[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET FOR THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION
SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 24, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-26
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
51-634 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK
ASSESSMENT
Jane Harman, California, Chair
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Al Green, Texas Mark E. Souder, Indiana
James A. Himes, Connecticut Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Vacancy Officio)
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Thomas M. Finan, Staff Director
Brandon Declet, Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Deron McElroy, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment............. 1
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment..................................................... 2
Witnesses
Mr. Bart R. Johnson, Acting Under Secretary, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET FOR THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jane Harman [Chair
of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Harman, Carney, Kirkpatrick,
Thompson (ex officio), McCaul, and Dent.
Ms. Harman. The hearing will come to order. Good morning,
and welcome to the subcommittee's fiscal year 2010 budget
hearing for the Department of Homeland Security's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis. That is a mouthful.
Let me first take the opportunity to acknowledge the wise
decision made by Secretary Janet Napolitano this week to shut
down the National Applications Office and its related program.
Under her leadership, DHS has recognized what a number of us
have advocated for the last 2 years, that this program offered
neither a desired capability for State, local, and Tribal law
enforcement, nor adequate protection for privacy, civil rights,
and civil liberties. With that good start, I am delighted to
welcome the Acting Under Secretary Bart Johnson to the
subcommittee and also to acknowledge that sitting behind him in
the front row is Tom Finan, who was former counsel to the
majority of the subcommittee, who has fled us to join DHS. In
reverse, I would like to recognize Michael Blinde, who was
formerly at DHS, who has fled you to join the subcommittee as
counsel. So I am not sure what all the implications of this
are, but I think it is a net plus for both sides.
Mr. Johnson, your distinguished record of more than 30
years as a State law enforcement official gives you special
insight into our subcommittee's focus on improving accurate,
actionable, and timely sharing of Homeland Security information
with State, local, and Tribal partners. Your written testimony
is excellent. I just commended you personally and heard from
you that you wrote most of it personally. It is exceptionally
good, and I also told that to your Secretary when I spoke to
her on the phone yesterday.
It clarifies a role for the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis that I personally completely agree with, one that
pulls information from the Federal intelligence community, DHS
intelligence components, State and local law enforcement and
fusion centers, combining it to create products that provide
regional and national assessments of threats to the homeland.
I&A after all must connect the dots so that cops on the beat,
America's first preventers, can get the information they need
in a form they can use in order that they will know what to
look for and what to do.
This is what we have been saying up here for years and
years. We believe, and I think you would agree, that our first
preventers are most attuned to their local communities and will
have the best chance, far better than a bureaucrat in
Washington or a politician in Congress, to know if something
looks suspicious. If they have the right intelligence products,
they will be best positioned to do something about it.
Thankfully, because of your law enforcement experience, I
believe you understand this. So the question we always have to
answer is, how can I&A make our homeland safer? I think a good
part of that answer is to develop products and distribution
methods to give law enforcement better information.
Let me highlight two issues, though, before I yield the
floor to the Ranking Member, that I also think we have to
consider. One is--and you mentioned this in your testimony--and
that is the overuse of outside contractors. I was surprised to
learn recently from one of those contractors, and I am
certainly not implying they don't render good service, but I
think as much as 50 percent of the analysis done at I&A is
contracted out. I don't think that is a good idea at all. It is
expensive and it will not get us to where we need to go, which
is to have this hyper-sensitivity to the needs of local law
enforcement. So I know you are addressing this. I would like
you to expand on this in your comments.
Second is the need always to respect civil rights and civil
liberties. The dissolution of NAO, your efforts to hire a
privacy officer, and your requirement that I&A personnel
undergo privacy and civil liberties training are very good
initiatives. They are, however, merely first steps. So I hope
you will amplify again on how privacy and civil liberties will
always be part of the procedures and protocols of your office.
We hope and expect that you will engage with us in a candid
dialogue and information sharing over the next months. This is
not an adversarial relationship. It is a partnership, and I
really believe, Mr. Johnson, that your skill sets will make I&A
finally into the intelligence function that many of us who
voted for the Homeland Security Department in the first place
intended, and I commend you again for your participation in
this and for your excellent testimony and now yield to the
Ranking Member, Mr. McCaul, for any opening remarks that he
has.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair. Let me be the first to
congratulate you on your recent victory regarding the NAO. I
know you have worked very hard on that effort. Mr. Johnson,
welcome to the committee. I enjoyed our visit recently and I
want to echo the Chair's comments about this being a
partnership, not a game of gotcha. We want to work together
with you. You have a unique background and set of skills for
this job that I think is going to greatly enhance DHS's
position with respect to local law enforcement.
Let me also say that since the House Appropriations
Committee has already reported out the Homeland Security
appropriation legislation for fiscal year 2010, it is important
that we use our time here today to talk about how the House
Appropriations Committee funding for the analysis and
operations account will affect the Department's mission.
Although the I&A budget numbers are classified, we should be
able to get a general sense of whether or not the appropriators
are providing adequate resources and funding necessary to
fulfill its critical mission.
Let me just say that I know the amount that came out of the
appropriations committee was roughly $11.8 million short of
what the President requested, and I think that is going to be
an issue that I will be focusing on at this hearing. Of
particular significance is the funding allocated for the fusion
centers and support for them. I think we can all agree that
they play a critical role in facilitating information sharing
at all levels of government. We need to ensure that these
centers are receiving all that they need to work effectively.
We must remember that if the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis as a whole is not provided the resources it needs, it
will not have the capability to provide adequate support to the
fusion centers and countless other programs so important after
9/11. It is also important to note this is the first budget to
fund the substantial increases in authority resulting from the
9/11 Implementation Act which this committee passed and
realigned the responsibilities of the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis and added additional responsibilities to the under
secretary. Therefore, again sufficient funding in my view is
needed to help realign your efforts and your office's efforts
according to this legal mandate.
Again, I am concerned that the appropriations committee may
not have provided enough of the funding necessary to accomplish
the goals and what H.R. 1 set out for your office and for the
Department to do.
So with that, I look forward to hearing your testimony, and
I yield back to the Madam Chair.
Ms. Harman. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Now I want
to recognize the Chairman of the full committee for opening
remarks, but also to tell him that when I speak of partnership,
he has been a terrific partner on this effort to get the
Department to appreciate the risks of proceeding with the NAO,
and I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your enormous
effort and support on this issue and many other issues, and I
yield to you for opening remarks for 5 minutes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I would
like to thank you for holding this hearing on the President's
fiscal year 2010 budget request for the Office of the
Intelligence and Analysis. I would also like to thank Acting
Under Secretary Bart Johnson for being present to testify
before the subcommittee for his first time in his new capacity.
First of all, Madam Chair, I would like to commend
Secretary Napolitano for doing the right thing with respect to
the NAO. This committee, as you know, has had serious concerns
since the recessed announcement of that entity and we have
followed it almost daily with that concern. While there are
significant issues with it, again Secretary Napolitano in a lot
of our estimation did the right thing, and I commend her for
that.
That being said, Mr. Johnson, you have some challenges. A
recent report about right-wing extremism came out. We don't
want to get caught up in the semantics of the report, but we
think there was some vetting that that report required that was
overlooked, and it is that vetting that we had issue with that
produced a product that I think would not have been in that
same format had the vetting occurred. I would like some
assurance from you that that is now in place; the secretary
committed it to this Member from Pennsylvania, but she also
committed to letting us know what the personnel actions that
were taken as a result of that report, and I am not certain,
Mr. Carney, you received any information. But we still are
looking for whatever personnel actions did occur relative to
that report.
Fusion centers are important. There is a need to have
uniformity and connectivity with them. A number of us have been
in fusion centers all over the country. The one thing we can
say is we have not found one that looks like another, and we
just hope that is not indicative of the failure to connect the
dots between them.
So we are looking for some direction from the Department to
help us put that whole situation together because we think it
is absolutely important.
Apart from that, the committee's loss with Tom Finan is
your gain. There is no question about that. You have a first-
class expert on your team. We trust you will take advantage of
it. If you don't, we will take him back.
Apart from that, I want to echo the Chair Harman's
challenges you face at I&A but with your background you can do
it. We are committed as a committee to help make that happen,
and I look forward to the testimony, Madam Chair. I yield back
the balance of the time.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Other Members of the
subcommittee are reminded that under committee rules opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
It is now my pleasure to welcome our witness this morning.
Bart Johnson is the Acting Under Secretary for the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis. Prior to his appointment at the
Department of the Homeland Security, Mr. Johnson served as the
Director of Homeland Security and Law Enforcement at the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence. His work focused on
bridging the intelligence community with Federal, State, local,
and Tribal customers. Before this, Mr. Johnson served as a
Colonel with the New York State police. He possesses over 30
years of law enforcement experience.
Without objection, your excellent and lengthy statement
will be inserted in the record, and I would now ask you, Mr.
Johnson, to summarize your statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF BART R. JOHNSON, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Johnson. Thank you very much. I just want to start off
by thanking you, Madam Chair, Mr. McCaul, and Mr. Thompson and
the rest of the distinguished Subcommittee on Intelligence, and
it is my pleasure to be here today to speak about the
President's 2010 budget.
As all of you well know, I just started 4 short weeks ago
as a principal deputy under secretary for intelligence and
analysis and until such time an under secretary is selected, I
will also be the acting under secretary. So basically I am
wearing two hats at this point in time.
You accurately stated that it is my first time in this
capacity, but I am kind of embarrassed to say it is my first
time, period, of testifying before Congress. So bear with me. I
was to appear back in April 2007 to testify about controlled
unclassified information but because of the tragic death of
Trooper David Brinkerhoff trying to apprehend a felon, this
group wrote into the record and you, Madam Chair, spoke to that
issue, and I want to take this time to appreciate very much the
kind comments that were shared with the family because of that
very unfortunate tragedy.
But having said that, I am very, very honored to be here in
this current capacity. I have met with and spoke at length with
the Secretary. I agree with everything that she is pushing
forward, which very fortunately is directly in line with
everything that you all have been saying for the past several
years, that I have been operating within for the past several
years and also agree with 100 percent.
I appreciate the comments regarding the more than 31 years
in law enforcement. I come from an organization based on pride
and tradition, rule of law, accountability, all the things that
make a great organization. I also come from a world where it is
all operational. So I am very familiar with those type
activities. So I hope I bring something to the table.
The most striking event that occurred to me, and many of
you, were the events of September 11 where foreign-directed,
foreign-supported, foreign-born individuals came to this
country and let upon us one of the biggest tragedies we have
ever seen. I lost two personal friends in those attacks,
Firefighter Sammy Ortiz and Port Authority Officer Paul
Jurgens. I live with that each and every day.
On that same day, Superintendent James McMahon tasked me to
build an intelligence operational investigative component
within the New York State Police, and I have been doing nothing
but since that time. So I am very familiar with a lot of the
programs that all of us have been building together as we move
forward.
I also had the opportunity to spend a year and a half as
the Director of Homeland Security and Law Enforcement with the
ODNI, where I got to see and witness the fine work and the
bravery of many members of the intelligence community, and I
also saw how those two worlds collided on September 11 which
clearly illustrated the need to get the right information to
the right people at the right time.
In my new role as a Principal Deputy, I often reflect upon
the fine work of Charlie Allen and General Hughes in what they
set into motion, and I am going to build upon that. I am going
to learn from them. I have been meeting with them already.
Nobody can illustrate to me the importance of getting
information to the first-line officers. It was the Maryland
State trooper that stopped Ziad Jarrah on September 9. They are
the people, they are the front lines that really need
operationalizing and to receive the information. That is what
all of you have been saying since that tragic event.
So what do we have right now? We have 70 fusion centers and
there is a baseline capability that is being built. They need
to be enhanced, they need to be matured. Like the Secretary has
stated, it is her role to counter terrorism, leverage those
fusion centers in connecting the dots and making sure that we
are empowering the people that need to be empowered with the
information that they need.
So what am I going to do? I am going to work with the State
and locals, solicit their thoughts before I do anything, like I
have been doing over the past 2 weeks. I am going to embrace
and fully support the fusion centers. I am going to move more
assets to the field. I am going to look at to professionalize,
which they are already professional, the Federal workforce and
become less reliant on the contractors that we are already
relying on. We are going to pull information, integrate
information, translate where required information, and really
put an operational spin into the hands of the people that need
it the most.
I understand the rule of law. I have testified in a court
of law. I know how to play by the rules and the needs to do
that. So I am going to work with the ACLU. Finally, with all of
your support--and I appreciate the very kind comments and the
partnership that is illustrated. You have my assurance that I
will be transparent. I will get back to you on issues that I
need to get back to you on, and I will work fully with you.
Thank you for your support.
[The statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bart R. Johnson
June 24, 2009
introduction
Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the President's fiscal year 2010 budget request for
the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis (I&A).
On May 18, 2009, I was appointed by Secretary Napolitano to be the
principal deputy under secretary for intelligence and analysis (I&A) at
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I am honored to have been
given this opportunity to serve as the principal deputy under secretary
at the request of Secretary Janet Napolitano. I proudly accepted this
new mission at her request and at the urging of many of my friends and
colleagues who work in homeland security, law enforcement and
intelligence. As you are aware, there currently is no under secretary
in place at I&A; for now, and for the foreseeable future, I will also
serve in the capacity of acting under secretary.
Since this is the first time I have interacted with some of you, I
want to share with you a little bit about my background. I served as a
law enforcement officer in the State of New York for nearly 31 years
and retired as the New York State Police Field Commander in December
2007. The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 was among the most
tragic experiences of my law enforcement career. That day impacted all
Americans directly and many of us lost loved ones. Two of my close
friends, New York City Fire Fighter Samuel Oitice and Port Authority
Police Officer Paul Jurgens, were among those killed.
Later in the day on September 11, 2001, I was assigned by the
Superintendent of State Police to build an investigative and
intelligence-led effort to work with other agencies to prevent, deter,
detect, and identify persons or organizations who are trying to carry
out other attacks in our country. It was through these efforts that I
worked with a number of agencies at the Federal, State and local
levels--including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--doing similar work. It was
through the relationships I developed with professionals at these
agencies that I was able to work on a number of programs that are now
in place throughout the country and in the Nation's capital to make us
safer. I would especially like to thank General Hughes and Charlie
Allen--my predecessors--for all of their work in standing up I&A and
making it an essential part of the Nation's homeland security effort.
In January 2008, I was selected by then Director Michael McConnell
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to be the
ODNI's Director of Homeland Security and Law Enforcement. For the next
year and a half, I gained a better understanding of the intelligence
community (IC) and what it does to better protect our country. These
experiences with the ODNI have given me a better understanding of the
importance of sharing intelligence and information with all of our
partners, both foreign and domestic. As acting under secretary, I will
continue to leverage the resources of the ODNI in my work at I&A.
During my short time in my new position, I have had the opportunity
to meet and interact with several Members of Congress and their staffs.
I appreciate these interactions and I find them to be informative and
helpful. I look forward to meeting and consulting with all of you in
the coming months.
I would also like to state that over the past month I have had
numerous opportunities to interact with the I&A staff through Town Hall
meetings that I have held and informal ``walk arounds'' during which I
have met quite a few of the employees. I have found them all to be
deeply committed to DHS' work and the important role they play in
performing the mission that I am going to outline for you today. I look
forward to working with each of them.
Finally, I would like to state that throughout my career, I have
taken my responsibility of protecting the public and upholding the rule
of law very seriously. I have always given my utmost to carry out the
mission while respecting the civil rights and civil liberties of the
people I serve. I am enthusiastic about the way forward, focused on the
challenges ahead, and look forward to working with the committee.
the office of intelligence and analysis mission
As Secretary Napolitano recently stated, the No. 1 responsibility
of DHS is preventing terrorism. Terrorism is the reason DHS was
created. More specifically, it is the reason that 22 legacy agencies
were joined together. To that end, the primary mission of I&A is to be
the recipient and developer of intelligence that creates the kind of
situational awareness that we need to stop a terrorist plot in its
tracks and save lives.
Critical to this effort is providing intelligence in a useable form
to State, local, and Tribal governments and the private sector. As
Secretary Napolitano has said, while there may be a lot of information-
sharing going on--among and between agencies and departments at all
levels of government--the key is disseminating useable intelligence to
our State, local, Tribal, and private sector partners; getting similar
intelligence back from those partners for I&A's ``in-house'' analysis
work; and making this two-way exchange happen on a real-time basis.
That is exactly the niche that Congress intended DHS to fill when
passing the Homeland Security Act of 2002. It is precisely where I will
be taking I&A during my service as acting under secretary.
The more than 70 State and local fusion centers that now exist
Nation-wide are an important step in the right direction and, in my
view, point the way forward. Secretary Napolitano made it clear at the
National Fusion Center Conference this past March that fusion centers
are ``the centerpiece of State, local, Federal intelligence-sharing for
the future and that the Department of Homeland Security will be working
and aiming its programs to underlie Fusion Centers.'' To that end, we
must look at information sharing in fundamentally new ways. Our goal is
not just to share a fact or a report, but rather to ensure that fusion
centers and fusion center personnel have the capacity not only to
gather and share information at the State, local, and Tribal levels but
also to analyze that information meaningfully--to convert what might
appear to be bits of unrelated information into a product that can help
authorities protect their communities from attack. That also requires
I&A to rise to the challenge. It must have at its core an analytical
team that accesses this kind of useful intelligence from fusion centers
and adds to their analysis intelligence and other information that is
available to DHS and other IC agencies about terrorist tactics and
plans. In the process, I&A will be well-positioned to create useful
homeland security intelligence products that can be shared back with
State, local, Tribal and private sector partners.
The National Suspicious Activities Reporting (SAR) Initiative,
which for the first time creates a systematic way for State, local, and
Tribal law enforcement officers to connect the dots in their own
jurisdictions about terrorism and other criminal activities, will be an
important source of data for both fusion center and I&A analysis. The
engagement of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and other
privacy and civil liberties organizations in the development of the SAR
Initiative, moreover, is the same kind of engagement that I&A plans to
initiate and maintain as it refocuses on building a robust and
transparent homeland security analysis function. As a former law
enforcement professional who well understands the critical importance
of the rule of law in making our people and places truly safe, I pledge
to you that strict adherence to privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties laws and regulations will be the starting, mid- and end-
points of I&A's homeland security intelligence work under my watch.
As I&A lays out a strategic vision going forward, we will focus on
several principles.
Sharing Information With State, Local, and Tribal Governments
First, the needs of State, local, and Tribal governments will drive
I&A's intelligence products. I&A will work closely with State, local,
and Tribal law enforcement officials, emergency managers, homeland
security advisers, mayors, Governors, county officials, and Tribal
leaders to better understand the types of information they need, and
the format in which they need it.
Second, I&A's production and dissemination process will be
streamlined and optimized. Intelligence and other information intended
for State, local, and Tribal authorities will be provided rapidly,
using dissemination processes that ensure that all State, local, and
Tribal decision-makers responsible for counterterrorism and other
homeland security efforts have the information and intelligence they
need to make critical decisions. I&A will work closely with the FBI,
NCTC, the DEA and other members of the IC to clearly define roles and
responsibilities related to the dissemination of Federal intelligence
and information to State, local, and Tribal officials. I&A will work
with these same entities to provide State, local, and Tribal officials
all intelligence and information necessary to support investigative
activity, protective actions, and response planning--particularly
during rapidly evolving threat-related situations and major events.
Third, I&A will better leverage State, local, and Tribal analytic
capabilities with the goal of developing synergistic analytical
excellence throughout the process. I&A will work closely with State,
local, and Tribal authorities to improve the capability of State and
local fusion centers to gather, assess, analyze, and share information
and intelligence regarding threats to both local communities and the
Nation. I&A's representatives in State and locally-owned analytic
centers will work closely with representatives from locally-based DHS
operational components as well as other locally-based Federal personnel
(FBI, DEA, ATF, etc.) to avoid duplication of effort and ensure close
cooperation in the sharing of Federal information. While fusion centers
are the central component of I&A's efforts to share information with
State, local, and Tribal authorities, they do not represent the
entirety of those efforts. Accordingly, I&A will ensure that mechanisms
are in place to share information with fusion centers and other State,
local, and Tribal officials as appropriate.
Fourth, I&A will analyze locally generated information to identify
regional trends and national threats. Each day across the Nation,
State, local, and Tribal officials gather information in the course of
their everyday efforts to provide emergency and non-emergency service.
This information may serve as the first indicator of a potential threat
to the homeland. The ability to blend and analyze information gathered
and documented by multiple localities is vital to I&A's ability to
identify regional and national patterns and trends that may be
indicative of an emerging threat to the homeland. To this end, I&A will
support Federal efforts to institutionalize the SAR Initiative.
Improving Coordination Among DHS Components
The consolidation of 22 legacy agencies into today's DHS was
intended to enhance Federal homeland security efforts by enabling
closer operational coordination and eliminating duplications in
mission-related activities. In order to strengthen the ability of the
various components to function as a unified department, I&A must
coordinate, centralize, and integrate information- and intelligence-
sharing activities across components that are distinct in their
missions and operations--thereby structuring a true DHS Intelligence
Enterprise. At the same time, individual components must continue to
strengthen their internal operational capabilities so that they can
continue to carry out critical law enforcement, transportation-related,
emergency response, and border security efforts. To achieve these
objectives, information-sharing efforts by individual components must
be organized based on a ``shared mission'' concept. Across DHS there
are multiple operational, technological, programmatic and policy-
related activities underway that focus on both improving the sharing
and analysis of information between departmental components and/or on
improving the sharing of intelligence and information between DHS and
other Federal, State, local, Tribal, and foreign government entities
and the private sector. Despite investing significant resources in
these efforts, more can be done. Accordingly, I&A will reevaluate the
current approach to how the various components design, procure, and
implement information-sharing technology. I&A will put in place
protocols, safeguards, and a governance structure that ensure that the
DHS Intelligence Enterprise better supports the missions of individual
components, I&A, and DHS as a whole.
Protecting Privacy and Civil Liberties
Efforts by I&A to gather, assess, analyze, and share intelligence
and information will be guided by the dual imperatives of protecting
the Nation from those who wish to harm it and protecting privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties. I&A will work closely with officials at
all levels of government, including the Department's own Privacy Office
and Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, as well as
representatives of the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties
communities, to ensure that information sharing efforts comply with
both the letter and spirit of the law. In fact, I&A is in the process
of hiring a privacy officer to work closely with senior leadership on
these important issues.
the work of the office of intelligence and analysis today
The dedicated staff of I&A strives every day to provide accurate,
actionable, and timely intelligence to support DHS; private sector
critical infrastructure owners and operators; Federal, State, local,
and Tribal officials; our component agencies and the other members of
the IC. As the current leader of this effort, I am responsible for
managing the daily activities of I&A and ensuring we are appropriately
organized and positioned to adequately meet the demands of our diverse
customer set. As DHS' Acting Chief Intelligence Officer, as codified in
the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
(9/11 Act), I am also responsible for integrating DHS' intelligence
components; developing programs such as the State and Local Fusion
Center (SLFC) Program described more fully below; and furthering the
DHS Intelligence Enterprise--all key examples of DHS's capabilities to
support our homeland and national security objectives. As the Acting
DHS Information Sharing Executive, I work to integrate and facilitate
information sharing within DHS and between DHS and our many customers.
As the Acting DHS Executive Agent for support to State, local, and
Tribal organizations, moreover, I manage the network of intelligence
personnel deployed across the country through the SLFC Program to
ensure a two-way exchange of information between our first preventers,
first responders and the Federal Government. Finally, as the Acting
Principal Accrediting Authority for DHS's classified information
management systems, I am responsible for the intelligence networks and
systems across DHS.
I&A continues to position itself to meet all of these growing
demands. We have increased and improved our analytic tradecraft in the
arena of domestic threat analysis--a notable accomplishment in an area
that has been traditionally outside the scope of the IC. I&A has
elevated border security to a division level to better focus analysis
on this issue and ensure that border-related activities are more
effectively integrated across I&A and the DHS Intelligence Enterprise.
Working with other Federal agencies and State, local, and Tribal
partners, I&A continues to grow the quality and frequency of the
Homeland Intelligence Reports (HIRs) that it distributes. These reports
rapidly provide State, local, Tribal, and Federal entities access to
unevaluated information that may be of intelligence value and also
inform the IC on matters that could be relevant to homeland and
national security. We likewise have, along with the DHS Chief
Information Officer, recently established a joint program office to
manage DHS' classified information systems. Furthermore, in my first
weeks in my new position, I instituted mandatory privacy training for
all I&A personnel. These are just some of the examples of the progress
I&A has and will continue to make in the months and years ahead.
I&A adds unique value when it comes to combating terrorism by
viewing it through the prism of its impact on the homeland. This
holistic perspective allows DHS to make connections--if and where they
exist--between terrorism and other illicit transnational criminal
activities, such as illegal immigration and smuggling, trans-national
organized crime or the trafficking of illicit drugs. Moreover, these
illicit activities often constitute additional threats to the homeland,
and I&A must address them as well in order to support both our
departmental mission and to help secure the public from harm.
state and local fusion centers and the interagency threat assessment
and coordination group (itacg)
Securing the homeland is a complex mission that requires a
coordinated and focused effort by Federal, State, local, and Tribal
authorities. I&A leads this coordinated effort through direct support
to State and local fusion centers through its State and Local Fusion
Center (SLFC) Program and a multi-faceted approach for providing
intelligence and information to non-Federal and private sector
partners. I am proud to say that by the end of this year, I&A will have
deployed intelligence officers to 45 fusion centers. These dedicated
officers are at the front lines working side-by-side with our first
preventers and first responders. Our fiscal year 2010 request provides
the resources necessary to increase deployments to all 72 approved
fusion centers, including centers located in Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) cities. We are also developing production plans that
focus on State, local, Tribal, and private sector requirements. Based
on the feedback of our partners, I&A has implemented a ``single point
of service'' contact to ensure that any State, local, or Tribal support
request (SLSR) makes of a fusion center receives a timely and
appropriate response. A Program Assessment Rating Tool audit of fusion
center representatives conducted by the Homeland Security Institute
earlier this year credited this initiative with significantly improving
the process for requesting and receiving a timely response from DHS. It
is my goal to forward deploy additional analysts to the field to major
cities and our component agencies.
In response to the needs of the fusion centers, we are also
strengthening core competency training programs--in cooperation with
the ODNI, the FBI and the Bureau of Justice Assistance--in order to
make our partnerships with State, local, and Tribal entities even more
effective. I&A training programs for fusion center employees are
designed to meet their intelligence training needs, and they contain
many of the best practices of training programs that have been
developed by the IC. Among other things, I&A offers Critical Thinking
and Analytical Methods (CTAM), Principals of Intelligence Writing and
Briefing (PIWB), Basic Intelligence Threat and Analysis Course (BITAC),
Mid-level Intelligence Threat and Analysis Course (MITAC), as well as
the Analytic and Critical Thinking Skills Workshop training modules to
our fusion center partners.
We likewise take our responsibility to protect and respect the
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of the public in the fusion
center environment very seriously. We partner with the DHS Privacy
Office, the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the DHS
Office of the General Counsel, the ODNI Civil Liberties and Privacy
Office, the ODNI Office of the Program Manager for the Information
Sharing Environment, and the ODNI Office of the General Counsel to make
sure that all of our efforts are consistent with our obligations. We
require all I&A staff assigned to fusion centers to receive specific
training and to have subject matter expertise on all relevant privacy,
civil rights, and civil liberties laws and regulations as a matter of
practice and as required by the 9/11 Act. Working with our partners in
the field, moreover, we are equally committed to ensuring that all
State, local, and Tribal representatives working in fusion centers are
supported and fully cognizant of their privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties obligations. Together with our Federal partners, we offer
technical assistance in meeting these goals. In its initial Privacy
Impact Assessment of the program, required under the 9/11 Commission
Act, the DHS Privacy Office has recommended that each fusion center
conduct its own privacy impact assessment, develop a privacy protection
policy, make it available to the public, and then engage with its local
advocacy communities. Approximately 60% of fusion centers have
completed such plans to date. Going forward, I&A will continue its
efforts to implement this recommendation at fusion centers.
In addition to placing intelligence professionals at the State and
local fusion centers, we have worked with our Federal partners to
establish the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group (ITACG).
The ITACG was created in the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to
help us meet the information needs of our State, local, and Tribal
partners. I&A has provided two senior I&A officers, along with two
officers from the FBI, to lead the stand-up and operation of this
organization. Over the past year, the ITACG has increased in size and
perspective. In total, four Federal representatives, five State and
local personnel (four police and one firefighter), one part-time Tribal
representative, and supporting contractors are working in dedicated
spaces with essential systems connectivity in NCTC.
The ITACG continues to mature in providing valuable input to
intelligence products disseminated to State, local, and Tribal
organizations and is engaged in DHS, FBI, and NCTC production processes
and activities critical to serving non-Federal customers. Since its
initial stand-up in October 2007, the ITACG has reviewed thousands of
intelligence products for State, local, and Tribal consumers of
intelligence, and has offered important suggestions to make them more
useful to our first responders. Of particular note is the Roll Call
Release that was developed by ITACG. The Roll Call Release is a
collaborative DHS, FBI, and ITACG effort that addresses specific needs
and requirements of ``street-level'' first responders. Like a
traditional roll call release for officers at the beginning of their
work shifts, this ITACG product provides situational awareness and
other actionable information that first preventers can use in the
course of their daily work. It has been very well received--as
evidenced by both the appearance of Roll Call Releases in State and
local-originated publications and by the high number of downloads from
Government Web sites.
As we expand our cooperation with our State, local, and tribal
partners I&A will increasingly position itself as a partner that
understands the needs of these organizations, responds to their
informational and intelligence requirements, and writes reports and
assessments that serve them well.
cybersecurity
DHS is a leading agency of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative as prescribed by Homeland Security Presidential Directive
23/National Security Presidential Directive 54. I&A provides the DHS
Office of Cybersecurity and Communications and National Cybersecurity
Division with intelligence support to help secure Executive Branch
unclassified civilian (.gov) networks and critical information
infrastructure, including parts of the .com domain, State and local
networks, and telecommunications infrastructure. The Homeland Security
Act prescribes that DHS shall share threat information with State,
local, and Tribal authorities and the private sector. I&A uses these
authorities and the public-private partnership framework as outlined in
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan to collaborate with the
National Protection and Programs Directorate to provide cyber threat
analysis and warning on issues to defend critical U.S. cyber
infrastructures and information systems.
Specifically, I&A provides cyber threat briefings and intelligence
products to State, local, and Tribal authorities on a regular basis.
For example, I&A analysts recently provided cyber threat briefings to
the Texas Homeland Security Fusion Center, the Wisconsin State and
Local Fusion Center, and the Multi-State Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (MS-ISAC). In addition, I&A has developed a line of
intelligence products tailored to State, local, and Tribal authorities
to help them understand the cyber threat that they face so they can
better allocate their computer network defense resources. I&A's
cooperation with the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT),
moreover, enables the U.S. Government and private sector to more
effectively deter, detect, defend, and respond to adversarial activity
against these vital resources.
integrating the dhs intelligence enterprise
As the acting under secretary and chief intelligence officer of the
Department, it is my responsibility to work with the component agencies
to transform I&A into a service-oriented provider of intelligence to
the DHS components themselves and to consolidate intelligence assets
throughout the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. To facilitate this, I chair
the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC), which provides a
venue for all Enterprise leaders to discuss issues and collectively
make decisions of consequence to the entire Enterprise. Under these
authorities, I am responsible for conducting an annual DHS intelligence
program review and work with the DHS Office of Policy and the Chief
Financial Officer to issue intelligence guidance as part of our
resource planning and programming cycle.
As you know, I&A is legally required to present a consolidated DHS
intelligence budget to the Secretary. The program reviews provide the
analysis and insights necessary for us to identify comprehensively the
requirements and activities of the Enterprise. These reviews will also
demonstrate how to streamline and structure Departmental activities to
leverage efficiencies of scale and eliminate unnecessary programmatic
duplication. In the future, we will seek to expand and diversify beyond
annual program reviews to include periodic, focused, issue-based
evaluations of smaller component intelligence activities throughout the
entire year.
A key element of integrating the Intelligence Enterprise is to work
with the other intelligence components within DHS. As we continue
forward with this effort, training and education will be key. I&A will
address this need by providing training and professional development to
the entire Enterprise. During this fiscal year, 130 Enterprise
personnel have completed the BITAC and 15 have completed the MITAC.
national applications office
At the direction of Secretary Napolitano, I am conducting a top-to-
bottom review of the National Applications Office (NAO). Specifically,
I am starting where Congress said the NAO should have started more than
2 years ago: with DHS' State, local, and Tribal partners. I already
have had two telephone conferences with representatives from the Major
Cities Chiefs Association; the International Association of Chiefs of
Police; the National Sheriffs Association; the Fraternal Order of
Police; the Major County Sheriffs Association; the National Native
American Law Enforcement Association; the Association of Law
Enforcement Intelligence Units (LEIU), State homeland security advisers
and other key stakeholders. I am working with these stakeholders to
determine how the NAO might meet their homeland security needs to
protect lives and property in their communities. Once, and if, any such
needs are identified, I plan to work closely with Congress, the Privacy
Office, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and the DHS
Office of the General Counsel to determine if they comply with DHS
policy and legal requirements. Once we have those answers, I will make
my recommendation on the future of the NAO to the Secretary for her
final determination. Let me be clear: my review and final
recommendation to the Secretary will be made in accordance with the
Constitution, the legal framework that law enforcement has worked under
for generations.
counterintelligence
No intelligence element can be completely effective without a
strong counterintelligence capability. DHS continues to develop its
counterintelligence elements in order to be able to assess the threats
posed to DHS personnel, programs, operations, and technologies and to
protect them from foreign espionage penetration. Counterintelligence
must be a part of the DHS infrastructure and integrated into DHS
operations. Support to our State, local, and Tribal partners; border
security; cybersecurity; and information sharing generally all require
counterintelligence support to be fully effective. For example,
counterintelligence support to fusion centers is especially critical
because I&A shares classified DHS information there. Furthermore, DHS
must instill a culture of counterintelligence awareness throughout the
Department in order to monitor foreign intelligence collection
efforts--especially the nearly 2,000 personnel who are permanently
assigned overseas and the many more thousands who travel abroad
routinely. An effective, DHS-wide counterintelligence program is
essential to the protection of DHS and its vital mission. Working
closely with the FBI, we must swiftly identify foreign intelligence
attempts to penetrate our operations and recruit our personnel, and we
must effectively neutralize those threats wherever they may be. I
consider this to be a priority for DHS and an area that requires
additional investment in both the analytical and operational areas of
counterintelligence.
border security
Border security is a major priority of the President, Congress, and
the Secretary. I&A has been working diligently with its partners and is
well-positioned to meet the increasing requirements to provide
intelligence support for border security operations. The office
currently works with border security operators at all levels of
government to ensure information sharing and intelligence support are
sufficient to enable focused enforcement activities.
Recently, I&A has been working very closely with our Federal,
State, local, and Tribal partners to ensure that a logical and
meaningful intelligence plan is developed to support operations in the
field. As you are aware, the National Southwest Border Counter
Narcotics Strategy was announced by the Secretary, the Attorney General
and the Director of the Office of Narcotics Drug Control Policy on June
5, 2009. This strategy contains clear and significant direction
regarding the need for an intelligence plan and implementation. Under
my leadership, I&A will be a full participant with our partners in this
process.
A critical part of this effort is the development of the southwest
border Homeland Intelligence Support Team (HIST) that operates from the
El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). EPIC hosts not only I&A and other
DHS representatives but also a number of our other key partners
including the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the FBI. The HIST is
designed to integrate and fuse key Federal, State, local, and Tribal
intelligence and information in the region in support of border
security operations. I&A border security analysts assigned to the HIST
(and elsewhere) identify and assess threats to the security of the
Nation's air, land, and maritime borders and analyze the methods by
which terrorists and their associates attempt to penetrate those
borders. They focus on five primary areas: Illegal immigration, human
trafficking; terrorist use or manipulation of homeland-bound maritime
and air transit; terrorist exploitation of specific U.S. border
security policies and procedures; and attempts by suspect persons to
enter the homeland and transport illegal contraband. I&A is currently
evaluating this effort. Based on the results of our review, we will
examine the potential establishment of a HIST along the northern border
to provide similar integrated cross-departmental intelligence support
to border operations.
In addition to I&A's efforts at the HIST and at headquarters, our
analysts are also participating in community-wide counterterrorism
research, analysis, and production planning--aligning our areas of
expertise with overarching documents such as the National Strategy for
Homeland Security or the Counterterrorism Implementation Plan which
will, in turn, influence the National Southwest Border Counter
Narcotics Strategy.
report and review processes
One of my primary areas of attention when I arrived at I&A on May
18, 2009, was the framework that I&A applied to the review, clearance,
and dissemination of its analytical intelligence products. This review
centered on the release of the April 7, 2009 Rightwing Extremism
assessment.
To strengthen our existing processes, an interim clearance process
was put in place shortly after the release of the April 7, 2009
assessment. That process established mandatory review and concurrence
by four offices--Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the Privacy Office,
Office of the General Counsel, and I&A's Intelligence Oversight
Section. Any non-concurrence that could not be resolved was elevated to
the deputy secretary for review, ensuring a much more coordinated
review of I&A's products than had previously been in place. We are
currently in the process of finalizing additional guidance to further
clarify and streamline the clearance process. I look forward to
briefing you and members of the staff on the new procedures in the near
future.
The lessons of the extremism assessment are important ones. I want
to assure you that DHS takes very seriously its mission of preventing,
preparing for, and responding to all threats posed by foreign and
domestic terrorists. As you know, the Secretary has pledged that
sharing information with State, local, and Tribal law enforcement
partners will be a guiding principle as we work to fulfill the mission
of securing the homeland from terrorist violence and related criminal
activity. At the same time, DHS will not target, for information
gathering or enforcement purposes, individuals or groups based on their
associations, beliefs, or other Constitutionally-protected activities.
the president's fiscal year 2010 budget submission
Finally, I would like to address how the President's fiscal year
2010 budget submission supports I&A and the programs outlined above.
This budget request continues our commitment to a national fusion
center network that is already demonstrating results by providing I&A
with additional funds to expand its representation at State and local
fusion centers across the country. The fiscal year 2010 budget will
enable I&A to deploy additional intelligence analysts and secure
communications to all 72 State and local fusion centers; provide
security awareness training to fusion center personnel accessing
sensitive Federal information; more robustly conduct privacy and civil
liberties awareness and protection training; and continue I&A's efforts
to provide intelligence support to fusion centers from headquarters. I
am encouraged by Congress' continuing support to the SLFC Program and
look forward to working with you to fully fund the program in fiscal
year 2010 in order to meet both the President's goals and objectives
and the requirements of the 9/11 Act.
The fiscal year 2010 budget also provides additional funds to hire
seven additional cybersecurity analysts. This budget request will allow
I&A to grow the cyber threat analysis element within I&A to provide for
strategic warning of cyber threats to our Federal, State, local,
Tribal, and private sector stakeholders in addition to supporting our
component agencies. I&A will be better able to fully coordinate and
integrate our cyber threat analysis with US-CERT, the National Cyber
Security Directorate, law enforcement, and the IC. Furthermore, we will
be in a better position to leverage Department and IC expertise to
provide analytic insight into cyber threats to U.S. Government and
critical infrastructure networks; fully analyze cyber intrusions and
emerging cyber threat trends; and provide strategic cyber threat
assessments for our Federal and non-Federal partners.
Our fiscal year 2010 budget request also includes additional
funding to improve information-sharing capabilities across DHS. The
requested funding will allow I&A to deploy approximately six homeland
secure data network (HSDN) systems to DHS components. Current
classified communication capabilities are limited, and this request
will increase DHS' ability to share classified information throughout
the Enterprise and with our State, local, and Tribal partners.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the fiscal year 2010 I&A
budget request includes--as you have urged--the conversion of over 100
contractors into Federal positions. As you know, when DHS was
established several years ago, we had to rely heavily on contractor
support in order to quickly build an intelligence organization from the
ground up. Since then, I&A and DHS have made a concerted effort to
maximize the number of Federal positions. If approved, these
conversions will enable I&A to maintain a more consistent workforce and
greatly reduce the amount of inherently governmental work performed by
contractor support.
conclusion
Members of the subcommittee, I want to convey to you my personal
sense of urgency and commitment to the responsibility we all share--
ensuring that DHS and its partners have the intelligence capability to
address threats to the homeland while performing their mission within
the rule of law. I&A is a modestly sized program, representing less
than one-half of 1 percent of the total IC workforce, but our mission
set belies our size. The President's budget request will enhance
Departmental intelligence capabilities to address the ``complex and
dynamic threats'' outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland
Security.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee
to provide you some background on my career and why I came to work for
DHS; to share my thoughts on the future of I&A; and to review the major
funding priorities in fiscal year 2010. These priority areas are vital
to advancing the DHS Intelligence Enterprise to where it should be.
Overall, the realization of a national homeland security intelligence
enterprise rests on addressing these areas. None of us--whether at the
Federal, State, local, or Tribal level; in the IC; or in the private
sector--can unilaterally predict the threat, warn our stakeholders, and
take action to mitigate the risks. Our success depends on our ability
to work together while never losing sight of the privacy, civil rights,
and civil liberties of the public that we are sworn to protect. Our
success in protecting our Nation's security depends on how relentlessly
we collaborate.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Ms. Harman. The Chairman just said wow, and I think that is
a sentiment that we all share for your rookie performance, Mr.
Johnson. That is an A-plus. Exactly on time and consistent with
much more lengthy testimony. That was superb. I know for the
moment you are the acting under secretary, but I would say that
not only I but a number of us on this committee want to remove
that word ``acting'' from your title as soon as we possibly
can, and it is something I have urged the secretary to do and
hopefully that will be another one of her wise decisions in the
near future. You are not permitted to comment on that because
you cannot turn this down.
I just want to give you a chance to elaborate on something
you didn't mention in your oral testimony, and that is the fact
that the fiscal year 2010 budget provides for the conversion of
over 100 contractors into Federal positions. I have stated my
concern about the overuse of Federal contractors, both because
it is expensive and because they don't provide the same skill
sets in terms of the understanding of needs of State, local,
and Tribal entities that I think the employees do.
So I want you to elaborate on that, I would also like you
to talk about the ITAC-G, the Interagency Threat Assessment
Coordination Group, which has been the tool, although not as
robust as we would like, to incorporate State, local, and
Tribal people in the preparation of intelligence products at
the Federal level.
So could you address those two issues in 4 minutes, please?
Mr. Johnson. Certainly. Regarding the contractors, it is
right now about 60 percent contractors, 40 percent
governmental. I come from a world where there were no
contractors. You did what you had to do to make the job work. I
do now understand that oftentimes there are a need for
contractors for very specific reasons, but not to run the
organization, not to have governmental people defer their
decisionmaking process to those contractors.
So what we are going to try to do by the end of 2010 is to
flip that number as a start point and then develop a plan. I
had an off-site yesterday. This was a priority for me. I need
to come up with a plan. I don't have the plan now, but I assure
you that we will have a plan and work very, very gainfully and
proactively and aggressively to try to make that flip and then
use that as a start point. It is not an endpoint. We need to
continue to work forward in that regard.
Regarding the ITAC-G, I am very familiar with the
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group. I sat on
the other side of the table from the DHS employees and I sat
alongside with Kerry Sleeper, the former director of the
Vermont State police, and we clearly illustrated to the
Department of Homeland Security why the needs and the
requirements and the thought process of State, local, and
Tribal and the private sector need to be borne into the
production process, the writing of reports, and basically the
``so what'' factor. That is not to criticize the expertise of
the intelligence community, but they write for a different
customer. We are the customer. So you can't have a better
integrator, I think, sitting at this table now, now bringing
that experience to I&A as a whole. So you have somebody on the
inside.
So I have been working with those detailees. I know those
detailees. I recruited those detailees to the ITAC-G and I am
going to continue to do that. I worked very closely with
Director Mike Leiter. I respect him and I know him and I have
committed to working with him, also.
I actually hosted my first ITAC-G advisory committee
meeting, and we spoke about a lot of the things that we need to
refine, refocus on, and really then to develop a plan to
implement them. I think they have done a good job. Are they
there yet? No, I don't believe they are, but it is not for a
lack of trying. So I am going to do whatever I can by providing
the support and direction that I need to get them to the next
level and then at the same time build that same type of
capability within I&A so everybody within the entirety of I&A
are looking towards the needs of the State, local, and Tribal.
I see I have 1 minute and 20 seconds left. That is not to
diminish the Federal people because I view a customs and border
protection officer standing at the border stopping cars,
interacting with people, falling into that same group of State,
local, and Tribal law enforcement entities and those types of
customer base, and that is my goal.
Ms. Harman. Well, thank you very much. You again stopped
before time ran out and I just want to say a couple of things.
No. 1, we share your assessment about Mike Leiter. We think the
NCTC is a critically important entity. I now recall that some
of that function was supposed to be in the Homeland Security
Department, and first former President Bush set up the
Terrorist Threat Integration Committee and then it morphed into
the NCTC. But the close collaboration between your office, I&A,
the ITAC-G, and the NCTC is what is going to make this whole
function work best.
I think one of the things we may want to do soon is take a
little road trip to see the NCTC. I have been there on several
occasions. But to see it and to meet the ITAC-G folks who are
now in place, and I take you at your word, you are going to add
to their number and diversity because I think that will make
all your products better.
My time is expired, and I now yield 5 minutes to the
Ranking Member, Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the Madam Chair. Let me commend you on
your testimony and experience. State and locals are the eyes
and ears on the ground and in the best position to apprehend
any threat, terrorists certainly, and experience shows that and
history shows that.
Two quick--I want to hit some issues on the budget. I
offered an amendment to restore the funding. The appropriations
committee came out with a $345.5 million number for this
division. The President's request is $357 million. I had an
amendment to restore that to the President's request. It was
not made in order, unfortunately. So with the writing on the
wall, how are you going to deal with that gap in funding? How
is that going to affect your office?
Mr. Johnson. First of all, I appreciate your efforts.
Second of all, we will work within the President's budget and
whatever funding we are provided. We had an off-site yesterday.
First of all, if we are going to start to convert contractors
to full-time governmental employees, that should result in a
cost savings. We are reevaluating the workforce, setting the
priorities, and the priorities are going to be State, local,
and Tribal fusion centers. Priorities are going to be the
suspicious activity reporting, priorities are going to be
training for analytical expertise within those fusion centers.
There is going to be training for our own cadre. We are going
to be cross-fertilizing detail people into I&A to get people
from Commander McNamara, who is seated behind me from the LAPD,
to have them understand what the needs and requirements are on
a more timely basis. So instead of spending a year there, they
are going to be dropped in for a month or 2 and then depart,
have new people in. I am confident that the President's budget
and whatever amendments and adjustments that have been made, we
could work within that, and I am confident that no program will
suffer any harm and will continue to move forward.
I would just like to add, I know this committee as a whole
is very, very committed to State and local fusion centers at
its current situation and there have been some enhancements to
it, and I very much recognize it, appreciate it, and I know
that is where it needs to be and I will continue to do that.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you. One other brief issue. The border
intelligence efforts that you have in your office, I know the
Department initiated the southwest border surge that would
triple the number of intelligence analysts working at the
southwest border to deal with the growing violence in the
region. I come from a border State, Madam Chair does as well.
This is a real concern for us.
Can you talk a little bit more about those efforts? I know
you have created a new division, and of course from a resource
standpoint I wish we could give you more. But can you comment
on what you are doing?
Mr. Johnson. Certainly. We have the Border Focus Group. It
is run by Tim Sampson. I am very familiar with the northern
border coming from New York State and all the challenges
associated with it, somewhat familiar with the southwest
border. I was there once. I plan on going back there again. We
have the Homeland Security intelligence support team situated
at EPIC. I know Mr. Art Doty. He is a real champion at EPIC for
all these efforts. Assistant Secretary Ted Sexton is very much
involved. Mr. Burson I have met with. The one concern that I
had was the number of intelligence efforts that are underway
and whether or not they are connected to one another. Through
those conversations and interactions I no longer have that
concern. I believe they are interrelated. I am tasked with
developing a plan to come together with the intelligence
efforts. I spoke to Mr. Tony Placido of the DEA, whom I have
known for a long period of time from New York. We are going to
be connected at the hip to co-chair that effort, to make sure
that whatever intelligence needs to get in the hands of the
State, local, and Tribal and really let them know what we want,
why we want it, where to send it, where they send it, what they
can expect in return, and really develop a more robust feedback
mechanism so they know that the information that they are
providing is having value to solving the issues that exist.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you. I want to follow up with you on that
specifically in the future. With the 20 seconds I have left, I
do have to throw out, as the Chairman brought up, the report
that came out of your office regarding right-wing extremists.
Secretary Napolitano came forward and very candidly admitted
that the ball was dropped, that mistakes were made, and that
the vetting process would be applied next time. But can you
tell us briefly what occurred with that report?
Mr. Johnson. Certainly. First of all, I believe that report
could have been much better written and it should have focused
on violent extremism, violent crime. That is where the linkages
need to be made. The ball was dropped as it relates to not
following the procedures that were established, and people need
to be held accountable to that because I believe that is an
anomaly that occurred. I believe that we need to do better than
that, that we had the professional staff and the expertise to
do better than that. I have been the recipient of many very
fine resource-cited products, and that is where we are and need
to go and it is going to be enhanced.
So what am I doing about it? This afternoon at about 1:30
we are going to be meeting on that clearance process to make
certain that it has within it the tenets that are necessary
without diminishing the outflow of information and the
analytical assessments that need to take place without it being
influenced, to have people encumbered and be reluctant to
produce what they need to produce. So it is a balance, but I
think we are moving in the right direction to get what
everybody needs in that regard.
Mr. McCaul. I look forward to your leadership on that, and
I yield back.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired. I
now recognize Mrs. Kirkpatrick of Arizona for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Johnson,
thank you for your excellent testimony. I, too, represent a
border State, Arizona, and my district is largely rural. Rural
law enforcement has seen an increase in human trafficking, drug
smuggling, almost more than they can handle. I just want to
know what efforts the fusion centers are making to work with
rural law enforcement.
Mr. Johnson. Certainly. I just want to share a story with
you. I stood up what I thought was the first intelligence
center in the country, the New York State intelligence center,
until I shared that conversation with Secretary Napolitano and
she said I beg to differ, the Arizona center was the first
center. So I stand corrected in that regard.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson. But Arizona has one of the most mature centers
in the country, as do several locations, and I know there are a
number of them in Texas also. What the fusion centers need to
do is they need to engage with the county sheriffs, they need
to engage with the smaller law enforcement organizations. The
Federal Government can't do everything every time for
everybody. So they need to rely on the fusion centers to really
look at that anomalous behavior that reaches reasonable
suspicion, that could be criminal in nature, and really have a
reporting mechanism so it is received at the ACTIC, the Arizona
Fusion Center. It is based on requirements, needs, awareness,
and collection processes that formulate in the rule of law, and
then know where to send it then. So what we are doing is we are
working with the EPIC, the El Paso Intelligence Center with Art
Doty to really be that clearinghouse to receive that
information for one-stop shopping, and then sharing it with the
Federal law enforcement community. There are dialogues going
on, which I don't believe I can talk about, I apologize, in
this venue, on the other side of the border.
So it is the lawful passing, you know, U.S. person,
reasonable suspicious information back and forth on the border
because you know that it is going to be an Arizona road trooper
or county sheriff that is going to stop an individual with
marijuana, with human smuggling. That is going to have pocket
litter of the names of the individuals and the phone numbers,
and there is going to be investigative leads. So those
investigative leads need to go to the right person to be looked
at, deconflicted so the best possible solution could come from
that information. So it is all about awareness and networking
and getting everybody on the same page. But they perform a
vital role in that regard, the fusion centers.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you. I appreciate your
understanding of that, and they are going more and more to the
back roads to traffic rather than using the highways, which
causes even more stress on our local law enforcement. So I look
forward to working with you on that. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mrs. Kirkpatrick. We have a vote on
a motion to adjourn. So what I think we will do is have
questions for Mr. Dent for 5 minutes, and then we will recess
this hearing and reconvene it in the Visitor Center in a
setting where we can review the classified budget.
So, Mr. Dent, it is now your turn to ask 5 minutes of
questions of the witness.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chair, for accommodating me. Mr.
Johnson, I am delighted you are here. Can you please explain
the role of the DHS's Intel and Analysis and how it relates to
the intelligence components of Homeland Security such as TSA's
Office of Intelligence? I would like to just hear what you have
to say about that issue.
Mr. Johnson. Certainly. What I look at is the No. 1
customer for me is the secretary, to support her, and then
other customers and partners are the State and local fusion
centers, which I spoke to, and then certainly the component
agencies. In my current role I wear two hats, No. 1 being the
under secretary with the intelligence community and then
equally important is the chief intelligence officer for the
Department. Building the intelligence enterprise and each of
the component agencies are part of that.
So I had a meeting on that the other day, the Homeland
Security Intelligence Committee, during which time there were
representatives from TSA, CBP, ICE, Secret Service, and all the
other component agencies. What I said to them is that as the
CINT, the CINT has the responsibility to coordinate activities,
not take over activities, not run activities, but try to
coordinate it. Very similar to what the ODNI is doing with the
intelligence community. I think it is a very good thing because
it creates efficiencies, we have a general understanding of
issues, elevating those issues, getting the support of the
issues whether it be through the secretary or venues such as
this. What I need to do is just make sure they get the
intelligence support, the training, the connectivity, working
with the intelligence community, getting them the access to the
information that they need, the clearance, the processes, right
to release tear-line information, all the different issues that
you have been working with.
What do I expect from that? I expect to have access to
their information so then it can be synthesized and translated
for the State, local, and Tribal and then shared as appropriate
with the intelligence community because a lot of information
resident within the country does, and I know it does, have an
impact on activities going on overseas, and conversely the
information over there is very, very relevant to what TSA is
doing and all the other component organizations that you
mentioned.
Mr. Dent. I would also like to ask you, too, this committee
used to continuously receive weekly unclassified intelligence
summaries from TSA highlighting significant security incidents
around the country. In February we stopped receiving those
reports. These unclassified reports were, I think, very useful
in highlighting real security threats the TSA has to manage and
help us make better-informed statisticians on the need for new
technologies like the whole body imaging to defeat these
threats, which, by the way, we had a problem with on the floor
the other day.
Can you please tell me why these reports stopped coming to
the committee? Would you commit to working with us to once
again including us on the distribution?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir. I have heard that also and I
understand that. I am reluctant to say why they stopped on
January 21.
Mr. Dent. Could you help us resume them?
Mr. Johnson. They are going to resume. Please bear with me.
Give me a little bit of time and we will work through it. We
will work with your staff to get you the items and issues and
topics that are relevant to you. But we will work with you on
that point.
Mr. Dent. Okay. Thank you. I would yield back at this time.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Dent. So, Mr. Johnson, thank you
for your testimony in open session. It was a wow. We do have
the sense, I think I can say this in a bipartisan basis, that
you will be an able partner with this subcommittee focusing on
accomplishing a mission that we share. There will be obviously
a lot of work to do in accomplishing the mission fully. There
is no such thing as 100 percent protection, but I think you
will improve the odds by preparing products that are better
suited to the questions that local law enforcement asks, by
including the private sector in the distribution of materials
and by bringing your own street cred to the game, and that is
something that I think will be a game-changer, the background
that you bring to this and the credibility that you have.
So again welcome, and we will now adjourn the public
session, the public part of this hearing, and reconvene shortly
after this vote in the House Visitor Center, Room 301. We will
have staff off the House floor to lead those like me who never
can find their way around that place. I am sure you already
know where it is, Mr. Johnson. But for the rest of us, we will
hope to find you there probably in about 15 or 20 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. The open portion of the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:48 a.m., the subcommittee was recessed,
to reconvene in closed session.]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
