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Intelligence in the Op!erational Environment

Part One discusses MI's role in peace, conflict, and war. Supporting the warfighter with effective intelligence is the primary focus of Military Intelligence. Intelligence provides commanders and decisionmakers with the requisite information facilitating their situational understanding so that they may successfully accomplish their missions in full spectrum operations.

Chapter 1 describes the operational environment and the roles of MI within the operational environment. It introduces the Intelligence BOS, the intelligence tasks, and the intelligence process, which are the mechanisms through which MI supports the warfighter. This chapter also introduces the intelligence disciplines, which are explained in detail in Part Three of this manual.

Chapter 2 describes the interaction of MI within the nation's intelligence community structure, providing an overview of the intelligence community at the national level and the unified action level— joint, multinational, and interagency aspects of full spectrum operations. This chapter also discusses the concepts and components of intelligence reach.

Chapter 1

Intelligence and the Operational Environment


1-1. The commander requires intelligence about the enemy and the battlespace prior to engaging in operations in order to effectively execute battles, engagements, and other missions across the full spectrum of operations. Intelligence assists the commander in visualizing his battlespace, organizing his forces, and controlling operations to achieve the desired tactical objectives or end-state. Intelligence supports force protection (FP) by alerting the commander to emerging threats and assisting in security operations.

1-2. The unit may need to deal with multiple threats. The commander must understand how current and potential enemies organize, equip, train, employ, and control their forces. Intelligence provides an understanding of the enemy, which assists in planning, preparing, and executing military operations. The commander must also understand his OE and its effects on both his own and enemy operations. The commander receives mission-oriented intelligence on enemy forces and the area of operations (AO) from the G2/S2. The G2/S2 depends upon the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) effort to collect and provide information on the enemy and battlespace.

1-3. One of the most significant contributions that intelligence personnel can accomplish is to accurately predict future enemy events. Although this is an extremely difficult task, predictive intelligence enables the commander and staff to anticipate key enemy events or reactions and develop corresponding plans or counteractions. The most important purpose of intelligence is to influence decisionmaking. Commanders must receive the intelligence, understand it (because it is tailored to the commander's requirements), believe it, and act on it. Through this doctrinal concept, intelligence drives operations.


1-4. The Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (BOS) is one of seven battlefield operating systems— intelligence, maneuver, fire support (FS), air defense, mobility/countermobility/survivability, combat service support (CSS), and command and control (C2)— that enable commanders to build, employ, direct, and sustain combat power. The Intelligence BOS is a flexible force of personnel, organizations, and equipment that, individually or collectively, provide commanders with the timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence required to visualize the battlefield, assess the situation, and direct military actions. Additionally, the Intelligence BOS is-

A complex system that operates worldwide, from "mud-to-space," in support of an operation, to include the ability to leverage theater and national capabilities.

Cooperation and division of labor internally, higher, lower, adjacent, and across components and the coalition.

1-5. The Intelligence BOS not only includes assets within the MI branch but also includes the assets of all branches or BOS that conduct Intelligence BOS tasks. Every soldier, as a part of a small unit, is a potential information collector and an essential component to help reach situational understanding. Each soldier develops a special level of awareness simply due to exposure to events occurring in the AO and has the opportunity to collect information by observation and interaction with the population.

1-6. Planning and executing military operations will require intelligence regarding the enemy and the battlefield environment. The Intelligence BOS generates intelligence and intelligence products that portray the enemy and aspects of the battlespace. These intelligence products enable the commander to identify potential courses of action (COAs), plan operations, employ forces effectively, employ effective tactics and techniques, and take appropriate security measures.

1-7. The Intelligence BOS is always engaged in supporting the commander in offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. We must posture the Army for success through hard training, thorough planning, meticulous preparation, and aggressive execution. We can no longer allow a "crawl, walk, run" cycle in preparation for operations. In our current environment we must maintain intelligence readiness to support operations on "no notice." This support is comprehensive and reaches across full spectrum operations and levels of war to produce the intelligence required to win on the battlefield. A combination of space, aerial, seaborne, and ground-based systems provide the most comprehensive intelligence possible. During force projection operations, the Intelligence BOS supports the commander with accurate and responsive intelligence from predeployment through redeployment.

1-8. The Intelligence BOS architecture provides specific intelligence and communications structures at each echelon from the national level through the tactical level. These structures include intelligence organizations, systems, and procedures for collecting, processing, analyzing, and delivering intelligence and other critical information in a useable form to those who need it, when they need it. Effective communications connectivity and automation are essential components of this architecture.


1-9. The personnel and organizations within the Intelligence BOS conduct four primary intelligence tasks that facilitate the commander's visualization and understanding of the threat and the battlespace. These tasks are interactive and often take place simultaneously. (Refer to FM 7-15 for the complete subordinate task listing.) Figure 1-1 shows these tasks tailored to the commander's needs.

Figure 1-1. Intelligence Tailored to the Commander's Needs.


1-10. This task centers on providing information and intelligence to the commander, which facilitates his achieving understanding of the enemy and the environment. It supports the command's ability to make sound decisions. Support to situational understanding comprises four subtasks: perform intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), perform situation development, provide intelligence support to FP, and conduct police intelligence operations.

Perform Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

1-11. The G2/S2 is the staff proponent for IPB. IPB is the staff planning activity undertaken by the entire staff to define and understand the battlespace and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces. IPB includes input from the whole staff. There is only one IPB in each headquarters with inputs from all affected staff cells; they are not separate BOS or staff section IPBs throughout the headquarters. It is a systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the threat and battlespace in a specific geographic area for a specific mission or in anticipation of a specific mission. By applying IPB, the commander and staff gain the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize combat power at critical points in time and space. IPB is most effective when it integrates each staff element's expertise into the final products. To conduct effective IPB, the G2/S2 must—

Produce IPB products that support the staff's preparation of estimates and the military decision-making process (MDMP).

Identify characteristics of the AO, including the information environ-ment, that will influence friendly and threat operations.

Establish the area of interest (AOI) in accordance with the com-mander's guidance.

Identify gaps in current intelligence holdings.

Determine multiple enemy COAs (ECOAs) by employing predictive analysis techniques to anticipate future enemy actions, capabilities, or situations.

Establish a database that encompasses all relevant data sets within and related to the battlespace.

Determine the enemy order of battle (OB), doctrine, and TTP. Identify any patterns in enemy behavior or activities.

Accurately identify and report hazards within the AO, including the medical threat and toxic industrial material (TIM).

Accurately identify threat capabilities, high-value targets (HVTs), and threat models.

Integrate IPB information into COA analysis and the MDMP.

Update IPB products as information becomes available.

Perform Situation Development

1-12. Situation development is a process for analyzing information and producing current intelligence about the enemy and environment during operations. The process helps the intelligence officer recognize and interpret the indicators of enemy intentions, objectives, combat effectiveness, and potential ECOAs. Situation development:

  • Confirms or denies threat COAs.
  • Provides threat locations.
  • Explains what the threat is doing in relation to the friendly force operations.
  • Provides an estimate of threat combat effectiveness.

1-13. Through situation development, the intelligence officer is able to quickly identify information gaps, and explain enemy activities in relation to the unit's own operations, thereby assisting the commander in gaining situational understanding. Situation development helps the commander make decisions and execute branches and sequels. This reduces risk and uncertainty in the execution of the plan. The intelligence officer maintains, presents, and disseminates the results of situation development through intelligence input to the common operational picture (COP) and other intelligence products.

Provide Intelligence Support to Force Protection

1-14. Provide intelligence in support of protecting the tactical force's fighting potential so that it can be applied at the appropriate time and place. This task includes the measures the force takes to remain viable and functional by protecting itself from the effects of or recovery from enemy activities. FP consists of those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense (DOD) personnel (to include Department of Army [DA] civilians, contractors, uniformed personnel, and family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions—

  • Conserve the force's fighting potential for application at the decisive time and place.
  • Incorporate coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures.
  • Facilitate the effective employment of the joint force while degrading the capabilities of and opportunities for the threat.

1-15. Intelligence to FP consists of monitoring and reporting the activities, intentions, and capabilities of adversarial groups and determining their possible COAs. Detecting the adversary's methods in today's OE requires a higher level of situational understanding, informed by current and precise intelligence. This type of threat drives the need for predictive intelligence based on analysis of focused information from intelligence, law enforcement, and security activities.

1-16. Intelligence analysis in support of FP employs analytical methodologies and tools to provide situational understanding and to predict the adversary's actions. Modified or standard time-event charts, association matrixes, activity matrixes, link diagrams, and overlays are beneficial in monitoring the actions of the adversary. Overlays may include (but are not limited to) threat training camps, organizations, finances, personalities, industrial sites, information systems, decisionmaking infrastructures, specific activities, and locations of previous attacks.

Conduct Police Intelligence Operations

1-17. Police intelligence operations (PIO) are a military police (MP) function that supports, enhances, and contributes to the commander's force protection program, COP, and situational understanding. The PIO function ensures that information collected during the conduct of other MP functions— maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, and internment and resettlement— is provided as input to the intelligence collection effort and turned into action or reports. PIO has three components: (See FM 7-15, ART 1.1.4)

  • Collect police information.
  • Conduct Police Information Assessment Program (PIAP).
  • Develop police intelligence products.


US Code, Executive Orders, DOD Directives, and Army Regulations contain specific guidance regarding prohibition on the collection of intelligence infor-mation on US citizens, US corporations, and resident aliens. These laws and regulations include criminal penalties for their violation. Any PIO directed against US citizens should undergo competent legal review prior to their initiation.

The inclusion of the PIO task branch in the Intelligence BOS does not change the intelligence process described in this manual.


1-18. Intelligence support to strategic responsiveness supports staff planning and preparation by defining the full spectrum of threats, forecasting future threats, and forewarning the commander of enemy actions and intentions. Support to strategic responsiveness consists of four subtasks: Perform I&W, ensure intelligence readiness, conduct area studies of foreign countries, and support sensitive site exploitation. (See FM 7-15, ART 1.2)

Perform Indications and Warnings

1-19. This activity provides the commander with forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of threat actions. The intelligence officer develops I&W in order to rapidly alert the commander of events or activities that would change the basic nature of the operations. It enables the commander to quickly reorient the force to unexpected contingencies and shape the battlefield. (See FM 7-15, ART 1.2.1)

1-20. The G2/S2 at the operational and strategic levels develops I&W in order to rapidly alert the commander of events or activities that would change the basic nature of the operations so the commander can initiate the appropriate action in a timely manner. I&W reduce the risk of enemy actions that are counter to planning assumptions. I&W enable the commander to quickly reorient the force to unexpected events and to shape the battlefield by manipulating enemy activities.

Ensure Intelligence Readiness

1-21. Intelligence readiness operations support contingency planning and preparation by developing baseline knowledge of multiple potential threats and operational environments. These operations and related intelligence training activities engage the Intelligence BOS to respond effectively to the commander's contingency planning intelligence requirements. (See FM 7-15, ART 1.2.2) While still in garrison, intelligence defines the full spectrum of threats and forecasts future threats and dangers. Intelligence readiness operations accomplish the following:

  • Provide intelligence to support contingency-based training and staff planning.
  • Identify, consider, and evaluate all potential threats to the entire unit.
  • Provide a broad understanding of the operational environment of the contingency area, which is developed through continuous exchange of information and intelligence with higher echelon and joint intelligence organizations.

Conduct Area Studies of Foreign Countries

1-22. Study and understand the cultural, social, political, religious, and moral beliefs and attitudes of allied, host nation (HN), or indigenous forces to assist in accomplishing goals and objectives. (See FM 7-15, ART 1.2.3)

Note: The inclusion of this task does not change the support to strategic responsiveness provided by MI organizations described in this manual.

Support Sensitive Site Exploitation

1-23. Sensitive site exploitation consists of a related series of activities inside a sensitive site captured from an adversary. A sensitive site is a designated, geographically limited area with special military, diplomatic, economic, or information sensitivity for the United States. This includes factories with technical data on enemy weapon systems, war crimes sites, critical hostile government facilities, areas suspected of containing persons of high rank in a hostile government or organization, terrorist money laundering, and document storage areas for secret police forces. These activities exploit personnel, documents, electronic data, and material captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents. While the physical process of exploiting the sensitive site begins at the site itself, full exploitation may involve teams of experts located around the world. (See FM 7-15, ART 1.2.4)

Note: The inclusion of this task does not change the support to strategic responsiveness provided by MI organizations described in this manual.


1-24. With staff participation, the intelligence officer synchronizes intel-ligence support to the ISR effort by focusing the collection, processing, analysis, and intelligence products on the critical needs of the commander. The operations officer, in coordination with the intelligence officer, tasks and directs the available ISR assets to answer the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs). Through various detection methods and systematic observation, reconnaissance and surveillance obtains the required information. A continuous process, this task has four subtasks: perform intel-ligence synchronization, perform ISR integration, conduct tactical recon-naissance, and conduct surveillance. (See FM 7-15, ART 1.3, and FM 3-90).

Perform Intelligence Synchronization

1-25. The intelligence officer, with staff participation, synchronizes the entire collection effort to include all assets the commander controls, assets of lateral units and higher echelon units and organizations, and intelligence reach to answer the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and information requirements (IRs). (See FM 7-15, ART 1.3.1)

1-26. The intelligence officer, with staff participation, supports the G3/S3 in orchestrating the entire ISR effort to include all assets the commander controls, assets of lateral units and higher echelon units and organizations, and intelligence reach to answer the CCIRs (PIRs and friendly force information requirements [FFIRs]) and other intelligence requirements. Intelligence synchronization activities include the following:

  • Conducting requirements management (RM): anticipate, develop, analyze, validate, and prioritize intelligence requirements. Recommend PIRs to the commander. Manage the commander's intelligence requirements, requests for information (RFIs) from subordinate and lateral organizations, and tasks from higher headquarters. Eliminate satisfied requirements and add new requirements as necessary.
  • Developing indicators.
  • Developing specific IRs (specific information requirements [SIRs]).
  • Converting the SIRs into intelligence tasks or ISR tasks. (See Figure 1-2 for the ISR task development process.) The S2/G2 assigns intelligence production and reach tasks to subordinate intelligence ele-ments or personnel, submits RFIs to higher and lateral echelons, and coordinates with (or assists) the G3/S3 to develop and assign ISR tasks.
  • Comparing the ISR tasks to the capabilities and limitations of the available ISR assets (in coordination with the operations officer).
  • Forwarding SIRs that cannot be answered by available assets to higher or lateral organizations as RFIs.
  • Assessing collection asset reporting and intelligence production to evaluate the effectiveness of the ISR effort.
  • Maintaining situational understanding to identify gaps in coverage and to identify the need to cue or redirect ISR assets.
  • Updating the intelligence synchronization plan. The G2/S2 manages and updates the intelligence synchronization plan as PIRs are answered and new requirements arise.

1-27. Intelligence Synchronization Considerations. The G2/S2 generally follows six considerations in planning intelligence synchronization and ISR activities: anticipate, integrate, prioritize, balance, control, and reach. Refer to FM 2-01 for more information regarding intelligence synchro-nization.

  • Anticipate. The intelligence staff must recognize when and where to shift collection or identify new intelligence requirements. The overall intent of this principle is to identify a new or adjust an existing requirement and present it to the commander for approval before waiting for the commander or his staff to identify it.

Figure 1-2. ISR Task Development Process.

  • Integrate. The intelligence staff must be fully and continuously integrated into the unit's orders production and planning activities to ensure early identification of intelligence requirements. Early and continuous consideration of collection factors enhances the unit's ability to direct collection assets in a timely manner, ensures thorough planning, and increases flexibility in selecting assets.
  • Prioritize. Prioritize each intelligence requirement based on its importance in supporting the commander's intent and decisions. Prioritization, based on the commander's guidance and the current situation, ensures that limited ISR assets and resources are directed against the most critical requirements.
  • Balance. ISR capabilities complement each other. The intelligence staff should resist favoring or becoming too reliant on a particular unit, discipline, or system. Balance is simply planning redundancy, when required, eliminating redundancy when not desired, and ensuring an appropriate mix of ISR assets or types. The intelligence syn-chronization matrix (ISM) is useful in determining or evaluating balance.
  • Control. To ensure timely and effective responses to intelligence requirements, a unit should first use ISR assets it controls. These assets usually are more responsive to their respective commander and also serve to lessen the burden on the ISR assets of other units, agencies, and organizations.
  • Reach. Although usually not as responsive as a unit's own assets, intelligence reach may be the only way to satisfy an intelligence requirement. If at all possible, one should not depend solely on intelligence reach to answer a PIR.

1-28. Develop IRs. The intelligence staff develops a prioritized list of what information needs to be collected and produced into intelligence. Additionally, the intelligence staff dynamically updates and adjusts those requirements in response to mission adjustments and changes. This list is placed against a latest time intelligence is of value to ensure intelligence and information are reported to meet operational requirements. (See FM 7-15, ART 1.3.1) Figure 1-3 shows a comparison of IR, PIR, and intelligence requirements.

Figure 1-3. IR, PIR, and Intelligence Requirements Comparison

1-29. An effective discussion of ISR has to include an understanding of the CCIRs. The CCIRs are elements of information required by commanders that directly affect decisionmaking and dictate the successful execution of military operations. The commander decides what information is critical based on his experience, the mission, the higher commander's intent, and the staff's input (initial IPB, information, intelligence, and recommendations). Refer to FM 3-0 for more information regarding CCIRs.

1-30. Based on the CCIRs, two types of supporting IRs are generated: PIRs and FFIRs. However, commanders may determine that they need to know whether one or more essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) have been compromised or that the enemy is collecting against a designated EEFI. In those cases, commanders may designate that question as one of their CCIRs. Figure 1-4 shows the CCIR composition.

1-31. IRs are all of the information elements required by the commander and his staff for the successful planning and execution of operations; that is, all elements necessary to address the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC). Vetting by the commander or his designated represen-tative turns an IR into either a PIR or an intelligence requirement. IRs are developed during COA analysis based on the factors of METT-TC.

1-32. PIRs are those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decisionmaking. PIRs are associated with a decision based on an enemy action or inaction or the battlespace that will affect the overall success of the commander's mission. The commander designates intelligence require-ments tied directly to his decisions as CCIR (PIR and FFIR). Answers to the PIRs help produce intelligence essential to the commander's sit-uational understanding and decisionmaking. For information on PIR devel-opment, see FM 2-01.

1-33. The G2/S2 recommends to the commander those IRs produced during the MDMP that meet the criteria for PIR. They do not become CCIR (PIR and FFIR) until approved by the commander. Additionally, The commander may unilaterally designate PIRs. The IRs that are not designated by the commander as PIRs become intelligence requirements. The intelligence requirement is a gap in the command's knowledge or understanding of the battlespace or threat that the Intelligence BOS must fill.

Figure 1-4. Commander's Critical Information Requirements Composition.

1-34. The G3/S3 then tasks the unit's assets to answer both the PIR and intelligence requirements through the ISR plan. PIR should:

  • Ask only one question.
  • Support a decision.
  • Identify a specific fact, event, activity (or absence thereof) which can be collected.
  • If linked to an ECOA, indicate an ECOA prior to, or as early as possible in, its implementation.
  • Indicate the latest time the information is of value (LTIOV). The LTIOV is the absolute latest time the information can be used by the commander in making the decision the PIR supports. The LTIOV can be linked to time, an event, or a point in the battle or operation.

1-35. Friendly Force IRs. The staff also develops FFIRs which, when answered, provide friendly force information that the commander and staff need to achieve situational understanding and to make decisions.

1-36. Essential Elements of Friendly Information. EEFI establish infor-mation to protect, not information to obtain. However, commanders may determine that they need to know whether one or more EEFI have been compromised or that the enemy is collecting against a designated EEFI. In those cases, commanders may designate that question as one of their CCIRs, which generates PIRs and/or FFIRs. For example, a commander may determine that if the enemy discovers the location and movement of the friendly reserve, the operation is at risk. In this case, the location and movement of the friendly reserve are EEFI. He designates determining whether the enemy has discovered the location and movement of the friendly reserve as one of his CCIR. That CCIR, in turn, generates PIR and FFIR to support staff actions in determining whether the EEFI has been compromised.

1-37. Develop the Intelligence Synchronization Plan. The entire unit staff develops their IRs and determines how best to satisfy them. The staff uses reconnaissance and surveillance assets to collect information. The intelligence synchronization plan includes all assets that the operations officer can task or request and coordination mechanisms to ensure adequate coverage of the AOIs. (See FM 7-15, ART

1-38. The intelligence synchronization plan, often presented in a matrix format as an ISM, aids in synchronizing the entire ISR effort with the overall operation and the commander's decisions and/or decision points (DPs). The intelligence synchronization plan is often produced in conjunction with the ISR plan. However, before performing intelligence synchronization and finalizing the intelligence synchronization plan, the G2/S2 must have—

  • The CCIR (PIR and FFIR).
  • A prioritized list of the remaining intelligence requirements.
  • Evaluated ISR assets and resources.
  • All of the assigned ISR tasks.

Perform ISR Integration

1-39. The operations officer, in coordination with the intelligence officer and other staff members, orchestrates the tasking and directing of available ISR assets to answer the CCIR. The operations officer, with input from the intelligence officer, develops tasks from the SIRs which coincide with the capabilities and limitations of the available ISR assets and the latest time information is of value (LTIOV). Intelligence requirements are identified, prioritized, and validated and an ISR plan is developed and synchronized with the scheme of maneuver. (See FM 7-15, ART 1.3.2, and FM 3-90)

1-40. The G3/S3, in coordination with the G2/S2 and other staff members, orchestrates the tasking and directing of available ISR assets to answer the CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs) and IRs. The result of this process is the forming of the ISR plan. The ISR plan provides a list of all the ISR tasks to be accomplished. The G2/S2 and the G3/S3 develop tasks from the SIRs. These tasks are then assigned based on the capabilities and limitations of the available ISR assets and the LTIOV.

1-41. Develop the ISR Plan. The operations officer is responsible for developing the ISR plan. The entire unit staff analyzes each requirement to determine how best to satisfy it. The staff will receive orders and RFIs from both subordinate and adjacent units and higher headquarters. The ISR plan includes all assets that the operations officer can task or request and coordination mechanisms to ensure adequate coverage of the area of interest. (See FM 7-15, ART, and FM 3-90)

1-42. The ISR Plan. The ISR plan is usually produced as the ISR Annex to an OPORD (Annex L, Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). Refer to FM 5-0 for specific and authoritative information on the ISR Annex. ISR is a continuous combined arms effort led by the operations and intelligence staffs in coordination with the entire staff that sets reconnaissance and surveillance in motion. The PIRs and other intelligence requirements drive the ISR effort. The commander takes every opportunity to improve his situational understanding and the fidelity of the COP about the enemy and terrain through the deployment of his ISR assets. Commanders integrate reconnaissance and surveillance to form an integrated ISR plan that capitalizes on their different capabilities. The ISR plan is often the most important part of providing information and intelligence that contributes to answering the CCIRs. For the G2/S2, an effective ISR plan is critical in answering the PIR. Also see FM 3-55 for more information on the ISR plan.

1-43. The ISR plan is not an MI-specific product— the G3/S3 is the staff proponent of the ISR plan— it is an integrated staff product executed by the unit at the direction of the commander. The G2/S2, however, must maintain his situational understanding in order to recommend to the commander and G3/S3 changes or further development of the ISR plan. Based on the initial IPB and CCIRs, the staff— primarily the G2/S2— identifies gaps in the intelligence effort and develops an initial ISR plan based on available ISR assets. The G3/S3 turns this into an initial ISR Annex that tasks ISR assets as soon as possible to begin the collection effort.

1-44. The G3/S3, assisted by the G2/S2, uses the ISR plan to task and direct the available ISR assets to answer the CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs) and intelligence requirements. Conversely, the staff revises the plan as other intelligence gaps are identified if the information is required to fulfill the CCIRs or in anticipation of future intelligence requirements. With staff participation, the G2/S2 intelligence officer synchronizes the ISR effort through a complementary product to the ISR plan— the intelligence synchronization plan.

1-45. Execute and Update the ISR Plan. The operations officer updates the ISR plan based on information he receives from the intelligence officer. The operations officer is the integrator and manager of the ISR effort through an integrated staff process and procedures. As PIRs are answered and new information requirements arise, the intelligence officer updates intelligence synchronization requirements and provides the new input to the operations officer who updates the ISR plan. He works closely with all staff elements to ensure the unit's organic collectors receive appropriate taskings. This ISR reflects an integrated collection strategy and employment, production and dissemination scheme that will effectively answer the commander's PIR. (See FM 7-15, ART, and FM 3-90)

Conduct Tactical Reconnaissance

1-46. To obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, such as signals, imagery, measurement of signature or other technical characteristics, human interaction and other detection methods about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics and the indigenous population of a particular area. This task includes the conduct of NBC reconnaissance and the tactical aspects of SOF special reconnaissance. The five subtasks are—

  • Conduct a Zone Reconnaissance.
  • Conduct an Area Reconnaissance.
  • Conduct a Reconnaissance in Force.
  • Conduct a Route Reconnaissance.
  • Conduct a Reconnaissance Patrol.

Note: This task branch includes techniques by which ART (Collect Police Information) may be performed. (FM 7-15)

1-47. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, and about the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of an AO. MI personnel and organizations can conduct reconnaissance through obtaining information derived from signals, imagery, measurement of signatures, technical characteristics, human interaction, and other detection methods. When performing reconnaissance, it is important to—

  • Orient the reconnaissance asset on the named area of interest (NAI) and/or reconnaissance objective in a timely manner.
  • Report all information rapidly and accurately.
  • Complete the reconnaissance mission not later than (NLT) the time specified in the order.
  • Answer the requirement that prompted the reconnaissance task.

Conduct Surveillance

1-48. To systematically observe the airspace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things in the AO by visual, aural (audio), electronic, photographic, or other means. Other means may include but are not limited to space-based systems, and using special NBC, artillery, engineer, SOF, and air defense equipment. (See FM 7-15, ART 1.3.4, and FM 3-90)

Note: This task is a technique by which ART (Collect Police Information) may be performed.

1-49. Conducting surveillance is systematically observing the airspace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things in the AO by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. Surveillance activities include—

  • Orienting the surveillance asset on the NAI and/or the surveillance objective in a timely manner.
  • Reporting all information rapidly and accurately.
  • Completing the surveillance mission NLT the time specified in the order.
  • Answering the requirement that prompted the surveillance task.


1-50. The task of providing the commander information and intelligence support for targeting of the threat's forces, threat organizations, units and systems through lethal and non-lethal fires to include electronic attack and information operations. This task includes three subtasks: provide intelli-gence support to targeting, provide intelligence support to information opera-tions, and provide intelligence support to combat assessment. (See FM 7-15, ART 1.4)

Provide Intelligence Support to Targeting

1-51. The intelligence officer, supported by the entire staff, provides the commander information and intelligence support for targeting the threat's forces and systems through employment of direct, indirect lethal, and non-lethal fires. It includes identification of threat capabilities and limitations. The Intelligence BOS plays a crucial role by providing intelligence throughout the steps of the targeting process: decide, detect, deliver, assess. Support to targeting includes identifying threat capabilities and limitations. The G2/S2 supports the unit's lethal and non-lethal targeting effort through target development, target acquisition (TA), electronic warfare (EW), and combat assessment. This task has two subtasks:

Provide Intelligence Support to Target Development is the systematic analysis of the enemy forces and operations to determine HVTs, systems, and system components for potential attack through maneuver, fires, or information.

Provide Intelligence Support to Target Detection establishes procedures for dissemination of targeting information. The targeting team develops the sensor/attack system matrix to determine the sensor required to detect and locate targets. The intelligence officer places the following requirements into the integrated ISR plan.

  Requires reconnaissance and surveillance operations to identify, locate, and track high-payoff targets (HPTs) for delivery of lethal or non-lethal effects.

  Includes employing fires, offensive IO, and other attack capabilities against enemy C2 systems as part of the unit's FS plan and IO objectives.

Provide Intelligence Support to Information Operations

1-52. IO are actions taken to affect adversary information, influence other's decisionmaking processes and information systems while protecting one's own information and information systems. Overall operational continuity and mission success requires close, mutual coordination and synchronization of intelligence plans and operations with IO elements and related activities. Refer to Appendix A, this manual, for more information. This task has three subordinate tasks: (See FM 7-15, ART 1.4.2)

  • Provide Intelligence Support to Offensive IO.
  • Provide Intelligence Support to Defensive IO.
  • Provide Intelligence Support to Activities Related to IO.

Provide Intelligence Support to Combat Assessment

1-53. Combat assessment is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. The objective of combat assessment is to identify recommendations for the course of military operations. It answers the question, "Were the objectives met by force em-ployment?" Although the assessment is primarily an intelligence respon-sibility, it requires input from and coordination with operations and fire support staffs. Combat assessment consists of conducting physical damage, functional damage, and target system assessments. (See FM 7-15, ART 1.4.3)

1-54. The staff determines how combat assessment relates to a specific target by conducting physical damage, functional damage, and target system assessments.

Conduct Physical Damage Assessment (PDA). A PDA is an estimate of the extent of physical damage to a target based upon observed or interpreted damage. This post-attack target analysis is a coordinated effort among all units.

Conduct Functional Damage Assessment (FDA). The FDA estimates the remaining functional or operational capability of a targeted facility or object. The staff bases FDA on the assessed physical damage and estimates of the threat's ability to recuperate (to include the time required to resume normal operations). Multiple echelons typically conduct this all-source analysis. The targeting or combat assessment cell integrates the initial target analyses with other sources, including intelligence, and then compares the original objective with the current status of the target to determine if the objective has been met.

Conduct Target System Assessment (TSA). The TSA is an estimate of the overall impact of force employment against an adversary's target system. The unit, supported by higher echelon assets, normally conducts this assessment. The analyst combines all combat assessment reporting on functional damage to targets within a target system and assesses the overall impact on that system's capabilities. This process lays the groundwork for future recommendations for military operations in support of operational objectives.

1-55. Munitions Effects Assessment (MEA). MEA takes place concur-rently and interactively with combat assessment since the same signatures used to determine the level of physical damage also give clues to munitions effectiveness. MEA is primarily the responsibility of operations and FS personnel, with input from the G2/S2. After the same weapon is used to attack several targets of a specific type, MEA should be accomplished to evaluate weapon performance. MEA analysts seek to identify through systematic trend analysis any deficiencies in weapon system and munitions performance or combat tactics by answering the question, "Did the weapons employed perform as expected?" Using a variety of input (targeting analysts, imagery analysts, structural engineers, and mission planners) analysts prepare a report assessing munitions performance. If combat troops capture attacked targets, it is then possible to collect detailed information on the target. Reports should detail weapon performance against specified target types. This information could have a crucial impact on future operations.

1-56. Re-attack Recommendation. Re-attack recommendations follow directly from both battle damage assessment (BDA) and MEA efforts. Basically re-attack recommendations answer the question, "Have we achieved the desired effects against our targeted objectives?" Evolving objectives, target selection, timing, tactics, weapons, vulnerabilities, and munitions are all factors in the new recommendations, combining both operations and intelligence functions.

1-57. Targeting Meeting. The role of the G2/S2 in targeting meetings is critical to ensuring intelligence supports the targeting process. The G2/S2 must come to the targeting meeting prepared. Additionally, the G2/S2 must understand the steps of the targeting process and tailor the intelligence products and G2/S2 participation according to the targeting process steps of: decide, detect, deliver, and assess.

1-58. There are two major areas in which the G2/S2 must prepare in order to support the targeting meeting.

  • Analysis: Determine what the enemy is doing (current situation) and anticipated threat models; ECOA situation templates, ECOA sketches and statements, HVTs, and other associated products.
  • IPB Products: Updated from the initial IPB effort, including analytical results (see above bullet), and tailored to the targeting requirements.

1-59. Decide. At the targeting meeting, the G2/S2 should be prepared to do the following:

  • Brief the current and projected future enemy situation with an event template.
  • Brief any combat assessments.
  • Brief HVTs for potential selection of HPTs.
  • Brief the current PIR portion of CCIRs, the PIRs of the CCIRs for the next phase or in accordance with the same timeframe of the targeting meeting.
  • Brief the current ISM or intelligence synchronization plan.
  • Participate in wargaming.
  • Refine the initial ISR plan (in conjunction with the FS and G3/S3 representatives).

1-60. Detect. Based on information from the decide portion of the targeting meeting, the G2/S2 should be prepared to do the following:

  • Identify specific ISR assets.
  • Develop IRs and propose pertinent IRs to the commander for designa-tion as PIRs.
  • Complete the initial ISR plan; ensure it addresses the HPTs.

1-61. Electronic Warfare. EW provides targeting information to the commander based on transmitter location data. There are three major subdivisions within EW: electronic support (ES), electronic protection (EP), and electronic attack (EA).

  • ES - Also referred to as electronic warfare support (EWS) in JP 1-02, involves actions to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy. In addition to supporting the overall ISR effort, ES is needed to produce intelligence required to support EA missions.
  • EP - Involves passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of EW that degrades, neutralizes, or destroys friendly combat capabilities.
  • EA - Involves the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. EA includes actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), such as jamming and electromagnetic deception.

1-62. Deliver. The G2/S2 should be prepared to do the following:

Brief how the Intelligence BOS will work to detect and track the target through the entire targeting process.

Brief the implementation of the intelligence synchronization and ISR plans, including the LTIOV and communications structure.

1-63. Assess. Depending on the factors of METT-TC and the PIRs, the same ISR assets that detect and track the targets may be required to support combat assessments in order to determine if re-attack is required. Converse-ly, if re-attack is a decision that the commander will make based upon the effects on the enemy, combat assessment should be reflected in the PIR, and supported in the corresponding ISR plan.


1-64. US military forces face a dynamic, multidimensional, and increasingly interconnected global OE. The world situation is complicated and split into many different factions with many possible conflicts. In addition, the characteristics of warfare continue to change as the nature of conflict changes. Different threats require intelligence operations to adapt to the ever-changing OE. This necessitates that all MI personnel maintain or very quickly build cultural awareness (to a high level of detail) specific to the regional and local environment in the AO. These conditions greatly affect MI, as they increase the degree of difficulty and complexity in determining not only who constitutes the enemy but also which of the many possible ECOAs the enemy could implement.

1-65. If the US can dominate an adversary through its size or technological, organizational, and strategic capabilities, the adversary will resort to unconventional and adaptive ways and means to achieve his ends, which may themselves change at times. MI personnel (uniformed and civilian) must also adapt their operations and thinking to understand and predict or anticipate the enemy's next move. MI personnel must remain vigilant, as any likely adversary is a thinking, adaptive threat with extensive resources which he cultivates through ingenuity, purchase of niche capabilities, and the support of his allies. For example, the adversary—

  • May use tactics designed to inflict large numbers of military or civilian casualties or attack high-profile persons.
  • May target and destroy subsystems of a BOS individually or collective-ly.
  • May use the local civilian population for cover and support.
  • May use the characteristics of the natural environment, industry, and enterprise against our forces in unexpected manners.
  • May study every aspect of US doctrine, training, and technological capabilities.
  • May quickly overcome any countermeasures and subsequent countermeasures that US forces emplace to deter his activities.
  • May employ many personnel to conduct reconnaissance as well as those in the local civilian population who support the threat.
  • May attack US information, information systems, and decisionmaking infrastructures in order to discredit or provoke the US, weaken alliances and coalitions, erode public support, incite nation-state and/or international condemnation, and degrade US C2 and/or ISR capabili-ties.

1-66. The overall ability of US forces to defeat such adversaries depends upon the ability of MI personnel to analyze the current and future methods and capabilities of potential adversaries and incorporate those considerations into training, planning, and executing military operations. The OE will continue to change, thus the US military forces and MI must evolve to provide intelligence.


1-67. The OE has six dimensions: threat, political, unified action, land combat operations, information, and technology. Each affects how Army forces (ARFOR) and MI units plan, prepare, execute, and assess military operations. (See FM 3-0, Chapter 1.)


1-68. Extremism, ethnic disputes, poverty, and religious rivalries create unstable conditions within and among states. Rarely are only two sides involved in modern conflicts. More often, one ethno-national group opposes other groups with conflicting interests. This poses a significantly more complex set of enemy or potential adversaries (threat), entities that MI personnel must understand.

1-69. Adversaries will try to create conditions to defeat US operations and to slow the advance of US forces. They will use complex terrain, urban environments, and force dispersal methods-similar to those used by enemies the US has faced before-to offset US advantages. These methods increase the difficulty for MI personnel to identify or locate the enemy's HVTs and may result in US forces' wasting precision weapons on relatively unimportant assets. MI personnel must be aware of the following general concepts that the enemy may use against US forces:

  • Conduct force-oriented operations.
  • Inflict unacceptable casualties.
  • Optimize the use of standoff weaponry and techniques.
  • Attempt to control the tempo.
  • Create conditions to defeat US forcible entry operations.
  • Transition to a defensive framework that avoids decisive battle, preserves capability, and prolongs the conflict. If US forces deploy, the threat may use terrorist and/or information warfare tactics and other measures to erode public support, erode or fracture alliance or multinational cohesion, and the will to fight.
  • Conduct effective ISR.
  • Use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to conduct sophisticated ambushes.
  • Attack key operating systems or inflict mass casualties within and outside the theater of operations.
  • Employ TIM or other toxic substances or pollutants in unconventional manners.
  • Use terrain and urban areas to conceal or shield mechanized and armored units. The threat may concentrate and disperse them as opportunities allow, particularly maneuvering forces during periods of reduced exposure to US ISR technology.
  • Use effective camouflage and deception techniques.
  • Form coalitions against the US.
  • Acquire or modify advanced technology systems to create surprise and limited duration superiority in specific areas.

1-70. Additionally, MI personnel must be aware of how to produce intelligence on the many transnational groups that conduct a range of activities that threaten US interests and citizens at home and abroad. Such activities include terrorism, information warfare, illegal drug trafficking, illicit arms and strategic material trafficking, international organized crime, piracy, and deliberate environmental damage.


1-71. The national security strategy defines how the US meets challenges in the complex and dynamic global environment. It establishes broad strategic guidance for advancing US interests through the instruments of national power. The military components of the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy focus on using military force as an instrument of national power. The President and the Secretary of Defense (formerly referred to as National Command Authorities [NCA]) combine using military force with accurate intelligence to preserve, protect, and advance US interests. Translating political decisions into missions depends on informed and candid assessments.


1-72. Unified action is a broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and non-governmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. (See Chapter 2.) The "Mud to Space" intelligence structure calls for MI to act as part of a fully interoperable and integrated joint intelligence structure. Consequently, the employment of MI in campaigns and major operations must be viewed from a joint perspective. Joint force commanders (JFCs) synchronize the complementary capabilities of the service components that comprise the joint force. They exploit service intelligence capabilities and create an effective joint intelligence team. Often, ARFOR intelligence assets work with multinational and interagency partners to accomplish their missions. Ideally, multinational and interagency intelligence partners provide cultures, perspectives, and capabilities that reinforce and complement Army MI strengths and capabilities. Close intelligence coordination is the foundation of successful unified action.


  • 1-73. Land combat continues to be the salient feature of conflict. It usually involves destroying or defeating enemy forces or taking land objectives that reduce the enemy's effectiveness or will to fight. The axiom "intelligence drives operations" continues to be true; operations and intelligence are complementary. Four characteristics distinguish land combat. The support MI provides is covered in each:
  • Scope. Intelligence considers and strives to understand an enemy throughout the depth of an operational area. Commanders rely on intelligence in order to use maneuver, fires, and other elements of combat power to defeat or destroy enemy forces.
  • Duration. Intelligence assets routinely conduct missions prior to, during, and after the commitment of land combat forces. Intelligence is always engaged.
  • Terrain. Intelligence missions occur among a complex variety of natural and manmade features. Employing intelligence assets in the complexity of the ground environment requires thorough planning. Employing intelligence assets must account for the visibility and clutter of the terrain and the effects of weather and climate.
  • Permanence. MI forces are integrated with, or assigned to, land combat forces as they seize or secure ground. MI assets with these land combat forces make permanent the temporary intelligence capabilities of other operations.


1-74. Many intelligence operations take place within an information environment that is largely outside the control of military forces. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information; also included is the information itself. (See JP 3-13 and FM 3-13). National, international, and non-state actors use the information environment to collect, process, and disseminate information. The media's use of real-time technology affects public opinion, both in the US and abroad, and alters the conduct and perceived legitimacy of military operations. Now, more than ever, every soldier is a potential representative of America to a global audience. The adaptive thinking adversary will often seek to exploit the information environment in an effort to counter, weaken, and defeat the US. Information warfare will be directed against the US and US interests. While the level of sophistication of such attacks may vary, they nonetheless will take place and over time will take their toll.

1-75. Historically, information superiority has enabled decisive ARFOR operations. Information superiority enables ARFOR to see first, understand the situation more quickly and accurately, and act faster than their adversaries. Information superiority, which is derived from the effective synchronization of ISR, information management (IM), and IO, is an operational advantage that results in friendly forces gaining and retaining the initiative. Effective ISR operations and IM identify the information commanders require, collect it, and get it to them when they need it. Offensive IO degrade an adversary's will to resist and ability to fight while simultaneously denying him relevant friendly force information. Defensive IO protect friendly information and C2 systems. Information superiority means commanders receive accurate and timely information that enables them to make better decisions and act faster than their adversaries.


1-76. Technology greatly enables intelligence operations. It enhances the intelligence leader, unit, and soldier performance and affects intelligence operations in full spectrum operations. Intelligence system interoperability is a major concern for the G2/S2, commanders, and staffs as they plan, prepare forces, and weigh employment options. Quality intelligence provided by advanced ISR capabilities and communications, coupled with sound IM, assists commanders in making decisions.

1-77. Battle command benefits from the ability of modern intelligence and telecommunications systems to provide intelligence products faster and more precisely. Technology improves all facets of intelligence, thereby increasing the potential for mission accomplishment. MI personnel must be able to operate their respective systems at their maximum potential. An MI soldier who can use technology to improve the quality, timeliness, and method of presentation of intelligence products provided to the commander is extremely valuable.

1-78. In all operations, MI personnel must determine the extent to which their adversaries possess at least some advanced weaponry. Their weaponry may range from a computer connected to the Internet to WMD. Adversaries may also possess information-based technologies or capabilities, such as satellite imagery, night vision devices (NVDs), or precision-delivery systems. The potential for asymmetric threats puts a premium on IPB and the other intelligence tasks, to include situation development and providing I&W. Operational success requires identifying and evaluating enemy capabilities (strengths and vulnerabilities), intentions, and potential ECOAs.


1-79. The contemporary operational environment (COE) is the operational environment that exists in the world today and is expected to exist until a peer competitor arises. There are eleven critical variables, as shown in Figure 1-5, that facilitate understanding the threat and define the OE. These variables are interrelated, and different variables will be more or less important in relation to each other in different situations. Only by studying and understanding these variables— and incorporating them into training— will the US Army be able to both keep adversaries from gaining an operational advantage against the US and to find ways to use them to our own advantage. Figure 1-5 not only depicts the critical variable of the OE but it also shows that they are linked to all the dimensions of the OE.


1-80. This variable refers to how strong or weak a country is. It is important to determine where the real strength of the state lies; it may be in the political leadership, the military, the police, or some other element of the population— or in some combination of these factors. Intelligence will provide the information crucial in defining the battlefield environment and allow US forces to better understand all aspects of the AO, the nature of the military campaign, and the true aims of an enemy campaign, operation, or action. Intelligence will inform the commander of threats that may be present in a particular country. The most direct and potentially lethal threat to US forces may come from elements other than the threat's military forces. Intelligence must also be aware of the condition of, or conditions leading to, a failed state.


Figure 1-5. Critical Variables And Dimensions of the Operational Environment


1-81. Nation-states and/or non-state actors often enter into relationships, which can be regional or global. These partnerships support common objectives, which can be political, economic, military, or cultural. When actors create regional or global alliances, it can add to their collective capability and broaden the scale of operations and actions. Intelligence will provide the commander with a visualization of all real and/or potential adversaries and the various aspects of their cooperation that could impact on the operation.


1-82. The economic variable consists of economic conditions in the region and economic ties between regional states and other world regions or other countries; the role that economic power plays in the operational environment; and the ability of the United States and its allies to apply economic power in the specific situation. A significant gap in the economic conditions among nation-states and other actors can be a source of conflict. Economic power provides the enemy with increased flexibility and adaptability. It can provide an enemy with the ability to purchase modern technology that can be used to counter US operations and prolong operations. In some cases, economic superiority, rather than military superiority, may be the key to power or dominance within a region. The IPB process identifies those elements of economic power that may be a significant characteristic of the battlefield. However, the application of the economic instrument of national power lies primarily outside the military sphere.


1-83. The demographics variable includes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup of a given region, nation, or non-state actor; additionally, such factors as public health and other population trends must be considered. Intelligence and information enable the commander to understand the influences of the demographic features of his AO. An evaluation of the situation and possible threats with these factors in mind will provide the commander with knowledge concerning underlying demographics that could affect operations in the region. Additionally, intelligence can provide information on whether the population is sympathetic to the US or the enemy cause or is uncommitted in its views to either the US or the enemy.


1-84. Broadcast media and other information means can make combat operations visible to a global audience. Various actors seek to use perceptions to control and manipulate how the public views events. The enemy will exploit US mistakes and failures, create disinformation based on falsehoods, and use propaganda to sway the local population to support their cause, to alienate world opinion, and to influence US public opinion. Media coverage can affect US political decisionmaking, internal opinion, or the sensitivities of multinational members. Intelligence can determine the enemy's ability to manage and manipulate information as well as assess the enemy's ability to access or disrupt US systems (for example, satellite communications [SATCOM] and imagery). Intelligence can also inform the commander on the enemy's communication infrastructure, to include its capabilities and vulnerabilities.


1-85. The main elements of the physical environment are terrain and weather, including the medical threat. Intelligence often considers terrain and weather effects on not only the earth's surface but also subterranean, aerospace, and space. Potential enemies understand that less complex and open environments favor a US force. Therefore, the enemy may try to operate in urban environments, in complex terrain, and in weather conditions that may adversely affect US military operations and mitigate technological advantages. Intelligence provides a thorough analysis and evaluation of the effects of weather, prevalent diseases, and terrain on military operations. Analysis of the adversary provides information on his preferred tactics, weapons systems, and other capabilities and vulnerabilities.


1-86. Even adversaries lacking a research and development (R&D) capability can purchase sophisticated systems, or gain access to such systems, in the global marketplace. Commanders and staffs should prepare for adversaries who use technology in sophisticated ways. These ways may differ sharply from the ways that US forces use similar technologies. The technology that nations or non-state actors can bring to the OE includes what they can develop, as well as what they can acquire through purchase or capture. MI —

  • Provides intelligence on the enemy's technological capabilities and vulnerabilities.
  • Provides the commander with intelligence regarding the enemy's potential technological ability to achieve equality or even superiority against the US in selected areas.
  • Indicates whether or not the enemy is employing dual-use technologies.


1-87. When the US Army conducts operations of any kind in a failed state or areas torn by conflict, it is likely to find non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international humanitarian organizations, multinational corporations, and other civilian organizations at work there. These organizations and/or their members can have both stated and hidden interests and objectives that can either assist or hinder US mission accomplishment. Defining the battlefield environment should provide the commander with information as to the impact civilians on the battlefield will have on mission accomplishment. Intelligence, in conjunction with other members of the commander's staff, can inform the commander on the number and types of humanitarian organizations and multinational corporations operating in the country or region and whether those organizations are supporting or hindering US mission accomplishment.


1-88. The willingness of the people to submit to enemy operations can be a significant characteristic of the battlefield. The intensity and durability of this support can influence the objectives of a conflict, its duration, the type and intensity of the enemy's operations in opposition to US operations, and the conditions for ending the conflict. Intelligence about the national will could affect the conduct of information operations.


1-89. Potential adversaries of the US generally view time as being to their advantage. An adversary may see prolonging combat operations for an extended period as a means of tying down US forces, increasing opportunities to inflict casualties on US forces, stirring public opinion in the area of responsibility (AOR) against the US presence and operations, and creating dissatisfaction in US public opinion. For example, an adversary can use the time required for US forces to deploy into an area to manipulate the nature of the conflict, attempting to control the tempo of operations by influencing early entry operations and prolonging operations with the desire to increase friendly casualties. Once US forces have deployed and begun operations in an AOR, the adversary may adopt modes of operation that seek to avoid decisive conflict to inflict casualties on US forces and create more favorable conditions for future combat. Intelligence provides the commander with information on the enemy's ability to use the time factor to impact on the commander's mission.


1-90. Intelligence supports the commander's understanding of the adversary's military capabilities and ability to use conventional and unconventional tactics. The adversary will be flexible, thinking, adaptive, and capable of using a combination of conventional and unconventional warfare tactics. Modern technology will enhance his capabilities. Terrorism, suicide bombings, WMD, sabotage, information warfare, and assassinations are but a few of the tactics within the adversary's arsenal.


1-91. Intelligence operations generally include the five functions that constitute the intelligence process: plan, prepare, collect, process, and produce. Additionally, there are three common tasks that occur across the five functions of the intelligence process: analyze, disseminate, and assess. The three common tasks are discussed after the last function, produce. The intelligence process functions are not necessarily sequential; this is what differentiates the Army's intelligence process from the Joint intelligence cycle. The intelligence process provides a common model with which to guide one's thinking, discussing, planning, and assessing about the threat or AOI environment. The intelligence process generates information about the threat, the AOI, and the situation, which allows the commander and staff to develop a plan, seize and retain the initiative, build and maintain momentum, and exploit success.


1-92. The plan step consists of the activities that identify pertinent IRs and develop the means for satisfying those requirements. The CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs) drive the planning of the ISR effort. The intelligence officer supports the G3/S3 in arranging the ISR effort, based on staff planning, to achieve the desired collection effects. Planning activities include, but are not limited to—

  • Conducting IPB.
  • Managing requirements.
  • Submitting RFIs and using intelligence reach to fill information gaps.
  • Evaluating reported information.
  • Establishing the intelligence communications and dissemination archi-tecture.
  • Developing, managing, and revising the intelligence synchronization plan and the ISR plan as mission requirements change.


1-93. The failure of MI units or personnel to accomplish their tasks or missions can often be attributed to their failure to prepare. The prepare step includes those staff and leader activities which take place upon receiving the operation order (OPORD), operation plan (OPLAN), warning order (WARNO), or commander's intent in order to improve the unit's ability to execute tasks or missions.

1-94. The most habitual and egregious preparation failures committed by leaders (as evidenced by performance at the combat training centers) is not the conduct of specific tasks, but the failure to adequately coordinate for more generic combat requirements such as—

  • Friendly forward unit liaison.
  • Departing or reentering friendly lines or AOs.
  • Fire support: enroute, at mission location, and return.
  • Casualty evacuation procedures.
  • Passwords (running, forward of friendly lines), recognition signals, call signs, and frequencies.
  • Resupply.
  • Movement through friendly AOs.


1-95. The collect step involves collecting and reporting information in response to ISR tasking. ISR assets collect information and data about threat forces, activities, facilities, and resources as well as information concerning the environmental and geographical characteristics of a particular battlespace. A successful ISR effort results in the timely collection and reporting of relevant and accurate information. This collected information forms the foundation of intelligence databases, intelligence production, and the G2's/S2's situational understanding. The requirements manager evaluates the reported information for its responsiveness to the CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs).


1-96. Processing involves converting collected data and information into a form that is suitable for analyzing and producing intelligence. Examples of processing include developing film, enhancing imagery, translating a document from a foreign language, converting electronic data into a standardized report that can be analyzed by a system operator, and correlating information.

1-97. Processing data and information is performed unilaterally and coopera-tively by both humans and automated systems.


1-98. The produce step involves evaluating, analyzing, interpreting, synthesizing, and combining information and intelligence from single or multiple sources into intelligence or intelligence products in support of known or anticipated requirements. Production also involves combining new information and intelligence with existing intelligence in order to produce intelligence in a form that the commander and staff can apply to the MDMP and that supports and helps facilitate situational understanding. During the produce step, the intelligence staff manipulates information by—

  • Analyzing the information to isolate significant elements.
  • Evaluating the information to determine accuracy, timeliness, usa-bility, completeness, precision, and reliability.
  • Combining the information with other relevant information and pre-viously developed intelligence.
  • Applying the information to estimate possible outcomes.
  • Presenting the information in a format that will be most useful to its eventual user.

1-99. The intelligence staff deals with numerous and varied production requirements based on PIRs and intelligence requirements; diverse missions, environments, and situations; and presentation requirements. Through analysis, collaboration, and intelligence reach, the G2/S2 and the staff use the collective intelligence production capability of higher, lateral, and subordinate echelons to meet the production requirements. Proficiency in these techniques and procedures facilitates the intelligence staff's ability to answer command and staff requirements regardless of the factors of METT-TC.

1-100. The three common tasks, discussed below, can occur throughout the intelligence process.


1-101. The intelligence staff analyzes intelligence and information about the enemy's capabilities, friendly vulnerabilities, and the battlefield environment as well as issues and problems that arise within the intelligence process itself to determine their nature, origin, and interrelationships. This analysis enables commanders, staffs, and leaders to determine the appropriate action or reaction and to focus or redirect assets and resources to fill information gaps or alleviate pitfalls. It is also within the analyze function that intelligence analysts sort through large amounts of collected information and intelligence to obtain only that information which pertains to the CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs), maintenance of the COP, and facilitates the commander's situational understanding.


1-102. Disseminating is communicating relevant information of any kind from one person or place to another in a usable form by any means to improve understanding or to initiate or govern action. Disseminating intelligence entails using information management techniques and procedures to deliver timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and usable intelligence to the commander. Determining the product format and selecting the means to deliver it are key aspects of dissemination. Information presentation may be in a verbal, written, interactive, or graphic format. The type of information, the time allocated, and the individual preference of the commander all influence the information format.


1-103. Assessment plays an integral role in all aspects of the intelligence process. Assessing includes evaluating the effectiveness of intelligence in supporting the operation. Assessing the situation and available information begins upon receipt of the mission and continues throughout the intelligence process. The continual assessment of intelligence operations and ISR efforts, available information and intelligence, and various aspects of the factors of METT-TC are critical to ensure—

  • The G2/S2 answers all CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs).
  • The G2/S2 and G3/S3 redirect ISR assets to support changing requirements.
  • Using information and intelligence properly.


1-104. Intelligence disciplines are categories of intelligence functions. The Army's intelligence disciplines are All-Source Intelligence, Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT), Technical Intelligence (TECHINT), and Counterintelligence (CI). Although JP 2-0 defines these intelligence disciplines, it also includes Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) as a separate intelligence discipline. Because OSINT is more appropriately defined as a category of information, used singly or integrated into an all-source analytical approach, it is not defined in this manual as an intelligence discipline. For more information regarding the intelligence disciplines, see Part Three of this manual, as well as the respective manuals, which covers each individual intelligence discipline.


1-105. All-source intelligence is defined as the intelligence products, organizations, and activities that incorporate all sources of information and intelligence, including open-source information, in the production of intelligence. All-source intelligence is a separate intelligence discipline, as well as the name of the task used to produce intelligence from multiple intelligence or information sources.


1-106. HUMINT is the collection of foreign information— by a trained HUMINT Collector— from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human sources as a tool, and a variety of collection methods, both passively and actively, to collect information.


1-107. IMINT is intelligence derived from the exploitation of imagery collected by visual photography, infrared, lasers, multi-spectral sensors, and radar. These sensors produce images of objects optically, electronically, or digitally on film, electronic display devices, or other media.


1-108. SIGINT is a category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT), however transmitted. SIGINT is derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals.


1-109. MASINT is technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks, identifies, and/or describes the specific characteristics of fixed and dynamic target objects and sources. It also includes the additional advanced processing and exploitation of data derived from IMINT and SIGINT collection. MASINT collection systems include but are not limited to radar, spectroradiometric, electro-optical (E-O), acoustic, radio frequency (RF), nuclear detection, and seismic sensors, as well as techniques for gathering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN), and other material samples.


1-110. TECHINT is intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of threat and foreign military equipment and associated materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical (S&T) capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary's technological advantages.


1-111. CI counters or neutralizes intelligence collection efforts through collection, counter-intelligence investigations, operations, analysis, and production, and functional and technical services. CI includes all actions taken to detect, identify, track, exploit, and neutralize the multidiscipline intelligence activities of friends, competitors, opponents, adversaries, and enemies; and is the key intelligence community contributor to protect US interests and equities. CI assists in identifying EEFI, identifying vulnerabilities to threat collection, and actions taken to counter collection and operations against US forces.


1-112. Force projection is the military component of power projection. It is a central element of the national military strategy. Army organizations and installations, linked with joint forces and industry, form a strategic platform to maintain, project, and sustain ARFOR, wherever they deploy. Force projection operations are inherently joint and require detailed planning and synchronization. Force projection encompasses a range of processes— mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment— discussed below.

1-113. The Army must change its mindset from depending on an "intelligence buildup" to performing intelligence readiness on a daily basis in order to meet the requirements for strategic responsiveness. MI personnel, even in garrison at the lowest tactical echelons, must use their analytic and other systems and prepare for possible operations on a daily basis.

1-114. Built on a foundation of intelligence readiness, the Intelligence BOS provides the commander with the intelligence he needs to plan, prepare, and execute force projection operations. Successful intelligence during force projection operations relies on continuous collection and intelligence production before and during the operation. In a force projection operation,

higher echelons will provide intelligence to lower echelons until the tactical ground force completes entry and secures the lodgment area. The joint force J2 must exercise judgment when providing information to subordinate G2s/S2s so not to overwhelm them. Figure 1-6 is an example of force projection intelligence.

Figure 1-6. Force Projection Intelligence.

1-115. The G2/S2 must anticipate, identify, consider, and evaluate all threats to the entire unit throughout force projection operations. This is critical during the deployment and entry operations stages of force projection. During these stages, the unit is particularly vulnerable to enemy actions because of its limited combat power and knowledge of the AO. Intelligence personnel must, therefore, emphasize the delivery of combat information and intelligence products that indicate changes to the threat or battlespace developed during predeployment IPB.

1-116. The G2/S2 should—

  • Review available databases on assigned contingency AOIs, conduct IPB on these AOIs, and develop appropriate IPB products.
  • Comply with higher headquarters standing operating procedures (SOPs) and manuals for specific intelligence operations guidance.
  • Coordinate for and rehearse electronic message transfers (for example, Internet Protocol addresses, routing indicators) using the same communications protocols with theater, higher headquarters, subordinate, and lateral units that the unit would use when deployed.
  • Plan, train, and practice surging intelligence functions on likely or developing contingency crises.
  • Prepare and practice coordination from predeployment through redeployment with other elements and organizations (for example, HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, IO, staff weather officer [SWO], civil affairs [CA], psychological operations [PSYOP], and special operations forces [SOF] units, to include databases and connectivity).
  • Include the following as a part of daily (sustainment) operations:
    •   RC and other augmentation.
    •   A linguist plan with proficiency requirements. (Alert linguists through early entry phases of deployment.)
    •   Training (individual and collective).
  • Establish formal or informal intelligence links, relationships, and networks to meet developing contingencies.
  • Forward all RFIs to higher headquarters in accordance with SOPs.
  • Establish statements of intelligence interests (SIIs), other production, and I&W requirements.

1-117. To draw intelligence from higher echelons and focus intelligence downward, based on the commander's needs, the G2/S2 must—

  • Understand the J2's multiple echelon and broadcast dissemination capability to ensure near-real time (NRT) reporting to all deployed, in transit, or preparing to deploy forces.
  • Maintain or build intelligence databases on the environment and threats for each probable contingency.
  • State and record the CCIR (as a minimum, list the PIRs and ISR tasks or requests).

1-118. Until the unit's collection assets become operational in the AO, the G2/S2 will depend upon intelligence from the ARFOR or JTF to answer the unit's intelligence needs. The following paragraphs describe the intelligence and ISR considerations during force projection.


1-119. Mobilization is the process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. It assembles and organizes resources to support national objectives. Mobilization includes activating all or part of the RC, and assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. A unit may be brought to a state of readiness for a specific mission or other national emergency. This process, called mobilization, is where specific AC or RC units, capabilities, and personnel are identified and integrated into the unit. During mobilization, the G2/S2 must—

  • Monitor intelligence reporting on threat activity and I&W data.
  • Manage IRs and RFIs from their unit and subordinate units to include updating ISR planning.
  • Establish habitual training relationships with their AC and RC augmentation units and personnel as well as higher echelon intelligence organizations as identified in the existing OPLAN. Support the RC units and augmentation personnel by preparing and conducting intelligence training and threat update briefings and by disseminating intelligence.
  • Identify ISR force requirements for the different types of operations and contingency plans (CONPLANs).
  • Identify individual military, civilian, and contractor augmentation requirements for intelligence operations. The Army, and the Intelligence BOS in particular, cannot perform its missions without the support of its Department of the Army Civilians (DACs) and contractors. The force increasingly relies on the experience, expertise, and performance of non-uniformed personnel and has fully integrated these non-uniformed personnel into the warfighting team.

1-120. During mobilization the G2/S2, in conjunction with the rest of the staff, must ensure the adequacy of training and equipping of AC and RC MI organizations and individual augmentees to conduct intelligence operations.

1-121. The G2/S2 supports peacetime contingency planning with IPB products and databases on likely contingency areas. The G2/S2 establishes an intelligence synchronization plan that will activate upon alert notification. For smooth transition from predeployment to entry, the G2/S2 must coordinate intelligence synchronization and communications plans before the crisis occurs. The intelligence synchronization plan identifies the intelligence requirements supporting those plans, to include—

  • ISR assets providing support throughout the AOI.
  • Command and support relationships of ISR assets at each echelon.
  • Report and request procedures not covered in unit SOPs.
  • Sequence of deployment of ISR personnel and equipment. Early deployment of key ISR personnel and equipment is essential for force protection and combat readiness. Composition of initial and follow-on deploying assets is influenced by the factors of METT-TC, availability of communications, and availability of lift.
  • Communications architecture supporting both intelligence staffs and ISR assets.
  • Friendly vulnerabilities to hostile intelligence threats and plans for conducting FP measures. The staff must begin this type of planning as early as possible to ensure adequate support to FP of deploying and initial entry forces.
  • Monitor time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) and recom-mend changes in priority of movement, unit, or capability to enable ISR operations.

1-122. The G2/S2 must continually monitor and update the OPLANs to reflect the evolving situation, especially during crisis situations. National intelligence activities monitor regional threats throughout the world and can answer some intelligence requirements supporting the development of OPLANs.

1-123. Upon alert notification, the G2/S2 updates estimates, databases, IPB products, and other intelligence products needed to support command decisions on force composition, deployment priorities and sequence, and the AOI. Units reassess their collection requirements immediately after alert notification. The G2/S2 begins verifying planning assumptions within the OPLANs. CI and ISR personnel provide FP support and antiterrorism measures.

1-124. Throughout mobilization, unit intelligence activities will provide the deploying forces with the most recent intelligence on the AO. The intelligence staff will also update databases and situation graphics. The G2/S2 must—

  • Fully understand the unit, ARFOR, and joint force intelligence organi-zations.
  • Revise intelligence and intelligence-related communications architec-ture and delete or integrate any new systems and software with the current architecture.
  • Support 24-hour operations and provide continuous intelligence.
  • Plan all required intelligence reach procedures.
  • Determine transportation availability for deployment and availability when deployed.
  • Determine all sustainability requirements.
  • Determine intelligence release requirements and restrictions; releasa-bility to multinational and HN sources.
  • Review status of forces agreements (SOFAs), rules of engagement (ROE), international laws, and other agreements, emphasizing the effect that they have on intelligence collection operations. (Coordinate with the staff judge advocate [SJA] on these issues.)
  • Ensure ISR force deployment priorities are reflected in the TPFDD to support ISR operations based upon the factors of METT-TC.
  • Ensure intelligence links provide the early entry commander vital access to multi-source army and joint intelligence collection assets, processing systems, and databases.
  • Review the supporting unit commanders' specified tasks, implied tasks, task organization, scheme of support, and coordination requirements with forward maneuver units. Address issues or shortfalls and direct or coordinate changes.
  • Establish access to national HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, and CI databases, as well as automated links to joint service, multi-national, and HN sources.


1-125. Deployment is the movement of forces and materiel from their point of origin to the AO. This process has four supporting components: predeployment activities, fort to port, port to port, and port to destination; these components are known collectively as reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I) activities. Success in force projection operations hinges on timely deployment. The size and composition of forces requiring lift are based on the factors of METT-TC, availability of pre-positioned assets, the capabilities of HN support, and the forward presence of US forces. Force or tactical tailoring is the process used to determine the correct mix and sequence of deploying units.

1-126. During deployment, intelligence organizations at home station or in the rear area take advantage of modern SATCOM, broadcast technology, and automated data processing (ADP) systems to provide graphic and textual intelligence updates to the forces enroute. Enroute updates help eliminate information voids and, if appropriate, allow the commander to adjust the plan prior to arrival in theater in response to changes in the OE or enemy actions.

1-127. Intelligence units extend established networks to connect intelligence staffs and collection assets at various stages of the deployment flow. Where necessary, units establish new communications paths to meet unique demands of the mission. The theater and corps analysis and control elements (ACEs) play a critical role in making communications paths, networks, and intelligence databases available to deploying forces.

1-128. Space-based systems are key to supporting intelligence during the deployment and the subsequent stages of force projection operations by—

  • Monitoring terrestrial AOIs through ISR assets to help reveal enemy location and disposition, attempting to identify the enemy's intent.
  • Providing communications links between forces enroute and in the continental United States (CONUS).
  • Permitting MI collection assets to accurately determine their position through the Global Positioning System (GPS).
  • Providing timely and accurate data on meteorological, oceanographic, and space environmental factors that might affect operations.
  • Providing warning of theater ballistic missile launches.
  • Providing timely and accurate weather information to all commanders through the Integrated Meteorological System (IMETS).

1-129. Situation development dominates intelligence operations activities during initial entry operations. The G2/S2 attempts to identify all threats to arriving forces and assists the commander in developing FP measures. During entry operations, echelons above corps (EAC) organizations provide intelligence. This support includes providing access to departmental and joint intelligence and deploying scalable EAC intelligence assets. The entire effort focuses downwardly to provide tailored support to deploying and deployed echelons in response to their CCIRs (PIRs and FFIR).

1-130. Collection and processing capabilities are enhanced, as collection assets build up in the deployment area, with emphasis on the build-up of the in-theater capability required to conduct sustained ISR operations. As the build-up continues, the G2/S2 strives to reduce total dependence on extended split-based intelligence from outside the AO. As assigned collection assets arrive into the theater, the G2/S2 begins to rely on them for tactical intelligence although higher organizations remain a source of intelligence.

1-131. As the ARFOR enter the theater of operations, the joint force J2 implements and, where necessary, modifies the theater intelligence architecture. Deploying intelligence assets establishes liaison with staffs and units already present in the AO. Liaison personnel and basic communications should be in place prior to the scheduled arrival of parent commands. ISR units establish intelligence communications networks.

1-132. CONUS and other relatively secure intelligence bases outside the AO continue to support deployed units. Systems capable of rapid receipt and processing of intelligence from national systems and high capacity, long-haul communications systems are critical to the success of split-based support of a force projection operation. These systems provide a continuous flow of intelligence to satisfy many operational needs.

1-133. The G2/S2, in coordination with the G3/S3, participates in planning to create conditions for decisive operations. The G2/S2 also adjusts collection activities as combat strength builds. During entry operations the G2/S2—

  • Monitors FP indicators.
  • Monitors the ISR capability required to conduct sustained intelligence operations.
  • Monitors intelligence reporting on threat activity and I&W data.
  • Develops measurable criteria to evaluate the results of the intelligence synchronization plan.
  • Assesses—
    •   Push versus pull requirements of intelligence reach.
    •   Effectiveness of the intelligence communications architecture.
    •   Reporting procedures and timelines.
    •   Intelligence to OPLANs and OPORDs, branches, and sequels (to include planning follow-on forces).


1-134. Employment is the conduct of operations to support a JFC com-mander. Employment encompasses an array of operations, including but not limited to—

  • Entry operations (opposed or unopposed).
  • Shaping operations (lethal and non-lethal).
  • Decisive operations (combat or support).
  • Postconflict operations (prepare for follow-on missions or redeploy-ment).

Entry Operations

1-135. Enemies often possess the motives and means to interrupt the deployment flow of ARFOR. Threats to deploying forces may include advanced conventional weaponry (air defense, mines, etc.) and WMD. Sea and air ports of debarkation (PODs) should be regarded as enemy HPTs because they are the entry points for forces and equipment. PODs are vulnerable because they are fixed targets with significant machinery and equipment that is vulnerable to attack; in addition to military forces and materiel, HN support personnel, contractors, and civilians may all be working there. An enemy attack, or even the threat of an enemy attack, on a POD can have a major impact on force projection momentum. Commanders at all levels require predictive intelligence so that they may focus attention on security actions that reduce vulnerabilities. To avoid, neutralize, or counter threats to entry operations, the commanders rely on the ability of the G2/S2 to support future operations by accurately identifying enemy reactions to US actions, anticipating their response to our counteractions and predicting additional ECOAs.

1-136. Predictive intelligence also supports the decisions the commander and staff must make about the size, composition, structure, and deployment sequence of the force in order to create the conditions for success. Commanders rely on predictive intelligence to identify potential friendly decisions before the actual event. While thorough planning develops friendly COAs to meet possible situations, the nature of an operation can change significantly before execution. The G2/S2 must provide timely, accurate, and predictive intelligence to ensure the commander can retain the initiative to implement his plan or his decisions before he loses the opportunity to do so.

Shaping Operations

1-137. Shaping operations create and preserve conditions for the success of the decisive operation. Shaping operations include lethal and non-lethal activities conducted throughout the AO. They support the decisive operation by affecting enemy capabilities and forces, or by influencing enemy decisions. G2/S2 intelligence analysis and ISR activities support the development and execution of shaping operations by identifying threat centers of gravity and decisive points on the battlefield. The G2/S2 also ensures the intelligence process focuses on the CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs). It is critical that the G2/S2 provide timely, accurate, and predictive intelligence to the commander so that he may execute shaping operations. Predictive intelligence should provide sufficient time for the commander to understand how the enemy will react to US COAs so that appropriate shaping operations can be implemented.

Decisive Operations

1-138. Decisive operations are those that directly accomplish the task assigned by the higher headquarters. Decisive operations conclusively determine the outcome of major operations, battles, and engagements. Continuously synchronized ISR activities, coupled with predictive intel-ligence results and products during all stages of force projection, combine to ensure the commander is prepared to employ the right forces with the right support to conduct decisive operations at the most appropriate place and time. In addition to coordinating with the G3/S3 to synchronize all ISR activities, the G2/S2 must answer the CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs) and provide continuous assessments of the enemy's current situation and predict the enemy's subsequent COA, branches, and/or sequels.

Postconflict Operations

1-139. Upon cessation of hostilities or truce, deployed forces enter a new stage of force projection operations. Postconflict operations focus on restoring order, reestablishing HN infrastructure, preparing for redeployment of forces, and planning residual presence of US forces. While postconflict operations strive to transition from conflict to peace, there remains a possibility of resurgent hostilities by individuals and forces. The ISR effort, particularly predictive intelligence analysis, remains just as critical in postconflict operations as in the other employment operations. ISR operations support the postconflict emphasis on restoration operations exemplified by commanders redirecting their CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs) and IRs to support units conducting these missions. These operations might include—

  • Engineer units conducting mine clearing or infrastructure reconstruc-tion operations.
  • Medical and logistics units providing humanitarian relief.
  • MP units providing law and order assistance.
  • CA units reestablishing local control and preparing for the orderly transition of local governments and to support civil-military operations (CMO).


1-140. Sustainment involves providing and maintaining levels of personnel and materiel required to sustain the operation throughout its duration. It is essential to generating combat power. CSS may be split-based between locations within and outside CONUS. These operations include ensuring units have the MI assets required to accomplish the mission, such as personnel (including linguists), communications systems, ISR systems, and appropriate maintenance support.


1-141. Redeployment is the process by which units and materiel reposture themselves in the same theater; transfer forces and materiel to support another JFC's operational requirements; or return personnel and materiel to the home or demobilization station upon completion of the mission. Redeployment operations encompass four phases:

  • Recovery, reconstitution, and pre-deployment activities.
  • Movement to and activities at the port of embarkation (POE).
  • Movement to the POD.
  • Movement to homestation.

1-142. As combat power and resources decrease in the AO, FP and I&W become the focus of the commander's intelligence requirements. This in turn drives the selection of those assets that must remain deployed until the end of the operation and those that may redeploy earlier. The S2—

  • Monitors intelligence reporting on threat activity and I&W data.
  • Continues to conduct intelligence to FP.
  • Requests ISR support (theater and national systems) and intelligence in support of redeployment.

1-143. After redeployment, MI personnel and units recover and return to predeployment activities. ISR units resume contingency-oriented peacetime intelligence operations. RC ISR units demobilize and return to peacetime activities. G2/S2s must—

  • Monitor intelligence reporting on threat activity and I&W data.
  • Update or consolidate databases.
  • Maintain intelligence readiness.
  • Provide their input into the Force Design Update (FDU) process to refine modified table of organizations and equipment (MTOE) and evaluate the need for Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) per-sonnel.


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