13 December 2002
CIA Chief Urges Broader Engagement with Muslim World
(Says moderates should be encouraged to speak out) (3580)
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet says "we need to engage
more fully in the Muslim world" as a strategic component of the war
against terrorism.
Winning the war on terror cannot be accomplished "simply by defeating
and dismantling al-Qaeda," he said December 11. Achieving victory
requires the United States and its allies "to address the
circumstances that bring peoples to despair, weaken governments, and
create power vacuums that extremists are all too ready to fill."
Terrorists, for a variety of complex reasons, "feed on" fragile
states, Tenet said.
In a speech at the Washington-based Nixon Center, Tenet, who heads the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), said Western and Muslim allies
should seek "to enlarge the opportunities within the Muslim world to
embrace democratic norms; to encourage open, constructive political
discussion in closed, reserved societies; to support experiments in
improved governance; (and) to promote opportunities for Muslim women
to participate more broadly in the life of their societies."
He also pointed to the importance of encouraging "the silent
majorities throughout the Muslim world to speak out on behalf of
moderate alternatives to radical Islamic ideology." Tenet said ways
must be found to encourage "the moderates to return to the field,
which has been dominated by the extremists."
Tenet candidly acknowledged that there is no "one-size-fits-all"
solution to the problems that many states in the Muslim world face,
just as there is "no Marshall Plan in the war against terror." At the
same time, he said, it is important to recognize that "we cannot
impose an 'approved' version of Islam on the Islamic world. What we
need to do is help the Muslim world come to grips with its issues and
to find its own way out of the political and economic dead-end the
radicals are urging."
Tenet said the United States is not at war with the Muslim world, nor
is the ongoing war directed against the faith or practitioners of
Islam, even though avowed terrorists want to portray it that way. "But
we are at war with extremists...with terrorists ... with fanatics," he
emphasized. "Our foes are literally 'the fringe-of-the-fringe' in the
Muslim world, the small subset of radical Muslims who also happen to
be violent and murderous," he added.
Most governments grasp the threat of al-Qaeda, Tenet said, and "there
is no letup in the threat at the moment." Even though the terrorist
network has lost several key lieutenants, security concerns exist for
its remaining leadership, and operations have been disrupted,
intelligence reports indicate that al-Qaeda is preparing additional
terrorist attacks, he said.
"We are still in the 'hunt phase' of this war -- the painstaking
pursuit of individual al-Qaeda members and their cells," and while
it's paying off, Tenet warned that the effort is manpower-intensive
and it will take a long time to succeed. "There are no set battles
against units of any size. We are tracking our enemies down,
one-by-one," he said.
Following are Tenet's remarks as prepared for delivery:
(begin transcript)
Remarks by the Director of Central Intelligence
George J. Tenet
at the
Nixon Center Distinguished Service Award Banquet
11 December 2002
(Note: Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet was honored
December 11th by The Nixon Center when the think tank presented him
its 2002 Distinguished Service Award for his "lifetime of public
service in intelligence and national security.")
I am honored to accept this award, on behalf of those who truly earned
it: the men and women of the U.S. intelligence community.
Richard Nixon's approach to foreign policy was, above all, realistic.
He respected history and the essential unpredictability of human
events. He was a strategic thinker who kept his eye on the big
picture. He strove for steady incremental improvements in the
international position of the United States and was skeptical of the
durability of any advantage.
What would President Nixon have made of our time? He lived to see the
fall of the Soviet Union and the halting start of Russia's
transformation. And he watched the development of relations with
China.
But the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty he negotiated is all but
defunct. NATO has expanded to include former members of the Warsaw
Pact. United States armed forces are bivouacking in the Central Asian
states of the former Soviet Union.
And what would President Nixon have made of the events of September 11
and the war on terror? He would have been as horrified as we all were
by what happened that day, and he would have strongly backed a
forceful U.S. response. He probably would have been surprised that,
after 9/11, the first phone call President Bush received from a
foreign leader was from [Russian President] Vladimir Putin.
That said, President Nixon would have made clear distinctions between
"the tactical" and "the strategic," and I'd like to dwell on those two
words for a moment.
It's routine to talk about the war in tactical terms: this battle,
that terrorist, this takedown. And I will talk to you about where I
think we are, what successes we've had, and what challenges we
continue to face.
But I also want to talk about a strategic imperative that runs
alongside the tactical effort. President Nixon's national security
adviser, Henry Kissinger, suggested a year ago that 9/11 changed
everything. All the foreign relations of the United States were, on
that day, cast in a new light. We soon found ourselves in new webs of
relationships that few would have thought possible before that day.
Following President Bush's call to world leaders to join in a great
coalition against terrorism, the United States moved to an emphatic
posture of engagement. Engagement was really the only choice we had.
And that great coalition came into being. It meant an even closer
engagement with the Muslim world.
But we can't let this engagement stop at the level of tactical wartime
cooperation, as necessary as that is. We also need to make more
fundamental connections. Because at the end of the day, we cannot hope
to make lasting progress in the war against terrorism without serious
steps to address "the circumstances that give it rise." I'll come back
to this in a moment.
We are not at war with the Muslim world. As President Bush has said on
many occasions, "Our war is not against Islam, or against faith
practiced by the Muslim people." But we are at war with extremists. We
are at war with terrorists. We are at war with fanatics. But we are
not at war with Islam -- even though the terrorists want to portray it
that way.
And nobody should confuse the Muslim world with the Middle East alone.
Not at all. The Muslim world reaches from Morocco to Indonesia, the
largest Muslim country. The next three largest Muslim populations
[are] all on the South Asian subcontinent -- Pakistan, Bangladesh, and
India.
Our foes are literally "the fringe of the fringe" in the Muslim world,
the small subset of radical Muslims who also happen to be violent and
murderous -- and targeting the United States, our people, our way of
life.
This is an enemy we know very, very well.
Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden have been formidable adversaries,
particularly after their migration to Afghanistan in 1996. Before
9/11, we had a lot of the tools in place, but we lacked some that were
necessary to wage a successful campaign.
Well before 9/11, we were hitting al-Qaeda's infrastructure, working
with foreign services to carry out arrests, recruiting or exposing
operatives, and going after bin Laden himself. And we made progress in
several areas:
-- We developed a stable of assets and a body of information that
pinpointed al-Qaeda's Afghanistan infrastructure, enabling its rapid
destruction when the war started.
-- In conjunction with the FBI, CIA had rendered 70 terrorists to
justice around the world. Al-Qaeda might have been able to operate
freely in Afghanistan, but the terrorists knew they were fair game
elsewhere.
-- During the Millennium threat period, we identified 36 terrorist
agents and pursued operations against them in 50 countries, building
on existing liaison relationships and forging new ones with
governments and sister services all around the world. These operations
disrupted attacks and saved lives. We had similar success overseas
during other high-threat periods, such as during Ramadan in 2000 and
spring/summer 2001.
Within our own government, we have a sound foundation for working
together, and since 9/11 we've enhanced ties to Homeland Security, law
enforcement, and a range of other federal, state, and local agencies.
But before 9/11, as you know, al-Qaeda had some advantages, like a
safe operating environment in Afghanistan and a protective sponsor,
the Taliban government. These advantages were reversed, dramatically,
after 9/11.
And when the fighting started last fall, al-Qaeda's leaders genuinely
expected to mire our coalition down in a reprise of the Soviet
experience. They were just as genuinely surprised -- and then sorely
disappointed.
More than one-third of the top leadership identified before the war
has been killed or captured.
Almost half of our successes against senior al-Qaeda members has come
in recent months. During that time we've netted:
-- Al-Qaeda's operations chief for the Persian Gulf. He also helped
plan the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings and the attack on USS Cole
in 2000.
-- A principal al-Qaeda planner who was also a conspirator in the 9/11
attacks.
-- Numerous operations officers and facilitators.
-- And a trove of information we're using to press the hunt further.
The United States has had lots of partners in this fight. Without
them, we could not have accomplished what we did.
Since September 2001, more than 3,000 al-Qaeda operatives or
associates have been detained in over 100 countries. Don't get stuck
on this number. Not everyone arrested was a terrorist. Some have been
released. But this worldwide "rousting" of al-Qaeda definitely
disrupted its operations.
Starting from almost zero, more than 166 countries worldwide have
seized over $121 million in terrorist-related financial assets.
And speaking of partners, let's dispel a myth tonight: the myth that
Muslim countries have lined up against us. Most governments understand
al-Qaeda poses a threat to them as well. And we're making steady
progress with every one of them.
Besides Pakistan's support in rounding up al-Qaeda members, Pakistani
President Musharraf's landmark speech in January calling for the
establishment of a moderate, tolerant Islamic state has begun a debate
across the Muslim world about which vision of Islam is the right one.
Jordan and Egypt have been courageous leaders in the war on terrorism.
A number of Gulf states like the UAE are denying terrorists financial
safe haven, making it harder for al-Qaeda to funnel funding for
operations, and others in the Gulf are beginning to tackle the problem
of charities fronting for, and funding, terrorists.
The Saudis are providing increasingly important support to our
counterterrorism efforts -- from making arrests to sharing debriefing
results.
Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia and Singapore, with
significant Muslim populations, have been active in arresting and
detaining terror suspects.
We mustn't forget Afghanistan, where the new government leaders are
providing support not only for their own self-interest, but at great
danger and difficulty to themselves.
And, after a few initial turnouts, the "Muslim Street" never really
showed up.
Intelligence information tells us the al-Qaeda leadership has been
rattled by recent losses and is taking more precautions. But let's be
very clear: there is no letup in the threat at the moment. Despite the
loss of several senior lieutenants, and the security worries of the
remaining leaders, intelligence clearly shows al-Qaeda is still
preparing terrorist attacks.
Indeed, every al-Qaeda operations officer and facilitator we have
captured so far, was in the midst of preparing attacks when captured.
Recent tapes by al-Qaeda leaders threatening the U.S. economy and our
coalition allies were unprecedented in their bluntness and urgency. It
is no coincidence that those tapes were released in the same period as
the recent attacks in Mombassa, Bali, off the Yemeni coast (French
tanker), and Kuwait (U.S. Marines shot).
Given the reverses they have suffered to date, they are obliged to say
such things to bolster morale. But they would be foolish to make so
bold a threat unless confident that some impending operation has a
high probability of success. In effect, their credibility with their
supporters is more than ever on the line.
And we would be foolish to take these threats in any way other than
with utmost seriousness.
On the homeland security front, keeping up our guard works. Our moves
to harden targets in response to threat information will disrupt or
slow terrorist plans. Any deterring of an attack, or of slowing down
al-Qaeda's operational planning, allows us more time to disrupt cells,
take operatives off the street, and continue our protection of the
homeland.
We are still in the "hunt phase" of this war -- the painstaking
pursuit of individual al-Qaeda members and their cells. This phase is
paying off, but is manpower-intensive and will take a long time. There
are no set battles against units of any size. We are tracking our
enemies down one by one.
And let there be no doubt that, day by day, we are winning this war
because of our military. Yes, we will have days when we are less
successful -- there will be battles won and battles lost -- this is
the nature of war. But we are winning.
Beyond tactical victories, we need to show al-Qaeda's potential
recruits that al-Qaeda is failing in every possible respect.
And if we can't take them off the board, we need to keep them on the
run. At least then they won't be planning and operating. More than the
provision of funding or materiel, denying al-Qaeda a new safe haven is
the best way to continue to disrupt their planning.
We can do more in many different areas -- in particular, we can
address the range of issues that affect the ability of our partners to
work with us and with each other -- but we need to engage more fully
in the Muslim world. This is the strategic component of the war
against terror.
We cannot win the war on terror simply by defeating and dismantling
al-Qaeda.
To claim victory, we and our allies will need to address the
circumstances that bring peoples to despair, weaken governments, and
create power vacuums that extremists are all too ready to fill.
The Muslim world is hugely diverse and complex -- anything but
monolithic:
-- More than 1.3 billion people;
-- Literally hundreds of languages and cultures.
For these reasons, Richard Nixon pointed out the improbability of such
a thing as a "clash of civilizations" between the West and the Muslim
World. "This nightmare scenario," he wrote, "will never materialize.
The Muslim world is too large and too diverse...."
But imagine a large map of the world. Let's say we stick a map pin in
every country that had a low per-capita income, and another for a high
rate of infant mortality; another for a sizable "youth bulge" -- what
[author] Robert Kaplan calls "unemployed young guys walking around," a
strong indicator of social volatility; and one for an absence of
political freedoms and participatory government.
At the end of this exercise, we would have marked out a large number
of states -- some of which are in the Muslim world.
We could go on to mark out another set of what we could call
"beleaguered states" -- states unable to control their own borders and
internal territory, that lack the capacity to govern, educate their
peoples, or provide fundamental social services. And some of them have
recognized the need to address these problems -- and they need help.
We know from experience that states struggling with these problems are
the natural targets of the terrorists. We have seen -- in places like
Afghanistan -- terrorists taking root and turning them into terrorist
havens.
For a complex variety of reasons, terrorists feed on such fragile
states.
At the same time, however, we see glimmers of hope that, in pockets
throughout the Muslim world, we are turning a corner.
I'm speaking about recent elections in Turkey, Morocco, and Bahrain --
where Islamist parties acted through the ballot box -- which suggests
that majorities in some Muslim countries want to work through a
participatory political process in effecting change through peaceful
means. And I'm thinking of recent events in Iran, where voices for
change are displaying a tenacious will to be heard.
My colleague and friend at the State Department, [Director of Policy
Planning] Richard Haass, recently pointed to developments in these and
other Muslim countries in observing that, "when given the opportunity,
Muslims are embracing democratic norms and choosing democracy."
He worries whether we are doing enough to foster gradual paths to
democratization. If we do not, he believes it will create a
"democratic exception" -- a missed opportunity to help these countries
become more stable, prosperous, peaceful, and adaptable to the
stresses of the 21st century.
I agree. We and our allies -- both in the West and in the Muslim world
-- owe it to ourselves to pursue such broad, strategic goals in the
war against terrorism: to enlarge the opportunities within the Muslim
world to embrace democratic norms, to encourage open, constructive
political discussion in closed, reserved societies, to support
experiments in improved governance, to promote opportunities for
Muslim women to participate more broadly in the life of their
societies.
We can also encourage the silent majorities throughout the Muslim
world to speak out on behalf of moderate alternatives to radical
Islamic ideology. We need to find ways of encouraging the moderates to
return to the field, which has been dominated by the extremists.
Such an approach requires honest discussions with our friends in the
Muslim world. We need to discuss candidly what we can do and what they
can do.
Friendship without such honesty is a hollow thing indeed. There is no
Marshall Plan in the war against terror. There is no "one size fits
all" for addressing these problems these states face.
Some may ask: What will the United States get out of such close
engagement? Naturally, we hope for better relations. But we most
emphatically want to ensure that we never again see the rise of a
terrorist sanctuary on the back of a beleaguered state. This is one
great lesson of Afghanistan.
By denying sanctuaries to terrorists, we will deny them camps where
they can train, where they can indoctrinate, where they can plan and
ultimately, undertake operations that hurt U.S. interests.
But we must also recognize we cannot impose an "approved" version of
Islam on the Islamic world. What we instead need to do is help the
Muslim world come to grips with its issues and to find its own way out
of the political and economic dead end the radicals are urging.
I have been privileged in my work -- as many of you have in yours --
to meet with a broad range of talented, passionate people from this
crucial part of the world. Most understand the threat that terror
poses to all of us. Most recognize that it does not advance the
legitimate aspirations of anyone, and that its inevitable result is to
bring suffering upon suffering.
They may not agree with every policy of the United States. Even the
closest of allies differ over tactics and strategy. And so, what we
seek from our foreign partners and friends is not a unanimity of
ideas, but a sharing of basic values, a dialogue from which we learn
together.
Of course, with the safety of our country in the balance, there are
times when dialogue and engagement are not enough. In intelligence, as
in other fields of national security, the principle that guides our
actions is a bit less elegant, but no less practical: with others if
possible, alone if necessary.
These concepts -- the mix of realism and idealism that is so closely
identified with the United States -- are at the very heart of the
thoughtful work done by the Nixon Center. We find ourselves at the
beginning of the 21st century in a very different place than any of us
would have imagined. We need to rely on well-honed skills and new
thinking -- the sort of thinking that was Richard Nixon at his best --
envisioning a world different than the one he knew -- a world in which
you could open relations with China or agree to arms control with the
Soviet Union as a means of advancing our interests without sacrificing
our values or goals.
And here, at an event that echoes the memory of President Nixon the
statesman, I would like to close with his words, as non-partisan as
any can be: "I believe in the American dream," he said, "because I
have seen it come true in my own life."
All of us here find truth in that statement. And we find something
more: A reason why so many are moved -- and so many have sacrificed --
to defend the blessings, the opportunities, the choices, the freedoms,
that we enjoy as Americans.
Thank you very much.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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