[Senate Hearing 111-351]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-351
SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM: MOVING FORWARD ON MODERNIZATION
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HEARING
before the
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 15, 2009
__________
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JON TESTER, Montana
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
Lisa M. Powell, Staff Director
Evan W. Cash, Professional Staff Member
Shelley K. Finlayson, Legislative Fellow
Jennifer A. Hemingway, Minority Staff Director
Tara Shaw, Minority Counsel
Benjamin B. Rhodeside, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Akaka................................................ 1
Senator Voinovich............................................ 2
Senator Burris............................................... 4
WITNESSES
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
Hon. Jeffrey D. Zients, Deputy Director for Management and Chief
Performance Officer, Office of Management and Budget........... 5
Hon. John Berry, Director, U.S. Office of Personnel Management... 7
Hon. James R. Clapper, Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, U.S. Department of Defense....................... 8
David R. Shedd, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for
Policy, Plans, and Requirements, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.......................................... 10
Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 11
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Berry, Hon. John:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Clapper, Hon. James R.:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Joint prepared statement with Mr. Shedd...................... 41
Farrell, Brenda S.:
Testimony.................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Shedd, David R.:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Joint prepared statement with Mr. Clapper.................... 41
Zients, Hon. Jeffrey D.:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 29
APPENDIX
Background....................................................... 63
Questions and Responses to questions:
Mr. Zients with an attachment for question 13................ 70
Mr. Berry.................................................... 83
Mr. Clapper.................................................. 91
SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM: MOVING FORWARD ON MODERNIZATION
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TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce,
and the District of Columbia,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K.
Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Akaka, Burris, and Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Good afternoon. This hearing of the
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia is called to order.
I want to welcome you to our sixth hearing on reforming the
security clearance process, which has been on the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) High-Risk List since 2005. Since
we began this line of hearings, much progress has been made in
laying the groundwork for reform. Now is the time to move
forward with modernizing the security clearance process in the
Federal Government.
When this issue was originally placed on the High-Risk
List, it was designated as a problem with the Department of
Defense's (DOD) clearance process. However, through our
oversight, it has become clear that this problem must be looked
at through a government-wide lens and in conjunction with
suitability screening. The last Administration, with the
support of dedicated career civil servants on the front lines
of this issue, worked hard to reduce processing times for
security clearances. The backlog of security clearance
determinations has all but vanished, but the investigations
still rely on outdated, paper-based processes.
We must use this opportunity to make fundamental changes to
the process to ensure that we do not experience the same
problems in the future. Modernizing also will lead to more
efficient operations and will help with another key priority of
mine, streamlining the Federal hiring process and making it
more user friendly.
It is also time to further examine the quality of clearance
investigations and adjudications. This means creating and
implementing meaningful metrics that can be audited so that we
know the system is working. The security of our Nation depends
on ensuring that security clearance decisions are based on
thorough, modern, and risk-based determinations.
With metrics in place, it will become clear that one of the
biggest barriers to modernizing the clearance system is
reinventing and modernizing the information technology (IT)
infrastructure at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the
Department of Defense, and within the intelligence community. I
have been concerned for years about the outdated systems in use
throughout the clearance process. Some of these systems date
back over 20 years.
Every change in the Administration brings inevitable
delays, as new leaders are put into place and get up to speed.
Some of the reforms outlined by the Joint Reform Team made up
of government stakeholders involved in issuing clearances and
suitability determinations at our hearing last May are behind
schedule.
It is important, after years of work put into reform, that
it continues to move forward in a meaningful way. We must work
to modernize the clearance process in order to remove it from
the High-Risk List as soon as possible.
While progress has been made, with timeliness greatly
improved and backlogs reduced, meeting the Intelligence Reform
Act's milestones alone should not be the ultimate goal. This
will require the buy-in of all stakeholders, a willingness to
collaborate, and the knowledge and skills that the reform team
has brought to the table.
I again want to thank all of our witnesses for appearing
today. I also want to recognize the dedicated career
professionals, those sitting behind our witnesses, as well as
those who are not here today, who have been working on this
issue for years. I again want to thank you all for your
service.
I especially want to thank Kathy Dillaman, who has worked
with this Subcommittee for many years and who I understand will
be eligible for retirement in the coming years.
I also want to thank Senator Voinovich for his continued
dedication to this issue. We have worked together on this issue
seamlessly, no matter who was the Chairman, and I think we have
shown that great progress can be achieved through oversight. I
know that Senator Voinovich is anxious to resolve some of these
pressing government management problems as he looks forward to
retirement, so I would urge you all to work hard on this issue
over the next year.
With that, I will recognize Senator Voinovich for his
statement. Senator Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
witnesses for being here today.
We are continuing to review the Federal Government's effort
to reform the security clearance process. We have worked on
this for a long time. This is our sixth hearing. This goes back
5 years--we started in 2005--so if some of our words today are
from a little bit of exasperation about things, you will
understand, for the newcomers here.
More than 4 years after our first hearing, the DOD's
security clearance process remains on GAO's High-Risk List and
I see little evidence of progress thus far in furtherance of
Congressional security clearance reform mandates. I am anxious
to hear from our new people about this.
Reforming the security clearance process and removing DOD's
personal security clearance process from GAO's High-Risk List
are priorities for me in, as Senator Akaka said, my final
Congress. I have always believed that the Executive Branch
could get DOD's clearance process off the High-Risk List, and I
want to see that happen. I intend to closely monitor efforts in
this regard and have told my staff I want weekly updates on
progress made to get DOD's personnel clearance process off the
High-Risk List before I leave.
There are many reasons this is important, perhaps most
notably because of the cost of the security clearance process.
Mr. Chairman, I cited this statistic before, but I think it
bears repeating. An August 2007, Department of Defense report
on security clearance investigations estimated it took an
average of 208 days to process ``secret'' clearance requests
for industry. For every day a contract employee is on the job
without the appropriate clearance, it costs the taxpayer
approximately $684 in lost salary and benefits because the
contractor is not able to do the job he is being paid to do.
Over 208 days, a secret clearance for one person costs more
than $140,000, about three times the 2007 median U.S. household
income of $50,000. This is pretty serious business.
Some real headway has been made to reduce this time. As the
Government Accountability Office noted in its May report,
Executive Branch agencies responsible for investigating or
adjudicating clearances have made significant progress in
improving the timeliness in clearance processing. Specifically,
in 2004, top secret clearance investigations took almost 400
days and today they take less than 80 days. Similarly, initial
secret clearance investigations took about 200 days in 2004,
and today they take less than 50. This is significant progress,
and I recognize and appreciate that. But it remains to be seen
whether the 2009 benchmark for processing clearance requests in
60 days will be met.
Additionally, even if that benchmark is met, timeliness is
just one aspect of the security clearance reform that Congress
called for in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act (IRTPA). The law also calls for a number of other actions,
including uniform policies regarding the security clearance
process, reciprocal recognition of security clearances among
agencies, and an evaluation of the use of technology to
expedite security clearance processes. Senator Akaka, I think,
did a pretty good job of outlining what we need to do there.
I am particularly concerned about the lack of progress
being made regarding reciprocity. I still consistently hear
from individuals who have problems having one agency accept
another agency's clearance. I am also concerned about the lack
of progress in, as I mentioned, implementing technology. I
believe the Executive Branch needs to do more to address these
requirements. As GAO noted in May, problems related to the
quality of security clearance investigations and adjudication
determinations, reciprocity of clearance determinations, and
information technology persist.
The Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team recognized
that more work regarding the security clearance process is
needed when, in December 2008, it issued a report with tasks to
be achieved during 2009, including implementing a revised
electronic questionnaire (e-QIP); deploying an automated
records check (ARC), capability in the Department of the Army,
and developing a strategy for further ARC use; developing a
curriculum for training national security clearance
professions; and revising the questionnaire for national
security positions.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) tells me it is
coordinating interagency review of these and other proposals
and I am anxious to hear about the results of that review. I
also want to know when that review will be complete and when
all of the called-for-reforms will be implemented. To that end,
I expect OMB to report to us in writing about any changes that
are made to the December 2008 Joint Reform Team Plan, including
a specific implementation timeline for each of the initiatives
called for in that plan so we know that this is down in writing
and there are goals that are being set.
I want to thank our witnesses again for their
participation. I am confident that if we all work together, we
can achieve security clearance that saves the Federal
Government time and money.
I am particularly glad to have the Government
Accountability Office here today, because last year, I
expressed concern that the Department of Defense security
clearance process, which was added to the GAO's High-Risk List
in 2005, would remain on the list in 2009. My prediction proved
true. In January, GAO continued the designation of DOD's
clearance process on the High-Risk List. As I mentioned
earlier, getting DOD's security clearance process off the High-
Risk List is a priority for me. Again, I look forward to
hearing from you today. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
It is really a pleasure for me to welcome our witnesses
today. But before I introduce our witnesses, let me call on
Senator Burris for his opening statement. Senator Burris.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, to Ranking Member
Voinovich and to our distinguished panel. I am very anxious to
hear all this great testimony from this distinguished panel.
I am aware that this Subcommittee has held several hearings
on the topic of security clearance reform. I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses and discussing ways to further
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the security
clearance process. Having been through the security clearance
process many years ago, I am interested to see what updates
have been made.
Considering that the government conducts roughly 800,000
security clearances and investigations each year, I was pleased
to learn about the progress we made in cutting down on the
investigative time, improving database technology, and
bolstering interagency cooperation. Nevertheless, our efforts
are far from over.
Just recently, as Senator Voinovich mentioned, I had a
problem with my own office relating to the reciprocity of one
staffer who had a security clearance from a Federal agency
which was not reciprocal here in the Senate. I witnessed
firsthand the challenges this presented for the staffer as well
as the impact it had on the office as a whole. Work was
delayed, certain briefings could not be attended, and the
questions arose that could have been avoided if ongoing
problems surrounding their agency reciprocity security
clearance was resolved.
So I am eager to learn more about this issue as well as the
other obstacles that could be avoided with better oversight and
management of our security clearance process. I look forward to
working with the entities here today in implementing a proper
reform goal needed for improvement.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I will then have
some questions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Burris.
Now I will introduce our witnesses: Jeffrey Zients, Deputy
Director for Management and Chief Performance Officer at the
Office of Management and Budget; John Berry, Director of the
Office of Personnel Management; Lieutenant General James
Clapper, Under Secretary for Intelligence at the Department of
Defense; David Shedd, Deputy Director of National Intelligence
for Policy, Plans, and Requirements for the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence; and Brenda Farrell,
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Government
Accountability Office.
It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in all
witnesses, so I ask all of you to stand and raise your right
hand.
Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give this
Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Zients. I do.
Mr. Berry. I do.
Mr. Clapper. I do.
Mr. Shedd. I do.
Ms. Farrell. I do.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Let the record show
that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Although statements are limited to 5 minutes, I want all of
our witnesses to know that their entire statements will be
included in the record.
Director Zients, will you please proceed with your
statement.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JEFFREY D. ZIENTS,\1\ DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR
MANAGEMENT AND CHIEF PERFORMANCE OFFICER, U.S. OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Mr. Zients. Thank you. Chairman Akaka, Ranking Member
Voinovich, and Senator Burris, thank you for inviting me here
today. It is my privilege to testify on behalf of the Office of
Management and Budget to discuss the Administration's ongoing
security clearance reform efforts and the status of
implementing those reforms.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Zients appears in the Appendix on
page 29.
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The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, challenged the Federal Government to address longstanding
problems with the timeliness and the coordination for granting
national security clearances. Executive Order 13467 reinforced
the goals of IRTPA and recognized OMB as the lead agency to
ensure coordination across the Federal Government.
OMB, OPM, and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), along with the Department of Defense,
comprise the Joint Reform Team and together provide leadership
regarding reforms to policy, processes, and information
technology which affect the approximately 2,000,000 security
and suitability determinations conducted by the government each
year.
Much has been accomplished to reform the process and
improve timeliness. Of note, processing times for initial
clearance investigations are down sharply since 2004 and the
backlog of pending clearance investigations, once over 100,000
cases, is now gone. These accomplishments are significant and
testify to the dedication of the staff at the agencies
representing the security and suitability community, as well as
to your leadership and persistent focus on these issues.
However, much remains to be accomplished. By the end of
2009, IRTPA requires that, to the extent practicable, 90
percent of security clearances must be completed within an
average of 60 days, providing 40 days, on average, for
investigations and 20 days, on average, for adjudications. To
achieve this goal with sustainable solutions that also enhance
quality, we must continue to reform and modernize existing
processes. These ongoing efforts will require focus and
execution, but I believe we have a strong plan from which to
move forward.
Since beginning work at OMB in late June, I have worked
with the leadership of the reform effort to finalize the plan
updates to the standard forms that support the security and
suitability clearance processes. These updates will support
better alignment between security and suitability processes and
thus drive greater efficiencies and higher quality for both.
Upon review, we determined that certain suitability
positions would not require investigations as detailed as the
security investigations with which they had been aligned under
the original plan. As a result of this determination, it is
necessary to modify the underlying investigative standards and
make the appropriate changes to the appropriate forms, Standard
Forms 85 and 86.
I am pleased to report that I expect the revised Standard
Form 86, which is used in national security investigations,
will be available for public comment by the end of this month.
And following a review of any comments received, we will make
final revisions to the Federal Investigative Standards. We will
make any changes to our overall development and implementation
schedule as a result of these changes. However, I remain
committed and confident that the reforms will be substantially
operational across the Federal Government by the end of
calendar year 2010.
Later this month, in my role as Chairman, I will lead a
meeting of the Performance and Accountability Council to
underscore the importance of this effort, reinvigorate
leadership among participating agencies, and reinforce the
close partnership necessary between the executive agents for
security and suitability, as well as DOD and OMB. From my
experience in the private sector leading transformational
projects such as this, the participation of major project
champions is essential for success.
With this support, the other keys to successfully driving
this reform effort include the development of detailed work
plans among the Joint Reform Team and all partners;
establishing appropriate metrics for the measurement and
management of the initiative; identifying problems early and
thinking creatively about solutions; and holding people
accountable for outcomes. I will ensure all of these elements
are in place and will maintain a relentless focus on the
overarching goals of improved timeliness, reciprocity, and
quality.
In summary, our shared goal of improving the suitability
and security clearance process is one of tremendous importance
to me personally and all the agencies at this table. It will
remain a high priority for this Administration.
I also want to recognize the important role that the
Government Accountability Office plays in the reform
initiative. I look forward to working with them toward our
common objective of improved performance and toward the goal of
removing the DOD security clearance program from their High-
Risk List.
The advances to date are certainly commendable, but much
work remains. With the commitment of this cross-agency team and
the continued support of this Subcommittee, I am confident we
will meet our goal of improving the timeliness, reciprocity,
and quality of clearance decisions for the security of the
American people.
Senators, we indeed will work very hard. Once again, thank
you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I would be
happy to answer any questions you have.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Director Zients.
Mr. Zients. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Now, we will hear from Director Berry. Will
you please proceed?
TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN BERRY,\1\ DIRECTOR, U.S. OFFICE OF
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
Mr. Berry. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you. And Mr. Chairman, I want to echo sentiments that you
made in your opening remarks. Ms. Dillaman, who sits behind me,
is our career Senior Executive who has been working on this
over the years, and all of the good news that I have to report
to you today is largely the work from her and her team. She has
been a phenomenal leader and I want to thank her for her
incredible efforts on this issue and recognize its importance.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Berry appears in the Appendix on
page 35.
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Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to underscore some of
the numbers. When OPM took over these investigations 5 years
ago, 90 percent of the cases were taking over 300 days per
year. In fact, in many cases, approaching 400 days per year. I
am very proud to come before this Subcommittee today and tell
you that we are ahead of schedule in meeting the December goal.
We will reach this year 90 percent of investigations being
completed in 40 days or less. That is not due until December,
but we are ahead of schedule. So that is significant progress,
and that is largely due to Ms. Dillaman's efforts and the
efforts of her team and all of the folks at this table.
The other thing that is, I think, important to point out is
the costs in addressing this over the 5 years have remained
within the inflation rate, within 1 percent. So there has not
been a significant increase in costs, we have been able to do
this responsibly.
Senator Voinovich, at my confirmation hearing, I promised
you that I would look into these issues. You raised the forms
at that point, that there was an issue involving a logjam on
these form issues. I have to tell you, it has been an honor and
a pleasure working with David Shedd and General Clapper on that
issue and I am pleased to report to this Subcommittee today, we
have reached consensus on the forms, and those are ready to go.
OMB is in their final review, and I think they will be in print
and you will see them done. So I am very pleased to report that
that logjam has been broken.
It doesn't mean we are all the way there, especially on IT
and reciprocity, two issues which this Subcommittee has been
dogging from the beginning.
On the automation efforts, at least on the investigations
front, we are well on our way. We are more than halfway there,
and we fully expect that we will be on schedule in meeting the
objectives of the plan. Obviously, if this is going to work, we
have got to be able to make this information accessible
electronically, and we will not rest until that is done. But
Ms. Dillaman and her team are well on the way.
And then the last thing I just want to do is to tip my hat
again to Mr. Shedd and General Clapper. They have been at this
issue for many years. They have been persistent in wrestling
these issues to the ground with us. Our team, working closely
with theirs, has developed a great comradeship in this effort.
My pledge to you is I will stay engaged and involved with this,
with Mr. Zients, General Clapper, and Mr. Shedd, until the job
is done.
So we won't rest until the GAO can sit at the end of the
table and say this has been removed from the high-risk
category, and I think that is within striking distance. We
aren't at the goal line yet, but we are within 10 yards. So I
am very optimistic.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Director Berry. That
has been great news.
Now, I would like to call on General Clapper for your
statement.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR.,\1\ UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Clapper. Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, and Senator
Burris, the Department of Defense shares the Subcommittee's
great interest in and focus on security clearance reform. It is
a top transformation priority for the Secretary and the Deputy
Secretary of Defense.
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\1\ The joint prepared statement of Mr. Clapper and Mr. Shedd
appears in the Appendix on page 41.
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I met with the Secretary yesterday and he specifically
asked me to thank you for your sustained support for clearance
reform. You can appreciate why we are so vitally interested.
Our volume of security clearance cases is approximately 1.2
million at a cost of nearly $1 billion a year.
While a lot of progress has been made in reducing the
security clearance backlog through Herculean efforts, it is
clear that end-to-end transformation of the security clearance
process is necessary if we are going to meet, and importantly,
sustain, the 2009 goals required by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act. In other words, said perhaps more
bluntly, I think we pretty much squeezed the blood out of our
current turnip and we need to go to a modernized system using
modern technology and focused investigations on what actually
produces relevant security data.
Earlier this year, the Government Accountability Office
identified several improvements needed in the adjudication of
Department of Defense security clearances, and I wanted to make
known that in response, we have taken the following actions.
First, the Department's Personal Security Research Center,
which I happened to visit last Thursday, worked with select
Central Adjudication Facility representatives to develop a
formal, professional certification program for adjudicators.
The program includes a governing board charter, business rules,
and an experience requirements checklist.
Second, we developed guidance for documenting adjudicative
rationales. This ensures that adjudicators will more thoroughly
document relevant information used to make their decisions and
help promote consistency among our Central Adjudication
Facilities (CAFs). This tool will be fielded by the end of the
year.
Third, we developed an automated tool that gathers specific
information about incomplete security investigations or
investigations that do not meet adjudicator needs. By the end
of this month, this tool will provide visibility to improve the
investigative process. It will also provide an automated
request for additional investigative work, which reduces the
number of forms adjudicators must complete.
We took another significant step in transforming the
adjudication process last November when the Army implemented
electronic adjudication which applies decision support
technology to assist in the processing of secret cases. The e-
Adjudication System screens all secret-level cases for military
members and automatically mediates so-called clean cases, which
are cases with no issues or acceptably minor issues. Since the
Army fully implemented e-Adjudication earlier this year, almost
70,000 eligible cases were screened. Nearly one-third of those
clean cases were automatically adjudicated. This means these
cases required no human review, which results obviously in
significant efficiencies.
Earlier this month, e-Adjudication was expanded to our
industrial cases, which represents almost 180,000 additional
cases annually. We expect that a quarter of these will qualify
for automatic adjudication, illuminating the need for human
intervention. The Department plans to roll out this capability
to Air Force and Navy adjudications by the end of the year.
We plan to co-locate the Department of Defense adjudication
facilities by 2012 as required by Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC). As part of that effort and in anticipation of it, we
plan to move all adjudicators to a standardized case management
system. This will enhance efficiency, enable consistency, and
allow for better performance measurement and management.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, and Senator Burris, thank
you again for the opportunity to be here today. This concludes
my remarks, and I look forward to addressing your questions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, General Clapper, for
your part of a joint statement with Mr. Shedd.
And now for the other part of the statement, Mr. Shedd.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID R. SHEDD,\1\ DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE FOR POLICY, PLANS, AND REQUIREMENTS, OFFICE OF THE
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Shedd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich,
Senator Burris, for the opportunity to speak to you this
afternoon. Let me assure you that the goals of this reform, to
transform and demonstrably improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of these important processes, remain a high priority
for the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and for the
intelligence community in which I serve.
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\1\ The joint prepared statement of Mr. Clapper and Mr. Shedd
appears in the Appendix on page 41.
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As Director Dan Blair's Deputy for Policy, Plans, and
Requirements, the DNI has entrusted in me the implementation of
these critical reforms. These improvements are badly needed to
put the best skilled and trusted personnel to work in timely
fashion in the defense of our Nation, as you have pointed out.
Our commitment is evident in our assignment of expert
personnel exclusively to this effort, the dedication of other
resources, including serving as the host facility for the Joint
Reform Team in its efforts since the inception.
Each of us understands the role the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 played in establishing the
first ever performance goals for this process. I note also that
the very same law established the Director of National
Intelligence and established the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, so these goals and other organizational
changes are linked in fundamental ways.
That linkage was enhanced in 2008 when the DNI took on the
responsibilities of the security executive agent, consolidating
policy and oversight responsibility for clearances in ways both
necessary and new. It is this perspective on reform across the
Executive Branch that I am pleased to share with you today,
along with my colleagues.
As Mr. Zients has noted, progress has been made, but work
remains to be done. In order to achieve the transformational
change we all want, and in order to reach the 2009 IRTPA goals,
we need to modernize the underlying security clearance
processes across the Executive Branch. This will require an
alignment of policies, process, and information technology.
To that end, our reform plan's key features are collecting
security-relevant information earlier in the process. Second,
leveraging the technology to significantly reduce manual
activity, as General Clapper has pointed out and is already
well underway at the Department of Defense, by using modern
data sources, making decisions based on modern analytic methods
that manage rather than avoid the risk. Third, tailoring field
investigative activity to better focus on the relevant data
that has been collected. Fourth, enhancing the alignment of the
investigation process in subsequent hiring and clearing
decisions, thereby reducing duplicative work. And finally,
applying these new capabilities to more frequently assess the
risk within the populations that already have a security
clearance.
The reform plan published in December 2008, Senator
Voinovich, that you cited, includes implementation timelines
intended to make these changes substantially operational across
the Executive Branch by December 2010. While an Administration
review of certain elements of the reform plan has resulted in
some temporary delays to that time table, we remain committed
to that goal and ask your support and attention in helping us
achieve it.
As the review concludes, we look forward to resuming an
ambitious pace of achievement, resuming activity in a number of
areas, including additional revisions to the Federal
Investigative Standards, continuing the development of
automated record check capabilities, changes to the automated
systems that will collect the SF-86 forms, information online,
changes to the automated systems to streamline management for
future investigations and the adjudication processes, and
finally, the guidance to enable agencies to execute their own
implementation plans as needed.
So last, I note that much work has continued even in the
Administration's review as it has been undertaken and I
highlight the work of all my partners as they pursue
improvements to organizational case management systems, online
repositories of clearance data, the electronic transmission and
adjudication of investigative cases, and the additional
meaningful performance measures to the suite of tools the
Performance Accountability Council will use to monitor our
collective progress.
Chairman Akaka, Senator Voinovich, and Senator Burris, this
concludes my prepared remarks and I submit this for the
Subcommittee's record. Thank you very much.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your statement, Mr.
Shedd.
And now, we will receive the testimony of Ms. Farrell.
TESTIMONY OF BRENDA S. FARRELL,\1\ DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Ms. Farrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich,
and Senator Burris, for the opportunity to be here today to
discuss DOD's security clearance process and the government-
wide reform efforts.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Farrell appears in the Appendix
on page 48.
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We have testified on clearance-related issues in five prior
hearings that this Subcommittee has held since January 2005,
when we first placed DOD's personnel security program, which
represents the vast majority of clearances adjudicated, on our
list of high-risk government programs. At that time, DOD was
experiencing significant backlogs and delays. Over the years,
we have conducted a broad body of work on clearance issues that
gives us a unique historical perspective.
My remarks today draw from two recently issued GAO reports.
My main message today is that progress has been made to reduce
delays in granting clearances, but further actions are needed
to enhance quality and sustain the reform efforts.
My written statement is divided into three parts. The first
addresses the progress at reducing delays in DOD's clearances.
DOD and OPM have made significant and noteworthy progress in
reducing delays in making clearance decisions and met statutory
timeliness requirements for DOD's initial clearances completed
in fiscal year 2008. Currently, 80 percent of initial
clearances are to be made within 120 days, on average. We found
that OPM and DOD made initial clearance decisions within 87
days, on average. This represents significant progress from our
finding in 2007, when we reported that industry personnel
waited more than one year, on average, to receive a ``top
secret'' clearance. Challenges do lie ahead to meet the
requirement that by December 2009, a plan be implemented in
which, to the extent practical, 90 percent of initial
clearances are made within 60 days, on average.
The second part of my statement addresses opportunities for
improving the Executive Branch annual reports to Congress. For
example, the Executive Branch's 2009 report does not reflect
the full range of time it takes to make all initial clearance
decisions and has provided little information on quality. Under
the current requirements, the Executive Branch can exclude the
slowest 20 percent and then report on the average of the
remaining differences. Without taking averages or excluding the
slowest percentages, we analyzed 100 percent of initial
clearances granted in 2008 and found that 39 percent still took
more than 120 days. The absence of comprehensive reporting
means that Congress does not have the information about
remaining delays that continue to exist, or importantly, about
the reasons for their occurrences that could help with
corrective actions.
With respect to quality, the reports to Congress provide
little information. However, the most recent report on the
reform efforts identified quality measures that the Executive
Branch proposes to collect. We have stated that timeliness
alone does not provide a complete picture of the clearance
process. For example, we recently estimated that with respect
to initial ``top secret'' clearances adjudicated in fiscal year
2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative
reports.
The third part of my written statement addresses the extent
to which the joint reform efforts reflect key factors for
reform. For example, initial joint reform efforts reflect key
factors for organizational transformation that we have
identified, such as having committed leadership and a dedicated
implementation team. But the Joint Reform Team's reports do not
provide a strategic framework that contains important elements
of a successful transformation, including long-term goals with
outcome-focused measures, nor do they identify potential
obstacles to progress and possible remedies. In the absence of
a strategic framework that is outcome-focused with clearly-
defined performance measures, the Joint Reform Team is not in a
position to demonstrate to decisionmakers the extent of
progress it is making toward achieving desired outcomes.
Let me conclude by noting we are looking forward to working
with OMB's newly-appointed Deputy Director for Management as he
oversees the joint reform efforts.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I will be pleased
to take questions when the Subcommittee so desires.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ms. Farrell,
for your statement.
Ms. Farrell, I want to ask you a question that I believe
Senator Voinovich asked last year, and I am sure that we are
both eager to ask it again, and here is the question: What
progress has DOD and other security clearance stakeholders made
in getting this issue off the High-Risk List?
Ms. Farrell. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The good news is that DOD
and others are moving in the right direction, as we have just
discussed. Backlogs and delays in granting clearances is what
was behind GAO putting DOD on our High-Risk List in 2005, and
we do see the numbers have moved in the right direction, and
DOD and OPM are meeting statutory time frames.
What remains ahead is issues of quality, which we reported
in our 2007 and 2009 high-risk reports. The good news is,
although there has been little done in terms of defining
quality and building that into each step of the security
process, the Joint Reform Team Subcommittee on Performance
Measurement and Management has identified some metrics that
they propose to collect, and those are what we will be watching
very carefully. Those have not been finalized.
What we would want to see for the personnel security
clearance process to get off of the High-Risk List is more
defined measures of quality, the correction action plan that
identifies the root causes of problems with quality, what steps
DOD and the other agencies are going to take to correct those,
not just in the investigative phase but the adjudicative phase
and the other phases of the clearance process, along with how
they plan to measure that effectiveness, and steps toward their
own measurement toward meeting that end.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ms. Farrell.
I would like to direct this next question to Director
Zients, though others may want to respond to this question, as
well. Director Zients, the Joint Reform Team report issued last
December had specific benchmarks and milestone dates, some of
which are scheduled for this month. Some delay was no doubt due
to the transition and changes in leadership. At this point,
after the transition, how many months has the process fallen
behind, and when will we see a rebaselining of milestones.
Mr. Zients. As to the ultimate goal of being done, or
substantially complete by, I guess it is 14\1/2\ months from
now, I feel very confident that we are going to make that goal.
So as we rebaseline, we will start with the answer that we are
going to be done on schedule. And I think that is doable.
I think that the place where we need to spend the most time
rebaselining is around IT. The milestones for IT were generally
spaced throughout 2010, some in the first half, some in the
second half, and we are going to have to make sure on the IT
front that we set new deadlines that allow us to hit the
ultimate end of next year's timeline, but I think we do have
some work ahead of us across the next month or two to ensure
that we rebaseline the IT piece of it.
Overall, I am confident that we will be where we wanted to
be at the end of next year. It will be in good shape for your
retirement, Senator Voinovich, and for removal from the GAO
High-Risk List in January 2011.
Senator Akaka. Are there any other comments? Ms. Farrell.
Ms. Farrell. We would like to see a strategic framework, as
we noted in our May 2009 report, that outlines very clearly
what the goal is of the reform effort, along with identifying
roles, responsibilities, and how progress will be measured. We
found in the course of our work last year that when we asked
senior leaders with the reform effort and agency officials
involved in the clearance progress that the goals were not
clear. Some referred to the IRTPA requirements with
reciprocity. Some would refer to timeliness.
And I do not mean to imply that there are no goals that the
Joint Reform Team has had. We feel that they have a number of
reports, the ones that they issued last year, April, as well as
in December, as well as the IT strategy and other memorandum
that present certain aspects of the goals. But if those goals
were brought together, very clearly agreed to, and there was a
consensus by those who are at this table, that is the goal of
this effort and who is responsible, especially for the IT
strategy, that would help sustain the momentum of the reform
effort and get it done.
Senator Akaka. Director Zients, as I said at your
confirmation hearing, security clearance reform has been an
important oversight priority for this Subcommittee. Your
predecessor, Clay Johnson, made it one of his highest
priorities, as well, and your position was designated as head
of the Performance Accountability Council (PAC) for reforming
clearances. You were just confirmed in June and you have a lot
on your plate at OMB, including additional responsibilities as
the first Chief Performance Officer for the Federal Government.
In your role as head of the PAC, how do you plan to
prioritize this important issue and provide sustained
leadership to ensure that this effort keeps moving forward?
Mr. Zients. This is absolutely a top priority for me. I
actually am lucky as to the point in the process that I am
coming on board in that this team and the group of career folks
behind us have really not only made a ton of progress, but have
teed up a plan that I believe is a good plan, a detailed plan,
and one that is doable.
So having been--as I mentioned in my opening remarks--part
of these larger transformational efforts, there is a lot of
work ahead, but there is a clear line between where we are
today and where we need to be 14\1/2\ month from now, and I
pledge to dedicate the time and the resources and the attention
to make sure that we get there. But with this team, I feel very
confident that we can get it done and I commit to doing so.
Senator Akaka. My time has expired. We will have a second
round. Senator Voinovich, your questions?
Senator Voinovich. First of all, I am really impressed with
the testimony that I have heard today. There seems to be an
urgency and seriousness about this issue and you seem to
portray that. I think it is worthy, again, to thank Ms.
Dillaman for the good job that she has done. The folks at the
table are only as good as the team that sits behind them, and
those of you that have had something to do with this, we
appreciate the effort that you have made.
One of the questions I was going to ask is what are the
largest risks to successfully implementing the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act's security clearance reform
mandates, and I think, Ms. Farrell, you have kind of laid out
in your report some of your concerns about what it is that
could stand in the way of moving forward. Is it possible that
the team could go through those specific things that have been
mentioned in the GAO report and come back to us and let us
know, frankly, whether or not you think they are as severe as
they have been represented to be and what you intend to do to
move on those issues? It certainly would be comforting to know
whether you agree with what GAO has said and what priorities
you are going to set in order to make sure that those things
are taken care of. Do you think you can do that?
Mr. Zients. Yes.
Senator Voinovich. I would be appreciative.
The other question I have, a big question, is about the
resources that you have available to you. I am very concerned
when you start talking about technology, you are talking about
spending some money. And in your respective budgets, has money
been allocated--I am on Appropriations now--for you to do that
portion of the assignment?
Mr. Zients. Why don't I start and then others can fill in.
We believe, as an overall effort, yes, that within the OPM
budget and the DOD budget, we have sufficient funds in the
budget to do the technology piece. We also need to make sure
that we are interfacing with the agencies to ensure that they
understand the technology implications for their systems and
that their systems are modernized and ready to accept, not in
any way to underestimate the IT piece, because I do think it is
one of the areas we have to pay special attention to. But this
is not very difficult, complex IT applications. This is on an
IT scale difficult, but not very difficult.
So I believe, bottom line, that we have the budgets and the
resources, but I will defer to my colleagues, too, if they want
to add anything here.
Mr. Berry. Our IT piece is really the investigations
portion of it, and the good news is we are halfway through that
project. We have been through the rate increases and have been
accumulating the funds necessary to complete that project. We
are at a place where we believe we can do that. We are on a
reimbursable basis, if you will, as we do the investigations.
And so this year, I am very pleased to announce, and I
don't know if Mr. Shedd and General Clapper have heard this
yet, but there won't be any rate increase for investigations
from OPM this year. So we will be holding our rates at what
they were last year, and those levels will allow us to maintain
what we need to do to finish the IT upgrades that are necessary
on the investigations piece of this.
Now, obviously, there is more work on the adjudication side
that will have to be done, as well, but I think in terms of the
investigations piece, we are well on track.
Senator Voinovich. OK. You have got that portion of it. I
just assume that the plan to go forward with the IT part of
this, the technology you are going to use, you have already
identified it, correct?
Mr. Berry. Yes.
Senator Voinovich. OK. And you have the money to do it.
General Clapper, your shop is going to have to interface
with OMB and OPM, and the question I have for you is have you
been spending the time to talk about how the two of them work
together, and do you have the wherewithal to take care of your
end of the bargain?
Mr. Clapper. Yes, sir, I believe we do. This is not new and
unknown. I don't think we have spent a lot of time on research
and development (R&D). It is largely a question of executing
what we already know we have to do. And I can assure you that,
based on the interest of both the Secretary and the Deputy, if
we need more money, we can get it, because of their high
interest in this.
I guess I would be remiss if I didn't take mild exception
to Ms. Farrell's commentary. Obviously, where you stand depends
on where you sit. But having worked this pretty hard for the
time I have been in office since April 2007, I think we have
made substantial progress. I do think we have a strategy, as
represented by the report that was submitted in December, and I
think we are pretty well along it. I tried to outline in my
previous remarks some additional things that the Department is
doing, even during this pause, to address some of the issues
that the GAO has appropriately raised.
One of the major things here, of course, to Mr. Berry's
comment, is a major feature of what we want to do in the reform
effort is not to do so many investigations, which has huge
impacts not only on the money that we have to convey to OPM for
doing investigations, but in the interest of saving time and
efficiency by capitalizing on what is available to us in
today's IT.
Senator Voinovich. And I assume that there is no problem
with human capital? You have the people that you need to get
the job done, that is not a problem?
Mr. Clapper. I don't think so, sir. That is one thing that
DOD has, is lots of people. So yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. Ms. Farrell, would you agree with that?
Ms. Farrell. Well, human capital hasn't been identified as
an issue right now. It has in the past, as you know, with the
investigations, and OPM did make great progress in building up
that capacity.
But regarding the clear mission and goals, during our
review, the last one, looking at the Joint Reform Team's effort
and what is the purpose and what are they trying to accomplish,
what we found was differences of opinion about the overall
mission of improving the security process. We were referred to
the report that General Clapper just referred to now. We were
also referred to a 2007 memorandum between DOD and ODNI, which
is not publicly distributed, in the comments on our report
regarding what the mission is of the reform effort.
Again, there are aspects and principles in the three key
reports that the Joint Reform Team has issued in the last year
and a half, as well as other memorandum. So we are not saying
that there is not direction. We are saying if there was a very
clear road map with a very defined mission and that these
principles that are reflected in the other documents were
linked to that, it would help move the reform effort forward
and it would make it much more easier to tell what progress
they have made. Are they halfway there? Are they 75 percent of
the way there? Are they 99 percent there? We just can't tell
right now without that strategic framework in place.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Chairman, could I just follow up on
that? This is kind of repetitious of many of these hearings
that we have had over the years. The Government Accountability
Office has some ideas, suggestions that aren't acted on. I know
we have such a problem with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). If you recall, we are still trying to work out some
metrics that we can look at to determine whether or not the
changes that are supposed to be made are being made.
So I would urge you, again, GAO has made some suggestions
and has some criticisms, constructive, and I think that you
should all sit down, or have somebody really spend some time on
this to work this thing out in terms of the differences of
opinion, to see if you can get some kind of consensus because
the bottom line is after this is all over and done with, we are
going to look to GAO to find out whether or not they think this
thing has gotten done. And the sooner you get at it, the better
it will be for everyone.
So at least you all agree that, pretty much--I mean, I am
not saying that there won't be some differences, there
certainly will be--but I think, overall, you can agree that
these are the metrics that ought to be looked at and this is
what we expect to be judged on, and then you carry the ball
from there so we don't end up 8 months from now saying, well,
that is not what we understood the situation to be. I would be
very grateful if you would do that, and I would like to see
that within a reasonable time, Mr. Chairman, so that we can see
that they have gotten together and they are on relatively the
same page.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Senator Voinovich. Senator
Burris, your questions.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would just
like to commend the Subcommittee and their staff for bringing
good news. I mean, I want to echo what Senator Voinovich has
said. In my short time here in the Senate, I hear reports or
testimony from witnesses and there are always problems. But I
am really impressed with the progress that has been made here,
so I urge you to keep up the good work and let us keep moving
forward.
Ms. Farrell, in your written testimony, you stated that the
greater attention to quality would increase the instance of
reciprocity, and what circumstances currently allow for
interagency reciprocity? I have a couple more questions in that
regard, too. What does a process of moving a clearance from one
agency to the other agency involve? And second, what factors
prevent interagency reciprocity? So you may want to try your
best at that, or whoever on the panel can best help me out on
this reciprocity question.
Ms. Farrell. Certainly. During the course of our body of
work on the personal security clearance process, the quality of
investigations has arisen as a possible underlying reason for
why there is not this sharing of clearances between or among
agencies, and there have been steps toward using the same
common guidelines for investigations as well as for
adjudications to move toward that end.
But reciprocity is one of the issues that is listed in the
IRTPA that has not been addressed yet. As we talked about,
there has been progress with timeliness. There has been
progress in other areas. But reciprocity is one that is still
under evaluation by the Joint Reform Team and is the type of
issue that we would like to see more fully addressed in a
strategic framework.
Senator Burris. OK. Mr. Berry.
Mr. Berry. Thank you, Senator. If I could, I agree with Ms.
Farrell, and I think all of us would, that is one of the
remaining poles in the tent we have got to get up. I mean, we
have to do better on reciprocity, and so we are all wrestling
with that as to assuring that gets done. And I think you have
hit on the key to that, and that is the quality of the
adjudications.
One of the things I want to recognize is that we also share
GAO's emphasis on this, that this is not one where we can be
right 98 percent of the time. We have to be right 100 percent
of the time.
Senator Burris. Sure.
Mr. Berry. One mistake could cause untold damages. And so
we have got to nail this. We have put in place some things this
year, and I think it is good for the Subcommittee to be aware
of this.
We have been working with the Performance Accountability
Council. One of the things I set up with Ms. Dillaman is a
hotline that the adjudicators can use to get their questions
resolved. We do the investigations and then it goes to the
agencies, and then they have people who take our investigation,
look through the information, and decide whether this is the
quality person that they want to assign the level of clearance
that is being sought, and whether the case has been made that
this person is worthy of that. Well, the adjudication is not
our call, it is the agency's call. And we have created a
hotline so that, if at any point they have any questions about
information in the investigation, their call goes directly to
Ms. Dillaman's office and they can have direct access to Ms.
Dillaman so that we can get to the bottom of this.
And, Ms. Farrell, you did identify that there was some
missed information in a number of the cases that have been
done. I think it is important for the Subcommittee to
understand that in context.
If somebody, for example, is on military duty in Iraq or
one of a subject's references is on duty in Iraq, we would make
all due efforts to try to get in touch with that person. But
rather than hold up the investigation, we would see if there
were other ways that we could verify the information. So, for
example, sometimes when one neighbor might not be home, we will
see other neighbors, or maybe two other neighbors in order to
justify moving forward and establishing a comfort level with
that information.
And so I don't want to give the impression to the
Subcommittee that we do not have a strong emphasis on quality.
We do. And in all of the cases that GAO identified where there
was missing information, we went back and reinvestigated all of
those. None of those resulted in a negative determination
through the adjudication process.
We do emphasize this. We do try to rate 100 percent. But,
as you are working these, there does need to be some
flexibility with the investigator. We hire professionals and we
do give them some discretion. We allow them to use their
judgment.
I think as we lift that standard and assure all of the
agencies about the quality of the investigation, the goal of
reciprocity is going to be reachable, and I think that is where
people will start to trust sharing the information across the
government.
I apologize for the length of that, but I think that was
important to clarify.
Senator Burris. Mr. Berry, I am sitting here with a little
concern in terms of what factors are there to prevent
reciprocity from being granted? I mean, is it the level of the
position that is being applied for in the agency? If they do
the investigation, they do the adjudication, does DOD have a
different--I think a ``top secret'' security clearance would be
a ``top secret'' security clearance.
Mr. Berry. Reciprocity has three levels to it, and I will
defer to Mr. Shedd and General Clapper, who have been working
on this a lot longer. But sometimes someone will come in for a
``secret'' clearance and then seek an upgrade in the clearance
level. Well, you can't give the ``top secret'' clearance based
only on the investigation at the ``secret'' level.
Senator Burris. That is correct.
Mr. Berry. We have to go back and do more rigorous
investigation. But what we have been trying to do is to
standardize all the questions so that we don't have to go back
and do the work that was done on the ``secret clearance.'' We
can just do the difference, and that is what we are striving to
do, is to achieve a consistency there so that, as people move
around the government and as their security clearances change,
agencies will recognize the work that has been done beforehand
so that we don't have to start over from ground zero every
time, as has been the case in the past.
Senator Burris. Mr. Clapper, can you comment on that
situation?
Mr. Clapper. Well, I think one of the things that
contributes to obstacles to reciprocity has to do with
transparency of the data, whether investigative or
adjudicative. So to the extent that we can promote through
automation so that appropriate officials either within, in our
case, the Department of Defense or with other departments of
the government can have access uniformly and consistently to
the basic investigative data if they require it or factors used
in adjudications, that those who are appropriate for that would
have uniform access to it so that if they have a question about
someone, they can go to the original source data.
Senator Burris. Are you saying there is a privacy question
here in reference to the----
Mr. Clapper. Well, I don't think that enters into it
necessarily, because once you--if you agree to enter into a
position that requires a clearance----
Senator Burris. We have got to know everything about you.
Mr. Clapper [continuing]. Then you sort of, having been one
of those people for a long time, then you give that up.
Senator Burris. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I can
stay, I might have a second round.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your first round
questions.
Director Berry, the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004
requires, and you mentioned this, that OPM conduct 90 percent
of its investigations in an average of 40 days by December
2009. According to your testimony, you are on track to meet or
exceed this benchmark, and I want to commend you and the agency
and all of those who had a part in this for making remarkable
progress on completing security clearance investigations as
promptly as you have.
GAO's written testimony states that in 2008, the slowest 11
percent of initial clearance decisions still took more than 300
days to complete. Can you tell me about why some investigations
still take a long time to complete and what is being done to
speed the most difficult investigations?
Mr. Berry. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a great question,
and I think it is one that counsels caution for all of us. I
think that is why the Subcommittee, and the GAO, and we use
that standard of 90 percent, because we are not giving out
drivers' licenses here. As you are well aware, we are giving
out, in some cases, the highest security clearances possible.
There are some people who will not successfully pass. And
if we cannot verify the information, and if we cannot get to
the bottom of it, and in some cases it is hard to do that, we
can't go forward. Now, recognizing that in some cases that also
denies someone a position if they are already in the
government, we have got to make every effort.
But I think we need to recognize in our performance
standards, that if there are problems, we must take the time to
do it right. I think we always need to be looking at that pool
of cases and making sure that it is legitimate, that the delay
is real and justified. But we do need to recognize there will
probably always be some pool of cases like that. So I don't
want to mislead you.
That being said, we still need to watch that very closely,
and it has to be, I think, one of the performance metrics that
GAO, OMB, and OPM are going to have to watch.
Senator Akaka. Are there any other comments? Ms. Farrell.
Ms. Farrell. Well, we recognize that some clearances are
going to take longer than 120 days, or come December, longer
than the 60 days. The reason we were focusing attention on the
slowest 10 percent or 20 percent is that there is currently not
any reporting of that to monitor to see what is going on with
100 percent of the clearances, not necessarily that 100 percent
of the clearances will have been completed in 120 or 60 days,
but what is going on with that pool that is not meeting it. And
we feel by reporting the total 100 percent, it would bring
visibility and thus maybe corrective action, if necessary.
Perhaps some of these cases are going to drag on and there
will be no clearance granted for the final result. But until
you determine what is going on with that population that is
taking longer than 120 and whether corrective action be done,
it is an unknown.
Mr. Berry. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I will pledge that we
will report on those cases. I believe it is important. The
transparency, as General Clapper has mentioned, is critical, we
must be held accountable on this. If we are not reporting
already, as the Director of OPM, my pledge to this Subcommittee
is that we will report on it. So we will develop the metric
necessary to get that job done.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for that.
Director Zients, you testified that the interagency review
process determined that few changes would be made in plans for
clearance reform. However, you did say that you plan to
reexamine overlaps between suitability and security clearance
investigations. Can you discuss this further and describe how
this is different from the original reform plan?
Mr. Zients. Yes. The original reform plan envisioned three
tiers of investigation based on increasing levels of risk. So
the bottom tier, all exclusively around suitability, is the
Form 85, and the topmost tier around national security and the
Form 86.
It envisioned a middle tier that I think, upon review, was
too broad in that it included, as an example, an HR executive
at an agency and a Border Patrol who carries a gun all in the
same tier. And what we have found is that it probably is better
to break that middle tier into two tiers which will allow for a
better and more efficient process. And that determination to
break the middle tier into two has led to some changes to the
Form 86.
Senator Voinovich, you had asked about that up front. That
will enter a 30-day public comment stage by the end of the
month. And therefore, once we incorporate those comments, we
should be done with that, certainly by the end of this year.
So that we have largely completed the review, it will
result in two tiers rather than one in the middle, and I think,
ultimately, a more effective and more efficient process that
will also allow for better reciprocity across the system.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Shedd, last December, ODNI, along
with OPM, updated the Federal Investigative Standards for
Security Clearance Investigations. These standards had not been
updated since 1995 and little has been said about the updates.
Can you describe why the update was necessary and how the
standards changed?
Mr. Shedd. Mr. Chairman, the reason for looking at the
standards was to align them into a process or a system of risk
management into three tiers, in that the top secret SCI, the
``sensitive compartmented information'' clearance being tier
three, the lowest level being tier one for general access,
below ``confidential'' level, and the middle level, tier two,
being ``confidential secret'' level. This was done in such a
way that as we moved forward with an E process (and what I will
term to be the flagging of issues of concern that would require
additional investigation), the process, of the standards for
leading to that built off of the new SF-86, would kick in and
be brought to bear on that investigation.
As General Clapper has said, one of the big objectives is
to lower, or minimize, the amount of time spent on clean cases,
those cases where there is no issue that has been identified.
At the Top Secret Sensitive Compartmental Information (TS-
SCI) level, an interview of that individual, that applicant
requiring a TS-SCI will still be required. However, much
earlier in the process because of this flagging system off of
the E-based identification of the data that is discovered on
the individual, you can go to a much more targeted way of doing
that investigation and thereby cutting down the number of days
that leads to the clearance and the adjudication of that
clearance. So that was the purpose behind that.
We will now go back to that with whatever realignment
occurs with OPM and under OMB's leadership and relook at that
if, in fact, it impacts on the standards that were issued in
2008 under Director McConnell.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shedd. You are welcome.
Senator Akaka. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Aren't there still some agencies that do
their own clearance?
Mr. Shedd. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. So they are not in this main area? In
other words, they are exempt from this whole process. They do
their own thing----
Mr. Shedd. No. They fall under the direction of the DNI in
terms of the standards for doing it, even though they do their
own investigations and don't fall to OPM. So, for example, the
National Reconnaissance Office does its own investigations, but
they must follow the process laid out----
Senator Voinovich. The guidelines. But the fact of the
matter is that in certain areas, they do their own
investigations so that----
Mr. Shedd. Correct.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. The kind of investigations
that the OPM does--there is a kind of standard investigation of
just generally people that want to come into the Federal
Government at a certain level of security clearance.
Mr. Shedd. That is correct, sir.
Senator Voinovich. And there is a consensus about the
information that you need to have investigated so that you get
to that level.
Mr. Shedd. That is correct, and I might add, they rely on
the standards for suitability that are published or issued by
the Office of Personnel Management, as well. So they don't get
to go outside of the suitability part of that security
clearance data collection.
Mr. Zients. I think we are talking about roughly 10
percent, is that correct?
Mr. Shedd. It is closer to 5 to 7 percent, total, for the
intelligence community (IC), for about a total of 82,000 cases
per year.
Senator Voinovich. So the majority of them go through the
regular system----
Mr. Shedd. Yes. Correct.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. In terms of the
investigation. I recall when we got into this whole
investigation that the people that were doing it were doing it
on a part-time basis. Obviously, you have got a new system and
more trained people so that the quality overall, would you say,
General Clapper, is better than what it was 2 or 3 years ago?
Mr. Clapper. I think that is a fair statement, yes, sir.
Mr. Berry. Senator, if I could, I would just like to point
out the scale. As Mr. Shedd mentioned, OPM is doing, in terms
of investigations, 2.2 million investigations a year, and that
is not just for suitability. We do suitability, secret, top
secret, and SCI investigation levels. So we meet that standard
throughout. As was mentioned, there is about 8 percent still
outside that, but----
Senator Voinovich. You have different standards for
investigations depending on what the call for is with the
agencies----
Mr. Berry. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. And you have the people on
board that can review those investigations to make sure that
they meet high standards, so once you send them over to the
agency, the agency doesn't look at them and say, we don't want
them.
How often, General Clapper, do you have to go back to them
and say, you have got to do some more work?
Mr. Clapper. I don't know the exact number, but it is
relatively small, but I would have to get the exact number of
referrals.
Mr. Zients. Across the system, it is less than 1 percent.
Senator Voinovich. I didn't hear you.
Mr. Berry. Less than 1 percent, Senator.
Mr. Zients. Less than 1 percent are returned by the agency
to the investigative process. And that doesn't mean that there
was an error. It might mean that sometimes a return is--you
only talked to four neighbors, because this is important----
Senator Voinovich. Oh, I have to tell you, 1 percent, it is
amazing.
Is this review of the SF-86 that you are doing pretty much
over? In other words, the security clearance reform initiative
of the former Administration, you have kind of looked that over
and you have got some changes that you want to make and now the
procedure is you have to send it out for comment? Is that where
we are at right now?
Mr. Zients. Yes.
Senator Voinovich. When do you think that will get done?
Mr. Zients. By the end of the month, we hope to have the
Form 86 out for public comment. We are going to do a 30-day
public comment period, and then we need to absorb those
comments, so certainly by the end of the calendar year.
Senator Voinovich. Yes. I would be interested, one of the
things that many of us were concerned about is whether or not
the DNI could reconcile some of the differences between the
agencies in terms of reciprocity. Has that been pretty well
worked out? Are there any hang-ups yet there?
Mr. Shedd. There are some hang-ups because bureaucracies
resist being told to accept something that either for them is
not transparent: Fully transparent in terms of the reciprocity,
the adjudication and so forth. But within the intelligence
community, tremendous progress has been made in a system called
Scattered Castles, which is a repository, then, of all the
security clearances of the individuals.
We need to modernize that database with additional
information to further increase the level of confidence of the
intelligence community's leadership confidence that when they
are getting someone who is transferring from one particular
agency in the intelligence community to another one, that all
the information that General Clapper talked about is available
to the receiving end for the individual who doesn't belong to
that agency.
Senator Voinovich. And that understanding among the
agencies is part of this review that you are doing?
Mr. Zients. Yes. I believe that the reciprocity issue is
around standardization and consistency, and therefore is right
at the heart of everything that we are doing here. We are using
IT and process reengineering to simplify this process and make
it more standard, and that has a big advantage when it comes to
reciprocity because of the cultural challenges that Mr. Shedd
is outlining. Historically, everybody has done it a different
way, and as we get that consistency and standardization, I
believe that, coupled with making the information available and
transparent, which we are making a lot of progress on, will
lead to big gains in reciprocity, because I think so far, we
haven't experienced those, but so far, we haven't completed the
effort around standardization and consistency. And once we do,
reciprocity will follow.
Mr. Shedd. Senator, I----
Senator Voinovich. I am sure this is something you are
going to--go ahead.
Mr. Shedd. I wanted to add one other perspective. Something
that is of high concern to the DNI is that the agency heads in
the intelligence community not add additional layers that
amount to being barriers even beyond the reciprocity on the
security clearance basis alone. In other words, standards for
the suitability and so forth that don't ultimately act as a
deterrent outright from a transfer from one agency to another
because they are added on top of the security clearance issue.
And so that is preeminent in Director Blair's mind and
something that we are addressing by way of policy.
Senator Voinovich. OK. So you think you are making
progress, and a year from now, when people feel a lot better,
with the help of the IT and other things, people will be
comforted because of the quality of the information and be much
more willing to rely upon it in terms of their concerns?
Mr. Shedd. Yes, combined with policies that make it very
clear what the terms are under which that transfer occurs, as
well.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am a little concerned about, are there statistics on how
many apply for, let us say, a top secret security clearance and
is, in fact, rejected? Now, there is an investigation and then
it goes back to the agency for adjudication. Who does the
rejection? What, then, is the process of this applicant--is it
follow-up steps to attempt to try to correct situations, or
what generally happens if there is--how many are rejected and
what happens?
Mr. Clapper. I, again, don't have the exact number of how
many actually fail to get a clearance for one reason or
another. I will tell you, though, that either in the case of an
initial clearance or it probably happens more often of people
who are already cleared and then have an update periodically,
the requirement now is at least every 5 years, and if
derogatory information turns up in the course of either the
initial or a subsequent update, there are appeal processes, at
least within the Department of Defense. There is a board that
is overseen by the Office of General Counsel that allows due
process for such appeals. They can be quite drawn out and quite
extensive because there is a balance here between national
security and then deference to people's rights. I can get you
the numbers, say, for a typical year----
Senator Burris. Just a guesstimate.
Mr. Clapper. Well, I would say it is, for the whole
Department, which would include the four intelligence agencies
that are embedded in the Department and the four services, I
would guess on the order of 200 or 300, maybe, and that is out
of thousands of----
Senator Burris. Is it a very small number?
Mr. Clapper. Yes. An even smaller number that actually goes
through an appeal process.
Senator Burris. Very good. And this is probably for Mr.
Berry. The investigators, in your assignment of their
investigating of a person, are they assigned to the same agency
or do they do various agencies? And if so, if they do, then why
not try to have them to do more than one agency? What is your
routine process for an investigator?
Mr. Berry. Senator, if I could, we can respond to that in
more detail for the record for you, but we have approximately
2,000 Federal Government employees and then a contract force
about double that size in terms of investigators who are
handling cases. And so it is quite a complicated operation to
manage, especially to make sure there is no backlog, which is
where we are right now, and to meet these timelines, as you can
imagine.
Senator Burris. You said you are letting contracts out to
private sources to do the investigations?
Mr. Berry. Absolutely. Part of this job is managed with
private sector employees, and they are--it is something we
watch very carefully and we work in hand----
Senator Burris. Are we investigating the investigators in
the private sector?
Mr. Berry. Absolutely. All of our investigators have to
have clearances before they are involved in the investigations.
We can get you more information about the details of that----
Senator Burris. Do you get consistency, then, in their
reports? I mean, I am seeing that if a person is assigned to do
the Defense Department, Health and Human Services (HHS), or the
White House, and they know the routine, if you switch them off
somewhere else, it might delay the process.
Mr. Berry. It goes to both making sure that all of the
investigators are trained, that their systems are in place--and
the transparency of the data. At the end of the day, the
investigation we are providing to the client; OPM makes no
determinations on the clearance level.
Senator Burris. Right.
Mr. Berry. That is done by someone--so, essentially what we
are doing is----
Senator Burris. Collecting the data.
Mr. Berry [continuing]. Collecting the data and making sure
that data is accurate, and then transferring that to the
client, who then makes the determination, or adjudication,
which is the term of art. So there is that consistency. In
other words, the client is used to it and knows what data to
expect, and if something, for example, is missing, the
explanation is fully transparent and made available so that the
client has the ability to say, no, we want you to go back and
do something else.
Mr. Clapper. Let me just reiterate or emphasize a point
made here, is that regardless of who does the investigation,
whether it is in the case of the intelligence agencies doing
their own or OPM doing the investigations--and by far the
lion's share of the investigations particularly for all of the
services, are done by OPM--they are operating using the same
investigative standards. So there is consistency across the
board in terms of how these investigations are done, be they by
OPM or one of the agencies, at least the four agencies in DOD.
Senator Burris. Ms. Farrell, are there any other agencies
that are on your list other than DOD that you are having
problems with?
Ms. Farrell. Well, when we first put DOD on the list, DOD
was responsible for the investigations as well as the
adjudications, and I think the Chairman said it best. The
personnel security process has to be looked at now through a
government-wide lens. There are many players besides DOD. The
roles and responsibilities have changed, as evidenced by the
Performance Accountability Council's involvement. So it is
beyond DOD at this point in terms of the personnel security
clearance process.
Senator Burris. Well, I was talking about other agencies.
Do you have HHS?
Ms. Farrell. Are there other agencies that we have concerns
about?
Senator Burris. Yes.
Ms. Farrell. It is more the concern of the roles and
responsibilities of who is doing the investigations and who is
doing the adjudications. Our focus has been on DOD and the
reform efforts. We have met with other agencies, at the
Department of Homeland Security, for example, and others that
issue clearances and have heard concerns expressed about the
sharing of investigations, as well as what we started talking
about earlier, the role and the mission of the Joint Reform
Team to improve the process. So we have heard from other
agencies' concerns, but it is limited. Does that answer your
question, sir?
Senator Burris. There is a limited number. I mean, you
don't have a watch list that you are looking at with reference
to some of the other agencies that might not be following
through or having a major backlog?
Ms. Farrell. We are not aware of backlogs with other
agencies, no, sir.
Senator Burris. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Burris. I will
have a third round here, but thank you for your questions.
Director Berry, I want to follow up on some information
that Mr. Zients mentioned about SF-85 and 86. While updating
the forms is important, the goal is to have applicants use an
electronic application, usually e-QIP. Has OPM taken steps to
update e-QIP and the Personal Investigations Processing System
(PIPS) system to accommodate the new forms as soon as they are
finalized?
Mr. Berry. Senator, we are at a place now where 97 percent
of that 2.2 million investigations are using that electronic
system. So we are getting close to the finish line on that. And
yes, those forms will be updated once--obviously, not until it
has made it through the public process--but we will be ready to
adjust and can modify that system to accommodate that once that
process is completed.
Senator Akaka. General Clapper, you testified that the
Department of Defense has begun to use electronic automatic
adjudication of some investigation files that were not flagged
with any outstanding issues. According to the Joint Reform Team
benchmarks, this is set to be more broadly deployed. What
quality checks or audits has the Department conducted in order
to validate that the electronic adjudications are as reliable
as adjudications completed by a DOD employee?
Mr. Clapper. I know the research that we have done, which I
think is crucial to the whole reform effort, in which we have
compared what would be revealed through automatic records
checks versus what was on cases that have already been
adjudicated under the old system, and there is a very close
correlation. In other words, they are congruent. And we believe
that the sample used was statistically reliable as done by the
Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) to make that
case, that we can rely on automatic records checks. And that,
of course, is a major feature of what was intended with the
overall personnel reform.
I am told that we did a 100 percent audit for the Army
pilot that was run between November 2008 and February 2009, and
we are now doing on a regular basis a 10 percent audit. Of
course, I would just repeat what I said earlier in my opening
remarks about the tools that we are building, one to assess the
completeness and accuracy of investigatory data, a tool called
RAISE, and then another one called RADAR, which we are in the
process of fielding, which will help assess the quality and
rationale for adjudications.
Senator Akaka. And I should have mentioned, I guess you can
call it clean cases, where there are is no negative
investigative information.
Mr. Clapper. In the case of the secret clearances done for
military personnel. That is right.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Director Berry, the Intelligence Reform Act called on
agencies to use an electronic form to apply for a security
clearance. I understand that currently e-QIP is the only format
OPM will accept from agencies submitting the electronic
investigation requests. Would OPM be open to allowing agencies
to use third-party electronic applications that conform with
OPM submission standards rather than having e-QIP as the sole
and only option?
Mr. Berry. Senator, I think we need to reach the targets
that we have set. I think bringing in new players, new systems
at this point in time could greatly complicate the timelines
and our ability to reach our goals. I think you always need to
be thinking ahead and looking more broadly, but at this point
in time, I think we need to maintain that centrality so that we
can have the consistency and have the ability to have the
transparency that customers should demand and should require.
So my sense would be, this is not the time to try to expand
that, sir.
Mr. Clapper. If I might, Senator, I would just strongly
endorse what Mr. Berry just said. From a DOD perspective, as
large as we are and as globally deployed as we are, I think it
is very important that we hew to the tenet of consistency here
in both the applications and all the way through the process.
So I would strongly endorse what Mr. Berry said.
Senator Akaka. Are there any other comments on this
particular question?
[No response.]
Senator Akaka. I have specific questions about the status
of several information technology systems, and I will just tell
you that I will submit it for the record to all of you.
Your responses have been really helpful and all of you
should be commended for the progress that we have made. I want
to thank all the witnesses for appearing today. Security
clearance reform continues to be a critical issue. I have
confidence that progress is being made, but much, as we agree,
needs to be done. This will require dedication, commitment, and
modernization of existing systems and processes, and I look
forward to seeing this issue removed from the GAO's High-Risk
List in the near future. Again, I want to thank all of our
witnesses for your continued efforts.
The hearing record will be open for 2 weeks for additional
statements or questions other Members may have pertaining to
this hearing.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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