[Senate Hearing 112-681]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-681
SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM: SUSTAINING PROGRESS FOR THE FUTURE
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HEARING
before the
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 21, 2012
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JON TESTER, Montana RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MARK BEGICH, Alaska JERRY MORAN, Kansas
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Nicholas A. Rossi, Minority Staff Director
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Joyce Ward, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARK BEGICH, Alaska JERRY MORAN, Kansas
Christine West, Counsel
Jena McNeill, Professional Staff Member
Aaron H. Woolf, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statement:
Page
Senator Akaka................................................ 1
Prepared statement:
Senator Akaka................................................ 25
WITNESSES
Thursday, June 21, 2012
Hon. Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 3
Hon. Daniel I. Werfel, Controller, U.S. Office of Management and
Budget......................................................... 5
Hon. Elizabeth A. McGrath, Deputy Chief Management Officer, U.S.
Department of Defense.......................................... 6
Merton W. Miller, Associate Director, Federal Investigative
Services, U.S. Office of Personnel Management.................. 8
Charles B. Sowell, Deputy Assistant Director for Special
Security, Office of the Director of National Intelligence...... 10
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Dodaro, Hon. Gene L.:
Testimony.................................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 27
McGrath, Hon. Elizabeth A.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 63
Miller, Merton W.:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 69
Sowell, Charles B.:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 77
Werfel, Hon. Daniel I.:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 55
SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM: SUSTAINING PROGRESS FOR THE FUTURE
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THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce,
and the District of Columbia,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in
Room 342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senator Akaka.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. This hearing of the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and
the District of Columbia is called to order.
Aloha and good afternoon to all of you. Mahalo. Thank you
very much for coming. I would tell you that this is a time for
praise because so much has been done and so much needs to be
done, too. But I think we are moving along the right course and
I would like to think of it like a canoe. We are on the right
course, so thank you.
In 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) placed
the Personnel Security Clearance Process on its High-Risk List
due to a massive backlog of applications and insufficient
quality standards. This is the Subcommittee's eighth hearing on
the security clearance process since that time.
In addition to GAO's and the Subcommittee's oversight, the
Administration has placed long-term high-level focus on
reforming the process, and I must commend you because,
together, these agencies have made significant improvements. I
am pleased to say that last year, the security clearance
process was removed from GAO's High-Risk List. The application
backlog has been eliminated, and timeliness requirements in the
2004 Intelligence Reform Act have been met and exceeded. Today,
initial investigations take an average of 44 days to complete,
compared to a staggering 189 days in 2005. That is the kind of
progress we have made.
Investigation quality improvements were another key aspect
of removing the high-risk designation. In multiple reports, GAO
had found that clearances were granted based on incomplete
investigation files. Moreover, there was no way to evaluate the
quality of security clearance determinations to make sure
security threats were consistently weeded out. Lapses in
quality posed a national security risk.
The Performance Accountability Council (PAC) has worked
together to address all aspects of investigation and
adjudication quality. The PAC has updated the security
clearance application, improved interview techniques, and
created quality metrics. Its members are working to standardize
investigator training and to develop governmentwide
adjudication guidelines.
Despite considerable progress, challenges remain. Continued
oversight and accountability are needed to sustain progress and
momentum in the future. Reciprocity continues to be an issue.
In our 2010 hearing, I urged agencies to work together to
accept clearances from other agencies. This allows critical
national security positions to be filled with the right people
more quickly.
Although progress has been made on this issue, establishing
more uniform training, investigation, and suitability standards
would increase trust between agencies and promote reciprocity.
Additional information technology improvements also are needed
to support information sharing and case management. Without
these investments, further improvements in timeliness and
reciprocity will be difficult to achieve.
As you all know, this will be my last hearing on the
security clearance process before I retire. Congressional
oversight and sustained focus by the Executive Branch have
produced a more efficient and functional security clearance
process. I am proud of what we have accomplished together and
hope that our work will serve as a model to address other high-
risk areas in our Federal Government.
I will continue to monitor this issue during my remaining
time in the Senate and I hope that future Members of this
Subcommittee continue to focus on this critical issue. I look
forward to hearing from our witnesses on how they plan to build
on this legacy and ensure the continued success of the security
clearance process.
It is my pleasure to again welcome our panel of witnesses
to the Subcommittee today: Gene Dodaro, Comptroller General of
the United States and head of the Government Accountability
Office; Danny Werfel, who is the Controller at the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB); Elizabeth McGrath, Deputy Chief
Management Officer at the Department of Defense (DOD); Mr.
Merton Miller, Associate Director of Federal Investigative
Services (FIS) at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM); and
Mr. Charlie Sowell, Deputy Assistant Director for Special
Security at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI).
As you know, it is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear
in all witnesses, so will you please stand and raise your right
hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give this
Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Dodaro. I do.
Mr. Werfel. I do.
Ms. McGrath. I do.
Mr. Miller. I do.
Mr. Sowell. I do.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Let the record show that the
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Although statements are limited to 5 minutes, I want all of
our witnesses to know that their entire statements will be
included in the record.
Mr. Dodaro, will you please proceed with your statement.
TESTIMONY OF HON. GENE L. DODARO,\1\ COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Dodaro. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good
afternoon to you.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Dodaro appears in the appendix on
page 27.
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Senator Akaka. Good afternoon.
Mr. Dodaro. I would like to start with the announcement of
your retirement. First, on behalf of myself and all my
colleagues at the GAO, thank you for your service to the
country and for being such a steadfast proponent of improving
management in the Federal Government. We have had the privilege
of working with you on many issues, on our High-Risk list,
human capital, nuclear-radiological issues, veterans' issues,
financial literacy, and the list goes on. Know, though, that
when you leave the Senate, you leave with our deep appreciation
for your dedication and with the best wishes from all of us to
you and your family.
Senator Akaka. Thank you much.
Mr. Dodaro. I think today's hearing is a really good
example of what can happen when you have sustained high-level
Congressional attention and active engagement with the
Executive Branch, and when the Executive Branch gets organized
properly to tackle a problem and gives dedicated, committed
top-level leadership and proper resources, and there is the
application of good management practices to tackle a problem at
hand.
As you pointed out, we put the area on the High-Risk List
in 2005 for various reasons--backlogs, incomplete
investigations and adjudication documentation. Congress held a
series of hearings, not only this Subcommittee, but other
Committees, a total of 15 hearings from the time it was put on
the list. The Administration organized into the Performance
Accountability Council. Top-level officials were dedicated to
it. They were supported by staff in their agencies. And metrics
were set, which is very important, and that is what I meant by
the proper application of management principles. And as a
result of dramatic improvements in the timeliness of processing
initial investigations from DOD, in particular, which covers
the lion's share of the investigation and clearances issues,
and the establishment of these quality metrics in 2010, we felt
comfortable removing the area from our High-Risk List with the
proviso that there be continued attention and commitment on the
part of the Executive Branch to do this.
Now, the real challenge going forward will be to sustain
the attention to this area and to enhance the efforts that have
been put in place and to make sure that the continued
improvements are there and there is not any potential for there
to be slippage in the progress that has already been achieved.
And a few areas that I would point out that I think really
need attention is, one, while quality metrics have been
introduced, they need to be fully implemented and they need to
be refined as the process unfolds and based on experience in
applying the quality metrics and to make sure that they are
used governmentwide, not just at DOD, ODNI and OPM. I think
those would be key developments.
Second, in terms of the fiscal pressures facing the Federal
Government right now, I think there are opportunities for
efficiencies to be gained in the process. I know OPM is looking
now at efficiencies in their process and is supposed to have a
report next year on that. We are encouraged by that
development. We also pointed out in our recent report on
overlap and duplication that there were five different agencies
developing case management systems and we thought that there
was a possibility for overlap and duplication in this area. We
made a recommendation to OMB to establish policies so that
agencies are leveraging off existing technologies and not
making duplicative investments. We are encouraged OMB agreed
with that recommendation and is moving to implementation in
that area. I think that can save a lot of money, too. As we
point out in our testimony, investments in information
technology are one of the major cost drivers associated with
processing clearances now.
And then, finally, there needs to be continued attention to
determining and having in place the right process for figuring
out who should have a clearance in the first place, and to make
sure that only the minimum number of people have them. I know
in many cases, it is important to have the flexibility of
having people with clearances, particularly at the ``top
secret'' level, in carrying out the missions of the agencies,
but there needs to be an initial process of determining what
that number is and keep it at a minimum. The same is true of
when reinvestigations have to be taking place and you have to
go through the process over again. Further, there is a huge
difference in the amount of money that is spent to process a
``top secret'' clearance versus a ``secret'' clearance, and so
there are cost implications, as well.
So in summary, Mr. Chairman, we are very encouraged by the
progress, with the partnership in Congress and the
Administration in this area. We felt comfortable enough to take
it off the High-Risk List, but that does not mean we do not
have a watchful eye on this going forward. Congressional
oversight and continued attention by the Executive Branch are
pivotal, and we will do our part, as well.
So thank you very much. I would be happy to answer
questions at the appropriate time.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Dodaro.
Mr. Werfel, please proceed with your statement.
TESTIMONY OF HON. DANIEL I. WERFEL,\1\ CONTROLLER, U.S. OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Mr. Werfel. Chairman Akaka, thank you for inviting me here
today. It is my privilege to testify on behalf of the Office of
Management and Budget and to discuss the Administration's
ongoing security clearance reform efforts.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Werfel appears in the appendix on
page 55.
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This Administration has made important advances in
reforming the security clearance process. There is still work
to be done, but Federal hires, military personnel, cleared
contractors, and those personnel requiring a reinvestigation
have a more effective and expedient clearance experience than
they did just a few years ago.
For many years, a backlog in the government's security
clearance inventory caused tremendous problems and significant
expense. Recognizing the breadth and depth of this problem,
Congress took action. In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) challenged the Federal
Government to address these issues, and in 2005, the GAO placed
DOD's Personnel Security Clearance Program on its high-risk
list.
In response, the Executive Branch took aggressive action to
address the goals of IRTPA and tackle the backlog, and the
results are clear. In 2005, the governmentwide average for
initial clearances was 265 days. As recently as 2006, the
backlog of pending clearance investigations over 180 days old
stood at almost 100,000 cases. By December 2009, 90 percent of
the government's initial clearances were completed within the
IRTPA-required time frame of 60 days, and we have consistently
met the IRTPA target since that time and the decades-old
backlog of initial investigations is now gone.
In addition, the Suitability and Security Clearance
Performance and Accountability Council, was established in 2008
and is held accountable to the President for achieving security
clearance reform goals. Since 2008, the PAC has aggressively
taken on and met many reform challenges.
In concert with the goal to increase the use of information
technology in making the security and suitability clearance
process more efficient, applicants are using an improved
electronic questionnaire for national security positions.
Investigators have increased access to electronic record
repositories. OPM investigations are transmitted
electronically. And the PAC has completed several promising
pilots on the effectiveness of automated record checks and
support of revised Federal investigative standards. The PAC is
currently developing an implementation plan for a five-tiered
investigative model that will streamline and facilitate greater
reciprocity between suitability and security investigations and
determinations. And perhaps most importantly, 90 percent of the
security clearance determinations last quarter were completed
within 46 days, an 83 percent reduction from the 2005 level,
exceeding the IRTPA timeliness standard.
This is significant progress, and our ongoing efforts to
sustain timeliness and ensure quality, led GAO to remove DOD's
Personnel Security Clearance Program from its high-risk list
last year. Such impressive results are attributable to the
skill and dedication of the staff at the Defense Department,
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Office
of Personnel Management, our partnership with GAO, and the
leadership and persistent focus of Congress and this
Subcommittee, in particular.
Looking forward, in order to sustain this progress, we are
focused on amending the investigative and adjudicative
standards to make identified efficiencies permanent and
supporting them with further technology improvements. In
particular, we are pushing forward on three key areas.
First, aligning suitability and security processes and
policies through modification of regulatory standards,
investigative standards, and information collection forms that
underlie our clearance operations.
Second, leveraging information technology (IT) solutions to
improve timeliness, quality, and reciprocity, in particular,
continuing to convert paper-based application processes to
electronic questionnaires in the intelligence community (IC)
and further connecting intelligence community and unclassified
record repositories.
And third, providing oversight of and assistance to
agencies that are lagging behind in security clearance reform.
In all these efforts, we will rely on the continued efforts
and partnership of the PAC, oversight of the Security and
Suitability Executive Agents, cooperative leadership of
Executive Branch agency heads, as well as the accountability
brought to bear by GAO and this Subcommittee to ensure that we
stay on track and do not lose momentum.
Without question, significant progress has been made to
date in security clearance reform, but work remains in order to
make that progress sustainable and that effort remains a high
priority for this Administration and for me personally.
With that in mind, before I close, I would like to take a
moment to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership. We will
lose a key partner when you leave the Senate, but we are proud
to have accomplished so much and to have established this
trajectory on your watch. We look forward to our continued work
with your colleagues on the Subcommittee as well as my fellow
witnesses who continue to drive forward the reform process
through the PAC.
Once again, thank you for the opportunity to testify and I
look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Werfel.
Ms. McGrath, will you please proceed with your statement.
TESTIMONY OF HON. ELIZABETH MCGRATH,\1\ DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT
OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. McGrath. Thank you very much. Chairman Akaka, thank you
for the opportunity to testify before you and the Subcommittee
today on the Defense Department's efforts toward reforming the
personnel security clearance process.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. McGrath appears in the appendix
on page 63.
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I, too, truly appreciate the Subcommittee's leadership over
the last few years. Your sustained attention has been
tremendously valuable in ensuring that we continued our
improvement in both timeliness and quality. And, sir, I want to
specifically thank you for your personal engagement in these
efforts. I do not know that I have been to all of the eight
hearings, but it feels like I have been to most of them, so
thank you very much, because I think without your leadership
and the leadership of the Administration and the Government
Accountability Office, we would not be as far along today as we
are.
Since co-founding the Joint Reform Team 5 years ago, DOD
and its teammates have accomplished quite a bit, as has been
mentioned, streamlining policy and processes, reducing
duplication and waste, strengthening governance through the
Performance Accountability Council, which I believe is a model
for effective interagency cooperation.
The results are clear. The timeliness far exceeds, as you
mentioned, sir, the goals set by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act. We certainly do have a higher quality
security clearance program today and we have better information
technology that enhances capabilities across the Federal space,
and certainly within the Defense Department.
And I must also say that it has been a long desire of the
Department to have at least one of its items removed from GAO's
High-Risk List. I mention our work in security clearance reform
all the time a model for how that it is achievable. We have
demonstrated that, and I look forward to taking more of our
high-risk items off of that notorious list.
These improvements to the security clearance process
certainly have made great contributions to the DOD mission. It
improves our ability to safeguard classified material, place
qualified individuals into jobs faster, effectively utilize our
contractor workforce, and reduce the burdens and inconveniences
on both the Federal workforce and our military members.
Our results present the progress that is possible when
agencies commit to joint goals informed by governmentwide
priorities and establish proper controls to ensure results. It
has been an honor to serve not only as the DOD voice to this
effort, but also as the Vice Chair of the Performance
Accountability Council. We could not have achieved this project
without the work of the organizations represented here today
and the sustained leadership and focus of this Subcommittee.
Specific to the Defense Department, I would like to
highlight just a few things. Against the IRTPA goal to
adjudicate cases in 20 days, DOD's statistic for adjudication
gone as low as 7 days. It is extremely impressive. We did this
through many different methods, both by looking at our process
within the Defense Department but also infusing and
implementing greater information technology.
I want to highlight our electronic adjudication capability.
In our Case Adjudication Tracking System (CATS), we were able
to electronically adjudicate last year almost 100,000 cases
representing 24 percent of our ``secret'' workload to allow our
adjudicators to focus on the more important cases. We have also
offered that to other Federal agencies. The Department of
Energy (DOE) has taken advantage of that capability with the
Social Security Administration planning to implement next year.
We have also implemented greater tools to ensure we have
quality in place for both our adjudicative determinations and
investigations we also have initiated a robust adjudicator
certification program to ensure comprehensive and standardized
training of all of our adjudicators.
As has been mentioned, we still have things to do. Key to
those are the policy initiatives, as Mr. Werfel mentioned, the
Federal Investigative Standards, and adjudicative guidelines.
We are very close to implementing both of those. Our
governmentwide regulations put policy in place to ensure that
we sustain this progress over the time horizon. We developed
training standards from a national perspective, in order to
reach not only the Department of Defense but also the Federal
space. We are setting and reaching stretch goals in the area of
information technology to truly enable our original vision of
end-to-end automation.
I do look forward to continuing to work with this
Subcommittee in the future on these important issues, and
again, Senator Akaka, I want to thank you very much for your
personal engagement on this and other issues that I have the
opportunity to talk to you about. I look forward to your
questions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ms. McGrath.
Mr. Miller, will you please proceed with your statement.
TESTIMONY OF MERTON MILLER,\1\ ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Chairman Akaka. On behalf of
Director Berry, I want to thank you for the opportunity to
testify today regarding OPM's role in security clearance reform
and our efforts in achieving and sustaining the tremendous
progress made in the security clearance and investigation
program.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Miller appears in the appendix on
page 69.
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I am also very pleased to have the opportunity to thank
Chairman Akaka and this Subcommittee for your sustained
leadership in correcting a decades-old problem through
investigative consolidation, legislated performance goals, and
directly supporting security clearance reform efforts.
Lastly, but most importantly, I am delighted to have the
opportunity to thank Chairman Akaka, and with deepest gratitude
and best wishes, mahalo nui loa, for his many years of noble
and dedicated service to our country.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Mr. Miller. From the beginning, OPM has been deeply
committed to working closely with our partners. The Office of
the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of
Defense, along with our other partners, have moved the security
clearance program forward. We have implemented important
reforms, and improved the timeliness, efficiency, and quality
of the security clearance and background investigative process.
It was not that long ago when Members of this Subcommittee
were hearing testimony about significant and growing security
clearance backlogs, inadequate resourcing to address the
growing workload, increasing risks to national security because
reinvestigations were delayed or not conducted at all, and the
loss of billions of dollars of productivity because hundreds of
thousands of Federal employees, military members, and
contractors experienced significant delays to obtain a
clearance. The backlog was first formally recognized in 1981
and continued until 2009, when the program was finally current.
While there had been continued reporting on the challenges
associated with the background investigative program, it was
not until legislation like the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act and E.O. 13381 that put this program
on the right course.
Today, OPM's background investigative program performance
is strong, demonstrated by years of providing timely, quality
products to our 100-plus customer agencies. We have no
backlogs, are meeting Congressional timeliness mandates, and we
continue to increase automation to enhance performance,
quality, timeliness, and reduce cost. The success of this
program can be directly attributed to this Subcommittee's
leadership, OMB's determined chairmanship of the Performance
Accountability Council, and the strong partnership OPM has
enjoyed with the DNI, DOD, and other Executive Branch agencies.
Since 2005, OPM has seen our workload and field work
intensive investigations increase significantly, with a 26
percent increase in ``top secret'' investigations, a 21 percent
increase in ``secret'' and ``confidential'' investigations, and
a 144 percent increase in ``top secret'' reinvestigations.
Despite unpredictable workloads and projections and a shift in
investigative requests towards more resource-intensive
investigations, OPM has been able to improve investigative
timeliness by 75 percent through appropriate levels of
investment in Federal and contract staffing, training, and
increased automation. More importantly, Federal, military, and
government contract employees are getting to work more quickly,
returning billions of dollars of previously lost productivity
back to the Federal Government.
As demonstrated by years of meeting PAC quality metrics and
supported by continuing reform enhancements, the quality of our
investigation program remains a top priority. We ensure the
quality of our investigations products by actively pursuing
feedback from our customers, maintaining a robust internal
quality and integrity control program, and have invested
heavily in standardizing training and the use of quality tools.
Our strategies to continue to ensure an effective investigative
staff includes targeted training enhancements, a realigned
quality structure, and modernized automation tools and system
support.
OPM's partnership with other Executive Branch agencies
remains one of the most important components of achieving our
strategy for continuous improvement. OPM co-chairs and
participates in a number of Executive Branch working groups,
including the Federal Investigative Standards Working Group,
Quality Standards Working Group, and Data Standards Working
Group, all focused on governmentwide process, quality, and
standardization improvements. In addition, OPM will continue to
work with our Federal, State, and local record providers to
streamline collection methods, standardize record formats, and
work to identify adjudicatively relevant information that will
enhance the content of our investigations.
Last, OPM is engaged in transforming our suite of eight
critical tools that we use to push investigative information. I
am extremely proud of the contributions that OPM has made in
reforming the security clearance investigative process. Through
sustained leadership of this Subcommittee and our joint
partnerships, we have successfully worked through and overcome
huge challenges. OPM looks forward to improving on our
successes as we focus on executing our critical executive
agency responsibilities to sustain the momentum.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
your questions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Miller.
Mr. Sowell, please proceed with your statement.
TESTIMONY OF CHARLES B. SOWELL,\1\ DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR SPECIAL SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Sowell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the progress we have made together on
security clearance reform.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Sowell appears in the appendix on
page 77.
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I am pleased to appear beside our principal partners of
reform who work together to ensure that improvements to
timeliness, quality, and reciprocity are institutionalized and
sustained. Director Clapper continues to give extensive time
and attention to this effort and he recognizes that his role as
Security Executive Agent is key to continuing the significant
progress we have made in transforming the end-to-end security
clearance process across the Federal Government. Clearance
reform truly remains one of his top priorities.
This initiative has enjoyed a unique level of bipartisan
support, and I believe that our success is the direct
reflection of that bipartisanship. We are grateful to this
Subcommittee and particularly to you, Senator Akaka. During
your tenure as Chairman, security clearance reform has thrived.
Today, I would like to focus my remarks on the DNI's
efforts and accomplishments. As the Security Executive Agent,
Director Clapper has a unique responsibility for implementing
comprehensive security clearance reform. And over the past 2
years, we focused our efforts on institutionalizing his
responsibilities in this area.
In August 2011, we issued a policy clarification to
eliminate discrepancies between intelligence community and
national investigative standards which immediately improved
governmentwide reciprocity. Reciprocity is important, because
as this Subcommittee knows well, it eliminates redundancy,
lessens the likelihood of errors, and saves time and taxpayer
dollars.
In March 2012, the DNI issued Security Executive Agent
Directive 1 (SEAD), a first of its kind publication, which
clearly outlines the Security Executive Agent's authorities and
responsibilities across the U.S. Government. SEAD 1 applies to
all departments and agencies. The DNI also led the interagency
efforts to revise the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines
which we expect to issue later this year.
The DNI continues to support the PAC's goals, including
aligning security and suitability, improving quality,
timeliness, and reciprocity. Our most mature oversight function
in support of these goals involves tracking and reporting
security clearance timeliness data from agencies across the
government. Based on this data, in 2009, the DNI began issuing
annual letters to departments and agencies that were failing to
meet these timeliness goals. We believe these letters reflect
oversight best practices. We report the facts, we hold the
agencies accountable, but we do so in a way that encourages
continual improvement and explicitly recognizes progress. In
other words, Mr. Chairman, we have taken a play out of this
Subcommittee's playbook.
Over the past year, we have refined our annual letters and
added periodic reinvestigation timeliness and backlog numbers
to further assist the PAC in understanding agencies' individual
and collective performance.
In January 2012, the DNI sent letters to 46 departments and
agencies addressing their 2011 performance. Twenty-two agencies
met the timeliness goals for all of 2011. Nineteen agencies met
the goals for some part of the year. And only five agencies did
not meet the goals and were directed to provide improvement
plans. And of particular note, four out of the five agencies
which did not meet the goals in 2011 actually improved their
performance throughout the year. We found this very
encouraging, because given the complexity of the security
clearance process and the organizational challenges at play,
even moderate improvements demonstrate a commitment to progress
that we think bodes well.
In addition to his oversight role, the DNI believes we must
be responsive to both the emerging requirements of departments
and agencies and the diminishing resources we all face. To that
end, we hold quarterly Security Executive Agent Advisory
Committee meetings with representatives from across the
government. The meetings are rotated among the participating
agencies and they serve as a forum to present ideas in
innovative policy, technology, and training solutions.
There is still work to do. We continue to focus on ensuring
reciprocal acceptance of existing clearances between agencies.
We have established a reciprocity webpage that provides
education and awareness, a checklist of exceptions, policy
references, and examples of non-reciprocity issues. Measuring
reciprocity is difficult, as this Subcommittee knows, and
despite an abundance of anecdotes, real data is hard to come
by.
To address this problem, we are developing a web-based form
for individuals to submit their experience with reciprocity
issues to the DNI. This will allow us for the first time to
collect empirical data, perform systemic trend analysis, and
assist agencies with achieving workable solutions.
We have also partnered with numerous industry associations
to address longstanding reciprocity issues. Industry is
uniquely affected by reciprocity problems and they have
provided key insight to understanding the potential impact of a
variety of Security Executive Agent efforts to make
improvements.
Director Clapper is intent on creating a strong, effective
Security Executive Agent capability for improving government
operations and efficiencies and we hope that the initiatives we
have outlined today demonstrate that.
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of Director Clapper, we appreciate
your exceptional leadership and dedication to security
clearance reform. I hope our collective efforts and successes
give you reassurance that the time and energy you have devoted
to this important national security capability have been very
well spent. We look forward to the continuing partnership with
our fellow agencies and this Subcommittee as we continue to
strengthen our clearance processes in defense of the Nation.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Sowell.
Mr. Sowell, the absence of standardized governmentwide
training is often cited as the reason that agencies are
reluctant to immediately reciprocate a clearance. As you
testified now, ODNI worked with OPM to develop national
training standards for investigators, which the PAC has
approved. My question to you is, how is ODNI working with
agencies to implement the new training standards across the
government and when can we expect full implementation?
Mr. Sowell. Thank you, Senator. As you mentioned, we have
partnered with the PAC and our colleagues at OPM to develop
investigator and adjudicator training standards. These will be
for both the security and suitability populations. And as you
mentioned, this will be an extremely important element of
improving reciprocity across government.
Where those standards are at this point is they are going
through the review process at the DNI and OPM. The Director of
OPM and the DNI will jointly issue the investigator training
standards and then Director Berry will issue the suitability
adjudicator training standards and Director Clapper will issue
the security adjudicator standards. We expect that those
standards will be issued before the end of summer, probably the
August time frame is our best estimate at this point. And once
those are issued, we will have an Implementation Working Group
with representatives from across government to make sure that
we get that right. That Working Group will form immediately
after the standards are issued.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Let me follow up with a question to Mr. Miller on that.
Will you comment, Mr. Miller, on OPM's role in this process and
on the challenges implementing formalized training standards.
Mr. Miller. Yes. Chairman Akaka, as Mr. Sowell indicated,
we have an interagency working group. In fact, I was the co-
chair of the PAC Subcommittee for Training that helped develop
the training standards. And the focus of the training standards
was to ensure that we had standardization across the Federal
Government relative to training for both background
investigators and security and suitability adjudicators, and
that was to lead to, obviously, reciprocity, which is the key
to reform, to ensure people can move across the government
efficiently, and we have assurances that not only are the folks
conducting investigations doing that to a trained standard, but
also those that are adjudicating are also adjudicating to a
proper standard.
The challenge will be this, getting everyone who does have
training implementation requirements within their agency to
comply with the standards, which will be a role of the
Executive Agents, both suitability and security, to ensure they
meet those standards.
Now, I can tell you personally, within OPM, we have already
implemented the new Federal standards for both background
investigators and suitability adjudicators and are already
training our folks and other agencies to that standard. So we
are not waiting for the implementation guidance to come out to
make sure we move forward.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Let me follow up with a question for you, Ms. McGrath, on
adjudicator training. You testified that DOD initiated the
Adjudicator Certification Program in 2010 and plans to have 90
percent of its adjudicators certified by this fall. Will you
please elaborate on this program and discuss how it dovetails
with the new investigator training standards we just discussed.
Ms. McGrath. Yes, sir. Thank you. As Mr. Miller mentioned,
DOD and the Office of Personnel Management are co-chairs of the
Training Subcommittee that is under the PAC's watchful eye and
the Adjudicator Certification Program that the Department has
put in place has served as the foundation to the national
adjudicator program. So the linkage between the two is very
solid.
Because of the DOD's volume and also our training facility
through the Defense Security Service Training Academy, we have
the ability to bring people through the training program. It is
very important for us to ensure we have reciprocity within our
own enterprise. Therefore, standardization within our own
enterprise is extremely important so that we can have the
reciprocity between our military departments and agencies. And
so we did move out and, as I mentioned, the national standards
are built upon the work that the Department started, but worked
through the Training Subcommittee to ensure that we had not
just the DOD requirements, but also the requirements of the
Federal Government.
And, sir, as you mentioned, we are on target to have 90
percent of our adjudicators complete the certification program
in the September time frame and we will continue to ensure that
all of them do meet those standards and also receive continuing
education after they receive the certification.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Werfel, OPM and the PAC currently track reciprocity,
but the metrics are limited to things like the number of
requested and rejected investigations. My question to you is
are these metrics adequate to get a full picture of reciprocity
challenges, and if not, what additional data will the PAC
collect in the future?
Mr. Werfel. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question.
Clearly, reciprocity is central to the overall effort. I want
to point out, though, as well, that there are broader metrics
that are important that will show progress as we improve
reciprocity generally, and that includes the timeliness
metrics, the quality metrics, reducing backlogs for
investigation and reinvestigation. All of that, I think, is
relevant and a byproduct to a healthier reciprocity policy
across the government.
I also want to point out that there are critical steps that
are underway to improve reciprocity, such as, and probably most
importantly, sharing of information in an automated way across
agencies and investigations to ensure that there is seamless
access that would enable a confidence level to occur to achieve
reciprocity. And, obviously, all of the work that is going on
to align our various policies around suitability and security
clearance and standardize them enables, again, that confidence
level to increase.
In terms of how we measure whether all of this is resulting
in a healthy diagnosis for how reciprocity is being used, we
have a performance metric team in place that is evaluating
different options. One of the metrics that is under development
is the number of reciprocal actions that are occurring by
quarter. I think there are a couple of pieces to it.
On the one hand, you want to understand how often requests
for reciprocity are being requested. You also want to
understand at the back end whether those requests are being
accepted and whether, at the end of the day, you have a
situation in which someone was cleared through reciprocal
means.
I think if you can look at those two pieces of the life
cycle together and then align them with the other broader
metrics that I described around timeliness and quality, you are
going to get to that point where you have a healthy and
comprehensive view of what is going on in security clearance.
But as mentioned, there is work to be done. These metrics are
not yet fully finalized and implemented. But I think we are on
the right trajectory to both define and implement them.
And in the meantime, while I cannot prove it through
mathematics, the availability of data in ways that it has not
been available before, combined with unprecedented performance
on the timeliness metrics that we are seeing continuous
improvement on each quarter, give us confidence that these
efforts to improve reciprocity are starting to take hold. But a
good, sound metric will help us monitor that very closely and
we are working towards that.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Werfel.
As you mentioned, in addition to tracking reciprocity, the
PAC has established performance metrics to gauge the progress
and quality of clearance investigations and adjudications. How
is the PAC using the results of metrics to guide reforms?
Mr. Werfel. Mr. Chairman, a high-level way of thinking
about this reform effort is there are a few key pieces to it.
One is that we are ensuring that we have the right amount of
resources dedicated to reducing the backlog and driving
activity, key points in these processes.
And second, in addition to making sure that the resources
are right to attack the problem, that we are also positioning
ourselves by making sure that our policies make sense to enable
reciprocity and making sure that our information technology is
deployed most effectively. And the metrics are constantly
referred to and looked at in our PAC meetings, in the
subcommittee meetings, to guide those efforts.
We have talked a little bit about the oversight role that
the PAC plays, the fact that DNI has sent letters to those
agencies that are underperforming, the fact that OPM has done
over 60 on-site visits to various agencies to essentially audit
their work. Those decisions are driven by what we see in the
timeliness metrics, trends, underperformance. So in that way,
the entire oversight framework is driven by the underlying
data.
Similarly, as we debate and dialogue exactly how to
structure the investigative standards to ensure the appropriate
alignment, we are again looking at the numbers and what the
underlying data are telling us in order to balance some key
things between quality and timeliness.
So I think you are going to hear a lot today and have heard
a lot today about this being a model. It has the key
ingredients. It has the dedication of resources at multiple
levels, including at a high level. It has a commitment and a
long-term commitment to changing the policies to make them more
fluid in serving a particular objective. And then modernization
and automation are driving everything that we do.
But critical to all of that is the reliance on metrics to
make sure that we are making smart decisions along the way. So,
again, I think all the right ingredients are there.
Senator Akaka. Thank you so much.
Mr. Dodaro, GAO has focused extensively on security
clearance reform since it was placed on the High-Risk List in
2005 and has worked closely with the PAC to address performance
measures for the quality and reciprocity of clearance
investigations and adjudications. Is GAO satisfied with the
PAC's work to address performance measures?
Mr. Dodaro. I think, basically, we were satisfied enough
with the progress that had been made to remove them from the
High-Risk List last year. But, as has been pointed out by every
witness this morning, there are still additional efforts that
need to be attended to going forward.
Principally in the reciprocity area, there need to be
metrics. I agree with Mr. Werfel that reciprocity in the
investigation and adjudication and timeliness all need to be
looked at together to get a comprehensive picture of what is
happening.
So good progress is being made, but it needs to be
sustained and it needs to be improved and continually enhanced
going forward. And as long as there is a process in place, and
we are going to stay focused on watching this evolution as it
takes place, I think continued progress can be made in those
areas.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Dodaro.
Mr. Sowell, in his previous testimony before the
Subcommittee, Director Clapper noted that the Intelligence
Community should be subject to the same quality metrics as the
rest of the Federal Government. To what extent is the IC
collecting data related to these quality metrics and what does
the information show regarding the quality of investigations
and adjudications in the IC?
Mr. Sowell. Thank you, Senator. As you know, the
intelligence community's cleared population consists of more
``top secret'' Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) level
clearances. Those clearances are granted on far more detailed
investigations and adjudications because of the sensitivity of
the data that the people are given access to.
Our data indicates that the quality of those investigations
across the IC is consistent and very good and we are working
with our partners at OPM and across the agencies that have
independent investigative authority. We are exploring specific
metrics for the IC that would give us better insight into exact
quality measures.
I think it is important that anything we do in the IC is
also coordinated closely with the PAC because we want to have
an apples-to-apples comparison as we look at quality data,
timeliness data, reciprocity data, et cetera.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Miller, I appreciate your focus on quality and
completeness in addition to timeliness. I understand that DOD
has implemented the Rapid Assessment of Incomplete Security
Evaluations (RAISE), to flag incomplete investigative reports
and compile data that can be shared with OPM. How does OPM plan
to use the results of RAISE to improve the quality of its
investigations?
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Chairman. We receive feedback from
DOD periodically on the results of their RAISE assessments that
are filled out by their adjudicators as they evaluate an
investigation. In fact, that leadership on the part of DOD in
developing RAISE actually pushed forward the idea of developing
a Quality Standards Working Group, an interagency group, to
assess and put together a standard for the Federal Government
relative to investigations. RAISE, as it is being used within
the Department, is now being looked at as being expanded as a
Federal wide quality assessment tool that can be used for all
investigative service providers, not just OPM, but for those
that have also been granted delegation for investigation. We
co-chair that working group and we are working towards--and
again, using RAISE as the current standard--expanding that to
have a Federal standard for that.
So the feedback is critical. It helped actually identify
some challenges we had relative to current investigative
standards and ensuring that everyone was complying with
standards when they conduct an investigation and this will help
us in the future, as well.
Senator Akaka. Thank you so much.
Mr. Werfel, in your testimony, you state that over 99
percent of clearance application submissions to OPM are now
electronically completed. I commend the PAC's efforts in
leveraging technology to move away from the old paper-based
applications to more efficient processes such as the use of the
Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-
QIP). Why are some agencies still using paper-based
applications? And how does this impact the PAC's efforts to
improve governmentwide timeliness and quality standards?
Mr. Werfel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is both. As
it turns out, it is basic common sense that the automation of
our forms are going to lead to efficiencies, and here that
common sense can be proven with data and real-time information
that demonstrates that where those agencies have moved to an
electronic process, it is just so much more efficient, in time,
in particular.
It is not just that the transmission of the records are
quicker. You also are more guaranteed to have a complete file
because if you are filling it out on paper, you can leave out a
question or put something down that is ineligible or illegible
and the information can be transmitted to the reviewer, and
then all of the sudden they realize they do not have certain
information. They have to send it back. Whereas in an
electronic environment, the system can make sure that before
you have closed out and can articulate that you have a
completed file, that everything is clear and understandable, at
least as it is programmed into the system that we have running
for e-QIP.
And I can go on and on and on about both central and
tangential benefits. And we are trying to carry that message
across to those agencies that have not yet implemented an
electronic means. I think it is just a lot of elbow grease that
is required on our behalf to go in and make sure that the
agencies are focused on taking those critical steps to deploy
these modernized solutions.
I think it is pretty clear what the results are. I think it
is about just pushing to make sure that it becomes a priority.
And I think that is one of the reasons why the PAC has
determined that the type of oversight that we are doing is
appropriate. I work on a variety of different interagency
councils across government and not all of those councils have
deployed this technique of sending representatives from the
council to a particular agency, in particular an under-
performing agency, and to apply that type of pressure and
accountability and technical assistance to make sure that
progress is being made. And the work that ODNI and OPM are
doing is having an impact and the take-up rate has increased
and we expect it will increase over time.
So, ultimately, I think it is very clear that to the extent
the agencies will adopt these electronic means, their
performance will improve. That is both inevitable and certain
and it is proven. For us, it is about staying relentlessly
determined in making sure that these very powerful tools are
implemented. And I think progress is being made.
We referenced the 99 percent statistic and clearly that is
important progress. That does not mean that we are done,
because an agency that is not utilizing these tools is
operating in a non-efficient manner and it is our job to make
sure that we end all of those situations across government.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Dodaro, your statement notes that OPM still converts
electronic applications to paper-based investigation files, in
part because of the small number of agencies without electronic
capabilities. Will you elaborate on this problem and how it
should be addressed?
Mr. Dodaro. Basically, yes. The electronic applications are
received and then converted into paper documents, and the real
solutions to this, I believe, are a couple-fold. Number one is
that some of the smaller agencies could benefit from the IT
investments that have been made in the larger agencies. This
was the point I was making earlier about leveraging existing
technologies, for example, to use DOD's system or some
variation of it rather than try to justify an IT investment for
a relatively small number of cases that may need to be
processed for some of these smaller agencies. So you have to
leverage technology, I think, a little bit more to help the
smaller agencies with systems that are in place that could be
used in their area.
Second, OPM, as I mentioned earlier, is doing a process
study of the efficiencies in their own process, and I believe
that the study, if done properly, can highlight additional
areas where this conversion process may not have to take place
or it should not be as extensive. And I think there are a lot
of opportunities to gain efficiency in those processes by
studying how to tackle some of the time lags that are a part of
this process. It will have multiple benefits in terms of both
improving the timeliness as well as the quality of the
investigations because more information will be able to be
processed in an easier manner than through the manual
conversion.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Dodaro.
Mr. Miller, I understand that OPM has been engaged in a
wide-ranging transformation of its EPIC IT system. During our
last hearing in 2010, I asked Director Berry about costs and
schedule concerns with this project. Would you please update us
on the status of this project and how OPM intends to use these
investments to streamline and automate the clearance process?
Mr. Miller. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The investment that we are
making is critical to ensuring that we remain agile enough to
handle the challenges of the future. We have eight key systems
that we are modernizing and I would like to characterize it as
that old Volkswagen van that we used to all drive that would
always start no matter what the circumstances. We are operating
with a system. It is old, but it has been reliable. And what we
are currently doing is we are updating that system. We are
investing from 2008 until 2014 and so we are a good part of the
way through our deliverables and our investment and we are
seeing, in fact, increased capability. As we deliver new
capability, we have seen new abilities to do new things with
our systems.
We are operating right now on very old software, in
particular, and a great deal of our investment is to update and
modernize that. We literally have to do coding, very detailed,
very costly coding today where we are now incorporating either
government off-the-shelf (GOTS) or commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) products that will advance us more rapidly and make us
more responsive to the needs of our customers.
So by 2014, we will have a new van, a van that will run and
operate and be efficient, and we will no longer have that
additional investment, IT investment that has been occurring
between 2008 and 2014. We will go back to our normal operations
and maintenance (O&M) investment. We are on track.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Ms. McGrath, during our last hearing on this subject, I
asked you about the status of DOD's new clearance IT system
known as the Defense Information System for Security (DISS), D-
I-S-S. Do you have updates on its capabilities, when it will be
fully functional, and how DOD has budgeted for its
implementation and maintenance?
Ms. McGrath. Yes, sir. The DISS, is essentially a family of
systems. There are three main pieces. One, I mentioned in my
opening remarks, the Case Adjudication Tracking System. That
does the case management, which is the movement of the cases
and also adjudicative determinations.
Our Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) is our
legacy system that is the database that houses the decisions
that have been made. That is to be replaced with a system
called the Joint Verification System (JVS). And then to the
extent that we decide as a group to enable an automated records
check capability, that would be the third aspect of DISS.
The CATS piece is fully implemented across our adjudication
facilities today. We are also moving toward a much more
consolidated adjudicative capability across the Department. The
Joint Verification System is targeted for implementation in
2014. The decisions that we make as a Federal group with regard
to the right approach to automated records checks will
determine the implementation of that piece should the DOD be
asked to do that.
CATS and JVS are fully funded and on track within the
Department, and again, CATS being fully implemented.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sowell, national security threats can be posed by
individuals who already have access to classified information.
Timeliness reforms have focused primarily on initial security
clearances. However, attention must also be paid to continuous
monitoring and periodic reinvestigations. How is ODNI
addressing these issues and how does it plan to improve moving
forward?
Mr. Sowell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, the insider
threat is something that we are all very concerned about. As
you can imagine, someone who does not have a clearance does not
have access to the crown jewels. The people who are inside the
system with the access to our most sensitive secrets are the
populations that we are among the most concerned about.
Following incidents over the past few years, we have stood
up the National Insider Threat Task Force and that task force
is looking at policy and technology and training issues that
can all be brought to bear to address the insider threat issue.
Key to addressing that issue, of course, is looking at our
cleared population in a timely manner.
One of the benefits of IRTPA was that it established
timeliness goals for initial clearances, and I think the PAC
leadership, in their wisdom, realized that you cannot just set
timeliness goals for initial investigations. You also need to
look at reinvestigations. So we do have a timeliness goal for
periodic reinvestigations.
I think our challenge is that while agencies are meeting
those goals, there is a problem where you are only being
measured when you submit the periodic reinvestigation through
the process. So if you have not submitted someone for a
reinvestigation, they are not being tracked. And so in his
letters last year, Director Clapper started notifying agencies
that we are going to be in the following year, so for 2012,
measuring their backlog of periodic reinvestigations, and we
think that this will give key insights to both the DNI and to
the Performance Accountability Council on the extent of the
problem and give us some indications of where we need to focus
our efforts and attention.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Miller, GAO recently issued a report on OPM's
investigation pricing structure which identified costs for OPM
personnel and contract employees doing field work as primary
cost drivers. Spending on these contracts has risen rapidly,
from roughly $19 million in fiscal year (FY) 2005 to a peak of
just under $486 million in fiscal year 2010. Please explain any
recent efforts to evaluate OPM's investigative workforce as
well as whether its current size and composition most
efficiently use taxpayer dollars to accomplish that mission.
Mr. Miller. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We are hyper-vigilant about
the expenditures of OPM. We are interested in full cost
recovery. We are not profit driven. And so back in 2005 when
you had tremendous backlogs and Periodic Reinvestigation (PRs)
were not being conducted, I do not think at that time the
government really recognized the cost associated with a current
program. In fact, it had not been current since time could
remember. And so when the program was transferred in 2005,
there is a recognition that we probably have to increase the
field investigative force to as many as 8,000 people. Along
with the backlog and the burden of clearing those PRs that had
not been accomplished, we still had to now meet an Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act requirement of a 40-day
standard.
So whether it is relative to a perfect storm or not, we
combined not only a huge backlog, but we drove investigative
times down. And we also implemented new standards during that
period and we have seen a significant increase in the number of
field work intensive investigations. As I mentioned earlier,
our Top Secret (TS) investigative workload went up 21 percent.
One ``top secret'' investigation is $4,000. A National Agency
Check and Inquiries (NACI) investigation can range from $125 to
$228. So when you see 20 percent of your workload go to the TS
side, you are spending 10, 20 times the amount of money for an
investigation.
So we believe we have a great process in place. We have
competition among our contractors. In fact, this year, our
contractors, due to recognizing the distribution of their work,
began to compete more dramatically on fees and we saw a
reduction of almost 13 percent in the cost being charged to us
by our contractors, which, extrapolated out this year, could
result in a $68 million savings to the government.
So we have a 25 percent baseline Federal workforce, which
is critical. We align those mostly with our DOD customers where
we know we have consistent workload. That is a sunk cost for
us. We are going to pay their pay and benefits. And then as
work needs to be delved out to our contractors, we pay them by
the product they produce.
So we continue to work to drive our costs down. We are
conducting a manpower study to drive our own resources down. In
fact, we have reduced our own manpower footprint on the Federal
side by about 120 personnel this year.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Mr. Dodaro, as you know, I worked with Senator Carper and
others to enact the Government Performance and Results Act
(GPRA) Modernization Act, which encourages a cost-cutting
approach, leadership commitment focus on management, and the
use of performance metrics to achieve better results for the
American people. At our hearing on implementation of the Act
last year, you cited security clearance reform as an example of
the type of progress that could be made using this approach.
What lessons from security clearance reform can agencies apply
to other high-risk areas, and what tools does the GPRA
Modernization Act provide for this type of systemic reform?
Mr. Dodaro. I think the GPRA Modernization Act provides
extensive opportunities to address these type of issues. First,
it enhances consultation requirements with Congress, which I
think is pivotal. I think there is an example in personnel
security clearances of Congress convening a meeting to talk
about performance metrics, to provide input. So I think the
Congressional consultation element of the GPRA Modernization
Act is very important and a good lesson learned, and the
application in this area is a good example of how that could
happen.
Second, it focuses a lot on cross-cutting issues. The
original Act, as you know, in 1993, focused on an agency-by-
agency strategic planning and performance measures. More and
more issues require multiple agencies to work together to
address those issues to achieve an overall outcome. The
security clearance area is another example of where now
agencies are working together and organized properly and
setting goals that collectively need to be met on a
governmentwide basis, and I think more of that needs to be done
and I think the GPRA Modernization Act is a good example of
that.
Third, there needs to be regular reporting. The GPRA
Modernization Act requires quarterly reporting of performance
metrics on a public Web site, and I would hope that perhaps
this area, the personnel security clearance process, can evolve
to that as well, to be more transparent and to provide
reporting requirements. One thing I am a little concerned about
is that the timeliness reporting requirement for this area
lapsed last year from the 2004 Act. And so I think there needs
to be continued regular reporting in this area.
Additionally, the GPRA Act focused really on quality
measures and outcomes and I think that area needs a lot of
attention. The initial focus here, properly so, was on
timeliness. But the real bottom line is, are people getting the
clearances who should be getting the clearances and that is a
function of quality. And I would encourage OPM in their task
force that they mentioned to look at the RAISE tool and expand
it across the government, expedite their work in that area,
because I think quality is really pivotal in this area, and to
continually reset goals. For example, it was mentioned here
that the timeliness goal now for reinvestments is 150 days.
Well, that is more than double the goal for the initial
clearances. Perhaps that goal can be driven down over time
through proper application of GPRA Modernization practices.
So those are a few of the ways that the GPRA Modernization
Act could continue to improve the personnel security process,
as well, as taking those lessons learned and implementing them
more governmentwide in other high-risk areas.
Finally, I would just say that we have been working with
Mr. Werfel and Mr. Zients at OPM in the 30 areas that are
currently on the High-Risk List to have joint meetings to talk
about metrics and how to assess progress going forward. So we
are trying to take the lessons learned from this particular
example and trying to implement them in other high-risk areas.
Ms. McGrath has been involved in the ones at DOD, as well.
Senator Akaka. Well, thank you very much for your
responses.
This is my final question and it is to the entire panel.
What oversight or legislative actions do you believe Congress
should consider to help sustain the progress made in the
security clearance process? I would like to ask Mr. Werfel to
begin followed, by Ms. McGrath, Mr. Miller, Mr. Sowell, and
then Mr. Dodaro. Mr. Werfel.
Mr. Werfel. Thank you, Chairman. It is a very good and
important question. One of the reflections that I have is that
the IRTPA framework worked and worked effectively. It set out a
hard target and it required the Executive Branch to organize
itself to meet that target, but it did not necessarily set out
how the Executive Branch would do so.
What we have borne out of that framework is an integrated
process bringing the right Federal agencies to the table. There
are clear lines of leadership and governance. And as we
mentioned today, there is a good, healthy mix of
accountability, performance, transparency, and a willingness to
reform the processes of government and the technologies of
government to get the job done.
All that being said, it could be very easy, as we have seen
in other areas of government historically, for that performance
to lapse if the type of attention does not sustain it in this
way. My gut tells me that the right approach from Congress's
vantage point is to make sure that the oversight is sustained,
that the hearings continue. It does not actually even have to
be hearings. It could be staff-level briefings. And those
hearings and briefings need to focus and isolate, if possible,
where any of the performance gaps are occurring because there
may be a need for further legislation if either certain
performance gaps that exist today sustain over time or if new
ones emerge.
But I think the overarching framework has worked very well,
and so I think where we want to be is in a place where we are
monitoring for particular systemic problems that may emerge,
and to the extent we can, move quickly to close those gaps,
potentially through legislative solutions. But we have to be in
a monitoring mode and I would urge not to do anything that
would necessarily change some of the guiding elements of the
IRTPA framework that have worked so well, which combined the
combination of a hard target with a certain amount of Executive
Branch flexibility in order to achieve that target.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Ms. McGrath.
Ms. McGrath. Yes, sir, and I would actually echo, probably
fully, Mr. Werfel's comments with regard to IRTPA told us what
in terms of setting the target but did not dictate how and it
gave us the flexibility to establish the Performance
Accountability Council and then drive performance through
oversight of this Subcommittee, the Council, and then the
reporting aspects.
I do think that to ensure Congress is also informed on a
regular basis with regard to performance, we should ensure on a
very routine basis that you have those performance measures. We
do collect them. But at this time, I do not see a need for
immediate legislation, but per Mr. Werfel's point, going
forward, and as we get further into our reform effort, there is
always the opportunity to come back and ask. So thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I would echo Mr. Werfel's
comments, as well. We recognize that through the Chairmanship
of the PAC by OMB there has been great progress in security
clearance reform. And as we recognize challenges as they come
up, the PAC has been aggressive in standing up appropriate
subcommittees like we did for training, as we have for
performance, and as we are talking about doing for record
repositories to ensure that we get a consistent flow of
information across the Federal Government in standardizing
those records so we can obtain them and pass them on to those
that need them.
So I would agree that we need to be vigilant. Persistent
surveillance on performance is critical. And we will report our
continued performance through the PAC.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Mr. Sowell.
Mr. Sowell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with my
colleagues. I do not see the need for additional legislation at
this point, but clearly, continued oversight and attention is
key. I think the combination of the Performance Accountability
Council, the Government Accountability Office, the Security and
the Suitability Executive Agents, and this Subcommittee,
working together to align the security and suitability
processes in every possible way, is where we will get the most
bang for our buck.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Mr. Dodaro.
Mr. Dodaro. Clearly, additional oversight and monitoring is
important. The real question is how to do that. The first area
I would say is in regular reporting. I think in the absence of
additional legislation, given the lapsing of the timeliness
reporting under the 2004 legislation, there should be a
commitment to substitute for that possibly an agreement by the
Administration with Congress on what form that regular
reporting will take place. It could be done through the GPRA
Modernization Act framework support. But I do not think it
should be left to be totally unclear or ambiguous about how
that reporting will take place. And if there is a satisfactory
solution without a legislative outcome then that is fine.
If that solution falls short of what Congress needs to get
regular information, it is important, and I do not think this
area ought to be treated or subjected to lesser requirements
than what the GPRA Modernization Act calls for now in terms of
quarterly reporting, visibility, et cetera, and also to
continue to improve the performance metrics, particularly for
the quality area. I think the quality area is essential to
ensuring that the objective of providing clearances which is to
make sure that people who should not have access to National
Security information do not have access to it.
The other area I think is important is that the Performance
Accountability Council has been created through Executive Order
(EO). And while attention to this area has transcended over the
last two Administrations, there have been slightly different
tactics taken by the different Administrations, and I would say
that would be an area that needs monitoring, as well. And a
number of other areas, whether it is the Chief Financial
Officer (CFO) Council, the Chief Information Officer (CIO)
Council, the Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) Council, there
is a legislative underpinning that provides for transition
between administrations over time. So that is another area that
I think there should be an eye kept towards because the current
configuration has worked well. Hopefully, it will be continued
in the future, but there is no guarantee absent a legislative
mandate.
Senator Akaka. Well, thank you very much.
At this time, there are no further questions. I would like
to thank all of the witnesses for being here today. Your
responses have been great. It will certainly help the
Subcommittee and all of us continue the progress that has been
made at this time.
The security clearance process is a model for cross-cutting
systemic reform. The Performance Accountability Council,
working together with GAO and Congress, has made great strides
and has created a framework for continued improvement. Ongoing
leadership commitment and oversight are still needed if our
accomplishments are to last into the future.
The hearing record will be open for one week for any
additional statements or questions from other Members of the
Subcommittee.
And again, I want to thank all of you for all of your work.
You have been tremendous in bringing the progress about and I
want to wish you well in your work.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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