ACCESSION NUMBER:381042
FILE ID:PO3205
DATE:02/28/95
TITLE:U.S. INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENT IT CAN MONITOR START II CUTS (02/28/95)
TEXT:*95022805.PO3
U.S. INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENT IT CAN MONITOR START II CUTS
(But sees uncertainties related to missile production) (900)
By Jacquelyn S. Porth
USIA Security Affairs Writer
Washington -- The U.S. intelligence community will be able to monitor "the
most significant provisions" of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) "with high confidence," says the deputy director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
1
In February 28 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Douglas MacEachin pointed out, however, that in some areas "we will have
uncertainty." The task of monitoring missile production activity, he said,
is "more difficult than monitoring reductions and deployed forces."
MacEachin explained that an outgrowth of "the historical difficulty in
monitoring missile production is that our estimates of the non-deployed
missile inventory are less certain." Nevertheless, U.S. intelligence
officials do not believe "the Russians have maintained a large-scale
program to store several hundred or more undeclared, non-deployed strategic
ballistic missiles," he said, although it may be "possible that some
undeclared missiles have been stored at unidentified facilities."
He said it would be "very difficult" for the Russians to acquire, produce
and maintain substantial numbers of delivery systems not deployed or
situated at revealed locations. To do so, MacEachin said, the Russians
would have to have a tight, perfect system.
Meanwhile, Russian and Ukrainian firms are developing and advertising plans,
the deputy CIA director said, "to produce new space launch vehicles (SLVs)
that are based on MIRVed (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry
Vehicle) ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles)." If the SLVs are not
START II accountable, he said, "ambiguities could arise." Still, he added,
SLVs used in conjunction with mobile launchers "must differ from
treaty-limited missiles in ways that are observable by NTM (National
Technical Means)" in the form of special airborne sensors.
U.S. confidence "will be highest," according to MacEachin, "when monitoring
the mandated reductions, including the elimination of SS-18 ICBMs, as well
as accounting for the number of deployed strategic weapons systems --
single-warhead ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy
bombers -- that remain in the force."
With respect to possible Russian cheating scenarios, MacEachin said the
intelligence community weighed its chances of detecting and correctly
interpreting potential cheating and decided that "the increased openness of
Russia and the other former Soviet republics make cheating increasingly
difficult to conceal."
Under the terms of START II, U.S. intelligence is tasked with monitoring:
-- warhead reductions to between 3,000 and 3,500, including a 1,700-to-1,750
sub-limit on submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads;
-- the ban on production, flight-testing, acquisition and deployment of
MIRVed ICBMs after January 1, 2003;
-- the conversion of up to 90 SS-18 silos for smaller, SS-25 type single
warhead ICBMs;
-- the elimination of the remaining SS-18 heavy ICBM silos and of all SS-18
missiles and canisters;
-- up to 105 SS-19 ICBMs that are downloaded to carry only a single warhead;
-- the number of nuclear weapons with which Russian heavy bombers are
actually equipped; and
-- that heavy bombers reoriented for conventional roles do not carry nuclear
weapons or train for nuclear missions.
MacEachin said the ban on MIRVed ICBMS will be monitored after the year 2003
"both by tracking the elimination of launchers for MIRVed ICBMs and by
analyzing the data from flight tests of new missiles."
He said START II really does "roll back" the growing threat of nuclear
weapons, and it takes the two major steps of cutting the number of U.S. and
1ussian weapons systems by at least half and of eliminating MIRVed ICBMs,
which the United States has always considered its "greatest threat."
Asked about the political prospects for Russian ratification of START II,
MacEachin indicated that it "is not going to be easy" to get the parliament
to act. He said it is a politically difficult issue because the Russians
are being asked to eliminate the "star" of their strategic triad at a time
when a search for national identity is underway.
Expanding on MacEachin's remarks, Peter Clements, chief of CIA's Russian
Affairs Division, told the committee the current U.S. assessment regarding
ratification is that it is "uncertain at best." Unrest in Chechnya, he
said, has complicated the arms control debate in Russia because some
experts are asking if it is wise for the country to "diminish" Russian
strategic forces at the very moment when conventional forces are so weak.
Clements said the election expected in the next six to eight months is also
complicating the Russian ratification issue.
MacEachin stressed, however, that despite all of these complications, the
Russian government has not rolled back from its commitment to START II.
There was considerable discussion between MacEachin and members of the
committee about the status of Russian security for nuclear materials. That
security "has been good," MacEachin said. The risk of disintegration of
Russian central control has been the biggest concern of U.S. officials, he
noted, but so far that Russian control has been "rigorous."
MacEachin drew an analogy between the demand for narcotics and the demand
for nuclear materials. Experts can try to interdict the product, he said,
but stemming the flow is a difficult task "as long as demand is there." As
with all strategic arms control reductions and eliminations, the official
said, "accountability" of nuclear products is "critical."
NNNN
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