to disseminate the intelligence prior
to the operation.
     Once ashore, the MAU's intelligence collection capabi-
lity is still extremely limited.  In the area of human intel-
ligence (HUMINT), the small size of the reconnaissance pla-
toon, counterintelligence team (CIT), and interrogator-trans-
lator teams (ITT) limits the ability of the MAU to operate
independently in a hostile enviroment.  The loss of the fourth
rifle company also limits the number of infantry personnel
available for patrols, counter-reconnaissance activities,
observation posts, and other intelligence-related tasks.
This situation becomes critical if one of the three remaining
rifle companies is retained aboard ship as a MAGTF reserve.
In the area of electronic intelligence (ELINT) and imagery
intelligence (IMINT), the MAU must continue to rely primar-
ily on external intelligence support.
     Before transitioning from the problems affecting intel-
ligence support to ways of solving the problems, a final
note is necessary concerning bureaucracy.  In many ways,
bureaucracy is the greatest problem which must be overcome
to improve the intelligence support of our MAGTF'S.  Those
characteristics of bureaucracy which cause the most concern
are the concept of turf, the resistance to change, and dif-
fusion of responsibility.  One of the better examples of
these bureaucratic principles at work is the repeated re-
quests by reconnaissance units for a primary military
specialty (0321 MOS) to solve the problem of insufficient
numbers of trained reconnaissance Marines.  In the first
stage, the request must be "staffed" through numerous staff
sections at Headquarters Marine Corps to allow each staff
officer the chance to make comments on the request.  Next,
if the view of a staff section (Manpower, in the case of this
example) is unfavorable, they recommend "nonconcur."  Such a
recommendation is nearly always fatal to a request.  The real
problem, however, is not the disapproval of a recommended
solution, but the absence of the responsibility to provide a
better solution to solve the problem.  As a result, the short-
age of trained reconnaissance Marines still exists today
with no solutions in sight.8  Given this situation, it will
not come as a surprise that my recommended solutions delib-
erately avoid any formal changes in organization and equip-
ment which would require approval of Headquarters Marine
     The first step to enhancing the intelligence support
of forward deployed MAGTF's is to improve external intelli-
gence support through the formation of a Direct Support Unit
(DSU).  The DSU would be an informal organization of intel-
ligence personnel task-organized around the parent regiment
or division of the deployed MAGTF.  Unlike the MAU/ATF staffs,
the DSU would not be restricted in space or personnel, and
could expand or shrink as the situation dictated.  One of
the most important qualities for DSU personnel would be
previous experience in MAGTF's and amphibious operations
which would enable them to anticipate the needs of the de-
ployed MAU's.  As the deployed MAU is alerted to a particu-
lar crisis situation, the DSU would be quickly augmented
with the appropriate area specialists to assist in the
analysis of information.  To provide timely administrative
support, the DSU would require direct communication with the
deployed MAGTF by secure voice, teletype, and if available,
facimile equipment.  It should be stressed that the DSU
would not interfere with the chain of command, but would
limit itself to administrative support of the MAU through
analysis of all-source information and coordination of in-
telligence support.
     While imposing "minimize" in a crisis situation can re-
duce the amount of message traffic, it cannot improve the
quality of the messages.  One of the chief functions of the
DSU would be to analyze the enormous amounts of all source
information and to provide the MAU with a timely and fini-
shed intelligence product.  Direct communications with the
MAU would allow any questions to be quickly answered by area
specialists in the DSU without going through a lengthy chain
of command.  While tasking of national collection agencies
would probably still have to go through the chain of command,
the DSU could conduct direct liaison with those agencies to
ensure coordination of collection efforts.  This coordina-
tion would also assist in identifying essential elements of
information and ensure that critical intelligence was not
delayed in routine analysis procedures.  Finally, the DSU
would fully support training exercises to rehearse and to re-
fine the procedures which would be used in a contingency
     While the capabilities of our national intelligence
agencies are truely awesome, nearly fifty percent of the
intelligence requirements are routinely not answered in am-
phibious operations.9  In an effort to fill these requirements,
the MAU S-2 must coordinate with his navy counterpart to make in-
creased utilization of the assets in the naval task force.
The carrier battle group normally in support of the ATF has
a significant ELINT and IMINT collection capability, as do
submarines.  Lacking expertise in amphibious operations,
however, tasking of these assets should be fairly specific
as to the nature and types of things that are being sought.
The ATF also has capability to collect ELINT and human
intelligence (HUMINT), but the limited range of these assets
usually restrict their use until immediately prior to the
amphibious operation.  Prior to the time of the operation,
the MAGTF intelligence officer will have to address several
deficiencies in his organic collection assets and take steps
to increase the MAGTF's collection capabilities.
     One of the more serious problems which the MAGTF in-
telligence officer must overcome is the size and the train-
ing of his organic collection assets.  Because personnel re-
strictions normally preclude deploying with additional col-
lection assets, intelligence planners must find ways to en-
hance the capabilities of those personnel already assigned
to the MAGTF.  One method of increasing the MAGTF informa-
tion collection capabilities and overcoming size and train-
ing deficiencies is to narrow the scope of the collection
mission assigned to each unit.  The best example of this
method involves the employment of the organic reconnaissance
     The reconnaissance platoon is equipped and organized
to operate in two, nine-man squads.  Of the 23 men in the
platoon, it is not uncommon for only 50% of the personnel
to be fully qualified in the 0321 recon MOS.10  This MOS
involves over forty technical capabilities which range from
beach reconnaissance to NBC surveys.  Given the frequent
personnel turbulance within the Marine division, training
quickly becomes watered-down if all subject areas are given
equal priority.  By assigning primary collection responsi-
bility for beach reconnaissance to the Navy SEALS, and other
collection tasks to the BLT and the Air Combat Element (ACE),
the MAGTF intelligence planners can narrow the scope of the
recon platoon's primary collection missions, and thereby
increase the quality of training in the areas of most likely
employment.  This increased intensity of training allows
for additional cross-training of squad members and normally
increases the number of qualified patrol leaders.  Under
optimum conditions, the additional patrol leaders will allow
planners the flexibility of employing two nine-man patrols,
three six-man patrols, or four five-man patrols.
     In addition to narrowing the scope of primary collection
missions, intelligence planners can further increase the
MAGTF's collection capabilities by tasking units normally
not involved with intelligence activities.  Returning to the
example of the reconnaissance platoon, the current platoon
is organized and equipped to perform it's mission through
stealth and covert collection.  The platoon lacks both the
ground mobility and the firepower to conduct high speed
(overt) reconnaissance in a mechanized enviroment.  It also
lacks the capability to resort to combat to obtain informa-
tion should the use of stealth fail.11  At some future date,
the division reconnaissance battalion may be equipped with
a reconnaissance version of the LAV-25 similar to the one
depicted in Figure 1.12  Meanwhile, the deploying recon
platoons are normally foot mobile once they have been in-
serted behind enemy lines by helicopter, small boats, vehicle
drop-off, or walking.  To overcome this ground mobility de-
ficiency, elements of the weapons company and the TOW section
can be tasked to conduct motorized reconnaissance patrols.
Marines and their vehicles from the heavy machinegun section,
the Dragon platoon, and the TOW section, augmented with in-
fantry or STA platoon personnel, would be ideal for this
mission.  In a high-threat enviroment, tanks and AAV's could
also be tasked with reconnaissance patrols.  In all cases,
patrols from the BLT would be carefully coordinated and in-
tegrated with other patrols at the MAGTF's joint intelligence
center.  Ground reconnaissance should also be augmented by
aerial reconnaissance by the MAU's helicopters, especially
the AH-1 Cobras.
     Once it is committed to a crisis situation, the third
way the MAGTF can improve it's organic intelligence produc-
tion and collection capabilities is by augmentation from ex-
ternal sources.  During the preassault phase, a valuable
source of augmentation is the 2d Force Reconnaissance Com-
Click here to view image
pany.  Although the company has not frequently supported
foward deployed MAGTF's, they are prepared to rapidly re-
spond to any request.  Airlifted to the crisis area for in-
sertion by submarine or parachute, the 2d Force Reconnaiss-
sance Company provides the MAGTF with the best trained force
available to covertly collect HUMINT in the objective area
while the amphibious task force is still making its approach.13
Recent acquisition of the AN/PGS data communication terminals
will allow recon teams to rapidly report essential information
by burst-transmission to the DSU using directional antennas
to reduce the risk of compromise.  The information can then
be quickly retransmitted by the DSU to the MAGTF, with or
without analysis, using the naval communication system.
This technique was used by the Special Air Service in the
Faulklands operations without problems or compromise, and
provided the British task force with continuous information
on Argentine activities prior to the amphibious landing.14
	One of the fundamental decisions which must be made by
the MAGTF commander and the commander of the ATF (CATF) is
the need to weigh intelligence collection against the pos-
sible loss of surprise.  By restricting collection activi-
ties until a period immediately prior to the amphibious
operation, surprise is maintained, but the number of collect-
tion assets required is greatly increased and the analysis
time decreased. Amphibious doctrine  addresses this problem
by encouraging "full exploitation of special reconnaissance
units and unconventional warfare forces in support of the
collection effort."15  Future Marine commanders must overcome
their reluctance to request assistance from these national
assets.  Once the need is identified, the DSU can relieve
the MAGTF of the planning burden and provide the necessary
liaison and coordination with the Joint Special Operations 
	Once the MAGTF is ashore, only imagination limits the
augmentation available to the MAGTF.  Using the air alert
battalion as a source, the MAU can be rapidly reinforces
with additional intelligence assets to include reconnaissance
units, CI teams, radio battalion teams, translators, elements
of the target acquisition battery, area specialists, sensor
personnel, additional AH-1 Cobra's, LAV's and a fourth
rifle company.  In the event that an airfield is not avail-
able to air land these assets, consideration should be given
to requesting similar forces from the 82d Airborne Division.
In the Faulklands, the British used the instructors and stu-
dents from their mountain warfare school to provide a ground
reconnaissance capability to the Royal Marines' brigade
headquarters.16  The key to this augmentation is to have a
comprehensive collection plan and recon and surveillance
plan to actively seek the required information about the
enemy and the terrain.  Knowing the requirements, the MAGTF
staff can then coordinate with their parent DSU to ensure
appropriate forces are made available to support the col-
lection plans.  
	Forward deployed MAGTF's must be prepared to fight on an
increasingly lethal battlefield where they will frequently
be outnumbered and outgunned.  Under these circumstances,
intelligence provides the MAGTF commander with an essential
combat multiplier to accomplish his mission.  In the pre-
ceeding paragraphs I have discussed many of the problems
limiting intelligence support of our forward deployed MAGTF's
and I have made several recommendations which can improve
that intelligence support.  The key principle in my recommen-
dations has been the time-honored technique of task organiza-
tion to make maximum utilization of orgainc and external
intelligence assets.  To counter the problem of limited man-
power, resources, and experience of the MAU S-2 section, the
MAU's parent organization can task organize a DSU to provide
highly detailed and specifically tailored intelligence pro-
ducts to the MAGTF in a timely manner.  The expertise, man-
power, and resources of the DSU would vary for a given sit-
uation, but in a crisis the DSU's capabilities would be vir-
tually unlimited.  To remedy the MAGTF's limited collection
capability, external Marine, Navy, and national intelligence
collection assets could be tasked organized to support the
MAGTF mission and coordinated by the DSU.  Internally, the
MAGTF's collection capability could be enhanced through air
lifted augmentation and increased use of ground and air
combat elements to collect combat information.  Finally,
none of these recommended solutions requires new equipment,
major reorganization, or additional funds which would require
lengthy and bureaucratic staffing actions.  I have always
believed in the Marine Corps' slogan that if a person was not
part of the solution, then that person was part of the pro-
blem.  The time for complaining about intelligence failures
is past.  Now is the time for Marine commanders to improve
the intelligence support of our foward deployed MAGTF's by
adopting the measures I have proposed.
	1Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Air-Ground
Task Force Doctrine, FMFM 0-1 (Washington, 1979), p.4-12.
	2Ibid, p. 4-14.
	3Ibid, p. 5-2.
	4MCDEC, USMC, Intelligence, FMFM 2-1 (Washington,
1980), Appendix A.
	5Potomac General Research Group for CG, MCDEC, USMC,
Alternative Means of Intelligence Collection/Production,
3 vols.  (Quantico, 1979), pp. II-83 to II-94.
	6MCDEC,USMC, Doctrine for Landing Forces, FM31-76/
NWP 30/AFM 2-54/LFM 02 (Quantico, 1971), p. 25.
	7Major John Bouldry, former CEO of 5th MAB, personal
interview concerning MAGTF communications, Quantico, March
20, 1984.  Exercise Gallant Eagle, for example, had 51 flash
msgs, 1,457 op. immediate msgs, 539 priority msgs, and 121
routine msgs over TTY circuts from 18 to 22 March 1982.
	8For more information concerning this topic and related
ground reconnaissance topics, refer to CG, MCDEC, Recon Sym-
posium reports dated Novemeber 22, 1974, June 2, 1976, Feb-
ruary 13, 1978, August 9, 1978, and July 13, 1982.  CMC
(Code RD) responses of interest are dated January 26, 1979,
and March 3, 1981.
	9Potomac General Research Group for CG, MCDEC, USMC,
Alternate Means of Intelligence Collection/Productions, 3
vols. (Quantico, 1979), pp. I-19 to I-22.
	10Major R.P. Adelhelm, Operations Officer, 2nd Reconnais-
sance Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, personal interview con-
cerning intelligence collection by the Recon Bn, Camp Le-
jeune, North Carolina, December 30, 1983.  Also personal
experience as a recon platoon commander in 1971 and 1972
in 3d Recon Bn, and recon company commander, 1st Recon Bn,
in 1975 and 1976.
	12Delco Systems Operations, General Motors Corporation,
ATWS LAV-25 (A) (Santa Barbara, 1983), p. 17.
	13Major Kevin A. Conry, Commanding Officer, 2d Force
Reconnaissance Company, FMF, personal interview concerning
intelligence collection by force recon personnel, Camp Le-
jeune, North Carolina, December 30, 1983.  Also personal
experience as Operations Officer, 1st Force Reconnaissance
Company in 1973
	14Major Chris J.E. McDowall, Royal Marines, experienced in
British reconnaissance procedures, personal interview concerning
intelligence collection by British recon, SAS, and SBS personnel,
Quantico, October 20, 1983.  It should be noted that numerous'
interviews with reconnaissance and intelligence officers
were unanimous in their opinions that the Deep Recon Platoon
in 1st and 3d Recon Bn's was currently unable to support
this type of mission given it's small size and high personnel
turnover.  CMC letter RDD-28-mrc dated January 26, 1979,
responded to the problem by stating that consideration was
being given to reactivation of 1st Force Reconnaissance
	15LFM 02, op.cit., p. 24.
	16Captain Jon J.B. Lear, Royal Marines, OIC Mountain and
Artic Warfare Cadre, letter concerning intelligence collection
in the Faulklands campaign dated January 24, 1984.
Adelhelm, Major R.P., Operations Officer, 2d Reconnaissance
     Battalion, 2d Marine Division, FMF.  Personal interview
     about intelligence collection by recon personnel.  Camp
     Lejeune, North Carolina, December 30, 1983.
Bouldry, Major John, former Communications Officer, 5th Marine
     Amphibious Brigade.  Personal interview about MAGTF com-
     munications.  Quantico, Virginia, March 20, 1984.
Chernyslov, Colonel T.U. "Reconnaissance."  Soviet Military
     Review, 9 (September, 1978), pp.21-22.
Conry, Major Kevin A., Commanding Officer, 2d Force Reconnais-
     sance Company, FMF.  Personal interview about intelligence
     collection by recon personnel.  Camp Lejeune, North
     Carolina, December 30, 1983.
Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.  Doc-
	trine for Amphibious Operations, FM31-11/NWP 22 (8)/AFM
     2-53/LFM 01.  Washington, 1967
Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.  Doc-
     trine for Landing Forces. FM31-76/NWP30/AFM 2-54/LFM 02.
     Washington, 1971.
General Motors Corporation, Delco Systems Operations.  ATWS
     LAV-25(A). S83-158.  Santa Barbara, November 18, 1983.
Korotchenko, Lieutenant General I. "Reconnaissance."  Soviet
     Military Review, 6(June, 1983), pp.44-45.
Lear, Captain Jon J.B., Officer-in-Charge, Royal Marines
     Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre, United Kingdom.
     Letter concerning intelligence collection in the Faulk-
     lands Islands campaign, January 24, 1984.
Mc Dowall, Major Chris J.E., expert in reconnaissance oper-
     ations.  Personal interview about reconnaissance oper-
     ations by Royal Marines, SAS, and SBS.  Quantico, Vir-
     ginia, October 20, 1983.
Staley, Lieutenant Colonel Roger F., G-2, I Marine Amphibious
     Force, Camp Pendleton, California.  Letter about MAGTF
     intelligence collection and production, December 6, 1983.
Summers, Colonel Harry G.  "Yomping to Port Stanley."  Mili-
     tary Review, 3 (March, 1984), pp.2-16.
Suvorov, Viktor.  "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's  Special
     Forces."  Military Review, 3(March, 1984), pp.30-46.
Trofimov, Colonel R.  "Tactical Reconnaissance."  Soviet
     Military Review, 5(May, 1976), pp. 26-27.
U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education
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U.S. Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Development and Education
     Command.  Amphibious Reconnaissance. FMFM 2-2. Quantico,
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U.S. Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Development and Education
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