89 006
107 th Congress
Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session
107 219
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002
September 26, 2001.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
REPORT
[To accompany H.R. 2883]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 2883) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2002
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence community management account.
Sec. 105. Codification of the Coast Guard as an element of the
intelligence community.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Sense of the Congress on intelligence community contracting.
Sec. 304. Requirements for lodging allowances in intelligence
community assignment program benefits.
Sec. 305. Technical amendment.
Sec. 306. Commission on September 11 government preparedness and
performance.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Modifications to Central Intelligence Agency's central
services program.
Sec. 402. Extension of CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act.
Sec. 403. Guidelines for recruitment of certain foreign assets.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 501. Authority to purchase items of nominal value for
recruitment purposes.
Sec. 502. Funding for infrastructure and quality-of-life
improvements at Menwith Hill and Bad Aibling stations.
Sec. 503. Continuation of Joint Interagency Task Force at current
locations in Florida and California.
Sec. 504. Modification of authorities relating to interdiction of
aircraft engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
Sec. 505. Undergraduate training program for employees of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
Sec. 506. Technical amendments.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2002
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the
Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
(12) The Coast Guard.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2002, for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2883 of the One
Hundred Seventh Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the
executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of
the number authorized for fiscal year 2002 under section 102 when the
Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except
that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized
under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence
community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel
authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2002 the sum of
$152,776,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the
Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain available until
September 30, 2003.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence are authorized 313 full-time personnel as of September 30,
2002. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of
the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed from
other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated
for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2002
such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts
shall remain available until September 30, 2003.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community
Management Account as of September 30, 2002, there are hereby authorized
such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2002, any
officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces
who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community Management
Account from another element of the United States Government shall be
detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer,
employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a
period not to exceed one year for the performance of temporary functions
as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in
subsection (a), $27,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds provided for research,
development, test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until
September 30, 2003, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall
remain available until September 30, 2004.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall
transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall
utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug
Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions
of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403
3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the
National Drug Intelligence Center.
SEC. 105. CODIFICATION OF THE COAST GUARD AS AN ELEMENT OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 3(4)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401a(4)(H) is amended--
(1) by striking ``and'' before ``the Department of Energy''; and
(2) by inserting ``, and the Coast Guard'' before the semicolon.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2002 the sum of
$212,000,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the
United States.
SEC. 303. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Director of Central
Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence
community, whenever compatible with the national security interests of
the United States and consistent with operational and security concerns
related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally
sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes
the procurement of products properly designated as having been made in
the United States.
SEC. 304. REQUIREMENTS FOR LODGING ALLOWANCES IN INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY ASSIGNMENT PROGRAM BENEFITS.
Section 113(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
404(h)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``An employee''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) The head of an agency of an employee detailed under subsection
(a) may pay a lodging allowance for the employee subject to the
following conditions:
``(A) The allowance shall be the lesser of the cost of the lodging
or a maximum amount payable for the lodging as established jointly by
the Director of Central Intelligence and--
``(i) with respect to detailed employees of the Department of
Defense, the Secretary of Defense; and
``(ii) with respect to detailed employees of other agencies and
departments, the head of such agency or department.
``(B) The detailed employee maintains a primary residence for the
employee's immediate family in the local commuting area of the parent
agency duty station from which the employee regularly commuted to such
duty station before the detail.
``(C) The lodging is within a reasonable proximity of the host
agency duty station.
``(D) The distance between the detailed employee's parent agency
duty station and the host agency duty station is greater than 20 miles.
``(E) The distance between the detailed employee's primary residence
and the host agency duty station is 10 miles greater than the distance
between such primary residence and the employees parent duty station.
``(F) The rate of pay applicable to the detailed employee does not
exceed the rate of basic pay for grade GS 15 of the General Schedule.''.
SEC. 305. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.
Section 106(b)(2)(C) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403 6(b)(2)(C)) is amended by striking ``Nonproliferation and National
Security'' and inserting ``Intelligence and the Director of the Office
of Counterintelligence''.
SEC. 306. COMMISSION ON SEPTEMBER 11 GOVERNMENT PREPAREDNESS
AND PERFORMANCE.
(a) Establishment.--There is established a commission to be known as
the ``Commission on Preparedness and Performance of the Federal
Government for the September 11 Acts of Terrorism'' (in this section
referred to as the ``Commission'').
(b) Duty.--
(1) Assessment of agency performance.--The Commission shall, with
respect to the acts of terrorism committed against the United States on
September 11, 2001, assess the performance of those agencies and
departments of the United States charged with the responsibility to
prevent, prepare for, or respond to acts of terrorism up to and
including that date. For purposes of the preceding sentence, those
agencies and departments include--
(A) the Department of Defense (including the intelligence elements
of the Department),
(B) the Department of Justice (including the intelligence elements
of the Department),
(C) the Department of State (including the intelligence elements of
the Department),
(D) the Department of the Transportation (including the intelligence
elements of the Department),
(E) the Department of the Treasury (including the intelligence
elements of the Department),
(F) the Central Intelligence Agency, and
(G) the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
(2) Report.--The Commission shall submit the report described in
subsection (g).
(d) Membership.--
(1) Number and appointment.--The Commission shall be composed of 10
members appointed as follows:
(A) The President shall appoint 4 members.
(B) The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall appoint 2
members.
(C) The majority leader of the Senate shall appoint 2 members.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives shall
appoint 1 member.
(E) The minority leader of the Senate shall appoint 1 member.
(2) Terms.--
(A) In general.--Each member shall be appointed for the life of the
Commission.
(B) Vacancies.--Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring
before the expiration of the term for which the member's predecessor was
appointed shall be appointed only for the remainder of that term. A
member may serve after the expiration of that member's term until a
successor has taken office. A vacancy in the Commission shall be filled
in the manner in which the original appointment was made.
(3) Basic Pay.--
(A) Rates of pay.--Members shall serve without pay.
(B) Travel Expenses.--Each member shall receive travel expenses,
including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with applicable
provisions under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States
Code.
(4) Quorum.--6 members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum
but a lesser number may hold hearings.
(5) Chairperson.--The Chairperson of the Commission shall be elected
by the members.
(e) Director and Staff of Commission.--
(1) Director.--The Commission shall have a Director who shall be
appointed by the Chairperson.
(2) Staff.--The Chairperson may appoint and fix the pay of
additional personnel as the Director considers appropriate.
(3) Applicability of certain civil service laws.--The Director and
staff of the Commission shall be appointed subject to the provisions of
title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive
service, and shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of chapter
51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to
classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that an individual
so appointed may not receive pay in excess of the annual rate of basic
pay for GS 15 of the General Schedule.
(4) Experts and consultants.--With the approval of the Chairperson,
the Director may procure temporary and intermittent services under
section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, but at rates for
individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum annual
rate of basic pay for GS 15 of the General Schedule.
(5) Staff of federal agencies.--Upon request of the Chairperson, the
head of any Federal department or agency may detail, on a reimbursable
basis, any of the personnel of that department or agency to the
Commission to assist it in carrying out its duties under this section.
(f) Powers of Commission.--
(1) Hearings and sessions.--The Commission may, for the purpose of
carrying out this section, hold hearings, sit and act at times and
places, take testimony, and receive evidence as the Commission considers
appropriate. The Commission may administer oaths or affirmations to
witnesses appearing before it.
(2) Powers of members and agents.--Any member or agent of the
Commission may, if authorized by the Commission, take any action which
the Commission is authorized to take by this section.
(3) Obtaining official data.--The Commission may secure directly
from any department or agency of the United States information,
including classified information, necessary to enable it to carry out
this Act. Upon request of the Chairperson of the Commission, the head of
that department or agency shall furnish that information to the
Commission.
(4) Mails.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the
same manner and under the same conditions as other departments and
agencies of the United States.
(5) Administrative Support Services.--Upon the request of the
Commission, the Administrator of General Services shall provide to the
Commission, on a reimbursable basis, the administrative support services
necessary for the Commission to carry out its responsibilities under
this section.
(6) Subpoena power.--
(A) In general.--The Commission may issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence
relating to any matter under investigation by the Commission. The
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence may be required
from any place within the United States at any designated place of
hearing within the United States.
(B) Failure to obey a subpoena.--If a person refuses to obey a
subpoena issued under subparagraph (A), the Commission may apply to a
United States district court for an order requiring that person to
appear before the Commission to give testimony, produce evidence, or
both, relating to the matter under investigation. The application may be
made within the judicial district where the hearing is conducted or
where that person is found, resides, or transacts business. Any failure
to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as civil
contempt.
(C) Service of subpoenas.--The subpoenas of the Commission shall be
served in the manner provided for subpoenas issued by a United States
district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States district courts.
(D) Service of process.--All process of any court to which
application is made under subparagraph (B) may be served in the judicial
district in which the person required to be served resides or may be
found.
(E) Immunity.--Except as provided in this paragraph, a person may
not be excused from testifying or from producing evidence pursuant to a
subpoena on the ground that the testimony or evidence required by the
subpoena may tend to incriminate or subject that person to criminal
prosecution. A person, after having claimed the privilege against
self-incrimination, may not be criminally prosecuted by reason of any
transaction, matter, or thing which that person is compelled to testify
about or produce evidence relating to, except that the person may be
prosecuted for perjury committed during the testimony or made in the
evidence.
(7) Contract authority.--The Commission may contract with and
compensate government and private agencies or persons for supplies and
services, without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes (41
U.S.C. 5).
(g) Report.--The Commission shall transmit a report to the President
and the Congress not later than 6 months after the date by which the
Director has been appointed by the Chairperson. The report shall contain
a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of the Commission,
together with its recommendations for legislation and administrative
actions the Commission considers appropriate.
(h) Termination.--The Commission shall terminate on 30 days after
submitting the report required under subsection (g).
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. MODIFICATIONS TO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S
CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM.
Section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403u) is amended as follows:
(1) Subsection (g)(1) is amended--
(A) by striking ``December'' and inserting ``January''; and
(B) by striking ``conduct'' and inserting ``complete''.
(2) Subsection (h) is amended--
(A) by striking paragraph (1) and redesignating paragraphs (2) and
(3) as paragraphs (1) and (2), respectively;
(B) in paragraph (1), as so redesignated, by striking ``(3)'' and
inserting ``(2)''; and
(C) in paragraph (2), as so redesignated, by striking ``(2)'' and
inserting ``(1)''.
SEC. 402. EXTENSION OF CIA VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY ACT.
(a) Extension of Authority.--Section 2(f) of the Central Intelligence
Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act (Public Law 103 36, 50 U.S.C. 403 4
note) is amended by striking ``September 30, 2002'' and inserting
``September 30, 2003''.
(b) Remittance of Funds.--Section 2(i) of that Act is amended by
striking ``or 2002'' and inserting ``2002, or 2003''.
SEC. 403. GUIDELINES FOR RECRUITMENT OF CERTAIN FOREIGN ASSETS.
Recognizing dissatisfaction with the provisions of the guidelines of
the Central Intelligence Agency (promulgated in 1995) for handling cases
involving foreign assets or sources with human rights concerns, the
Director of Central Intelligence shall--
(1) rescind the provisions of the guidelines for handling such
cases; and
(2) provide for provisions for handling such cases that more
appropriately weigh and incentivize risks to achieve successful
operations.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE ITEMS OF NOMINAL VALUE FOR
RECRUITMENT PURPOSES.
(a) Authority.--Section 422 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(b) Promotional Items for Recruitment Purposes.--The Secretary of
Defense may use funds available for an intelligence element of the
Department of Defense to purchase promotional items of nominal value for
use in the recruitment of individuals for employment by that element.''.
(b) Clerical Amendments.--(1) The heading of such section is amended
to read as follows:
``422. Use of funds for certain incidental purposes''.
(2) Such section is further amended by inserting at the beginning of
the text of the section the following: ``(a) Counterintelligence
Official Reception and Representation Expenses.--''.
(3) The item relating to such section in the table of sections at the
beginning of subchapter I of chapter 21 of such title is amended to read
as follows:
``422. Use of funds for certain incidental purposes.''.
SEC. 502. FUNDING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND QUALITY-OF-LIFE
IMPROVEMENTS AT MENWITH HILL AND BAD AIBLING STATIONS.
Section 506(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996 (Public Law 104 93; 109 Stat. 974), as amended by section 502 of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105
107; 111 Stat. 2262) and by section 502 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106 120; 113 Stat.
1619), is further amended by striking ``for fiscal years 2000 and 2001''
and inserting ``for fiscal years 2002 and 2003''.
SEC. 503. CONTINUATION OF JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE AT
CURRENT LOCATIONS IN FLORIDA AND CALIFORNIA.
(a) Main Location.--The Secretary of Defense shall continue to
maintain the Joint Interagency Task Force at Key West, Florida, with the
responsibility for coordinating drug interdiction efforts in the Western
Hemisphere and with such additional responsibilities regarding worldwide
intelligence for counterdrug operations as the Secretary may assign.
(b) Component Location.--The Secretary of Defense shall convert the
Joint Interagency Task Force located at Alameda, California, to be a
component site of the main location specified in subsection (a).
(c) Director.--The Director of the Joint Interagency Task Force shall
be a flag officer of the Coast Guard.
SEC. 504. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO INTERDICTION
OF AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING.
(a) Certification Required for Immunity.--Subsection (a)(2) of
section 1012 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1995 (Public Law 103 337; 108 Stat. 2837; 22 U.S.C. 2291 4) is amended
by striking ``, before the interdiction occurs, has determined'' and
inserting ``has, during the 12-month period ending on the date of the
interdiction, certified to Congress''.
(b) Annual Reports.--That section is further amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:
``(c) Annual Reports.--(1) Not later than February 1 each year, the
President shall submit to Congress a report on the assistance provided
under subsection (b) during the preceding calendar year. Each report
shall include for the calendar year covered by such report the
following:
``(A) A list specifying each country for which a certification
referred to in subsection (a)(2) was in effect for purposes of that
subsection during any portion of such calendar year, including the
nature of the illicit drug trafficking threat to each such country.
``(B) A detailed explanation of the procedures referred to in
subsection (a)(2)(B) in effect for each country listed under
subparagraph (A), including any training and other mechanisms in place
to ensure adherence to such procedures.
``(C) A complete description of any assistance provided under
subsection (b).
``(D) A summary description of the aircraft interception activity
for which the United States Government provided any form of assistance
under subsection (b).
``(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''.
SEC. 505. UNDERGRADUATE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE
NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY.
(a) Authority To Carry Out Training Program.--Subchapter III of
chapter 22 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end the following new section:
``462. Financial assistance to certain employees in
acquisition of critical skills
``The Secretary of Defense may establish an undergraduate training
program with respect to civilian employees of the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency that is similar in purpose, conditions, content, and
administration to the program established by the Secretary of Defense
under section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C.
402 note) for civilian employees of the National Security Agency.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of
such subchapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
``462. Financial assistance to certain employees in acquisition of
critical skills.''.
SEC. 506. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.
Section 2555 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section
1203(a) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted by Public Law 106 398; 114 Stat. 1654,
1654A 324), is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking `` Convey or'' in the subsection heading and
inserting `` Transfer Title to or Otherwise'';
(B) in paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking ``convey'' and inserting ``transfer title''; and
(ii) by striking ``and'' after ``equipment;'';
(C) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (2) and inserting
``; and''; and
(D) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) inspect, test, maintain, repair, or replace any such
equipment.''; and
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) by striking ``conveyed or otherwise provided'' and inserting
``provided to a foreign government'';
(B) by inserting ``and'' at the end of paragraph (1);
(C) by striking ``; and'' at the end of paragraph (2) and inserting
a period; and
(D) by striking paragraph (3).
PURPOSE
The bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2002 for (a) the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government,
(b) the Community Management Account, and (c) the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 2002 for the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government
and permit the Director of Central Intelligence to authorize personnel
ceilings in Fiscal Year 2002 for any intelligence element up to two
percent above the authorized levels, with the approval of the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget;
(3) Authorize $27 million for the National Drug Intelligence Center
in Johnstown, Pennsylvania;
(4) Establishes the United States Coast Guard as a National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP) agency under the National Security Act;
(5) Creates an independent commission to review the performance of
those federal public safety, law enforcement, and national security
departments and agencies responsible for preventing and/or responding to
acts of terrorism in the period prior to and including September 11,
2001;
(6) Rescinds the 1995 guidelines on recruitment of foreign assets
and sources;
(7) Supports confirmation of Joint Inter-Agency Task Force
operations and facilities at current locations in California and
Florida;
(8) Amends current law relating to official immunity for employees
and agents of the United States and foreign countries engaged in the
interdiction of aircraft used in illicit drug trafficking.
OVERALL PERSPECTIVE ON THE INTELLIGENCE BUDGET AND COMMITTEE INTENT
The classified Annex to this public report includes the classified
Schedule of Authorizations and its associated language. The committee
views the classified Annex as an integral part of this legislation. The
classified Annex contains a thorough discussion of all budget issues
considered by the committee, which underlies the funding authorization
found in the Schedule of Authorizations. The Committee intends that all
intelligence programs and intelligence-related activities discussed in
the classified Annex to this report be conducted in accord with the
guidance and limitations set forth as associate language therein. The
classified Schedule is incorporated directly into this legislation by
virtue of section 102 of the bill. The classified Annex is available for
review by all Members of the House of Representatives, subject to the
requirements of clause 13 of Rule XXIV of the House.
SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW
U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under the
jurisdiction of the committee include the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
(TIARA) and the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) of the
Department of Defense.
The NFIP consists of all programs of the Central Intelligence Agency,
as well as those national foreign intelligence and/or
counterintelligence programs conducted by: (1) the Department of
Defense; (2) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (3) the National Security
Agency; (4) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (5) the
Department of State; (6) the Department of the Treasury; (7) the
Department of Energy; (8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (9) the
National Reconnaissance Office; (10) the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency.
The Department of Defense TIARA is a diverse array of reconnaissance
and target acquisition programs that are a functional part of the basic
military force structure and provide direct information support to
military operations. TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Secretary of Defense, include those military intelligence activities
outside the General Defense Intelligence Program that respond to the
needs of military commanders for operational support information, as
well as to national command, control, and intelligence requirements. The
Armed Services Committee in the House Committee in the House of
Representatives has joint oversight and authorizing jurisdiction of the
programs compromising TIARA.
The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated program
management of defense intelligence elements that support defense-wide or
theater-level consumers. Included within JMIP are aggregations created
for management efficiency and characterized by similarity, either in
intelligence discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery
Intelligence (IMINT)), or function (e.g., satellite support, aerial
reconnaissance). The following aggregations are included in the JMIP:
(1) the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP); (2) the Defense Imagery and
Mapping Agency (DIMAP); (3) the Defense General Intelligence
Applications Program (DGIAP), which itself includes (a) the Defense
Airborne Reconnaissance Program (DARP), (b) the Defense Intelligence
Tactical Program (DITP), (c) the Defense Intelligence Special
Technologies Program (DISTP), (d) the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug
Program (DICP), and (e) the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program (DSRP).
As with TIARA programs, the Armed Services Committee in the House of
Representatives has joint oversight and authorizing jurisdiction of the
programs compromising the JMIP.
OVERALL COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Committee completed its review of the President's fiscal year
2002 budget, carrying out its annual responsibility to prepare an
authorization based on close examination of intelligence programs and
proposed expenditures. The review reflected the Committee's continuing
belief that intelligence activities must be examined by function, as
well as by program. Due to the late delivery of the details of the
President's amended budget request and to circumstances caused by the
deplorable terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11,
2001, the Committee conducted only a limited number of budget-related
hearings. The Committee's membership also had numerous discussions and
briefings with the White House and the Intelligence
Community leadership to examine the views and plans for the
future of intelligence and the Intelligence Community. There were, in
addition, numerous individual briefings to Members and over one hundred
staff briefings on programs, specific activities, and budget requests.
In the classified schedule of authorizations and the accompanying
explanatory language, the Committee has addressed numerous specific
matters related to the fiscal year 2002 budget. In the following
section, the Committee addresses many issues that it believes are
particularly important although there may have been no direct budgetary
action. It should be noted that, because of the extraordinary
circumstances with respect to the national security environment in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the Committee made a determination
to make very few modifications to the President's request. Those changes
that are made primarily are focused on responding to deficiencies that
could quickly impact the Community's ability to provide warning against
future such attacks.
Taken as a whole, the Committee's budgetary actions and general
provisions reflect the Committee's concern that the United States has
placed, and continues to place, undue risks on its national security
interests by not redressing the many critical problems facing the
Intelligence Community. Many of these are enduring issues that the
Committee has repeatedly highlighted in the past. However, the ominous
message sent by the terrorist actions in New York and Washington D.C.
demonstrates an urgency to correct these Intelligence Community
deficiencies like no other time in our Nation's history.
The United States cannot continue to use the same processes and
priorities to build the intelligence budgets of the 21st century that
were used in the Cold War. American interests have changed, new threats,
particularly the elusive and unrestricted terrorist threat, have evolved
and the priorities placed on intelligence and the role of the
Intelligence Community have grown. For the President and senior
policymakers, intelligence often forms the basis for key foreign policy
strategies and decisions, and can provide insights as to the effect of
such decisions. At its best, intelligence provides key indications and
warning (I&W) information that can direct national command authority
attention to issues and areas before crises occur. When fully
successful, such intelligence support allows for appropriate actions to
provide regional stability or, hopefully, ward off an attack or larger
conflict. Yet, despite the Committee's repeated direction to more
broadly provide this information on the myriad threats world-wide, the
nation's intelligence resources remain highly focused on only the
highest priority military support issues and nations, leaving few
resources for the critical I&W functions, especially against
transnational, non-nation state actors or against areas of the world
that could erupt overnight.
For the military, intelligence is now the basis for, and organic to
everything it does. HUMINT and SIGINT, in particular, provide direct and
immediate threat data to personnel engaged in activities that risk their
lives on a daily basis: our ground forces in Kosovo, our pilots
conducting Northern and Southern Watch missions in Iraq, our forces on
the border between North and South Korea, our forces engaged in
counternarcotics operations in Latin America, and our Special Operations
personnel who may have to enter a country unannounced and undetected,
and require the on-scene intelligence officer to give them ``ground
truth.''
It must be pointed out that the requirements for intelligence support
have grown at a rapid pace, making the relatively status quo
intelligence budget more and more inadequate. Increasingly, existing
resources are being siphoned off to meet day-to-day tactical
requirements. Global coverage and predictive, strategic intelligence
have suffered as a result, contributing to shortfalls such as the lack
of warning of recent nuclear tests, the lack of information on the New
York and Washington D.C. terrorist attacks, the inability to monitor key
facilities suspected of producing weapons of mass destruction, the
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and the shortage of ISR
assets around the world.
Intelligence should be the first line of defense, yet, it is not
treated as such. Remedying this situation, however, is not a task that
Congress can, or should, take on alone. Along with a new focus on
intelligence budgeting and conduct by the Administration, there also
must be a Community-wide effort actually to work as a ``community.''
Although there have been some areas of progress, not nearly enough is
apparent.
The Committee's review of this year's budget request included
in-depth discussions with, or testimony from, the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI), the Community's senior leadership the managers of
individual programs and agencies, as well as leaders from the Department
of Defense and the military services who produce intelligence or who use
or rely on intelligence systems and information on a daily basis. Their
message continues to be that, despite the increases in the President's
amended request for the Intelligence Community's people and programs,
there are insufficient intelligence resources to meet the immediate
national security intelligence needs, let alone future needs. Although
the Committee does not believe that additional funding alone will
correct all the Community's deficiencies, indeed the Committee believes
that there is a fundamental need for both a cultural revolution within
the Intelligence Community as well as significant structural changes,
the Committee is concerned that the additional funding sought for the
Community constitutes a misjudgment in national security priorities. As
an example, the Committee notes that intelligence funding constituted a
significantly lower percentage of the overall amended defense request
for fiscal year 2002. This amount is inconsistent with the overall
Intelligence Community funding percentage relative to national defense
and does not seem to comport with the Administration's or the Secretary
of Defense's emphasis on intelligence. Moreover, the fact that
intelligence must continue to compete with other defense needs is a Cold
War legacy that does not reflect the new national security definitions
nor encompass the realities of today's and tomorrow's threats. The
Committee is also concerned that increasing requirements for greater
volume, higher fidelity, and more timely intelligence, especially by the
military, is forcing the Intelligence Community to ``accomplish much
more, with much less.'' The lack of long-term analysis to provide
predictive warning
against acts of war against the United States, such as that
perpetrated by the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, is
indicative of this problem.
For the past six years, the Committee and Congress have sought to
increase the ``top line,'' or overall funding level for the Intelligence
Community. The President's amendment to the fiscal year 2002 request was
welcomed as a recognition that the congressional priorities for national
defense, and particularly intelligence operations, were justified.
However the extremely modest increase to the request does not
demonstrate to this Committee the full commitment by the Administration
to build a healthy, future years' intelligence budget that meets
national security needs. The Committee does understand that the
Administration's request that resulted in the ``The Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Recovery and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the
United States'' includes resources for the Intelligence Community.
Further, the Committee recognizes that the new Administration is
attempting to conduct a full review of the Intelligence Community to
determine its future needs. The Committee must assume that the
supplemental appropriation is not a long-term ``fix,'' and must caution
that the requested increase in this single fiscal year must be sustained
in the future years' request so that no future unfunded bills will
result. The Committee is compelled to highlight this issue, since it is
our understanding that the preliminary budget guidance for fiscal year
2003 appears to fall into the same, status quo, bureaucratic construct
that will result in, at best, having intelligence on a flat-line funding
track. With this in mind, the Committee has made some adjustments and
recommendations in this bill in order to implore and to prod the
President, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of
Defense to re-examine the basic process used to put the yearly budget
request together.
It is imperative that the Executive Branch address these critical
shortfalls in planning and its intelligence capabilities, especially to
include the following areas:
In the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) arena, ill-advised reductions of
resources after the Cold War, combined with poor planning,
infrastructure problems, extended requirements for military force
protection, and unexpected contingency operations have all worked to
take resources from the ``front line'' field officers, thus limiting our
efforts to rebuild our ``eyes and ears'' around the globe. In stark
contrast to the Community's budget request that actually cuts manpower,
it is imperative that the Intelligence Community increase its efforts to
add to its HUMINT capabilities, particularly in the areas of increasing
the number of clandestine case officers and defense attaches around the
world, improving language and specialized skills training, and creating
and fostering a positive career culture for specialists.
Also critical is the rebuilding and restructuring of the Community's
all-source analytic resources and tools. The number of analysts needs to
increase, and collaboration across the Community and across intelligence
disciplines must occur. The Committee believes that physical collocation
of analysts may well serve to create a better, stronger analytic base
for the Community.
Despite the oversight committees' exhortations, the Intelligence
Community is still faced with totally inadequate planning and investment
for systems to correct the Community's multi-intelligence tasking,
processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) problems. This is
particularly true for current imagery intelligence collection
capabilities, and more so for planned capabilities. The Intelligence
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002 has begun to address imagery
tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination deficiencies by
providing the initial funding for the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency's modernization. The funding will enable the initiation of
acquisition reform, improved information management capabilities, new
business processes to better produce innovative imagery and geo-spatial
products, and greater access to all imagery sources.
As the Committee stated last year, in the area of Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, we continue to see
extensive over-utilization of very limited, but critical airborne
assets, with little relief in sight. While planning for deployment of
new ISR airborne capabilities, the Department of Defense has taken money
from existing, supposedly complementary, platforms to pay for future
capabilities. The aging manned reconnaissance fleets are in clear need
of recapitalization with no funded plan to do so. The result: our
overall ISR capabilities and resources, in practical terms, are
decreasing at a time when our military forces are relying on them more
and more.
The most serious and immediate problems continue to be with signals
intelligence (SIGINT) resources. The Director of the National Security
Agency (NSA) has a new team in place to correct many of the significant
infrastructure and modernization problems caused by nearly a decade of
decline in resources and severe internal mismanagement. In the same
decade the signals targets increased dramatically in both number and
technological sophistication. The problems have been daunting:
infrastructure needs went unfunded and major interruptions of service
occurred, Information Technology (IT) resources were mismanaged and
collection and analysis efforts suffered, and the lack of sufficient
acquisition processes and expertise brought critical modernization
efforts to a crawl. This did not come as a surprise: indeed, the
Committee has, for over four years, warned the NSA and the Director of
Central Intelligence about these problems. As stated, the Director of
NSA has begun efforts to address these issues, and his efforts have the
Committee's support. However, the Committee is concerned about NSA
internal management's willingness to fully understand the need for
radical change and to get behind these programs.
The Committee recognizes that the men and women who work in the
Intelligence Community are taking the events of September 11 very hard
and personally. These extremely hard working, dedicated, and courageous
individuals are doing good work with what they have. Terrorism is an
extremely difficult target, and the resources that the Community has
appear inadequate. This reason alone should compel the Administration
and Congress to heavily invest in our intelligence disciplines. The
government cannot, however, stop by responding to terrorism alone. There
are many other issues that the
Intelligence Community also must attend to in order to assure
that our nation's security is best maintained.
Heavy investments alone also will not sufficiently address the
national security challenge and needs. As we sit today, it appears that
many of the questions that are being asked after the attacks on
September 11, 2001, are similar to those asked in the aftermath of the
attack on U.S. forces at Pearl Harbor. As was done after Pearl Harbor,
the Committee believes, that the Government must conduct a thorough
review of our national security structures to determine whether these
are the right structures to address the security challenges of the
future.
The Committee will be discussing this issue in greater detail in the
next few months, and stands ready to work with the Administration to
undertake this review and make whatever changes are deemed appropriate.
This is not a time to preserve the status quo, although there will be a
tendency to do so as we embark on this war on terrorism. Now, more than
ever, we must be bold in addressing our needs for intelligence--our
first line of defense--and for our overall security.
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
In the following several pages, the Committee has chosen to highlight
areas of special interest that it believes must be addressed by the
Intelligence Community and the Administration if our country is to have
sufficient intelligence resources to protect our national security. The
Committee has chosen to identify those issues that address the
Intelligence Community as a whole or that cross bureaucratic boundaries
of the various programs. These primarily relate to broader investment
and management policies rather than individual programs and projects
within the NFIP, JMIP or TIARA that are addressed with these accounts.
The order of these issues is, by and large, irrelevant in terms of
priority for the Committee--all are important. Moreover, these
provisions, along with others in this bill, are intended to highlight
for the new Administration the critical need for intelligence, the
critical state in which the Intelligence Community finds itself, and to
emphasize that the Administration must broadly address the shortfalls
and needs of the Community, least we continue to suffer attacks such as
those inflicted on September 11, 2001--or worse!
Terrorism threat analysis
In the wake of the USS Cole bombing, senior Defense intelligence
officials were directed to devise and initiate sweeping structural and
procedural changes to strengthen the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA)
counterterrorism analysis and threat warning efforts. The focus of this
task was to improve long-term threat analysis, reduce duplication of
effort, more precisely apply all-source intelligence, expand the base of
source information to include location and disposition of U.S. forces,
and sharpen the focus of threat warning intelligence to those forces.
The result was the formation of a new terrorism analysis center within
the DIA.
Although the Committee applauded the innovative thinking of Defense
Department officials with respect to the development of this center, the
Committee was concerned that the initiative was moving forward without
the resolution of significant implementation issues, particularly those
involving information sharing of sensitive source data, and how such
data might be reported--and more importantly protected in such a way as
to be effective. Further, the Committee questioned the rationale for
such a capability within DoD, since the CIA's existing center was
designed to provide the all-source analysis needed by the Defense
Department. The Committee has determined to support both capabilities,
but in a much more community wide sense.
The events of September 11, 2001, highlighted why and how the
Intelligence Community, as a whole, must respond to the myriad national
security requirements, especially to the war on terrorism. The Committee
believes there can no longer be any cultural, bureaucratic or other
artificial barriers to impede the flow and analysis of information
related to countering this threat. Information must be ubiquitous and
available to all-source analysts. The artificial, but existing barriers
to true information sharing must be overcome. Security issues must be
resolved such that source identifying information that needs protecting
is protected and information that is needed to piece together terrorist
activities be made available. Additionally, all technological
impediments, such as on-line accesses to databases, must be immediately
overcome. Existing data mining tools must be put to full use and
additional tools must be developed. Most importantly, the concepts of
the two centers must be adopted as a community-wide inter-agency
approach. The war against terrorism necessarily crosses all boundaries.
The Intelligence Community must, therefore, support all of its customers
equally well--from the President, to the ``soldier,'' to those in law
enforcement. Thus, the Committee has supported a new construct; one that
leverages all the concepts of the military and civilian analytical
functions, and that is Intelligence Community-wide in composition and in
service.
Focusing on people as long-term intelligence needs
Congress has provided an initial response to the horrific terrorist
attacks suffered by the United States on September 11. Emergency funds
and grants of authority to the President have been provided. Additional
responses will be necessary in the weeks ahead as the international
effort against terrorism proceeds and as assessments are made about the
performance of those federal agencies charged with safeguarding national
security in the period before and during the September 11 attacks.
The Committee believes it critical that a comprehensive examination
be conducted independently of the federal government. Section 306 of the
bill establishes a ten member commission to conduct such a review of the
activities of the Departments of Defense, Justice, State,
Transportation, and Treasury (including the intelligence
components of those departments), the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The report of
the commission is to include recommendations on changes in activities
and programs, structure, and/or responsibilities of the departments and
agencies reviewed.
This Committee conducts oversight of the Intelligence Community and
has been concerned for some time that intelligence agencies were not
well positioned to respond to the national security challenges of the
21st century, including terrorism. Despite a succession of
congressionally-provided funding increases to spur investment in all
areas of intelligence, including human intelligence, the Committee is
not satisfied that the Intelligence Community is moving quickly enough.
There is a shortage of intelligence officers with the linguistic,
operational, and analytic skills, as well as foreign area expertise and
cultural background to discharge effectively the foreign intelligence
mission.
Although a start has been made in increasing the ranks of officers,
the Committee is not convinced that there is an Intelligence
Community-wide strategy for ensuring that recruited persons have the
diverse mix of skills and background necessary to enhance mission
effectiveness. Accordingly, the Committee requests that the DCI submit a
report to the congressional intelligence committees, by April 1, 2002,
detailing employment and training initiatives within the Community,
including spending plans, through which a diverse workforce will be
recruited and trained. The report shall comment specifically on those
spending and policy plans designed to enhance language training and
cultural expertise. The Committee acknowledges that there is no quick
fix to remedying skills mix problems, but believes that a commitment to
their solution needs a well considered strategy to be successful. The
Committee expects the DCI's report to present that strategy so that the
authorization bill for fiscal year 2003 can provide resources against
well defined objectives. In the Committee's view, those objectives must
include: aggressive recruitment of case officer candidates, particularly
those with ethnic and language backgrounds needed by the Community; more
overseas-based operations officers; increases in the numbers of civilian
and military analysts; a greater emphasis on improving language skills
through training and language proficiency incentives; a higher priority
attached to building and maintaining expertise in foreign areas and
cultures; and greater support for improving technological and
operational disciplines. The Committee recommends consideration of the
creation of a scholarship program, similar to the Former Defense
Language Scholarship program, to assist in the recruitment of
undergraduate and graduate students with proficiencies of use to the
Community in areas such as foreign language and area studies, foreign
cultural studies, and appropriate technical disciplines. The DCI's
assessment of such a program will be expected in the report.
Emergency supplemental funding
The emergency supplemental appropriations measure passed in response
to the September 11 terrorist attacks contains significant sums to
support Intelligence Community needs. The Committee expects to be
notified promptly by the DCI when decisions are made as to how these
funds are allocated to specific intelligence programs and activities. A
considered allocation of these funds could greatly enhance intelligence
capabilities against terrorism. The Committee believes that priority
should be given in the use of supplemental funds to: improving the
effectiveness of human intelligence, particularly through language
training and proficiency; improving the effectiveness of signals
intelligence, particularly in the analysis function; and improving the
effectiveness of measurement and signature intelligence, particularly in
the fielding of new technologies to discover weapons of mass
destruction, including chemical and biological agents which may be
employed by terrorists. It is the Committee's expectation that all
measures taken by the Intelligence Community in response to acts of
terrorism will preserve a balance between the preservation of civil
liberties and the need to improve the effectiveness of intelligence and
law enforcement agencies.
Intelligence Community for the 21st century
The Committee continues to believe that there is a need for a
fundamental review of the Intelligence Community's authorities,
structure, funding levels, procedures, areas of mission emphasis,
security procedures, depth and breadth of analytic expertise, and
inter-agency relationships. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon provided tragic emphasis for that position. The
Committee does not, in any way, lay blame to the dedicated men and women
of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the success of these attacks. If
blame must be assigned, the blame lies with a government, as a whole,
that did not fully understand nor wanted to appreciate the significance
of the new threats to our national security, despite the warnings
offered by the Intelligence Community. In many respects, however, the
Nation now has witnessed another Pearl Harbor event, and the President
has called for all means at our disposal, including placing a great
responsibility on the Intelligence Community, to wage the worldwide war
on terrorism. The Committee believes that there are both short-term and
long-term issues that must be addressed if the nation is to win this
war.
The Committee is fully aware of the ongoing internal and external
reviews of the Intelligence Community under NSPD 5. The outcomes of
those reviews are not yet determined, and may result in some
recommendations for changes. If history serves, however, no major
substantive changes will occur after these reviews are complete. The
Committee believes that major changes are necessary. They were necessary
in 1996 when the Committee released its Intelligence Community for the
21st Century report, and they are necessary today. The only thing that
has changed is the cause for immediate emphasis.
The Committee's response to the President's fiscal year 2002 National
Foreign Intelligence Program budget request is in many ways modest, but
focused. The time and ability for change, however, is now. Programs that
the Committee believes warrant a ``fresh'' look include the
establishment of a separate Clandestine Service that would combine all
HUMINT resources under a similar tasking and operating structure; a
Technical Collection Agency that would operate all technical collectors
under a single
management structure to eliminate ``stove-piping'' and enhance
cross-collection capabilities; a Technology Development Office that
provides Community Research and Development and a new, all-source
analytic effort that enhances collaboration and, thus, analysis. These
are but some of the options. Clearly, changes in funding processes,
authorities, and mechanisms are also warranted. The Committee had
planned to address many of these issues prior to September 11th, in
order to serve notice to the Administration that the Intelligence
Community is in dire need of attention and investment, that structure
and management changes may well be necessary, and that it is a time for
the Administration to be bold, innovative, and to think ``out of the
box''. The Committee retains these views, especially given the war on
terrorism. Thus, the Committee requests that the Administration begin to
make such changes with the fiscal year 2003 budget submission.
The Committee believes the Director of Central Intelligence must take
the lead in making these changes, working closely with Congress to
effect the right changes.
Foreign language expertise
There continues to be a great need throughout the Intelligence
Community for increased expertise in a number of intelligence-related
disciplines and specialties. However, the Committee believes the most
pressing such need is for greater numbers of foreign language-capable
intelligence personnel, with increased fluency in specific and multiple
languages. The Committee has heard repeatedly from both military and
civilian intelligence producers and consumers that this is the single
greatest limitation in intelligence agency personnel expertise and that
it is a deficiency throughout the Intelligence Community. The principle
agencies dealing with foreign intelligence--CIA, NSA, FBI, DIA and the
military services--have all admitted they do not have the language
talents, in breadth or in depth, to fully and effectively accomplish
their missions. Too often, the Committee has seen these organizations
focus on developing ``intelligence generalists,'' rather than
intelligence professionals with strong linguistic capabilities and
extensive expertise in a specific foreign language, culture and area.
This has certainly long been the trend in CIA's Directorate of
Operations. Too often CIA, and other intelligence agencies have
neglected long-term priorities, such as building in-depth expertise in
the intelligence collection and analysis cadres. Rather, people are
readily assigned and reassigned to confront the burning issues of the
day. At the NSA and CIA, thousands of pieces of data are never analyzed,
or are analyzed ``after the fact,'' because there are too few analysts;
even fewer with the necessary language skills. Written materials can sit
for months, and sometimes years, before a linguist with proper security
clearances and skills can begin a translation. Intelligence officers
overseas often cannot contact and recruit key potential sources because
they do not possess the requisite language skills. This language skill
limitation dramatically affects our national security posture. The key
to minimizing terrorist and other threats is clear: build a professional
intelligence cadre with the requisite linguistic skills and in-depth
expertise, with a long-term focus on areas of specialization. Advanced
knowledge of the plans and intentions of America's enemies, who almost
never use the English language to conduct their deadly business,
requires trained and experienced specialists, not generalists. This is
not to say that some generalists are not needed. Indeed, given the
complexity of many transnational targets and issues, individuals who can
place a broader view on intelligence that is collected can be critical
to assuring quality reporting. There must be a balance struck.
The Committee is so concerned about foreign language capabilities
that it believes the Intelligence Community must make major changes in
policies and funding regarding foreign language proficiency for the
HUMINT services, and for analysts at CIA, DIA, NSA, and elsewhere. The
Committee believes that the DCI and the Secretary of Defense must
enhance the current system of bonuses to provide additional positive
incentives for employees to achieve and maintain proficiency, especially
in the languages of the toughest and most important targets,
particularly state sponsors and other nations that support terrorism.
The size of the bonuses should be established based on the level of
proficiency and the value of the language, as reflected in the CIA and
DoD Operating Directives. Language specialists should be afforded the
same or better opportunities for advancement as managers and other
intelligence professionals enjoy. The Committee also believes that the
IC and DoD should establish a policy, to be phased in appropriately to
reflect current workforce realities that personnel engaged in foreign
areas or subjects must demonstrate appropriate levels of proficiency in
at least one foreign language relevant to their area of expertise in
order to gain promotion. The Committee recognizes that such demands and
requirements will probably exceed the infrastructure in place for
instruction and proficiency testing. There is every indication that the
Community requirements cannot be met by existing schools. Therefore, the
Committee believes that it is time to consider a dedicated Intelligence
Community school that addresses future language needs as well as
allowing Intelligence Community officers the ability to keep and build
proficiency. The Committee directs the Director of Central Intelligence,
in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to develop a plan to
implement these concepts/changes, conveying the plan to the
congressional intelligence committees within 120 days after the date of
enactment of this Act. The Committee urges the Director and the
Secretary to implement the plan as rapidly as possible, and thus would
fully support use of supplemental appropriations for these important
efforts, recognizing that sustaining funding would have to be included
in future years' budget requests.
Airborne signals intelligence recapitalization and modernization
The Committee has been vitally interested in properly sustaining the
nation's tactical airborne reconnaissance platforms. These aircraft
provide the bulk of the real-time, tactical imagery and signals
intelligence to theater commanders. Included in their numbers are
operational RC 135 RIVET JOINT, the EP 3 AIRES II, and the U 2
Dragonlady; and the future Aerial Common Sensor and Global Hawk
aircraft. Longevity for the operational systems has become an issue. The
Committee learned last year that most of the EP 3 aircraft will soon
reach end of service fatigue life. Although not as urgent a problem, the
RC 135 family of aircraft is aging and becoming more expensive to
maintain. The U 2 fleet has fewer average total hours than
either of the larger aircraft, and are expected to be operational beyond
2020.
In addition to the longevity of the airframes, the Committee remains
fully aware of the state of the individual collection systems,
particularly the SIGINT systems, that must constantly be improved to
maintain parity with the threat environment. Unfortunately, the common
SIGINT development, the Joint SIGINT Avionics Family (JSAF) Lowband
Subsystem failed to produce the expected SIGINT collection system
upgrade. Because the Department of Defense made the management decision
to pursue this single SIGINT upgrade, foregoing most other airborne
SIGINT improvements, the state of the operational collection systems has
suffered tremendously.
Prior to the decision to pursue the single JSAF approach, the
individual Services had effective but disparate upgrade programs, and
technology sharing was sporadic and uncoordinated. However, the
individual collection system capabilities against the fielded threats
remained relatively good, as the Service program offices pursued
mission-specific requirements and continually upgraded their weapon
systems. The Committee is adamant that the Services must be allowed to
return to constant and incremental system upgrades as the standard
method of modernization. This modernization approach must be properly
overseen by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure a
standardized architectural approach, guided by detailed standards
promulgated by the Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA).
Further, in his SIGINT functional manager's role, the DIRNSA should
ensure the service program offices share technologies consistent with
Service mission requirements, funding, and unique integration
challenges.
However, the state of the airframes themselves continues to be a
concern. The Committee is aware of the discussions within the Navy to
possibly replace the EP 3 aircraft with its future Multi-Mission Manned
Aircraft (MMA). The Air Force, too, is discussing replacement of its
reconnaissance aircraft with the Multi-Mission Command and Control
aircraft (MC2A). Both of these concepts have positive and negative
aspects. For example, the Committee is concerned that the replacement
airframe type the Navy is currently considering will have severe
limitations as a SIGINT collection platform. Further, the Air Force's
concept may likely limit the number of aircraft available for world-wide
reconnaissance operations. The Committee does not see budget requests
that will make these proposals reality, nor does it see a coordinated
approach that will maximize operational capability and flexibility while
minimizing cost.
The Committee believes that the concept of replacing the two fleets
with two new fleets is not the right direction. The Committee believes a
single manned reconnaissance fleet that is ``owned'' by an ``executive
agent'' service, but co-operated by the two services is the right model
for the future. This would be a concept analogous to the electronic
combat EA 6B model in service today, and would be a concept that allows
for the best operational concepts from each of the services to be put
into use. Further, a combined fleet of dedicated reconnaissance aircraft
could be smaller in number than two separate fleets of dissimilar
aircraft.
From the Committee's perspective, there seems to be a logical ``way
ahead'' for both the multi-place, self-contained aircraft and the
smaller manned or unmanned aircraft that depend on data-link tethers to
ground stations or, in the future, other ``mothership'' aircraft such as
the RC 135 or its replacement. This ``way ahead'' also appears to have a
logical progression of sensor and sensor developments that would improve
the flexibility and mission capability, while minimizing costs.
The Committee's concept consists of three basic parts: the
replacement of the RC 135 and EP 3 fleets with a single Boeing 767-sized
aircraft fleet, with the first aircraft beginning delivery as early as
2012; the continuing improvement and eventual ``cross-decking'' of the
RC 135 collection system to the new reconnaissance aircraft; and the
continuing upgrade and eventual ``cross-decking'' of the U 2 collection
system to the Global Hawk and the Army's ACS programs.
Although, the Committee does not presume to choose the airframe, it
firmly believes that the next generation, manned reconnaissance aircraft
should be based on the same type airframe that the Air Force chooses for
its next tanker aircraft--likely the B 767 aircraft. The concept for the
development and fielding of this new reconnaissance aircraft includes
the necessary life extension modifications to keep the EP 3 fleet
capable until the first new aircraft can begin replacing them on a
one-for-one basis. Under this concept, the new would first replace the
EP 3s, and then later the RC 135s. The study for concepts, numbers of
aircraft, and the design and modification of the new aircraft should
begin no later than calendar year 2004, with the first funding provided
in the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request. The modification of
the future aircraft will clearly require an acquisition process and
organization that both understands the airborne reconnaissance mission
and requirements, and has a proven record of delivering operational
systems. The Committee believes the Air Force's Big Safari program
office is the only logical choice for fielding the new reconnaissance
aircraft.
The concept for the future of the new aircraft's sensor systems is
likewise relatively straight-forward. There is little question that the
most sophisticated and capable collection system today is the 85000
System onboard the RIVET JOINT aircraft. The Committee's concept would
continue the incremental and continuous sensor improvement to the 85000
System with the goal of ``cross-decking'' it to the new aircraft in the
then-current state of modification when the first aircraft is ready to
accept it. This would require ``new'' equipment purchases for the first
number of new aircraft that replace the EP 3, and the later number of
aircraft would be outfitted with equipment directly transferred from the
RC 135 aircraft as each is retired. The cost savings realized with this
concept would be substantial over the alternative option to develop an
entirely new SIGINT system.
Lastly, the Committee believes the sensor approach outlined above
would work well for the U 2, Global Hawk and ACS aircraft. the U 2's
collection system is very sophisticated, and moreover, operational. It,
too, can be upgraded both architecturally and technically to maintain
capability against the evolving threat. This needs to be done regardless
of the new aircraft that will augment the U 2. The concept the Committee
envisions is to incrementally improve the U 2's sensor suite
and eventually ``cross-deck'' it to the Global Hawk and the ACS
aircraft. For the Global Hawk, this accomplishes several important
tasks. First, and foremost, it provides a single collection system for
the Air Force's two high-altitude collection systems, simplifying both
maintenance and logistics at the single main operating base location.
Secondly, it results in no major ground station modifications to accept
two separate SIGINT systems, thereby saving significant amounts of
money. For the ACS, this would preclude the Army having to develop, on
its own, a new SIGINT collection system, as the Air Force's previous
investments would be completely leveraged. Secondly, this would provide
true interoperability between the Air Force and Army ground
stations--allowing both services to draw on the assets of the other.
Lastly, this would allow both services to share future research and
development costs.
The Committee understands that this concept is a radical departure
from the programs of record within the Services and that it forces a new
way of doing business. However, the future of airborne reconnaissance
systems must be addressed now, and concrete actions must begin.
Therefore, the Committee requests that the Secretary of Defense conduct
a study of this concept and provide the congressional defense and
intelligence committees a recommendation on the path to recapitalizing
the Department's reconnaissance aircraft. The Committee serves notice
that it will not entertain a status quo answer, and that it will take
direct fiscal action in future years' request to ensure the nation's
reconnaissance capabilities.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION
TITLE 1--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101--authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists departments, agencies, and other elements of the
United States Government for whose intelligence-related activities the
Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2002.
Section 102--classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts authorized to
be appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities and
personnel ceilings for the entities listed in section 101 for fiscal
year 2002 are contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations.
The Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated as to section 101 by
section 102.
Section 103--personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence, with the
approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in
fiscal year 2002 to exceed the personnel ceilings applicable to the
components of the Intelligence Community under section 102 by an amount
not to exceed 2 percent of the total of the ceilings applicable under
section 102. The Director may exercise this authority only when
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, and
any exercise of this authority must be reported to the two intelligence
committees of the Congress.
Section 104--intelligence community management account
Section 104 provides certain details concerning the amount and
composition of the Community Management Account (CMA) of the Director of
Central Intelligence.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$152,776,000 for fiscal year 2002 for the staffing and administration of
various components under the CMA. Subsection (a) also authorizes funds
identified for the Advanced Research and Development Committee to remain
available for two years.
Subsection (b) authorizes a total of 313 full-time personnel for
elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2002 and provides that such
personnel may be permanent employees of the CMA element or detailed from
other elements of the United States Government.
Subsection (c) explicitly authorizes the classified portion of the CMA.
Subsection (d) requires that personnel be detailed on a reimbursable
basis, with certain exceptions. Personnel may be detailed on a
non-reimbursable basis for a period not to exceed one year.
Subsection (e) authorizes $27,000,000 of the amount authorized for
the CMA under subsection (a) to be made available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center (NDIC) in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Subsection (e)
requires the Director of Central Intelligence to transfer $27,000,000 to
the Department of Justice to be used for NDIC activities under the
authority of the Attorney General, and subject to section 103(d)(1) of
the National Security Act.
Section 105--codification of the United States Coast Guard as
an element of the intelligence community
Section 105 establishes the United States Coast Guard as a National
Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) agency under the National Security
Act. The Commandant of the Coast Guard recently explained that the
definition of national security ``has widened to include many of the
things for which the Coast Guard has been responsible for years. These
are the so-called asymmetric array of threats that are now added to the
classical inventory of nation-state engagement, potentially leading to
armed conflict. It certainly now includes counter-terrorism,
counter-narcotics, illegal alien smuggling, and worrying about our
Exclusive Economic Zone.'' The Coast Guard is the only organization
responsible for law enforcement, intelligence and military activities
simultaneously. As a humanitarian organization, it has access to ports
unreachable by other U.S. entities and welcomed by foreign navies. Under
the aegis of law enforcement, the Coast Guard can board and search
vessels in our territorial waters, exclusive economic zones or on high
seas.
The Coast Guard is the organization with the primary responsibility
for maritime interdiction and at sea enforcement of U.S. immigration
laws. The Coast Guard routinely intercepts illegal migrants and returns
them to their countries of origin. As such, the Coast Guard gains
particular insight on migration patterns and pressures.
The Coast Guard is charged with eliminating environmental damage and
natural resource degradation associated with maritime transportation,
fishing, and recreational boating. The Coast Guard supports important
national interests in living marine resources enforcement, maritime
environmental protection, and maritime pollution enforcement.
Relative to its law enforcement mission, the Coast Guard is the U.S.
Government agency with primary responsibility for maritime drug
interdiction. The strategic goal is to protect our maritime borders by
halting the flow of illegal drugs, aliens, and contraband into this
country through maritime routes, preventing illegal incursions of our
exclusive economic zone, and suppressing violations of federal law in
the maritime region. Thus, the Coast Guard has particular insight into
the operations of international criminal organizations dealing with
illegal drugs, aliens, and other contraband.
Coast Guard Captains of the Port in major U.S. ports are intimately
aware of the foreign maritime presence and have ready access to foreign
vessels. This allows the Coast Guard to play a major role in homeland
defense, counter-terrorism, and consequence management in U.S. ports.
In support of military commanders, the Coast Guard has national
security objectives in the areas of maritime interception operations,
port operations security and defense, military environmental response
operations, and peacetime military engagement. The Coast Guard is an
armed service ``at all times'' and conducts defense missions outlined in
the 1995 Department of Transportation/Department of Defense Memorandum
of Agreement.
The current Coast Guard intelligence training program can better take
advantage of available Intelligence Community intelligence training
courses to increase Coast Guard expertise at negligible cost.
Additionally, at negligible cost, the Coast Guard could elevate the
Coast Guard Intelligence Program (CGIP) to a flag level directorate. An
intelligence directorate would facilitate improved coordination of
limited Coast Guard assets, recognize the increasing value provided by
intelligence across all Coast Guard million areas, and place this
organizational element on a par with those of other armed services and
agencies.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201--authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations authorized by the conference
report for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal
employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as
may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 301--increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law
Section 301 provides that appropriations authorized by the conference
report for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal
employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as
may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
Section 302--restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of appropriations by the
conference report shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the
conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized
by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Section 303--Sense of the Congress regarding Intelligence
Community contracting
Section 303 is a Sense of the Congress provision to encourage the
Intelligence Community to maximize the procurement of U.S.-made
products.
Section 304--requirements for lodging allowances in
Intelligence Community Assignment Program benefits
Section 304 enhances benefits paid under the Intelligence Community
Assignment Program (ICAP). ICAP provides opportunities for Intelligence
Community employees to gain experience and perspective through
rotational details to intelligence-related positions external to an
employee's parent organization. In order to avoid the significant
familial impact of a detail and relocating under ICAP, this section
authorizes the payment of a lodging allowance, subject to conditions,
when an employee leaves his or her immediate family at the permanent
duty station to participate in the ICAP. The section does not mandate
the payment of the lodging allowance. Rather, it authorizes the
detailing agency, within its discretion, to pay an allowance up to a
maximum amount determined by the Secretary of Defense and the Director
of Central Intelligence with regard to detailed employees of the
Department of Defense, or by such other appropriate agency head and the
Director of Central Intelligence, but no more than the actual lodging
expense at the new duty station.
This section sets forth five conditions that must be met prior to
receipt of the lodging allowance under this program. First, it requires
that the employee maintain a primary residence for his or her immediate
family in the local commuting area of the permanent duty station from
which the employee regularly commuted to the former duty station prior
to the detail. Second, the employee must actually incur lodging expenses
within reasonable proximity of the new duty station. The third condition
limits the payment of the allowance to circumstances where the new duty
station is more than 20 miles from the employee's former duty station.
Fourth, the section requires that the distance from the employee's
primary residence to the new duty station be at least 10 miles farther
than the distance from the employee's primary residence to the former
duty station. The 10-mile requirement parallels the current limitation
in the federal travel regulations for short distance transfers. Finally,
the section limits the payment of the lodging allowance to employees
compensated at or below the maximum annual rate of pay for grade GS 15
of the General Schedule.
Section 305--technical amendment
Section 305 provides a technical correction to the National Security
Act.
Section 306--commission on September 11 government
preparedness and performance
Section 306 of the bill establishes an independent commission to
review the performance of those federal public safety, law enforcement,
and national security departments and agencies responsible for
preventing and/or responding to acts of terrorism in the period prior to
and including September 11, 2001. The review is to include the
activities of the Departments of Defense, Justice, State,
Transportation, and Treasury (including the intelligence components of
those departments), the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the
Central Intelligence Agency. The commission is to submit a report to the
President and the Congress with recommendations for changes in
activities and programs, structure, and/or responsibilities of the
departments and agencies reviewed. The report is to be submitted no
later than six months from the date the commission's director is
appointed. The commission shall consist of ten members, four of whom are
to be appointed by the President, two by the Majority Leader of the
Senate, two by the Speaker of the House, one by the Minority Leader of
the Senate, and one by the Minority Leader of the House.
The committee believes that the commission will only be successful if
it is seen to be truly independent of any preconceived notions about the
effectiveness of the activities of the departments and agencies it will
review. Appointing members with a reputation for challenging
conventional wisdom, wide perspective, bold and innovative thought and
broad experience in dealing with complex problems will contribute
directly to instilling the commission with an independence of spirit
which will enhance the credibility of its work. Those given the
authority to appoint members of the commission are urged to be
especially sensitive to the committee's concerns in this regard.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Section 401--modifications to Central Intelligence Agency's
Central Services Program
Section 401 makes several changes to the Central Intelligence
Agency's Central Services Program (CSP). This section changes the date
the annual audit is required to be completed from 31 December to 31
January. This brings the financial audit requirements of the CIA
Inspector General in line with similar requirements placed on other
Inspectors General in the Federal government. Moreover, it eliminates a
sunset date for the CSP.
Section 402--extension of Central Intelligence Agency
Voluntary Separation Pay Act
Section 402 extends to September 30, 2003 the DCI's ability to offer
separation pay incentives, which otherwise would expire as of September
30, 2002.
The Central Intelligence Agency has used the Central Intelligence
Agency Voluntary Separation Pay Act authority over the past several
years to restructure and ``re-skill'' its workforce to support the
Strategic Division that the DCI has outlined. The use of incentives, and
early-outs, has contributed greatly to Agency efforts to re-tool the
Agency workforce for the challenges of the 21st century, and is a
critical tool in providing the Director of Central Intelligence the
flexibility to adapt the workforce as priorities change. The changes in
the workforce required to support the DCI's direction have an impact on
the number of areas within the Agency. Authority to offer incentives,
and early outs, to targeted groups of employees to encourage separation,
therefore, remains important to the success of Agency restructuring.
Data from the Agency's exit survey indicate that the separation
incentive pay has accelerated the departure of employees in targeted
groups.
The Agency is engaged in a concerted effort to further streamline its
administrative processes. As that effort bears fruit, the Agency will
need to continue restructuring the CIA workforce. The recent
disestablishment of the Agency's Directorate of Administration and the
creation of five new Mission Support Offices also may necessitate
additional reconfiguration of Agency staffing.
In addition to the restructuring outlined above, other ongoing
initiatives are intended to better position the Agency workforce to
support the DCI's vision of intelligence collection, analysis, and
dissemination in the coming years. Of continuing importance is the
ability to redirect middle- and senior-level management positions in the
Directorate of Intelligence and the Directorate of Science and
Technology. Reductions in managerial ranks will make available positions
for senior substantive experts in the analysis and technology fields.
Separation incentive and early out authority will substantially assist
in achieving this transition without serious adverse impact on the
managerial workforce.
Section 403--guidelines for recruitment of certain foreign assets
Section 403 addresses the CIA's 1995 guidelines on recruitment of
foreign assets and sources. The Committee believes that the 1995 CIA
guidelines on the handling of cases involving foreign assets and sources
with human rights concerns have had the unintended consequence of
deterring the effective recruitment of potentially high-value assets.
The Committee has long been concerned that a culture of ``risk
aversion'' has hindered decision-making across the Intelligence
Community, and especially within the CIA. In the instance of the 1995
guidelines, we are concerned that excessive caution and a burdensome
vetting process have undermined the CIA's ability to recruit assets. The
Committee is concerned that the guidelines have had a negative impact on
the recruitment of sources against terrorist organizations and other
hard targets as well. Admittedly, in the past, there have been
recruitments that have proved to be inappropriate. Since 1995, CIA's
well-intended effort to address human rights concerns may have
significantly limited the U.S. Government's access to foreign assets and
sources.
Far too often, Committee members have learned of field officers who
have been deterred from recruiting promising assets or who have lost
potential assets to competing intelligence services, because of a slow
and overly litigious vetting process. Legal and bureaucratic concerns
must not be ignored, but neither should they dictate the asset
recruitment process. New guidelines must rebalance the equation between
potential gain and risk. Clearly, there is a certain class of
individuals who, because of their unreliability, instability, or nature
of past misconduct, should be avoided. A new balance must be struck that
recognizes concerns about egregious human rights behavior, but provides
the much needed flexibility to seize upon opportunities as they present
themselves. The Committee looks to the Director of Central Intelligence
to promulgate new guidelines that restore equilibrium to the asset
vetting process, satisfactorily address legal questions in a time-urgent
manner, thereby expediting recruitment of foreign assets and sources,
and provide confidence to personnel in the field that their best
judgment will be supported.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 501--authority to purchase items of nominal value for
recruiting purposes
Section 501 helps to align the recruiting practices of Intelligence
Community elements of DoD with those of private industry in order to
assist these agencies in maintaining their competitiveness for
prospective employees in the marketplace. Express authority is granted
to the Secretary of Defense with respect to the Intelligence Community
elements of DoD to use appropriated funds for the purchase of
promotional items of nominal value for recruitment purposes. Such items
would include hi-liters, mugs, magnets, letter openers, and other
nominal-value items deemed necessary by agency recruiters to establish
an agency presence on campuses and at job fairs. The provision of such
items will assist these agencies in attracting students on college and
university campuses or prospective applicants at job fairs.
Recruitment give-away items are commonly offered to prospective
applicants by private sector employers as part of normal recruiting
activities. These give-away items help the employer to establish a
presence at recruiting functions by serving as a reminder to potential
applicants of the prospective employer's name and contact number, and as
a means of attracting attention to the employer's lines of business.
Intelligence Community elements of DoD currently lack the authority to
offer these nominal-value items.
Expressly authorizing Intelligence Community elements of DoD to use
this standard private-sector recruiting practice will enhance their
ability to attract the attention of prospective job applicants, as well
as their ability to participate in various recruitment activities and at
job fairs. The mission of each of these agencies is largely dependent on
attracting the broadest possible range of potential applicants. It is
therefore necessary that their recruiting activities be as competitive
as possible with those activities practiced
by the private-sector entities with whom they vie most
vigorously for talent, especially in the technical disciplines.
Section 502--fund for infrastructure and quality-of life
improvements at Menwith Hill and Bad Aibling stations
Section 502 would extend through the end of FY 2003 authority granted
the Army in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 for
the enhancement of capabilities to include infrastructure and quality of
life concerns at Bad Aibling and Menwith Hill Stations. With respect to
Bad Aibling Station, this authority is requested as an interim measure
pending any final decision on the future operations of this station.
The Army became the Executive Agent for Bad Aibling Station in FY
1995 and Menwith Hill Station in FY 1996. Without congressional action,
the Army is prohibited by 31 U.S.C. 1301 from using appropriated funds
to support these field sites, notwithstanding that the Army is the
Executive Agent for them. Language in the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1996 provided the necessary flexibility to allow the
Army to transfer or reprogram relatively minor amounts of funds (up to
$2 million in FY 1996 O&M and $2 million in FY 1997 O&M funds) for
necessary enhancements at these stations. However, sufficient funding
has not been available to allow the Army to meet all of the stations's
needs, given financial constraints and increasing operational tempo.
Consequently, in order to continue addressing enhancements to include
infrastructure and quality of life needs at Menwith Hill Station and to
be able to continue operations on an interim basis at Bad Aibling
Station, the Army requests that its flexible transfer and reprogramming
authority be extended through FY 2003.
Section 503--continuation of Joint Inter-Agency Task Force at
current locations in Florida and California
Section 503 supports retention of Joint Inter-Agency Task Force
intelligence and law enforcement operations in Florida and California.
In 1989, Congress designated the Department of Defense (DoD) as the
``Lead Agency'' for the detection and monitoring (D&M) of aerial and
maritime trafficking. To carry out their new mission, the Defense
Department built upon the Unified Command Structure and established
several Joint Task Force operations centers.
Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) East was created as a result of
Presidential Decision Directive 14, which ordered a review of the
nation's command and control intelligence centers involved in
international counter-narcotics operations.
The principal statutory authority of JIATF counterdrug detection and
monitoring activities is set forth in 10 USC 124, which directs the
Defense Department to serve as the single lead agency of the Federal
Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime
transit of illegal drugs into the United States. JIATF activities
implement this Defense Department authority.
JIATF operations are also based on the authority of Section 1004 of
Public Law 101 510, Division A, Title X, of the National Defense
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1991, as amended, which provides
additional authority for Defense Department counterdrug activities in
support of any Federal agency or department, and of any State, local, or
foreign law enforcement agency for various purposes, to include the
detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air and sea
traffic within 25 miles of and outside the geographic boundaries of the
United States. Other counterdrug support authorized by Section 1004
includes maintaining and repairing equipment; transporting personnel and
equipment; establishing bases of operations; providing counterdrug
related training; constructing roads and fences and installing lighting
to block drug smuggling corridors; establishing command, control
communications, and computer networks; providing linguist and
intelligence analysis services; and producing aerial and ground
reconnaissance.
Additionally, JIATF operates under the authority and restrictions
provided for in Chapter 18 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Sections 371
382) governing military support for U.S. Federal, State, and local
civilian law enforcement agencies. These provisions include authority
for the Defense Department to support civilian law enforcement agencies
by various means, to include sharing information (Section 371), making
equipment available (Section 372), training in operation of equipment
made available and providing expert advice (Section 373), and making
Defense Department personnel available for among other purposes, to
operate equipment for the purposes of detecting, monitoring, and
communicating the movement of air and sea traffic, and of surface
traffic outside the United States in support of civilian law enforcement
agencies (10 USC 374).
JIATFs are ``DoD intelligence components'' within the meaning of DoD
Directive 5240.1, DoD Intelligence Activities (25 April 1988) and DoD
Regulation 5240.1, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD
Intelligence Components that affect United States Persons (December
1082). These Defense Department publications implement Executive Order
12333, United States Intelligence Activities (4 Dec 1981). As a Defense
Department intelligence component, JIATF activities are conducted in
compliance with DoD Directive 5240.1, DoD Regulation 5240.1, and
Executive Order 12333. Procedure 12 of DoD Regulation 5240.1, entitled
``Provision of Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities,'' specifically
authorizes DoD intelligence components to cooperate with law enforcement
authorities for the purpose of international narcotics activities.
Procedure 12 incorporates the limitations on assistance to law
enforcement authorities contained in Executive Order 12333, and the
general limitations and approval requirements pertaining to the
provision of assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies set forth
in DoD Directive 5525.5. The provisions of 10 USC 371 provide Defense
Department authority to share intelligence information collected during
the normal course of military training or operation that is relevant to
a violation of any Federal or State law with Federal, State, or local
civilian law enforcement officials.
Section 504--modification of authorities relating to
interdiction of aircraft engaged in illicit drug-trafficking
Section 504 amends current law (22 U.S.C. 2291 4) relating to
official immunity for employees and agents of the United States and
foreign countries engaged in the interdiction of aircraft used in
illicit drug trafficking. Under this section, the President must make an
annual certification to Congress concerning both the existence of a drug
threat in the country at issue and the existence in that country of
appropriate procedures to protect against innocent loss of life. An
annual report to Congress by the President concerning United States
Government assistance to such interdiction programs is also required by
this section.
Section 505--undergraduate training program for employees of
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency
Section 505 amends the National Imagery and Mapping Act of 1996 to
authorize the Secretary of Defense to establish a program to send NIMA
civilian employees to accredited professional, technical, and other
institutions of higher learning for training at the undergraduate level.
It is similar in purpose, content, and administration to the NSA program
established under the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 USC
402(note)).
Section 506--technical amendments
Section 506 is a technical amendment that deletes the requirement
contained in 10 U.S.C. Section 2555(b)(3) that foreign governments
return transferred nuclear test monitoring equipment if either the
United States or the foreign government terminate an agreement to share
the information collected through such an agreement. The proposal
further clarifies that the Secretary of Defense has authority to convey,
transfer title to, or otherwise provide such equipment to a foreign
government and may maintain, repair, or replace equipment so
transferred.
COMMITTEE POSITION AND RECORD VOTES TAKEN
On September 24, 2001, in open session, a quorum being present, the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, by a recorded vote of 18
ayes to 0 noes, approved the bill, H.R. 2883, as amended by an amendment
in the nature of a substitute offered by Chairman Goss. By that vote,
the committee ordered the bill reported favorably to the House. On that
vote, the Members present recorded their votes as follows: Mr. Goss
(Chairman)--aye; Mr. Bereuter--aye; Mr. Castle--aye; Mr. Boehlert--aye;
Mr. Gibbons--aye; Mr. LaHood--aye; Mr. Cunningham--aye; Mr.
Hoekstra--aye; Mr. Burr--aye; Mr. Chambliss--aye; Ms. Pelosi--aye; Mr.
Bishop--aye; Ms. Harman--aye; Mr. Condit--aye; Mr. Roemer--aye; Mr.
Hastings--aye; Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr. Boswell--aye.
During consideration of the bill, Mr. LaHood offered an amendment to
the legislative provisions. The amendment would have removed section 306
from the bill. Section 306 establishes an independent commission to
assess the performance of those agencies and departments of the United
States charged with the responsibility to prevent, prepare for, or
respond to acts of terrorism up to and including the events of September
11, 2001. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence rejected Mr.
LaHood's amendment by a vote of 7 ayes to 11 noes, a quorum being
present. On that vote, the Members present recorded their votes as
follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)--no; Mr. Bereuter--aye; Mr. Castle--aye;
Mr. Boehlert--no; Mr. Gibbons--aye; Mr. LaHood--aye; Mr.
Cunningham--aye; Mr. Hoekstra--no; Mr. Burr--aye; Mr. Chambliss--aye;
Ms. Pelosi--no; Mr. Bishop--no; Ms. Harman--no; Mr. Condit--no; Mr.
Roemer--no; Mr. Hastings--no; Mr. Reyes--no; Mr. Boswell--no.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the House of
Representatives, the committee is not subject to this requirement;
therefore, the committee has not received a report from the Committee on
Government Reform pertaining to the subject of this bill.
OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, the committee held three hearings and numerous
briefings on the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R. 2883.
Testimony was taken from senior officials of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Reconnaissance Office,
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, the Department of Treasury, the Department of
Justice, and the Department of Transportation regarding the activities
and plans of the Intelligence Community covered by the provisions and
authorizations, both classified and unclassified, of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. The bill, as reported by the
committee, reflects conclusions reached by the committee in light of
this oversight activity.
FISCAL YEAR COST PROJECTIONS
The committee has attempted, pursuant to clause 3(d)(2) of rule XIII
of the Rules of the House of Representatives, to ascertain the outlays
that will occur in fiscal year 2002 and the five years following, if the
amounts authorized are appropriated. These estimates are contained in
the classified annex and are in accordance with those of the Executive
Branch.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATES
In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, and pursuant to sections 308 and 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the committee submits the following
estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office:
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, September 24, 2001.
Dr. Dan Crippen, Director, Congressional Budget Office,
Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Dr. Crippen: In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIII of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, I am writing to request a cost
estimate of H.R. 2883, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002, pursuant to sections 308 and 403 of the Congressional Budget
Act of 1974. I have attached a copy of the bill as approved today by the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
As I hope to bring this legislation to the House floor in the very
near term, I would very much appreciate an expedited response to this
request by the CBO's staff. Should you have any questions related to
this request, please contact Chris Barton, the Committee's Acting Chief
Counsel. Thank you in advance for your assistance with this request.
Sincerely,
Porter J. Goss,
Chairman.
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, September 25, 2001.
Hon. Porter J. Goss, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the
enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2883, the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2002.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to
provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew Schmit.
Sincerely,
Steven Lieberman
(For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
Enclosure.
H.R. 2883--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002
Summary: H.R. 2883 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2002 for intelligence activities of the United States government, the
Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of the bill. On
that limited basis, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost
$156 million over the 2002 2006 period, assuming appropriation of the
necessary funds. The bill would affect direct spending by insignificant
amounts; thus, pay-as-you-go procedures would apply.
H.R. 2883 contains an intergovernmental and private-sector mandate as
defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). CBO estimates that
the costs of the mandate would not exceed the thresholds established in
that act ($56 million for intergovernmental mandates and $113 million
for private-sector mandates in 2001, adjusted annually for inflation).
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary
impact for the specified authorization of appropriations in the
unclassified portions of H.R. 2883 is shown in the following table. CBO
cannot obtain the necessary information to estimate the costs for the
entire bill because parts are classified at a level above clearances
held by CBO employees. For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that
the bill will be enacted near the start of fiscal year 2002, and that
the necessary amount will be appropriated for that year. Estimated
outlays are based on historical spending patterns. The costs of this
legislation fall within budget function 050 (national defense).
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT
Spending Under Current Law 149 0 0 0 0 0
Proposed Changes 0 153 0 0 0 0
Spending Under H.R. 2883 149 153 0 0 0 0
COMMISSION ON TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS
Spending Under Current Law 0 0 0 0 0 0
Proposed Changes 0 3 0 0 0 0
Spending Under H.R. 2883 0 3 0 0 0 0
SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION 0 156 0 0 0 0
\1\The 2001 level is the amount appropriated for that year.
\2\In addition to effects on spending subject to appropriations, H.R. 2883 would affect direct spending, but CBO estimates that such changes would be less than $500,000 a year.
Spending subject to appropriation
The bill would authorize appropriations of $153 million for the
Intelligence Community Management Account, which funds the coordination
of programs, budget oversight, and
management of the intelligence agencies and unspecified
amounts for intelligence activities in fiscal year 2002.
Section 306 would establish a commission to examine the federal
government's preparedness to prevent, prepare for, or respond to acts of
terrorism up to and including the terrorist acts on September 11, 2001.
Based on costs for similar commissions, CBO estimates implementing this
section would cost about $3 million in fiscal year 2002.
Direct spending and revenues
The bill would authorize $212 million for CIARDS to cover retirement
costs attributable to military service and various unfunded liabilities.
The payment to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and the authorization
under this bill would be the same as assumed in the CBO baseline. Thus,
this estimate does not ascribe any additional cost to that provision.
Section 401 would provide permanent authority for a program that
authorizes the CIA to provide goods and services on a reimbursable
basis. CBO estimates that the costs of providing those goods and
services would be offset by the reimbursements and that this provision
would have an insignificant net impact each year and no net budgetary
impact over the long run.
Section 402 would extend the authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) to offer incentive payments to employees who voluntarily
retire or resign. The authority, which will expire on September 30,
2002, would be extended through fiscal year 2003. Section 402 also would
require the CIA to make a deposit to the Civil Service Retirement and
Disability Fund equal to 15 percent of final pay for each employee who
accepts an incentive payment. Although the timing of agency payments and
the additional benefit payments would not match on a yearly basis, CBO
believes that these deposits would be sufficient to cover the cost of
any long-term increase in benefits that would result from induced
retirements. CBO cannot provide a precise estimate of the direct
spending effects because the data necessary for an estimate are
classified.
Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act sets up pay-as-you-go procedures for legislation
affecting direct spending or receipts. CBO estimates that the net change
in outlays for section 401 that are subject to pay-as-you-go procedures
would be insignificant for each year. CBO cannot estimate the precise
direct spending effects of section 402 because the necessary data are
classified.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 2883 would
establish the Commission on Preparedness and Performance of the Federal
Government for the September 11 Acts of Terrorism and would give it the
power to subpoena testimony and evidence. Such power would constitute an
intergovernmental and private-sector mandate under UMRA. CBO estimates
that the costs of the mandate would not exceed the thresholds
established in UMRA ($56 million for intergovernmental mandates and $113
million for private-sector mandates in 2001, adjusted annually for
inflation). The remaining provisions of the bill contain no
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates and would impose no costs
on state, local, or tribal governments.
Previous CBO estimate: On September 14, 2001, CBO transmitted a cost
estimate for the unclassified portion of S. 1428, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, as ordered reported by the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on September 6, 2001. The
differences in the estimated costs reflect differences in the bills. In
particular, S. 1428 would authorize $238 million for the Intelligence
Community Management Account, while H.R. 2883 would authorize $153
million for that account.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Matthew Schmit. Impact on State,
Local, and Tribal Governments: Elyse Goldman. Impact on the Private
Sector: Zachary Selden.
Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director
for Budget Analysis.
COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATES
The committee agrees with the estimate of the Congressional Budget
Office.
SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENT OF THIS
LEGISLATION
The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States government are carried out to support the national security
interests of the United States, to support and assist the armed forces
of the United States, and to support the President in the execution of
the foreign policy of the United States. Article 1, section 8 of the
Constitution of the United States provides, in pertinent part, that
``Congress shall have power * * * to pay the debts and provide for the
common defence and general welfare of the United States; * * *''; ``to
raise and support Armies, * * *'' ``to provide and maintain a Navy; * *
*'' and ``to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution * * * all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.'' Therefore, pursuant to such authority,
Congress is empowered to enact this legislation.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as
reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is
enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing
law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
* * * * * * *
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 3. As used in this Act:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(H) the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force,
the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of
the Treasury, and the Department of Energy , and the Coast Guard;
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
APPOINTMENT OF OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES
Sec. 106. (a) * * *
(b) Consultation with DCI in Certain Appointments.--(1) * * *
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(C) The Director of the Office of Nonproliferation and National
Security Intelligence and the Director of the Office of
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.
* * * * * * *
DETAIL OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
ASSIGNMENT PROGRAM
Sec. 113. (a) * * *
(b) Benefits, Allowances, Travel, Incentives.-- (1) An employee
detailed under subsection (a) may be authorized any benefit, allowance,
travel, or incentive otherwise provided to enhance staffing by the
organization from which the employee is detailed.
(2) The head of an agency of an employee detailed under subsection
(a) may pay a lodging allowance for the employee subject to the
following conditions:
(A) The allowance shall be the lesser of the cost of the lodging or
a maximum amount payable for the lodging as established jointly by the
Director of Central Intelligence and--
(i) with respect to detailed employees of the Department of Defense,
the Secretary of Defense; and
(ii) with respect to detailed employees of other agencies and
departments, the head of such agency or department.
(B) The detailed employee maintains a primary residence for the
employee's immediate family in the local commuting area of the parent
agency duty station from which the employee regularly commuted to such
duty station before the detail.
(C) The lodging is within a reasonable proximity of the host agency
duty station.
(D) The distance between the detailed employee's parent agency duty
station and the host agency duty station is greater than 20 miles.
(E) The distance between the detailed employee's primary residence
and the host agency duty station is 10 miles greater than the distance
between such primary residence and the employees parent duty station.
(F) The rate of pay applicable to the detailed employee does not
exceed the rate of basic pay for grade GS 15 of the General Schedule.
* * * * * * *
SECTION 21 OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM
Sec. 21. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(g) Audit.--(1) Not later than December January 31 each year, the
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct
complete an audit of the activities under the program during the
preceding fiscal year.
* * * * * * *
(h) Termination.--(1) The authority of the Director to carry out the
program under this section shall terminate on March 31, 2002.
(2) (1) Subject to paragraph (3) (2), the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
acting jointly--
(A) may terminate the program under this section and the Fund at any
time; and
(B) upon such termination, shall provide for the disposition of the
personnel, assets, liabilities, grants, contracts, property, records,
and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations,
and other funds held, used, arising from, available to, or to be made
available in connection with the program or the Fund.
(3) (2) The Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget may not undertake any action under
paragraph (2) (1) until 60 days after the date on which the Directors
jointly submit notice of such action to the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate.
* * * * * * *
SECTION 2 OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY
ACT
SEC. 2. SEPARATION PAY.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(f) Termination.--No amount shall be payable under this section based
on any separation occurring after September 30, 2002 2003 .
* * * * * * *
(i) Remittance of Funds.--The Director shall remit to the Office of
Personnel Management for deposit in the Treasury of the United States to
the credit of the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (in
addition to any other payments which the Director is required to make
under subchapter III of chapter 83 and subchapter II of chapter 84 of
title 5, United States Code), an amount equal to 15 percent of the final
basic pay of each employee who, in fiscal year 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
or 2002 2002, or 2003 , retires voluntarily under section 8336, 8412, or
8414 of such title or resigns and to whom a voluntary separation
incentive payment has been or is to be paid under this section. The
remittance required by this subsection shall be in lieu of any
remittance required by section 4(a) of the Federal Workforce
Restructuring Act of 1994 (5 U.S.C. 8331 note).
TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
Subtitle A--General Military Law
* * * * * * *
PART I--ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 21--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL MATTERS
Sec.
421. Funds for foreign cryptologic support.
422. Counterintelligence official reception and representation expenses.
422. Use of funds for certain incidental purposes.
* * * * * * *
422. Counterintelligence official reception and representation expenses
422. Use of funds for certain incidental purposes
(a) Counterintelligence Official Reception and Representation
Expenses .--The Secretary of Defense may use funds available to the
Department of Defense for counterintelligence programs to pay the
expenses of hosting foreign officials in the United States under the
auspices of the Department of Defense for consultation on
counterintelligence matters.
(b) Promotional Items for Recruitment Purposes.--The Secretary of
Defense may use funds available for an intelligence element of the
Department of Defense to purchase promotional items of nominal value for
use in the recruitment of individuals for employment by that element.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 22--NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER III--PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
Sec.
461. Management rights.
462. Financial assistance to certain employees in acquisition of
critical skills.
* * * * * * *
462. Financial assistance to certain employees in acquisition
of critical skills
The Secretary of Defense may establish an undergraduate training
program with respect to civilian employees of the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency that is similar in purpose, conditions, content, and
administration to the program established by the Secretary of Defense
under section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C.
402 note) for civilian employees of the National Security Agency.
* * * * * * *
PART IV--SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 152--ISSUE OF SUPPLIES, SERVICES, AND FACILITIES
* * * * * * *
2555. Nuclear test monitoring equipment: furnishing to foreign
governments
(a) Authority To Convey or Transfer Title to or Otherwise Provide
Nuclear Test Monitoring Equipment.--Subject to subsection (b), the
Secretary of Defense may--
(1) convey transfer title or otherwise provide to a foreign
government (A) equipment for the monitoring of nuclear test explosions,
and (B) associated equipment; and
(2) as part of any such conveyance or provision of equipment,
install such equipment on foreign territory or in international waters.
; and
(3) inspect, test, maintain, repair, or replace any such equipment.
(b) Agreement Required.--Nuclear test explosion monitoring equipment
may be conveyed or otherwise provided provided to a foreign government
under subsection (a) only pursuant to the terms of an agreement between
the United States and the foreign government receiving the equipment in
which the recipient foreign government agrees--
(1) to provide the United States with timely access to the data
produced, collected, or generated by the equipment; and
(2) to permit the Secretary of Defense to take such measures as the
Secretary considers necessary to inspect, test, maintain, repair, or
replace that equipment, including access for purposes of such measures;
and .
(3) to return such equipment to the United States (or allow the
United States to recover such equipment) if either party determines that
the agreement no longer serves its interests.
* * * * * * *
SECTION 506 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996
SEC. 506. ENHANCEMENT OF CAPABILITIES OF CERTAIN ARMY FACILITIES.
(a) * * *
(b) Source of Funds.--Funds available for the Army for operations and
maintenance for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 2002 and 2003 shall be
available to carry out subsection (a).
* * * * * * *
SECTION 1012 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
1995
SEC. 1012. OFFICIAL IMMUNITY FOR AUTHORIZED EMPLOYEES AND
AGENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES ENGAGED IN
INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT USED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING.
(a) Employees and Agents of Foreign Countries.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, it shall not be unlawful for authorized
employees or agents of a foreign country (including members of the armed
forces of that country) to interdict or attempt to interdict an aircraft
in that country's territory or airspace if--
(1) * * *
(2) the President of the United States, before the interdiction
occurs, has determined has, during the 12-month period ending on the
date of the interdiction, certified to Congress with respect to that
country that--
(A) interdiction is necessary because of the extraordinary threat
posed by illicit drug trafficking to the national security of that
country; and
(B) the country has appropriate procedures in place to protect
against innocent loss of life in the air and on the ground in connection
with interdiction, which shall at a minimum include effective means to
identify and warn an aircraft before the use of force directed against
the aircraft.
* * * * * * *
(c) Annual Reports.--(1) Not later than February 1 each year, the
President shall submit to Congress a report on the assistance provided
under subsection (b) during the preceding calendar year. Each report
shall include for the calendar year covered by such report the
following:
(A) A list specifying each country for which a certification
referred to in subsection (a)(2) was in effect for purposes of that
subsection during any portion of such calendar year, including the
nature of the illicit drug trafficking threat to each such country.
(B) A detailed explanation of the procedures referred to in
subsection (a)(2)(B) in effect for each country listed under
subparagraph (A), including any training and other mechanisms in place
to ensure adherence to such procedures.
(C) A complete description of any assistance provided under
subsection (b).
(D) A summary description of the aircraft interception activity for
which the United States Government provided any form of assistance under
subsection (b).
(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) (d) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
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