Intelligence Process in Full Spectrum Operations
THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
4-1. Commanders use the operations process of plan, prepare, execute, and assess to continuously design and conduct operations (see Figure 4-1). The commander cannot successfully accomplish the activities involved in the operations process without information and intelligence. The design and structure of intelligence operations support the commander's operations process by providing him with intelligence regarding the enemy, the battle-field environment, and the situation.
4-2. Intelligence operations consist of the functions that constitute the intelligence process: plan, prepare, collect, process, produce, and the three common tasks of analyze, disseminate, and assess. Just as the activities of the operations process overlap and recur as circumstances demand, so do the functions of the intelligence process. Additionally, the analyze, disseminate, and assess functions of the intelligence process occur continuously throughout the intelligence process.
4-3. The operations process and the intelligence process are mutually dependent. The commander, through the operations process, provides the guidance and focus through CCIRs and PIRs that drives the intelligence process; the intelligence process provides the continuous intelligence essential to the operations process. Intelligence about the enemy, the battlefield environment, and the situation allows the commander and staff to develop a plan, seize and retain the initiative, build and maintain momentum, and exploit success (see Figure 4-2). The intelligence process is just one of the mechanisms that provides input to build the COP and facilitate the commander's situational understanding.
4-4. The planning step of the intelligence process consists of activities that include assessing the situation, envisioning a desired outcome (also known as setting the vision), identifying pertinent information and intelligence require-ments, developing a strategy for ISR operations to satisfy those require-ments, directing intelligence operations, and synchronizing the ISR effort. The commander's intent, planning guidance, and CCIRs (PIRs and FIRs) drive the planning of intelligence operations. Planning, managing, and coordinating these operations are continuous activities necessary to obtain information and produce intelligence essential to decisionmaking.
4-5. Staff and leaders coordinate with various elements, units, and organizations to ensure the necessary resources, linguist support (see Appendix B), information, intelligence, training, and procedures are in place to facilitate effective intelligence operations.
- · Coordination for Movement of ISR Assets. All ISR assets at one time or another will move through or near another unit's AO. To avoid fratricide, ISR elements must coordinate with units, G3/S3, G2/S2, and each other, as well as coordinate with the fire support officer (FSO) to establish no-fire areas and/or other control measures around ISR assets and the air defense officer (ADO) in reference to aerial ISR assets in order to establish the appropriate weapons control status.
- · Coordination for Information and Intelligence. The intelligence staff must prepare and practice coordination with personnel from all MI units, non-MI units, other service components, and multinational organizations that may contribute to or facilitate the collection effort. This coordination enables the G2/S2 to share and update databases, information, and intelligence and ensures connectivity with those organizations. All units are sources of relevant information regarding the enemy and the operational environment.
- · Liaison. In order to accomplish the mission, exchange information and intelligence, move through certain areas and ensure FP, it may be necessary to coordinate with many different elements, organizations, and local nationals of the country in which friendly forces are conducting operations. Local nationals include police, town officials, foreign military forces, and political and other key figures within the AO. Operations may also necessitate coordination with other US and multinational forces; for example, the International Police Task Force (IPTF), Joint Commission Observers (JCO), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Allied Military Intelligence Battalion (AMIB), and Defense HUMINT Service (DHS).
- · Movement. Coordination with the G3/S3 ensures ease of movement and safe passage of friendly forces through an area. Coordinating movement also helps avoid fratricide.
INTELLIGENCE BOS CONSIDERATIONS
4-6. The Intelligence BOS is a unified system that anticipates and satisfies intelligence needs. Commanders ensure its proper employment by clearly articulating intent, designating CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs), and prioritizing targets. Commanders must, however, understand the limitations of the Intelligence BOS to preclude unrealistic expectations of the system. The following are Intelligence BOS limitations:
- · Intelligence only reduces uncertainty on the battlefield; it does not eliminate it entirely. The commander will always have to determine the presence and degree of risk involved in conducting a particular mission.
- · The Intelligence BOS is composed of finite resources and capabilities. Intelligence systems and soldiers trained in specific ISR skills are limited in any unit. Once lost to action or accident, these soldiers and systems are not easily replaceable; for some, it may not be possible to replace them during the course of the current operation. The loss of soldiers and equipment can result in the inability to detect or analyze enemy actions. The loss of qualified language-trained soldiers, especial-ly soldiers trained in low-density languages or skills, could adversely affect intelligence operations as well.
- · The Intelligence BOS cannot effectively and efficiently provide intelligence without adequate communications equipment, capacity, and connectivity. Commanders and G2/S2s must ensure communica-tions support to intelligence has the appropriate priority.
- · Commanders and G2/S2s cannot expect that higher echelons will automatically send them everything they need. While intelligence reach is a valuable tool, the push of intelligence products from higher echelons does not relieve subordinate staffs from conducting detailed analysis and focusing the efforts of higher headquarters. Nor can they expect products pushed to them to be always at the level of detail they require. Commanders and G2/S2s must focus higher echelons by clearly articulating and actively pursuing intelligence requirements. By providing higher echelons with a clear picture of the required intelligence products, commanders can also narrow the flow of intelligence and information and preclude being overwhelmed by too much information.
4-7. Commanders should be aware that intelligence collection is enabled by, and subject to, laws, regulations, and policies to ensure proper conduct of intelligence operations. While there are too many to list here specifi- cally, categories of these legal considerations include United States Codes (USCs), Executive Orders, National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NCSIDs), Army Regulations, United States Signal Intelligence Directives (USSIDs), SOFAs, ROE, and other international laws and directives.
4-8. The prepare step includes those staff and leader activities which take place upon receiving the OPORD, OPLAN, WARNO, or commander's intent to improve the unit's ability to execute tasks or missions and survive on the battlefield. These activities include:
- · Effecting necessary coordination in accordance with the OPORD, METT-TC, unit SOP.
- · Establishing and testing the intelligence architecture. This activity includes complex and technical issues like hardware, software, communications, COMSEC materials, network classification, techni-cians, database access, liaison officers (LNOs), training, funding, and TTP.
- · Establishing an intelligence team attitude. This activity includes knowing different unit's and organization's capabilities, training the necessary collective skills, establishing effective relationships with different units and organizations, developing mutual battle rhythms and TTP, and leveraging the right architectures and collaboration tools.
- · Coordinating effective analytic collaboration. Effective analytic collaboration is necessary to maximize the complementary analytic capabilities of different units and organizations that produce intelli-gence within the same theater of operations. Coordinating this collaboration is an effort-intensive activity that requires careful mutual planning, division of labor, defined responsibilities, and procedures for adapting to changing circumstances as they develop.
- · Establishing reporting procedures.
- · Conducting IPB.
- · Producing Intelligence Estimates.
- · Presenting briefings.
- · Ensuring staff and personnel are trained. If personnel are not adequately trained at this point, they must be trained or the leader must evaluate the risk they bring to the operation.
- · Planning refinement, brief-backs, SOP reviews, rehearsals, and coordi-nating with various elements and organizations.
- · Establishing other troop-leading procedures (TLPs) or coordination, as necessary, in accordance with METT-TC factors.
G2/S2 PREPARATION ACTIVITIES
4-9. The G2/S2 takes numerous steps before mission execution to ensure intelligence operations run smoothly and effectively. These steps include, but are not limited to, the following:
- · Conduct rehearsals.
- · Conduct communication rehearsals.
- · Review and update available databases and IPB products.
- · Review applicable SOPs, Army Regulations, DA Pamphlets, Field Manuals, and ROE for guidance in conducting intelligence operations.
- · Plan and practice actions supporting likely contingencies, or the branches or sequels to an operation.
- · Ensure coordination measures are still in effect.
- · Ensure training (individual and collective).
- · Verify communications protocols with theater and higher headquarters and subordinate and lateral units.
- · Update intelligence databases.
- · Update the forces with the most recent intelligence on the AO imme-diately before mission execution.
4-10. Coordination for or requesting provisions or services is only the first step in acquiring them. It is crucial that staff and leaders check to verify that procedures, personnel, equipment, and services are in place and ready for mission execution.
4-11. Rehearsals help units prepare for operations by either verifying that provisions and procedures are in place and functioning or identifying inade-quacies, which staff and leaders must remedy. They allow participants in an operation to become familiar with and to translate the plan into specific actions that orient them to their environment and other units when executing the mission. They also imprint a mental picture of the sequence of key actions within the operation and provide a forum for subordinate and supporting leaders and units to coordinate. (FM 6-0)
4-12. The timely and accurate reporting of CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs) and IRs is key to successful operations. All assets should know when, how often, and what format to use when reporting. The G2/S2 must verify the frequencies, alternate frequencies, and reactions during jamming, as well as the LTIOV for specific information to be reported. Unit SOPs provide the proper reporting procedures.
4-13. The G2/S2 coordinates with the unit staff, subordinate and lateral commands, and higher echelon units to ensure that specific reporting assets, personnel, equipment (especially communications), and procedures are in place. The G2/S2 requests or establishes the appropriate message addresses, routing indicators, mailing addresses, and special security office (SSO) security accreditation for units.
4-14. Staff and leaders must work closely with the G6/S6 or signal officer (SIGO) to coordinate for the required communication links. The unit may require classified and unclassified network connections for their equipment. If elements of the unit will be working outside the range of the unit's communications systems, then it is necessary to coordinate for global or extended range communications. Leaders must obtain the required type and amount of communications equipment and related components as well as the latest fills and frequencies. They must possess and be familiar with all the instructions, passwords, policies, regulations, and directives conducive to OPSEC. They must also ensure soldiers are trained in the use and procedures involved in operating communications equipment.
4-15. Each staff section and element conducts activities to maximize the operational effectiveness of the force. Coordination and preparation are just as important, if not more important, as developing the plan. Staff preparation includes assembling and continuously updating estimates. For example, continuous IPB provides accurate situational updates for commanders.
4-16. A well-executed intelligence hand-off will ensure a smooth and seamless transition between units. It is important that the incoming unit becomes familiar with the operation as soon as possible to avoid compro-mising the intelligence production and flow of the mission. The following are points to consider during a mission hand-off:
- · Briefings and reports (learn what briefings are required and when as well as report formats and requirements).
- · Past, present, and planned activities within the AOI.
- · Established SOPs (know procedures for reporting; intelligence contin-gency funds [ICFs] and incentive use if applicable; emplacement and use of ISR equipment).
- · Key personalities (introductions are required; establish rapport and a good working relationship with all key personalities).
- § Key personnel on the base or camp (their responsibilities; how to contact them).
- § Key personnel in other US and multinational service components (coordinate for exchange of information and intelligence).
- § Key personalities from surrounding towns (local figures).
- § Key national level political and military figures.
- · Supporting units (know where to go for provisions, information, or assistance and POCs within those organizations).
- · Current attitudes (understand current attitudes and perspectives of the local populace).
- · Equipment operation and idiosyncrasies (equipment may run on different applications; personnel may need to train on specific equipment and procedures).
- · Area familiarization (identify NAIs, key terrain, minefields, and bound-aries; know camp locations, routes and route names, checkpoints, towns, and troubled resettlement areas).
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
4-17. Although ROE training was presented during the plan function of the intelligence process, leaders at all levels can take the opportunity during the prepare function to ensure their subordinates completely understand the ROE. It is also during this function that commanders may need to consider exceptions to, or modifications of, the ROE to facilitate HUMINT and CI collection or to enable the placement of ISR assets.
4-18. Recent ISR doctrine necessitates that the entire staff, especially the G3/S3 and G2/S2, must change their reconnaissance and surveillance mind-set to conducting ISR. The staff must carefully focus ISR on the CCIR (PIR and FFIR) but also enable the quick retasking of units and assets as the situation changes. This doctrinal requirement ensures that the enemy situation not just our OPLAN "drives" ISR operations. Well-developed procedures and carefully planned flexibility to support emerging targets, changing requirements, and the need to support combat assessment is critical. The G2/S2 and G3/S3 play a critical role in this challenging task that is sometimes referred to as "fighting ISR" because it is so staff intensive during planning and execution (it is an operation within the operation). Elements of all units on the battlefield obtain information and data about enemy forces, activities, facilities, and resources as well as information concerning the environmental and geographical characteristics of a particular area.
4-19. ISR tasks are the actions of the intelligence collection effort. ISR tasks consists of three categories:
- · Intelligence.
- · Surveillance.
- · Reconnaissance.
4-20. Intelligence tasks are included in Annex B of the OPORD under Scheme of Intelligence. They include the following:
- · Intelligence Production. Intelligence production includes analyzing information and intelligence and presenting intelligence products, conclusions, or projections regarding the OE and enemy forces in a format that enables the commander to achieve situational under-standing.
- · Request for Information. Submitting an RFI to the next higher or lateral echelon is the normal procedure for obtaining intelligence information not available through the use of available ISR assets. Users enter RFIs into an RFI management system where every other user of that system can see it. Hence, an echelon several echelons above the actual requester becomes aware of the request and may be able to answer it. A G2/S2 who receives an RFI from a subordinate element may use intelligence reach to answer RFIs.
- · Intelligence Reach. Intelligence reach allows the commander to access the resources of national, joint, foreign, and other military organizations and units. Requestors can acquire information through push and pull of information, databases, homepages, collaborative tools, and broadcast services. (See Chapter 2 for more information on intelligence reach.)
4-21. For information on reconnaissance or surveillance tasks, refer to FM 7-15 and FM 3-55.
4-22. Special reconnaissance (SR) is the complementing of national and theater intelligence collection assets and systems by obtaining specific, well-defined, and time-sensitive information of strategic or operational signi-ficance. It may complement other collection methods where there are constraints of weather, terrain, hostile countermeasures, and/or other systems availability. SR places US or US-controlled personnel conducting direct observation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory when authorized. SOF may conduct these missions unilaterally or in support of conventional operations. (See JP 3-05 and FM 101-5-1.)
4-23. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) elements conduct SR missions to obtain information not available through other means. SR operations encompass a broad range of collection activities to include reconnaissance, surveillance, and TA. SR complements national and theater collection systems that are more vulnerable to weather, terrain masking, and hostile countermeasures. SR missions provide intelligence or information that is often not available through other means. Typical SR missions include:
- · TA and surveillance of hostile C2 systems, troop concentrations, deep-strike weapons, lines of communication (LOCs), WMD systems, and other targets.
- · Location and surveillance of hostage, prisoner of war, or political prisoner detention facilities.
- · Post-strike reconnaissance for BDA.
- · Meteorologic, geographic, or hydrographic reconnaissance to support specific air, land, or sea operations.
4-24. For more information on special reconnaissance, see FM 3-05.102.
4-25. The most critical information collected is worthless if not reported in a timely manner. Collectors may report information via verbal, written, graphic, or electronic means. Unit SOPs must clearly state the transmission means of different types of reports (for example, sent by voice frequency modulated [FM] radios or by automated means). In general, the transmission of reports for enemy contact and actions, CCIRs, exceptional information, and NBC reports is by voice FM, and then followed up with automated reports. Commanders and staffs must remember that timely reporting, especially of enemy activity, is critical in fast-moving operations. Collectors must report accurate information as quickly as possible. Commanders and staff must not delay reports for the sole purpose of editing and ensuring the correct format. This is particularly true for reporting information or intelligence that answers the PIR.
4-26. Intelligence and time-sensitive combat information that affects the current operation is disseminated immediately upon recognition. Combat information is unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user's tactical intelligence requirements. Thus combat information is provided directly to the tactical commander (see JP 1-02). The routing of combat information proceeds immediately in two directions: directly to the commander and through routine reporting channels, which include intelligence analysis and production elements.
4-27. Time-sensitive information usually includes reports concerning enemy contact and actions and CCIRs.
4-28. The process function converts relevant information into a form suitable for analysis, production, or immediate use by the commander. Processing also includes sorting through large amounts of collected information and intelligence (multidiscipline reports from the unit's ISR assets, lateral and higher echelon units and organizations, and non-MI elements in the battlespace). Processing identifies and exploits that information which is pertinent to the commander's intelligence requirements and facilitates situational understanding. Examples of processing include developing film, enhancing imagery, translating a document from a foreign language, converting electronic data into a standardized report that can be analyzed by a system operator, and correlating dissimilar or jumbled information by assembling like elements before the information is forwarded for analysis.
4-29. Often collection assets must collect and process their data prior to disseminating it. MI systems have their own reporting and processing systems, the details of which are in the appropriate MI system manuals and technical manuals. Some collection assets, particularly air reconnaissance and ground scouts, can report relevant information that is immediately usable by the tactical commander (for example, for targeting purposes). However, the personnel in the reporting chain still process these reports by evaluating their relevancy and accuracy. In many cases, the output of a collection asset is data, or information of limited immediate use to a commander. Also, in certain situations ROE dictate a requirement for target confirmation by other sources.
4-30. The intelligence staff processes information collected by the unit's assets as well as that received from higher echelons. The intelligence staff processes many types of information and data from intelligence reach, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) imagery, radar imagery, mobile target indicators (MTIs), and HUMINT and SIGINT reports.
4-31. In the production step, the G2/S2 integrates evaluated, analyzed, and interpreted information from single or multiple sources and disciplines into finished intelligence products. Like collection operations, the G2/S2 must ensure the unit's information processing and intelligence production are prioritized and synchronized to support answering the CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs).
4-32. Intelligence products must be timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and usable. The accuracy and detail of every intelligence product has a direct effect on how well the unit plans and prepares for operations. However, the G2/S2 and unit must use intelligence (no matter what form the intelligence is in) that meets the requirements but might not be as detailed or refined as possible or in a better form. A good answer on time is better than a more refined answer that is late.
4-33. The G2/S2 produces intelligence for the commander as part of a collaborative process. The commander drives the G2/S2's intelligence production effort by establishing intelligence and IRs with clearly defined goals and criteria. Differing unit missions, environments, and situations impose numerous and varied production requirements on the G2/S2 and his staff.
4-34. The G2/S2 must employ collaborative analysis techniques and procedures that leverage intelligence production capability of higher and subordinate echelons to meet these requirements. Proficiency in these techniques and procedures enables the G2/S2 to answer the commander's and staff's requirements regardless of the mission, environment, and situation. The G2/S2 and staff intelligence products enable the commander to:
- · Plan operations and employ maneuver forces effectively.
- · Recognize potential COAs.
- · Employ effective tactics and techniques.
- · Take appropriate security measures.
- · Focus ISR.
COMMON INTELLIGENCE PROCESS TASKS
4-35. Analysis occurs at various stages throughout the intelligence process. Personnel conducting intelligence operations at all levels analyze intelligence, information, and problems to produce intelligence, solve pro-blems and, most importantly, answer the PIRs. Leaders at all levels conduct analysis to assist in making many types of decisions. An example is a HUMINT collector analyzing an intelligence requirement in order to deter-mine the best possible collection strategy to use against a specific source.
4-36. Analysis in RM is critical to ensuring the IRs receive the appropriate priority for collection. The intelligence staff analyzes each requirement to determine its feasibility, whether or not it supports the commander's intent, and to determine the best method of satisfying the IRs. The staff also analyzes collected information to determine if it satisfies requirements.
4-37. During the produce function, the intelligence staff analyzes information from multiple sources to develop all-source intelligence products. The intelligence staff analyzes information and intelligence to ensure the focus, prioritization, and synchronization of the unit's intelligence production is in accordance with the PIRs.
4-38. In situation development, the intelligence staff analyzes information to determine its significance relative to predicted ECOAs and the CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs). Through predictive analysis, the staff attempts to identify enemy activity or trends that represent opportunities or risks to the friendly force. They use the indicators developed for each ECOA and CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs) during the MDMP as the basis for their analysis and conclusions.
4-39. Successful operations at the tactical and operational levels require an increased ability to synchronize fires, have faster access to intelligence, and enhance situational understanding and effective FP. Timely and accurate dissemination of intelligence is key to the success of these and other operations. Commanders must receive combat information and intelligence products in time and in an appropriate format to support decisionmaking. Additionally, sharing the most current all-source information and intelligence at all echelons is essential for commanders to maintain situational understanding.
4-40. To achieve this, it is imperative that the commander and staff establish and support a seamless intelligence architecture-including an effective dissemination plan-across all echelons to ensure information and intelli-gence flow in a timely manner to all those who need them. Intelligence and communications systems continue to evolve in their sophistication, appli-cation of technology, and accessibility to the commander. Their increasing capabilities also create an unprecedented volume of information available to commanders at all echelons. Finally, the commander and staff must have a basic understanding of these systems and how they contribute to the Intelligence BOS. A dissemination plan can be a separate product, or integrated into existing products such as the ISR synchronization plan or ISM, the decision support template (DST), or decision support matrix (DSM).
4-41. The G2/S2 and intelligence personnel at all levels assess the dissemination of intelligence and intelligence products.
4-42. Disseminating intelligence simultaneously to multiple recipients is one of the most effective, efficient, and timely methods. This can be accomplished through various means; for example, push, broadcast. However, within the current tactical intelligence architecture, reports and other intelligence products move along specific channels. The staff helps streamline information distribution within these channels by ensuring dissemination of the right information in a timely manner to the right person or element. There are three channels through which commanders and their staffs communicate: command, staff, and technical.
4-43. Command Channel. The command channel is the direct chain-of-command link that commanders, or authorized staff officers, use for command-related activities. Command channels include command radio nets (CRNs), video teleconferences (VTC), and the Maneuver Control System (MCS).
4-44. Staff Channel. The staff channel is the staff-to-staff link within and between headquarters. The staff uses the staff channel for control-related activities. Through the staff channel, the staff coordinates and transmits intelligence, controlling instructions, planning information, provides early warning information, and other information to support C2. Examples of staff channels include the operations and intelligence radio net, telephone, the staff huddle, VTC, and the BOS-specific components of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS).
4-45. Technical Channel. Staffs typically use technical channels to control specific combat, CS, and CSS activities. These activities include fire direction and the technical support and sensitive compartmented information (SCI) reporting channels of intelligence and ISR operations. The SIGINT tasking and reporting radio net, intelligence broadcast communications, and the wide area networks (WANs) supporting single intelligence discipline collection, processing, and production are examples of technical channels.
Presentation Techniques and Procedures
4-46. The staff's objective in presenting information is to provide the commander with relevant information. Table 4-1 lists the three general methods that the staff uses to present information and meet its information objective. Systems within the ABCS contain standard report formats, maps, and mapping tools that assist the staff in presenting information in written, verbal, and graphic form. Audio and video systems such as large format displays and teleconferencing systems enable the staff to use a combination of the methods in multimedia presentations.
Intelligence Communications Architecture
4-47. The intelligence communications architecture transmits intelligence and information to and from various ISR elements, units, and agencies by means of automation and communication systems. With the continued development of sensors, processors, and communications systems, it is increasingly important to understand the requirements of establishing an effective communications architecture. The G2/S2 must identify the Intelli-gence BOS specific requirements of the unit's overall communications architecture. Refer to FM 2-33.5 for more information on intelligence communications reach. The following are some (but not all) of the questions which the staff must answer in order to establish the intelligence communi-cations architecture:
- · Where are the unit's collectors?
- · What and where are the unit's processors?
- · Where are the unit's intelligence production elements?
- · Where are the unit's decisionmakers?
- · How does the unit disseminate information from its producers to its decisionmakers and/or consumers?
- · Are the systems which the unit's collectors, producers, processors, and consumers use compatible with each other? If not, what is the plan to overcome this challenge?
- · How can the unit access databases and information from higher and other agencies?
4-48. Assessment is the continuous monitoring: throughout planning, preparation, and execution-of the current situation and progress of an operation, and the evaluation of it against criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments. Assessment plays an integral role in all aspects of the intelligence process. Assessing the situation and available information begins upon receipt of the mission and continues throughout the intelligence process. The continual assessment of intelligence operations and ISR assets, available information and intelligence, the various aspects of the battlefield environment, and the situation are critical to:
- · Ensure the CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs) are answered.
- · Ensure intelligence requirements are met.
- · Redirect collection assets to support changing requirements.
- · Ensure operations run effectively and efficiently.
- · Ensure proper use of information and intelligence.
- · Identify enemy efforts at deception and denial.
4-49. During planning, the intelligence staff conducts a quick initial assessment of the unit's intelligence posture and holdings, status of intelli-gence estimates, and any other available intelligence products. From this assessment the commander issues his initial guidance and a WARNO.
4-50. While the majority of the unit is engaged in preparation, the ISR effort should already have begun. It is during this period when the prepare and execute activities of the operations process overlap, that the G2/S2 assesses the current situation as well as the progress of ISR operations.
4-51. During execution the intelligence staff continues assessing the effectiveness of the ISR effort while at the same time assessing the results and products derived from the collection effort. The critical aspects of assessment at this point include determining whether the PIRs have been answered, will be answered with the current ISR operations, or which ISR operations to adjust in order to answer the CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs). This type of assessment requires sound judgment and a thorough knowledge of friendly military operations, characteristics of the AO and AOI, and the threat situation, doctrine, patterns, and projected future COAs.
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