India's intelligence in crisis after double agent disclosure
IRNA - Islamic Republic News Agency
New Delhi, May 29, IRNA -- India`s external intelligence service has been rocked by revelations that Ravinder Singh, a joint secretary- level officer of the country suspected of having defected to the United States, may have been a double agent. According to the Hindu, a New Delhi-based English daily, although Singh had no access to material of high sensitivity since he was posted in Western Indian state of Punjab during the early 1980s, he is believed to have used his contacts within the Research and Analysis Wing to gather classified data and assessments. Singh is believed to have fled India in recent weeks, while faced with prosecution for espionage. Media reports claim he has joined his wife and children, who have lived in the US for several years. No official confirmation has been forthcoming, but R&AW sources admitted that their counter-intelligence services had obtained evidence that Singh had been illegally copying documents to be passed on to a suspected CIA contact. The evidence was procured through covert video and telephone surveillance. An Amritsar resident from an affluent Jat Sikh landed family, Singh had served in the Indian army as a major before joining the R&AW. He served with distinction in Amritsar during Operation Bluestar. Soon after, he again attracted the attention of his superiors by procuring classified US government documentation. Singh`s source seems to have been one of his relatives, a U.S. citizen who has worked for over two decades with the US Agency for International Development, a donor organization Indian intelligence has suspected is a front for the CIA. Singh`s relative is alleged to have visited India regularly on official work, sometimes staying at his residence. This relationship, R&AW investigators claim, enabled Singh to pass on documents with only a minimal risk of exposure. Newspaper reports have suggested that Singh`s operations were detected because of an inadvertent reference to him made in casual conversation by the CIA`s station chief for India. However, sources familiar with the R&AW investigation told The Hindu that this was not in fact the case. Whatever the truth, Singh`s energetic use of his office photocopier remained undetected for several years. Some in R&AW, however, began expressing disquiet after Singh began asking colleagues for information he did not require. Some of the suspicion focussed on his financial circumstances. In 1992-1993, sources say, Singh`s daughter was left almost paralyzed after a serious road accident. Using the offices of then-minister of state for external affairs, R.L. Bhatia, Singh attempted to secure a posting to Washington DC. The request was shot down. "My interest in the whole affair was purely compassionate," Bhatia said. "Singh said he needed a lot of money to pay for his daughter`s treatment, and that the Washington posting would help." No official explanation has been offered as to why Singh was not immediately interrogated after evidence of his espionage activities was obtained. In two earlier cases, video and photographic evidence led to double agents confessing their crimes. A top Intelligence Bureau officer was forced to admit to having contact with a woman officer posted in the US Embassy in New Delhi after an intelligence sweep detected the diplomat using a mobile phone he had purchased for her. Intelligence Bureau watchers acting on the orders of the organization`s then-boss, Arun Bhagat, subsequently filmed the IB officer spending time with the woman at several locations, including a resort on the New Delhi-Jaipur highway. Earlier, R&AW counter-intelligence used video evidence to compel a field officer to admit that he had passed on sensitive information to the CIA through 1985-1986. The officer at first denied any wrong- doing. However, R&AW was able to confront him with footage showing him making contact with a US national on a beach in Chennai, and at a resort in Kerala. After this affair, R&AW tightened up its in-house surveillance procedures. However, officers at and above the rank of joint secretary were not generally searched while leaving the organization`s headquarters at Lodhi Road in New Delhi - a loophole exploited by Singh. Some experts say they are increasingly concerned over the security risks posed by the growing numbers of children of officers holding sensitive posts who are now working or studying abroad. Efforts to compromise Indian intelligence personnel through this route date back several decades. In the early 1980s, the son of the then-R&AW chief left the US after efforts were made to approach the spy-chief through him. The young man had been denied a visa extension, and was offered its renewal in return for his cooperation with US` intelligence services. "Not all," says a senior R&AW officer, "would respond with such probity." Top intelligence officials also believe that the scandal points to the danger of growing and sometimes indiscriminate contact between Indian and foreign intelligence services - often carried out under the cover of counter-terrorism work. Under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, R&AW alone was authorized to make contact with foreign intelligence services. These restraints, however, have loosened in recent years, and top people in the National Democratic Alliance Government sometimes met the heads of international intelligence services, particularly those of Israel and the US. Heads are likely to roll within R&AW for the failure to stop Singh from leaving India. Notably, sources in the Delhi Police say no instructions to stop the officer from leaving the country were issued to them. Opinion within R&AW seems to have been divided on the course of action that needed to be taken against him. Singh took advantage of this feud and disappeared. Past affairs of this kind provoked both the US and India to expel intelligence personnel. This time around, Singh`s defection could also have damaging consequences for India-US relations. 2160/2323/1412
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