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Intelligence



    
  
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62–240
2000
  
[H.A.S.C. No. 106–30]

RESULTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S INSPECTOR GENERAL INQUIRIES INTO SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE ESPIONAGE INVESTIGATION AT THE LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
NOVEMBER 10, 1999
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MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina
BOB STUMP, Arizona
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JAMES TALENT, Missouri
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
MARY BONO, California
JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia
IKE SKELTON, Missouri
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JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina
LANE EVANS, Illinois
ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
TOM ALLEN, Maine
JIM TURNER, Texas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBERT BRADY, Pennsylvania

Peter J. Berry, Professional Staff Member
Peggy Cosseboom, Staff Assistant
(ii)  

C O N T E N T S

HEARING:

    Wednesday, November 10, 1999, Results of the Department of Energy's Inspector General Inquiries into Specific Aspects of the Espionage Investigation at the Los Alamos National Laboratory

APPENDIX:
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    Wednesday, November 10, 1999

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1999
RESULTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S INSPECTOR GENERAL INQUIRIES INTO SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE ESPIONAGE INVESTIGATION AT THE LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Military Procurement Subcommittee

    Sisisky, Hon. Norman, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, Military Procurement Subcommittee

WITNESSES

    Friedman, Gregory H., Inspector General, Department of Energy

    Moler, Elizabeth, (former Deputy Secretary of Energy), Vinson & Elkins

    Peña, Federico F., (former Secretary of Energy), Senior Advisor, Vestar Capital Partners

    Trulock, Notra, former Director of the Office of Energy Intelligence
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APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:
[There were no Prepared Statements submitted for the Record.]

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Documents submitted for the Record.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Questions and Answers submitted for the Record.]
(iii)  

RESULTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S INSPECTOR GENERAL INQUIRIES INTO SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE ESPIONAGE INVESTIGATION AT THE LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Military Procurement Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 10, 1999.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
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    Mr. HUNTER. The subcommittee will come to order. The first order of business will be a motion by Mr. Thornberry, whom I recognize for the purpose of offering a motion.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to House rule XI(g) and committee rule 9(a), I move the subcommittee be authorized to close this hearing at the appropriate point for reasons of national security and which closing does not apply to appropriate cleared members of the staff.

    Mr. HUNTER. House and committee rules require a roll call vote. The Clerk will call the roll.

    The CLERK. Mr. Hunter.

    Mr. HUNTER. Aye.

    The CLERK. Mr. Sisisky.

    Mr. SISISKY. Aye.

    The CLERK. Mr. Spence.

    Mr. SPENCE. Aye.

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    The CLERK. Mr. Skelton.

    Mr. SKELTON. Aye.

    The CLERK. Mr. Stump.

    Mr. STUMP. Aye.

    The CLERK. Mr. Spratt.

    [No response.]

    Mr. Hansen.

    Mr. HANSEN. Aye.

    The CLERK. Mr. Evans.

    [No response.]

    Mr. Saxton.

    [No response.]

    Mr. Blagojevich.
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    [No response.]

    Mr. Talent.

    [No response.]

    Mr. Allen.

    [No response.]

    Mr. Everett.

    Mr. EVERETT. Aye.

    The CLERK. Mr. Turner.

    Mr. TURNER. Aye.

    The CLERK. Mr. Watts.

    [No response.]

    Mr. Smith.

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    [No response.]

    Mr. Thornberry.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. Aye.

    The CLERK. Mr. Maloney.

    Mr. MALONEY. Aye.

    The CLERK. Mr. Graham.

    Mr. GRAHAM. Aye.

    The CLERK. Mr. McIntyre.

    Mr. MCINTYRE. Aye.

    The CLERK. Mr. Ryun.

    Mr. RYUN. Aye.

    The CLERK. Ms. McKinney.

    [No response.]
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    Mr. Gibbons.

    [No response.]

    Mrs. Tauscher.

    Mrs. TAUSCHER. Aye.

    The CLERK. Mrs. Bono.

    Mrs. BONO. Aye.

    The CLERK. Mr. Brady.

    [No response.]

    Mr. Pitts.

    [No response.]

    Mr. Hayes.

    Mr. HAYES. Aye.

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    The CLERK. The ayes are 16, the nays are 0.

    Mr. HUNTER. The motion passes, and the subcommittee will close at the appropriate time.

    It is my intention to swear in all witnesses for today's hearing, and that includes the Honorable Gregory Friedman, Ms. Elizabeth Moler, the Honorable Federico Peña, and Mr. Notra Trulock. Would the witnesses please rise.

    [witnesses sworn.]

    Mr. HUNTER. All the witnesses responded in the affirmative. Thank you very much, and please be seated at the witness table.

    The subcommittee meets today to hear continuing testimony on the espionage investigation at the Los Alamos Nuclear Weapons Laboratory. In particular we meet to find out why the prime suspect in this case was allowed to remain in place working on classified nuclear weapons programs for 14 months after the FBI stated that there was ''no longer any investigative reason'' to keep him in place with his clearance working on sensitive matters.

    We are not here today to try to determine if the prime suspect in this espionage investigation, Mr. Wen Ho Lee, is guilty of espionage against the U.S. or if he is the only possible perpetrator. We are here to ask questions that cry out for a response to what seems like a simple, common sense inquiry.

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    When Director Freeh of the FBI twice told senior Department of Energy officials in 1997 that there was no investigative reason to keep the suspect in place, why did no one take what would seem to be the prudent action and remove the suspect from the classified nuclear weapons development facility at Los Alamos, the so-called X Division, until 14 months had expired?

    I would think that the Department and laboratory officials who had knowledge of the severity of the espionage loss to China would be extremely anxious about the prime suspect's being allowed to remain in the X Division with his Q security clearance working on nuclear weapons design information.

    Where was the sense of urgency? Did officials at the Department and the labs become so accustomed to intelligence losses that they were accepted as unavoidable occurrences? Were counterintelligence and security always considered someone else's problem, a problem to be addressed by others at other levels in the organization?

    Was the Department populated with managers who felt they didn't have any responsibility or stewardship for the country's nuclear weapons secrets?

    With us today to provide some clarity regarding these issues because of their high degree of involvement in them are Mr. Federico Peña, the former Secretary of Energy from March 1997 until June 1998, Ms. Elizabeth Moler, the former Deputy Secretary of Energy from June 1997 until October 1998 and the Acting Secretary of Energy from July to August 1998; Mr. Notra Trulock, the Director of the Office of Energy Intelligence from May 1994 until April 1998 and the Acting Director of the DOE Office of Intelligence from April until October of 1998. Also with us is Mr. Gregory Friedman, the current Department of Energy Inspector General.
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    Mr. Friedman's testimony is important because his office conducted a review at the request of Secretary Richardson to address the facts and circumstances surrounding the security clearance, access and assignments of the espionage suspect at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. I hope our witnesses can provide explanations for who dropped the ball and what systemic problems allowed this situation to persist.

    As I noted above, today we are going to continue testimony on the DOE espionage case. This is the fifth briefing or hearing we have held, the first having taken place over a year ago on October 6, 1998. At that time both Ms. Moler and Mr. Trulock testified and, as my colleagues know, part of Mr. Trulock's originally prepared testimony was withheld at the direction of Ms. Moler. As all my colleagues know, for almost eight months this subcommittee attempted to obtain an unredacted, that means an unchanged copy, of this testimony from DOE and met late this past Monday to take the extraordinary step of authorizing a subpoena to obtain it. Having finally gotten this classified document in exchange for not issuing the subpoena, we want to know more about why parts of it were withheld, and will probe this matter to the extent we can in open session.

    Which brings me to another point, classification. It seems the entire testimony of Mr. Friedman is classified when almost every point he makes can be found in the Department's own press release announcing his conclusions. I find this to be extremely irritating. I respect the need to protect sensitive information as much as any person in the room, but Mr. Friedman, most of what you have classified is either in the press release or can be found in other open source documents which have even been reviewed by your own Department. I want it understood I am not going to stand by and let the Department hide behind security if it is not warranted.
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    Let me now recognize the distinguished ranking member of the subcommittee, my good friend, Norm Sisisky, for any comments he might have.

STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN SISISKY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

    Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join with Chairman Hunter in welcoming our witnesses to the hearing today. Since this subcommittee authorizes the Department's counterintelligence programs and is the focal point for the Armed Services Committee in exercising its oversight responsibilities of the Department, it is essential that we have a clear understanding of matters relating to the issue. It is my expectation that the witnesses appearing before us today will be able to enhance our understanding of the context and the specific issues that are the subject of our concern. They should be able to help us understand if the corrective actions taken will preclude repeating the mistakes that have been noted with this matter.

    With regard to the matter before us today, there are no secrets. We are all aware that security problems exist within the Department, but they are not newly emerging problems. There is a long history with stories of dereliction and neglect extending to almost every specific security violation that has come to light.

    One of the conclusions that I am certain we can all agree on is that this Nation can ill afford to have policies and practices that foster security breaches and lapses at the very location where our nuclear weapons are developed and maintained. Over the course of the last year, the Department has taken some dramatic steps to improve its security posture. At the same time, there has been an absence of interest here in the Congress or attention by the many committees of jurisdiction. One of the positive actions recently taken by the Congress was the enactment of title XXXII provisions in the Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act which reduces the bureaucracy and fixes accountability within the Department. While it may not be perfect, I am convinced it was necessary and a good first step.
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    The Special Oversight Panel on the Department of Energy Reorganization established by the committee provides an excellent opportunity for the committee to assess the implementation of the provisions and recommend needed refinements.

    Based on my initial review of the information that has been made available so far, the handling of possible espionage problems in the Department is just one of the manifestations of the absence of accountability, of failure of communications and a lack of follow-up. On the surface it could be considered a process issue, but it is a process issue that must be addressed now because of the potential long-term implications on the credibility of testimony we receive from the Department.

    As a member of both this subcommittee and the House Intelligence Committee, I am aware of a number of ongoing initiatives to protect critical national security information in the Department of Energy enterprise. I am also aware of the reinvestigation of this espionage matter by the community.

    While some progress has been noted in the management of security problems in matters in the Department, to me the real activity for us is not so much embedded in the past, but in the future. Specifically, now that it appears we have some momentum building for increased accountability in the Department, how do we as Members of Congress, and, more specifically, the Procurement Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, act in a responsible manner to exercise our oversight responsibilities? To identify the problem and criticize is easy. We need to be certain that our activities contribute to the solution. That includes the manner in which we conduct our hearings, our responsiveness to fiscal requirements needed to correct the problems and our willingness to provide enabling legislation that would improve security management.
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    Mr. Chairman, I worry that as we reexamine the past activities, we on this subcommittee will become so mesmerized by what happened then that we will not pay sufficient attention to address the critical needs of tomorrow. That would be equally detrimental to our national security.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. I thank my distinguished friend. I would just add that if you don't pay attention to history, it may be repeated. One thing we don't want to do is to allow a person who is suspected of having stolen nuclear secrets to remain with a Q clearance for 14 months after he has been identified.

    So we want to find out today what happened. I want to ask Mr. Notra Trulock to lay the groundwork, since you have been in several hearings with us, Mr. Trulock. I know you are now in private industry. Thank you for being with us today. But I want to go directly to the August 12th, 1997, meeting that you and Ms. Moler had with the head of the FBI, Mr. Freeh. As I understand it, that was the much publicized meeting in which Director Freeh stated that you had a suspect who was suspected of stealing nuclear secrets, and you can take it from there. What happened at that meeting?

TESTIMONY OF HON. FEDERICO F. PEÑA, FORMER SECRETARY OF ENERGY, SENIOR ADVISOR, VESTAR CAPITAL PARTNERS; ELIZABETH MOLER, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY, VINSON & ELKINS; HON. GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; AND NOTRA TRULOCK, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF ENERGY INTELLIGENCE
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    Mr. TRULOCK. Mr. Chairman, Chairman Spence, Mr. Sisisky, I don't have a prepared statement. I am prepared to respond to questions, and in that light, my recollection of that particular episode in August of 1997 is as follows.

    We, at the direction of Secretary Peña, had briefed the White House prior to this on our findings and judgments concerning the case that has come to be known as Kindred Spirit. As part of—.

    Mr. HUNTER. That is the W–88 warhead theft case.

    Mr. TRULOCK. The W–88 is one of a number of examples that has come to be known as Kindred Spirit. There are others that we should probably save for the closed session.

    As part of the after action of the White House briefing to Mr. Berger, we sat out on a briefing schedule around town. We briefed Secretary Cohen, we briefed Attorney General Reno, we briefed Mr. Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence. And on that schedule we also briefed Director Freeh, as you noted, on August 12th.

    At that briefing, after we provided the results of our assessments and analysis, Director Freeh began a discussion of the handling—

    Mr. HUNTER. Let me understand. This is the meeting on August 12th, 1997, with you, Ms. Moler, and Director Freeh.
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    Mr. TRULOCK. That is correct.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

    Mr. TRULOCK. Director Freeh initiated a discussion of the handling of the Kindred Spirit suspects at Los Alamos. Up to that time, we, DOE, had cooperated fully with the FBI, and under those guidelines we had taken no steps that could indicate to the individual that he was a suspect or under investigation of any kind.

    Mr. HUNTER. But he was a prime suspect at that point, was he not?

    Mr. TRULOCK. At that point, yes, sir, he was.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did he have access to nuclear secrets at that point?

    Mr. TRULOCK. He did retain his access to nuclear secrets at that point, yes, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Go ahead. So what happened at the meeting?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Director Freeh, in the meeting, told us that it was his judgment that the FBI was having great difficulty obtaining a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act coverage of the individual, in effect, technical coverage to look at his computer and so forth, and that Director Freeh was concerned about this individual's continued access to nuclear secrets, and told us to—and I must paraphrase somewhat—but, in effect, take the FBI's investigative interest off the table with regard to how you deal with this individual in the future.
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    The implication of that I thought, and others I believe in the room also thought, was clear, that the bargain, the quid pro quo that we had with the FBI at that point, was no longer in effect; that Director Freeh was saying to us that do not allow our investigative interests to impede any steps that you would take to remove this individual from access to nuclear secrets.

    Mr. HUNTER. And while you were having the meeting, he was, in fact, sitting in the place with a Q clearance with access to the Nation's nuclear secrets.

    Mr. TRULOCK. Yes, sir. As I later learned, that is correct.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Did you talk to Ms. Moler about that?

    Mr. TRULOCK. My recollection is that we discussed this in the car coming back, and that I told her that it was my judgment that Director Freeh was telling us that we should no longer be concerned about FBI investigative equities in Mr. Lee, the Kindred Spirit suspect, and that in effect we could go ahead and remove him from his access to classified information.

    Mr. HUNTER. What was her response to that?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I don't recall a specific response, other than an acknowledgment that that was in fact the case.

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    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Ms. Moler, when you had this briefing with the FBI Director and he identified Mr. Lee as a suspect of stealing nuclear secrets, you knew that Mr. Lee had a very sensitive clearance at that very time at our nuclear weapons labs, did you not?

    Ms. MOLER. Chairman Hunter, my recollection, not surprisingly, of these events is somewhat different than Mr. Trulock's.

    Mr. HUNTER. Please pull that mike a little closer, if you would.

    Ms. MOLER. My recollection of these events is somewhat different than Mr. Trulock's. I would note that the August 12th, I agree with him certainly, the August 12th meeting took place. I would also add that Director of Central Intelligence Tenet attended the meeting as well. I don't believe he mentioned that.

    I do recall that after a considerable briefing by Mr. Trulock as to his theories of what was happening at Los Alamos, Director Freeh said something to the effect that as far as the way DOE is handling this case, you should take the FBI's equities off the table. I concur with Mr. Trulock's characterization of that conversation.

    At the time—.

    Mr. HUNTER. Now, I asked you a question, my question is—.

    Ms. MOLER. I am about to answer the question.
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    Mr. HUNTER. My question is did you know that the suspect, while that briefing was taking place, still held a Q clearance and had access to America's nuclear secrets?

    Ms. MOLER. At the time of that meeting, I was relying and continued to rely on the information I had previously been given by Mr. Trulock that the suspect had had his access limited, and that he had been taken off the work that he had been doing. It had been done under cover of an investigation, and that he was no longer in a position where he had access to nuclear secrets.

    If you listened carefully to what Mr. Trulock just said, he said yes, as he later learned, meaning after the Director Freeh meeting, the suspect still had access to the classified information. But if you review the IG's report you will find, as we discuss it in closed session, that I had been told, according to several Department officials, that the suspect's access had been limited.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did you ask him a question as to whether he still had a Q clearance? Isn't that one of the highest clearances?

    Ms. MOLER. Q is one of the highest clearances. I had previously been told, Mr. Chairman, that his access had been limited.

    Mr. HUNTER. Now, my question to you is this: Were you told by anybody that his Q clearance had been taken away?
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    Ms. MOLER. I was not told specifically what his clearance was, no.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did you know that he had a Q clearance?

    Ms. MOLER. I did not know specifically what his clearance was. I had been told by the highest ranking intelligence officials in the Department that his access had been limited.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Trulock, is that the case?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Let me make a couple of points. First of all, I think Ms. Moler has confused the August 12th meeting with a subsequent meeting in October. In fact, DCI Tenet was not present at the August 12th meeting. That was an FBI-only meeting held in the FBI Director's conference room. That is the first point.

    I think the second point is that we were told after an April 1997 meeting that Mr. Lee would be transferred to another project, working on what has come to be known as the legacy codes. This was a project under the stockpile stewardship activity that was intended to update those nuclear weapons simulation codes that had been used to develop devices such as the W–88. It was clear to all of us that Mr. Lee retained his Q access, retained the appropriate Sigmas that he would require under the DOE system to have access to nuclear weapons information, and on a number of occasions and briefings, I did express my concern to Ms. Moler as to the unwillingness of Los Alamos to provide us with any sort of concrete information as to precisely what Mr. Lee was working on at the time.
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    One other aspect I would add to this, it became known to us and was briefed to Ms. Moler, that Mr. Lee had requested the services of a Chinese post-doc student to come in and help him on this particular project. I think that raised a number of alarms throughout the Department as well as at the FBI, since it was our understanding that the legacy code activity was, in fact, still classified.

    Mr. HUNTER. Ms. Moler states that you told her that the suspect had been removed from a position in which he could access our nuclear secrets.

    Mr. TRULOCK. I did not tell her that. I told her he had been removed from a position where he would have access, and he had been transferred to a legacy code project in which he held the same clearances and the same Sigmas.

    Mr. HUNTER. What does that mean, Mr. Trulock? If you continue to hold your clearances, even though you have been moved, can you still access nuclear secrets at Los Alamos?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Again, in retrospect, it is clear that in fact he was not moved off of the particular floor that he worked on at Los Alamos, and he retained his accesses across the board. In fairness, neither I nor Ms. Moler had any way of knowing that at the time.

    Mr. HUNTER. So he wasn't even moved at all.

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    Mr. TRULOCK. He was not moved, no. But, again, neither Ms. Moler nor I was aware of that at the time.

    Mr. SISISKY. Could she have misunderstood that? You just said there was some parts that he didn't have access to.

    Mr. TRULOCK. Mr. Sisisky, I am recounting to you what we were told by the FBI and what we were told by Los Alamos. What concerned us was that he would have access to the nuclear weapons simulation codes that had been used to develop the W–88.

    Mr. HUNTER. So you told Ms. Moler that he would have access to nuclear simulation codes?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Yes. We told her that he would be working on the legacy code project and we explained to her what the legacy code project entailed.

    Mr. SISISKY. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. But there were some things that he did not have access to, am I correct in that? Did you say that? Because you are mixing me up.

    Mr. TRULOCK. No, forgive me then for doing that. My understanding of the situation then is pretty much as it is today, that he was to be removed from access to the current projects that he was working on, and that he would be transferred to a project that involved the development of what is known as the legacy codes. The legacy codes involved updating the W–88 nuclear weapons simulation codes, in effect replicating and trying to incorporate test data into a code to be run on a computer.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask you this, Mr. Trulock: What you are saying is he was moved from an area you might consider the most sensitive, or you thought he had been moved from the area that was most sensitive, to a less sensitive but nonetheless classified area, that still involved America's nuclear secrets.

    Mr. TRULOCK. That is right.

    Mr. HUNTER. Is that right?

    Mr. TRULOCK. That is right. And what I heard at the August 12th meeting from Director Freeh, the way I interpreted it, was that even though he was working on topics that might be considered less sensitive than previously, it was still Director Freeh's concern that he did, in fact, have access to classified information.

    Mr. HUNTER. Ms. Moler, did Mr. Trulock ever tell you that the suspect had been removed totally from classified information?

    Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, I was relying on his statement, which he never changed, never told me otherwise—.

    Mr. HUNTER. Fine. What was your understanding—.

    Ms. MOLER. That his access to classified information had been limited. I relied on that. I relied on that, as did other people in the Department. You will find in several instances in Mr. Friedman's report that there was a widespread belief at headquarters that the individual's access had been limited so that he was not in a position to do damage to the United States security. I relied on that, sir.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Did Mr. Trulock say to you the words that his access had been limited so that he was not in a position to do damage to U.S. security?

    Ms. MOLER. Yes, sir, I believe he did.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Trulock, did you say that?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Categorically not, no. It was my concern that as long as he had access of any type with Qs and Sigmas he still represented a threat. The risk assessment was that in fact the FBI wanted us to leave him in place so that he would not be tipped off that he was a subject of investigation. At the August 12th meeting when Director Freeh said take that off the table. I thought we were home free and in fact we would be able to remove him from any access to classified information.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did you tell Ms. Moler how to remove or how to go about removing him from access to classified material after the August 12th meeting?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Well, of course. After Director Freeh's recommendation, I communicated to Ms. Moler two things.

    Mr. HUNTER. Where were you at the time?

    Mr. TRULOCK. My recollection is that it was in a car coming back from the FBI meeting.
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    Ms. MOLER. And I dispute this.

    Mr. HUNTER. You will be given that opportunity. Go ahead, Mr. Trulock.

    Mr. TRULOCK. My recollection is that I said a number of things: One, as the Directorate of Intelligence I do not have the authority to remove the Kindred Spirit suspect from access to classified nuclear weapons. I have the authority to remove any access that he would have from intelligence information. He had none, and never had had any.

    Therefore, the next step was to go to the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security and within the office, the Office of Safeguards and Security, who in effect controlled and granted the Kindred Spirit suspect his clearances, his top secret and Sigmas.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Did you tell Ms. Moler that you thought he should be removed from access to classified material?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I did, yes.

    Mr. HUNTER. And did you tell her how to do it?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I told her the way I would proceed would be to recommend that the Office of Safeguards and Security find a pretext to hold an interview with the Kindred Spirit suspect and then put him in a position in which he would either be nonresponsive or be offered an opportunity to take a polygraph and use that as a pretext to get him out of the X Division as soon as possible.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Ms. Moler, you dispute that conversation?

    Ms. MOLER. I categorically dispute that that conversation ever took place. I was never told about the legacy code project. Mr. Trulock never suggested to me that we should involve the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security. I feel confident that had he done so, I would have gone back to my office, called up the head of that office, and we would have discussed it.

    He never did so.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Let's move ahead to the next meeting. That was August 12th, 1997. August 15th, 1997, the Director of the FBI met with Secretary Peña.

    Mr. TRULOCK. That was the October meeting.

    Mr. HUNTER. What is that?

    Mr. TRULOCK. The meeting was held in October.

    Mr. HUNTER. October 15th, 1997.

    Mr. TRULOCK. I know it was in October. I don't have the date.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Who was at that meeting, Mr. Trulock?
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    Mr. TRULOCK. Secretary Peña, Ms. Moler, I believe my recollection is that Secretary Peña's Chief of Staff was at that meeting, and I believe Mr. Baker was at that meeting.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

    Mr. TRULOCK. And myself. From CIA, George Tenet, the Director, and I believe Paul Redmond, his Assistant for Counterintelligence, Director Freeh, and a number of his people.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. What happened at that meeting?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Well, the purpose of the meeting was to communicate to the Secretary, Director Freeh's and Director Tenet's concerns and support for the development of a robust counterintelligence program at the Department of Energy. Director Freeh had a set of talking points, and in those talking points, before he launched into an enumeration of the steps that FBI and CIA were recommending that DOE take, he reiterated his concern and his recommendation that the FBI investigative interests in Mr. Lee no longer restrict DOE from taking the steps that it considered necessary.

    In this instance, he underscored the concerns stemmed from Mr. Lee's continued access to classified nuclear weapons simulation codes.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So he stated that at that meeting.
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    Mr. TRULOCK. Yes, sir, he did.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Secretary, you were present at that meeting.

    Secretary PEÑA. Yes, I was, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. Didn't it concern you when the head of the FBI told you you had a suspected nuclear secrets spy still accessing classified material?

    Secretary PEÑA. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, first of all, before I answer your question directly let me say that I am very pleased to be here today to answer these questions. I think it is very important that we understand what occurred during this period of time and, more importantly, to take steps to correct this in the future.

    I am very prepared and pleased to answer your questions, Mr. Chairman. I simply want to ask for the members of the subcommittee a fundamental question about whether we want to discuss these matters in an open session. Let me, for my benefit at least, describe why it is that there should be a little concern here.

    Number one, it is my understanding that this suspect is still under investigation by the FBI. It is my understanding that there may or may not be charges brought against this suspect in the future. I am concerned that a public discussion about, for example, the question you asked, when was the suspect ''a prime suspect,'' may be an issue that those representing the suspect will want to know about.
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    So I am concerned about things that are said here that might in fact jeopardize any future criminal prosecution if one does occur.

    I have some other concerns about a public discussion about how the government deals with espionage cases and whether that information should be made available to other governments which may be listening to this kind of conversation.

    So I simply raise that for the committee's consideration. I am very happy to answer these questions. I am going to be very thoughtful about how I answer these questions, because I don't want information to be provided that should not be provided.

    Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman makes a good point, and I move that we go into closed session at this point so we can have a full and complete hearing.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, I would say to my friend, Mr. Spratt and to Mr. Peña, that what occurred is both public and private. The second meeting that you have had with the head of the FBI and with Mr. Trulock, the fact that that meeting occurred and that the head of the FBI said there is no investigative reason to keep this gentleman in this classified position, and that in fact the suspect was kept in a position to have access to nuclear secrets for over a year after that meeting with you is public record. So what we are talking about right now is public record. I am not going to ask you about details of techniques for law enforcement. I am simply going to ask you, my question again is, weren't you concerned when the FBI Director told you that this gentleman was still on the job with access to classified information?
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    Secretary PEÑA. Mr. Chairman, let me answer your question very directly.

    Mr. SPRATT. Just a second, if I can say something else for the record, Mr. Chairman. I think you proceed at the risk of impairing the prosecution, and also tripping into areas where we would inadvertently disclose counterespionage and counterintelligence techniques. I want to lay that warning in the record. If we go ahead in open session, we run that risk.

    Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I would also lay on the record the secret document here by the Inspector General that may be able to answer some of the questions.

    Mr. HUNTER. We are going to give him every opportunity.

    Mr. SISISKY. Whether you agree with whether it should be secret or not doesn't make any difference. It is secret.

    Mr. HUNTER. I advise my friend from Virginia, I am not asking about that document right now. We will give the Inspector General every opportunity in closed session to talk about that. What I am talking about is the 14-month lapse between the FBI seeing there is no investigative reason to keep this person with access to classified information and a system, or leaders in the system, that kept the person in place. Now, that is, in my judgment, not going to prejudice any prosecution, and I want to repeat—I would like you, Mr. Secretary, to answer the question. Were you concerned when the head of the FBI told you that this person who was suspected of stealing nuclear secrets was still on the job with his clearance and had access to classified information?
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    Secretary PEÑA. Mr. Chairman, I do not have a recollection of that matter being raised in that meeting that I had with the FBI Director, Director Tenet, Mr. Trulock, Deputy Secretary Moler, my Chief of Staff and others who were in that room.

    The purpose of that meeting in October was to discuss how to bring major reform in the Department of Energy. The purpose of that meeting was to discuss the need to create—.

    Mr. HUNTER. I am not asking about the purpose, because Mr. Trulock has talked about that as the purpose, the purpose for the meeting.

    Secretary PEÑA. Mr. Chairman, I hope—.

    Mr. HUNTER. I am asking about what really took place at the meeting, and whether or not the FBI Director said to you that a spy suspect, suspected of stealing nuclear secrets, that he previously briefed Secretary Moler on, was still on the job with access to classified information. Did he tell you that?

    Secretary PEÑA. I do not recall that statement being made to me, Mr. Chairman. What happened—.

    Mr. HUNTER. Next question. When did you become aware of that?

    Secretary PEÑA. Become aware of—.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Of the Wen Ho Lee case.

    Secretary PEÑA. This gets back to questions being asked earlier. I was first briefed about the Chinese espionage matter and the Kindred Spirit investigation in July of 1997. I was sworn in as Secretary of Energy, as you know, Mr. Chairman, on March 12, 1997.

    At that briefing, which was provided by Mr. Trulock, that was the first occasion that this matter had been brought to my attention. I was absolutely stunned by it, I was shocked by it.

    Mr. HUNTER. When was that?

    Secretary PEÑA. This was July 14 of 1997, a few months after being sworn in as Secretary of Energy.

    Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I hate to interrupt, and I am just a country lawyer—.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, me too. Go ahead.

    Mr. SKELTON. I am a former prosecuting attorney, and I am concerned that some of the testimony in this open hearing may have an effect on any subsequent proceedings that might occur within a court, and I would hope that the Chair would think about very seriously closing the hearing because of that.
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    Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for his recommendation, and I simply want to continue with my question here. Mr. Secretary, when was this person taken out of his classified position?

    Secretary PEÑA. Mr. Chairman, I think I was about to answer your first question, the last question, and that was I was first briefed about this matter on July 14, 1997.

    Mr. HUNTER. That you had a person suspected of stealing nuclear secrets working in Los Alamos. Right?

    Secretary PEÑA. Mr. Chairman, the information that was provided to me in that briefing was that there were a number of individuals, both current and former members of the Department of Energy, who had certain investigations or suspicions raised by the intelligence and law enforcement communities of the government, and that there had been a longstanding concern about activities of the Chinese government as relates to our labs that went back into the early 1980s. This was a very comprehensive briefing involving a number of years, a number of issues, and a number of weapons systems.

    Mr. HUNTER. Were you ever briefed on the Wen Ho Lee case, the W–88 warhead theft, by the FBI in 1997?

    Secretary PEÑA. Not by the FBI, but by Mr. Trulock. Mr. Trulock was the gentleman in—.
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    Mr. HUNTER. When did he brief you?

    Secretary PEÑA. July 14, 1997. But at that briefing, and I am doing this from recollection, this is some time ago, I don't believe we actually knew names of individuals. I think each of the individuals were given a code description, like Kindred Spirit and others, that were brought to my attention at that time.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Did you follow the investigation?

    Secretary PEÑA. Yes, I did. Let me tell you what I did, if I might, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. Go ahead.

    Secretary PEÑA. First, as a result of that meeting, which I have said under oath was a very shocking and pretty stunning bit of information to be given to me as the new Secretary of Energy, I instructed my Deputy Secretary, Mr. Trulock and my Chief of Staff to inform immediately the Attorney General of the United States, the Director of the FBI, the Director of the CIA, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. That was done.

    Second, Deputy Secretary Moler did a complete review of all the past GAO reports and other recommendations of the Department which had been long-standing indicating that there were major problems in intelligence and counterintelligence at the Department, and we both concluded we needed major reform in the Department.
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    We then fully embarked on, after the meeting in October, drafting the Presidential Decision Directive 61, which I think the committee knows made major reforms in the Department by creating a new Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence because for years they had been buried in the Department of Energy, which I believe is part of the reason for this miscommunication, lack of accountability, responsibility being placed out into the field as opposed to Headquarters.

    Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask you this question, Mr. Peña. We have now established that the FBI briefed at least Ms. Moler, you can't recall your briefing—.

    Secretary PEÑA. I was not at that meeting—.

    Mr. HUNTER. No, the meeting I am referring to was the October 15th meeting with you and Mr. Freeh. We have now established that there was a suspect, Mr. Wen Ho Lee, suspected of stealing nuclear secrets, and yet 14 months passed before he was removed from access to classified nuclear secrets. That is a fact, isn't it?

    Secretary PEÑA. No, it is not. What I want to testify to, I want to correct the language, Mr. Chairman, that you are using.

    Mr. HUNTER. Go ahead.

    Secretary PEÑA. I don't want to get into legalese here, but when you use the word ''suspect,'' we need to be thoughtful about how we use that word in open hearing. But, number one, at that meeting in October, what we did talk about at great length was the drafting of the presidential decision directive, the need for major reform, and it is my testimony that I do not recall Director Freeh making the comment that Mr. Trulock has testified to this morning, and if one reads the Inspector General's report, there are a number of people in that meeting who have my similar recollection.
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    Sometime in the fall of 1997, apparently after this meeting occurred, I was advised by either Mr. Trulock, my deputy, or Mr. Baker, that the individual involved here had been moved and that he was no longer a problem at Los Alamos, and was not having access to the kind of sensitive information that we were all very terribly concerned about.

    I later learned, after I left office, to my chagrin and to my shock, that that had not occurred.

    Mr. HUNTER. Ms. Moler, did you tell him that?

    Ms. MOLER. I completely concur with Secretary Peña's recollection of the circumstance. We had the discussion with the Director, with the Director of the FBI and the Director of the CIA. They did not raise the particular case in October. Furthermore, as we will find in detail when we get in closed session and can discuss—.

    Mr. HUNTER. My question is, I need you to respond to my question. My question was Secretary Peña said he was told either by you or Mr. Trulock that the suspect, Mr. Lee, had been removed from a classified position and he said it was either you or Mr. Trulock, he thought—.

    Secretary PEÑA. Or Mr. Baker.

    Mr. HUNTER. Or Mr. Baker who told him that. I am trying to ascertain who told him that. Did you tell him that?
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    Ms. MOLER. If I could just complete one thought?

    Mr. HUNTER. I want you to respond.

    Ms. MOLER. I will then answer the question. It was Mr. Trulock's statement to me and to Secretary Peña that his access had been limited.

    Mr. HUNTER. So you heard Mr. Trulock say that.

    Ms. MOLER. We relied on Mr. Trulock's statement that his access had been limited.

    Mr. HUNTER. Now, my question is, did you tell that to Mr. Peña or are you saying you heard Mr. Trulock say to Mr. Peña?

    Ms. MOLER. My recollection is, sir, that Mr. Trulock told both of us that his access had been limited.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Mr. Trulock?

    Mr. TRULOCK. We seem to have some—even between Secretary Peña and Ms. Moler, some differences of recollection. I believe I heard Secretary Peña say that at the July meeting briefing we did not discuss the Kindred Spirit case. I will tell you that other than the October meeting, that is the only discussion I had with Secretary Peña about this case.
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    Secretary PEÑA. Mr. Chairman, may I object? I don't appreciate the witness mischaracterizing my testimony. I did not say that.

    Mr. HUNTER. You will be given that opportunity. You will be allowed to respond in just a second here. Go ahead, Mr. Trulock.

    Mr. TRULOCK. Well, to continue, at the July—.

    Mr. HUNTER. Move the mike closer if you would.

    Mr. TRULOCK. At the July meeting, we did discuss what Ms. Moler refers to as my theories about Chinese espionage being conducted against the United States and its laboratories, but we also discussed in some detail the ongoing activities of the FBI and DOE cooperation on this, and the individuals who were involved in this. That was in the July 1997 meeting.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Let me move on now. On October 6th, Ms. Moler, you and Mr. Trulock came to testify before this subcommittee.

    Ms. MOLER. That is correct.

    Mr. HUNTER. At that time, it is now clear Dr. Wen Ho Lee was still in place, still had access to nuclear secrets, is that right?

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    Ms. MOLER. No.

    Mr. HUNTER. What is that? I say it is clear now that at that time he still had access to nuclear secrets.

    Ms. MOLER. It is clear—.

    Mr. HUNTER. He wasn't moved until December of 1998.

    Ms. MOLER. It is clear to me today that at that time he still had access. It was not clear to me in October.

    Mr. HUNTER. That is my point. That is my point, that the spy was still in place. We now know that.

    When you arrived to testify or when you were requested to testify, Mr. Trulock, you prepared a statement for the subcommittee, did you not?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Yes, I did.

    Mr. HUNTER. That statement included in it, among other things, the statement that there had been theft of America's nuclear secrets by Chinese nationals, is that right? And that the FBI would provide us the details.

    Mr. TRULOCK. That statement, in my recollection, was classified. I did make reference to espionage activities, and I did refer the committee to the FBI for any further details.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. That statement was taken out of your testimony by somebody, wasn't it?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Yes, it was.

    Mr. HUNTER. Ms. Moler, did you take that part of the statement out of the testimony?

    Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, as I have previously testified before this subcommittee under oath in my most recent appearance before today, before this subcommittee, my understanding of the subject matter to be covered at the October hearing was the foreign visitors and assignments program. I read Mr. Trulock's first version, or his first version of his testimony. It went considerably beyond the subject matter of the hearing. I directed him to revise his testimony.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did you send that testimony to the White House?

    Ms. MOLER. The testimony was sent to the National Security Council and to the Central Intelligence Agency for clearance.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did you send it to the White House?

    Ms. MOLER. To the National Security Council, yes, sir.

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    Mr. HUNTER. Who did you send it to?

    Ms. MOLER. I did not personally send the statement, a staff assistant did so. I believe it was reviewed by Gary Samore and/or Rand Bers of the National Security Council staff.

    Mr. HUNTER. And after it was brought back from the White House, you sent it back to Dr. Trulock with indications that certain portions should be removed, right?

    Ms. MOLER. I did not specifically indicate what portions should be removed. I did not edit it myself, nor did anyone on my staff edit his testimony. I told him that I believed that the testimony should be limited to the foreign visitors and assignments program because, as I have testified, that was my understanding that that was the subject matter of the hearing.

    Mr. HUNTER. Why did you need the White House to make that determination? If you are simply saying it is a matter of responding to the subject matter, why would you send it up to the White House? Why wouldn't you just do that?

    Ms. MOLER. Testimony of this nature is routinely cleared by the White House. National Security Council staff, one of their jobs is to follow issues such as this.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did they make any recommendations on whether parts should be taken out? Mr. Samore?

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    Ms. MOLER. No, they did not.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did you have any discussion with Mr. Samore about the statement that was there relating to the Chinese theft of nuclear secrets? In Mr. Trulock's testimony?

    Ms. MOLER. No, I did not.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did you have any conversation with Mr. Berger relating to that?

    Ms. MOLER. No, I did not.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did you have any conversation with Ms. McCarthy regarding that?

    Ms. MOLER. I believe I had a conversation with Ms. McCarthy when an initial version of the testimony was sent to the National Security Council staff for clearance. I reviewed it at approximately the same time frame.

    I made a judgment that the testimony was too broad and much of the material in the testimony was not relevant to the subject matter of the hearing. I subsequently told the National Security Council staff that I had directed Mr. Trulock to revise his testimony.

    Mr. HUNTER. What did the staff tell you?
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    Ms. MOLER. I do not recall the specifics of my conversation.

    Mr. HUNTER. What did Ms. McCarthy tell you?

    Ms. MOLER. I don't recall the specifics of my conversation.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did anybody advise you, Ms. McCarthy or others at the White House, to take out the report to Congress involving the Chinese theft of nuclear secrets?

    Ms. MOLER. As I have said, sir, I do not recall the specifics of my conversation. However, I do not believe that anyone at the White House or the CIA, for that matter, told me to have Mr. Trulock remove that from his testimony.

    Mr. HUNTER. But you did report to them that some of it had been taken out?

    Ms. MOLER. Yes, sir, I did. I told them that the subject matter of the hearing, as is covered in Mr. Friedman's report, on several occasions, was the foreign visitors and assignments program.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

    Ms. MOLER. I directed Mr. Trulock to limit his testimony to the subject matter of the hearing as I understood it.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Well, Ms. Moler, you knew at this time that there had been a theft, at least the FBI had informed you, this is October of last year, that there had been a theft of nuclear secrets from Los Alamos.

    Ms. MOLER. I did not know there had ''been a theft of nuclear secrets from Los Alamos.'' I knew that there was an investigation.

    Mr. HUNTER. And you had been briefed on the investigation?

    Ms. MOLER. I had been briefed on the investigation by Mr. Trulock.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, this subcommittee that received you in classified session obviously had a major interest in that, didn't we?

    Ms. MOLER. Yes, sir, you did.

    Mr. HUNTER. And yet when Mr. Trulock sat before us with you at his side, and you said we are here to tell you the truth, Mr. Chairman, and I asked him with you sitting right with him, have there been any thefts of nuclear secrets at Los Alamos, Mr. Trulock did not mention this W–88 or Mr. Wen Ho Lee, and you didn't mention it either, did you?

    Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, I believed the subject matter that you are now delving into is classified and I am not going to comment on classified matters in open session.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. You have got a right to not comment on anything. But my question, again, is you didn't tell us about this theft even when we asked you about it. You didn't tell us there was even the possibility that it had occurred. You told us nothing, is that right?

    Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, you didn't—with all due respect, sir, you did not ask me about it.

    Mr. HUNTER. I didn't ask you. That is true. I asked Mr. Trulock with you sitting next to him, both of you under oath, on a very serious matter, I might add, Ms. Moler, on whether there had been a theft of nuclear secrets at Los Alamos. You, at the time, knew there was at least a chance that there had been, you had been briefed on the investigation. You sat there and said nothing. Is that right?

    Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, I will stand by the comments I have made until closed session.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Trulock, you didn't tell us about this when we asked you the question, did you?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I did not.

    Mr. HUNTER. Why didn't you?

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    Mr. TRULOCK. I was under a gag order.

    Mr. HUNTER. And explain that.

    Mr. TRULOCK. Repeatedly I was instructed by Ms. Moler that without the explicit and express permission of Secretary Peña and Ms. Moler, that I was not to communicate any information about the Kindred Spirit activity to anyone.

    Mr. SISISKY. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Were you asked the question?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I was asked the question about thefts of—.

    Mr. SISISKY. You were also under oath.

    Mr. TRULOCK. And I did respond, and I discussed a number of activities during that thing. I did not make explicit reference to the Kindred Spirit case.

    Secretary PEÑA. May I respectfully interpret for a minute? I have no idea how Mr. Trulock is testifying about this. I was not at the Department of Energy. His reference that I needed to be cleared, I left the Department of Energy at the end of June of 1998. This apparently occurred several months after this time. So I was gone, Ms. Moler was Acting Secretary of Energy. I think Mr. Richardson came in in August. I don't know if he was there at the moment.

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    Mr. TRULOCK. Secretary Peña is correct. He was gone at that time. I am telling you a communication standing—in effect a standing order from Ms. Moler that predated Secretary Peña's departure, and was still in effect during the time that I was up here briefing you. Indeed, as we left some of her staff expressed considerable relief that we had dodged the bullet of providing that information to your committee, your subcommittee.

    Mr. HUNTER. So you didn't talk to Secretary Peña. The discussion was with Ms. Moler and she said unless she or Secretary Peña gave you permission, you were to keep this from Congress?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I had one interaction with Secretary Peña on this subject in July of 1997. After that time, all of my interactions on this subject were with Ms. Moler. Secretary Peña, for all intents and purposes, to me at least as the Director of Intelligence, became invisible.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

    Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, I find that statement preposterous.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Peña—so your position, Ms. Moler, is that you never told Mr. Trulock not to tell us about that theft?

    Ms. MOLER. That is correct.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well then, Ms. Moler, your subordinate sat there when I asked the direct question and he didn't tell us about it. Why didn't you tell him to? You were both sitting at the witness table like you are right now. You have no problem about interjecting right now. Why didn't you say wait, there is one we haven't told you about? Why not?
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    Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, I was—as I have testified before, I was quite taken aback at the nature of the discussion that took place in closed session. I was quite taken aback by your first question to me about whether I had directed Mr. Trulock to revise his testimony.

    I testified truthfully at that time that I did direct Mr. Trulock to revise his testimony, and I reiterate that statement. I did so because it was my understanding that the subject matter to be covered by the hearing was the foreign visitors and assignments program.

    I also said, as a careful reading of the transcript will show, that we would testify fully and would be responsive to whatever question you asked.

    Mr. HUNTER. So when I asked the question, have there been any nuclear thefts at Los Alamos and Dr. Trulock sat there with you and went through some old cases, but didn't tell us about the Wen Ho Lee case, why didn't you interject, like you have done several times this morning, and say wait, there is one we haven't told you about. Here it is? Knowing that it existed, why didn't you?

    Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, I cannot delve into what went on in Mr. Trulock's mind at the time of the subcommittee's hearing. I don't know why he answered the way he answered.

    Mr. HUNTER. Why didn't you correct it as his superior?
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    Ms. MOLER. I was not expert in the case. I did not see fit, nor did he. He was certainly, as Mr. Sisisky has pointed out, he was under oath. There was no gag order in place. I categorically dispute that there was a gag order in place. I don't know why he answered you the way he did.

    Mr. HUNTER. Why didn't you tell us the truth when you were standing side-by-side with him?

    Ms. MOLER. Sir, I did tell you the truth.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, you didn't tell us about the Wen Ho Lee case. I asked that direct question, whether there had been theft of nuclear secrets at Los Alamos, and you sat there and your subordinate did not tell us and you didn't tell us. I mean, the idea that somehow there was an unclear question, it was a very clear, a blunt question, and you sat there after telling me you were here to tell the truth to the committee.

    Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, there is an ongoing investigation as to whether there has been a theft of nuclear secrets at Los Alamos.

    Mr. HUNTER. You didn't even tell us whether there had been an investigation, Ms. Moler.

    Ms. MOLER. I did not, I cannot tell you why Mr. Trulock did not bring up the case. I did not have a definitive understanding one way or the other, and to this date I do not have a definitive understanding one way or the other about whether there has been a ''theft'' of nuclear secrets at Los Alamos. It is still an ongoing matter.
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    Mr. HUNTER. When was Dr. Lee removed from his position of access to classified information?

    Ms. MOLER. It is my understanding that, contrary to what I was told while I was the Deputy Secretary of the Department, that Mr. Lee's security access was not removed until December of 1998.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Trulock, shed some light for our subcommittee. What mechanism operated to finally remove Mr. Lee from access to nuclear secrets after 14 months?

    Mr. TRULOCK. To be perfectly candid, I have no idea. Secretary Richardson took the action to both remove Mr. Lee and subsequently fire him after the publication of the New York Times article, but at that point, his direct advisers were Mr. Ed Curran and Mr. Larry Sanchez, and I have no light to shed on his decision-making process at that time.

    Mr. HUNTER. And Secretary Peña, did you ever have a conversation with any of your lab directors or other personnel in DOE to the effect that the gentleman was still in place with access to classified information?

    Secretary PEÑA. Not that specific conversation, Mr. Chairman. Again, I was advised in the fall of 1997 that the individual involved had been dealt with, had been removed from this kind of access, and that he was no longer ''a problem.'' We did bring in the lab directors in March of 1998, after the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) was signed by the President in February. At that time we reviewed with all the lab directors the importance of their new responsibilities under the PDD, the fact that they were personally accountable for counterintelligence and they were to report and be accountable to the Secretary.
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    Mr. HUNTER. I am just trying to figure out what happened and who was on first when the suspect was allowed to maintain this position for such a long period of time and what finally happened to get him out of there.

    Secretary PEÑA. Mr. Chairman, I wish I could answer your question. All I can suggest is when one reads the Inspector General's report, it is at least clear to me today that several things happened:

    First, and I am going to be very careful about how I say this—it is my judgment that the law enforcement—.

    Mr. HUNTER. We will go into classified session. If you want to reserve it for that, go ahead.

    Secretary PEÑA. Let me make a general statement and I would be happy to go into more detail in a classified setting.

    It is my judgment today, and months after I left office, that the law enforcement community of the government and the intelligence community of the government did not fully apprise the then Secretary of Energy of the complexity, the magnitude and the longevity of this situation.

    Second, it is my judgment that the way the Department of Energy was structured, where the Office of Counterintelligence and Intelligence were beneath what we call NN, caused partially some of this lack of accountability and lack of communication and the fact that, for reasons I don't understand, responsibility was delegated to the field offices, and that was corrected by the PDD. I agreed that the Department was not structured correctly. Third, it is my impression after having read the Inspector General report that individuals involved, both at the lab level and at Headquarters and throughout the Department, both within the law enforcement community and the Department of Energy community, had a misunderstanding of the use of certain terminology.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

    Secretary PEÑA. I can't put it any more bluntly than that. If you look at the totality of the investigation of the Inspector General, it is clear there were a number of systemic communication and information issues that were not operating very effectively during this time period. I hope that that has been corrected today.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Friedman, you have listened to the sworn testimony today of Ms. Moler and Mr. Peña and Mr. Trulock. You have listened to the recounting of the fact that they came here October 6th after it was clear that Mr. Wen Ho Lee was suspected of stealing nuclear secrets at Los Alamos, and that I asked a direct question, have there been any thefts of nuclear secrets at Los Alamos and they didn't tell me about them. They told about other stuff, but they didn't tell me about that. That is clear. They both agree on that.

    Isn't that a failure to inform Congress on a very important matter, and one that the chairman of the subcommittee has asked a direct question on?

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. You are asking me an easy question, Mr. Chairman, for the first question. I am not familiar with all of the facts. I just heard what I have heard here today, over and above the reviews that we have done, so I really can't opine on that. I am not in a position to do that.

    Mr. HUNTER. You know what I am going to do? I am requesting to let you take a look at the transcripts while we are in the hearing today, and I want to hear an answer from you. But I want you to answer this question. If you assume that I asked a direct question, if you assume that, that I asked a direct question, have there been thefts of nuclear secrets at Los Alamos on October 6th, 1998, and they knew that there was at least an investigation of theft of nuclear secrets at Los Alamos at that time, and they sat there after they had been sworn in and didn't tell me or didn't tell the rest of the subcommittee, would you say that that is withholding of information from Congress?
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     Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I believe—.

    Mr. HUNTER. You are the IG.

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. I understand. But I don't know that I am in a position. I wasn't at the hearing, I haven't seen the transcript. I don't know precisely what the question was. But obviously, I mean, my preference is and the way I testify is to full disclosure. That is my preference.

    Mr. HUNTER. Do you think that is full disclosure?

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't know what the question was—.

    Mr. HUNTER. I want you to presume that I asked them the direct question, have there been any thefts of nuclear secrets at Los Alamos, a very short question, and I got no answer.

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. The first lesson in my business, Mr. Chairman, is not to presume. But based on—you are the Chair, and I will make that assumption and I will say certainly, there is reason to disclose that to your committee, to your subcommittee.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Mr. Sisisky.

    Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get into closed session, if you will. I just want to remind the subcommittee that I think it is important while we are in open session that the letter of invitation to the Department of Energy clearly focused on the need for DOE to provide information on the foreign visitors program.
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    Lest we forget, there should be no doubt in any member's mind that no Department permits testimony to be presented on the Hill by subordinate activity without some form of review of the testimony. All of us on the Armed Services Committee know that this is true. Nobody can come to this committee and testify without somebody clearing it somewhere along the line.

    Mr. HUNTER. I would simply respond to my friend by citing the third paragraph in the invitation letter that says the testimony of Mr. Curran and Mr. Trulock will be received in a closed session as it will pertain to counterintelligence and intelligence matters.

    I would just simply say to the witnesses, if you are trying to make the argument that theft of a nuclear secret at Los Alamos isn't relevant to counterintelligence and intelligence matters, and further that that somehow permits you not to respond to a direct question as to whether there has been a theft of a nuclear secret, then that is an insult to our intelligence. So, Mr. Sisisky, I take it you don't have any further questions at this time?

    Mr. SISISKY. I don't have any further questions in an open hearing, Mr. Chairman. Let me put it this way: I didn't realize the other part of that letter was in there. I really thought it was for the foreign visitors program.

    Mr. HUNTER. Here is the letter right here, the third paragraph.

    The chairman of the full committee is recognized.
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    The CHAIRMAN. No questions at this time.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Thornberry.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Friedman, I just want to ask in open session about some of the matters that are listed in the Department of Energy news release dated August 12th, 1999, where there are a number of factors listed there which apparently you found in your investigation that were part of the problem here. I notice that included among those are problems in management of counterintelligence, lack of communication and confusion of individual responsibilities and accountability, indicators of long-term management deficiencies, no direct response—people contending they had no direct responsibility, et cetera. There is a long list of those kinds of things.

    In your opinion, based on your report and all of your investigations, is management of systemic problems at the Department of Energy a significant factor in what went wrong here?

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe that is a fair characterization.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. It is not the only factor on what went wrong here?

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. Certainly not.

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    Mr. THORNBERRY. The management made this problem worse than it otherwise would have been.

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think that is fair.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. And part of the management confusion difficulties were not just who has responsibilities for what, but how you issue an order and get it carried out.

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. There has been an historic problem that I would characterize as a lack of follow through, and if that is what you are referring to, I would agree with that. It is a question of whether you give a precise order and that you have some assurance that it is in fact executed the way you had it envisioned.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. Was there also a problem in who was responsible at Headquarters for making a decision about whether to remove him and seeing that it was—I mean, from hearing some of the comments Mr. Trulock and others said this morning, it is not clear to me whose job it was to say get him away from those things.

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. Frankly, after conducting 97 witness interviews and reviewing thousands of pages of documents, in many respects it is still not clear to me either.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. Secretary Peña, if I could just ask you based on being at the top of this organization, at the time did you see this kind of difficulty and do you see it now, looking back? I am talking about the structure, the management deficiencies, how you can't know who is responsible and once somebody gives an order that it is carried out?
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    Secretary PEÑA. Congressman, yes. If I had an organizational chart of the Department of Energy as it existed back in 1997, I think you would be astounded by it. Let me describe it very generally for you. I think you will appreciate why these management issues contributed to this issue.

    The Office of Counterintelligence, I am doing this from memory, I believe had been subsumed under the Office of Intelligence, which was under the Office of NN, which then reported directly to me. So there were at least four steps between the Secretary and the Office of Counterintelligence. There may have been others.

    Second, the field organization, and I don't know if the members understand the complexity of our field organization, we have field offices and people in charge of those field offices, apparently also had direct supervisory responsibility and oversight over these matters.

    Third, it is not clear that the contracts that were signed between the Department of Energy and in this case the University of California, which is the contractor operating the Department of Energy laboratories, addressed these issues.

    So it was my judgment, particularly after the Deputy Secretary went back and read all of the GAO reports that go back to the 1980s which identified years of management problems within the Department, that it needed to be fixed. It was broken in my judgment. That is why the PDD, when it came out in February, called for the creation of two new Offices of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, elevated in the Department, reporting directly to the Secretary. That is why the PDD called for the retraction of the supervisory role of the field offices back to the Department of Energy Headquarters. That is why it calls for the contracts with the laboratories to be rewritten to include counterintelligence responsibilities and to have the laboratory directors directly accountable for counterintelligence issues accountable to the Secretary. Those are reforms I felt were necessary.
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    Mr. THORNBERRY. You don't think PDD 61 solved all of the management problems, do you?

    Secretary PEÑA. No. I believe it was the first big step in probably a decade in trying to reform these issues within the Department of Energy. Obviously, after the PDD was issued, there was a second strategic plan that was developed by July 1 by Mr. Curran, who came in when I was Secretary of Energy. That was developed on time. I happen to have left office the day before. There was then a more complete strategic plan that was supposed to have been developed by the Secretary of Energy within I believe 180 days. I think that was done within that time frame. So hopefully in those strategic plans, more detail was given to how we could improve communications, lines of authority and responsibility. But when I was there, I concluded we had problems.

    Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Skelton.

    Mr. SKELTON. I have no questions at this time. I do think that we should be in closed session, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. We will be there shortly. Mr. Talent.

    Mr. TALENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't want to get into what might be classified or maybe it would be better to go into closed session, but when you are sitting here and you hear one witness say something and another minute later another witness says I categorically deny that, it tends to wake you up a little bit. Let me get into this issue about what you called, Mr. Trulock, the gag order.
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    This is with reference to the testimony on October 6th before the subcommittee. Sometimes people can remember the same set of things or statements and put different interpretations on them, which is what I prefer to believe is the source of the difference of opinion between you and Ms. Moler on this issue. So let me go into this a little bit.

    I believe you testified, tell me if this isn't your understanding, that you were repeatedly told not to say anything to this subcommittee about Mr. Lee's activities or the theft of nuclear secrets unless you were explicitly given permission to do it by Ms. Moler or Mr. Peña. Is that correct?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Let me be perfectly clear here. Earlier in the summer I had received a request from a representative of the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for a briefing on this subject. Ms. Moler denied that briefing.

    If I was not allowed by Ms. Moler to come up here and brief the appropriate intelligence oversight committee, why would it be any more likely that she would allow me to come up and tell you, after all clearly our authorization committee, but not the Intelligence Committee, on this topic? So the gag rule was in effect and it stood and continued on after the October 6th briefing.

    Mr. TALENT. Let's go into that a little bit. I was going to ask you, you know, when the gag rule, as you call it, I will use that terminology, was first handed down, and are you telling me now it was in connection with this request from the Intelligence Committee?
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    Mr. TRULOCK. It was first handed down in late summer of 1997. Instructions from her at that time was that neither I nor Mr. Bloodsworth, who was my deputy for counterintelligence, nor any other official, was to have any discussions or provide any briefings to anyone, either in the government or in the Congress, without the express permission of Ms. Moler and Secretary Peña.

    Mr. TALENT. They were oral instructions, not in writing.

    Mr. TRULOCK. They were oral.

    Mr. TALENT. Were they ever confirmed in writing?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Of course not.

    Mr. TALENT. Was anybody present besides you and Ms. Moler when these instructions were given?

    Mr. TRULOCK. My recollection is there were a number of people in the room. I believe Mr. Bloodsworth, who is an employee of another agency, but at that time was my deputy for counterintelligence, was present during that.

    Mr. TALENT. Do you remember anybody else who was present?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I can't recall any other names, no.
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    Mr. TALENT. There were other people there?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Yes.

    Mr. TALENT. Where was that meeting, do you recall?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Most of the meetings we had to discuss this occurred in GA–301, which was my office. It was a secure compartment and information facility.

    Mr. TALENT. Did anybody besides Ms. Moler give you instructions like that? Did Mr. Peña give you instructions like that?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Mr. Peña did not. I had very few dealings with Secretary Peña.

    Mr. TALENT. He wasn't present at that meeting?

    Mr. TRULOCK. My recollection is he was not present at that meeting.

    Mr. TALENT. Okay. And so it wasn't that you just inferred from the fact that you were denied permission to brief the Intelligence Committee that you were not supposed to go into this. It wasn't just inferring it from that order. You were given explicit instructions?
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    Mr. TRULOCK. Explicit.

    Mr. TALENT. Ms. Moler, does that jive with your recollection at all? Is there something you might have said to him that he could have interpreted as that? As a gag rule?

    Ms. MOLER. Congressman, it does not jive with my recollection at all. I think it is fair to say that when Secretary Peña and I were first apprised of the long-standing concern about counterintelligence matters at the Department, that we, particularly Secretary Peña, determined that we wanted the information closely held until we briefed appropriate members of the Administration. It was also clearly classified information and the rules respecting the sharing of classified information on a need to know basis and the specific statutes that come into play do limit the access to that information.

    I am quite surprised to hear Mr. Trulock testify that he was repeatedly told not to discuss the case. That is simply not true.

    There has also been an investigation by Mr. Friedman into the circumstance surrounding the request to testify, to provide the information to the House Intelligence Committee. Mr. Friedman's investigation, which is another IG report that is not classified, concludes that he could not corroborate many of the statements that Mr. Trulock made.

    Mr. TALENT. Okay. So just to make it clear, and I am almost done, Mr. Chairman, you didn't in June of '97 or any time subsequent tell Mr. Trulock not to provide this information to the Congress unless you explicitly authorized him to do it?
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    Ms. MOLER. That is correct. I did not tell him he could not testify or provide the information to the House Intelligence Committee.

    Mr. TALENT. Mr. Trulock, you are not testifying—are you testifying here that your understanding was that even if you were asked in a subcommittee setting you were not to tell the truth to Congress?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Explicitly. Explicitly.

    Mr. TALENT. Well, I guess we can't reconcile those memories. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Trulock, after you sat there and I asked the direct question about whether there had been any thefts of nuclear weapons secrets at Los Alamos and you didn't respond about the W–88 case, and this Ms. Moler didn't respond to, did she admonish you later for not telling us about that, or ask you why you didn't tell us about it?

    Mr. TRULOCK. No. In fact, Secretary Moler was quite upset. I was told that she believed that I had informed the committee that she had doctored my testimony. Certainly my testimony today is that I did not. We had no further discussion after that time. I would also note that Mr. Curran, I believe, was sitting to her left and was also fully apprised of the case and made no response to you.

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    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Sisisky and then Mr. Spratt.

    Mr. SISISKY. Did you tell anybody on this committee or anyone on this staff about any of this? Did you tell anyone on this staff before that meeting about this?

    Mr. TRULOCK. About—.

    Mr. SISISKY. About what you just said, that you were told not to talk about it?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I don't believe I did. I have no recollection of doing that.

    Mr. SISISKY. You don't believe you did.

    Mr. TRULOCK. No.

    Mr. SISISKY. Thank you.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Spratt.

    Mr. SPRATT. When we say that you were not allowed to brief, what was the subject matter of these briefings? Was it espionage generally at the national labs, the foreign visitors program specifically, W–88 information losses, thefts, Wen Ho Lee and other suspects? What were all of these requests for briefings, what was the subject matter of them?
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    Mr. TRULOCK. Are you referring to the October 6th for this subcommittee, or for the HPSCI briefing?

    Mr. SPRATT. You said that you were requested, for example, by the Intelligence Committee. It is my understanding, my recollection, I don't have the record before me, that the Intelligence Committee was briefed and informed about the W–88 losses in June or July of 199—.

    Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, you are getting into an area now that we shouldn't be getting into.

    Mr. SPRATT. I think it is in the open record. That is a problem we have got.

    Mr. SISISKY. It is not usually an open record.

    Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman wants to have a little discussion with the gentleman from the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Sisisky, before he proceeds, go right ahead.

    Mr. SPRATT. Did you ever brief the Intelligence Committee in 1997 or 1998?

    Mr. TRULOCK. No. I briefed the staff members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August of 1996.
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    Mr. SPRATT. 1996. Were these other requests to amplify the briefing or to have the briefing you had given the staff given directly to the members, was that the purpose of the request?

    Mr. TRULOCK. The request as it was relayed to me by a representative of the HPSCI, I believe in July of 1998, was that Chairman Goss wished to see what was known as the Kindred Spirit briefing. I think probably I should stop there.

    Mr. SPRATT. Okay. I understand shortly thereafter, a month or so thereafter, Sandy Berger, the National Security Advisor, also was briefed.

    Mr. TRULOCK. I am sorry, Congressman, your time line is a little off there. The briefings, there were two briefings provided to Mr. Berger. The first was in, I believe, March of 1996. The second was in August of 1997. I had no further contact—.

    Mr. SPRATT. Did you take place in those?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I was the main briefer.

    Mr. SPRATT. Nobody impeded or restricted those briefings?

    Mr. TRULOCK. No, absolutely not.

    Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Bloodsworth, he works for you?
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    Mr. TRULOCK. He did at the time, yes, sir.

    Mr. SPRATT. His job or position was what?

    Mr. TRULOCK. He was my deputy for counterintelligence.

    Mr. SPRATT. He told the IG and the report the IG made at the request of the Secretary that he had no personal knowledge of any restrictions or impediments that were imposed upon you that prevented you from briefing relevant committees of the Congress or those agencies.

    Mr. TRULOCK. You have me at somewhat of a disadvantage. I have read that report once several months ago. I do recall that particular statement made by Mr. Bloodsworth. I believe Mr. Bloodsworth is mistaken in his recollection.

    Mr. SPRATT. Page 28, would you like to read what he said? Mr. Bloodsworth advised the IG he had no direct personal knowledge that Ms. Moler or any other senior department official had impeded or interfered with Mr. Trulock's communication to Congress on espionage at Los Alamos Nuclear National Laboratory.

    Mr. TRULOCK. That is Mr. Bloodsworth's statement.

    Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Baker, Kenneth Baker, does he work for you also, did he work for you also?
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    Mr. TRULOCK. I worked for Mr. Baker. It is the other way around.

    Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Baker advised the IG that he was never in attendance at any meetings wherein Mr. Trulock was told by anyone, including Ms. Moler, that he could not brief Congress on the LANL espionage issues.

    Are you aware of that statement by Mr. Baker? You have got someone beneath you and someone immediately above you, both of whom are at odds with what you just testified. How do you explain that?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I can't, sir. I am telling you the truth.

    Mr. SPRATT. Okay. We will have further questions in the closed session. Thank you.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Trulock, you didn't mention the two people that Mr. Spratt mentioned as being present at any meeting in which Ms. Moler told you not to talk to Congress.

    Mr. TRULOCK. I have no recollection of Mr. Baker. I do have a recollection of Mr. Bloodsworth being present. In many of the occasions on which we briefed Ms. Moler, Mr. Bloodsworth would be in attendance.

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    Mr. HUNTER. Was he in attendance at one of the meetings in which Ms. Moler told you don't give him that information?

    Mr. TRULOCK. That is my recollection, yes, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Ryun.

    Mr. RYUN. Mr. Chairman, I just have a brief statement. I know we are heading for a vote. I simply wanted to thank you and the staff for the persistence on this issue. I know it has taken quite a bit of time to get the corrected, or should I say unedited testimony, and I reserve my questions until the closed session. I also want to thank you for being willing to keep the session open as long as you have so that this information can be made available to others. That is my statement.

    Mr. HUNTER. Certainly. I thank the gentleman. We have got probably about eight or nine minutes left, correct me, staff, if I am wrong on this, on a rule on H.R. 3093, the Fathers Count Act. So I would suggest that we recess briefly. We will be back in a few minutes.

    [Recess.]

    Mr. HUNTER. The subcommittee will resume. The gentlewoman from California, Mrs. Tauscher, is the next in line to ask questions.

    Mrs. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have many questions in closed session. However, while we are still in open session, I just have one clarification I would like to make and one position I would like to state.
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    First and foremost, I don't want anybody to be confused about the fact that there have been no indictments in this case and, frankly, there is some dispute about what exactly the Chinese have and how they got it. Is that not true, Mr. Trulock?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I think that the intelligence community published a damage assessment I believe in the spring of 1999 that made some rather definitive statements about what the Chinese have acquired. I do not have that statement in front of me, but I believe that statement probably could be taken as the Administration's position on Chinese espionage and their successes thereof. What has actually been discussed in the media seems to me to be absent of content and access to classified information that was used in providing our own assessments.

    Mrs. TAUSCHER. And, Mr. Trulock, is it your testimony per a request of Mr. Sisisky that you never informed anyone on this committee nor the staff of this committee about your suspicions regarding the Los Alamos case?

    Mr. TRULOCK. No, I thought the question was did I have any discussions about the staff up here on either side of the aisle with regard to the order not to provide testimony to the committee. Could we ask the recorder to replay that again?

    Mrs. TAUSCHER. But is that what your answer was?

    Mr. TRULOCK. My answer to that was I had no discussions with members or staff on either side of the aisle about a gag order or an attempt to prevent testimony to this committee. I had discussions with staff members of the HPSCI about that, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
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    Mrs. TAUSCHER. Well then, I am confused. Then how did we know that your testimony had been changed?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I have no idea.

    Mrs. TAUSCHER. We just guessed?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I am sorry, ma'am, I can't answer your question. I did not inform—.

    Mrs. TAUSCHER. If you didn't tell us, who told us your testimony had been changed? I would suppose Ms. Moler, who has testified that she didn't change your testimony, who would have told the committee or the staff that your testimony had been changed?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I don't know. It certainly was not me.

    Mrs. TAUSCHER. That is it, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Hayes.

    Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of questions.

    We looked at some testimony that we received, written testimony this morning, that has been in all honesty rather difficult to obtain, both in terms of request and length of time, and it has to do with the failure to provide complete testimony to this committee about the theft of nuclear secrets.
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    Now, Mr. Trulock, you were talking about there was no gag order about that testimony. Does your statement about no gag order, that is obviously a spoken possibility, does that include a written order? And also an implied request not to bring this information out? Could there be any misunderstanding between the two of you as to the fact that this is information we don't want to bring out in this committee at this time?

    Ms. MOLER. Congressman, clearly there were a number of misunderstandings between the two of us. That is obvious from the discussion we have had in the last session, as well as the discussion from today.

    I did not consider Mr. Trulock to be under a gag order not to testify to this committee.

    I have said that I was not aware of a request from Chairman Goss for Mr. Trulock to provide testimony to his committee. Mr. Trulock has said he sent me a memo about it. I said I never received the memo, and the IG has investigated it and could not corroborate the statements he made about the memo.

    You know, with benefit of hindsight, I wish there had been a great deal more interaction with this committee. I was operating under what I have described as a conventional view of the sharing of classified information. It was my understanding that we were supposed to talk to the intelligence committees and then, because this committee and the Intelligence Committee have common members, as is the case on the Senate side, that the intelligence committees would make a judgment about who should know what.
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    You know, with the benefit of hindsight, I wish that we had had further interactions. There are lots of things I have done in 25 years in the government that I wish that I could do differently. I suspect that is true of every person in this room.

    But I did not consider that Mr. Trulock was under a gag order with respect to this committee. I certainly believed that when asked a direct question, that he should have responded fully and appropriately.

    Mr. HAYES. But there is still a possibility that he may have felt for some reason that we ought to talk about it to another committee besides this, or something. I hear you saying this. It just seems like, as I listen to the testimony of—Mr. Trulock has been very forthright and answered the question directly, and it troubles me, particularly on the issue of sitting there beside each other and knowing this information, knowing how crucial it was to the committee, and as we look back to the document, again, why didn't you say to this committee, this is a matter where secrets have been exposed, whatever. That would have led the committee down the path which would have, as Mr. Sisisky said, helped us to prevent this in the future.

    Help me with that.

    Ms. MOLER. I have the burden of being a lawyer. I don't want to get into splitting infinitives and parsing sentences and all this horrible stuff lawyers do.

    Mr. HAYES. Excuse me for interrupting, but when we can't decide what ''is'' means and we talk about, and I quote you directly, this had to be closely held until briefing certain members of the Administration, the Administration has got some problems with forthrightness to the country about extreme security matters, so I don't want you to think we are splitting hairs. But when it comes to the Administration, without splitting hairs, you can't get straight answers.
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    Ms. MOLER. I understand, sir, that that is your opinion. It was my information and belief at the time I was at the Department as Deputy Secretary, and it continues to be my information and belief, that the FBI briefed the Intelligence Committee repeatedly on this subject. I think that that is addressed extensively in Mr. Friedman's report. I believed then that they had the lead, if you will, with respect to briefing the Congress on the various, and there were more than one, investigations that were ongoing in this area.

    I believed then that the Congress was fully informed, the appropriate committees of the Congress had been appropriately informed. Do I wish I had done it differently? Certainly I wish I had done it differently. Hindsight is a wonderful thing.

    Mr. HAYES. In closing, Mr. Chairman, you are absolutely right. It is clear from the documents we received this morning that vital information was withheld from this committee, and it troubles me that we are unable over the past period of months to have done our job because, and again this is my opinion, your loyalty could be, any or all of you, to your bosses. The Administration seems to have overcome the need for honesty in dealing with these matters for the committee and for the Congress.

    Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. The real tragedy is that while this was taking place, if they had told the subcommittee about this, if Mr. Trulock's testimony had been allowed to stay in and hadn't been taken out, we would have been able to pursue it and at least get the guy who was suspected of stealing stuff away from the classified secrets. As it is, he continued to sit there, access those secrets, and harvest Lord knows what in terms of America's nuclear secrets.
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    Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, may I comment?

    Mr. HUNTER. Sure, go right ahead.

    Ms. MOLER. I believe that we will find on several occasions in Mr. Friedman's report that both Mr. Trulock and I were under the impression at the time, and I will refer you to specific pages in that report, that his access to sensitive information had been restricted.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, Ms. Moler, do you know what a Q clearance is?

    Ms. MOLER. Certainly I do, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. Was it your understanding that he had lost his Q clearance?

    Ms. MOLER. I did not know specifically whether he had lost his Q clearance or his top secret or any of his special access rights. But I believe you will find, and I am sure we will talk about it this afternoon, that it was my information and at the time it was Mr. Trulock's information, that his access had been restricted. Hopefully, perhaps we will cover that this afternoon.

    Mr. HUNTER. Of course, Mr. Trulock states that he told you that it was important to get him away from the classified access to nuclear secrets, and he told you the steps as to what you would do, and that you took no action, in fact made no response. So there is a difference of opinion or a difference of statements with respect to you and Mr. Trulock on that point. That is not a view that is commonly held by the two of you. That is your position. His position is that he thought he should be removed from a Q clearance.
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    Did anybody ever tell you that he had lost his Q clearance?

    Ms. MOLER. It is—.

    Mr. HUNTER. As I understand it, if you have a Q clearance, you can access classified information. You may not be in on the most sensitive program, but you can access classified nuclear weapons information.

    Ms. MOLER. Even if one has a Q clearance, one is not given unlimited access to any kind of information.

    Mr. HUNTER. But that doesn't mean that they don't have some access to some important nuclear weapons information.

    Ms. MOLER. It is compartmentalized, sir. One has access to restricted types of information. It is not just everybody who has a Q clearance does not get access to all of our Nation's sensitive secrets.

    Mr. HUNTER. We understand that. By the same token, if you have access to Q clearance, you may have been removed or moved from an extremely sensitive classified area, but still allowed to stay in an area that has nuclear secret material in it, right?

    Ms. MOLER. It was my—.

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    Mr. HUNTER. It cuts both ways, doesn't it?

    Ms. MOLER. That is correct. It was my understanding that his access had been restricted in such a way so that he was not in a position, as I have stated on several occasions, to damage the United States. That is what I was told and that is my testimony.

    Mr. HUNTER. Question: Did you ask him if the Q clearance had been removed?

    Ms. MOLER. No, I did not, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Mr. Pitts.

    Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Trulock, back to the October 6th hearing, the statement about Chinese theft of nuclear secrets, did you remove that on specific orders? What were the instructions to you about altering your testimony?

    Mr. TRULOCK. The instructions I had from Ms. Moler was to remove everything that did not pertain specifically to the foreign visits and assignments program at the labs. That was contrary to the assumption as communicated in both an e-mail to me by representatives of the Office of Congressional Affairs and the letter of invitation which made reference to discussion of counterintelligence activities. My understanding of the request was a discussion of how it was that we came to the point in October of 1998 that the Department was requesting a significant plus-up in budgetary support for its counterintelligence program.

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    One of the dilemmas that we confronted repeatedly with the laboratories in particular as well as people in the Department in what is known commonly as the well to disbelieve, is skepticism that in fact any such threat from foreign intelligence services existed to the laboratory and its secrets. So the guidance that I was operating under as communicated to me from the Office of Congressional Affairs in a letter was to provide to you a discussion of threats from foreign intelligence services to the laboratories, including those represented by foreign visitors, which I did include a discussion on the kinds of activities that we had seen over time.

    Mr. PITTS. Now, Ms. Moler, you said that you discussed this testimony with someone in the White House. When did you do that?

    Ms. MOLER. Congressman, Mr. Trulock's testimony was sent to the National Security Council staff by the Congressional Affairs Office or someone on my staff, I don't know who actually physically faxed it to them, on a secure fax for clearance.

    Mr. PITTS. Did you discuss the testimony with anyone in the White House?

    Ms. MOLER. My recollection is that I had a brief discussion with, as I said, either Rand Bers or Gary Samore of the White House staff. I also believe at one point I talked with Ms. McCarthy, who was on detail to the NSC staff. I do not remember the specifics of those conversations, however. I took the action directing Mr. Trulock to revise his testimony on my own.

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    Mr. PITTS. And when did you have this—when did you send it and when did you have the discussion with Bers or Samore or McCarthy?

    Ms. MOLER. I do not know the specific date. I believe it was a day or two before the hearing, as is typically the case.

    Mr. PITTS. You want to add something?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I want to add one additional point. By this time I had been the Director of Intelligence at the Department of Energy for four years, and I had made numerous appearances before both of the intelligence oversight committees, the Armed Services Committees on both sides, appropriations committees. I want to say dozens, I can't give you an exact number, but I prepared dozens of statements for the record.

    The normal procedure, process, if you will, was to forward those statements to the Office of Management and Budget budgetary examiner for review. In my experience at the Department under Secretary O'Leary, my testimony before any of these committees was never submitted to the National Security Council for review, nor was my testimony ever submitted, or to the best of my knowledge, do I know any of my predecessors as the Director of Intelligence, testimony was submitted to the CIA for review prior to sending it up here.

    It simply was not done. So I found this to be sort of out of keeping with the process that had been established and the tradition at the Department for review of intelligence testimony before it was sent to the Hill.

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    Mr. PITTS. Ms. Moler, when you had your discussion with the individuals you have mentioned in the White House, did you discuss any specific statement in the testimony that should be removed?

    Ms. MOLER. To the extent that I can recall my conversation at all, sir, it was something to the effect that we have been requested to testify about the foreign visitors and assignments program. The prepared testimony runs far afield from that specific topic, and I did not believe it was relevant to the topic that we were asked to appear before you to discuss.

    Mr. PITTS. Did you discuss with them the Chinese espionage of nuclear threat, of nuclear secrets?

    Ms. MOLER. No, sir, I did not. I cannot recall it. I simply called Mr. Trulock. I have testified before this committee, this subcommittee, excuse me, sir, on a prior occasion. I said that I called Mr. Trulock. I told him to limit his testimony to the foreign visitors program.

    Mr. PITTS. I understand that. I am talking about people in the White House.

    Did you discuss with them the aspect of the testimony about the Chinese theft of nuclear secrets?

    Ms. MOLER. I do not recall the specifics of the conversation. They had the testimony. I called them. I told them I had directed him to revise it. They—.
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    Mr. PITTS. Okay. Did you discuss the fact that the Chinese were involved?

    Ms. MOLER. I do not recall doing that, sir, no.

    Mr. PITTS. Did you discuss the fact that the election was just a few weeks away?

    Ms. MOLER. Absolutely categorically not.

    Mr. PITTS. You did not discuss the allegations of Chinese contributions?

    Ms. MOLER. Absolutely categorically not.

    Mr. PITTS. This gag order not to testify or not to release certain information, Mr. Trulock, were you instructed not to brief the intelligence oversight committee?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Yes, I was.

    Mr. PITTS. And is that your understanding, Ms. Moler? Did you instruct him not to testify?

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    Ms. MOLER. No, it is not.

    Mr. PITTS. And when did this instruction occur, Mr. Trulock?

    Mr. TRULOCK. My recollection, without having the chronology in front of me, was it was July of 1998.

    Mr. PITTS. I will yield to the gentleman. I did not hear what he said.

    Mr. SISISKY. Was that before the election? That was after the election, am I correct?

    The election was in 1996. The congressional elections.

    Mr. PITTS. Yes.

    That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. Ms. Moler, what was the response of the White House personnel who you talked to when you told them that you were going to instruct that some of the testimony be taken out?

    Ms. MOLER. I don't recall a specific response.

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    Mr. HUNTER. Was that conversation initiated by them after they had a copy of the testimony? Had you sent them a copy of the testimony?

    Ms. MOLER. Someone on my staff had sent them a copy of the testimony, yes, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. How did you talk to them, over the phone or did you go see them?

    Ms. MOLER. Over the phone.

    Mr. HUNTER. What did you ask them about when you called them?

    Ms. MOLER. It was a very brief conversation. To the extent I recall it at all, it was that I had directed Mr. Trulock to limit his testimony to the foreign visitors and assignments program.

    Mr. HUNTER. What did they say?

    Ms. MOLER. They had no objection—it was fine with them. They cleared the testimony. It was fine.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, why did you feel you had to call them? If you are simply limiting it because you didn't think it is the subject matter, why did you have to call them?
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    Ms. MOLER. It was just in the ordinary course of business to get the testimony cleared. We had sent testimony version number one. Testimony version number one was altered at my request—at my directive. I was telling them that testimony version two was the testimony that was going to be given and they had no objection to that.

    Mr. HUNTER. When you sent testimony number one, did they object to that?

    Ms. MOLER. I don't recall a specific conversation where they objected one way or failed to object. I just don't recall, sir.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, then if one was never objected to, why didn't you stick with one?

    Ms. MOLER. Because as I have said, I unilaterally made a judgment.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, then why did you feel it was necessary to tell them about that? In other words, if they didn't object to testimony one, the first testimony, why did you feel then you had to call them up?

    Ms. MOLER. I wasn't asking their permission, sir. I was telling them that the testimony that was to be given was going to be different than we had previously submitted to them.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Did you at any time—.

    Ms. MOLER. This was a conversation. It was very brief. It was not a big deal at the time.

    Mr. HUNTER. And who was that that you were talking to in that conversation?

    Ms. MOLER. As I have said—testified several times today, I believe I talked, but I am not absolutely certain I talked, with Rand Bers or Gary Samore. I know for certain that I talked to Ms. McCarthy.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. How many conversations did you have with respect to Mr. Trulock's testimony?

    Ms. MOLER. I think I just had one, with Ms. McCarthy. Sir, I don't recall every single conversation I had with them.

    Mr. HUNTER. Was there a conversation—.

    Ms. MOLER. I can recall one with Ms. McCarthy, but I am not certain otherwise.

    Mr. HUNTER. Do you recall having any conversation with Mr. Samore about it?
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    Ms. MOLER. I am sorry, sir. I can't state it any more clearly than I have. I have said—.

    Mr. HUNTER. A very simple yes or no is good. Do you have any recollection of any conversation with Mr. Samore? If you can't remember, that's fine.

    Ms. MOLER. I have said I believe I talked to Mr. Samore or to Mr. Bers. I am certain I talked to Ms. McCarthy. I cannot reconstruct it any more clearly than that.

    Mr. HUNTER. Who was Mr. Bers?

    Ms. MOLER. He was a senior National Security Council staff person at the time. He is now at the Department of State, I believe.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. When you sent testimony number one to the White House, was it returned to you with any notes or recommendations on it?

    Ms. MOLER. No.

    Mr. HUNTER. Was it ever returned to you?

    Ms. MOLER. No.

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    Mr. HUNTER. Were there any communications to your staff about it?

    Ms. MOLER. If there were communications to my staff about it, I was not privy to those communications. I don't know one way or the other.

    Mr. HUNTER. So you didn't have any communications from your staff that, hey, the White House sent this back and they recommended a change?

    Ms. MOLER. No.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Trulock, the attempt that you made to brief the House Intelligence Committee on this, what month was that?

    Mr. TRULOCK. My recollection is it was July of 1998.

    Mr. HUNTER. Who contacted you from House Intelligence to ask for this thing?

    Mr. TRULOCK. A staff member who was at that time our point of contact on the HPSCI for DOE counterintelligence matters. Her name is Kathy Eberwine.

    Mr. HUNTER. What did you do at that point?

    Mr. TRULOCK. My recollection is, I informed Paul Richanbach, who was at that point Ms. Moler's staff member, of this request that had come in. I also prepared a memorandum for Ms. Moler that I forwarded to my executive assistant at the time for finalization. It is my recollection that she carried that memo upstairs. I received no response from my—.
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    Mr. HUNTER. What did the memo say?

    Mr. TRULOCK. The memo, in my recollection, the memo makes note of the fact that we had requests from Chairman Goss for a briefing on the Kindred Spirit matter, without referring to Kindred Spirit. It also made reference to the fact that Senator Domenici, or a staff aide of Senator Domenici, had requested a briefing and it covered a number of other matters.

    Mr. HUNTER. You sent that in written form up to Ms. Moler?

    Mr. TRULOCK. The normal way of doing these kinds of things on this topic was to hand carry the memo upstairs and provide it to one of her staff—excuse me, point of contact on her staff.

    Mr. HUNTER. You did that?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I did not. My executive assistant did that.

    Mr. HUNTER. What happened after that?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I received no response. I asked Mr. Richanbach one or two times additionally. I received an—.

    Mr. HUNTER. Who is Mr. Richanbach?
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    Mr. TRULOCK. Mr. Richanbach was a staffer of Ms. Moler's in the Office of the Secretary.

    Mr. HUNTER. What did he say?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Words to the effect that Betsy hasn't gotten back to me on this yet.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did you get further prodding from the intelligence staff member?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I recall receiving at least two phone calls from Ms. Eberwine asking the status of the HPSCI request for a briefing.

    Mr. HUNTER. What did you tell them?

    Mr. TRULOCK. I told them that the request was under review and that I would get back to them as soon as I could.

    Mr. HUNTER. Ms. Moler, did you ever see that request?

    Ms. MOLER. No, sir, I did not.

    Mr. HUNTER. So you had no knowledge that the Intelligence Committee wanted to get a briefing on this nuclear theft?
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    Ms. MOLER. That is correct. I did not see that memorandum until after I left the Department of Energy.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did anybody tell you that there was a request, any staff member say, hey, Mr. Trulock just sent up a request to brief Intelligence?

    Ms. MOLER. No, sir. And after I left the Department I asked—the memorandum was addressed to me with copies to Under Secretary Dr. Moniz and to Paul Richanbach. I have had conversations with both of those individuals, who purportedly received the same memorandum. Neither of them recalls having seen the memorandum.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, did you—.

    Ms. MOLER. That is covered in Mr. Friedman's report.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Trulock, did you send the memo to other people besides Ms. Moler?

    Mr. TRULOCK. No. We hand carried it to Mr. Richanbach for action.

    Mr. HUNTER. Has Mr. Richanbach talked about this?

    Ms. MOLER. Mr. Richanbach has provided sworn testimony about this to the Senate Armed Services Committee. He has been interviewed by Mr. Friedman as well and Mr. Friedman's report covers this exact subject.
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    Mr. HUNTER. And he claims that he has no knowledge about this request?

    Ms. MOLER. That is correct.

    Mr. HUNTER. So what happened after you talked to the staff several times and told them it was under review?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Several days after that, at a meeting on another topic—.

    Mr. HUNTER. This is just amazing, incidentally. This committee is trying to get a hearing on this thing and the Under Secretary claims she has no knowledge about this. Please proceed.

    Mr. TRULOCK. I had an opportunity to ask Ms. Moler directly, remind her of the request, and she again—this time to me directly denied that request.

    Mr. HUNTER. What did she say?

    Mr. TRULOCK. Well, I have recounted this a number of times, but she said, I think they—and by they I inferred that she meant Chairman Goss and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence—they are only interested in hurting the President on China.
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    Mr. HUNTER. Well, did she say there was going to be a briefing or wasn't going to be a briefing?

    Mr. TRULOCK. No briefing.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did you say what do I tell them when they keep calling me?

    Mr. TRULOCK. No briefing. So I went back to Kathy Eberwine, again the staff member on the HPSCI, and told her that the request was denied.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Any other questions by members?

    Mr. Talent.

    Mr. TALENT. Mr. Chairman, just a comment. I got into some of the details of this and I felt uncomfortable doing it. I feel a little uncomfortable listening to you go into the details of it. And it may be important for the record, before we go into closed hearing that, you know, we have here statements by Mr. Trulock, who was the head of intelligence of this Department for a number of years and who was entrusted with the duty of overseeing this investigation and watching out for it, and let me just say to Ms. Moler and Secretary Peña that when somebody like that comes forward and makes these kind of statements about information that he claims was withheld from the Congress, we have to follow up on it. It is a very serious thing.
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    So I appreciate your having the hearing and I think it is important that we have done this much anyway in an open hearing. Thank you for that, Mr. Chairman.

    Secretary PEÑA. Mr. Chairman, may I once again for the record clarify an implication made by the Congressman's last statement?

    Mr. HUNTER. Sure.

    Secretary PEÑA. I left the Department, Congressman, at the end of June.

    Mr. TALENT. I understand. When I said ''secretary'' it was—.

    Secretary PEÑA. All these things occurred after I left. I have no knowledge of them other than what I have read in the paper and listened to here today in the hearing. But I have to tell you that there are lots of things, lots of things about this entire issue, that are very perplexing.

    Mr. TALENT. Yes.

    Secretary PEÑA. Perhaps we can go into that in closed session, and I would very much welcome and look forward to discussing a number of issues that cannot be discussed publicly, that I think would cause all of you great concern, as it has caused me great concern, having left the Department of Energy and learned far more about this than I ever dreamed possible.
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    Mr. TALENT. Mr. Secretary, when I said ''secretary'' I was referring to your—I wasn't trying to suggest that you were in control throughout this whole thing.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. We look forward to a closed session.

    Ms. MOLER. Can I comment briefly to the fact that there has been an investigation of this subject? Secretary Richardson asked the Department's Inspector General to investigate this precise issue, and the Department's Inspector General concluded that the Office of Inspector General could not establish with any certainty that any Department official knowingly or intentionally improperly delayed, prohibited or interfered with briefings to Mr. Peña or the congressional Intelligence Committees. There were several statements that Mr. Trulock made that other people could not corroborate.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, let me just say, Ms. Moler, that we are going to go into closed session and we are going to read your statements, or lack thereof, after my direct questions while you were sitting there under oath about the theft of nuclear secrets, and your refusal to tell me about them. And I have quoted the direct question, have there been thefts of nuclear secrets from Los Alamos? And Mr. Friedman did not say that that is forthrightness to Congress.

    So in my estimation, there is a record, a sworn record, that contradicts the conclusion that you have just come to.
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    I don't think that your lack of candor with this subcommittee is anything to be proud of, and I think if you are talking about your legal obligation, you are very, very close to the line. But certainly in my estimation—I mean, after this hearing was over, when I asked a direct question neither of you told us, and this doggoned spy was kept in place at the very minute we were hearing this. He was sitting next to the weapons vault, presumably accessing our nuclear secrets. The idea that that continued to occur I think is pretty frustrating and maddening, not only for this committee but for the American people.

    I wouldn't be too proud of this report by Mr. Friedman. We are going to ask him more about this when we go into closed session.

    Mr. TRULOCK. Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. HUNTER. Yes, Mr. Trulock.

    Mr. TRULOCK. Since Ms. Moler has seen fit to introduce this in the open testimony, may I offer to the committee my response to Mr. Friedman's report dated August 23rd, 1999? I would simply point out that I found Mr. Friedman's report to be lacking in a number of aspects, not the least of which the conclusion that he was unable to substantiate the fact that senior officials of the Department had interfered with our ability to bring information to the Hill, in light of the fact that Ms. Moler's open testimony under oath that, in fact, she had done exactly that.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you. Let me ask you one question, Mr. Friedman. Did you clear your testimony today with the CIA?
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    Mr. FRIEDMAN. Absolutely not.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did you clear it with the National Security Council?

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. I did not.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did you send it to the White House?

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. I did not.

    Mr. HUNTER. Did you do any of the clearances that Ms. Moler says she regularly does with this type of information?

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. It was not cleared by anyone other than my office.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you.

    We are going to go in just a second into closed session.

    Mr. Friedman, I do have one question for open session. Why did your investigation only apply to the Intelligence Committees?

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    Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman?

    Mr. HUNTER. Why did your—.

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't understand the question.

    Mr. HUNTER. I understand that your investigation with respect to whether there was forthrightness by Ms. Moler only applied to the Intelligence Committees.

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, that's not accurate. As a matter of fact, with all due respect to Mr. Trulock, his last statement wasn't accurate, either. We identified, based on our witness interview with Mr. Trulock, five instances in which he indicated that he was prohibited from either getting to Members of Congress, five separate instances. In fact, Ms. Moler acknowledges two and we report that in our report, and it is very clear-cut. The language is very plain. So, in fact, there are three instances in which she has no recollection, she denies that it took place. So the fact of the matter is, we fully agree with Mr. Trulock that two instances did occur. Now, what we do provide in the report is Ms. Moler's rationale for why she did what she did, and every individual can read the report and make their judgment as to whether her rationale holds weight or not.

    Mr. HUNTER. You are saying that you do have several instances where Ms. Moler did say that she did keep information from Congress?

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, one of which you discussed—well, when I say—I want to be careful, Mr. Chairman, because of the framing of the question. I mean, she has indicated today—.
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    Mr. HUNTER. You can frame it however you want.

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. She has indicated today that she did, in fact, instruct or direct Mr. Trulock to delete a portion of his initial version of the testimony before this committee. I think she has said that quite clearly.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, did you read the classified testimony of Ms. Moler and Mr. Trulock when I asked the direct question, have there been any thefts of nuclear secrets from Los Alamos?

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall precisely that recitation.

    Mr. HUNTER. I am going to give it to you in just a minute in the closed session and you can tell me whether you think that her refusal to tell me anything is a lack of candor or not telling Congress. Okay?

    Mr. FRIEDMAN. I look forward to it.

    Mr. HUNTER. Okay. We will do it here in just a minute.

    Any other questions? The chairman of the full committee is recognized.

    The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, before you go into executive session, on just that point, why wait until executive session for this kind of a response or answer? It has nothing to do with national security and all of these kind of things. I want to point out in that respect, too, that for anyone who is wondering why we are trying to stay in open session as long as we are, it is because what happens when we go into executive session. The cameras go off, the media are expelled from the room and from then on the American people never will know what happens because we are precluded from telling them. That's the reason we are trying to stay in public session, as much as we can.
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    To my colleagues who are insisting on going into executive session, that's always the best way to hide something, is to get it out from the view of the public into executive session where we can't tell anybody. We wouldn't have had the revelations of the Cox Committee report had they not been made public and the American people would never have known these kind of things otherwise.

    Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman.

    Any other questions from members before we go into closed session?

    Okay. We will go into closed session and we will reconvene in ten minutes.

    [Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed session.]



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