[Senate Hearing 111-991]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-991
SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM: SETTING A COURSE FOR SUSTAINABILITY
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HEARING
before the
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 16, 2010
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JON TESTER, Montana LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Joyce Ward, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
Lisa M. Powell, Staff Director
Evan W. Cash, Professional Staff Member
Dana Smullen, Minority Staff Director
Kristy Brown, Professional Staff Member
Aaron H. Woolf, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statement:
Page
Senator Voinovich............................................ 1
Senator Akaka................................................ 10
Senator Coons................................................ 12
WITNESSES
Tuesday, November 16, 2010
Hon. Jeffrey D. Zients, Deputy Director for Management and Chief
Performance Officer, U.S. Office of Management and Budget...... 3
Hon. James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Office
of the Director of National Intelligence....................... 5
Hon. John Berry, Director, U.S. Office of Personnel Management... 6
Hon. Elizabeth A. McGrath, Deputy Chief Management Officer, U.S.
Department of Defense.......................................... 7
Brenda A. Farrell, Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office.............. 9
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Berry, Hon. John.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Clapper, Hon. James R.:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Farrell, Brenda A.:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 50
McGrath, Hon. Elizabeth A.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Zients, Hon. Jeffrey D.:
Testimony.................................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 27
APPENDIX
Questions and responses for the record:
Mr. Zients................................................... 68
Mr. Clapper.................................................. 70
Mr. Berry.................................................... 73
Ms. McGrath.................................................. 78
Ms. Farrell.................................................. 79
Background....................................................... 82
SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM: SETTING A COURSE FOR SUSTAINABILITY
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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce,
and the District of Columbia,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:45 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K.
Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Akaka, Coons, and Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Senator Voinovich. [Presiding.] The hearing will come to
order. I have been asked by Senator Akaka to get the hearing
started today. We are very, very fortunate to have a very
distinguished panel of witnesses to talk about a subject that I
have been working on for a long period of time. And to begin
with, I would like to say to all of you I really appreciate the
work that you are doing and your cooperation and your
receptivity to our request that you keep us informed on a
pretty regular basis. And today what we are going to try to do
is find out where we are.
If you will all stand, as is the custom of our
Subcommittee, I will ask you to be sworn. Do you swear the
testimony that you are about to give before this Committee is
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
Mr. Zients. I do.
Mr. Clapper. I do.
Mr. Berry. I do.
Ms. McGrath. I do.
Ms. Farrell. I do.
Senator Voinovich. I am grateful to Senator Akaka for
calling this hearing. Yesterday we were in Akron, Ohio, on
another subject dealing with human capital. And I am grateful
that we continue the review of the Federal Government's efforts
to reform the security clearance process. The Chairman and I
worked a long time together on a bipartisan basis. I try to
remind people that it looks like sometimes we are not
functional or we are dysfunctional here, but there are some
wonderful things that are happening in committees in the
Senate, and Dan Akaka and I have been friends for a long time,
and our agenda has been the same for about 10 years, which is
awesome.
My hope is that enough progress would have been made on
this that you all could say that this is off the high-risk
list. I told General Clapper that you are going to have it off
for next year. I know you will. And I am going to come back
when they have the news conference just to be in the room to
hear it.
We started these hearings back in 2005 to examine efforts
in furtherance of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act, the (IRTPA), as well as efforts to remove the
Department of Defense (DOD) from the high-risk list. But soon
thereafter, we recognized that the problem was not exclusive to
the Defense Department but was instead a government-wide issue,
and it must be addressed collaboratively, such as through the
Joint Suitability and Security Reform Team.
I would like to congratulate the team on the significant
strides it has made in streamlining and improving the
timeliness of the process. According to the data the Joint
Reform Team provided to Senator Akaka and me earlier this
month, in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2010 Executive
Branch agencies investigated and adjudicated 90 percent of all
initial security clearances in an average of 53 days and 90
percent of initial secret/confidential clearances in 45 days,
thus exceeding the 60-day benchmark, with an impressive change
from 2007, just 3 years ago, when it took the Department of
Defense an average of 208 days to process secret clearance
requests for contractors.
While improvement in timeliness of the security process
should be acknowledged, we must recognize that timeliness is
just one aspect of the clearance, and the law necessitates a
number of other actions, including uniform policies regarding
the security clearance process, reciprocal recognition of
security clearances among agencies, and an evaluation of the
use of technology to expedite security clearance processes. I
am particularly concerned about the lack of progress being made
in reciprocity. I still consistently hear from individuals who
have problems with one agency accepting another agency's
clearance.
Another issue that gives me some concern is the information
technology, which is an update of existing technologies,
despite the fact that these technologies are old and outdated
as opposed to the fact that these technologies--purchasing new
technologies would likely better sustain efficiency in the
security clearance process. And, by the way, Mr. Berry, we got
into that yesterday in terms of Social Security and the
technology that you are using in terms of those judges.
Furthermore, lack of timeliness in budget estimates for
technology relating to clearance processes is also a concern
for me. As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has
pointed out for several years now, quality, particularly
completeness of investigative and adjudicative files, has been
a problem. Fortunately, the team has recognized that more work
regarding the security clearance process was needed. In
December 2008, it issued a report identifying its seven-step
approach for reform, including, but not limited to, validating
the need for investigation requests, using automated records
checks to better target investigations, allowing for electronic
adjudication of less complex cases, and continuously re-
evaluating individuals who have been granted clearances.
As requested, the team has provided monthly updates to us,
as I mentioned, and I am also interested in learning about
additional efforts that remain before the goal of security
clearance can be achieved.
I want to thank our witnesses for their participation. I am
honored by your presence today. I do not think that everybody
realizes that this is a top group of people here, and I am
very, very grateful that you thought enough of what we are
doing here to come over and spend some time with us. As we have
the kind of protocol rule at 5 minutes; your testimony will be
put in the record.
I would like to start out with Mr. Zients. We will hear
from you, and, again, thank you for being here.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. JEFFREY D. ZIENTS,\1\ DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR
MANAGEMENT & CHIEF PERFORMANCE OFFICER, U.S. OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Mr. Zients. Thank you, Senator. It is my privilege to
testify in my role as the Chairman of the Suitability and
Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (PAC)--
admittedly, a mouthful--otherwise known as the PAC. Before I
start, I want to acknowledge my colleagues who are testifying
with me today: General Clapper, John Berry, and Beth McGrath.
We have a very strong partnership, and the initiative would not
be where it is today without their leadership.
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\1\The prepared statement of Mr. Zients appears in the appendix on
page 27.
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In keeping with our partnership, we divided up our time
this morning, and I will probably run a little longer than the
5 minutes, but we will make up time as my colleagues will do
brief updates on their specific areas.
Since we last appeared before you in September 2009, the
administration has made critical advances in reforming the
security clearance process. Today I look forward to sharing our
accomplishments and discussing the steps necessary to sustain
our progress moving forward.
For many years, the backlog of security clearances caused
tremendous problems and significant expense for the Federal
Government. In 1994, a Joint Security Commission report noted
that substantial delays in processing security clearances led
to unnecessary costs and risks because workers were unable to
perform their jobs while waiting for a clearance. In light of
these results, in 2005, the GAO placed security clearances on
its high-risk list.
Today, however, much has changed. The Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act, otherwise known as IRTPA, was
signed into law in 2004, challenging the Federal Government to
address longstanding problems that unnecessarily affected the
timeliness and quality of security clearances. As a result of
actions taken to meet the objectives of IRTPA, the average time
for security clearance has decreased dramatically. IRTPA
required that all agencies complete 90 percent of their
security clearances in an average of 60 days. At the time that
IRTPA was enacted, the government-wide average was 205 days. By
December 2009--so about a year ago--90 percent of the
government's clearances were completed within the IRTPA-
required time frame of 60 days. We have met the IRTPA target
every quarter since. In fact, as you mentioned in your opening
remarks, Senator, last quarter 90 percent of security clearance
determinations were completed within 53 days, a 74-percent
reduction from the 2004 level. Moreover, the backlog of
investigations is gone.
Now we must ensure that our progress is sustained in the
future. The Strategic Framework document we submitted to this
Committee in February established the path forward. Today I
would like to emphasize our progress in the most critical areas
within this larger strategic framework.
First, we are aligning suitability and security policies
and processes to limit redundancies in our investigations and
adjudications. To achieve this, we are modifying the regulatory
and investigative standards as well as the information
collection forms that underlie our clearance operations. For
example, in March, we published a revised Standard Form 86 that
will capture the information necessary to enable more cost-
effective security investigations.
Second, we are working to improve reciprocity through
initiatives such as enhanced sharing of relevant investigatory
data among Federal agencies and developing performance metrics
for tracking reciprocity outcomes. Notably, Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) and DOD data are now integrated through a
single interface, allowing agencies to see the data that
underlies existing security clearances when they are deciding
whether to grant reciprocity.
Third, we are improving clearance quality by increasing
access to information and enhancing training. To ensure that
our approach on quality is most effective, we are also
measuring the results. In May 2010, in partnership with GAO, we
reported to you a set of quality metrics, which we will
continue to refine and deploy by early next year.
Finally, we are using enhanced technology to improve
timeliness and reduce the number of unnecessary questions or
the possibility of receiving incomplete forms. We have made
important advances in converting paper-based application
processes to automated solutions such as Electronic
Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP). Notably,
over 98 percent of clearance application submissions to OPM are
now completed electronically.
Although this reform process has achieved many successes,
work still remains to be done. We are making progress in
establishing a five-tier framework for investigations that will
enable greater reciprocity of clearances among tiers of equal
or lower work. We expect this new framework to be released
early next calendar year. Next month, we plan to deploy the new
Standard Form 86 in an electronic format. And, importantly, we
will continue to develop and improve metrics to track
reciprocity and quality.
Throughout this process, three key principles drove our
reform effort.
First, IRTPA set clear, outcomes-based goals, and each
month, the administration delivers to your Committee a report
on our progress relative to these goals.
Second, we hold the appropriate agency leadership
accountable for results. Since I joined the administration, I
have met regularly with my colleagues testifying here today as
well as with their teams who drive the day-to-day effort. The
administration has also used our High Priority Goal Initiative
to hold officials at OPM and DOD responsible for their
respective deliverables.
And, third, the backbone of the reform effort has been
effective partnership. The PAC has helped foster collaboration
among various Federal stakeholders, and the Joint Reform Team
has provided technical leadership, training, and monthly
progress reports. The GAO has offered insightful and important
counsel, and this Subcommittee has held us accountable to the
goals set forth in IRTPA.
In closing, we have made significant progress on improving
the suitability and security clearance processes. In fact, I
believe that this effort serves as a model for our broader
government-wide reform initiatives. I would like to thank you,
Senator Voinovich, for the extraordinary work that you have
done on this issue and for your leadership throughout your
Senate career. I think I speak for all of us in saying we will
certainly miss you.
I would also like to recognize the talented staff who have
been instrumental in the security clearance reform effort, in
particular my Vice-Chair, Beth McGrath, Kathy Dillaman from
OPM, and John Fitzpatrick from the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI). With their hard work, as well as
that of the agency leadership testifying with me today, and the
continued support of this Subcommittee, I am confident that we
will continue to improve the timeliness, reciprocity, and
quality of clearance decisions.
Once again, thank you for the opportunity, and I look
forward to questions.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you very much. I think you have
really done a good job as Director of Management and Chief
Performance Officer.
Mr. Zients. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich. We enjoyed working with you.
Mr. Zients. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich. Our next witness is General James
Clapper, Director of the National Intelligence, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, and, General, we are glad
that you are here today, and we appreciate the fact that you
are continuing to serve your country.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER,\1\ DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Clapper. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. I,
too, am pleased to be here to highlight the progress we have
made on security clearance reform. And as Jeff said, I am also
very pleased to appear beside my principal partners of reform
with whom I have bonded over the last couple years, and that is
Jeff, John Berry, and Beth McGrath, as well as our GAO
colleague, Brenda Farrell, to update you on the work we have
done together to ensure that improvements to clearance
timeliness, quality, and reciprocity are institutionalized and
sustained.
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\1\The prepared statement of Mr. Clapper appears in the appendix on
page 34.
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In both my former role as Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and now as Security Executive Agent as the
Director of National Intelligence, I have pushed this effort
and will continue to do so to transform the end-to-end security
clearance process across the Federal Government. The
intelligence community (IC) is a key player in this, and I
assure you the IC as a whole continues to pay attention to this
as a top priority.
As Jeff mentioned, we are all pleased to note that our
performance continues to meet the timelines set forth in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.
As Security Executive Agent, I continue to support the
Performance Accountability Council's emphasis on sustaining
timeliness performance by hosting Executive Branch-wide reform
briefings where we address agencies' performance and progress.
Together with the Council, we will also continue to develop new
and meaningful performance measures, including reciprocity, and
also assess agencies' progress in adopting reform practices in
the context of their own technology and process improvement
goals.
I would be remiss if I did not recognize the crucial role
that GAO continues to play in keeping the heat on the Executive
Branch for security clearance reform and also on areas they
have identified where more work is required. Reform leaders
have long focused on the goal of removing DOD from GAO's high-
risk list. In this regard, I also want to recognize the value
of this Subcommittee's continued attention to this issue, and
specifically you, Senator Voinovich, for your leadership. You
leave a lasting legacy that will ensure a secure and capable
Federal workforce for the future.
So thanks very much for your efforts to ensure effective
and efficient processes, and certainly when the time comes, we
will stand ready to answer your questions. Thank you very much.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you very much.
Mr. Berry, Director of the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management. John, I remember when we first met, and I thought
you were an eager beaver, and you talked a good game, and I
thought, if he can just do half as good as it looks like he
wants to do. And you have done a very, very good job. I have
dealt with your predecessors, and I am really pleased with what
you are doing and your outreach to other agencies and working
with them. It is extremely important. I do not think that this
country realizes how important your operation is to human
capital, and you have done a very good job, and I am grateful
for your service.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. JOHN BERRY,\1\ DIRECTOR, U.S. OFFICE OF
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
Mr. Berry. Senator, right back at you. It has been an
incredible honor to serve with you, sir, and I appreciate very
much your allowing me the opportunity to hold this position,
and having your support at the beginning meant a lot. You are
one of those leaders who not only, on this issue, is concerned
with the effectiveness and the efficiency of our government,
but your appreciation for the men and women who serve our
country, both in uniform and in the civilian service, day in
and day out. And you are amongst a handful who really
understands and appreciates the importance of their role and
responsibility in our Republic. And you are going to be sorely
missed. On behalf of everyone in the civil service, sir, thank
you for your service to your Nation and for your emphasis on
quality. It has been an honor, and the Nation has been
fortunate for your service.
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\1\The prepared statement of Mr. Berry appears in the appendix on
page 39.
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I am going to try to even be briefer than General Clapper,
sir. I think what this comes down to is four keys. We, in our
piece of this puzzle, have focused very diligently on
timeliness, on quality and accuracy, and on cost, because at
the end of the day we have to bill agencies, and we want to
make sure that we are doing this in a responsible manner.
But I think it is the fourth--and it has been alluded to by
everybody at this table--that has really made the difference on
this, and that is teamwork. None of us could have taken on this
task by ourselves and succeeded. We only did it because all of
the players at this table, and GAO included, really rolled up
their sleeves, recognized the criticality of this issue, and I
think are delivering solid progress for you and for the
country. My promise to you while I remain in this post is that
I will continue to maintain high attention and focus on this
and will continue to be a productive member of the team. As
General Clapper mentioned, we have actually all become, I
think, good friends over this process as well, which also
bespeaks the attention that has been focused.
So with that, sir, I will yield back and look forward to
discussing more in questions.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
kind words.
Our next witness is the Hon. Elizabeth McGrath, Deputy
Chief Management Officer of the U.S. Department of Defense.
Beth, you have played a key leadership role in bringing folks
together, and I am very much impressed with your work and your
leadership. I think that, as I have looked over the last 12
years and I have observed this, if you can get people to work
together and develop good interpersonal relationships, it is
amazing what you can get done. And I think that is what has
happened here, and that is why I think you are doing as well as
you are. And it takes somebody like you to understand that and
keep the team together. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. ELIZABETH A. MCGRATH,\1\ DEPUTY CHIEF
MANAGEMENT OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. McGrath. Senator, thank you very much. As all of the
witnesses have mentioned, the teamwork really has gelled over
the last probably 3 years, so I think General Clapper and I
have tenure in terms of the clearance reform effort. Certainly
it would not compete with yours, sir, but it has been very much
a team effort to enable the progress to have been made, and it
is not just with--it also includes the Government
Accountability Office (GAO).
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\1\The prepared statement of Ms. McGrath appears in the appendix on
page 44.
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I, too, appreciate your continued oversight and interest
and also the opportunity to testify today regarding DOD's
continued commitment to and progress in reforming the personnel
security clearance process.
As the Deputy Chief Management Officer, I am the primary
agent for improving cross-cutting management of the
Department's business activities. Secretary Gates and Deputy
Secretary Lynn have both clearly articulated the pressing need
for departmental reforms that include: Modernization of our
financial management strategy; a different, more streamlined
approach to information technology acquisition; and a
transformed hiring process to get the right talent on board in
a timely manner.
DOD's overarching management agenda is focused on creating
an effective, agile, and innovative business environment that
is fiscally responsible.
The Department has invested a significant amount of
attention and energy on the improvement of personnel security
clearance processes, both within the Department and as part of
the integrated Federal reform effort. As GAO placed the DOD's
Security Clearance Program on its high-risk list in 2005 due to
timeliness issues which included extensive backlogs and
significant delays. Each year since then, the Department has
taken proactive steps and made improvements. This includes
direct leadership engagement, sufficient resources to resolve
risk, a corrective action plan, the presence of a program to
monitor and independently validate effectiveness and
sustainability of corrective actions, and the ability to
demonstrate the implementation of corrective measures. My
written testimony highlights the activities we have undertaken
to improve security clearance cycle times and institute
proactive management and accountability, as well as describes
the actions the Department has taken to address all of the
GAO's high-risk list removal criteria.
To specifically address the issue of timeliness of
investigations, DOD partnered with its primary Investigative
Service Provider, OPM, and together has made remarkable
progress. In 2006, DOD military and civilian clearances
averaged 155 days and industry clearances averaged
approximately 196 days. As has been mentioned, the 2004
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act required all
agencies to complete 90 percent of their security clearances in
an average of 60 days by December 2009. DOD has met that
requirement and has continued to improve.
This remarkable performance is attributable to several
initiatives. The first came from OPM and its ability to
significantly reduce the amount of time needed to conduct the
investigation portion of the clearance process. OPM's proactive
processing steps, coupled with DOD's improved clearance
forecasting capability, enabled effective workload balancing
for both investigations and adjudications.
Next came DOD's transition away from hard-copy paper
reports of investigation to electronic transmission and receipt
of these documents, eliminating the need to deploy trucks to
deliver the investigative packages. This process improvement
alone is estimated to have eliminated up to 15 days of
processing time for each clearance package.
We have also made extensive progress in the quality of our
clearances by focusing on improvements to our policies, use of
information technology, and training for those involved in
security clearance and adjudicative processes. In short, I
believe the Department has taken all the necessary steps to
warrant removal from the GAO high-risk list for personnel
security clearances. Our demonstrated and sustained performance
that exceeds the requirements set by both the IRTPA and the
Performance Accountability Council is evidence of our ability
to demonstrate the implementation of corrective measures. The
decades-old backlog of investigations, which as recently as
October 2006 stood at almost 100,000 cases, has been
eliminated.
I would like to thank Chairman Akaka but also and
especially Senator Voinovich for your leadership and commitment
and strong oversight of this issue. Your continued call for an
efficient, effective Federal security clearance process has
helped bring positive and lasting change to the way we do
business at DOD. I wish you all the best as you prepared to
leave the Senate.
Thank you for the opportunity again, and I look forward to
your questions.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. [Presiding.] Thank you.
Now we will hear from Director Farrell.
TESTIMONY OF BRENDA A. FARRELL,\1\ MANAGING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Ms. Farrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see you
again.
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\1\The prepared statement of Ms. Farrell appears in the appendix on
page 50.
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Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to
discuss DOD's progress on addressing timeliness and quality
with its personnel security clearance process. The recent
unauthorized leak this past year of about 500,000 pages of
classified documents posted to the Internet related to the
ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is an example of the
inherent risk involved when granting an individual a security
clearance. We have testified on clearance-related issues in six
prior hearings that this Subcommittee has had since January
2005 when we first placed DOD's personnel security clearance
program, which represents the vast majority of clearances
adjudicated, on our list of high-risk government programs.
Over the years, we have conducted a broad body of work on
clearance issues that gives us a unique historical perspective.
My remarks today draw on both our ongoing work and prior work
on the personnel security clearance process. My main message
today is that DOD has made significant and noteworthy progress
to reduce delays in granting clearances and taken positive
steps to integrate quality into its investigative and
adjudicative processes.
My written statement submitted for the record is divided
into two parts. The first addresses DOD's progress in reducing
delays in its clearance process. In 2007, we found that initial
clearances for DOD industry personnel took almost a year to
complete. When I testified before this Subcommittee last year,
I noted that DOD had made significant improvements in reducing
delays. However, despite these improvements, we continued to
designate DOD's program as a high-risk area due to more
stringent timeliness objectives that were to take effect later
in the year. As of December 2009, by law the timeliness
objective is for each Federal agency to process the fastest 90
percent of initial clearances within an average of 60 days. I
have good news to confirm. DOD met the 60-day objective for
each of the first, second, and third quarters of fiscal year
2010. GAO's ongoing work will continue to examine the
timeliness for the last quarter.
The second part of my statement addresses DOD's progress in
building quality into the process used to investigate and
adjudicate security clearances. We have stated many times that
timeliness alone does not provide a complete picture of the
clearance process. For example, in our prior work, we estimated
that with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated
in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM
investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to grant
clearances. Today I am pleased to report that DOD has taken a
number of positive steps to integrate quality into OPM's
investigative process and its adjudicative process, including
issuing guidance and developing tools to measure quality. For
example, in March 2010, DOD issued guidance to clarify when
adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports as the
basis for granting clearances.
In addition, DOD created two electronic quality assessment
tools to track the quality of investigative and adjudicative
documentation. These tools are embedded in a DOD tracking
system used by all non-intelligence DOD central adjudication
facilities. However, these tools have not been fully
implemented. GAO's ongoing work continues to examine the
implementation of these tools.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we are strongly encouraged by
the progress that GAO has made over the past few years. The
progress that has been made with respect to the overall
government-wide reform efforts would not be made possible
without the committed and sustained leadership of Congress, in
particular this Subcommittee, and by the senior leaders
involved in the Performance Accountability Council. Their
continued oversight and stewardship of the reform efforts is
the cornerstone to sustaining momentum and making future
progress.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I will be happy to
take questions when you are ready.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Director Farrell.
I want to welcome this panel to the Subcommittee and also
thank my brother and good friend, Senator Voinovich, for his
leadership here, and we will begin here with my opening
statement. I am also going to call on our newest Member to the
Subcommittee, Senator Chris Coons, for any remarks that he
would like to make after my statement. Then we will return to
the questions.
Just over 5 years ago, in 2005, this Subcommittee held its
first hearing on the Department of Defense's personnel security
clearance program after the Government Accountability Office
designated the program as being at high risk for waste, fraud,
abuse, or mismanagement. Today, we hold our seventh hearing on
security clearance issues, and I am pleased to say that we have
seen tremendous progress throughout the course of our oversight
work.
Delays in the clearance process began over 20 years ago. By
the time this issue was added to the GAO high-risk list, DOD
industry clearances took over 300 days on average to complete.
Ongoing delays led to a backlog of hundreds of thousands of
investigations and adjudications.
Today, as we will hear from our panelists--and we have
heard from our panelists--the backlogs are gone and timeliness
is within the goals laid out in the 2004 Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act: less than 60 days total for most
investigations and adjudications.
The other key aspect of the high-risk designation is
investigation quality. Until recently, GAO noted that
incomplete investigation files were routinely sent to
adjudicators, who would either send them back to OPM or
adjudicate them with incomplete information. Unfortunately,
there was no way to monitor or measure investigation quality.
I am pleased that earlier this year, in response to a
letter from Senator Voinovich and me, GAO and the Executive
Branch worked together to identify metrics that would be
consistent with GAO's recommendations on quality.
Overall, I have been pleased with the work of the
Performance Accountability Council to address the high-risk
designation and to modernize and streamline the security
clearance process. We will continue to rely on its work to
sustain the progress and momentum for reform in the future.
Despite the progress, however, there are remaining issues
and challenges that I believe are crucial to successfully
reforming the clearance process. The information technology in
place, especially at the Office of Personnel Management, must
be modernized to support 21st Century capabilities--as is
common across the private sector and other government agencies.
I look forward to hearing more about this and OPM's enterprise
architecture modernization project.
Additionally, it seems reciprocity may be still an issue
between certain agencies. The intent of several Executive
Orders on this issue is clear: Agencies need to work together
to accept clearances from other agencies. This will allow
national security positions to be filled more quickly with
right people in the right jobs. Reciprocity for employment
suitability may need to be addressed as well.
Senator Voinovich and I introduced legislation to
institutionalize these reforms to the security clearance
process. Our bill, the Security Clearance Modernization and
Reporting Act calls for strategic planning, expanded timeliness
reporting, and a more formal establishment of the PAC.
I also look forward to GAO's next high-risk list update in
the coming months to see where this issue stands. Regardless of
whether it remains on the list, I think that we can all agree
that there has been outstanding progress.
The progress is in no small part a testament to strong
congressional oversight, which is key to making the Federal
Government more efficient, more effective, and more responsive.
I have been proud to work with Senator Voinovich on these
issues over the years, and I will continue our oversight
efforts in the future.
As evidenced by our distinguished panel here today, this
particular issue has enjoyed high-level leadership attention,
and I hope your work will serve as a model for addressing other
high-risk areas and management challenges.
We are very pleased to have the Acting Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) Director, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the OPM Director working so closely together
with this Subcommittee.
I am also honored to have my brother and good friend
Senator Voinovich by my side as we hold this, one of our last
hearings together. He has been a leader on this issue, as he
has been on many other complicated management challenges our
Nation faces. Again, I want to thank him for all of his work on
these issues over the years, and I thank our entire panel for
being here today.
I would like to now call on newest Member, Senator Coons,
for any remarks that he may have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COONS
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Chairman Akaka, and my
purpose today is to join you in this hearing, in part to
continue the good work of Senator Kaufman of Delaware, in whose
shoes I attempt to stand today. This is my first day on the job
as a U.S. Senator. Thank you, Chairman Akaka, thank you,
Senator Voinovich, for what from the testimony today has
clearly been an effective and engaged job of oversight, and
thank you to all the panel members today for demonstrating in
response to both the identification of issues by the GAO and
repeated and effective engagement by this group in a
collaborative process that identified critical steps forward,
set metrics, and then, in the course of several hearings and
several years of difficult work, reduced what was a critical,
longstanding backlog in a way that improved efficiency, reduced
costs, and delivered an outcome that is important to the
security of our Nation.
I am glad to join you in today's hearing and look forward
to working with you in what time I have left on this Committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Well, thank you. You are certainly welcome,
and I look forward to working with you.
We will begin now with the questions. Ms. Farrell, last
year, Senator Voinovich and I sent GAO and members of the PAC a
letter asking GAO and the PAC to work together to address
performance measures for quality of clearance investigations
which have been suggested by GAO.
My question to you is: Was GAO satisfied with the resulting
response from the PAC regarding these measures?
Ms. Farrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, GAO was
satisfied with the result. There had been a great deal of
collaboration that we witnessed among the players that you have
already acknowledged here, and we have been pleased to see that
collaboration continue even with the change in the
administration almost 2 years ago.
The metrics, the 15 metrics that resulted in the letter to
you and Senator Voinovich, we have evaluated those against what
we consider successful--indicators of successful performance
measures. There are at least nine criteria that GAO has
identified in prior work that we have used to measure
performance measures against to see if they are showing
success, and those consist of, for example, being quantifiable,
having measurable goals, aligned with an agency's goals,
reliable, independent, free from bias so that an independent
party can make the same determination using those performance
measures, as well as interim goals with measures to show
progress as the transformation is playing out.
We found that most of the performance measures had some of
the criteria as well as baselines and goals for 2010 and 2011.
The PAC, once it decided that quality was a high priority,
moved very quickly, I think, to develop these and put a plan in
place with some guidelines that can be used as measurement. So
we are very pleased with what the result was, sir.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for that response.
General Clapper, I want to follow up with you regarding
performance measures. Some elements in the Executive Branch,
including the intelligence community, do their own
investigations rather than using OPM.
How will the quality measures apply to these elements? And
does the PAC plan to standardize quality standards across all
executive agencies?
Mr. Clapper. Well, sir, it would be my view that whatever
performance metrics we agree on for the community would apply
across the board regardless of who does the investigation or
how it is done. And I say this since I signed up to those
standards in my last job, so it would be a little difficult for
me to fall off that position, so absolutely.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Director Berry, DOD has initiated the Rapid Assessment of
Incomplete Security Evaluations (RAISE), a tool to track and
complete investigation files. This tool measures investigation
completeness after OPM has delivered its investigation file.
Does OPM have a system for ensuring the completeness of its
own investigations? And how do you resolve investigations that
customers identify as incomplete?
Mr. Berry. Thank you, Senator. It is great to be here with
you again today on this important issue.
The answer is yes, absolutely, we have in place such a
system. Kathy Dillaman, who is my Associate Director, who
manages this project for us on a day-to-day basis, has put in
place, consistent with the Department of Defense's systems and
these measurements that we've worked out jointly with GAO, a
couple of ways to sort of triple-check and have some backstops
that we can know what we can rely upon.
Most urgently, we put in place an immediate direct line
ability for DOD to be in touch with sort of a fast call
complaint issue so that Kathy can have at her--she knows
exactly where shortfalls are happening, and so we can decide
whether they are the result of factors that are beyond our
control. For example we cannot resolve some cases if there is
an ongoing criminal investigation or a court case. We know that
is one--we are obviously not moving forward with that, but
there are others that might be a trend indicator. And so one of
the most important things we have is for Kathy to be able to
carefully monitor through all of that feedback system so we can
identify where there might be a weakness that we need to
immediately address in our investigations.
In addition, we are moving forward with upgrading our
automated systems so that we can share information in an
electronic format. And that is one we have made substantial
progress to date on. We have a long way to go. We are
probably--as I say, you have to balance costs to the customer
to make sure that we can do this. We have eight components in
our IT system, and all eight are being upgraded as we speak.
And those will also greatly assist us in--as we pass this
information back and forth, we are able to do that in a much
quicker time frame, sir, so that we can get those complete
cases, back and forth in such a way that the adjudication by
the agency can be made off of a complete file.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
I would like to follow up with a question to Director
Zients on this, and I would like to hear from you as well. Do
you believe tools should be developed at other agencies that do
not have the same tools?
Mr. Zients. Yes, although I am hesitant to say that they
need to be developed, as we have developed good tools at DOD,
at OPM, and what we should be doing is taking those tools and
other best practices beyond technologies and transferring those
to the smaller-volume agencies so that we can get the same
efficiencies and quality gains that we have achieved at DOD.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich, your questions.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Again, thank
you for holding this hearing. We have one more.
When Senator Akaka and I met with the Joint Reform Team at
GAO in the spring, I expressed concern about the lack of
information regarding budget plans and funding needs for the
reform effort. In the past, GAO has suggested that the Joint
Reform Team provide Congress with ``long-term financing
requirements for security clearance reform.'' With long-term
funding requirements--and during last year's hearing, Senator
Akaka and I specifically asked for such information and
expected to see it in the Security and Suitability Reform
Strategic Framework. However, the framework States, ``Resources
from DOD and OPM are sufficient to enable implementation of the
transformed process designed for the mainstream elements of the
process.''
Do you have the resources to continue to do the job that we
have asked you to do? And, second, is this issue of continuing
resolution and the omnibus bill or whatever we get, what impact
is that having on your ability to do this work?
So that is two questions. In your budgets currently do you
have the money? In the budget that is proposed, is the money
there for you to get the job done? And are you being thwarted
right now in terms of some things you would like to do because
of not being confident as to when this budget is going to be
passed, appropriations are passed?
Ms. McGrath. So I can----
Mr. Zients. Please.
Ms. McGrath. Our position on the funding has not changed
from what we provided the Department--between the Department
and the Office of Personnel Management, we believe we have
sufficient resources to sustain.
I will indicate that the information technology that the
Department is developing, primarily the DISS, the DISS Program,
the Defense Information Security System (DISS), does have a
Program Objective Memo (POM)-12 request that will ensure that
we have sufficient development dollars. It has not yet been
locked, but I do believe that we will have that. It was
previously not funded in 12.
Having said that, we are not impacted by the continuing
resolution. The work we have in the budget for 2010 and 2011 is
continuing. It is not a new start; therefore, we are not
impacted specifically by the CR.
And then from the long term, we also have sustainment
dollars that are in the budget to ensure that we can sustain
the programs. And as Mr. Zients mentioned earlier, many of the
information technologies that we are developing within the
Department are portable, if you will, to other organizations.
We are ensuring that we have the proper contracting language so
that these can be utilized by other Federal agencies so we are
not developing new systems, that we are leveraging existing
technologies.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Berry.
Mr. Berry. Senator, I would underscore what Beth is saying,
especially from our information technology (IT) needs, which
obviously the systems that we discussed we need to upgrade over
the next period of time. We have been able to keep our rates--
which is obviously what we charge the agencies for the
investigations. We have not exceeded the cost of inflation, so
we have been able to sort of keep our customers happy but build
into that approach sufficient resources necessary to upgrade
the technology as we move along. And so, for example, right now
almost 70 percent of our fingerprints are done electronically.
That has been a significant time saver for us, and we look
forward--we are not going to be happy until that number
continues to increase, but it is great and a great example of
how we have been able to bring the technology forward.
Right now, 98 percent of all the submissions are done
electronically, so a lot of the speed which you have seen in
these has been in the IT solutions that we have been able to
bring online over time with this. And because we have been able
to build a budget that provides for the upgrade of each of
these eight components of that IT system, we believe we have
the resources both now and in the future to stay on track with
the objectives that we all share.
Senator Voinovich. I think one of the really important
things about this endeavor is that--General Clapper, you
understand how important it is, and I think I would be
interested--and you do not have to do it today, but I would
really be interested in--you are making this effort, and I
would like your--we are spending more money, but the issue is
we are becoming a lot more efficient. And the impact that it is
going to have, security clearance and having this move the way
it is supposed to in terms of the warfighter and other people
that--security and how important it is that we get this system
to where it should be. And I think you are going to have to do
a lot more of that because of the tight financial situation
that you have. And I think that--I know you are all busy, but
as much as you can do that and share that with Congress, I
think the better off all of us are going to be.
Now, Ms. Farrell, I congratulate you. You are working with
the team. Obviously, you have a good interpersonal type of
operation here. And I want it off the list. Do you think it is
possible that--I think you put out your high-risk list in,
what, February of next year?
Ms. Farrell. Maybe January.
Senator Voinovich. There is a possibility that it could be?
Could you list maybe the one or two things--let us say two
things that you think really need to be addressed if that were
to occur?
Ms. Farrell. Yes, sir. The Acting Comptroller General,
soon-to-be Comptroller General, will make that announcement in
January of next year, hopefully, and I believe the written
statement does reflect a lot of the significant and noteworthy
progress that DOD has made toward actually implementing actions
that we are evaluating to make that high-risk determination.
Sometimes we will take a program off of the high-risk list and
we will keep monitoring it always, but sometimes we have to
reapply that designation. Hopefully, it will not happen in this
case if personnel security clearances are removed. But it has
happened. The decennial census is an example of one that has
been on and off, on and off.
DOD has been very responsive, again, to our
recommendations, and it is not just our recommendations that we
look at. It is other solutions that they are putting in place
regarding timeliness and quality.
We have seen great progress with the timeliness and the use
of IT that you have already discussed, and I think the main
message today is the progress being made to develop metrics
which can be used to measure the documentation.
Senator Voinovich. And you all agree on the metrics?
Ms. Farrell. Yes, we do. We saw those before they were
submitted to you, and we have--at that time we had not done a
complete evaluation against our criteria, but we had a number
of conversations to help facilitate the development of those
metrics.
We are looking--and I am not in a position to say it is
coming off or staying on, but obviously there is progress, as
you have noted. Whether it stays on or off, I do not think--we
should not forget how much progress and how far DOD and the
other agencies have come over the last 5 years. It is truly
noteworthy.
We will continue to monitor the implementation of the tools
that I mentioned in my opening, the tools that are going to be
used or are being used for investigations and adjudications.
Those tools are not fully implemented. There is some more
information that we want to work with DOD and OPM regarding
those tools' deployment as well as what is the process in place
for continuous evaluation for the results of those tools.
Senator Voinovich. Do you think they have the budget to get
the job done? They both said that they thought they did, but
how do you feel about that?
Ms. Farrell. DOD does have a large budget. I think one of
our concerns has been that as we are moving into more and more
tightening of dollars, what is going to happen to that large
budget, not only at DOD but at the implementation of some of
these IT projects at the smaller agencies? We have heard
concerns from agencies outside of DOD about how they will be
able to keep pace with the technology and be responsive.
We still believe that identifying long-term funding for all
of the reform efforts would help, especially as the money
becomes tighter and congressional decisionmakers such as
yourself have to prioritize.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
Senator Coons, do you have any questions?
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Akaka.
If I might, Ms. McGrath, you had spoken previously that the
Department of Defense was working to achieve some cost savings
through the streamlining of its processes. Have you, in fact,
achieved some cost savings? I understand the necessary pressure
for increased appropriations in order to implement some of
these reform moves. But have you been able to realize cost
savings in the adjudication process for security clearances?
Ms. McGrath. Senator, thank you for the question. All
along, this reform effort has taken an approach of one that
puts policy, process, and information technology in the same
conversation in addition to cost savings, performance
management, and leadership engagement. And so all of those
attributes must be present, I believe, in order to have an
effective outcome. And I think what you have heard today is
exactly that, and specific to the cost savings question, if you
do not put the policy, process, and information technology as
part of the answer, then I think you are falling short of the
overall outcome.
And so from specifically the electronic adjudications that
the Department has implemented for clean secret cases, where
you have a very clean case, it is coded that way, and the need
for a human adjudicator to take a look at a very simple case
was not necessary based upon business rules and data standards.
We have taken that step using again, policy, process, and
information technology. We processed last year over 73,000
cases utilizing this e-adjudication capability. And, again,
before we launched on the information technology, we ensured we
had the appropriate standards and business rules, and we also
did a 100-percent audit for 6 months to ensure that we had the
process right. And so with that, we certainly have saved
dollars but, more importantly, increased productivity in the
use of our professional adjudicators, put their time and
attention on those cases that needed it more than those.
Mr. Zients. Might I chime in on cost? I think Beth is
exactly right. We are getting better and better, both in terms
of cost and quality. But I think if you really want to think
about the cost here, it goes beyond the process to eliminating
the backlog and going from 200 days down to 60 days, which
allows us to get thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of
thousands of people more productive in protecting our national
security interests.
So I think we need to be cognizant of the cost, and we
should be using information technology to drive costs down of
the process and to improve the quality at the same time, which
I think can be done. I think they are correlated. At the same
time--and we at OMB will be very careful on this front--we do
not want to be penny-wise and pound-foolish because the main
productivity gain here and national security gain is by
ensuring we never have a backlog again and by ensuring that we
get it done within the 60 days.
Senator Coons. That is right. Thank you for that point. So,
in other words, if you are saying a look at total cost is not
just a per transaction cost, but the total benefit to the
public, to the national security----
Mr. Zients. And I think the latter is much more weighted.
Senator Coons. In many ways. What are some of the reasons--
--
Mr. Clapper. Senator--oh, excuse me. I was going to, if I
might just add to that.
Senator Coons. Certainly.
Mr. Clapper. One of the underlying features of the whole
security clearance reform process is actually to reduce the
need for investigations as a standard uniform requirement and
do it on a selective, focused basis. So that in itself, I
think, will over time--as we implement that feature will accrue
great savings.
At the same time, we are all concerned about forthcoming
budget pressures, and I think it is clear, at least as far as
the intelligence community is concerned, that we are going to
become smaller and we are going to have a lot less reliance on
contractors. So the demand here, even though we are going to
have less funding, so the demand for investigations and
clearances is also going to go down proportionally.
I can attest, having spent some time in industry for about
6 years in one of my sojourns back out of the government, to
the huge impact this has on industry in the amount of lost
time, which for a company is money, in waiting for clearances.
So in a sense, there are opportunity costs there that I think
are huge by virtue of implementing, fully implementing this
process.
Senator Coons. Having had that experience previously in
private industry, I agree with you.
What are some of the reasons that even today there might
still be a lack of documentation about adjudication in these
cases, Ms. McGrath?
Ms. McGrath. Although it seems as if an adjudication should
be an adjudication, it is not. And every adjudicative decision,
what we talk about, we tend to commingle a hiring adjudicative
decision and also then a clearance adjudicative decision, and
then the different levels of adjudications that take place. So
what decisions are you making? What information do you need?
And how trained are you and how much risk does a particular
case have with it based upon the clearance level that you are
granting? A secret case would have less risk than a top secret
case, or a moderate-risk public trust position certainly is a
lesser risk than a high-risk public trust position.
So I go through that level of detail to make my point that
adjudication is not exactly the same as you go through.
Therefore, we rely on many things to ensure that the right
adjudicative decision is made. At the end of the day, that is
what we are looking for. We want appropriately trained
adjudicators having the right information to make the right
decision. And so depending on the case, that information may or
may not be slightly different. If the national standards
indicate that you must look at all, prior history of 10
employment organizations and you get 9 of 10, technically that
might be an incomplete investigative package. But if it is 9 of
10 and you have a seasoned investigator, you can make that
decision.
So the risk really is, I am going to say, somewhat on a
case-by-case basis, recognizing that we want to drive standards
as much as we possibly can, ensure that the different types of
investigations or clearances, be it on the hiring side or the
clearance side, build upon each other so that the adjudicator
has all the information he or she needs to make the appropriate
adjudicative decision.
Senator Coons. Thank you for your responses.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your questions,
Senator Coons.
Director Berry, I understand that OPM has been working on
transforming its investigation IT systems known as EPIC. The E-
Gov Office has ranked this investment as a 4 out of 10,
indicating poor performance related to cost and schedule. Your
Chief Information Officer (CIO) describes the project as in a
``mixed life cycle.''
Would you please update us on the status of EPIC, the
anticipated costs, and when could we expect to see a new IT
infrastructure?
Mr. Berry. Yes, Senator, if it is OK, we will get you the
specifics on the costs for the record. What we have, sir, is a
system that is not sort of one monolith. It is a system that
has eight components to it, and we are working on all eight in
terms of upgrading them.
Right now, we have a game plan that will provide for the
updating of them within our cost structure to the agencies,
staying within budget, over the next 3 years. And so we feel we
are on schedule for that, and we are doing--we are happy with
where we are at the time, recognizing we need to continue on
with this and will not be happy until all of them are where we
need them to be.
But just to give you an example, sir, of one of the most
important components--and I think it is one of the ones that
also goes to the efficiency Senator Coons was discussing. We
have a central verification system that allows us to automate
the file, essentially the investigative history, so the
adjudicator can see exactly where we are and what pieces may be
missing.
Right now, there are over 258,000 active cases on this
system that is linked in what has been, I think, a major step
forward with DOD's Joint Personnel Adjudication System. And so
there are potentially over 3,500 people around the world who
are adjudicating these issues and need to call up a case to see
and, make sure they can make an appropriate judgment. And right
now, because we have been able to integrate those systems, they
can now do that, and that has been one of the leaders in terms
of increasing our time and accuracy.
We continue to move forward on all of these. Each of these
components--for example, one of the systems we talked about is
electronic fingerprints. That is one of the eight sub-units, if
you will, getting that data. Getting background checks from
State and local law enforcement agencies has been one that has
been a major step forward. That used to take weeks. It is now
done in 3 to 4 days. And it is because we have been able to
upgrade that system and integrate it with 50 different State
systems across the country.
So you can see, as each one of these components of those
eight components--and we for the record can break down each of
the eight for you. But I feel we are making good progress. It
is bearing fruit. The fruit is being borne in the numbers that
we are reaching. And we can do this within the budget that we
discussed, that you mentioned, Senator Voinovich. And anytime
that we have a savings, the savings is folded into the
technology. And then our customer, DOD, obviously the largest,
has agreed with us on that, put that money into those IT
systems so that we can continue the forward progress. And so I
think we are on the right track, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you so much for that response.
Ms. McGrath, DOD also has been in the process of replacing
its current clearance IT system known as Joint Personnel
Adjudication System (JPAS) with a new system knows as the
Defense Information System for Security.
What is the status of this system, its funding, and what
capabilities will DOD have after it is implemented?
Ms. McGrath. JPAS is currently scheduled for sunset or
retirement in mid-2013. That includes a 6-month parallel
processing if we need it. So our plan is to deploy the Defense
Information System for Security in total by the end of 2012,
and we will run JPAS in parallel for 6 months. So we will cut
over essentially at the end of 2012. It, too, is a family of
systems. I do not think it has quite eight parts to it, but it
has the access to the information, documentation of
adjudicative decisions that have been made. We are including
the Case Adjudication Tracking System (CATS), in the family of
systems so that you have somewhat of an end-to-end process
within the DISS program. We are leveraging the information
technology, deploying it across the Department, so from a low
side, an unclassified perspective, we have singled in on a
single solution for all of our central adjudication facilities,
both in IT and then the policy and process, so that it acts as
if it is a single unit.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Director Zients, all of OMB's reform team partners--Office
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), OPM, and DOD--
are updating various components of their respective clearance
IT systems. The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act called for a
single clearance verification database which, as I understand
it, has not been fully implemented. I would like to hear from
you, as head of the PAC and the Director for Management at OMB,
what is being done to ensure that IT investments are
coordinated across the clearance community and that systems
work together.
Mr. Zients. On the actual clearinghouse, or having one
database, I think we have effectively integrated, as Beth and
John talked about, their major databases, and that coupled with
scattered castles is the IC community, the intelligence
community, has accomplished the same goal or outcome that we
were looking for in IRTPA.
So I think as to a single clearinghouse, while we have not
merged all the databases by putting in front-end search
capabilities, we have achieved in a very cost-effective way
while protecting national security interests the same outcome
that we were looking for.
Overall, I think that IT here in the security clearance
process, as is true across government, offers the promise to
increase efficiency, timeliness in this case, and quality all
at once if indeed we manage these projects well. So it is a
major push at OMB working with the E-Gov Office and our Federal
CIO, Vivek Kundra, to make sure that projects are appropriately
scoped, that we are using developed software and avoiding
proprietary development where appropriate, and holding these
projects to clear milestones and deliverables along the way.
Too often these projects historically have had years before any
deliverable was planned or executed upon. We are bringing all
that forward. That basic philosophy we are applying, as you
heard in Beth's and John's statements, to the IT work that we
are doing for security clearance, which I think is going well,
holds a lot of promise for further efficiencies and quality
improvements. And as I stated earlier, we are going to take
what is working at the major agencies and transfer that across
government.
Ms. McGrath. Sir, if I might add, through the oversight of
the Performance Accountability Council, we have asked each of
the Federal agencies, in addition to the ones that are here, to
bring forward their implementation plans for clearance reform
and to identify budgets that are required for implementation,
information technology, and to make available, as I previously
mentioned, pre-existing or existing information technology like
we are deploying at the Department.
The Department of Energy has taken us up on that offer to
date, and there are others that are interested, so that we are
not creating duplicative information technology capability
across the Federal space; rather, we are leveraging existing
capability. And it is through the oversight of the PAC that we
are achieving that.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Berry.
Mr. Berry. Mr. Chairman, I would just add that I think what
was also an item of foresight of the Committee when you created
this program was conferring on us the revolving fund authority
that allows us to essentially operate very much like a business
where we charge the customer for the product and have to meet
schedules, meet budgets, etc. And that revolving fund authority
is why, Senator, I think, when we answer your question of do we
have the resources necessary to do the IT upgrade, at least
from our component, our piece of this, we do because----
Senator Voinovich. You charge them.
Mr. Berry. You have given us the ability to recoup that.
But as I say, we have never exceeded the cost of inflation. So
we are trying to be careful with that authority that you allow
us working with our customer.
Senator Akaka. Director Berry, as the SF-86 form used for
applying for a clearance was recently updated. Director Zients
said in his statement that the electronic form of the new SF-86
will be released soon.
What new capabilities will this new electronic form have
over the current e-QIP system? And why is the new electronic
form only now being deployed?
Mr. Berry. Sir, we have had the form. It has been deployed.
What we are doing is updating it with the changes that we have
made to the form that the team has worked out. And we are on
schedule to have those changes online by the end of the year,
in December. And so we are on schedule and on budget with that
update.
So it is really a refresher, sir, of an electronic form,
but we have made changes to it regarding--through the team
here.
Ms. McGrath. If I could add, the most significant
enhancement--there are two--to the Standard Form 86, the form
itself was approved back in the March time frame, and the
deployment that Director Berry is mentioning is the deployment
of that form through the e-QIP solution, which is on schedule
for implementation in December of this year.
The two main attributes of this particular form are the
branching questions. If you will recall, back in the 2007 time
frame when we looked at the end-to-end process, part of what
would make the process better than what we do today is
collecting more information earlier in the process. And the
applicant is the most productive source of information, so
asking those questions as part of the application process was
felt by everybody that was the best way to initially achieve
the collection of that information. So we revised the form to
include branching questions, much like Quicken does, if you are
familiar with that software tool. If you answer one way for
something, it takes you down a series of questions, and that is
what the electronic form would do.
The other piece is we revised the consent piece. If you
will also recall, part of the reform process looks and asks for
at the end of the process more of a continuous evaluation to
manage the cleared population. In order to do that, we had to
change the consent form, the existing consent form on the SF-
86.
So those are the two main changes that are being made, and,
again, the information technology, the e-QIP upgrade is on
schedule for deployment in December.
Mr. Berry. And, Mr. Chairman, as you can imagine, what Beth
just described takes a lot of programming, and there are over
100--there are hundreds of screens through this branching that
have to be developed and programmed to implement, which is why
it has taken from March until the end of this year to get this
done. And we have to test it, obviously, to make sure it works
and is rigorous. But right now I am told we are on schedule
with it, and it is looking good.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was just thinking about all of this information that you
are able to get today, and for a long time, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has been trying to get like four areas
of information. We were trying to get the States to have better
driver's licenses to get information, and one of the reasons
why we have not been able to really crack down on them is
because the information that they need is not available to
them. And I was just thinking, through what you are all doing
here, its applicability to perhaps dealing with their problem
so that we can do a better job on the State level in terms of
these licenses that are being granted to individuals. That is
the big-picture stuff for your shop.
The other thing is there is reciprocity. It is still a
problem. Ms. Farrell, do you think we are making--what is the
stumbling block there? Because I still get complaints from
folks about the reciprocity, and that is a big deal because
that--if somebody moves from one agency to another agency and
they just sit there and cannot do things until they--even in my
own office, people have come to work for me; they have
clearances, and they have to go through the whole thing all
over again in order to come into a meeting with me.
Ms. Farrell. Senator, I believe everyone has a story, as
you are conveying, about a neighbor or a friend or a family
member that has had a security clearance but for some reason it
does not transfer when they go to another agency. We have noted
that perhaps the quality of the investigations or adjudications
could be an underlying cause for reciprocity when it not
working the way the law intended.
We do have work ongoing that is looking at reciprocity.
That work should be completed by the end of this year. Prior to
that work, there had not been a GAO study or another study that
we are familiar with that actually gave data on is reciprocity
a problem or not. What is the extent to which it is a problem?
Senator Voinovich. The thing is that part of the problem
that we have had is that some agencies just refuse to do it. In
other words, they say, ``Your background stuff is not good
enough for us.'' And I think, General Clapper, or somebody
needs to just say to them, ``Look, we have decided that if they
have this kind of clearance, it ought to be acceptable in your
shop.''
Ms. Farrell. True, and I think my colleagues will elaborate
that sometimes agencies are confusing what is needed for
suitability clearance with the personnel security clearance,
and that raises another set of issues. But still, whether we
are talking about suitability or clearances, the granting of a
clearance to an individual we do not really know at this time
the extent to which reciprocity is an issue or if the agencies
are actually refusing. We have work that is ongoing, and we
have had conversations with agencies outside of DOD about their
views, and I will say that their intent is to honor the
reciprocity.
Mr. Clapper. Senator, as a security executive agent, I can
say that we have issued reciprocity rules, and, of course, the
reporting we get back from security managers is that they
support and follow them. And, of course, this is an area that
we will always need to pursue improvements to. And as you have
heard and you have experienced yourself, reciprocity is
something that lends itself to anecdotes. And so one of the
things we want to try to do here is to quantify some of these
anecdotes, and one of the things we are thinking about doing is
establishing a 1-800 line sort of thing so if people have
reciprocity complaints, we will have a way to gather some
actual empirical data on this and just see what the extent of
the problem is.
I would also point out that within the intelligence
community oftentimes there are degrees of access, so for
special access programs, if someone's initial background
investigation is, say, 4 years old and under the current system
it is every 5, a Special Emphasis Program (SEP) program manager
is authorized--and this pertains both in DOD and the rest of
the IC--to do an additional check, to do a quick bring-up on
that initial investigation. Now, hopefully, when we get into
the continuous evaluation program, some of that will be
attenuated. But this, again, I would say is a case where it is
an area that lends itself to anecdotes, and we want to try to
quantify those anecdotes to see what the actual extent of the
problem is.
Senator Voinovich. I would like to say, again, thank you
very, very much for the good work that you have done. It has
been an inspiration to me to see the progress that you have
made and, again, the teamwork that is obvious here at the
table. I would also like the people that are sitting behind you
to--I want to let you know how much I appreciate the work that
you all do. At this stage in my life, I am looking around
about, how do you get where you are and what can you
accomplish. And I have found that all I am is a reflection of
some wonderful people around me that have made a difference for
me. And so I want to say I know they are sitting there at the
table, but I know darn well that what they have been able to do
would not have been able to happen without the great teamwork
that you have and the support that all of you give them. And I
just want you to know how grateful I am to you for what you are
doing
Senator Akaka, again, thank you for this hearing, and, Ms.
Farrell, I hope I am back next year. I will even come back from
Florida, where I expect to be. [Laughter.]
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for appearing today.
As we have heard and as we have seen, great, great progress has
been made on this issue, and I want to thank the panelists
here. You have certainly been great leaders in this. Statistics
tell us that tremendous progress has been made already through
your efforts, and I really want to thank you for doing that.
And this Subcommittee will continue its strong oversight in the
coming Congress.
Again, I want to thank my very good brother and friend
Senator Voinovich for his attention and leadership on this
issue. In 2005, he chaired the first in this series of
hearings. As you can see, this continued when I became
Chairman, and we have worked so well together in a bipartisan
manner, and I would say accomplished so much doing it, and have
enjoyed it as well. And I look upon him as a champion in human
capital, and this will, of course, be part of the legacy of his
life. And I hope your successor will bring the same dedication
and energy to all of the high-risk areas and improving
government management.
Senator Voinovich. He would be a good one, if we can
convince him. He was Director of the Office of Budget and
Management, so he has a pretty good idea of how the system
works.
Senator Akaka. Yes. Well, this has been a great experience
for me and for all of us and for the U.S. Senate as well. And I
again want to say thank you to the Committee Members, this
Subcommittee, and I want to say thanks to our staff. Our staff
has done a tremendous job here on either side of the aisle, and
I want to say thank you so much. We have made great progress as
a Subcommittee.
The record of the hearing will be open for 2 weeks for
additional statements or questions other Members may have
pertaining to the hearing.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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