Intelligence

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

GENERAL CHARLES G. BOYD, USAF (RET)

PRESIDENT AND CEO

BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

SENATOR ROBERTS, SENATOR ROCKEFELLER, DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE, IT'S ALWAYS A SPECIAL HONOR TO BE ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE IMPORTANT WORK OF ANY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE.  MY CONTRIBUTIONS, HOWEVER MODEST, ARE OFFERED WITH THE HIGHEST SENSE OF PURPOSE.

I HAVE BEEN ASKED, SPECIFICALLY, TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE HART-RUDMAN COMMISSION-OF WHICH I WAS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR-IN THE CONTEXT OF INTELLIGENCE REFORM.  I WILL SUMMARIZE BRIEFLY THAT EFFORT, AND THEN LET YOUR QUESTIONS GUIDE THE DISSCUSSION THAT FOLLOWS.  I WILL ALSO GIVE YOU A COUPLE OF PERSONAL PERSPECTIVES DERIVED FROM DECADES SPENT AS A USER OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE HOPE THEY WILL BE OF SOME USE.  I WILL LEAVE SPAGHETTI CHARTS AND WIRING DIAGRAMS TO OTHERS WITH MORE CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL FAMILIARITY.

BY WAY OF REFRESHER, THE HART-RUDMAN COMMISSION WAS CHARTERED TO TRY TO DETERMINE WHAT KIND OF WORLD WE ARE GOING TO LIVE IN OVER THE NEXT QUARTER CENTURY, THEN DEVELOP A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY RELEVANT TO THAT WORLD, AND FINALLY TO EXAMINE THE STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES BY WHICH THE NATION FORMULATES AND EXECUTES ITS NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES, AND RECOMMEND ADJUSTMENTS OR RESTRUCTUING AS APPROPRIATE.  FOURTEEN PROMINENT AMERICANS SERVED AS COMMISSIONERS, WITH ANALYTICAL, RESEARCH, AND SUPPORT

STAFF, CONSISTING OF APPROXIMATELY 50 PEOPLE.  WE DEVOTED OVER TWO AND A HALF YEARS TO WHAT WAS THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF OUR NATION'S SECURITY APPARATUS TO BE CONDUCTED SINCE 1947.

THE FIRST PHASE OF OUR WORK LED US TO A CONCLUSION NONE HELD AT THE OUTSET:  THAT THE SECURITY PHENOMENON OUR NATION WOULD FACE IN THE EARLY 21^ST CENTURY, AND THE ONE FOR WHICH WE WERE LEAST PREPARED, WOULD BE TERRORISM-IN A VARIETY OF FORMS-RANGING FROM SMALL SCALE DISRUPTION TO-QUITE POSSIBLY-MASS CASUALTY CATASTROPHE OF A MAGNITUDE THAT COULD CHANGE THE VERY NATURE OF THE WAY OUR SOCIETY WORKS AND INTERACTS WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD.

AFTER THAT UNDERSTANDING HAD BEGUN TO SETTLE INTO OUR CONSCIOUSNESS, IT AFFECTED, TO A PREVAILING DEGREE, HOW WE WOULD THINK ABOUT SECURING THE BASE CAMP-OUR HOMELAND-AND THEN THE EFFECT THAT WOULD HAVE ON ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, TO INCLUDE OF COURSE, INTELLIGENCE.

HART RUDMAN COMMISSION IS PRIMARILY IDENTIFIED NOW, IN THE AFTERMATH OF 911, FOR ITS' SPECIFIC WORK ON HOMELAND SECURITY, AND IN RETROSPECT IT IS THE PIECE OF WORK WITH WHICH I AM THE MOST PLEASED.  FOR OUR PURPOSES TODAY, HOWEVER, I WILL IGNOR THAT, EXCEPT WHERE IT RELATES TO INTELLIGENCE, AS WELL AS THE 40 OTHER MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS THAT DEALT WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, AND STICK WITH THE SECTION THAT PLEASES ME THE LEAST:  THAT HAVING TO DO WITH INTELLIGENCE.

WITH OUR CONVICTION THAT TERRORISM WOULD BE THE METHOD OF CHOICE FOR MOST OF OUR EARLY 21^ST CENTURY ENEMIES, CAME THE DAWNING NOTION THAT THE MILITARY COMPONENT WOULD DECLINE IN RELATIVE IMPORTANCE IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY CALCULUS. THE ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC AND COMMUNICATION COMPONENTS WOULD INCREASE IN RELATIVE VALUE, AND SOME-NOT ALL-CONCLUDED THAT, ULTIMATELY, THIS TYPE OF CONFLICT COULD NOT BE WON WITH THE ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE.  ALTHOUGH THEIR ROLE WOULD BE IMPORTANT, SUCH CONFLICT WOULD BE WON WITH THE OTHER COMPONENTS, WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND WITH THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF ALL-INTELLIGENCE.

THE DEBATE ABOUT INTELLIGENCE, AT THIS MOMENT, IS ABOUT ORGANIZATION, BUT THAT WAS NOT THE CENTERPIECE OF OUR WORK ON THE SUBJECT.  IT WAS ON PROCESS AND PRIORITES.  WE CONCLUDED THEN, AS HAD OTHERS, THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY LOST IT'S FOCUS WHEN THE BERLIN WALL CAME DOWN, AND, TO THAT POINT, SINCE THE NATION HAD NO EFFECTIVE, SYSTEMATIC PROCESS FOR ESTABLISHING NEW NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES, AND WAS FLOUNDERING IN ITS ATTEMPT AT REORIENTATION, IT FOLLOWED THAT THE INTELLIGENGE COMMUNITY HAD NOTHING SOLID ON WHICH TO REALIGN ITS OWN ORIENTATION AND PRIORITIES.  THE TWO HAD TO BE INSEPARABLE PROCESSES, SO, IN SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT WORK WE DID, WE DEVELOPED MODELS FOR BOTH.  I COMMEND THEM TO YOUR ATTENTION.

THE SECOND MAJOR AREA WE DEALT WITH HAD TO DO WITH HUMINT, SPECIFICALLY THE PAUCITY OF IT.  WE PUT VERY STRONG EMPHASIS ON THIS CAPABILITY, WELL BEFORE THE BANDWAGON FOR IT BEGAN TO ROLL.  I MIGHT ADD, MUCH OF THE REASON FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF THAT CAPABILITY, AND RESTRICTIONS ON WHAT KIND OF PEOPLE COULD BE INVOLVED, CAME FROM THE U.S. CONGRESS. YOU'VE GOTTEN OVER THAT NOW, I THINK, AND I FERVENTLY HOPE YOU STAY OVER IT.

FINALLY, WE DEALT WITH THE ISSUE OF ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMENSUATE WITH THE EMPHASIS WE HAD PLACED ON ECONOMICS AS A COMPONENT OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY ARSENAL, ALONG WITH SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS A MUCH HIGHER PRIORITY FOCUS AREA.

THERE WERE TWO DOGS THAT DIDN'T BARK:  THE POWERS OF THE DCI, AND PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE BILLET.

TO THE FIRST-IT'S NOT THAT WE DIDN'T ADDRESS IT, ONLY THAT IN THE END WE COULD NOT FIND AGREEABLE, COMMON GROUND.  SINCE YOU INVITED ME HERE TODAY, AND NOT THE REST OF THE COMMISSIONERS, I'LL TELL YOU WHAT MY POSITION WAS-AND IS:  IF THE DCI, OR NOW THE NID OR THE DNI IF THAT IS TO BE OUR FATE, IS TRULY TO BE THE DIRECTOR OF THIS NATION'S INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS, THEN HE/SHE MUST BE ABLE TO DIRECT THOSE ELEMENTS ON WHICH THE BROAD USER COMMUNITY IS DEPENDENT.  BY DIRECTION, I MEAN: RESOURCE ALLOCATION-BUDGETS-MANPOWER-REQUIREMENTS.

AT THE TIME WE STRUGGLED WITH THIS ISSUE, THE DCI OF COURSE ALREADY CONTROLLED CIA, BUT OUR ANALYTICAL TEAM THOUGHT HE NEEDED MORE CONTROL OVER THAT PORTION OF THE BUDGET THAT RESIDED IN DOD.  THE ARGUMENT THEN WAS BASED ON THE NOTION THAT THE NON-DOD USER COMMUNITY WAS INCREASING FOR SOME DOD PRODUCTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF NSA, AND IN THE WORLD WE SAW COMING THAT FRACTION WOULD ONLY CONTINUE TO INCREASE.  THE ARGUMENT IS EVEN MORE OBVIOUS TODAY, AND I WOULD PROBABLY TRANSFER CONTROL OF NGA AND THE NRO, AS WELL AS NSA, TO THE NID.  PURELY DEPARTMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS DIA, INR AT STATE, SERVICE INTELL ORGANIZATIONS, ETC SHOULD STAY RIGHT WHERE THEY ARE.  THESE ARE THE ONLY ORGANIZATION FIXES WE CONTEMPLATED, AND INDEED REORGANIZATION WILL NOT FIX WHAT'S WRONG TODAY.  I AGREE WITH A RECENT STATEMENT BY DR. FALKENRATH (Richard A. Falkenrath, formerly Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Homeland Security Advisor, Homeland Security Council) THAT OUR RECENT INTELLIGENCE FAILURES WERE DUE TO PERFORMANCE, NOT ORGANIZATION.

MY LAST ISSUE IS A TOUGH ONE, AND HAS NOT, TO MY KNOWLEDGE, APPEARED IN THE CURRENT DEBATE.  IN FACT, I MAY BE THE ONLY ONE WHO IS WORRYING ABOUT IT, THOUGH I THINK OTHERS MAY IF THEY START THINKING ABOUT IT, AND THAT IS THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR.

THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF MILITARY ADVISOR IS A MILITARY PROFESSIONAL, STANDING AT THE VERY TOP OF THE ENTIRE PROFESSION OF ARMS.  WE PUT ONLY PROFESSIONALS INTO THAT POSITION, AND IN FACT OUR LAW REQUIRES THAT ONLY ONE WHO HAS SERVED AS A SERVICE CHIEF, VICE CHAIRMAN, OR COMMANDER OF A UNIFIED OR SPECIFIED COMMAND CAN HOLD THE POSITION.   NOT SO, FOR THE PERSON WHO STANDS AT THE TOP TO THE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSION, AND SERVES AS THE PRINCIPAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT FOR INTELLIGENCE.

AFTER 1947, AS A PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE BEGAN TO BE DEVELOPED, PROFESSIONALS WERE PLACED IN CHARGE.  THE FIRST FEW WERE MILITARY PROFESSIONALS SINCE THERE WERE NO INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS AT THE TIME.  WHEN EISENHOWER CAME TO OFFICE THE FIRST CIVILIAN WAS APPOINTED WHO, THOUGH NOT A PROFESSIONAL, HAD SENIOR LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCE IN A WARTIME AD HOC INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION.

 IN THE YEARS SINCE, WITH OCCASIONAL EXCEPTION, A TREND OF PLACING NON-PROFESSIONALS IN THE POSITION HAS EVOLVED:  LAWYERS, BUSNINESSMEN, ACADEMICS, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFERS, POLITICIANS, AND THE LIKE, AND INDEED THERE IS NOTHING IN LAW THAT REQUIRES PROFESSIONALISM, OR EVEN NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERIENCE.  THE PRESIDENT CAN CHOOSE WHOMEVER HE WANTS, AND THOUGH YOUR CONSENT IS REQUIRED, I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY OCCASION WHEN THE SENATE OBJECTED TO A NOMINEE ON THE BASIS OF LACK OF PROFESSIONAL CREDENTIALS.  SHOULD YOU?

IT IS NOT JUST BECAUSE THE INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINE, THE SCIENCE, THE ART, INDEED THE CRAFT OF IT ARE SO SPECIALIZED AND COMPLEX THAT, LIKE THE MILITARY, BEGS FOR DEPTH OF PARTICULAR KNOWLEDGE IN THE ONE WHO IS TO LEAD, BUT IT IS ALSO THE SPECIAL ETHOS OF THE PROFESSIONAL THAT HELPS THE PERSON STAND APART FROM THE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT INEVITABLY SURROUNDS EVERY PRESIDENTIAL POLICY CHOICE.   THOSE WHO SERVE AT THE PLEASURE OF A PRESIDENT, FOR AN EXPECTED TERM LIMITED TO HIS, WHO COME TO OFFICE PRECISELY BECAUSE OF SHARED POLITICS AND POLITICAL RELIABILITY, COME-I SHOULD THINK-UNDER ENORMOUS PRESSURE OR TEMPTATION TO GIVE THE PRESIDENT WHAT HE WANTS RATHER THAN WHAT HE DOESN'T WANT BUT NEEDS; AND WHEN THAT SERVANT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SELECTING THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TO GIVE HIS PRESIDENT, I THINK I'D PREFER A PROFESSIONAL TO A POLITICAL APPOINTEE-WITH AS MUCH INDEPENDENCE AND JOB SECURITY AS POSSIBLE.

IT IS WITHOUT IMPUGNING ANYONE WHO HAS EVER HELD THE DCI BILLET, OR IS ABOUT TO, THAT I ADVANCE THIS IDEA.  I WILL DEVELOP IT FURTHER IN THE QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD IF YOU WISH.

I'LL BE HAPPY TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.