• Military
• WMD

• Intelligence Menu               

• Systems
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Imagery
• Links

• Homeland Security
• Space

FM 34-25-1: Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS)

Chapter 5

SURVIVABILITY

DESERT STORM provided the materiel and combat developers a rare opportunity to assess the current capabilities of a full scale development system in a wartime operational environment.

The Joint STARS GSM can deploy virtually anywhere to support the commander's needs to support his operations. It can be located from relatively secure sanctuary areas in the rear to forward CPs on the battlefield. As a result of this great flexibility, it faces a variety of threat levels and types. When in operation, the GSM is not in continual data and voice communications with the aircraft. The GSM is also linked to the TACFIRE and ASAS on the ground. Because of the hardwired links to TACFIRE and ASAS, the GSM has the capability to operate in a totally passive mode. However, jamming and sabotage are a threat.

The threat to the Joint STARS GSM is classified into two categories:

• Jamming the SCDL or the UHF and VHF radios to the E-8 aircraft.
• Sabotaging the GSM.

JAMMING THE SCDL LINK:

Correct communications security (COMSEC) procedures help reduce radio communications vulnerability. The SCDL is relatively jam resistant. Active enforcement of secure communications procedures for voice transmissions over supporting networks will reduce vulnerability. For example, the operator can--

• Employ frequency hopping.
• Decrease transmission distance. (Given the orbit of the aircraft at a specified time; this is not always a possibility.) (See classified Appendix A.)
• Reduce transmission time. This involves communication between GSM radios and the aircraft. Voice formats should be planned to achieve brevity and uniformity (for example, stay on the air long enough to conduct business, then get off the air).

SABOTAGING THE GSM:

The GSM has a unique recognition profile to enemy visual reconnaissance. The main GSM physical signature is the SCDL antenna that rises vertically to 100 feet on the IGSM and 30 feet on the Block I GSMs. Using proper security procedures in active garrison and field sites reduces vulnerability to the sabotage threat.

Locating the GSM to take advantage of concealment and cover reduces the vulnerability. GSM personnel must be proficient in camouflaging urban, desert, and wooded environments to supplement natural concealment and cover. The GSM faces the same threat of destruction by fires as the unit or CP to which it is assigned. The GSM does not provide any protection against direct or indirect fire weapons.

The GSM has an inherent recognition profile to enemy visual reconnaissance because of its SCDL antenna. To operate efficiently, its antenna must have LOS to the aircraft. If the antenna is extended to its full height to achieve LOS, this will create a unique profile which helps identify the GSM. Natural silhouetted terrain features can be used to reduce the antenna's profile. Mounting the SCDL on the tripod vice the main mast can also reduce the antenna profile.

Although the GSM's antenna cannot be camouflaged without degrading reception, the shelter may be camouflaged. Shape-disruptive painting and the Lightweight Camouflage Screen System (LCSS) reduce visual or electronic detection of the GSM.

SHAPE-DISRUPTIVE PAINTING:

This is commonly called pattern painting or camouflage. It reflects in the near infrared band of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum like nature's colors. This type of painting helps equipment to blend in with the natural surroundings and reduces detection from image-intensifying sensors.

LIGHTWEIGHT CAMOUFLAGE SCREEN SYSTEM:

LCSSs provide excellent cover when properly used. They are radar scattering or radar transparent. The radar scattering screen contains minute fibers of stainless steel which inhibit the passage, reflection, and return of a threat radar signal. The radar transparent version is made without these fibers. It can be used to protect the GSM without altering its effectiveness to link to the aircraft. LCSSs can usually be set up in 20 to 25 minutes.

The GSM has protection against the effects of EM pulse.

To protect against the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) threat, the GSM and GSM shelters, antenna group, and exterior and interior finishes are painted with nontoxic chemical agent resistant paints.

The Block I GSMs are designed to maintain positive pressure for collective protection or to be operated by personnel in individual NBC protective clothing. Personnel leaving the shelter should always be in proper mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) as determined by the environment.

Standard NBC alarms are used outside the shelter to provide a local alarm warning of detected chemical agents. When an NBC attack occurs, outside personnel should be in MOPP 4 and erect a protective entrance as soon as possible. This allows the mission to continue without opening the shelter door. (See FM 3-4.)

When in an NBC environment, extreme caution must be used to avoid contaminating the interior of the shelter. Should contamination occur, all work must be conducted in MOPP 4 until the interior can be decontaminated. For the exterior of the shelter and the vehicle, the appropriate decontamination kits and solutions should be used. (See FM 3-5.)

Operations security (OPSEC) is the process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions. OPSEC--

• Is accomplished by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations and other activities.
• Is a common-sense approach applied systematically to a unit's situation and mission.
• Requires a totally integrated effort by commanders, staffs, units, and individuals. The result is security of the force.

Good OPSEC provides the best method of battlefield survival and keeps the enemy from locating GSM stations. Under the OPSEC umbrella, three actions are taken:

• To protect the true status of friendly activities and operations and counter-surveillance.
• To eliminate or reduce enemy SIGINT and related electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and activities that threaten the United States Army counter-signals intelligence (C-SIGINT).
• To create a false picture of friendly activities and operations to mislead the enemy into actions which are counter to their intentions and deception.

GSM crews must practice good OPSEC as soon as the GSM is deployed. All operators should know reporting procedures and SCDL frequencies as well as GSM UHF and VHF radio coordination frequencies. Operators should be knowledgeable of datalink initialization parameters.

The GSMs overall physical security plan should be designed to safeguard its personnel, property, and operations. The supporting command provides physical security. GSM physical security procedures should, when possible, include--

• Locating the GSM adjacent to a sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) for the TOC.
• Placing supplemental barbed wire and concertina wire to further protect the system.
• Controlling access (concertina wire, only when appropriate).
• Knowing or being aware of friendly combat units that could provide additional security.
• Properly classifying, handling, safekeeping, and destroying all intelligence information.