[Senate Hearing 111-568]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-568
NOMINATION OF CARYN A. WAGNER
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
of the
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOMINATION OF CARYN A. WAGNER TO BE UNDER SECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE
AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
DECEMBER 3, 2009
__________
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JON TESTER, Montana ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
PAUL G. KIRK, JR., Massachusetts
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Kristine V. Lam, Professional Staff Member
Christian J. Beckner, Professional Staff Member
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Jennifer L. Tarr, Minority Counsel
John K. Grant, Minority Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee
Laura W. Kilbride, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1
Senator Collins.............................................. 3
Senator Kirk................................................. 4
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 17
Senator Collins.............................................. 20
Senator Kirk................................................. 22
WITNESS
Thursday, December 3, 2009
Caryn A. Wagner to be Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 23
NOMINATION OF CARYN A. WAGNER
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THURSDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Kirk, and Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order. Good
morning and welcome to this hearing at which we will consider
the nomination of Caryn Wagner to be Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).
Although Ms. Wagner's nomination has been referred by the
Senate to the Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Res. 445
gives committees with jurisdiction over the departments where
nominees will serve the right to also hold hearings and
interviews on the nomination--a right that we assert today.
We do so because the development of the Intelligence and
Analysis Directorate (I&A) has been a high priority for this
Committee since the passage of the Homeland Security Act in
2002.
When the Act was being debated on the Senate floor, I said
the provision that established the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate ``goes to the heart of
the weaknesses that have been exposed in our Nation's homeland
defenses since September 11, 2001--and that is, the lack of
information sharing related to terrorist activities between
intelligence, law enforcement, and other agencies.''
In 2007, this Committee was privileged to lead efforts in
the Senate to pass the second 9/11 Act, the unfinished
legislative business that came out of the 9/11 Commission,
which clarified and expanded the responsibilities of the I&A
Directorate and DHS and established the position for which Ms.
Wagner has been nominated.
Under the leadership of her predecessors, former Under
Secretary Charlie Allen and current Acting Under Secretary Bart
Johnson, the Department of Homeland Security's Intelligence and
Analysis Directorate has, I think, taken important steps
forward to clarify its duties, to implement its
responsibilities both within the Department and the
intelligence community and with its many stakeholders outside
of the community. And I think the American people clearly are
safer as a result.
But this is unfinished work, and Senator Collins and I have
talked with Secretary Napolitano about it, and I think she has
a vision that is consistent with the vision that created this
Directorate, which is not to duplicate what other parts of the
intelligence community are doing, but to add value, to add
something unique.
The two most obvious, it seems to me, areas in which the
I&A Directorate can add value is in the integration,
coordination, and expression--sharing--of the intelligence
brought forth anyway by components of the Department of
Homeland Security, including, for instance, Customs and Border
Protection or the Transportation Security Administration or
Immigration and Customs Enforcement or the Coast Guard. That
was required under the 9/11 Act, and I think it is still a very
important function.
These components of DHS each possess intelligence-raising
capacity and intelligence products related to travel,
immigration, and individuals' access to critical infrastructure
that, if brought together, really can enhance investigative and
intelligence efforts to protect our homeland and our people
here at home.
The importance of this work was demonstrated most recently
and, I think, most impressively in the terrorism investigations
that led to the arrests of Najibullah Zazi, David Headley, and
Tahawwur Rana.
The Department of Homeland Security formed a Threat Task
Force within itself to coordinate its support of these FBI-led
investigations and provided critical information to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the investigations proceeded
and suspects were subsequently arrested. I think the Department
should be very proud of these efforts, which represent exactly
the kind of coordination that we hoped for when DHS was
created.
The second and an increasingly significant role played by
the Department and by I&A particularly, in conjunction with the
FBI, is to serve as the interface between the national
intelligence community, through the DHS, and State, local, and
tribal law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
The Department's efforts to support and sustain fusion
centers around the country are critical to our homeland
security, and I am pleased by the steps that Secretary
Napolitano has taken to better coordinate these efforts.
I presume that as Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis, if you are confirmed, you will play a very critical
role in implementing this vision and ensuring that the
Department is helping to build a well-integrated and effective
national network of fusion centers. In both these ways,
coordination of intelligence assets within the Department will
create interfacing between your Directorate and State, local,
and tribal law enforcement and intelligence; you will really
coordinate this effort and be an important part of what is not
only our constant desire, but necessity to improve our
intelligence capabilities against the terrorists, who we know
are plotting every day to attack us here at home again.
I appreciate the record that you bring to this, Ms. Wagner.
You have a very strong background both in the intelligence
community and strong management experience, serving in the Army
Signal Corps, at the Defense Intelligence Agency, and with the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence at the time of
its creation. It makes me very proud that this Committee can
say that we have created the opportunity for you to have the
last two jobs you have had. It is our small part in increasing
employment in America.
She has served also on two occasions on the staff of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, including
most recently as the committee's budget director. So you come
to this job with some very relevant and important experience.
I thank you for being here, and I now would call on Senator
Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The nomination of Caryn Wagner to serve as the next Under
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, as well as serving as
the Chief Intelligence Officer at DHS, comes at a time when our
understanding of threats to our security is rapidly evolving.
Recent events serve to remind us that the threat of
terrorist attacks no longer comes only from countries half a
world away, but also from within our borders. The arrests of
plotters like Najibullah Zazi in New York, the indictment of 14
individuals in Minneapolis connected with recruiting Somali-
Americans to fight with a terrorist group in Somalia, and the
shooting rampage at Fort Hood have underscored a key finding of
this Committee over the course of a 4-year investigation--that
is, that the threat of violent Islamist radicalization
occurring in this country is real, and it is happening now.
Detecting and responding to this threat does not fall to
the FBI alone. An effective response requires a coordinated
effort backed by the support of the hundreds of thousands of
State, local, and tribal law enforcement officers on the front
lines every day. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis plays
a critical role in that effort.
Over the course of the last several years, the Office has
provided vital support to our law enforcement community. State
and local fusion centers have benefited from I&A-developed
training programs. DHS intelligence analysts have been detailed
to fusion centers, serving alongside their State and local
partners. I&A has disseminated numerous classified and
unclassified intelligence products to help Federal, State,
local, and tribal officials and the private sector prepare for,
prevent, and respond to homeland security threats.
Ms. Wagner, as the Chairman has pointed out, possesses
considerable experience in managing the budget and analytic
products of intelligence community elements. I am concerned,
however, that she appears to lack experience working with State
and local law enforcement, and that is an area that I will want
to pursue today. It is an important responsibility of the Under
Secretary. To meet the intelligence requirements of State and
local law enforcement officials, who are among I&A's most
significant intelligence customers, will require a sustained
and focused commitment from the next Under Secretary.
To continue to improve I&A and to integrate the DHS
intelligence enterprise, the next Under Secretary will also
need to address several significant challenges:
Information sharing has improved, but there remains
resistance to the culture of sharing that must exist across the
Department, within the intelligence community, and between I&A
and its Federal, State, and local partners. Important
information is still not getting into the hands of those who
need it at a level of classification where they can use it,
plus we have seen what appears to be a failure of information
sharing in the Fort Hood case.
I&A must continue to focus on improving the quality of its
analysis--producing timely and actionable information for its
intelligence customers, not merely repackaging or forwarding
analysis that is done elsewhere.
I&A continues to rely too heavily on contractors to perform
its work. While contractors can be an important force
multiplier and provide a ``surge capacity'' on unique topics,
I&A needs a strong base of Federal employees. Contractors
currently make up approximately 63 percent of the I&A
workforce. The new Under Secretary must correct this imbalance.
I&A must adapt to the changing nature of the homegrown
threat. As this Committee has found, self-radicalizing ``lone
wolf '' terrorists are hard to detect and to deter. I&A and the
entire intelligence and law enforcement community will have to
develop new ways to respond to the growing threat of homegrown
terrorism.
I look forward to discussing these and other issues with
Ms. Wagner today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins, for
that very thoughtful statement.
Senator Kirk, normally we limit the freedom of expression
of Members of the Committee besides Senator Collins and myself
at the outset so that we can get to the witnesses, but since it
is only the three of us, would you like to make an opening
statement?
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KIRK
Senator Kirk. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You
are very kind. I will make a very brief statement in welcoming
Ms. Wagner and thanking you for holding this hearing about her
important nomination to an important office. And I thank
Senator Collins for her comments as well.
As was said, Ms. Wagner has an impressive record in
intelligence, having served at the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DNI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). She may not
know this, I did mention it to her a little earlier, but our
career paths are not totally unconnected since I was an alumnus
of Fort Benning in Columbus, Georgia, where Ms. Wagner was
born, and I am also an alumnus of Fort Devens in Massachusetts
where she served. So we know about neighborhoods, in any event.
My interest will be hearing this morning from Ms. Wagner
about the relationship and the intelligence needs at the State
and local level. That is the line of the first responders. That
is where the action and the antennae, if you will, and the ears
and eyes are open for suspected threats. And that relationship
with the first responders and the training and development of
that area is going to be vitally important, I would think,
under your watch, if you are confirmed.
And the second area is the area of cyberspace and cyber
attacks, which is obviously a network where those who are
looking to do damage to us will focus their attention. And so
the policing of the cyberspace area and also the sharing of
information with those at the State and local level on
intelligence needs, intelligence products that relate to things
on their watch are going to be important as well. So I am going
to look forward to your statement and maybe follow up with some
specific questions in those two areas. So I welcome you. And I
thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to make an opening
statement.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Kirk. I appreciate
it.
Ms. Wagner, as you may know, our Committee rules require
all witnesses at nomination hearings to give their testimony
under oath, so I ask you to please stand and raise your right
hand. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give the
Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you, God?
Ms. Wagner. I do.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. Please be seated, and we
would invite and welcome an opening statement and introduction
of any family or friends that are with you today.
TESTIMONY OF CARYN A. WAGNER,\1\ TO BE UNDER SECRETARY FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Wagner. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. My husband, Chad
Lash, is here, and a friend, Hope Headley.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Wagner appears in the Appendix on
page 23.
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Chairman Lieberman. Good.
Ms. Wagner. I am honored to appear before you as the
nominee for Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at
the Department of Homeland Security. I would like to thank
President Obama and Secretary Napolitano for having the
confidence in me to nominate me for this position.
I believe this position occupies a unique mission space
between the national intelligence and law enforcement
communities and the State, local, tribal, and private sector
entities that are the front lines of homeland security. There
is nothing more important than forging and fostering these
connections. If confirmed, I believe I have the right skills to
continue building on the foundation laid by Pat Hughes, Charlie
Allen, and the current acting Under Secretary, Bart Johnson.
As Senator Kirk mentioned, Mr. Chairman, I began my
intelligence career as a signals intelligence officer in the
U.S. Army, serving 8 years on active duty. In the years since,
I have spent 7\1/2\ years at the Defense Intelligence Agency, 5
years on the staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, 3 years in the private sector, and 3 years with
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. I have had
a mixture of staff and line management positions, including
leading a 2,000-person analytic organization within the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
I have also had a great deal of experience in the
interagency environment, and I am familiar with all facets of
the intelligence community. As Senator Collins noted, however,
my experience with law enforcement has been more limited. I
have had significant exposure while working at the DNI and in
Congress to the capabilities and contributions of national law
enforcement and homeland security agencies. I know I still have
a lot to learn about State, local, and tribal law enforcement,
which is why, if confirmed, I am eager to get started with the
help of Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis, Bart Johnson, who is a highly respected and decorated
veteran of the New York State Police Force and who has done an
outstanding job as Acting Under Secretary for the past 6
months.
I have had the opportunity to observe the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis from the outside while I served in
the Office of the DNI and on the HPSCI staff, and I am aware of
the challenges that the organization still faces. Since my
nomination, I have learned more about I&A's statutory mission,
its ongoing activities and programs, and the Secretary's vision
about where she would like to take the Department. I have
formed some preliminary views on what needs to be done to
enhance I&A's support to its customers and the Department and
to improve its standing within the Intelligence Community and
with its congressional overseers.
If confirmed, I plan to focus my initial efforts in three
main areas: First, creating a true homeland security
information-sharing enterprise through a greater focus on the
State and local fusion centers; second, creating a DHS
intelligence enterprise as the Chief Intelligence Officer for
the Department; and, third, putting in place the management
processes necessary to improve the morale, efficiency, and
professionalism of I&A as an organization.
The unique niche that DHS I&A occupies, as defined by the
Congress, is best defined by its responsibility to share
information with State, local, and tribal authorities and the
private sector on the full range of threats to the homeland--
often referred to as ``all threats, all hazards.'' First
responders at the State and local levels are the Nation's first
line of defense. They are uniquely able to identify anomalous
or criminal behavior that could have a terrorist nexus. It is
critical to educate them on terrorist indicators and behaviors
as they are identified, to capture information that is lawfully
obtained while strictly adhering to privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties regulations, and to share it with the larger
intelligence and law enforcement enterprise. This is a
multifaceted challenge that requires adapting analytic
methodologies and product lines, a great deal of training at
all levels of the enterprise, and information technology (IT)
and information-sharing solutions to enable two-way information
flow. It also requires an approach that is tailored to the
different threat and operational realities of the individual
fusion centers. If confirmed, I intend to develop a
comprehensive, multi-year strategic plan for supporting the
State and local fusion centers that can be used to guide
resource and analytic planning.
The role of Chief Intelligence Officer for the Department
was created to empower the Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis to create a DHS intelligence enterprise that was more
than the sum of its parts. DHS's operational components have
intelligence elements that support their individual missions,
and they also have data and expertise that can be leveraged by
I&A in support of departmental priorities or national, State,
local, and tribal clients, again, while strictly adhering to
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties regulations. In
addition, the components may have intelligence or information
requirements that are not adequately being met. I&A can help to
meet those requirements by leveraging the rest of the
intelligence community on their behalf, producing tailored
products for or with them, providing analytic training and
mentoring, and serving as an advocate for increasing their
organic capabilities. By leveraging both the components' and
I&A capabilities, we can build on the recent progress that you
mentioned, Senator Lieberman, to create a true intelligence
enterprise that enables I&A and the Department to achieve their
full potential and best serve their customers. If confirmed, I
will view the role of Chief Intelligence Officer for the
Department as one of the most important of my missions and
functions, and I will put in place a staff structure to manage
it.
In the management arena, I&A is still a young organization,
and several recent studies have suggested that it suffers from
a lack of institutionalized processes and poor morale. If
confirmed, one of my biggest priorities will be developing and
formalizing internal processes for planning, programming, and
budgeting, performance measurement, and human capital
management, which will include taking a hard look at
contractors in the organization, what they are doing and
whether it is appropriate, and trying to reverse that ratio
that Senator Collins mentioned in her opening statement. I
believe that communicating clear mission guidance, implementing
fair and transparent processes for hiring, promoting, and
rewarding people, and developing a structured and inclusive
process for building the budget will go a long way toward
improving morale. If confirmed, I also plan to make training a
centerpiece of my agenda. I have already mentioned the
importance of training to building information-sharing and
intelligence enterprises, but it is equally important for
professional development and morale within I&A. If confirmed, I
will focus on ensuring that I&A analysts receive the training
and tradecraft that they need.
Finally, if confirmed, I will work hard to establish and
maintain constructive partnerships, particularly with the
Office of the DNI, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC),
the FBI, and the Congress. If confirmed, I pledge to keep you
fully informed of I&A's progress and activities. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much. That was an
excellent opening statement. Obviously, you know about this
area and have thought some about it.
We will have 7-minute rounds of questioning. I am going to
start with the standard questions we ask of all witnesses.
First, is there anything you are aware of in your
background that might present a conflict of interest with the
duties of the office to which you have been nominated?
Ms. Wagner. No.
Chairman Lieberman. Do you know of anything, personal or
otherwise, that would in any way prevent you from fully and
honorably discharging the responsibilities of the office to
which you have been nominated?
Ms. Wagner. No.
Chairman Lieberman. And, finally, do you agree without
reservation to respond to any reasonable summons to appear and
testify before any duly constituted committee of Congress if
you are confirmed?
Ms. Wagner. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you.
Let me begin with just a few baseline factual questions
that I thought about as you were delivering your opening
statement. Do you know how many employees there are in the I&A
Directorate now?
Ms. Wagner. Senator, I believe there are between 600 and
700 employees.
Chairman Lieberman. That sounds right, yes. So it has grown
in the years since it was created. Incidentally, I want to make
an apology on the record to Pat Hughes. How quickly we forget.
I mentioned Charlie Allen and Bart Johnson, but Pat Hughes got
this started and, as part of a long career of service to our
country, did a really great job.
To the best of your knowledge--and maybe you have knowledge
of this particularly from your time at DNI--what is the way the
Under Secretary for I&A interfaces regularly with the rest of
the national intelligence community? Are there regular
meetings?
Ms. Wagner. Yes, Senator Lieberman, there are regular
meetings, and they take place at all levels of the
organization. As the Under Secretary, if confirmed, I would
attend Executive Committee (EXCOM) meetings hosted by the DNI,
along with all the other members of the intelligence community,
on topics ranging from the budget to current intelligence
problems. I know that members of the I&A organization meet
regularly with their counterparts on such things as
establishing collection priorities and ensuring that they are
communicated to the elements of the intelligence community (IC)
that can answer them.
There is also a lot of interaction between the analysts and
the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and
the analytic ombudsman.
Chairman Lieberman. Just in an informal, ongoing way.
Ms. Wagner. Some formal meetings and a lot of informal
coordination on analytic tradecraft, on the analytic guidelines
that have been established in the wake of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. And there is a lot of
interaction with the National Counterterrorism Center, of
course.
Chairman Lieberman. I was going to ask that. Does I&A have
a representative there?
Ms. Wagner. I&A has something called the Interagency Threat
Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) that was created in
legislation. It is made up of State and local law enforcement
officials headed by an I&A employee who reports to Michael
Leiter as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
Chairman Lieberman. So you are plugged into the National
Counterterrorism Center, or I&A is, on a 24/7 basis.
Ms. Wagner. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Lieberman. So before I get to a couple of
substantive questions, let us say that somebody in the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement intelligence section sees
something that is suspect of potential terrorist activity. In
the normal course, how does that make its way up and through
the rest of the intelligence community and to the law
enforcement community?
Ms. Wagner. In the normal course of events, in the course
of executing their legal authorities, if they identify any
information in accordance with those authorities, they would
enter them into appropriate databases and notify the
appropriate person. And I am not 100 percent sure at this point
in my nomination to know exactly how that works, and I would
expect to become familiar with that very early, if I am
confirmed.
The idea of identifying suspicious behavior and reporting
it upward is something that I think is being addressed as part
of the Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, which would
apply much more broadly than just to components of DHS. And
that would be, based on what I have read and learned, a very
structured, formal process to ensure that the information is
reported in a way that is useful and, again, consistent with
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. Is that process being initiated
by the DNI?
Ms. Wagner. I believe it is being initiated from the White
House with the cooperation----
Chairman Lieberman. Through John Brennan.
Ms. Wagner [continuing]. Of multiple elements of the
Executive Branch.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Well, this is really important,
and I am going to go now to a question about what happened at
Fort Hood with Major Hasan. Again, hindsight is always clearer,
but it was really about a judgment call made by the people at
the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) who looked at the e-mails
apparently between Hasan and the radical imam in Yemen and what
decision they made about whether to share that or not. So this
heightened sensitivity, very difficult, I understand, because
the data flowing by people and all the components of the
Department of Homeland Security and intelligence divisions
every day is large, but how to sensitize them to err on the
side of caution when they see something that worries them, I
think without prejudging, is going to be one of the conclusions
we are going to make about the Hasan case and the people at
JTTF who happen to be looking at those e-mail transcripts. Do
you agree? I am not asking for a judgment on the Hasan case,
but just generally about the handling of suspect data.
Ms. Wagner. Yes. Generally, I would agree. I am not, as the
nominee, briefed on all the details of the Hasan case.
Chairman Lieberman. Understood. This Committee, as you
probably know, has launched an investigation into the terrorist
attack at Fort Hood by Nidal Hasan. I&A plays an important role
today with respect to radicalization and violent Islamist
extremism, producing analytic reports and disseminating them
often at the ``For Official Use Only'' (FOUO) level to key
partners in State and local law enforcement.
For instance, and of real interest, I&A issued reports at
the FOUO level to State and local law enforcement in September
2008 and January 2009 on Anwar al-Awlaki, the radical Yemeni-
American imam who, according to media reports, was involved in
this e-mail correspondence with Hasan.
I want to ask you what you believe I&A's responsibility
should be with respect to analysis of radicalization and
violent Islamist extremism and how should those
responsibilities be distinct from the FBI or, in another
sense--less relevant, but relevant--the National
Counterterrorism Center.
Ms. Wagner. Thank you for that question because I have
actually given that some thought.
Chairman Lieberman. Good.
Ms. Wagner. I think that I&A plays an important role both
before and after and, to a lesser extent, during these kinds of
investigations. And certainly analysis of radical and violent
extremism is an appropriate mission, with the emphasis on the
violent part.
I expect that they would coordinate closely with analysts
who are working on this issue at NCTC and other elements of the
community to ensure that the products are meeting the needs of
their specific State, local, and tribal customer sets. Where
they do not, I would expect I&A to try to fill those gaps and
tailor those products or take them to the next level since the
goal is to leverage that knowledge and expertise to provide
actionable, useful information that the first responders/
preventers can use to identify these behaviors early on and
potentially stop any terrorist plots from going on.
So before something would happen, you would expect, exactly
as you said, that I&A would be putting out products to provide
situational awareness and, wherever possible, specific
indicators and actionable intelligence for use for the fusion
centers to pass on in their areas of jurisdiction.
During an investigation, they would support the FBI by
ensuring that all of the information that resides within the
DHS components and that they have gleaned from State, local,
and tribal sources would be brought to bear to support the
investigation. And afterward, they would participate in any
after-action lessons learned and, again, try to translate that
into useful, actionable products that could be put out to
State, local, and Tribal law enforcement.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks. I appreciate the answer. It is
clear you have thought about it. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Wagner, you have talked about the reports and products
that I&A produces. Obviously, it is critical that those
products be of high quality. Earlier this year, I&A produced a
report on right-wing extremism in the United States that was
widely panned. It was considered to be poorly written and
inadequately sourced. It needlessly offended a number of
veterans organizations such that Secretary Napolitano had to
make apologies for the Department.
It is also of concern to me to learn, when we looked into
this, that the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties had
not concurred with the release of the report, and yet it was
released. The Office of General Counsel had not reviewed the
report, and yet it had been released.
Have you read this report?
Ms. Wagner. Yes, Senator Collins, I have.
Senator Collins. What is your judgment of the quality of
the analysis in the report?
Ms. Wagner. I believe that the report showed some serious
shortcomings in tradecraft and in concern for privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties.
Senator Collins. Do you believe that the Department, and
I&A in particular, has now adopted a sufficient process to help
ensure the quality of future reports and prevent poorly sourced
and poorly written reports such as this one from being released
in the future?
Ms. Wagner. I know that they have taken steps to put in
place a process for vetting, review, and release of products to
ensure that the tradecraft is rigorous and that the appropriate
concerns for privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties have
been accommodated in the products. If confirmed, I will
certainly review that process to make sure it is adequate, and
I intend to focus a great deal, along with Dawn Scalici, who is
the new Deputy Under Secretary for Analysis and has worked at
the National Counterterrorism Center, to ensure that we are
inculcating the analysts with the appropriate tradecraft,
providing them mentoring, taking advantage of the analytic
ombudsman at the DNI, and everything we need to do to raise the
level of tradecraft in I&A.
Senator Collins. The Homeland Security Institute recently
reviewed the activities of the Office, and among its findings
was that it concluded that I&A had not clearly defined the
value that it adds to the products that we just discussed that
are distributed to stakeholders. Clearly, our vision was that
I&A would do more than simply disseminate intelligence reports
prepared by other components of the intelligence community.
That, too, is important, but what do you see as I&A's role in
adding value to analysis that may be prepared elsewhere to make
sure that it meets the needs of your customers?
Ms. Wagner. Senator Collins, I think it has to start with
ensuring that we have the best understanding of what the
requirements of the customers are, and part of that is going to
involve sending more I&A people out to the fusion centers to
live that life for a while and possibly even bringing some of
those folks back for a mutual exchange of perspectives.
I am going to rely a lot on Bart Johnson to help me as I go
out to the fusion centers to understand what should we be
providing, and then I think what I&A needs to do--and will do
if I am confirmed--is examine how do you best meet those
requirements. In some cases, you can meet it by using the
analysis produced by other elements of the community with a few
changes. In others, you are going to have to tailor that or,
again, take it that next step, sort of like what the ITACG
folks do at NCTC where they can sometimes find a paragraph
within a highly classified report that is classified at a much
lower level, but includes a nugget of really useful information
on a terrorist methodology that you can then extract out,
package, add whatever needs to be added, and get out to the
customers.
In some cases, we may find that the intelligence community
is not producing the information we need to meet those
requirements, and then I&A would have to determine whether they
want to establish their own ability to do that kind of original
analysis or leverage a task on the intelligence community.
So I think the answer is to figure out the best way to meet
the need and get it done, and it will be a combination of
tailoring an original analysis and levying requirements on the
rest of the community.
Senator Collins. You mentioned in your opening statement
that although you have a great deal of experience on Capitol
Hill and in certain intelligence agencies, you have not worked
closely with State and local law enforcement and tribal law
enforcement, and that is a critical role that the Department of
Homeland Security plays.
Other than relying on and learning from Deputy Secretary
Johnson, who, I agree, is a tremendous asset to you, how do you
intend to compensate for that gap in your experience? What will
you do beyond turning to your Deputy?
Ms. Wagner. I intend to travel to some of the State and
local fusion centers and basically meet the people, talk to
them, and try to understand what it is that they need and what
they are looking to I&A to provide. And I will, obviously, read
as much as I can. I will try very hard to learn as much as I
can as quickly as I can.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins. Senator Kirk.
Senator Kirk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is in part a follow-up to Senator Collins' question,
and it has to do with what I will call the local, State first
responders and so forth who are the front line of this effort
and so many others. And I know that the Department is making
some strides to, shall we say, increase progress on its
information sharing and that you particularly, if confirmed,
hope to do more in that area.
One of the things that you may hear as you travel around
and visit is that the intelligence products are sometimes not
relevant or helpful to those at the State and local level, that
they may be just not useful and too dense and so forth. So one
of the things that perhaps you could speak to this morning is,
if you have enough knowledge at this point, what you might do
about it, is how you intend to improve and strengthen
information sharing, and I am especially interested in how you
would provide tailored intelligence products so they are more
relevant and useful on the front lines.
Ms. Wagner. Thank you, Senator Kirk. I do think that there
is somewhat of a parallel--not an exact parallel, but somewhat
of a parallel--to work that I have done in the past in the
military. When I was at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
one of the functions of the analytic organization that I led
was to provide actionable and useful intelligence to deployed
forces in theater. And it was a similar exercise of, is this
just sort of academic information that is not necessarily going
to help them, or is this something that they can actually use
and act on.
There is also a long tradition in the military of being
able to put out information at lower classification levels
without sources and methods that then can be acted on by
tactical forces. And so I think there are some parallels in my
experience.
But I will focus on looking at what is the bottom line of
these products. If I read it, do I see that there can be some
action taken, some training provided, something that will
actually move the ball down the field, if you will. And I know
that Bart Johnson is focused on that as well, and he and the
ITACG have actually already started, I think, a very nice
product line called the Roll Call Release, which is a one-pager
designed for the local police forces to use during their roll
calls. And those are the kinds of things I think we need to
focus on.
Senator Kirk. The other aspect of this is the collection of
information at the local level. In some areas, it has been
suggested that, as the information is collected and then
hopefully shared, training would be more helpful so that those
on the front line could be more sophisticated perhaps in how
and what to do with that information. Do you have some thoughts
about that and how you might be able to help on the training
aspect of the front-line folks again?
Ms. Wagner. I think training is absolutely critical. The
State and local fusion centers are State-run entities. They do
not belong to the Federal Government, and they are part of an
enterprise. They need to be mutually reinforcing, and we need
to support them, and they are providing information back to us.
One of the things that I&A and the Department can do to
help them is to help train the people that are there, both the
I&A people and the other folks at the fusion centers, so that
they understand the legal frameworks within which they are
collecting information and the requirements for safeguarding
that information, how long it can be stored, and that is
definitely something that, if I am confirmed, I will focus on,
trying to ascertain what training is needed and start providing
it to anybody actually who is interested.
Senator Kirk. If I may, I am just going to thank you for
that. I wanted to switch now, if I could, to the cyberspace
issue, and, again, it is the collecting and disseminating of
cyberspace information and possible threats from the local
level to the sharing entities and also the training of local
folks within the cyberspace area because that, it seems to me,
in this age and moving forward is going to be a potential
battleground, if you will, that we need to protect. So any
thoughts that you want to offer with respect to that?
Ms. Wagner. Well, I agree with your assessment of the
cybersecurity threat. I believe that right now I&A's efforts in
cybersecurity are focused on critical infrastructure
protection, and there is an analytic effort that is taking
place as part of the joint threat vulnerability analysis for
critical infrastructure. I do not know yet whether that is
sufficient, and if confirmed, one of the things I intend to do
is to meet with Phil Reitinger, who is the Deputy Under
Secretary for Cybersecurity within the Department, and find out
ways that I&A can team with him to provide more analytic
support to what is going on as the cybersecurity effort ramps
up. And one of the key areas that I will discuss with him is
the information-sharing piece and what role I&A should play in
that. And I will do everything I can to support the
Department's efforts to ramp up that capability consistent with
the overall Administration's approach.
Senator Kirk. And just perhaps a final follow-up, if I may.
Tell me, if you know, what the Department's role in information
sharing is with the private sector, and particularly I am
thinking, obviously, about our electric national grid system
and utilities and the danger or threat that might pertain with
the kidnapping of key products or the dismantling of certain
transformers and the impact it might have on the Nation's
communications system and other aspects of electric-based
transmissions.
Ms. Wagner. I believe the Department has a very robust
information-sharing effort with the private sector in all of
the key domains for critical infrastructure protection. I&A's
role in that is working with the critical infrastructure
protection folks to assess the threat to the infrastructure, so
I&A teams with the analysts who are looking at the
vulnerability, and they bring the threat component, and those
products are produced jointly and they are shared with the
private sector components of each of the domains that they deal
with.
Senator Kirk. I am beyond my time, but I would only repeat
that, if you are confirmed, it seems to me that in the age in
which we live and to which we are headed, that is a very
sensitive and potentially threatening area of technology that
we need to protect for the purpose of the security of our
homeland.
Ms. Wagner. Yes, Senator, I agree.
Senator Kirk. Good. Thank you very much, Ms. Wagner. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Kirk.
I have one or two more questions. Obviously, my colleagues
are welcome to ask questions, too. We just will do a quick
second round.
I want to come back to these two great areas of potential
for value-added through the Intelligence and Analysis
Directorate. We always, after September 11, 2001, use the
metaphor of connecting the dots on the board, and it seems to
me that in your role you have the ability to bring quite
relevant dots to the board from within the Department of
Homeland Security and from State and local.
In the 9/11 Act of 2007, as I am sure you know, we gave the
Under Secretary strong authorities with respect to the
management and integration of intelligence components within
the various agencies of DHS, including authorities to develop a
consolidated intelligence budget for the intelligence
components of the Department. I wanted to ask you if you have
thought about how you would use that authority and others to
harmonize policies, standards, and processes within the
Department in a way that would not only enhance integration but
make it more likely that you would bring dots up from within
the Department to put on the board to be connected.
Ms. Wagner. Yes, Senator, I have thought about that. I do
not know that I have an answer at this point, but I think that
it is a very powerful tool that you have provided to the Under
Secretary, and I would expect that it could be very useful in
helping to evaluate the capabilities of the intelligence
elements of the components of the Department to ensure that
they are providing optimal support to their components and also
to put in place the infrastructure to make sure that we can get
the information and expertise that resides there to bring to
bear on other problems, both to support other components and
other parts of the community.
So I think it is a useful tool. I also think that
potentially there needs to be sort of a staff element within
I&A that is focused on administering this effort. And that is
something that I have been thinking about and, if confirmed, I
will certainly explore.
Chairman Lieberman. Good. The final question is about the
other part of it, which is State and local, and we had the
exchange with Senator Kirk about information sharing. There is
greater access--but not as great as it should be--to databases.
Now, I know there have been a couple of cases at least that I
know of where a local or State police officer stopped someone,
had a suspicion, plugged into a terrorism watchlist, and
actually apprehended people who turned out to be planning
terrorist activities and were charged with violations of law.
It seems to me that the other part of this may be to try to
train, in some sense educate, the hundreds of thousands of
State and local law enforcement officers and tribal law
enforcement officers we have across the country to think of
themselves as not just first responders but first preventers
and to see themselves as intelligence gatherers. A police
officer walking along the beat has a responsibility to that
neighborhood, etc. But he or she may see something that has an
intelligence aspect to it, and to educate them to report on it
is, I think, an important tool. I have no idea what is going on
in this regard. I do not know whether you do, but I wanted to
mention it to you.
Ms. Wagner. Well, I agree. They are absolutely critical.
They are the first line of defense. And I think the kind of
product that I mentioned earlier, the Roll Call Release that
you can send out to all of the local police departments so that
they can brief their folks, is a good step in that direction,
and also training, obviously.
I think there will be a great deal of training that is
going to be associated with the Suspicious Activity Reporting
Initiative. When that moves from the pilot project to be more
broadly implemented, it will be absolutely key for that to
happen so that what you are getting is quality information.
So I agree with you, and I need to explore, if I am
confirmed, the ways to make every first preventer aware of the
kind of information that would be useful if it was passed back
up the line.
Chairman Lieberman. Good. Thank you. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just one final question. I&A has significant human capital
issues. It has a very lengthy hiring process that often
discourages highly qualified applicants so they get snapped up
by other agencies at other levels of government. It also has
problems in providing a career path for individuals who are
hired, and thus, I&A has individuals working there with low
morale and with a lot of turnover. And that has led to an
overreliance on contractors, which in turn limits opportunities
for people who are working there as Federal employees. So it is
a vicious circle in many ways.
In 2007, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) did a
review and discovered that DHS had a particularly high number
of contractors who were performing inherently governmental
functions, and that should not occur. We held a hearing on that
GAO report, and to see a couple of years later that I&A still
has a workforce that is made up of more than 60 percent
contract employees is very disturbing because it shows that no
one is taking this problem seriously.
How do you intend to address the workforce needs of I&A?
Obviously, we need to have long-term career employees at I&A
that will help to improve the quality and the quantity of the
products that they are producing, so it is an important issue.
So what steps would you take to reduce the reliance on Federal
contractors and build a highly qualified cadre of Federal
employees?
Ms. Wagner. I will rely on the guidelines that exist from
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the DNI on the
use of contractors to inform what I do. But I also intend to
basically, if I am confirmed, look across the board at who is
doing what and map out a strategic human capital plan that says
how many people we think we need for these functions.
There are some functions that are on a growth path, like
potentially cybersecurity analysis, and others that potentially
may not need all the resources currently devoted to them. We
will try to reallocate. We will try to look at making sure that
contractors are being used in an appropriate way consistent
with the DNI and OMB guidelines.
And as for the hiring, I had a similar challenge in DIA,
and what I will do initially is map out the entire hiring
process and try to find out where the problems are. There is
always going to be a percentage of that process from when you
think about hiring someone to when they walk in the door that
you do not control. But when you map it out, you actually find
out that you control a lot more of it than you thought. And the
things that I can affect, if I am confirmed, I am going to make
a matter of my management leadership emphasis to try to bring
some new blood and some new people into those billets.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Very good. Thanks very much. Thanks for
appearing before the Committee. Thanks for your service to the
country up until now, and if you are confirmed, obviously, we
look forward to working with you as you develop this very
important function of the Department, over which we have an
oversight responsibility, to yet greater levels of its
potential.
Without objection, the record will be kept open until 12
noon tomorrow for the submission of any written questions or
statements, and we will try our best to see if we can get you
confirmed as soon as possible.
Ms. Wagner. Thank you, Senator Lieberman and Senator
Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much. The hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:02 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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