Analysis on the Infiltration Tactics Concerning China's Espionage Cases
ROC National Security Bureau (NSB)
2025-01-12
China has continued to employ diverse channels and tactics to infiltrate various sectors in Taiwan, recruit Taiwanese nationals to assist in developing organizations, or obtain sensitive intelligence from the Taiwanese government. To help the general public be aware of China's infiltration channels and tactics, as well as the substantive results against China's infiltration conducted by Taiwan's national security intelligence community, the NSB has compiled the report titled "Analysis on the Infiltration Tactics Concerning China's Espionage Cases."
In terms of infiltration targets, in recent years, the number of individuals prosecuted for Chinese espionage has increased significantly, with 48 in 2023 and 64 in 2024, representing a sharp increase compared to 2021 and 2022. The number of prosecuted cases has also risen from 3 cases in 2021 and 5 cases in 2022, to 14 cases in 2023 and 15 cases in 2024. In addition, active and retired servicemembers account for the largest proportion of China's targets. In 2024, 15 retired and 28 active servicemembers were prosecuted, accounting for 23% and 43% of the total cases, respectively. This indicates that active and retired servicemembers are China's main infiltration targets in Taiwan.
In terms of infiltration channels and tactics, by analyzing the patterns of espionage cases in 2024, there are five primary infiltration channels, such as gang groups, underground banks, front companies, temples and religious groups, as well as civilian associations. Also, by employing the four infiltration tactics, including using retired servicemembers to recruit active ones, establishing networks through the internet, lure of money, and coercing individuals by exploiting their debts, China conducts all-out infiltration into Taiwan's military units, government agencies, and pro-China organizations. Such efforts aim to gain access to sensitive intelligence of Taiwan's national defense, and to develop espionage and co-optee networks in Taiwan, and even to intervene in Taiwan's democratic elections.
In terms of indicative cases, China colludes with gang groups to develop internal armed co-optees, requiring them to raise the five-star flag as a sign of internal co-optees during China's military invasion of Taiwan, in order to launch sabotage, accordingly. Meanwhile, China has utilized gangsters to recruit retired servicemembers to organize their former military comrades in establishing "sniper teams" and to plot sniper missions against Taiwan's military units and foreign embassies.
China also uses retired servicemembers to establish shell companies, underground banks, and casinos, to entice or coerce active servicemembers to collect sensitive military intelligence, sign pledges to demonstrate loyalty, or pilot military helicopters to defect to China. China also provides funding to Taiwanese temples and religious groups, leveraging religious activities to approach active servicemembers. Those individuals are enticed to film videos of defecting to China while wearing military uniforms and holding the Chinese five-star flag. They are also asked to hand over military defense planning documents.
Additionally, China instructs Taiwan's local associations to establish the United Front Work Committee in Taiwan. During election periods, the committee organizes all-expense-paid trips for Taiwanese village chiefs and residents to visit mainland China. Moreover, China utilizes certain online media to publish false polls and news reports, aiming to intervene in Taiwan's elections. It is worth noting that as various types of social media are gaining more popularity among Taiwanese people, China continues to use online platforms such as Facebook, LINE, and LinkedIn to offer loans to active and retired military personnel in urgent needs of money to repay their personal debts. They are asked to provide sensitive intelligence, recruit fellow servicemembers to expand the organization. Such maneuvers are often conducted by using cryptocurrencies to evade investigation.
In response to infiltration conducted by foreign forces, national security intelligence agencies, military counterintelligence units, and judicial investigative departments have established a collaborative mechanism, constructing a common picture concerning national security threats, so as to provide all-out support to the detection and prosecution of China's espionage cases. In addition, prosecutorial and judicial authorities have aligned their interpretations on espionage cases. This can be seen in higher rates of indictment and conviction for such offenses. In 2024, authorities dismantled a China espionage network involving 23 individuals and secured a 20-year prison sentence in a China espionage case. The successful investigation and resolution of espionage cases in recent years have also been facilitated by whistleblowing from military personnel and civilians, enabling case initiation and follow-up investigation. This indicates a significant enhancement in public awareness of counterintelligence and national security.
For more information, please refer to
Analysis on the Infiltration Tactics Concerning China's Espionage Cases
Secretariat
National Security Bureau
Republic of China (Taiwan)
January 11, 2025
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