FM 34-45: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Electronic Attack
Electronic Deception is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, suppression, absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflection of EM energy in a manner intended to convey misleading information and to deny valid information to an enemy or to enemy electronic dependent weapons. Electronic deception is both parts of EW and military deceptions. Normally, an electronic deception is conducted as part of a larger deception, and are seldom conducted alone. Division is the lowest level at which a deception plan can be initiated, and the commander must approve all deception plans. Historically, deception operations originate from EAC.
TYPES OF ELECTRONIC DECEPTION
C-1. Among the types of electronic deception are—
C-2. Although electronic deception is usually thought of in terms of communications, electronic deception is also conducted using digital (analog) emissions. The signals could mimic the data flows issuing from a TOC when in reality it is a jammer putting out a signal pre-recorded for this mission.
MANIPULATIVE ELECTRONIC DECEPTION
C-3. MED uses communication or noncommunication signals to convey indicators that mislead the enemy. For example, to indicate that a unit is going to attack when it is actually going to withdraw, the unit might transmit false FS plans and requests for ammunition.
C-4. MED is used to cause the enemy to splinter his intelligence and EW efforts to the point that they lose effectiveness. It is used to cause the enemy to misdirect his EA and ES assets and therefore cause fewer problems with friendly communications. Used in these ways, MED is an EP technique.
SIMULATIVE ELECTRONIC DECEPTION
C-5. SED uses communication and noncommunication signals to mislead hostile forces as to friendly units and/or the capabilities of friendly units. There are three types of SEDs:
IMITATIVE ELECTRONIC DECEPTION
C-6. In IED, the enemy's EM emissions are imitated to mislead the enemy. Examples include entering the enemy communication nets by using his callsigns and radio procedures, and then giving enemy commanders instructions to initiate actions which are to our advantage. Targets for IED include any enemy receiver and range from cryptographic systems to very simple, plain-language tactical nets. IED can cause a unit to be in the wrong place at the right time, to place ordnance on the wrong target, or to delay attack plans. Imitative deception efforts are intended to cause decisions based on false information that appears to the enemy to have come from his own side.
C-7. Properly used, IED can be decisive on the battlefield. However, to be effective, IED requires electronic equipment capable of convincingly duplicating the functions of enemy equipment. IED is done if—
C-8. If available, however, captured enemy equipment (CEE) should be used to ensure that the technical characteristics of signals are authentic.
ELECTRONIC DECEPTION PLANNING
C-9. Electronic deception planning determines how to use EM equipment to mislead the enemy and cause him to do something to our advantage. Each piece of electronic and associated equipment has its own electronic signature. These signatures are exploited in deception.
C-10. The G3 usually plans and supervises deceptions. The EWO is usually responsible to the G3 for the electronic deception plan. All of these personnel work with the G2 to determine the electronic activities most likely to be intercepted by enemy SIGINT.
C-11. Careful integration of electronic deception with visual, sonic, and olfactory actions is critical. What the enemy detects electronically must remain consistent with other sources of intelligence reports. Because of the reliance placed on EM radiation (for example, communication, surveillance, navigation) this aspect of deception requires close attention. Although electronic deception can be the sole act of deception, the effect is often of short duration.
C-12. The enemy's success depends upon his knowledge of your emitters. Success in MED and SED depends on understanding how your emitters appear to the enemy. The SIGINT team should keep a profile (database) of a command's voice and digital (analog) emitters. This is to determine how best to electronically portray a desired portion of that command. When planning MED and SED, it is usually necessary to consider all the command's EM emitters. It is necessary to consider what is occurring and what should occur with all EM emitters in the unit's area.
C-13. Similarly, when planning an electronic deception, consider all unit electronic activities, such as—
C-14. Some considerations for planning are-
C-15. Time is critical. Given sufficient time, the enemy can discover even the most complex electronic deception. A deception intended to deceive the enemy for two or three days must include a well-coordinated electronic deception that covers all electronic emitters.
C-16. The commander can perform MED and SED as long as he uses only equipment under his control. IED can only be done with permission of the appropriate commander— within a division, this is usually the division commander. This restriction is to ensure that IED does not jeopardize the SIGINT effort. IED, if recognized by the enemy, will provide data concerning the friendly ES effort. This could cause the enemy to improve his communications security (COMSEC) and procedures to reduce the effectiveness of the friendly SIGINT efforts. Coordination with higher will always occur before any MED or SED operations begin.
C-17. False emanations must be—
ELECTRONIC DECEPTION TECHNIQUES
C-18. The following are electronic deception techniques:
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