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17 December 2004

History of Intelligence Reform Reflects Past Contingencies

Previous Efforts Have Also Been Extensive

By Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr.
Washington File Staff Writer

(This is the second article in a continuing series)

Washington -- Established in 1947 to prevent another Pearl Harbor-like sneak attack on the United States, the U.S. intelligence community is about to undergo the most sweeping overhaul since its inception as the result of another surprise assault: the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

In December, the U.S. Congress overwhelmingly approved the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act to immediately restructure the nation's intelligence community. President Bush signed the bill into law December 17.

The act creates a director of national intelligence with broad, strategic authority over budgets and missions, and it also creates a National Counterterrorism Center to deal specifically with terrorist threats.

This overhaul did not come about easily, but it was helped substantially by a report from the 9/11 Commission, which recommended changes in the intelligence process to prevent perceived intelligence failures in the 2001 terrorist attacks. The law can also be considered as a culmination of several previous attempts to strengthen the intelligence community.

But in 1947 President Harry S Truman wanted the Central Intelligence Agency to be the collection point for all of the government's intelligence efforts. The United States had agencies collecting intelligence before the Second World War, but it was determined that a more unified collection system was needed to meet new threats.

However, the demands of the Cold War and the needs of subsequent presidents reshaped the intelligence community, and barriers established to prevent the misuse of intelligence sometimes resulted in preventing the sharing of it, too.

Over the years, attempts at overhauling or reforming the intelligence community have been plentiful, stemming sometimes from crises or scandals, but the changes that have occurred have come primarily through gradual transformation.

Two key things -- varying trends in American foreign policy and the ever-changing international environment -- have shaped each attempt at intelligence reform or restructuring. But the core of proposed changes has been a recurring concern for accountability, which figured heavily in the rationale for the latest legislation.

In the ensuing years, there have been independent commissions, individual experts, and legislative initiatives examining the growth and mission of the U.S. intelligence community. Reports and studies have led to numerous changes through internal agency direction, presidential directives, executive orders, and new laws, according to a 2004 study done by researchers at the Congressional Research Service, part of the Library of Congress.

During the Truman administration (1945-1953), two reports influenced structural changes at the CIA. One significant change involved the creation of a panel called the Board of National Intelligence Estimates that produces and reviews intelligence analysis by drawing upon the resources of the entire intelligence community. Produced to this day, national intelligence estimates are major intelligence products and have significant impact on the president and policy-makers.

Three investigations into U.S. intelligence activities, including those of the CIA, were conducted during President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration (1953-1961), with the goal of strengthening intelligence efforts through better coordination among the various agencies.

As a result of these inquiries, both a congressional oversight committee and a presidential advisory panel were established, the current security clearance process was instituted, and the very term "intelligence community" came into being. And as the closed society of the East European bloc nations made human espionage more prohibitive, the community turned toward developing more scientific and technical intelligence tools.

During President John F. Kennedy's administration (1961-1963), two more studies were conducted, both focusing on the failed, CIA-supported counter-revolutionary operation against the communist regime of Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. Although the studies' findings revealed the extent of the failure, another decade would pass before any real reform of operational procedures occurred.

President Richard M. Nixon and then-National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger began another review of the intelligence community in 1970 to study its organization and suggest improvements. A report, prepared by then-deputy budget director James R. Schlesinger, a future director of central intelligence (DCI), recommended expanded authority for the DCI to control costs and improve intelligence production across the intelligence community.

During the period of 1974-1981, there were a series of six public investigations initiated by both the White House and Congress. They focused on the propriety of intelligence operations, assessed the adequacy of intelligence organizations and functions, and recommended corrective measures.

In response to issues related to clandestine operations were strong recommendations that the DCI operate separately, not managing any single agency, in order to focus instead on coordinating and overseeing the entire intelligence effort, eliminate duplication, and evaluate performance and efficiency.

Following these public investigations, Presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan each issued Executive Orders setting guidelines for the organization and management of the intelligence community.

Among them was an executive order by President Ford to designate the DCI for the first time as the president's primary intelligence advisor and the principal spokesman for the intelligence community. The DCI also was given responsibility for development of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. But the position remained attached to management of the CIA.

In 1985, Admiral Stansfield Turner, who previously was DCI under President Carter, again recommended that the jobs of DCI and the CIA director be separated. He argued that the two jobs were in conflict and one person could not do justice to both responsibilities. He proposed creation of a separate director of national intelligence, who would be superior to the CIA director. Again, this recommendation was not enacted in large part because it had neither White House nor congressional support.

During the highly public Iran-Contra investigation of 1987 in the Reagan administration, the CIA, intelligence community and the DCI all came under intense scrutiny. From those hearings came stronger congressional oversight and a requirement that certain members of Congress be notified of any covert actions.

The Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee separately launched a significant effort in 1992 to overhaul the intelligence community. They also recommended the creation of a separate director of national intelligence with budgetary authority over the entire intelligence community and authority over personnel. The legislation also recommended structural changes within the CIA and other agencies' intelligence units.

While the legislation was not adopted, some of the recommended changes were included in the 1994 intelligence budget authorization legislation.

Two further efforts during the Clinton administration -- the Aspin/Brown Commission in 1995-96 and the Intelligence Community in the 21st Century in 1996 -- sought enhanced congressional oversight and expanded authority for the existing director of central intelligence. The ensuing legislation in 1997 provided some enhancements by adding additional committees to the National Security Council -- one to oversee foreign intelligence gathering and establish policies and the other to identify transnational threats.

Additional deputy directors of central intelligence were added with one specifically designated to management of the intelligence community. The director of central intelligence was given authority to develop and present to the president an annual budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

Following the terrorist attacks on targets in the United States in 2001, the Senate and House intelligence committees conducted a joint inquiry calling for reforms and structural changes. And in 2003 the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission") began 27 months of hearings and investigations.

The 9/11 Commission's report on July 22, 2004, spurred congressional action that resulted in major legislation being passed by Congress and sent to the president for his signature into law December 17. It provides for, among other things, a separate national intelligence director. The law includes many of the recommendations debated in the past but not enacted.

The legislative initiative began in the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and was spearheaded by its chairman, Republican Senator Susan Collins of Maine.

"Just as the National Security Act of 1947 was passed to prevent another Pearl Harbor, the Intelligence Reform Act will help us prevent another 9/11," said Collins, who helped negotiate the final compromise with the House of Representatives. "We are rebuilding a structure that was designed for a different enemy at a different time, a structure that was designed for the Cold War and has not proved agile enough to deal with the threats of the 21st century."

Additional information on the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 can be found at http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=December&x=20041208174821dmslahrellek0.7232935&t=is/is-latest.html.

The full text of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 can be found on the Internet at
http://a255.g.akamaitech.net/7/255/2422/13dec20041150/www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/108-796/108-796_intel_reform.pdf.

(The Washington File is a product of the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

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