[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
IS THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS ADEQUATELY CONNECTED TO THE
BROADER HOMELAND COMMUNITIES?
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
INFORMATION SHARING, AND
TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 29, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-83
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Mike Rogers, Alabama
Columbia Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Zoe Lofgren, California Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Henry Cuellar, Texas Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Pete Olson, Texas
Laura Richardson, California Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey Tom Graves, Georgia
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Dina Titus, Nevada
William L. Owens, New York
Vacancy
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK
ASSESSMENT
Jane Harman, California, Chair
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Laura Richardson, California Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Tom Graves, Georgia
Al Green, Texas Peter T. King, New York (Ex
James A. Himes, Connecticut Officio)
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Michael Blinde, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Meghann Peterlin, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment..................................................... 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Witnesses
Ms. Caryn A. Wagner, Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Appendix
Questions From Chairwoman Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael
McCaul for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis............. 21
Questions From Chairwoman Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael
McCaul for the Office of Infrastructure Protection............. 23
Questions From Chairwoman Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael
McCaul for the Office of Operations Coordination............... 24
Questions From Chairwoman Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael
McCaul for the Office of Domestic Nuclear Detection Office..... 24
Questions From Chairwoman Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael
McCaul for the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement.......... 24
Questions From Chairwoman Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael
McCaul for the Office of Cyber Security and Communications..... 24
Questions From Chairwoman Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael
McCaul for the Office of Health Affairs........................ 25
Questions From Chairwoman Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael
McCaul for the Office of Policy................................ 25
Questions From Chairwoman Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael
McCaul for the Office of Risk Management and Analysis.......... 25
Questions From Chairwoman Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael
McCaul for the Science and Technology Directorate.............. 26
IS THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS ADEQUATELY CONNECTED TO THE
BROADER HOMELAND COMMUNITIES?
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Wednesday, September 29, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:10 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jane Harman
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Harman, McCaul, and Dent.
Ms. Harman. The Subcommittee on Homeland Security will come
to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to receive
testimony on the question: Is the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis--called I&A--Adequately Connected to the Broader
Homeland Communities?
Let me apologize to our witness for keeping her so long.
The House is probably in its last day before the recess until
the election, and everything possible is coming up on the House
floor, including in a few minutes the intelligence
authorization bill, something that I know our witness has great
affection for because a few years back she worked on the staff
of the House Select Committee on Intelligence.
We are starting now, but our Ranking Member is expected any
minute, and I am vamping just slightly so when I finish my
opening statement he will be here and can give his, and then we
will move promptly into Secretary Wagner's testimony and
questions.
Welcome, Under Secretary Wagner. This is a busy time of
year for all of us, and the subcommittee greatly appreciates
your appearance today to discuss how you are improving I&A's
capabilities.
Today's hearing will focus on I&A's relationships with
other parts of DHS, the other headquarters elements that need
intelligence to carry out their own missions.
We want to know how you are communicating and sharing
information with the Science and Technology Directorate, the
National Operations Center, and the National Programs and
Protection Directorate, among others. Are your relationships
with these entities adequate and are you performing as a leader
in a constellation of parts of DHS that need intelligence to
carry out their missions? Is intelligence adequately shared so
that I&A accurately analyzes and produces timely and useful
threat information about terror targets and tactics to its
customers?
As you know, your predecessor, Charlie Allen, prided
himself on his connections throughout the Government. He was a
legend, having spent a half century virtually as one of the
leaders of the Central Intelligence Agency, and no one doubted
his ability to work horizontally across the Government.
The issues this subcommittee had with your predecessor
related not to his ability to work horizontally, but to his
ability to work vertically, something that is much improved
during your tenure under the leadership of your deputy, Bart
Johnson.
So today it appears to us, or to me anyway, that I&A is
doing much better with vertical integration outside the
Department, from I&A down to State and local law enforcement
and back. It is also doing much better with vertical
integration within the Department, from I&A to the intelligence
elements inside DHS and back to I&A. But what we are concerned
about is whether I&A is doing enough with horizontal
integration across the Department, from I&A to the other DHS
headquarters offices and back. I hope I am being clear.
We have taken a look at the most recent version of the DHS
Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan, which I might note is
dated 2008 and still has Charlie Allen's picture at the front.
It says that you as the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer are
charged with leading and managing the Enterprise. This includes
making sure that information is shared throughout the
Department. What is your honest assessment of progress to date?
I want to assure you, Madam Under Secretary, that I am not
proposing to move boxes around. I think I have learned a lot
about doing that in recent years, and I do not want to just add
names of organizations to the list that composes the
Enterprise. What I am interested in is making sure that you
have what you need to manage the critical relationships of I&A,
both vertical and horizontal, to manage them simultaneously
without trading one off against the other.
Today we hope to hear the good news stories of cooperation
and collaboration, but we also want to hear about the areas
that need some work. We want to work as your partner, an offer
I made frequently to Charlie Allen, knowing that the better you
do your job, the safer our communities will be.
Welcome, and again thank you for your service.
The Ranking Minority Member is now here. I now yield 5
minutes to the Ranking Member for an opening statement.
[The statement of Chair Harman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chair Jane Harman
September 29, 2010
Welcome, Under Secretary Wagner. This is a busy time of year for
all of us, and the subcommittee appreciates your appearance today to
discuss how you are improving I&A's capabilities.
Today's hearing will focus on I&A's relationships with other parts
of DHS--the other headquarters elements that need intelligence to carry
out their own missions.
We want to know how you are communicating and sharing information
with the Science & Technology Directorate, the National Operations
Center and the National Programs & Protection Directorate--among
others. Are your relationships with these entities adequate?
Is intelligence adequately shared so that I&A accurately analyzes
and produces timely and useful threat information about terror targets
and tactics to its customers?
As you know, your predecessor, Charlie Allen, prided himself on his
connections throughout the Government. He was a legend--and no one
doubted his ability to work horizontally across the Federal Government.
The issues this subcommittee had with your predecessor related to
vertical information sharing--something much improved during your
tenure, under the leadership of your deputy, Bart Johnson.
Today, it appears that I&A is doing much better with vertical
integration outside the Department--from I&A down to State and local
law enforcement and back.
I&A is also doing much better with vertical integration within the
Department--from I&A to the intelligence elements inside DHS and back
to I&A.
But this subcommittee is concerned that I&A is not doing such a
great job with horizontal integration across the Department--from I&A
to the other DHS headquarters offices and back to I&A.
We've taken a look at the most recent version of the DHS
Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan (which I might note is from 2008
and still has Charlie Allen's picture at the front).
It says that you, as the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, are
charged with leading and managing this Enterprise. This includes making
sure that information is shared throughout the Department. What is your
honest assessment of progress to date?
I want to assure you, Madam Under Secretary, that I am not
interested in moving boxes around in an organizational chart.
And I do not want to just add names of organizations to the list
that composes the Enterprise.
What I am interested in is making sure that you have what you need
to manage the critical relationships of I&A--both vertical and
horizontal--and manage them simultaneously, without trading one for the
other.
Today we hope to hear the good news stories of cooperation and
collaboration.
But we also want to hear about the areas that need some work.
We want to work as your partner--knowing that the better you do
your job, the safer our communities will be.
Welcome, and thank you for your service.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate your
patience in waiting for me. I got tied up on an important
matter, but nothing is more important to me than this hearing,
and it has been a joy to work with you. This may be our last
hearing, and I just want to say one thing about the Chair, you
always know where you stand, and I appreciate that.
I want to thank Madam Chair for holding this hearing.
Welcome, Madam Secretary.
First of all, I want to let you know that the Houston
Fusion Center, I had a visit and they wanted connectivity to
classified information, SCIF, and you were very responsive in
fixing that issue, and I want to thank you for that.
Also, I want to let you know that we have heard that I&A
has significantly improved its interactions both within the
Department and with State and local fusion centers and I
appreciate that. We are all well aware of the problems you
inherited at I&A, and it does appear at least to some extent
that things are improving.
I do, however, want to raise a few specific concerns with
you. I know you recently had to change your plans for the Joint
Fusion Center Program Management Office, and I am pleased to
learn that you are continuing to move forward with that, that
goal to coordinate DHS interactions with the fusion centers. In
my judgment, this level of coordination is extremely important.
I am concerned, however, that DHS is not paying the same
attention to coordinating its interaction with the States as a
whole. I have heard reports that different parts of DHS are
going to different State offices with threat information,
sometimes cutting the fusion centers out of the process
altogether. In my judgment, the Department should be the
shining example for the rest of the Federal Government on
coordination and information sharing, and I want to be sure
that we are not ignoring stovepipes that may be popping up
within DHS, particularly when it comes to interactions with
State and locals.
Additionally, when taking a look at the DHS Intelligence
Enterprise organizational chart, many DHS elements seem to be
missing, in my judgment. As one example, the Office of Cyber
Security does not appear as part of the Intelligence
Enterprise.
I hope through this hearing we can explore how the
Department defines homeland security intelligence and how you
distinguish between partners in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise
and elements who are not, and how you have prioritized I&A's
customers within the Department. So I look forward to hearing
your testimony.
Madam Chair, I am aware there were some scheduling
conflicts with today's hearing, so we were unable to hear from
the other DHS headquarter elements that we will discuss here
today. While I know Under Secretary Wagner will do a capable
job, I want to be sure that we note that we will only be
hearing from one side, Madam Chair, and I hope that we will be
able to hear from the other parts of the Department on this
topic in the future so that we can really delve into the
problem areas and find solutions.
Finally, I have said it before, but I want to reiterate
once again that I hope that you will view this as an
opportunity for us to discuss the issues, have a constructive
conversation, and work together to solve the internal problems
at the Department. At the end of the day, I know we all want to
see it succeed in keeping the American people safe. In my
judgment, DHS needs to get its own house in order before it can
hopefully fulfill that mission.
With that, I yield back.
Ms. Harman. I thank the Ranking Member. We did have several
conversations about who else might testify today and decided
for a variety of reasons, including the lateness of the hour,
that we would have Under Secretary Wagner but that we will
communicate with the other Enterprise elements. I am notifying
you, Ms. Wagner, that we plan to send questions in writing as
part of our hearing record to those elements so that we have a
full record of their views as well as your views about this
critical subject. I assume that is all right. Fine.
You are now recognized to summarize your testimony in
approximately 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CARYN A. WAGNER, UNDER SECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE
AND ANALYSIS, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Wagner. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Before I
start, I wanted to congratulate you on the passage of your
legislation, Reducing Overclassification Act of 2009. We
enjoyed working with you on that legislation, and we believe it
is going to help us in our efforts to prevent
overclassification and ensure that we can share critical
information with State and locals.
Ms. Harman. If I might interrupt, we are all pleased about
that. It wasn't just my legislation, it was unanimously
reported by our subcommittee, and it only took 3 years to get
it to pass the Congress. Much of that time was spent in the
United States Senate, you understand. But at any rate, we are
thrilled about this, and are hoping that the President will
sign the bill into law at the nearest possible time.
Ms. Wagner. I am sure he will.
Madam Chair, Ranking Member McCaul, Congressman Dent, and
other distinguished Members who may appear later, thank you for
the invitation to appear before you to discuss how the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis supports the activities of the
Department's headquarters elements and thus the Department's
larger set of customers and partners.
We have spent some time trying to come up with a vision
statement for I&A, which is not as easy as it might seem given
the broad and diverse set of missions that the office has. What
we settled on was the phrase: ``Equipping the Homeland Security
Enterprise with the information it needs to keep the Nation
safe, secure, and resilient.''
The Homeland Security Enterprise, as I have testified
before this subcommittee before, is a set of concentric
circles. It includes the Department's headquarters elements,
its many and varied components, its State, local, Tribal, and
territorial partners, and at its widest extent, the American
public, who is a key stakeholder in the Homeland Security
Enterprise.
I have appeared before you, as you mentioned, to discuss
our role in supporting the Department's components, and also
the National network of fusion centers. Today, you have asked
me to focus on our support and relationships to the
headquarters elements. I am happy to do that. I think I have
some good news to share, although clearly there are areas where
we can improve, and I will highlight a few of those.
I&A is by its nature a service element, and we provide our
specific service, tailored intelligence and information, to
both the operating elements of the Department, like Customs and
Border Patrol, but also to other service elements like
ourselves, such as the Office of Policy and the Office of
Health Affairs. While the types of interactions and products
and services that we provide to the different department
elements vary, there are several common themes that underpin
our interactions with all of these elements.
First, we provide the entire Department, and by inference
its many customers, with a common understanding of the threat.
The Department is largely in the business of managing risk,
risks from terrorism, natural disasters, chemical and
biological agents, cyber attacks, and identifying and analyzing
the threat is a key part of the risk management model. So risk
is a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequences. I&A
owns the threat piece, and we support our partners in assessing
vulnerability and consequences to assess the overall risk to
the homeland.
Second, we are responsible for facilitating the
Department's interaction with our State and local customers via
the fusion centers. This goes to Ranking Member McCaul's
comments. We are trying to improve this, and I think we are
making progress, although we do still have incidences of people
kind of getting a little bit off the reservation. I think that
is happening less and less as we improve the representation in
our State and Local Program Office and we educate both the
fusion centers, the State governments, and our own people on
the mission of the State and Local Program Office.
We also use interdepartmental coordination forums, and as I
mentioned, liaison personnel, and our most recent detailee to
the State and Local Program Office comes from the Office of
Health Affairs to better integrate health information into our
interactions with State and local governments.
Third, we leverage the intelligence community for the most
complete and current information to support our many customers
and partners. An example of this is the role that we play in
communicating to the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the
analytic judgments and the collection capabilities of the
National intelligence community so that they can factor those
in as they develop the global nuclear detection architecture.
So our closest continuing collaborations within the
Department are probably with the National Programs and
Protection Division, the Office of Operations Coordination and
Planning, and the Office of the CIO.
We have an extremely close partnership with the Office of
Infrastructure Protection, which resides within the National
Programs and Protection Division. We work together in an
integrated analytic unit to assess the threat and vulnerability
for critical infrastructure and key resources. We are jointly
conducting a Risk 101 training course for State and local
fusion center infrastructure analysts, and we recently held a
joint meeting for fusion center analysts and IP's deployed
protective security advisers, another element that for a while
was independently dealing with fusion centers and State and
local governments, and we have now tried to make that more
integrated and coherent, and we have gotten great cooperation.
We also work closely with IP's Office of Bomb Prevention to
provide coordinated products to the field on terrorist use of
bombs, improvised explosive devices, and other weapons.
The Department's Office of Cyber Security and
Communications also resides within the National Programs and
Protection Division. I&A analysts are physically embedded in
the National Cybersecurity and Communications Center, the NCCC,
and in the U.S. Cyber Emergency Response Team, US-CERT. These
cyber analysts deliver products and services to the sector
coordinating councils, to State and local authorities, and to
the private sector, working in close collaboration with our
NPPD counterparts. We are working here also to increase the
interaction with the fusion centers and the products that we
provide.
In the operations arena, I&A as an Intel Watch and Warning
Section embedded in the National Operations Center to integrate
intelligence into the common operation picture, receive and
disseminate intelligence warning information, and provide
outreach to the intelligence community to keep the NOC and the
DHS leadership advised of breaking events. While the
relationship with the NOC is excellent, the physical
configuration that we have on Nebraska Avenue is not optimal
for integrating the intel and operations pieces, so we are
actively engaged with our ops colleagues to follow best
practices in how we integrate intelligence operating at a
different classification level with our operations and watch
elements when we move to St. Elizabeth's, and that is going
very well.
In addition to being Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis and the Chief Intelligence Officer for the Department,
I am also responsible for information sharing. I chair the
Information Sharing Governance Board with representatives from
all of the key components and headquarters elements. In order
to help the Department move forward in having an integrated
information architecture, I formed a strategic partnership with
the CIO, Richard Spires, to use the Information Sharing
Governance Board to accomplish IT portfolio management
responsibilities as well as its broader policy and procedure
mandate. He and I also co-chair the National Security Systems
Program, a vehicle for joint management of the Department's
classified systems. So the relationship with the CIO is strong
and growing.
These are just a few of the relationships that we have with
elements at the headquarters. I am happy to answer questions
about these or any of the others that I haven't mentioned. In
the 7 months I have been on the job, I have worked hard to
reach out and make it clear that I&A exists to serve the
Department and its missions. There is still room for
improvement, especially as we bring new people on board and try
to introduce them into the ops and planning cycles of all of
the various headquarters elements, but I think we are making
steady progress, and I hope that we are increasingly being
viewed as a constructive member of the DHS team. I personally
will continue to focus on improving those relationships.
Thank you for your time.
[The statement of Ms. Wagner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Caryn A. Wagner
September 29, 2010
introduction
Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and distinguished Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss how the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office
of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) interfaces, supports, and
coordinates with headquarters elements of the Department--the offices
and directorates at the headquarters level that report directly to the
Secretary, outside of our seven operating components.
Before I address the main topic of this hearing, I must echo the
Secretary's testimony from September 22, 2010: The terrorist threat to
our country is changing in ways that increasingly challenge law
enforcement and the intelligence community. The Department is moving at
all levels to address this evolving threat; preventing terrorist
attacks in today's dynamic threat environment means working in a
unified way across all levels of Government. DHS' intelligence mission,
which I am honored to lead, is to sustain a unified and synchronized
intelligence enterprise that enables informed decision-making at DHS
and in the entire homeland security enterprise. The mission of I&A is
to strengthen the Department's and our partners' ability to perform
their homeland security functions by accessing, integrating, analyzing,
and sharing timely and relevant intelligence and information, while
protecting privacy and civil liberties.
the office of intelligence and analysis strategic vision
I&A is charged with leading the Department's efforts to provide
intelligence and information in a useful form to Departmental decision-
makers, headquarters, and operational components, State, local, Tribal,
and private sector partners, and the National intelligence community.
Our job is to serve as the two-way conduit for information that
supports protecting the homeland. I&A's programs, projects, and
activities align with the core DHS missions designated in the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). To that end, I&A plays a
critical role to DHS' success in all of its core mission areas:
Preventing terrorism and enhancing security, securing and managing our
borders, enforcing and administering our immigration laws, safeguarding
and securing cyberspace, ensuring resilience to disasters, and
strengthening and maturing the Department.
In my last appearance before this subcommittee in May, I addressed
the evolution of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise and how it interacts
with Departmental operational components. Today, I appear before you to
discuss the ways in which I&A supports the headquarters elements of the
Department.
intelligence support to dhs headquarters elements
A key reason for I&A's existence is to support the intelligence
needs of the Department as a whole. To this end, I firmly believe that
I&A must provide the entire Department with a common understanding of
the threat. In ascribing to this model, I am dedicated to providing
timely, relevant, and vigorous intelligence support to DHS headquarters
elements, as well as to the Department's operational components. This,
of course, is in addition to our focus on supporting the intelligence
and information sharing needs of our non-Federal partners, the National
intelligence community, and the Nation's private sector.
I&A interacts with headquarters elements within DHS in accordance
with the authorities given to me as the Department's Chief Intelligence
Officer. This interaction includes I&A production of analytic products
tailored to the needs of DHS headquarters elements. I use my dual
authority, as both the Under Secretary and Chief Intelligence Officer,
to ensure that Department investments in intelligence programs,
projects, and activities are focused on Departmental and National
priorities, closing gaps, eliminating redundancies, and ensuring that
investments in intelligence are measured for utility and outcome.
I&A supports, interacts, and shares information with DHS
headquarters elements in many ways. These include the following
elements:
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
S&T is one of I&A's principal Departmental customers. I&A provides
monthly and ad hoc intelligence briefings to Dr. Tara O'Toole, the DHS
Under Secretary for Science and Technology. These customized briefings
are designed to meet her intelligence needs. I&A disseminates finished
intelligence assessments to specific customers in S&T on a regular
basis, and interacts with decision-making and subject matter expert
counterparts at least several times a week. I&A participates in and
manages intelligence community input to the threat elicitation phase of
S&T's Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism
Risk Assessments, including the Bioterrorism Risk Assessment, and the
Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment for the Department.
I&A plays a significant role in supporting the Material Threat
Assessments, which were developed by S&T to support the Secretary in
issuing Material Threat Determinations pursuant to the Project
Bioshield Act of 2004. Members of I&A also serve on the Biodefense
Knowledge Center Advisory Board and the National Biodefense Analysis
and Countermeasures Center Science Advisory Board.
National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)
I&A has a unique, ingrained relationship with the DHS Office of
Infrastructure Protection (IP), which resides in NPPD. As you know,
I&A's precursor organization combined the missions of intelligence and
analysis with infrastructure protection. Today, I&A provides enduring
support through its participation in the Homeland Infrastructure Threat
and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), a Departmental fusion center
designed to facilitate the sharing of threat and risk information with
IP's public and private sector partners in the Nation's critical
infrastructure community. I&A also collaborates closely with NPPD's
cybersecurity elements, including the United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT).
Support to Infrastructure Protection
Through analysts assigned to HITRAC, I&A has provided regular,
steady-state, and incident-specific classified and unclassified
briefings and reports to Federal, State, local, and private sector
critical infrastructure protection community members; supported the
development of the annual National Risk Profile included in the
Congressionally-required National Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resources (CIKR) Protection Annual Report; and participated in
exercises designed to improve public and private sector responses to
current and emerging threats to critical infrastructure. Recent
examples include supporting the July 2010 tabletop exercise on reducing
the vulnerability of the U.S. food supply to intentional contamination
and subsequent Infrastructure Protection Note, as well as a May 2010
five-city classified briefing series on the Nation's evolving threat
picture to State and local critical infrastructure partners.
I&A further supports IP's efforts to build critical infrastructure
expertise in State and local fusion centers. For example, I&A and IP
are jointly conducting a training course for State and local fusion
center infrastructure analysts to provide them with an overview of risk
analysis trade-craft, including threats to critical infrastructure. I&A
and IP are also collaborating to support an exchange program that
brings State and local fusion center infrastructure analysts to
Washington, DC for threat briefings and training--an iteration of this
program is occurring this week. Most recently, I&A and IP held a joint
annual meeting for I&A's fusion center analysts and IP's field-deployed
Protective Security Advisors to facilitate collaboration and mutual
awareness.
I&A and IP work together on additional specialized projects and
programs. For example, they are collaboratively developing
infrastructure sector-specific intelligence requirements and a
comprehensive information requirements process, which will further
improve the ability of I&A and the intelligence community to meet the
information needs of the Nation's critical infrastructure community.
I&A works closely with IP's Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) on
issues related to improvised explosive devices and chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) and explosive threats, and
supports IP's operational programs such as Enhanced Critical
Infrastructure Protection security surveys at critical infrastructure
facilities and the Regional Resiliency Assessment Program. I&A reviews
and provides substantive comments on information reports derived from
OBP's Technical Resource for Incident Prevention (TRIPwire), which
describe terrorist use of bombs and Improvised Explosive Devices. I&A
products are frequently posted on the TRIPwire portal for use by
applicable stakeholders.
Support to Cybersecurity
I&A provides substantial and growing support to the cybersecurity
and protection activities of the Department. This support includes
tactical and strategic threat intelligence analysis for elements of
NPPD's Office of Cybersecurity and Communications. I&A delivers
tactical intelligence support--situational awareness and early warnings
of potential cyber threats that combine all-source analysis with data
from EINSTEIN sensors--to the National Cybersecurity and Communications
Center (NCCIC), US-CERT, the National Coordinating Center for
Telecommunications (NCC), and the Industrial Control Systems Cyber
Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT). I&A publishes Homeland Information
Reports derived from intrusion or other exploited cyber data, which
identifies cyber-focused collection gaps and generates requirements
based on these gaps. I&A further develops and delivers strategic
intelligence products and services, such as assessments, briefings, and
teleconference support, to numerous customers, including CIKR customers
through Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC), Government Coordinating
Councils (GCC), and State and local government authorities. These
products can relate to cybersecurity or physical cyber-related
infrastructure.
Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS)
I&A has a mutually reinforcing relationship with OPS; I&A is the
Department's primary intelligence element and OPS is responsible for
maintaining full awareness of all DHS activities and relevant
developments. I&A's primary support to OPS is in providing needed
intelligence and information to the National Operations Center (NOC).
I&A maintains an embedded classified-level watch and warning function
at the NOC that serves as the immediate conduit for intelligence and
information obtained from I&A's myriad customers.
I&A coordinates with OPS to address requirements for the
Department's Single Point of Service (SPS) program. This program,
consisting of elements from the NOC, I&A, and the DHS Office of
Intergovernmental Affairs, processes support requests in a visible,
transparent, and accountable manner. Support requests include requests
from State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners for support to
include Requests for Information, classification downgrades, on-site
training, and briefing support. I&A ensures that support requests
forwarded by the NOC conform to I&A's authorized missions, qualitative
standards, and legal and regulatory requirements; protect individual
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties; are responsive to the
requirements of I&A customers; and maintain the integrity of the
Departmental intelligence process.
I&A directly supports OPS via its embedded Operations Intelligence
staff. For example, our health intelligence team supported OPS' H1N1
Operations Planning Team during the H1N1 pandemic. More recently, I&A's
Operations Intelligence staff and chemical and biological threats
analysts were fully integrated into developing and implementing
Departmental CBRN and health response plans. This was done in close
tandem with OPS and other Department elements and components.
Even though the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer is the head of the
Department's statutory program to support State and local fusion
centers, OPS, mainly through the NOC, has key responsibilities in
furthering the Department's commitment to sustain and support fusion
centers. I&A appropriately coordinates with OPS in salient areas such
as fulfilling support requests received from fusion centers.
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)
I&A provides strategic intelligence assessments that focus on
threat actors, their claims, and their plans to attack the United
States with radiological and nuclear materials. These assessments
support DNDO's policymaking and resource planning efforts. In addition,
I&A produces baseline and estimative intelligence products to enable
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) planners to anticipate
adversaries' future capabilities and intent and develop a better
understanding of the future environment in which the GNDA will operate.
I&A products support DNDO as the Departmental lead in developing the
GNDA, which includes red teaming and reviewing deployment strategies.
Office of Health Affairs (OHA)
I&A's partnership with OHA entails close collaboration at multiple
levels. I&A provides tailored monthly briefings for Assistant Secretary
and Chief Medical Officer Dr. Alexander Garza to address his key
intelligence questions. I&A produces intelligence analysis to meet
OHA's unique information needs; for example, I&A recently provided
tailored analysis and briefings to support OHA's BioWatch Program. I&A
coordinates with OHA to provide the Secretary, DHS elements and
components, and State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private sector
customers with appropriate products that detail CBRN and health
intelligence threat assessments, as well as related medical
countermeasures and infectious disease mitigation techniques.
I&A and OHA collaborate closely on the Health Security Intelligence
Enterprise (HSIE), a joint initiative to integrate the public health
and health care communities into the Department's intelligence and
information sharing programs and processes. The HSIE focuses on
building multidisciplinary partnerships to facilitate a two-way flow of
information among State and local health officials and the National
network of State and local fusion centers. The on-going collaboration
and coordination for the HSIE initiative represents a valuable
partnership between I&A and OHA.
On the programmatic front, I&A coordinates with the National
Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) on a regular basis,
participating in its daily biosurveillance teleconferences, providing
salient finished intelligence products, and responding to NBIC's
requests for information on disease events around the world. As part of
this partnership, I&A provided the medical intelligence briefing for
the inaugural Food Protection Workshop that NBIC cosponsored with the
Federal Food Safety and Inspection Service (U.S. Department of
Agriculture) this summer.
Office of Policy
I&A provides distinct intelligence support to DHS' Office of Policy
in ensuring that its decisions and initiatives are informed by the
latest intelligence and threat analysis. This includes focused support
on counter-terrorism, watch-listing and screening, National and
international information-sharing access agreements, Departmental
strategic planning and risk management, and preventing the unauthorized
acquisition or use of CBRN materials and capabilities. For example, we
provided intelligence that supported Policy's involvement in the
implementation of Executive Order 13546, ``Optimizing the Security of
Biological Select Agents and Toxins in the United States.''
Multiple I&A divisions, including its Strategies, Plans, and Policy
Division, Information Sharing and Intelligence Management Division, and
its Border Security Division, work in close collaboration and
cooperation with various elements within the Office of Policy. These
engagements ensure that the decisions and initiatives of sub-offices
within Policy are informed by the latest intelligence.
Our program and intelligence analysts coordinate with the Office of
Policy in addressing intelligence requirements for the Visa Waiver
Program. Using the mandate from the 9/11 Act, the Director of National
Intelligence designated DHS as the lead intelligence community entity
responsible for biennial Visa Waiver Program assessments. We
independently assess the integrity and security of travel processes and
documentation for each country in or applying to the program to address
the potential for illicit actors--including transnational criminals,
extremists and terrorists--to exploit travel systems and the security
environment that can facilitate unlawful access to the United States.
I&A, as the statutory lead for establishing intelligence policy for
the Department's intelligence enterprise, ensures appropriate
coordination with the Office of Policy in all our intelligence and
information sharing activities. I&A provides direct intelligence policy
input to the formulation of Office of Policy strategies and
initiatives, such as those associated with our Southern and Northern
borders, counterterrorism, screening coordination, and information-
sharing with U.S. and international partners.
Office of Security
I&A provides significant support to the Office of the Chief
Security Officer on a variety of issues, including the development of
implementation guidelines for Executive Orders impacting classified
information management. Other pertinent collaborative activities
include the issuance of security clearances to non-Federal partners and
building and accrediting Sensitive Compartmented Information
Facilities, or SCIFs.
Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (CNE)
I&A provides CNE with analytic and intelligence support for its
efforts to coordinate DHS responsibilities to stop the entry of illegal
drugs into the United States, and track and sever the connections
between drug trafficking and terrorism. I&A is a member of the CNE-led
Counternarcotics Coordinating Council, a body that coordinates
Department counternarcotics policy and operations.
I&A provides substantial support to the development of National and
DHS counternarcotics strategies. Significantly, I&A served as a co-
chair, along with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, of the
interagency effort to develop the intelligence and information-sharing
chapter in the 2009 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics
Strategy. I&A is responsible for tracking over 100 such interagency
initiatives alongside CNE, and is currently assisting CNE in the
development of a DHS strategy to combat the links between drug
trafficking and terrorism.
I&A supports CNE with subject matter expertise on drug trafficking
trends along our Northern and Southern borders, serving as CNE's link
to the intelligence community for obtaining information and
intelligence on the threats posed by international drug trafficking and
on the connections between drug trafficking and terrorism. I&A works
closely with CNE to ensure that its information needs are incorporated
into the DHS Standing Information Needs (SINs). DHS SINs identify the
universe of enduring intelligence needs of the Department, and allow
the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer to focus collection, analytic, and
reporting activities and efforts based on the distinct needs of the
Department and its customers. I&A also facilitates CNE's requests for
information to the intelligence community on international drug
trafficking and drug-terror nexus issues.
other areas of interaction with dhs headquarters elements
National Security Systems
I&A management of the DHS National Security Systems (NSS) Program
provides a significant enabling capability to Departmental decision-
makers, including in headquarters elements. The NSS is a joint
initiative between I&A and the Office of the Chief Information Officer
(OCIO). The Deputy Secretary chartered the NSS in January 2009 to bring
a One DHS approach to the management of all classified information
technology infrastructure provided by DHS, including networks, secure
communications, and enterprise services. This joint initiative
institutionalizes a strong mission partnership between OCIO and I&A in
the relatively small and specialized--but critical--area of classified
information technology capability.
The NSS Program provides clear benefit for DHS headquarters
elements, as well as operational components, to ensure their users have
appropriate access to classified information technology infrastructure,
such as the Homeland Secure Data Network. These benefits include
consolidated, enterprise-level management of all classified information
technology services; strengthened alignment to Departmental and
component mission priorities; coordinated investments for efficiency
and interoperability; and improved service delivery and transparency.
Intelligence Training
I&A supports DHS headquarters elements by offering many
intelligence tradecraft and other related training multiple times each
year. Intelligence training is a critical capability that enables
fulfillment of the Department's intelligence mission. We are building
on existing intelligence training successes and expanding this program
to establish a culture of disciplined and uniform intelligence
capabilities throughout the Department. Strong intelligence tradecraft
across the Department serves the dual purpose of making headquarters
consumers of intelligence more informed of what intelligence can--and
cannot--provide to DHS decision-makers.
strengthening interface
In preparing for this hearing, I identified several areas in which
I&A can improve its support to DHS headquarters elements. We are making
strides in how we provide the Secretary and Deputy Secretary tailored
and timely all-source intelligence briefings. We have engaged key
decision-makers across the Department and asked them how I&A can better
fulfill their requirements. I have found the feedback from these
inquiries to be both helpful and substantive.
I&A has used this feedback to accelerate understanding of
Departmental policy deliberations and the programmatic activities of
DHS headquarters elements. Stronger insight by I&A into Departmental
policy and programmatic matters will make us more attuned to the needs
of our customers, and thus more focused on the core intelligence
questions and needs of DHS decision-makers.
conclusion
Members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss how I&A supports and coordinates with
headquarters elements within the Department. I&A has made significant
strides, and continues to adapt to the current and emerging needs of
our partners and customers across the Department. I&A has a vital and
unique mission and continues to improve its strategic posture to more
effectively support core customers, including DHS headquarters
elements.
I&A's efforts to manage, collect, analyze, and share intelligence
and information will continue to be guided by the dual imperatives of
protecting the country from those who wish to do us harm, and
protecting the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of our
citizens. With your support, the leadership of Secretary Napolitano,
and the fine men and women of I&A, I believe we can accomplish our
multi-faceted mission and help DHS headquarters elements accomplish
theirs. I look forward to keeping the subcommittee and Congress
apprised of I&A's continued progress in this important area, as well as
our progress in leading and strengthening the critical intelligence
mission of the Department.
Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your questions.
Ms. Harman. Thank you for your testimony. Let me say for
the record that other Members of the subcommittee are permitted
to submit opening statements for the record. None of them is
here at the moment, but they can do this at a later time.
[The statements of Chairman Thompson and Hon. Richardson
follow:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
I have been a vocal critic of the way the intelligence community
interacts with other agencies outside of their community.
This is the sort of conversation I have heard, and I am confident
you have heard it, too, when people are talking about sharing
information:
``What do you have?'' ``What do you need?''
``How do I know what I need if you don't tell me what you
have?''
``How can I tell you what I have that can help you, if you
don't tell me what you need in the first place?''
And so on.
In the end, those outside of the intelligence community do not know
what the intelligence community has and those inside the intelligence
community do not have a clear idea of what everyone else needs.
The same thing seems to be happening inside DHS, with offices and
agencies throughout the Department needing intelligence but not getting
it from I&A--and I&A having intelligence that could be useful to these
offices and agencies, but not knowing that they need it.
The way I see it--as a leader--there are some common sense actions
that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis needs to take so
that the Department can become more efficient.
First, you need to find out who needs what intelligence, and where
they are getting it from, if anywhere.
The answer to that question is pretty clear when it comes to the
other intelligence elements in the DHS components, but not so for the
headquarters elements.
Second, you need to identify which DHS activities are lacking
critical intelligence. I realize this sounds difficult, but it just
means taking the time to get to know other people and other
organizations, and helping them to see what you can provide.
Third, you need to open your own doors and allow others in, so they
can see what you have and determine what might be useful.
I am not talking about sharing intelligence with people who may or
may not have a need-to-know. But I am talking about sharing enough
information with people so that they can at least try to match their
needs with your capabilities.
I do not believe this should be a very difficult outcome to
achieve.
For example, every entity within the Department that creates a
terrorism risk assessment (such as DHS S&T) should be getting
intelligence from or through I&A.
The same holds true for those creating risk assessments and making
risk-based decisions (such as the Office of Health Affairs deciding
where BioWatch detectors should be emplaced throughout the Nation,
based on risk).
I am sure you agree that words and phrases like ``threat
assessment,'' ``terrorism risk assessment,'' ``threat determination,''
and ``intelligence policy'' are pretty obvious indicators.
Under Secretary Wagner, I realize that this is not all on your
shoulders. Granted, you have a lot of intelligence professionals
working for you, but you should not need for them to have to use their
spook skills to find out what is going on in the other headquarters
elements.
Secretary Napolitano has a responsibility to act as well. She needs
to require every entity in the Department that has any need for
intelligence to work with I&A--and for I&A to work with them.
But it is up to you and your peers to make it happen--connecting
the dots between intelligence and information sharing.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Laura Richardson
September 29, 2010
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this hearing today focusing
on the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis interacts with other headquarters' elements
within the Department. I would also like to thank the Honorable Caryn
Wagner, DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence & Analysis and Chief
Intelligence Officer, for appearing before the committee today to
discuss these very important issues.
The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis (I&A) plays a dual role in ensuring the security of the
homeland. First it is charged with collecting and analyzing
intelligence information. Second, it is responsible for disseminating
that information to departmental units and with intelligence-related
functions or activities.
As we've learned from experience, the gathering and sharing of
intelligence within and across units of Government is critically
necessary to protect this country from potential terrorist attacks.
From the failed Times Square car bombing that led to the apprehension
of Faisal Shahzad to the disrupted plot to attack New York's subway
system, the sharing of information among our intelligence agencies has
been, and will continue to be, a crucial tool in either preventing
terrorist plots or providing the necessary information to making sure
similar plots will not be successful in the future.
However, there continue to be a number of issues with I&A that
urgently need to be addressed. For example, it has been documented that
where headquarters have not received intelligence by I&A in a timely
manner, they have reacted by attempting to obtain it on their own, or
develop their own sources, or use open source information that is often
unreliable or incomplete. Thus, it is very important to for us to
evaluate the timeliness, method, and adequacy by which I&A responds to
the legitimate intelligence needs of its headquarters.
I have a special interest in this subject because my district, the
37th of California, contains a number of high-profile airports, rail
lines, and refineries that could be considered potential targets for
would-be terrorists. Thus, the ability of DHS to communicate and share
intelligence effectively is not only critically important to me, but
also vital to ensuring the security of the American people.
I am pleased that Chairman Thompson convened this hearing because
it provides an opportunity for committee members to understand and
evaluate the current state of information sharing within the
intelligence enterprise of DHS.
I am particularly interested in discussing at length with the under
secretary the ways and means she has identified in strengthening the
capacity and performance of I&A.
Thank you again Chairman Thompson for convening this hearing. I
yield back my time.
Ms. Harman. I thank you for your testimony, and just would
note every time I hear the words ``DHS Intelligence
Enterprise,'' I think of a battleship in a sci-fi movie. A lot
of big words and a lot of huge acronyms. What we are trying to
get at, just to be very clear, is whether you are a leader
across these elements in this battleship, and are able in real-
time to get critical intelligence to the right folks so that it
can be used correctly in time to prevent and disrupt plots.
That is what we are after. We are not after memorizing an org
chart, and we that are not trying to force you to memorize the
org chart either. We are trying to be sure you are in a
position to lead on intelligence and analysis issues in the
departments of Homeland Security. Are you?
Ms. Wagner. Yes, ma'am, I am, and I think people are
looking to me to do that. I am trying to lead the intelligence
elements of the Department, to make sure that we are all
working together, that we are sharing all the information so
that every element the Department is receiving from their intel
support people the same information that they can use in their
operational missions.
So I would say that I lead the intelligence elements of the
Department, but for the other, the operational components and
the headquarters elements, I am in a supporting role which I
think is appropriate, making sure that they have the
information they need to do their missions. So it is a
symbiosis, and I think that that is working better. They are
more frequently looking to me for that.
Ms. Harman. That is what we want to hear. They need to be
looking to you. You need to have a seat at all the relevant
tables, as the jargon goes, and to make certain that you are
respected and consulted, and have input into other elements of
your Department that deal with intelligence, right?
Ms. Wagner. Yes, ma'am, and I feel that that is the case.
Ms. Harman. We are trying to help you get there because our
goal is not to play gotcha. Our goal is to make certain that
you are performing at full capacity so that the I&A function
horizontally is what it needs to be, and we are pleased to see
its performance vertically improving now that we have someone
with a law enforcement background as your deputy.
I want to ask about two current events and just test you a
little bit here. If we have time, I want to ask you one wonky
organizational question.
The Cyber Storm III exercise is being held this week. Is
I&A contributing intelligence analysts to this exercise? Tell
us about how you are doing this and your efforts to address the
threat of cybersecurity in coordination with other offices
within DHS. That is my first question, and I will put them both
out so you can answer them both.
Second, news reports as recent as last night, and maybe
even today, have made public a terror plot in the United
Kingdom and perhaps in France and Germany in which small teams
of terrorists plan to seize and kill hostages similar to the
Mumbai attacks in 2008. How have you or do you propose to work
with your partners within DHS headquarters to inform and
respond to this new development?
Ms. Wagner. On the Cyber Storm exercise, I am actually
attending that tomorrow afternoon, which should be extremely
interesting. The analysts that I referred to who are embedded
into the NPPD cyber organization have been active participants
in developing and implementing this exercise. I and the Chief
of my Cyber Analytic Branch, routinely attend the cyber jam
sessions that are hosted by Phil Ridinger, who works for Rand
Beers, as you know. So I feel we are extremely integrated into
this; and, yes, we did participate in the development of the
exercise.
On item No. 2, I cannot really confirm anything about what
is in the press, which I know will not surprise you because we
don't want to compromise or undermine any on-going intelligence
activities. I can assure you that we are actively engaged in
monitoring on-going threat activity, of which there is always a
significant amount, and are working very closely with other
elements of the intelligence community and within the
Department and with our foreign allies.
We have instituted, just in general, some procedures for
ensuring that we are delivering up-to-date intelligence to all
members of the headquarters elements. We are now scheduling
weekly briefings for all of the key staff elements in addition
to having weekly video teleconferences with the components to
ensure that we are all on the same page.
So I think we have taken a lot of steps recently to make
sure that everybody is in sync.
Ms. Harman. I appreciate your care in answering that
question. I too am not revealing anything that I have been
briefed in a classified setting. But I just said that these
news reports also say that the so-called storming operations
could occur in the United States. That is your turf, and so I
just wanted to be sure you are on it; and you are on it.
My final question. Why aren't any of the other headquarters
elements recognized as critical members of the DHS Intelligence
Enterprise?
Ms. Wagner. That is actually a good question, ma'am. I
think that they are, and I don't know if you are quoting from
the 2008 Intelligence Enterprise.
Ms. Harman. That is our last Enterprise, the one with
Charlie Allen's picture on it.
Ms. Wagner. Exactly. We are in the process now of
completing actually, and we hope to do so in October, a revised
strategic plan. We actually had this conversation the other
day, going, well, is it for I&A or is it for the Enterprise. My
thought process is that since I am the Under Secretary and the
CINT, that our strategic plan ought to be both for the I&A and
for the Enterprise, and that should include not just the
components but also the headquarters elements that we support.
So I am personally going to make sure that is the case when
it is completed. But I do view them as part of the Enterprise.
In fact, they are some of our most important customers.
Ms. Harman. Well, that is a great answer to my great
question, and that is the way we hope you will be thinking
about this. Please, no more stovepipes. I think we have had our
fill of those. You need to act as the intelligence leader for
the Department, obviously working for the Secretary, but the
intelligence leader who is involved in all of the active
problems out there that could lead to harm of our citizens and
our communities. We see you as a very key player here, and we
are holding this hearing to make certain that you understand
how we view your role and that you take your vitamins.
I now yield to the Ranking Member for his questions.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I think you addressed this in your testimony, but on the
vertical information sharing, we were just getting some
reporting from some of the fusion centers that DHS was going
around it and maybe going straight to the State homeland
security coordinator, but you are aware of that and you have
taken action to address that?
Ms. Wagner. Yes. We are trying to synchronize all of those
interactions through our State and Local Program Office, and
there are a lot of on-going relationships with State and local
governments that elements have that have gone back for quite
some time. So it is well meaning and we just need to make sure
that we are all aware so that we are not coming at the States
from multiple, different uncoordinated directions. We are
trying to achieve that. I can't claim that we are 100 percent
effective yet, but it is steadily improving.
Mr. McCaul. That is good to hear.
On the horizontal information-sharing side, I think the
last time you testified we talked a little about the National
Fusion Center Program Office, and I understand since that time
the appropriators have denied that reprogramming. So I was just
curious as to what the Department is doing to move forward on
that.
Ms. Wagner. Actually, I appreciate the opportunity to
answer that question.
Mr. McCaul. Thanks.
Ms. Wagner. We sort of pitched a concept that was based on
the fact that we had two related but distinct responsibilities
to fulfill. One was, as you all are terming it, the horizontal
sort of relationships within the Department, again addressing
your issue, making sure that we are coordinating all
Departmental interactions with State and local governments
through the fusion centers, and that was going to be the Joint
Fusion Center Program Management Office. The National Fusion
Center Program Management Office was going to address the
larger whole of Government coordination responsibilities that
we were assigned by the White House, to include working with
the FBI and ONDCP and others.
We still have those two functions to fulfill. We understand
that the proposal we made looked overly bureaucratic. So what
we have done to move ahead is we have combined those two
functions in one office with shared infrastructure, and so it
will be a more streamlined, leaner effort. But we will continue
to fulfill both of those sets of responsibilities. At the
moment it is still being called the State and Local Program
Office, which is what it was before. We are exploring with our
Congressional oversight committees whether we could possibly
change the name, possibly to the National Fusion Center Program
Management Office, but we will have those conversations so that
we are completely in sync with our overseers.
Mr. McCaul. I guess the appropriators' concerns were that
it was two different offices, maybe it was duplicative and it
was costing too much money, was that their concern, and your
response was to put it within one office?
Ms. Wagner. I do think that was part of their concern.
Also, I am not sure that we explained it completely. We have
had subsequent conversations with everybody, and I am hoping
that we are all in agreement that the way forward we proposed
makes sense.
Mr. McCaul. I was looking at the diagram of the DHS
Intelligence Council. I think I mentioned this in my opening
statement. One entity that is not in here that I was a little
surprised with was the cyber piece. Why is that not included in
this organizational chart?
Ms. Wagner. Probably also a good question. Our relationship
with NPPD tends to focus mostly on infrastructure protection,
and so they are in fact at the table and we do occasionally
discuss the issues and they basically represent NPPD at the
forum. They are welcome also if there is a cyber-related topic
on the agenda, to bring anybody that they would like with them
to the HSIC. In fact, we frequently have sort of guest
attendees at the HSIC. But I may in fact ask that question
myself when I get back.
Mr. McCaul. One other entity, the S&T, Science and
Technology, is doing threat assessments as well, I saw. I was
kind of curious why they are doing that; and if they are, why
aren't they part of this as well?
Ms. Wagner. I am not aware that they are doing threat
assessments per se. I may have to take that one for the record.
Mr. McCaul. The information I have is that they are. You
may want to take a look at that.
Ms. Wagner. We work with them to do threat assessments that
they put out. They do sort of risk assessments in some areas,
and we always provide the threat piece of a larger risk
assessment. So if that is--and we do interact with S&T and with
Health Affairs on those types of risk assessments. I don't
think of them as being threat assessments, I think of them as
being risk, which as I mentioned before combines the threat
vulnerabilities and consequences, and we do participate in
those.
Mr. McCaul. On infrastructure protection in the private
sector, particularly in cyber, the cyber world, that has been
very difficult. The ISACs, the Information Sharing Analysis
Centers, are out there. Can you give me an update on where the
Department is with the sharing of critical information sharing
with the private sector for infrastructure protection?
Ms. Wagner. Generally speaking, we, I&A, partner with
Infrastructure Protection to provide information on critical
infrastructure, including cyber infrastructure, to the private
sector. We do a lot of that through the Sector Coordinating
Councils and other existing mechanisms, such as involving
DSACs, Domestic Security Adviser Councils. We also do a lot of
table top exercises and those kinds of activities with the
private sector to try to help them understand the nature of the
threat and terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures, to
help them work through some of these issues. We have recently
done one with the hotel industry. In fact, I think we did two.
We put a product on that topic as well. Basically, again, we
teamed with infrastructure protection to provide the threat and
vulnerability information, and then we get the information out,
either through written products, conferences, telephone
conferences, or some of these exercises that we run and invite
key representatives of the various sectors.
Mr. McCaul. Is there a two-way flow of threat information
between DHS and the private sector and vice versa?
Ms. Wagner. I think the answer to that is yes, although the
flow back to DHS I think is less developed, as it is sort of
across the board. We are working with the FBI on the Suspicious
Activity Reporting Initiative, which I am sure you are aware
of, which would also pertain to the private sector and in fact
the public at large. So we are hoping to get more information
as that becomes more socialized. So yes, we do get information.
Mr. McCaul. What are some of the obstacles that you see
that prohibit or discourage the private sector from sharing
this information with you?
Ms. Wagner. I think probably the fact that the private
sector is just so large that--I will frequently hear from
people, well, the private sector is saying you don't share
anything with them. We are trying to increase our level of
interaction with the private sector, but it is so huge that you
are unfortunately impacting only a small percentage. I think
part of the real challenge is just educating them on what we
can do and making sure that they know where to come into the
Enterprise, if you will, if they have information. They are
always free to go to their local fusion center, directly to the
JTTF with terrorist information, but we also need to make it
clear that there are other avenues for them and educate them. I
think that the sheer magnitude of building that relationship is
a challenge.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. That is all I have.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. If you have another question, feel
free to ask it. I have one more question and one observation.
I will make my observation first, which is that the key
ingredient is leadership. It is not the org chart, but I
appreciate the Ranking Member's additions to your org chart.
But it isn't the org chart, it isn't the underlying law, it is
leadership. As you well know, threats against us are evolving,
and while the best we can do is to manage risk, and I agree
with that, what risks we manage have to be reconsidered all of
the time. So you need to lead the Intelligence Enterprise of
the Department of Homeland Security, and that is our hope and
expectation.
In that regard, my last question is: Do you need anything
from us?
Ms. Wagner. I really appreciate this committee's support. I
think that is all I need, and I feel I am getting it. I feel
you all are clearly motivated to help us succeed, and believe
me, that is very much appreciated.
Ms. Harman. I appreciate your answer. If you lose, we all
lose. Let's understand that. We are in this together. Now my
rather old sound bite is the terrorists won't check our party
registration before they blow us up. We really are in this
together.
So I appreciate the fact that the Ranking Member works
closely with me on these things, and I don't think we have had
a disagreement about the course or agenda of this subcommittee,
not even one.
Let me yield to him for a final thought or observation or
question.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair. I also appreciate our
close working relationship.
You know, this is a little bit off topic for this hearing,
but since we have you held hostage for at least 30 minutes, I
am becoming increasingly more concerned not so much about
command and control of al-Qaeda, or the threat coming from
there, but more these sort of franchise operations, but even
more so--and we had a couple of hearings on this, and I
appreciate Madam Chair doing it--on internet radicalization. I
am becoming more and more concerned about disenfranchised
Muslims or even some non-Muslims, people getting on the
internet, listening to someone like Awlaki or talking to him
like Mr. Hassan did, and suddenly radicalizing and then we have
an act of terrorism.
Can you touch that at all or discuss if you see that threat
becoming increasingly more of a threat?
Ms. Wagner. I think we are concerned that that is becoming
more of a threat, and the intelligence community is focused on
what more can we do to understand the process of radicalization
in order to do really two things, to help law enforcement in
our communities identify and possibly interrupt that process
and also to advise the policy community on what types of
engagement or policy interventions might actually be effective.
In the wake of the Christmas day bombing, Rudy and I tasked
my office to lead an interagency effort with FBI and NCTC to
try to improve our analytic understanding of this problem.
Since the last time I spoke to you, we developed and
incorporated an action plan with the community. We did receive
some money from the DNI to do this, and we have worked on a
series of case studies for some of the people that have been
radicalized and performed violent acts that we are now going
out and discussing with our partners in the fusion centers and
our State and local law enforcement folks, to say, okay, here
is what we found out, is this useful to you? What more can you
add? Particularly in areas where there may be communities about
which the local law enforcement people know a lot and can give
us information.
We are also working closely with our allies who have
experienced some of these problems to ensure that we understand
what their best practices are, both analytically and in things
like community policing, those kinds of issues, and obviously
with academia as well, because this is partially an
intelligence problem and partially a human behavior problem.
I don't want to minimize the difficulty of understanding
why some people who are radical or have extremist views--and
that is not illegal--take that next step and go into violent
manifestations of those views. Difficult to predict, and very
difficult to predict if they are sitting in their basement on
the internet.
Mr. McCaul. One of the magazines, I think it was Inspire--
--
Ms. Wagner. Inspire.
Mr. McCaul. They had how to make a bomb in your mom's
kitchen. I showed it to a group back home, a video of Awlaki I
think is on the internet, and they weren't as concerned with
him as much they were with the rap video that was very
disturbing. That is a clear effort to recruit in sort of a
totally different way, that is trying to cater to maybe a
younger audience and trying to--you know, it is sort of a hip-
hop rap-type video.
Ms. Wagner. There is clearly an effort to reach out in ways
that are consistent with pop culture and that will appeal to
people of a certain age and background, so that is a concerning
developing. But we are working on this, but it is a difficult
problem.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Well, we are working on it, too. We have had a
series of careful hearings on this. This rap video and some of
these other things were shown to us at one of our hearings.
I would just underscore something you said, Secretary
Wagner, which is that radical views are protected by the First
Amendment. The forming of our Republic, in many ways, was a
radical act. What we are concerned about is that line between
holding radical views, which is protected, and engaging in
violent behavior, which is illegal.
We are obviously trying to understand what takes a person
into that second box. It is a complicated subject and one size
does not fit all, but it is urgent business for the United
States of America. I think we all agree on this.
I want to thank you for your valuable testimony and thank
the Ranking Member for his insightful questions.
As I have mentioned, the Members of the subcommittee may
have additional questions for the witness, and we will ask
other questions of these elements inside the Department of
Homeland Security with which you interact so we get a full
picture of these relationships.
We would ask that you respond, that you and they respond
expeditiously in writing to those questions. I assume that is
acceptable to you.
Ms. Wagner. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Harman. Hearing no further business, the subcommittee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chair Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael McCaul for
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
Question 1. What do you want your legacy to be when you leave I&A,
as far as the rest of the Department is concerned?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What do you think can and should be done to improve
connectivity between I&A and the other headquarters elements?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. We recently learned from the Office of Operations
Coordination that I&A often provides a classified annex for their
planning documents. Does intelligence from I&A inform all levels of the
planning process at DHS?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Which headquarters elements does I&A interact with
significantly? Please expand on what you submitted in your written
testimony regarding these interactions.
How does I&A track its interaction with these elements?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. How does the strategic plan for the DHS Intelligence
Enterprise address the needs of the headquarters elements?
Do you have processes in place to continuously identify needed
improvements and changes to the products and services I&A provides to
the headquarters elements?
How important is collaboration with the headquarters elements when
it comes to DHS intelligence processes?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. What information does I&A receive from the headquarters
elements? What more do you need?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7. How can you as Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT),
maintain insight into the intelligence needs of non-traditional DHS
partners, specifically those who are not formally part of the
Intelligence Enterprise?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8. Are you confident that you have you identified all
parts of DHS that need intelligence or conduct intelligence-related
activities? Have you added them all to the DHS Intelligence Enterprise?
If not, why not?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 9. The DHS Intelligence Enterprise organizational chart
has some solid lines and some dotted lines, which, according to the
chart, indicate offices without key intelligence officials. Would you
please expand upon the relationships shown in the chart?
Would you please explain why other DHS elements, such as the Office
of Cyber Security and the Office of Health Affairs do not appear as
part of the chart?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 10. Do you believe that it is through your role as CINT or
through your role at Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis,
that you chair the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC)?
We have heard very good things from component members of the HSIC
about the improvements you have made to the Council. Are all members of
the HSIC--to include I&A, the components with larger intelligence
functions, and those organizations connected by ``dotted lines'' on the
chart--truly equal partners with equal voice? Would you please explain
how you are able to ensure full partnership for all members?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 11. Have you done a complete, end-to-end strategic
analysis of all DHS intelligence and intelligence-related activities?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12. We have seen the charts showing I&A relationships. How
well connected would you say I&A is to all of its Departmental
partners? How could these connections be strengthened?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 13. When organizations do not get the intelligence they
need from others, they tend to try to create it themselves. What can
I&A do to prevent this from happening in the Department?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 14. We have seen the problems that I&A and IP have had
being together and being apart, organizationally. Have these problems
been solved?
What challenges remain with I&A working with IP?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 15. Who is ultimately accountable for the Homeland
Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center's analytic products, I&A
or NPPD? Who publishes the products?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 16. How well do you think the Homeland Infrastructure
Threat and Risk Analysis Center is functioning? What are some areas
could be improved?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 17. In the military, S-2 (intelligence) is almost always
paired with S-3 (operations). How is this working between I&A and the
DHS Office of Operations Coordination?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 18. A number of entities within DHS are creating terrorism
risk assessments, including DHS S&T. Have you identified all of the DHS
entities making similar assessments? Does I&A provide all of them with
intelligence?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 19. I understand that I&A participates in an integrated
product team (IPT) to get its information sharing needs met. Would you
please describe I&A's participation, and the benefits of your
involvement?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 20. The Office of Health Affairs (OHA) is currently
responsible for producing an intelligence-based biodefense
architecture. Can you offer some examples of the kind of intelligence
that I&A could provide OHA to help in such an endeavor?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 21. What is the nature of the medical intelligence that
I&A provides to OHA?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 22. The National Biosurveillance Integration Center is an
OHA operational entity that uses a great deal of open source
information. Do you think there are other types of intelligence that
could be of value, which I&A is in a position to provide?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 23. How does I&A support risk assessments with timely
intelligence in various areas of the Department?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 24. What is the relationship between I&A and the Office of
Risk Management and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 25. In which DHS headquarters elements have you embedded
I&A analysts?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 26. It appears that there are three types of relationships
that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis needs to manage:
(1) Between I&A and the other members of the intelligence community;
(2) between I&A and the other intelligence elements inside the DHS
components; and (3) between I&A other DHS headquarters elements. How do
you manage those relationships?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 27. We understand that I&A is going to be developing
intelligence doctrine for DHS. DHS may well be the only Department that
is creating intelligence doctrine anew. What is the plan for developing
this doctrine?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 28. How does I&A facilitate relationships between non-
intelligence organizations within DHS and intelligence organizations
outside of DHS?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 29. DHS, DOD, and the intelligence community are working
on bioforensics right now. DOD aside, how is I&A helping to get the
intelligence community to work with DHS--specifically with the DHS
National Bioforensics Analysis Center?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 30. Aside from going to meetings at the White House when
he cannot, what kind of support do you, and the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis provide to DHS's Chief Counterterrorism Official and vice
versa?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 31. In your testimony, you described how your customers
for intelligence could be viewed as a series of concentric circles. How
do you prioritize the sharing of intelligence with the private sector
specifically, as compared with serving the needs of other DHS
components or State and local governments?
How do you balance these competing interests in terms of resources?
How many analysts do you have dedicated to the private sector?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 32. Do you have standard operating procedures or protocols
that govern the sharing of information with components and their
respective customers and partners?
Specifically, is the way by which intelligence is shared with the
private sector done in a consistent way, or is it determined on a
threat-by-threat basis?
If it is not consistent, why not? And does this result in delays in
the sharing of threat information with the private sector?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 33. Is it the policy of DHS to put a priority on sharing
intelligence with the private sector through fusion centers or through
the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC)?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 34. How will I&A's reorganization affect HITRAC? Will
HITRAC continue to be a priority after the reorganization?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 35. What is your vision for HITRAC and in what way does
HITRAC enhance your ability to support the private sector specifically?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 36. How many staff does I&A have dedicated to HITRAC?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 37. Does the Department include the private sector in
determining collection requirements for intelligence?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chair Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael McCaul for
the Office of Infrastructure Protection
Question 1. What do you think can and should be done to improve
connectivity between the Office of Infrastructure Protection and the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How does the Office of Infrastructure Protection track
its interaction with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Does the Office of Infrastructure Protection obtain
intelligence from members of the intelligence community without going
through I&A in the first place? If so, why?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. We have seen the problems that I&A and IP have had
being together and being apart, organizationally. Have these problems
been solved?
What challenges remain with I&A working with IP?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Who is ultimately accountable for the Homeland
Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center's analytic products, I&A
or NPPD? Who publishes the products?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. How well do you think the Homeland Infrastructure
Threat and Risk Analysis Center is functioning? What are some areas
could be improved?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chair Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael McCaul for
the Office of Operations Coordination
Question 1. What do you think can and should be done to improve
connectivity between the Office of Operations Coordination and the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How does the Office of Infrastructure Protection track
its interaction with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Does the Office of Operations Coordination obtain
intelligence from members of the intelligence community without going
through I&A in the first place? If so, why?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. In the military, S-2 (intelligence) is almost always
paired with S-3 (operations). How is this working between I&A and the
DHS Office of Operations Coordination?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chair Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael McCaul for
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
Question 1. What do you think can and should be done to improve
connectivity between the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How does the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office track
its interaction with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Does the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office obtain
intelligence from members of the intelligence community without going
through I&A in the first place? If so, why?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. How does I&A provide the intelligence community's
``best judgment'' to the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office regarding
the terrorist nuclear threat to the Nation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chair Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael McCaul for
the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement
Question 1. What do you think can and should be done to improve
connectivity between the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement and the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How does the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement
track its interaction with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Does the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement obtain
intelligence from members of the intelligence community without going
through I&A in the first place? If so, why?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Does CNE get its intelligence regarding links between
terrorism and narcotics from I&A?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chair Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael McCaul for
the Office of Cyber Security and Communications
Question 1. What do you think can and should be done to improve
connectivity between the Office of Cyber Security and Communications
and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How does the Office of Cyber Security and
Communications track its interaction with the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Does I&A provide intelligence to the Office of Cyber
Security? If not, why not?
Are I&A's cyber analysts co-located with other DHS cyber security
analysts? How does their role differ from the work being done within
the Office of Cyber Security?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chair Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael McCaul for
the Office of Health Affairs
Question 1. What do you think can and should be done to improve
connectivity between the Office of Health Affairs and the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How does the Office of Health Affairs track its
interaction with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Does the Office of Health Affairs obtain intelligence
from members of the intelligence community without going through I&A in
the first place? If so, why?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. How could I&A help the BioWatch program improve its
risk-based judgments of where to emplace detectors throughout the
country?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. OHA is currently responsible for producing an
intelligence-based biodefense architecture. Can you offer some examples
of the kind of intelligence that I&A could provide OHA to help in such
an endeavor?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. OHA is currently responsible for producing an
intelligence-based biodefense architecture. Can you offer some examples
of the kind of intelligence you believe that I&A could provide OHA to
help in such an endeavor?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7. What is the nature of the medical intelligence that I&A
provides to OHA?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8. Do you think there are other types of intelligence that
could be of value to the National Biosurveillance Integration Center,
that I&A is in a position to provide?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chair Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael McCaul for
the Office of Policy
Question 1. What do you think can and should be done to improve
connectivity between the Office of Policy and the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How does the Office of Policy track its interaction
with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Does the Office of Policy obtain intelligence from
members of the intelligence community without going through I&A in the
first place? If so, why?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chair Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael McCaul for
the Office of Risk Management and Analysis
Question 1. What do you think can and should be done to improve
connectivity between the Office of Risk Management and Analysis and the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How does the Office of Risk Management and Analysis
track its interaction with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Does the Office of Risk Management and Analysis obtain
intelligence from members of the intelligence community without going
through I&A in the first place? If so, why?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. How does I&A support risk assessments with timely
intelligence in various areas of the Department?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. What is the relationship between I&A and the Office of
Risk Management and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chair Jane Harman and Ranking Member Michael McCaul for
the Science and Technology Directorate
Question 1. What do you think can and should be done to improve
connectivity between the Science and Technology Directorate and the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How does the Science and Technology Directorate track
its interaction with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Does the Science and Technology Directorate obtain
intelligence from members of the intelligence community without going
through I&A in the first place? If so, why?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. What is the nature of I&A input into the terrorism risk
assessments conducted by the S&T Directorate? Aside from chairing the
intelligence community advisory group for these assessments, does I&A
provide any other input?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. What kind of relationship has S&T had with I&A in
developing I&A's next generation of intelligence information systems,
such as HSIN 2.0?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
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