Intelligence and Information Operations
THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
A-1. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information; also included is the information itself. (FM 3-0) The information environment, it should be noted, is not an exclusively military one; in fact, the military applications of information are almost obscured in today's universal usage of the information spectrum by national, inter-national, and non-state players.
THE COMMANDER AND INFORMATION
A-2. Information is facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form; the meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. (JP 1-02) Information provides the key to battlefield success in the 21st century. Commanders must have detailed information to command. Information is the medium that allows the commander's decisionmaking and execution cycle to function. Information gives direction to actions by the force, identifies the enemy's centers of gravity, provides COAs for force activity, and enables the force to accomplish its operational mission.
A-3. Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. (FM 3-0) Relevant information drawn from intelligence supports the creation and development of situational understanding that contributes directly to information superiority during decisive operations. The requirement for information superiority is not new; what is new is that today's information technologies are creating a base of knowledge for military planning and execution that is unprecedented in scope, volume, accuracy, and timeliness. This means commanders receive accurate, timely information that enables them to make better decisions and act faster than their adversaries.
A-4. Information superiority, however, is neither a staple in today's battlespace nor is it necessary in military operations as a constant condition; rather, at specific times during operations, information superiority becomes a key enabler for assuring military success. At the operational level of predominant interest to the land component commander (LCC), information superiority is realized through the integration of operational level, interdependent ISR, information management, and IO to gain and maintain operational initiative and to achieve an operational advantage.
A-5. IO are the employment of core capabilities of electronic warfare, com-puter network operations, PSYOP, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decisionmaking.. Information systems are.the equipment and facilities that collect, process, store, display, disseminate information. These include computers, hardware, software, and communications, as well as policies and procedures for their use. (FM 3-0). Offensive IO are capable of degrading an adversary's will to resist and ability to fight. Defensive IO measures passively and actively protect friendly information and C2 systems and limit their vulnerability.
A-6. Offensive and defensive IO are conducted as a fully coordinated effort to ensure the complementary, asymmetric, and reinforcing effects to attack enemy forces, influence others, and protect friendly forces. Relevant information assures that the right person has the right information at the right time for decisionmaking and execution.
The Elements of IO
A-7. Full-spectrum IO incorporates, integrates, and synchronizes tradition-ally independent capabilities and activities in support of the commander's mission. (See FM 3-0 and FM 3-13.) The Army's doctrinal view of full-spectrum IO as evolving core capabilities are:
- · PSYOP.
- · OPSEC.
- · EW.
- · Military deception.
- · CNO.
- § CNA.
- § CND.
- § CNE.
A-8. Supporting IO capabilities are:
- · Physical destruction.
- · Physical security.
- · Information assurance.
- · Counterpropaganda.
- · Counterdeception.
- · Counterintelligence.
A-9. The IO-related activities of PA and CMO are closely associated and integrated with the elements of IO as key contributors to information superiority.
Intelligence Support to IO
A-10. All-source intelligence support, encompassing all of its forms, is the principal enabler for successful IO. The commander's capability to synchronize military operations can be heavily influenced by the ability to identify the threat and understand the adversary's capabilities and intentions in the information environment.
A-11. It is essential that the elements of the command's IO capabilities and vulnerabilities are integrated into the command intelligence plan. This leads to COAs that synchronize the elements of IO and IO-related activities into the commander's warfighting plans. Integration of the full-spectrum aspects of IO ensures that the relative importance of information is recognized in the development of a synchronized OPLAN. Further, integration of IO into the planning process provides a methodology for analyzing the threat from a knowledge base that enhances protection of friendly systems and assets while exposing windows of opportunity for attack or exploitation. IPB is the best process we have for understanding the battlefield and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces.
A-12. Provide Intelligence support to IO includes, but is not limited to, the following:
· Provide Intelligence Support to Offensive IO. The Intelligence BOS supports offensive IO by providing information to identify critical enemy C2 nodes. Intelligence also helps to identify enemy systems and procedures that may be vulnerable for offensive IO. Additionally, intelligence plays a key role in evaluating and assessing the effectiveness of offensive IO.
§ Provide Intelligence Support to PSYOP. This task identifies the cultural, social, economic, and political environment of the AO. It identifies target groups and subgroups and their location, conditions, vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, cultures, attitudes, and behaviors. PSYOP influence foreign target audiences in the AO to support achieving the commander's goals in the AO.
- Identify the cultural, social, economic, and political environment of the AOI; for example, adversary mechanisms for political control, adversary communication and broadcast systems used to elicit support from the populace, and current and past adversary propaganda activities and their effectiveness.
- Identify target groups and subgroups and their location, conditions, vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, cultures, attitudes, and behaviors. This includes determining the audience demo-graphics of popular radio and television programs and periodicals; groups influenced by media personalities and political cartoons.
- Identify impact of planned PSYOP on individuals outside the targeted group (for example, multinational partners, neighboring populations).
§ Provide Intelligence Support to Military Deception. This task identifies the capabilities and limitations of the adversary's intelligence-gathering systems and identifies adversary biases and perceptions.
- Profiles of key adversary leaders.
- Cultural, religious, social, and political characteristics of the country and region.
- Sources of military, economic, or political support.
- Adversary decisionmaking processes, patterns, and biases.
- Adversary perceptions of the military situation in the AO.
- Capabilities and limitations of adversary CI and security ser-vices.
§ Provide Intelligence Support to Electronic Attack. This task supports electronic attack employing jamming, electromagnetic energy, or directed energy against personnel, facilities, or equipment. It identifies critical adversary information systems and C2 nodes. It includes determining and presenting the adversary's electronic OB and their information system infrastructure. The enemy's C2 system vulnerabilities and the means they use to protect their C2 systems is part of the electronic OB.
· Provide Intelligence Support to Defensive IO. The Intelligence BOS supports defensive IO by providing information to identify threat IO capabilities and tactics. Intelligence provides information relating to CND, physical security, OPSEC, counterdeception, and counterpro-paganda. The Intelligence BOS supports defensive IO by providing information to identify threat IO capabilities and tactics. Intelligence provides information relating to CND. Provide Intelligence Support to OPSEC: identify capabilities and limitations of the adversary's intelligence system to include adversary intelligence objectives and the means, methods, and facilities used by the threat to collect, process, and analyze information: supports the identification of indicators that could be interpreted or pieced together to penetrate EEFI in time to be useful to adversaries.
· Provide Intelligence Support to Activities Related to IO. The Intelligence BOS when operating outside US territories supports activities related to IO under some circumstances.
§ Provide Intelligence Support to CMO. This task allows military intelligence organizations to collect and provide information and intelligence products concerning foreign cultural, social, economic, and political elements within an IO in support of CMO. Identify cultural, social, economic, and political environment of the AOI, including:
- Population demographics.
- Civilian populace attitudes, alliances, and behavior.
- Availability of basic necessities (food, clothing, water, shelter, medical care) and the ability of the populace to care for itself.
- Access to medical care.
- Locations and potential routes, destinations, and assembly areas or sites of displaced persons.
- Local government type, status, organization, and capabilities.
- Availability of local material and personnel to support military operations.
- NGOs in the AOI, their agenda, resources, and capabilities.
§ Provide Intelligence Support to Public Affairs. This task identifies the multinational and foreign public physical and social environment, as well as world, HN national, and HN local public opinion, in addition to the propaganda and misinformation capabilities, activities, targets, themes, and dissemination means of the adversary. Identify world, national, and local public opinion (location, biases or predispositions, and agenda of national and international media representatives in the AOI, and trends reflected by the national and international media).
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