PART 2. PRE-INCIDENT INDICATORS
Pre-incident indicators will exist in every terrorist incident.
Incidents do not occur in a vacuum. They are planned, organized, and carried out by individuals acting alone or in groups. The nature of the incident, its target, the level of force used, the types of weapons used, the number of people involved, and the behavior of the perpetrators will depend on the nature of the group.
Once a target is chosen, weapons choice and requisite force levels will probably depend on the nature of the target.
PRE-INCIDENT INDICATORS
Three Generic Catagories
Group Related Indicators.
Target Related Indicators
Incident Related Indicators
Group Related Indicators
On-going campaigns of a certain nature,
Protests against the treatment of a group member (ie, events following capture, trial, or death of a group member),
Name dates commemorative actions,
Visible group preparations for activity.Target Related Indicators
Identity of the group may or may not be known.
Specific collection or threats against a target.
Actions by the target that places it in the target
spectrum.
Prior activity directed against the target.
Incident Related Indicators
Used to jar a deadlock - apply more pressure in another incident, ie., Mogadishu used to break the Schleyer deadlock,
Previous threats and announcements of intent,
Tips from other sources,
Prior surveillance of the target/ victim on threat list,
Equipment stolen, logistics movements,
Rehearsals (as in Moro),
Victim previously vandalized/ attacked.
Normally represent data with the shortest warning time.
Data may be noticed by the victim, but is improperly assessed and consequently ignored:
- Kroessen observes two subjects following him on a motorcycle three days in a row (RAF MO)
- Guard dogs poisoned shortly before the takeover of the Dominican Republic Embassy in Colombia by M-19
- East-bloc attendees leave diplomatic reception en masse minutes before takedown at Dominican Republic Embassy H&B
-U.S. Security policeman is robbed at gunpoint and receives calls prior to the assassination of Herrington in Adana, Turkey
Assessment Procedures
Look for fragments/indicators,
Look for patterns,
Examine fragments prior to the action,
Evaluate all fragments in the context of the group,
Assess the data in relation to the possible action,
Cross reference groups by region,
Cross reference action types by group,
Assess group capability vs. target vulnerability,
Produce assessment, task for further collection when necessary.
Part 3 Database Design and Development
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