106th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 106-279
_______________________________________________________________________
AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001 FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
_______
May 4, 2000.--Ordered to be printed
Mr. Shelby , from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the
following
REPORT
[To accompany S. 2507]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered the original
bill (S. 2507), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do
pass.
PURPOSE OF THE BILL
This bill will:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for (a) U.S.
intelligence activities and programs; (b) the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System; and (c) the Community
Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2001, for
intelligence activities of the U.S. Government and for the Community
Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence;
(3) Authorize the Director of Central Intelligence, with Office of
Management and Budget approval, to exceed the personnel ceilings by up
to two percent;
(4) Prohibit the knowing and willful unauthorized disclosure of
classified information to a person not authorized to receive it;
(5) Establish a POW/MIA analytic capability within the Intelligence
Community;
(6) Preclude the application of any U.S. law implementing treaties
and other international agreements to otherwise lawful and authorized
U.S. Government intelligence activities unless U.S. law expressly states
that it will apply to such activities;
(7) Require the Director of Central Intelligence to certify to
Congress that each element of the Department of State that handles,
retains, or stores material classified at the Sensitive Compartmented
Information level is in full compliance with applicable Executive Orders
and Director of Central Intelligence Directives;
(8) Permit Executive branch agencies to contribute appropriated funds
for fiscal year 2000 to support the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive
Secretariat;
(9) Expand the reporting requirements of the CIA Inspector General to
include notification concerning certain designated senior officials;
(10) Extend the CIA's Central Services Program and expand the
authorities for the Central Services Working Capital Fund;
(11) Permit long-term detailing of CIA employees to the National
Reconnaissance Office on a reimbursable basis;
(12) Permit appropriated funds transferred by the CIA to other
government agencies for the purpose of the acquisition of land to remain
available for a period of three years;
(13) Permit the Director of Central Intelligence to designate
categories of employees in addition to those designated in law that
would be eligible to receive partial reimbursement for the cost of
purchasing professional liability insurance;
(14) Extend for two additional years the Secretary of Defense's
authority to engage in commercial activities as security for
intelligence collection activities;
(15) Support the Intelligence Community's effort to monitor nuclear
weapons tests on a worldwide basis by authorizing the Department of
Defense to convey nuclear test monitoring equipment to a foreign
government through a bilateral agreement which provides the U.S. the
right to install, inspect, and maintain such equipment and to have
continued access to data collected;
(16) Expand the hiring authority of the Director of Central
Intelligence to facilitate the recruitment of eminent experts in science
and engineering for research and development projects administered by
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), National Security Agency
(NSA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA); and
(17) Clarify the standing of United States citizens to challenge the
blocking of assets under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act.
CLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMITTEE REPORT
The classified nature of United States intelligence activities
prevents the Committee from disclosing the details of its budgetary
recommendations in this Report.
The Committee has prepared a classified supplement to this Report,
which contains (a) the classified annex to this Report and (b) the
classified Schedule of Authorizations which is incorporated by reference
in the Act and has the same legal status as public law. The classified
annex to this report explains the full scope and intent of the
Committee's action as set forth in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations. The classified annex has the same status as any Senate
Report, and the Committee fully expects the Intelligence Community to
comply with the limitations, guidelines, directions, and recommendations
contained therein.
The classified supplement to the Committee Report is available for
review by any Member of the Senate, subject to the provisions of Senate
Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress.
The classified supplement is made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and to the
President. The President shall provide for appropriate distribution
within the Executive branch.
SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW
The Committee conducted a detailed review of the fiscal year 2001
budget requests for the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) of
the Director of Central Intelligence; the Joint Military Intelligence
Program (JMIP) of the Deputy Secretary of Defense; and the Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) of the military services.
The Committee's review entailed a series of briefings and hearings with
senior intelligence officials, numerous staff briefings, review of
budget justification materials, and numerous written responses provided
by the Intelligence Community to specific questions posed by the
Committee. The Committee also monitored compliance with numerous
reporting requirements contained in statute. Each report was scrutinized
by the Committee and appropriate action was taken when necessary.
In accordance with a Memorandum of Agreement with the Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC), the Committee is including its
recommendations on both JMIP and TIARA in its public report and
classified annex. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has
agreed that JMIP and TIARA issues will continue to be authorized in the
defense authorization bill. The SASC has also agreed to involve the SSCI
staff in staff-level defense authorization conference meetings and to
provide the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SSCI the opportunity to
consult with the SASC Chairman and Ranking member before a JMIP or TIARA
issue is finally closed out in conference in a manner with which they
disagree. The Committee looks forward to continuing its productive
relationship with the SASC on all issues of mutual concern.
In addition to its annual review of the Administration's budget
request, the Committee performs continuing oversight of various
intelligence activities and programs. The Committee's audit staff
conducts in-depth audits and reviews of specific programs and activities
identified by the Committee as needing thorough and focused scrutiny.
The Audit Staff also supports the Committee's continuing oversight of a
number of administrative and operational issues. During the last year
the Committee's Audit Staff reviewed the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA) and a covert action program; completed portions of the
Committee staff's review of counterintelligence at the Department of
Energy's National Laboratories and the mishandling of classified
information by former Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch; and
monitored the products and activities of the Community's statutory and
administrative Inspectors General. These kinds of inquiries frequently
lead to Committee action with respect to the authorities, applicable
laws, and budget of the activity or program concerned.
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
The majority of the Committee's specific recommendations relating to
the Administration's budget request for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities are classified, and are contained in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations and the classified annex. The Committee
is committed, however, to making its concerns over, and priorities for, intelligence
programs and activities public to the greatest extent possible consistent with the
nation's security. The Committee, therefore, has included in this report
information that is unclassified.
TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP (TAG)
In 1997, the Committee established a Technical Advisory Group (TAG)
to inform and advise Members of the threats and opportunities presented
by the extraordinary technological advances of recent years. The TAG
members have extensive expertise in computer hardware, software,
telecommunications, aviation, satellites, imagery, physics, chemcial
engineering, and other technical fields, as well as, in many cases,
extensive Intelligence Community experience. They are drawn from both
government and industry, and volunteer their time and effort to help the
Committee understand how the Intelligence Community is being affected
by, and can take advantage of, current and developing technologies.
The Committee wishes to thank the TAG members for the many hours they
devoted to examining Intelligence Community capabilities. The Committee
will continue to study the findings of this distinguished group, to draw
upon their world-class expertise, and to work with the Director of
Central Intelligence to implement the Committee's recommendations that
are based in whole or in part on the findings of the TAG.
Signals intelligence
In 1997, at the Committee's behest, the TAG undertook a study of the
National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA has responsibility for
collecting signals intelligence (SIGINT) from electronic signals
worldwide, and therefore requires an in-depth understanding of the
global telecommunications revolution to complete its mission. The TAG
extensively reviewed current and planned operation as well as research
and development programs at the NSA. Their findings and recommendations
regarding the NSA's ability to address a changing technological
environment have been incorporated into prior and current Committee
initiatives.
This year, the Committee asked the TAG to update its SIGINT review in
light of reforms both proposed and underway at the NSA. The Committee
has again utilized the TAG's analysis and recommendations for guidance
in drafting the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.
Human intelligence
In 1998, the Committee asked the TAG to review the status of the
Intelligence Community's human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. The
TAG concluded that human intelligence collection will play an
increasingly important role in defending U.S. national security
interests and recommended that the Intelligence Community develop a
comprehensive plan that recognizes the rapidly changing and technically
sophisticated world that now confronts the HUMINT collector.
This year, the Committee also asked the TAG to assess the progress
that the Intelligence Community has made in undertaking the substantial
changes to HUMINT recommended in 1998. The results of this review have
been incorporated, where applicable, within this year's authorization.
MASINT and IMINT intelligence
In 1999, the TAG reviewed the Intelligence Community's capabilities
to collect measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) and imagery
intelligence (IMINT). The Committee referred often to the TAG's review
of MASINT and IMINT as it drafted the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000. Some of the TAG's conclusions have influenced
provisions within this year's bill as well.
COMMITTEE PRIORITY ISSUES
Rebuilding the National Security Agency
The Committee is increasingly troubled by the National Security
Agency's (NSA) growing inability to meet technological challenges and to
provide America's leaders with vital signals intelligence (SIGINT).
Successful execution of the NSA's mission is essential to protecting
U.S. national security. The Committee is committed to providing the
resources and support necessary to restore and improve the NSA's
capabilities.
Collecting and deciphering the communications of America's
adversaries has been instrumental in protecting our national security
during the last half of the 20th Century. SIGINT has played a decisive
role in every military confrontation in which the United States has been
involved, from World War II through the Kosovo conflict. SIGINT also has
consistently provided our nation's policy makers with additional
knowledge and understanding of international developments and threats to
the nation's security. This essential intelligence information has
enlightened our foreign policy, thwarted terrorist attacks, disrupted
narcotics trafficking, and averted unnecessary military conflict.
American presidents and senior policy makers rely upon this vital source
of information to make critical decisions on behalf of the national
interest.
As the central repository of the government's SIGINT expertise, the
NAS is a critical national asset. The NSA historically has led the way
in development and use of cutting edge technology that has kept the
United States a step ahead of those whose interests are hostile to our
own. Unfortunately, in recent years, the Administration has failed to
invest in the infrastructure and organizational changes required to keep
pace with revolutionary developments in the global telecommunications
system.
As detailed above, in 1998, and again this year, the TAG reviewed the
NSA's operations. The TAG's conclusions are disturbing. While the
current information revolution presents both opportunities and threats
to its mission, the NSA's ability to adapt to this changing environment
is in serious doubt. The TAG's two reports identified serious
deficiencies resulting from the sustained budget decline of the past
decade. As resources have been reduced, the NSA systematically has
sacrificed infrastructure modernization in order to meet day-to-day
intelligence requirements. Consequently, the organization begins the
21st Century lacking the technological infrastructure and human
resources needed even to maintain the status quo, much less meet
emerging challenges.
This year's TAG review, however, sounded a note of optimism, noting
that the NSA Director in November 1999 initiated an aggressive and
ambitious modernization effort. In November 1999, the Director began a
series of changes designed to transform the NSA and sustain it as a
national asset. Spurred by the NSA computer outage in January 2000, this
transformation includes seeping organizational and business strategies
that promise to transform the way the NSA conducts its missions. The
Committee is encouraged by these actions, and expects that the Director
of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense will support the
Director of the NSA in making the difficult decisions necessary for the
NSA to restore its predominance. To return the NSA to organizational and
technological excellence, NSA managers, as well as Intelligence
Community leaders and the Congressional oversight committees, must be
prepared to accept a level of risk as some resources are shifted from
short-term collection to long-term infrastructure modernization. Failure
to do so will irreversibly undermine the NSA and its ability to perform
in a transformed global information technology arena.
To address these problems, the TAG recommended new business practices
coupled with additional resources to finance this recovery. Inadequate
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) spending leaves little
flexibility to meet the increasingly complex intelligence challenges
faced by the NSA, but the crisis demands immediate attention and
warrants shifting resources in order to stave off a steady and
inevitable degradation of the NSA's unique and invaluable capabilities.
The budget recommendations in the classified annex accompanying this
bill constitute a down payment on this requirement.
The Committee supports the NSA Director's transformation objectives,
and recommends investments in areas that are consistent with his plan.
The Committee is particularly encouraged by the willingness of the
Director to reach beyond his current workforce to hire industry
professionals. The Director has hired a Chief Financial Manager from
industry, an essential prerequisite if the NSA is to develop a
comprehensive business plan for this effort. As the Director moves
forward on his plan to reshape the Agency, the Committee will look for
specific goals to support establishment of business-based objectives.
Despite the need for additional resources, the Committee does not
believe that money alone will solve the NSA's problems. Organizational
change also is essential. The Director of the NSA has authority over
approximately thirty percent of the total SIGINT budget within the NFIP.
Other agencies and organizations within the NFIP and the Department of
Defense expend funds for cryptologic activities outside the authorities
of the Director of the NSA. If the Director of the NSA is to have
functional responsibility for rebuilding the nation's cryptologic
program, the Director must have greater authority in the planning,
programming, budgeting, and execution of the entire SIGINT budget. To
build a comprehensive, efficient U.S. Cryptologic System, the NSA
Director must have the requisite authorities to manage his program. The
Committee will work with the Director to improve his ability to provide
centralized direction across the SIGINT infrastructure as he implements
his modernization strategy.
Rebuilding the NSA is the Committee's top priority. Failure to do so,
risks our nation's security. The Committee, therefore, will take
whatever steps are necessary to ensure America's continuing superiority
in the signals intelligence field.
Tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination funding shortfall
The Committee has long been concerned that intelligence collection
continues to outstrip analysis, and is troubled that funding for the
latter remains woefully inadequate. This funding shortfall challenges
the Intelligence Community's ability to manage the tasking, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) of intelligence collected by
satellites, airplanes, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other platforms and
sensors. The issue of TPED is at the heart of how the Intelligence
Community collects raw intelligence data, and then in a timely manner,
turns it into a product that is understandable and usable to a wide
variety of consumers, from the President of the United States to the
military commander in the field.
In June 1999, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) issued a
congressionally-mandated report describing the challenges and projected
shortfalls in the areas of TPED of intelligence to be collected by the
Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) satellite program and other
intelligence collection systems. The funding shortfall figures in the
NIMA report were updated in the summer of 1999.
The NIMA report addressed only Phase I of three phases identified by
the Intelligence Community's TPED assessment process. The three phases
of TPED modernization are defined and staged in the following manner:
Phase One--Infrastructure Foundation: covering fiscal years 2001
2005, this portion of the TPED modernization plan will (a) provide full
support to the Enhanced Imagery System (EIS); (b) provide a foundation
for the FIA; (c) provide infrastructure ``hooks'' for commercial
imagery; and (d) provide a minimal level of modernization supporting
airborne systems.
Phase Two--Imagery and Geospatial Information Transition: covering
fiscal years 2002 2007, this portion of the TPED modernization plan will
(a) provide full support for the FIA; (b) provide full support for
commercial imagery; (c) provide intermediate modernization supporting
airborne systems; (d) expand the ability to handle motion imagery; and
(e) provide infrastructure ``hooks'' for TPED modernization supporting
all intelligence collection (``multi-INT''), including signals
intelligence, human intelligence, and measurement and signature
intelligence.
Phase Three--Common Operational Picture: covering fiscal years 2004
2009, this portion of the TPED modernization plan will (a) provide full
support for multi-INT TPED; (b) provide support of all sensor platforms;
(c) integrate moving target indicator (MTI) data; and (d) provide full
support for airborne systems.
The updated NIMA modernization plan for Phase One contains 26
recommendations for TPED modernization with associated cost estimates to
implement each. The multi-billion dollar modernization plan sets forth
an overall cost ranging from implementing only the Imagery and
Geospatial Community's highest priority TPED improvements to full
funding of all 26 recommendations over the next five years.
Complete Phase Two and Phase Three cost estimates have not yet been
developed and are expected to be formulated in the context of the fiscal
year 2002 and fiscal year 2004 budget cycles, respectively. Preliminary
indications are that each phase will carry a significant price tag over
and above the funding range currently estimated for Phase One.
The funding contained in the proposed fiscal year 2001 budget for
Phase One TPED modernization is about 10% of the total funding amount
pledged by the Administration for the effort over the next five years. A
proportionate, one-fifth, installment of the total amount pledged would
have required a funding commitment in fiscal year 2001 nearly double the
amount actually proposed.
The inadequacy of the fiscal year 2001 TPED funding request is more
stark when compared to the needs set forth in the NIMA's updated TPED
modernization plan. The fiscal year 2001 request for NIMA TPED is
significantly below what is required in the upcoming year to support
only the top priorities in the modernization plan. This shortfall
balloons when compared to the funds needed to proceed with all the
recommended fiscal year 2001 TPED improvements. When expressed in
percentage form, the proposed funding in fiscal year 2001 for NIMA TPED
is 25% of what is required for the top priorities alone, and 15% of what
is required for the full complement of modernization projects.
The recently completed Defense Science Board Task Force report on
NIMA also found the TPED modernization funding plan to be insufficient
and recommended an investment of $3 billion over the next five years in
order for the U.S. to maintain information superiority in the future.
The Committee concludes that Phase One of the TPED modernization plan
is woefully underfunded in the proposed fiscal year 2001 budget and over
the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), i.e., fiscal years 2001 2005. The
Committee is troubled by the Administration's unwillingness to recognize
the significant disparity between its proposed funding plan and the TPED
modernization funding plan, which is based on a rigorous technical
evaluation that has yet to be challenged as being either flawed or
inflated. The proposed funding for the TPED modernization effort to date
has come from anticipated saving from lower than expected inflation over
the next five years and not from other programs within the Intelligence
Community and defense budgets, thus avoiding the tough programmatic
trade-offs and choices required to fully fund needed modernization.
The Committee is concerned that the dramatic underfunding of Phase
One TPED modernization in fiscal year 2001 is setting up a budgetary
crunch wherein a disproportionate amount of funds will be required in
subsequent years of the FYDP. Assuming the budgetary top line for
national security is not increased over this period of time to cover the
emerging TPED modernization bill, these out-year balloon payments will
create a Hobson's choice for the Intelligence Community: either make
abrupt and deep cuts in other needed programs or curtail the TPED
modernization program to an extent that raises serious doubt as to why
tens of billions of dollars are being spent on intelligence collection
platforms when the customers of the intelligence will not be able to use
much of the raw data that is collected. The Committee cannot and will
not accept either alternative.
When the yet unknown costs for the Phase Two TPED modernization
effort covering fiscal years 2002 2007 and the Phase Three TPED
modernization effort covering fiscal years 2004 2009 are added to the
equation, this chasm widens as does the challenge to find the needed
funding to bridge it.
Therefore, the Committee recommends a number of funding changes
within the NIMA budget, both in the National Foreign Intelligence
Program and the Joint Military Intelligence Program, to bolster Phase
One TPED modernization efforts in fiscal year 2001. These funding
changes are described in the classified annex to this Report.
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION BY FORMER DCI DEUTCH
The Committee was deeply concerned to learn of serious breaches of
security by former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John M.
Deutch. As the DCI, Mr. Deutch was entrusted with protecting our
nation's most sensitive secrets pursuant to the National Security Act of
1947 which charges the DCI to protect the sources and methods by which
the Intelligence Community conducts its mission. It is this Committee's
view, based upon the Committee's inquiry to date, that Mr. Deutch failed
in this responsibility. Mr. Deutch, whose conduct should have served as
the highest example, instead displayed a shocking and reckless disregard
for the most basic security practices required of thousands of
government employees throughout the CIA and other agencies of the
Intelligence Community. In open testimony before the Committee, current
DCI George Tenet stated, ``there was enormously sensitive material on
[Mr. Deutch's] computer, at the highest levels of classification.''
The Committee believes further, based upon the Committee's inquiry to
date, that, in their response to Mr. Deutch's actions, Director Tenet,
Executive Director Nora Slatkin, General Counsel Michael O'Neil, and
other senior CIA officials failed to notify the Committee in a timely
manner regarding the Deutch matter, as they are required by law to do.
The Committee has determined that there are several gaps, or
potential gaps, in existing law that require legislative action. The
Committee has decided to proceed with one statutory change at this time
(Section 401, described below), despite the fact that the Committee has
not completed its inquiry, because there is broad agreement on the
nature of, and the solution to, this particular problem. The Committee
also wishes to ensure that this amendment can be enacted into law
expeditiously as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2001. The Committee is reviewing additional proposals for statutory
changes, and may make recommendations when the Committee completes an
unclassified report setting forth Committee's findings and conclusions.
Inspector General reporting requirements relating to senior CIA officials
Section 401 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001 closes gaps in the Congressional reporting requirements to the
intelligence committees revealed by the Deutch matter. Current law
requires the Inspector General to notify the committees ``immediately'' if the Director or
Acting Director, but not the former Director, is the subject of an
Inspector General inquiry. The committees were not notified of the
security breach by Mr. Deutch until more than 18 months after it was
discovered, and even then the full scope of the problem was not
adequately disclosed. This amendment broadens the notification
requirement to include former DCIs, all Senate confirmed officials
(Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence for Community Management, Assistant Directors for Central
Intelligence, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community
Management, Assistant Directors for Central Intelligence and General
Counsel), the Executive Director and the Deputy Directors for
Operations, Intelligence, Administration, and Science and Technology. In
addition to expanding the number of senior officials covered by the
notification requirement, the amendment also requires the IG to notify
the intelligence oversight committees whenever one of the designated
officials is the subject of a criminal referral to the Department of
Justice.
STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Limitation on retention or storage of certain classified
materials by the Department of State
In the last two years, the Committee has taken a series of steps
designed to identify, and require the State Department to address,
serious deficiencies in policies, procedures, and attitudes relating to
the protection of classified information. Despite these efforts, and a
nascent, if belated, recognition by the State Department of the
magnitude and severity of the problem, serious breakdowns in security
and counterintelligence practices continue to occur.
Most recently, on April 17, 2000, The Washington Post published an
article entitled ``State Dept. Computer with Secrets Vanishes.''
According to this article and subsequent press reporting, a laptop
computer containing highly sensitive classified intelligence materials,
including Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) relating to weapons
proliferation, has disappeared from the State Department Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR) , and is presumed stolen. The FBI is
investigating the matter. The Committee has been briefed by the
Department of State, the CIA and the FBI.
The loss of this information, which endangers intelligence sources
and methods directed at one of our most critical intelligence targets,
is a matter of urgent concern. The Committee expects that the FBI will
thoroughly pursue all aspects of this loss, including a full
counterintelligence investigation.
In addition to security and counterintelligence issues with regard to
the loss of the classified laptop, the Committee also was distressed at
the failure of the State Department, and the CIA, to notify the
Congressional intelligence committees about this incident--even after
the story appeared in the press. The State Department had known of the
loss for almost three months. The CIA became aware of the loss of the
computer in mid-February.
Section 502 of the National Security Act [50 U.S.C. 413a] requires
that the heads of all departments of the United States Government
involved in intelligence activities keep the intelligence committees
``fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities,''
including ``significant intelligence failures.'' Clearly, the loss and
possible compromise of highly sensitive compartmented intelligence
information should be considered a significant intelligence failure and
should have been reported in a timely manner to this Committee and the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Beyond the clear legal requirement for notification, we note that the
State Department is well aware of this Committee's sustained interest in
security and counterintelligence problems at INR and the Department at
large, and therefore should have informed us of this event even in the
absence of a statutory requirement.
The January 2000 laptop incident follows the discovery of a Russian
listening device in a seventh floor State Department conference room. On
December 8, 1999, the FBI detained a Russian intelligence officer,
Stanislav Gusev, as he was recording transmissions from a bug implanted
in a piece of chair rail, in a conference room within the Department of
State headquarters building. Gusev was declared persona non grata and
required to leave the United States.
Gusev's expulsion capped a six-month investigation that began when
the FBI spotted the Russian intelligence officer loitering near the
State Department. Following surveillance and observation of Gusev,
technical countermeasures discovered the remotely-activated device in
the conference room.
The FBI and State Department continue to investigate who was
responsible for planting the bug, and what sensitive materials discussed
in the conference room may have been compromised. Recreating the extent
to which Russian intelligence or other personnel may have had access to
the room in question has been complicated by the fact that from 1992 until August 1999,
there were no escort requirements for Russian (or other foreign)
visitors to the State Department.
The Gusev incident followed a February 1998 incident, in which an
unidentified man wearing a tweed jacket entered the Secretary of State's
seventh floor office suite and removed classified documents, including
SCI documents. He has never been identified, the documents have never
been recovered, and poor procedures for handling classified information
resulted in the Department's inability to reconstruct which documents
were taken.
Following the ``tweed jacket'' affair, the SSCI, in the Annex to the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, directed the State
Department Inspector General (IG) to review and report on State
Department policy and procedures for handling classified information
within the State Department Headquarters facility.
The resulting IG report, entitled ``Protecting Classified Documents
at State Department Headquarters,'' found that ``[t]he Department [of
State] is substantially not in compliance with the DCIDs [Director of
Central Intelligence Directives] that govern the handling of SCI.''
(emphasis in original) According to the Report:
``Very highly classified documents relating to intelligence
reporting are not safeguarded in accordance with government regulations.
Most offices have never been inspected and accredited for handling such
documents.
``A significant number of foreign nationals are permitted unescorted
access to the Department. Uncleared maintenance, repair, and char force
personnel are not always escorted in areas where classified information
is handled, processed, stored, and discussed.
``Administrative actions taken to discipline employees are
ineffective to ensure that poor security practices are corrected.
``Unit security officers are not well informed about security
requirements and do not have the authority to enforce security
requirements.''
In response to the IG Report, in the Annex to the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, the Congressional intelligence
committees fenced funds for the State Department Bureau of Intelligence
and Research pending receipt of (1) a State Department report on
specific plans for enhancing the security of classified information
within the State Department and fully implementing, as appropriate, the
recommendations found within the Inspector General's report, and (2) a
report from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) evaluating the
State Department's compliance with all DCIDs related to the protection
of Sensitive Compartmented Information. These reports were provided to
the Congressional committees in February of this year. The State
Department, in its response, identified a number of actions or proposed
actions it intended to take in response to the IG Report.
The DCI report noted that an independent review by the CIA and the
Community Management Staff confirmed that the State Department was not
in compliance with applicable DCID requirements, and concluded that
certain additional steps were required to ``improve security practices
in Department control and accountability.'' The Department agreed with
the findings of the DCI report as to the steps required to address these
deficiencies.
In addition, in the wake of the Gusev incident, Secretary Albright
ordered a ``top-to-bottom'' review of the Department's security
practices and procedures led by Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic
Security David Carpenter. The review is expected to be completed in the
near future. The Committee looks forward to receiving the presentation
of a comprehensive plan that will ensure that security and
counterintelligence receive adequate resources and consistent senior
management attention.
Despite the February 2000 report confirming that the State Department
failed to comply with applicable DCID requirements, the DCI decided to
permit the CIA and other Intelligence Community components to continue
to provide SCI materials to INR and other authorized recipients at the
Department of State. The Committee believes, however, that the time has
come for the State of Department to be held accountable for its failure
to comply with directives governing the protection of SCI information.
The Committee therefore has adopted a provision, Section 306 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, that would require
the DCI to certify to the Congressional intelligence and foreign affairs
committees whether each element of the State Department that handles,
retains or stores classified information that is classified as SCI
complies with all applicable DCI directives (DCIDs) and all applicable
Executive Orders relating to the handling, retention, or storage of such
classified information. Moreover, the DCI many not certify, as in
compliance, any element that is operating under a DCI waiver of
compliance with respect to any such directive or Executive Order. The DCI must
promptly notify the Congressional intelligence and foreign affairs
committees if the DCI determines that any element is not in full
compliance.
Unless the DCI has certified each covered element of the Department
of State to be in full compliance, the following restrictions take
effect as of January 1, 2000: (1) no funds authorized to be appropriated
under the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 may be
obligated or expended by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State, until each covered element has been determined to
be in full compliance, and (2) no covered element that has not been
certified to be in full compliance may contain or store SCI material,
until the DCI has certified that it is in full compliance.
The provision further stipulates that the President may waive the
application of the restriction on the retention or storage of classified
information if the President determines that such a waiver is in the
national security interests of the United States. The President must
provide to the Congressional intelligence and foreign affairs committees
a report with respect to any such waiver, describing the element
affected, the reasons for the waiver, and the actions taken by the
President to protect covered classified material to be handled,
retained, or stored by the element in question.
Department of State Inspector General review
The Committee anticipates that the Department will come into
compliance with applicable DCIDs in the near future. There will be a
need for continued monitoring and oversight to ensure ongoing
compliance, however. Therefore, the Committee directs the Department of
State Office of Inspector General to conduct reviews of State Department
policies and procedures for protecting classified information at Main
State Headquarters annually for the next five years, beginning with a
report to be submitted by December 31, 2001. As in the September 1999
report, the Committee expects the State IG to determine, among other
matters, compliance with Director of Central Intelligence Directives
(DCIDs) regarding the storage and handling of Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) material.
Transfer of SCI authority at the Department of State
In 1998, the Committee directed a State Department Office of
Inspector General review of the protection of classified information at
the Department of State, and last year the Committee directed a review
by the Director of Central Intelligence Department compliance with
directives regarding protection of classified material. Among the State
IG recommendations included in its review was the transfer of
responsibility for protection of Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to the Bureau
of Diplomatic Security (DS). The DCI review did not address this
recommendation. The Committee believes such a transfer unnecessarily
complicates efforts to address this issue, and may hinder the
possibility for success in this vitally important task.
The transfer of responsibility for protection of SCI material from
INR to DS improperly transfers authority from an Intelligence Community
element to a bureau over which the Director of Central Intelligence has
no oversight authority. Despite INR's record, it is a member of the
Intelligence Community, and the DCI has statutory authority to approve
its budget. This oversight and budgetary authority will be critical to
ensure effective implementation of measures to protect intelligence
information. The DCI does not approve the budget request for DS, has no
influence over DS personnel, and will not have the organizational
authority to review directly DS compliance with directives concerning
the handling of classified information. This will severely limit the
ability of the DCI to carry out his responsibility under the National
Security Act of 1947 to ensure the protection of intelligence sources
and methods.
Further, the proposed transfer will complicate and hinder oversight
of protection of SCI material at the State Department by the Legislative
branch. This Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) are the congressional bodies with the legal
responsibility, institutional knowledge, and expertise necessary to
exert legislative oversight over the protection of SCI material. The
SSCI and HPSCI are charged with overseeing the Intelligence Community,
which produces the SCI material that requires stringent controls and
accounting. Neither the SSCI nor the HPSCI currently have direct
jurisdiction or oversight over the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
For the reasons stated above, the Committee believes the proposed
transfer of the responsibility for protection of SCI material from INR
to DS imprudently takes this function away from those with the authority
to ensure successful implementation. Therefore, the Committee will
closely review any Department of State plan to transfer the
responsibility for protecting Sensitive Compartmented Information from
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
The Committee supports the efforts by the Secretary of State to improve
the security procedures and practices
throughout the State Department. However, the Committee believes the
responsibility for protecting SCI material within the Intelligence
Community elements that use and produce such information must continue
to reside with those elements themselves.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE--CI 21
The Committee has become increasingly concerned about the ability of
existing U.S. counterintelligence structures, programs, and policies to
address both emerging threats and traditional adversaries using cutting
edge technologies and tradecraft in the 21st Century. The Committee has
made its views known to the nation's senior intelligence and
counterintelligence officials, and found many of them share these
concerns.
On March 8, 2000, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director
of the FBI, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense unveiled a proposal
entitled ``Counterintelligence for the 21st Century'' during a closed
hearing before the SSCI. The plan, generally referred to as ``CI 21,''
resulted from a review launched in June 1999 to assess existing
counterintelligence structures and capabilities to address emerging as
well as traditional counterintelligence threats.
CI 21 restates and expands upon other recent assessments on the
emerging counterintelligence environment. The report notes that the
threat has expanded beyond the traditional paradigm of ``adversary
states stealing classified data''--which includes traditional espionage
by Russia, the PRC, North Korea, Cuba, Iran, and Iraq--to include new
efforts by these traditional adversaries, as well as threats from
certain allies and friendly states, to collect economic information and
critical but unclassified technologies.
Terrorist groups, organized crime, and drug cartels are additional,
non-state actors that pose an increasing counterintelligence threat. New
roles and missions for U.S. military forces, such as peacekeeping and
new kinds of coalition operations, create new force protection and
counterintelligence challenges. Academic exchanges and joint ventures
also are venues for the loss--witting or unwitting--of sensitive or even
classified information.
Both traditional and non-traditional threats are exploiting modern
technology, particularly modern computer technology and the Internet, to
develop information warfare (IW) and intelligence collection
capabilities and tradecraft that alter traditional notions of time,
distance and access.
Complicating the task of U.S. counterintelligence agencies is the
sheer volume of classified and sensitive information that requires
protection, and the resulting need for top level policy guidance and
prioritization in determining which information and technologies must be
protected.
CI 21 found current U.S. counterintelligence capabilities intended to
confront this expanding and changing threat to be ``piecemeal and
parochial.'' Key problems include:
inadequate coordination between policy and counterintelligence,
including failure to identify ``must protect'' information;
inadequate coordination, cooperation, and information-sharing
between counterintelligence agencies;
lack of strategic counterintelligence threat analysis;
lack of agility, and a focus that is reactive instead of
proactive--at both the national and operational levels;
failure to adequately exploit new technologies;
lack of a national counterintelligence plan to integrate
information, analysis, and a new proactive focus;
an inadequately prepared workforce and insufficient, diffused,
resources;
a lack of a national advocate for resources, policies, and proactive
initiatives; and
inadquate coordination with the private sector.
To address these shortfalls, the CI 21 report recommends adoption of
a new counterintelligence philosophy--described as more policy-driven,
prioritized, and flexible, with a strategic, national-level focus--and a
restructured national counterintelligence system. The proposed new national
counterintelligence system would include:
A National Counterintelligence Executive;
A National Counterintelligence Board of Directors; and
A National Counterintelligence Steering Committee.
The Committee commends both the senior leadership and the senior
counterintelligence officials of the CIA, FBI, and the Defense
Department for their work in developing the CI 21 proposal. This
ambitious plan proposes significant changes in the way the United States
Government approaches, and organizes itself to meet, the threat of
foreign espionage and intelligence gathering. Implementation would
require additional resources, as well as changes to existing
Presidential directives and statutory authorities. Perhaps most
difficult, it would challenge traditional ways of doing business.
The Committee notes that the CI 21 plan has not yet received final
interagency approval. Given the seriousness and evolving nature of the
threat, and the demonstrated shortcomings of current counterintelligence
structures, the Committee strongly urges the agencies involved to reach
agreement on this matter.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Following its extensive 1999 review of Department of Energy (DOE)
security and counterintelligence problems, the Committee continues its
oversight over the Department's Counterintelligence and Intelligence
programs. The Committee is monitoring closely the Department's
implementation of Presidential Decision Directive-61 (PDD), the DOE
Counterintelligence Implementation Plan and the National Defense
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2000 to ensure that the Department
follows through on these and other long-overdue reforms. Although the
Committee understands that the Department's problems are deeply-rooted
and will not be solved overnight, the Committee is disappointed that in
the Department's initial counterintelligence inspections of the major
weapons laboratories, only one lab--Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory--received a ``Satisfactory'' rating. Sandia National
Laboratories received an ``Unsatisfactory'' grade, while Los Alamos
National Laboratory was judged ``Marginal.''
The Committee is also concerned that, to date, neither the DOE
Director of Counterintelligence, the DCI, nor the FBI Director has been
able to certify to the Congress, pursuant to Section 3146(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, that the
foreign visitors program at any one of the national laboratories:
complies with applicable DOE orders, regulations, and policies, and PDD
and similar requirements, relating to the safeguarding and security of
sensitive information; fulfills counterintelligence responsibilities
arising under such requirements or Directives; has adequate protections
against the inadvertent release of Restricted Data or other sensitive
information; and does not pose an undue risk to the national security of
the United States.
The results of the DOE counterintelligence inspections, which will
make it difficult indeed to make the certifications set forth under
Section 3146, underline the extent and resilience of the problems
identified at the Department of Energy. They also reinforce the need for
continued vigorous executive leadership at the Department, together with
aggressive Congressional oversight, to ensure that the current momentum
for reform is maintained.
MANAGEMENT OF MASINT
The Committee has repeatedly noted the significant contribution that
measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) can make in
accomplishing critical missions within the Intelligence Community,
particularly in countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
As a result, the Congress has specifically designed a significant amount
of additional funds provided over the last three years to bolster MASINT
capability. At the same time, the Congress and various independent
entities, including the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General,
have criticized the Intelligence Community for failing to come to grips
with resources, management, and organizational MASINT deficiencies.
Therefore, the Committee was not surprised to learn during its first
real combat test in Kosono, MASINT performed poorly. The January 31,
2000, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-action Report stated that
MASINT's ``flaws in supporting tasking, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination limited their overall utility and needed to be corrected
to make these capabilities an integral part of intelligence support to
operations.''
The Committee believes that the continued lack of adequate management
within the Intelligence Community for the MASINT program has been
demonstrated by the failure to sustain Congressional priorities,
especially in the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). The
Committee is concerned with the funding shortfall in individual programs
that have not been addressed as part of a comprehensive plan.
At the same time, the Committee also recognizes that the
capitalization of these sensors appears to be beyond the capability of
the GDIP as it is currently constituted and resourced by the
Administration. The Committee also questions whether the Cold War
orientation of many of these sensors, and level of funding required to
maintain them, is reflective of the current realities regarding transfer
and proliferation. Rather than a piecemeal approach to recapitalization,
it seems prudent to the Committee to direct a review of the technical
collection ``system of systems,'' with particular emphasis on
articulating the requirements base, programmatic status, operations and
maintenance costs, and the Administration's approach to recapitalizing
or reconfiguring the current systems. The review should be conducted by
the DCI, in conjunction with the GDIP Program Manager and the Director
of the Central MASINT Organization, and result in a report to be
delivered to the Committee no later than October 1, 2000. As for back as
1993, this Committee has expressed its displeasure with the management
of MASINT. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994,
noted that ``[t]he Senate has been critical of the performance of the
Central MASINT Office (CMO) to date and concerned that the Director,
DIA, did not have the interest or authority to manage a major beet
uncoordinated and underdeveloped discipline.'' Little, other than the
organization's name, has changed and intelligence support to our
operational forces is now suffering.
Last year, the Committee concurred with the findings and
recommendations of its Technical Advisory Group (TAG). In their report,
the TAG recommended the creation of a new high-level organization, led
by a world-class expert and staff detailed from operational elements to
facilitate deployment of technologies on an urgent basis. The Senate and
House Conferees noted the importance and potential offered by MASINT
technologies--if they are rigorously developed and rapidly deployed. The
Conferees specifically noted that, (1) successful exploitation of MASINT
technologies could significantly enhance U.S. national security; (2)
MASINT technologies could potentially eclipse in value the more
traditional intelligence disciplines; (3) MASINT technologies offer
potential solutions to denial and deception capabilities and other
countermeasures; and (4) the IC currently lacks a sufficiently robust
MASINT organizational structure, particularly for development and
integration of close-in (less than 10 km) MASINT technologies.
In addition, the House of Representatives dealt with the management
issue of MASINT legacy systems, and as a result, the conferees to the
fiscal year 2000 authorization bill directed a report, now in the hands
of Congress, that addresses concerns such as the identification of
collection systems, the need to review requirements, and the need to
overcome operational shortfalls between national level collection and
analysis and warfighter support.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence for Community Management to conduct a utility and
feasibility study to find a way to improve MASINT management and
organization including the possible establishment of a centralized
tasking, processing, exploitation and dissemination (TPED) facility. Of
the facility options, one which should be explored is a facility located
within the extended metropolitan region (less than 100 miles from
nation's capital). As envisioned, such a facility would serve as a
significant integration capability for specified MASINT integration
cells--i.e. SURF EAGLE MASINT Integration Cell/Navy Oceanographic
Command, SAR/MASINT Cell/Missile and Space Intelligence Center located
in Huntsville, Alabama (see the GDIP section of the Classified Annex for
details). The conceptual outline of the aforementioned study shall
include management, organization and the integration facility and shall
be briefed to the Intelligence Committed prior to the conference on the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2001. An interim report
with cost data shall be provided to the Intelligence, Appropriations,
and Armed Services Committees not later than December 15, 2000. The
final study shall be transmitted not later than April 1, 2001.
COUNTERTERRORISM
The Committee continues to be extremely concerned by the threat posed
by international terrorism to our nation's security, and to the lives of
Americans here and around the world. The Committee is further concerned
that, in addition to traditional weapons such as hi-jacking and car
bombs, terrorists' attacks are ever more likely to include chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.
The threat of terrorist use of such weapons exacerbates an already
critical threat. This threat took on crisis proportions during the
recent millennium celebrations. Counterterrorism experts throughout the
U.S. Government worked around the clock and resources were reportedly
stretched thin. This is of particular concern given the assessment that
the threat was deferred rather than defeated.
The Committee notes that all too often the United States Intelligence
Community receives no thanks for its efforts. Its operations, by
necessity conducted in secret, are unknown to the people whose lives are
saved. The United States intelligence and law enforcement communities
stand between America and terrorist plans to attack U.S. interests. The
Committee has expressed its appreciation and again thanks the
Intelligence Committee on behalf of the American people.
The Committee will work to ensure that the Intelligence Community's
efforts to fight international terrorism are well funded. In support of
this goal, and because the committee is concerned about repeated leaks
of classified intelligence and the impact of these leaks on the
counterterrorist effort, the Committee directs that the DCI provide a
report describing any and all known leaks since January 1, 1998 that may
have made the counterterrorist effort more difficult. The report should
include an assessment of the potential damage to sources and method
arising from these leaks. This report should be provided to the
Committee no later than December 1, 2000.
COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL
Proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons
The Committee believes that the bi-annual reports provided by the
Director of Central Intelligence pursuant to Section 721 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 are valuable to the
Senate and contribute to the public's knowledge of proliferation
activities of concern. The Committee also acknowledges the many
classified reports and briefings on proliferation provided to the
Committee and Committee Staff.
The Committee believes, however, that a number of issues warrant
comprehensive assessments and in some cases, publication of unclassified
separate reports.
1. Russian and Chinese proliferation to Iran
The Committee directs the DCI to provide the Committee with a
comprehensive report detailing available information concerning Russian
and Chinese cooperation with Iranian military programs and their
transfer of sensitive technologies to Iran. This report should be
provided no later than October 1, 2000, and if possible should be
provided in classified and unclassified versions. The classified report
should include information gained from bilateral discussions with the
Russians. The unclassified version should include, to the maximum extent
possible, declassification of information provided to the government of
Russia under the classification ``Secret, Release Only to Russia.''
2. Biological weapons capabilities
The Committee commends the Intelligence Community on its publication
of the National Intelligence Estimate on biological weapons
capabilities. However, the Committee believes that the information in
this report should be provided in an unclassified form to the maximum
extent possible. The Committee therefore directs the DCI to provide the
Committee with an update to the NIE as well as an unclassified version
of the NIE no later than October 1, 2000.
3. Possible Iraqi misuse of Oil for Food Program funds
The Committee is concerned by the lack of monitoring and verification
of Iraqi purchases under the United nations Oil For Food Program. While
the United States reviews contracts prior to United Nations approval, no
monitoring and verification program exists to confirm identified end
uses and end users once items enter Iraq. The Committee therefore
directs the DCI to provide the Committee with a report on the challenge
posed by this lack of monitoring and verification, the number and nature
of dual use items provided under Oil for Food contracts to date, and the
contribution these dual use items could make to Iraq's chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, and missile programs. The
report should be provided to the Congressional intelligence committees
no later than February 28, 2001.
Foreign missile developments and the ballistic missile threat
to the United States
The Senate report 105 24 accompanying the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1998 directed the Intelligence Community to produce
annual reports on the ballistic missile threat. The reports, due
annually in march, have been provided in March 1998 and September 1999.
In July 1998, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States, also known as the Rumsfield Commission, produced
an independent assessment of and recommendations for improvements to
Intelligence Community assessments. The Intelligence Community adopted these
recommendations and the changes were reflected in the September 1999
report. The Committee applauds the more realistic approach to the
ballistic missile threat and the analytical rigor of the September 1999
report, which was prepared as a National Intelligence Estimate, and
which drew upon outside expertise as recommended by the Rumsfeld
Commission.
The Committee is disappointed, however, that the Intelligence
Community has missed the deadline for submission of this year's
congressionally-mandated annual report. The Committee also notes that
the requirement for an annual estimate on the ``non-traditional''
weapons of mass destruction threat to the United States, as detailed in
the Senate report 105 24, has not been met. The Committee urges the
Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that these Congressional
requirements are satisfied. The Administration should also ensure that
adequate funds and other resources are made available to enable timely
provision of rigorous assessments to Congress and the American public.
Consolidation of theater and cruise missile analysis and production
The Committee remains deeply concerned with the growing threat posed
by ballistic and cruise missiles. On February 2, 2000, the Director of
Central Intelligence testified before the Committee that the
proliferation situation was ``stark and worrisome.'' The DCI testified
that ``Transfers of enabling technologies to countries of proliferation
concern have not abated. Many states in the next ten years will find it
easier to obtain weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver
them.''
The Committee notes that the analysis and assessment of these weapons
is spread among organizations within the Intelligence Community to such
an extent that developers of our theater ballistic and cruise missile
defense programs must deal with many different organizations, each
employing different analytical methodologies and differing assumptions
about the threat. The Committee believes that this situation often
results in problems ranging from inconsistent data, duplication of
effort, and poor use of resources.
Accordingly, the Committee recommends that the GDIP Program Manager
consolidate all analysis and production of intelligence on foreign
theater ballistic missiles (with ranges less than or equal to 3500 km,
guided or unguided, and regardless of basing) within elements of the
Defense Intelligence Agency. Furthermore, to allow a consistent approach
to the analysis of all missile threats within a theater of operation,
the Committee also recommends that the GDIP Program Manager consolidate
all intelligence analysis of foreign cruise missiles, regardless of
basing, within elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
North Korea
The Committee directs the Director of Central Intelligence to provide
an all-source, comprehensive report covering the history and status of
all North Korean chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear programs
and North Korean missile programs. This report should include all
available information regarding assistance or cooperation received by
North Korea from other countries. The Report should be provided no later
than December 1, 2000.
Arms control monitoring
The Committee is aware that a number of arms control negotiations are
underway regarding follow-on agreements to the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention. The Committee directs the Director of Central
Intelligence to provide the Committee with a report on the Intelligence
Community's ability to monitor the follow-on agreements under discussion
and negotiation, and the contribution and challenges each agreement will
make to the U.S. Government's understanding regarding other nation's
programs in each of these areas. Key areas of uncertainty and resource
requirements for monitoring should be addressed. To the extent possible,
this report should be provided in classified and unclassified forms no
later than December 1, 2000.
Enhanced monitoring of nuclear test explosions worldwide
Section 502 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to convey to a
foreign government nuclear test explosion equipment to be installed
within the sovereign territory of that government. This authority may be
delegated to the Secretary of the Air Force. Conveyance, or other
provision, or the monitoring equipment would be accomplished through
bilateral agreements in which the nation receiving the equipment agrees
to provide the United States with full and timely access both to the
data collected and to the equipment to purposes of inspection and
maintenance.
The goal of this arrangement is for the United States to obtain the
cooperation of foreign governments in locating monitoring equipment in
important sites throughout the world and to have the guarantee of full
access to the data and equipment. This equipment would be installed as
part of the United States Atomic Energy Detection System. The
Intelligence Community has relied heavily on data from this system,
which is operated by the United States Air Force, to monitor nuclear
weapons tests on a worldwide basis. The agreements envisioned by Section
502 are with governments judged by the Intelligence Community to be
capable of providing monitoring coverage in parts of the world of high
U.S. national security concern.
These instruments must be properly maintained to achieve top
performance. Moreover, as technology evolves, they must be upgraded to
meet new U.S. standards. Section 502 authorizes the use of appropriated
funds to maintain and upgrade the equipment that has been provided or
conveyed to foreign governments under the agreements.
Section 502 would not authorize the provision of nuclear test
explosion monitoring equipment to any international organization,
including the Comprehensive Test Ban Organization and its International
Monitoring System.
COUNTERDRUG
Section 308 waives two existing prohibitions and authorizes Executive
branch agencies to contribute appropriated funds for the purpose of
supporting the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat
established by the President's General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan
(the Plan) on February 12, 2000. The Plan fulfills requirements
contained in the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of
1998 (P.L. 105 61) and the Conference Report accompanying the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998. These two
provisions required the Director of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy to submit ``a plan to improve coordination and eliminate
unnecessary duplications among the counterdrug intelligence centers and
counterdrug activities of the Federal Government,'' and to specifically
report on efforts to structure the National Drug Intelligence Center to
``effectively coordinate and consolidate strategic drug intelligence.''
The Congress had requested completion of these two tasks by February and
April 1998 respectively. While disappointed by the two year delay, the
Committee understands the difficulty in undertaking such a far-reaching,
multi-agency review and appreciates the thoroughness of this effort and
the subsequent Plan.
The Committee has and continues to place high priority on counterdrug
intelligence programs. These programs provide essential support to the
nation's efforts to attack the supply of illicit drugs and thereby
reduce drug abuse and its devastating societal consequences in the
United States. Intelligence is critical to effective source country
programs, interdiction actions, and law enforcement investigations.
The Committee is encouraged by the steps outlined in the Plan.
Although the initial reorganization and the implementation of action
items is modest, the Plan has the potential to significantly enhance
coordination among the various law enforcement and intelligence agencies
that play a role in counterdrug efforts. Increased coordination should
lead to better information sharing not only among Federal agencies, but
also with and between state and local law enforcement entities.
In addition to the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat,
the Plan establishes the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group as
a sub-cabinet level interagency body to oversee the Secretariat. The
Group will be the primary forum for counterdrug intelligence policy
discussions and resolution of interagency disputes. The Committee
directs the co-chairs of the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group
to provide annual reports concerning outstanding drug intelligence
issues to the appropriate committees of Congress, including the
Committees on Intelligence and Appropriations.
One area of concern is the lack of a permanent staff for the
Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat. As currently structured,
the staff will be comprised entirely of individuals on loan from other
agencies. The Committee understands the valuable role that detailees can
play in an interagency organization such as this, but also considers it
important to maintain some number of senior staff who can provide
continuity and corporate memory. The Plan addresses this question and
calls on the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group to annually
review and recommend the appropriate mix of detailees and permanent
staff. The Committee requests that the co-chairs of the Counterdrug
Intelligence Coordinating Group inform the Committee of that
recommendation.
EXPORT CONTROL
The Committee remains concerned with exports of sensitive
technologies and the effect of these transfers on the capability of the
Intelligence Community to collect information regarding critical threats
to our nation. In recent years, the development and widespread usage of
advanced computing and telecommunications systems has brought
technologies previously limited to governments and militaries into the
worldwide marketplace. Most of these technologies are of little or no
national security significance, and pose no threat to the capabilities
of intelligence agencies. Many of these technologies, however, may be
used by adversaries of the United States to thwart the ability of the
Intelligence Community to collect intelligence critical to our national
security.
In light of these concerns, the Committee will continue to review
modifications to export regulations and proposed statutory changes to
existing export laws to ensure such changes do not adversely affect
intelligence and national security interests.
INTELLIGENCE SHARING
The Committee maintains a keen interest in the intelligence-related
implications of NATO enlargement and the subsequent evolution of
European security structures. In a March 1998 report to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Committee staff assessed the intelligence,
security, and counterintelligence implications of admitting Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO, noting the risks posed by
these nations' past associations with Soviet intelligence services,
their proximity to Russia, and continuing Russian intelligence efforts
in these countries. The report also highlighted the significant steps
taken by the three NATO entrants to restructure, reform, and redirect
the activities of their intelligence services.
To establish a mechanism for continued monitoring of these issues,
the Committee directed two reports on the procedures and methods
utilized in each of the countries for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods, and how these procedures and methods compared with
those in place in other NATO countries. These reports have made a useful
contribution to the Committee's understanding and continued oversight of
these issues.
The Committee is also concerned about the implications of the
evolution and proliferation of European security structures for
intelligence sharing with, and within, the NATO alliance. At the recent
Helsinki summit, European Union (EU) members took steps to create a
European Security and Defense Identify (ESDI), but failed at the time to
develop a mechanism to work with NATO on military matters. Moreover,
current EU structures were not designed to manage elements such as the
proposed rapid-reaction corp nor to coordinate closer intelligence
sharing among the EU members.
In addition to structural issues, as a practical matter, EU members
face enormous resource challenges in making ESDI a reality, with the
result that European reliance on NATO--and thus U.S.--intelligence
support will remain a military reality in Europe for the foreseeable
future. Many of these operational and organizational problems and
shortfalls were highlighted during NATO air operations last year in the
Balkans. The difficulties encountered under the relatively undemanding
combat conditions over Kosovo point to far more serious difficulties
that might arise in a more challenging political and military
environment.
To address these and related issues, the Committee directs the DCI to
provide to the Congressional intelligence committees, no later than
January 1, 2001, a report in classified and unclassified form, to
address the following issues:
An update of the findings contained in the reports previously
provided to the Committee concerning (a) the status and effectiveness of
procedures and requirements established by Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, to
include measures relating to computer, information, and communications
security, and (b) an assessment of how these procedures and requirements
compare with the procedures and requirements for the protection of
intelligence sources and methods of other NATO members. The report
should include any examples of unauthorized disclosures of U.S. or NATO
classified information by any NATO member or official, or any official
of a NATO member;
The extent and adequacy of cooperation in resolving cases of
espionage against the United States or NATO by U.S. citizens;
An analysis of the NATO intelligence shortfalls and other
intelligence-related lessons learned from the Kosovo campaign; and
An analysis of the potential implications for U.S. intelligence
sharing with NATO, including the protection of sources and methods, that
may arise as a result of the evolution and proliferation of European
security structures.
COLLECTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
The Committee is concerned about impediments and restrictions imposed
by policies, other than those directed by statute or Executive order, of
any entity of the U.S. Government on the collection of national
intelligence in foreign countries., The Committee notes that such
policies have in some cases impeded collection of intelligence by
elements of the Intelligence Community legally authorized to undertake
such collection. These policies can restrict U.S. collection of high
priority intelligence regarding some of the most dangerous threats to
the United States. The Committee is further concerned that it was not
notified of these impediments and restrictions.
The Committee therefore directs that the DCI report to the
Congressional intelligence committees on all policy impediments and
restrictions--written or understood--that have been interpreted to
prohibit, restrict, or discourage intelligence collection. The report
should be provided to the Committees no later than 90 days after the
enactment of this bill. The Committee further directs that any such
impediment or restriction on the duty authorized collection of
intelligence should be notified to Congress pursuant to Section 502(1)
of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTORS GENERAL
Last year the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reconfirmed its
ongoing interest in sustaining the capabilities and independence of the
administrative Inspectors General within the Intelligence Community.
These include the Inspectors General at the National Security Agency
(NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National
Reconnaissance Office (NR), and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(NIMA).
Senate Report 106 48 called for the Directors of the above agencies
to provide a written response setting out their efforts to ensure that
each agency's administrative Inspector General has a separate budget
line item and personnel authorization, and the authorities required to
independently manage those resources. The responses to this request
indicated that appropriate steps were being taken to meet these
requirements. The Fiscal Year 2001 Congressional Budget Justification
for each of the agencies, except the DIA, contained a separate line item
for the Inspector General. The Committee also notes that the budget
submission for the contained a significant budget increase for the
Inspector General, giving that office greater parity with the size and
capabilities of the other Intelligence Community administrative
Inspectors General.
While clear progress has been made, the Committee remains concerned
about the ability of the Intelligence Community's administrative
Inspectors General to hire and retain staffs that are professionally and
technically qualified. At some agencies, limited hiring authorities,
with respect to both positions and occupations, will not allow the
Inspector General to keep pace with attrition. As they seek to fill
vacancies, the Inspectors General need the flexibility to hire
individuals with demonstrated audit, inspection, and investigation
skills, as well as individuals with expertise in critical areas such as
information technology and financial and contract management. The
Committee also is concerned that the relatively low government service
pay for the senior managers within selected administrative Inspectors
General has the potential to impair their independence, effectiveness,
and credibility
Based on these concerns, the Committee requests that the Directors of
the NSA, DIA, NRO, and NIMA provide the Committee with a report
outlining the projected hiring requirements of their agency's Inspector
General over the next five years. The report should include a projection
of the number, qualifications, and rank of staff, as well as anticipated
difficulties in acquiring or retaining these skills and positions. This
report should be provided to the Committee no later than July 31, 2000.
Senate Report 106 48 also required annual reports from each
administrative Inspector General detailing the fiscal and personnel
resources requested for the coming fiscal year, plans for their use,
comments on the office's ability to hire and retain qualified personnel,
and any other concerns relating to the independence and effectiveness of
the Inspector General Office. The initial reports were helpful to the
oversight process, but the Committee requests that the following
information be added to future reports: a specific breakdown of staff by
function (e.g. audit, inspection, investigation, or support); budget
information for the two previous years, the current request, and
projections for the next two years; and an overall assessment of the
agency's response to the Inspector General's individual report
findings and recommendations during the previous year. These
reports should be provided to the Congressional intelligence committees
by January 31 of each year.
RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Section 305 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to add a new
provision which articulates a rule of statutory construction applicable
to U.S. laws enacted to implement the provisions of treaties and other
international agreements. Section 305 provides that future U.S. criminal
laws enacted to implement treaties shall not be construed as making
unlawful what are otherwise lawful and authorized intelligence
activities of the United States Government, unless Congress includes an
express provision to the contrary.
United States intelligence activities currently are subject to a
comprehensive regime of U.S. statutes, regulations and presidential
directives that provide authorizations, restrictions and oversight. In
addition, U.S. agencies involved in intelligence activities have
extensive internal regulations and procedures governing appropriate
levels of approval and authorization depending on the nature of such
activities. These laws and regulations have developed from decades of
interaction and agreement between the executive and legislative branches
of the U.S. Government. The intelligence oversight committees themselves
were created to meet a perceived need that the Congress must keep a
close watch on the potential abuses that can occur in the intelligence
area.
It is important that the Intelligence Community be able to look to
this clear and precise body of U.S. domestic law, regulation and
procedures as the controlling sources of authority for its activities.
There has been a concern that future legislation implementing
international agreements could be interpreted, absent the enactment of
Section 305, as restricting intelligence activities that are otherwise
entirely consistent with U.S. law and policy. Of course, Congress may
extend any such implementing statutes to cover intelligence activities
if that is its intent, but it must do so expressly under the new
provision. Such an expression of congressional intent would result in a
clear prohibition that would be added to the existing body of laws
regulating intelligence activities. The intelligence officers who work
hard to conduct lawful and authorized activities to protect the national
security of the United States will not be burdened by the uncertainty
that laws never intended to apply to their activities could be so
interpreted.
POW/MIA ANALYSIS
Section 304 directs the Director of Central Intelligence to establish
and maintain an analytic capability within the Intelligence Community
with responsibility for supporting activities related to prisoners of
war and missing persons since 1990. Currently, no standing analytic
capability exists. This analytical shortfall was highlighted by the case
of Navy Lt. Commander Michael Speicher who was shot down over Iraq on
January 17, 1991, during the Persian Gulf War. Section 943 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105
85; 111 Stat. 1866; 10 U.S.C. 1501 note) requires the Director of
Central Intelligence to provide intelligence analysis on matters
concerning prisoners of war and missing persons to all departments and
agencies of the Federal Government involved in such matters.
The Committee notes that Commander Speicher's fate remains unknown.
The Navy declared Commander Speicher ``killed in action'' in May 1991.
Federal regulations state that a finding of presumptive death is made
when a survey of all available sources of information indicates, beyond
doubt, that the presumption of continuance of life has been overcome.
Information available to Congress does not necessarily support this
conclusion.
The Committee has reviewed the support of the Intelligence Community
for the decision of the United States Government to characterize
Commander Speicher's status as ``killed in action.'' The review was
based upon a September 1998 report by the Direct or Central Intelligence
and additional information on the chronology of the disappearance of
Commander Speicher. The Committee concluded that it is critical that an
intelligence organization be specifically assigned responsibility for
analysis of all-source information on POW/MIA matters, including
information derived from sensitive intelligence sources and methods,
such as the information collected with respect to Commander Speicher.
The case of Commander Speicher demonstrates that valid questions
about POW/MIA remain today, and that rigorous and timely analytic
assessments and accountability are essential to resolving such
questions. A POW/MIA analytic capability in the Intelligence Community
is required. The Committee understands the sporadic nature of the
requirement for this analytic capability and directs the DCI to
designate a small number of analysts with responsibility for current
POW/MIA issues and with the capability to surge their effort should the
need arise.
NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
Guidelines and limitations governing intelligence collection
information on U.S. persons
The Committee is concerned about recent media accounts alleging that
the National Security Agency (NSA) conducts activities that may violate
the constitutional rights of United States persons.
The NSA's primary mission is to intercept and analyze the
communications of foreign adversaries, including terrorists and drug
traffickers. The President and other policymakers rely heavily on the
critical information provided by the NSA. The Committee recognizes the
potential intrusion into the private lives of U.S. citizens inherent in
this type of intelligence collection, and the need to remain vigilant to
ensure that the laws and regulations that protect the privacy of U.S.
persons are strictly adhered to. This Committee was created in part in
response to violations of the constitutional rights of American citizens
by intelligence agencies that at times lost sight of the critical
balance between defending national security and defending those values
upon which our security as a nation ultimately depends. The Committee
has no more critical responsibility than to ensure that this balance is
maintained.
In the 1970's, after congressional inquiries revealed abuses by the
NSA, CIA and FBI, the Congress and the Executive branch created an
extensive structure of laws and oversight (including the creation of the
Congressional oversight committees). These laws, executive orders and
regulations established stringent guidelines and limitations governing
the collection of information on U.S. persons. Finally, the intelligence
agencies, including the NSA, were prohibited by presidential executive
order from circumventing United States legal restrictions by asking
foreign agents or governments to collect information on their behalf.
The Committee believes, based on all available information, that the
NSA is in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. The NSA is
required by law to keep the oversight committees fully and currently
informed of all significant intelligence activities and must report any
illegal intelligence activities. Moreover, the NSA, in coordination with
the CIA and the Justice Department, was required last year by congress
to conduct a review of the legal standards in place to protect the
constitutional rights of U.S. persons from intrusive electronic
surveillance. The report indicates that the legal standards controlling
the NSA's electronic surveillance are effective in adhering to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
As noted above, however, the Committee has no more critical
responsibility than to ensure that the balance between national security
and rights of Americans established in law is maintained, and will
continue to monitor strictly the NSA's activities.
Experimental Personnel Management Program for technical
personnel for certain elements of the Intelligence Community
Section 503 establishes an experimental personnel program providing
the Director of Central Intelligence with limited authority over a
five-year period to recruit up to 39 science and engineering experts for
advanced research and development projects administered by three
elements of the Intelligence Community. Of the 39 positions covered
under this personnel program, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(NIMA) will be allocated no more than fifteen positions, the national
Security Agency twelve positions, the National Reconnaissance office six
positions, and the Defense Intelligence Agency six positions. Expanded
hiring authorities of this type were granted to the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency in fiscal year 1999. The need for such
authorities in the Intelligence Community has been supported by the
testimony of the respective program managers and was reaffirmed by the
Committee's May 1999 Technical Advisory Group report on the NIMA, the
future of imagery intelligence, and the emerging challenge of
modernizing the Intelligence Community's tasking, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination system.
Beginning in 2001, the DCI must submit, no later than October 15 of
each year in which employees serve under the program, an annual report
to the intelligence oversight committees of the Congress. The annual
report shall include a discussion on the DCI's exercise of the special
personnel management authority during the reporting period, the sources
from which individuals appointed were recruited, and the methodology of
identification and selection of recruits.
Functional management of Tactical Imagery and Geospatial Programs
The Committee is concerned that the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA) does not exercise comprehensive functional management
authority over U.S. imagery and geospatial programs. The NIMA's founding
legislation, Public Law 104 201, sets forth authorities provided to the
NIMA Director in relation to other elements of the Intelligence
Community, the Department of Defense, and the
military services. Department of Defense Directive Number
5105.60 established the NIMA within the Defense Department and
prescribed its mission, organization, responsibilities and authorities.
Department of Defense Directive Number 5105.60 notes two types of
management authority those of a functional manager and those of a
program manager. Functional management is defined as ``(t)he review of
and coordination on investment activities related to imagery, imagery
intelligence, and geospatial information, which includes RDT&E
[research, development, testing, and evaluation] and procurement
activities within the NFIP (National Foreign Intelligence Program), JMIP
(Joint Military Intelligence Program), and TIARA (Tactical Intelligence
and Related Activities) aggregate.'' Although not defined, program
management authority is understood in practice to include the authority
to make program investment decisions as well as all authorities present
under functional management.
The NIMA's authorities regarding national and tactical level imagery,
imagery intelligence, and geospatial programs are different for each
function. The NIMA Director is both ``program manager'' and ``functional
manager'' for the National Imagery and Mapping Program within the NFIP
and the Defense Imagery and Mapping Program within the JMIP. As such,
the NIMA Director is tasked with providing imagery, imagery
intelligence, and geospatial information for national customers with the
CIA, the State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
the service components, and has the authority to make program investment
decisions to support these missions.
However, the NIMA Director serves only as the ``functional manager
for imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial investment activities
which include Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) and
procurement initiatives within the Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities (TIARA) aggregate.'' As a result, the NIMA Director has less
influence over the tactical imagery and geospatial programs within the
military services.
The National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104 201 amended the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403 5b)) to provide the NIMA
with substantial functional management authority. Under the amended
section 105(b)(2) of the National Security Act, the NIMA Director is
responsible, ``notwithstanding any other provision of law, for
prescribing technical architecture and standards related to imagery
intelligence and geospatial information and ensuring compliance with
such architecture and standards.'' This provision was further expanded
by Department of Defense Directive 5105.60, which provides the NIMA with
the authority to set standards for end-to-end architecture related to
imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information; geospatial
information products; career and training programs for imagery analysts,
cartographers, and related fields; and technical guidance regarding
standardization and interoperability for systems utilizing imagery,
imagery intelligence, and geospatial information.
Officials involved in the formation of the NIMA believed the
combination of authority to set standards, and review investment and
RDT&E decisions, would provide the NIMA with a significant ability to
influence tactical imagery and geospatial programs even though the
agency did not control their funding. However, current NIMA officials
have commented that the authority merely to review investment and RDT&E
decisions has not given the NIMA a prominent position in the budget
review process. Being a relatively new agency, the NIMA has had to work
to assert its role in the already established Department of Defense and
Intelligence Community infrastructures.
To address a similar lack of comprehensive management with regard to
tactical signals intelligence programs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
in 1995 granted the National Security Agency Director approval authority
over the tactical investment and RDT&E decisions of the Defense
Cryptologic Programs of the service components. National Security Agency
(NSA) officials have stated that this approval authority enabled the NSA
Director to be more involved in investment and RDT&E decisions earlier
in the budget process, thereby assuring that his recommendations and
guidance as functional manager of signals programs were incorporated
into tactical systems.
In September 1999, the Committee issued an audit report of the NIMA's
structure, mission, and role within the Intelligence Community. The
first conclusion of the audit report is that the lack of approval
authority over tactical investment and RDT&E programs limits the ability
of the NIMA Director to serve as the functional manager for imagery and
geospatial programs. The NIMA has had difficulty receiving information
about tactical programs in a timely manner and has had to provide its
recommendations on service components plans late in the budget review
process. The Committee recommended that the Secretary of Defense grant
the NIMA Director the approval authority over service component imagery
and geospatial investment and RDT&E programs to ensure that NIMA has an
established role and can provide oversight early in the budget process.
The recently completed Defense Science Board Task Force report on
NIMA concurred with the Committee's recommendation:
RECOMMENDATION 1: Strengthen NIMA's Role as
Functional Manager of U.S. Imagery and Geospatial Information
``* * * The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) need to reemphasize NIMA's charter
as the executive agency for all geospatial information, much
as NSA is the executive agency for all SIGINT information.
The Secretary of Defense, in his January 5, 2000, reply to the
Committee's audit report concurred with all of its conclusions and
recommendations and noted that his staff was working with the NIMA on
implementing them, with the exception of the recommendation to grant the
NIMA approval authority over tactical investment and RDT&E decisions.
The reply states: ``We are currently working with the Services and with
NIMA to evaluate this recommendation, and we hope to reach a decision
within the next few months.'' To date, no such decision has been
reached.
The Committee reiterates its support for strengthening the role of
the NIMA Director as functional manager of U.S. imagery and geospatial
programs and directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a status report
on efforts to implement the recommendations pertaining to this issue
contained in the Committee and Defense Science Board Task Force reports.
The report shall be submitted to the Committee no later than July 31,
2000.
Hard copy production in the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) era
The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has no stated requirement to
generate hard copy products for the Intelligence Community as part of
the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA), nor does the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA) plan to produce these products. The Committee is
concerned that the transition to soft copy image display and archiving
systems has been slower than planned, potentially creating a situation
where current hard copy imagery users will not be able to receive soft
copy images when the FIA becomes operational. Therefore, the Committee
directs the Director of the NIMA, in coordination with the Director of
the NRO, to provide a report detailing imagery user requirements and a
roadmap for the transition of hard copy imagery users to soft copy
before the FIA begins operation. The report shall be submitted to the
Congressional intelligence committees no later than July 31, 2000.
Critical Intent Model 2 (CIM2)
Given the emergence of new and ambiguous threats, it is important for
the United States, its allies and future coalition partners to find and
develop additional ways to exploit new information technology to improve
radically their crisis avoidance, situation assessment, and
collaboration capabilities. The explosion of information available
combined with reduced resources available for national security programs
highlighted the need for a fast and efficient capability to detect and
manage crises. The Committee is aware of the Critical Intent Model
(CIM)--a structured argumentation tool--as a key enabling technology in
PROJECT GENOA, which provides analysts and policy makers with the
capability to track ongoing and evolving situations, collect analysis,
and enable users to discover previously unknown information and critical
data relationships. The CIM structured argumentation tool facilitates
more comprehensive analysis, creates a corporate memory for use in
current analysis, and allows the comparison and contrasting of details
of a particular argument. Moreover, CIM captures logic patterns for
policy option analysis and serves as a foundation for scenario-based
crisis avoidance systems.
The Committee recommends the transition of the CIM structured
argument prototype software from the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency to the Intelligence Community, and strongly recommends investment
by the Intelligence community in the CIM structured argument tool with
available fiscal year 2000 and 2001 funds.
Funding of intelligence activities, section 504
At a time when the Intelligence Community faces many difficult
decisions about spending priorities, the Committee continues to be
concerned that the budget practices of the CIA and the Intelligence
Community as a whole are simply inadequate to address current
requirements. Upper level program managers lack sufficient insight into
the process to make informed and timely decisions regarding the
allocation of funds, and to assure Congress, and themselves, that funds
are being spent as appropriated and authorized. The Committee is
particularly troubled by recent CIA reprogramming requests that appear
not to meet legal requirements.
Those legal requirements are outlined in Section 504 [50 U.S.C. 414]
of the National Security Act of 1947. According to Section 504,
``[a]ppropriated funds available to an intelligence agency may be
obligated or expended for an intelligence or intelligence-related
activity only if:
(1) those funds were specifically authorized by the Congress for use
for such activities; or
(2) in the case of funds from the Reserve for Contingencies * * * or
(3) in the case of funds specifically authorized by Congress for a
different activity--
(A) the activity to be funded is a higher priority intelligence or
intelligence-related activity;
(B) the need for funds for such activity is based on unforseen
requirements; and
(C) the Director of Central Intelligence, * * * has notified the
appropriate congressional commitees of the intent to make such funds
available for such activity * * *'' (emphasis added).
In the case of the CIA, the Committee is not convinced that all funds
reprogrammed in fiscal year 2000 met the thresholds of ``higher
priority'' and ``unforseen requirements'' as stated in the National
Security Act of 1947. Recent actions, including taxing directorates for
funds to be used in other areas, and moving funds within expenditure
centers without Congressional notification, have eroded this Committee's
confidence that appropriations are used as intended. The Committee
understands that the CIA's Inspector General is conducting an audit of
the CIA's budget process and reprogramming practices and will report on
the overall budget process and compliance with Section 504. Such an
independent and detailed assessment is long overdue, and we applaud the
Inspector General's efforts in this regard.
To address the Committee's concern that resources be obligated and
expended as intended by Congress, without unduly restricting the CIA's
flexibility to respond to high-priority unfunded requirements, the
Committee directs the CIA's Comptroller to provide to the Congressional
intelligence committees quarterly briefings on the CIA's execution of
its budget during the remainder of fiscal year 2000 and in fiscal year
2001. These briefings should provide the committees with sufficient
information to demonstrate the CIA's compliance with Section 504.
Joint Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Avionics Family
The proposed fiscal year 2001 budget includes $17.0 million in Air
Force procurement funding for the purchase of one Joint SIGINT Avionics
Family (JSAF) High Band Subsystem (HBSS)/Low Band Subsystem (LBSS) unit.
The proposed funding is insufficient to purchase the appropriate spares,
aircraft cabling, antennas, and installation needed to field the first
operational JSAF system on the U 2S aircraft. The current JSAF
procurement plan is to procure one U 2 JSAF unit in fiscal year 2002 and
two JSAF units in each of the next five years. This funding plan fails
to take advantage of economics of scale associated with higher
production rates, delays fielding the JSAF capability in the U 2 fleet,
and will not support the stated goal of maintaining 11 sensors (a
combination of RAS 1R and JSAF) by the end of 2004 when aircraft
currently in the fleet will no longer be flown. The Air Force deploys
the U 2 aircraft in detachments of three planes to their forward
operating bases, and the current requirement is to have no fewer than
two of the three aircraft carrying the JSAF.
Therefore, the Committee recommends an addition of $52.0 million in
Air Force procurement funding to the JSAF program: (1) $8.0 million to
fully fund the first JSAF unit with appropriate antennas, spares and
installation on the U 2; and (2) $44.0 million to procure two additional
units to take advantage of economies of scale and to provide sufficient
units for fielding a complete detachment of three U 2 aircraft.
Geospatial production
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) is in the initial
stages of an internal reorganization and realignment of personnel that
will shift almost one-tenth of its geospatial workforce over to imagery
analysis to better meet the growing needs of the imagery customer base.
Over the five years, beginning in fiscal year 2001, a total of 300
geospatial experts--60 positions a year--will be retained as imagery
analysts. As a result, geospatial production readiness within the
Intelligence Community will degrade and the NIMA's reliance on the
contractor community for the outsourcing of geospatial products will
increase. The Committee recommends an additional $5.0 million for
geospatial production under the NIMA's Omnibus Outsourcing Program to
shore up this erosion in readiness.
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
GUARDRAIL Common Sensor
The GUARDRAIL Common Sensor (GRCS) is a corps-level, airborne signals
intelligence collection and location system capable of providing
tactical commanders with near-real time targeting information. The GRCS
combines communications intelligence and electronic intelligence
capabilities onboard multiple versions of RC 12 fixed-wing aircraft.
The Committee recommends an addition of $2.0 million in Army
procurement funding for the GUARDRAIL modifications effort to accelerate
the integration of the Tactical Intelligence Broadcast System (TIBS)
capability for GRCS System 2. The additional funding will complete the
integration of TIBS in the last of four GRCS systems.
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Common Ground System
The Common Ground System receives, processes, correlates, and
disseminates data simultaneously from the Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other tactical,
theater and national systems for targeting, situation development, and
battle management.
The Committee recommends a reduction of $2.0 million in Army RDT&E
funding proposed for the Distributed Common Ground Station--Army
prototype. The Committee understands that this effort duplicates an
effort being performed under the Army's Tactical Exploitation of
National Capabilities program.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists departments, or reconfiguring the current systems.
United States Government for whose intelligence and intelligence-related
activities the Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2001 and
lists authorization of appropriations for conduct of intelligence and
intelligence activities for certain elements of the United States
Government for fiscal years 2002 through 2005.
Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 states that the details of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities and
personnel ceilings for the entities listed in section 101 for fiscal
year 2001 are contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated into the Act by this section.
Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence, with the
approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in
fiscal year 2001 to exceed the personnel ceilings applicable to the
components of the Intelligence Community under Section 102 by an amount
not to exceed two percent of the total of the ceilings applicable under
Section 102. The Director may exercise this authority only when
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions or to
the maintenance of a stable personnel force, and any exercise of this
authority must be reported to the intelligence oversight committees of
the Congress.
Section 104. Community Management Account
Section 104 provides details concerning the amount and composition of
the Community Management Account (CMA) of the Director of Central
Intelligence.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$232,051,000 for fiscal year 2001 for the staffing and administration of
various components under the CMA. Subsection (a) also authorizes funds
identified for the Advanced Research and Development Committee to remain
available for two years.
Subsection (b) authorizes a total of 618 full-time personnel for
elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2001 and provides that such
personnel may be permanent employees of the CMA element or detailed from
other elements of the United States Government.
Subscection (c) explicitly authorizes the classified portion of the CMA.
Subsection (d) requires that personnel be detailed on a reimbursable
basis, with certain exceptions.
Subsection (e) authorizes $27,000,000 of the amount authorized for
the CMA under subsection (a) to be made available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center (NDIC) in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Subsection (e)
requires the Director of Central Intelligence to transfer the
$27,000,000 to the Department of Justice to be
used for NDIC activities under the authority of the Attorney
General, and subject to Section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of $216,000,000
for fiscal year 2001 for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability Fund.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law
Section 301 provides that appropriations authorized by the conference
report for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal
employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as
may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of appropriations by the
conference report shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the
conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized
by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Section 303. Prohibition of unauthorized disclosure of
classified information
Section 303 creates a basis in law for prosecuting the knowing and
willful unauthorized disclosure of classified information to a person
not authorized to receive that information. This section closes the gap
in existing law for the unauthorized disclosure of classified
information.
Section 304. POW/MIA analytic capability in the Intelligence Community
Section 304 requires the Director of Central Intelligence to
establish and maintain a POW/MIA analytic capability within Intelligence
Community with responsibility for intelligence in support of the
activities of the United States relating to prisoners of war and missing
persons.
Section 305. Applicability to lawful United States
intelligence activities of Federal laws implementing international
treaties and agreements
Section 305 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to add a new
provision which articulates a rule of statutory construction applicable
to U.S. laws enacted to implement the provisions of treaties and other
international agreements. Section 305 provides that future U.S. laws
enacted to implement treaties shall not be construed as making unlawful
what are otherwise lawful and authorized intelligence activities of the
United States, unless Congress includes an express provision to the
contrary.
Section 306. Limitation of handling, retention, and storage
of certain classified materials by the Department of State
Section 306 requires the Director of Central Intelligence to certify
to Congress that each element of the Department of State that handles,
retains or stores material classified at the Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) level is in full compliance with all applicable
Director of Central Intelligence directives (DCIDs) or Executive Orders
regarding the handling, retention, or storage of SCI materials. As of
January 2001, funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act for the
Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research shall be
prohibited from obligation or expenditure so long as any covered element
of the Department of State has not been certified by the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) as being in full compliance. Any element of
the Department of State not certified will be prohibited from retaining
or storing material classified at the SCI level until the DCI certifies
its compliance, unless such elements receive a Presidential waiver.
Section 307. Clarification of standing of United States
citizens to challenge certain blocking of assets
Section 307 amends the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act
(title VIII of Public Law 106 120) (hereafter referred to as the
``Act''). This provision simply states that whatever process was
available to a United States citizen under the Administrative Procedure
Act or any other provision of law, with respect to the blocking of
assets by the United States, prior to the enactment of the Act, remains
available after the enactment of the Act. It was not the intent of the
United States Congress to abrogate in any way the due process rights of
U.S. citizens upon the enactment into law of the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act. Section 307 expressly states in statutory
language Congress's original intent.
Section 308. Availability of certain funds for administrative
costs of Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat
Section 308 waives prohibitions that prevent Executive branch
agencies from contributing appropriated fiscal year 2000 funds to an
interagency body for the purpose of supporting the Counterdrug
Intelligence Executive Secretariat.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Section 401. Expansion of Inspector General actions requiring
a report to Congress
Section 401 closes gaps in the reporting requirements to the
intelligence oversight committees of the Congress revealed by the
Committee's inquiry into the mishandling of classified information by
former DCI John Deutch. Current law requires the Inspector General to
notify the intelligence oversight committees only if the Director or
Acting Director is the subject of an inquiry. This amendment broadens
the notification requirement to include former DCIs, all confirmed
officials (General Counsel, DDCIs and ADCIs), the Executive Director,
and the Deputy Directors for Operations, Intelligence, Administration,
and Science and Technology. In addition to expanding the number of
senior officials covered by the notification requirement, the amendment
also requires congressional notification whenever a criminal referral to
the Department of Justice is made on one of the designated officials.
Section 402. Subpoena authority of the Inspector General of
the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 402 provides several technical corrections to the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 to address superseding legislation,
conform language and streamline reporting procedures.
Section 403. Improvement and extension of Central Services Program
Section 403 extends the Central Services Program until March 31,
2005, and clarifies that the Central Services Program Working Capital
Fund may retain and use receipts resulting from reimbursements for
utility services and meals provided to individuals and cash receipts
from the rental of property and equipment to employees and detailees.
This change would allow the Central Services Program Working Capital
Fund to retain miscellaneous receipts that are paid directly to an
enterprise by an individual, thereby properly offsetting costs incurred
in the operation and maintenance of enterprise facilities where the
Government incurs costs associated with those individuals. In addition,
this section expands the current law to allow retention of rents
collected from individuals who are not CIA employees, and therefore not
subject to payroll deduction. Finally, this section excludes
depreciation of CIA owned structures as a recoverable operating expense.
Section 404. Details of employees to the National Reconnaissance Office
Section 404 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act to permit the
Director of Central Intelligence to detail CIA employees on a long-term
basis to the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO). Current laws,
regulations and Comptroller General opinions which govern the detailing
of employees from one government agency to another have been interpreted
by the CIA General Counsel to limit details to NRO to no more than five
years. This amendment would exempt CIA from these requirements and would
provide the flexibility necessary to deal with the unique staffing
requirements of the NRO.
Section 405. Transfers of funds to other agencies for
acquisition of land
Section 405 extends the life of appropriated funds transferred by the
CIA permitting them to remain available for three years to other
government agencies for the purpose of purchasing land. Any exercise of
this authority must be reported to the intelligence oversight committees
of the Congress.
Section 406. Eligibility of additional employees for
reimbursement for professional liability insurance
Section 406 allows the Director of Central Intelligence to designate
categories of employees in addition to those noted in Public Law 104
208, who would be eligible to receive reimbursement for up to one-half
of the cost of purchasing professional liability insurance. This section
permits the expenditure of appropriated funds to reimburse employees who
are at risk of incurring liability claims due to the nature of their
duties, but are not included within the existing job categories that are
currently eligible for reimbursement. Any exercise of this authority
must be reported to the intelligence oversight committees of the
Congress.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 501. Two-year extension of authority to engage in
commercial activities as security for intelligence collection activities
Section 501 amends section 431(a) of title 10 to extend current
Department of Defense authority to engage in commercial activities as
security for intelligence collection activities until December 31, 2002.
This authority expires on December 31, 2000.
Section 502. Nuclear test monitoring equipment
Section 502 authorizes the Secretary of Defense, who may delegate the
authority to the Secretary of the Air Force, to convey to a foreign
government nuclear test explosion monitoring equipment that is installed
within the territory of that government. This equipment would be
conveyed with a bilateral agreement in which the recipient nation agrees
to provide the United States with timely access to the data produced,
collected, or generated and to provide the U.S. access to the equipment
for purposes of inspecting, testing, maintaining, repairing, or
replacing the equipment.
Section 503. Experimental personnel management program for
technical personnel for certain elements of the Intelligence Community
Section 503 allows the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), for a
period of five years from the date of enactment of this Act, to carry
out an experimental program using special personnel management authority
to facilitate the recruitment of eminent experts in science or
engineering for research and development projects administered by the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) the National Security Agency
(NSA), the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO), and the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). Under this limited authority, the DCI may
appoint scientists and engineers from outside the civil service and
uniformed services to the NIMA, NSA, NRO and DIA.
COMMITTEE ACTION
On April 27, 2000, the Select Committee on Intelligence approved the
Bill and ordered that it be favorably reported. The Committee approved
by a vote of 11 0 an amendment by Senator Levin to add Section 307, a
clarification of the standing of United States citizens to challenge
certain blocking of assets by the United States.
ESTIMATE OF COSTS
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the
Senate, the estimated costs incurred in carrying out the provisions of
this Bill, for fiscal year 2001, are set forth in the classified annex
to this Bill. Estimates of the costs incurred in carrying out this Bill
in the five fiscal years thereafter are not available from the Executive
branch, and therefore the Committee deems it impractical, pursuant to
paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, to
include such estimates in this report. On May 4, 2000, the Committee
transmitted this Bill to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and
requested that it conduct an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying
out the provisions of this Bill.
EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) rule XXXVI of the Standing Rules
of the Senate, the Committee finds that no regulatory impact will be
incurred by implementing the provisions of this legislation.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
In the opinion of the Committee it is necessary to dispense with the
requirements of section 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the
Senate in order to expedite the business of the Senate.
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