[H.A.S.C. No. 106–21]
RECENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS AT DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY LABORATORIES
MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
APRIL 15, 1999
MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina
BOB STUMP, Arizona
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JAMES TALENT, Missouri
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
MARY BONO, California
JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia
IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina
ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
TOM ALLEN, Maine
JIM TURNER, Texas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBERT BRADY, Pennsylvania
Peter J. Berry, Professional Staff Member
Peggy Cosseboom, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
Thursday, April 15, 1999, Recent Counterintelligence Problems at Department of Energy Laboratories
THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 1999
RECENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS AT DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY LABORATORIES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Military Procurement Subcommittee
Sisisky, Hon. Norman, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, Military Procurement Subcommittee
Curran, Mr. Edward J., Director, Office of Counterintelligence, U.S. Department of Energy
Moler, Ms. Elizabeth, Former Deputy Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy
Moniz, Dr. Ernest J., Under Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy
Trulock, Mr. Notra, III, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Intelligence, U.S. Department of Energy
[There were no Prepared Statements submitted for the Record.]
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Documents submitted for the Record.]
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Questions and Answers submitted for the Record.]
RECENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS AT DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY LABORATORIES
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Military Procurement Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, April 15, 1999.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. HUNTER. The subcommittee will come to order.
This morning the subcommittee meets to revisit the testimony we received on October 6, 1998 regarding counterintelligence issues at the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons laboratories. That hearing was divided into two parts: an open, unclassified session, and a classified executive session. At the open session, the General Accounting Office recounted their reviews and reports over the last decade on the need for tighter controls over DOE's foreign visitor program at our nuclear weapons laboratories. The directors of the three national laboratories then provided testimony on their efforts to respond to the GAO recommendations.
When we moved to the executive session, we received testimony from the DOE offices of intelligence and counterintelligence on counterintelligence problems the laboratories had experienced and efforts to remedy those problems. When the subcommittee staff was setting up this hearing, they told DOE's Office of Congressional Affairs the subcommittee wanted the directors of the Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories to testify in the open session and that we wanted Mr. Notra Trulock, Special Adviser on Intelligence Matters, and Mr. Edward Curran, Director of the Office of Counterintelligence, to testify in the executive session.
In response, the subcommittee, staff received a call from the Department requesting that Deputy Secretary of Energy Elizabeth Moler be allowed to testify in both the open and executive sessions. The subcommittee staff pointed out that, with four witnesses scheduled to testify in the open session and two in the executive session, we would not have the time for an additional witness in each session.
Nevertheless, after the third call from the Department asking us to allow her testimony, we relented. The subcommittee staff told the Department that we wanted Mr. Trulock to provide testimony on counterintelligence problems that had been experienced at the laboratories and had resulted in the formation of the new Office of Counterintelligence during the two days leading up to the hearing; the subcommittee had a difficult time obtaining the prepared testimony of Mr. Trulock as required by committee rules. According to committee rules, witnesses need to have their prepared testimony to the committee 48 hours before a hearing. The Department told us Mr. Trulock's testimony was being reviewed and was not yet available.
Multiple inquiries over these two days were met with responses that Mr. Trulock's testimony was being reviewed and that some changes were being made, much of the testimony was not available to the subcommittee until a couple of hours before the hearing.
It is interesting to note that in the middle of this prepared testimony it is very evident that a paragraph had been stricken and replaced, as the size of the typeface had changed. We wondered what had been removed.
At the executive session I asked Secretary Moler under oath if she had directed the removal of portions of the prepared testimony of any of the witnesses. She responded that she had directed that certain information be removed from Mr. Trulock's testimony because she had determined that it was, quote, ''not relevant to the subject of the subcommittee hearing.'' Unquote.
Secretary Moler then indicated that, although she had directed the removal of certain information from the testimony, the Department of Energy was prepared to be fully responsive to the subcommittee's inquiries. I then asked Mr. Trulock to provide the information that had been removed from his testimony. It was not provided.
Consequently, on March 24, 1999, Mr. Sisisky and I wrote to Secretary Richardson asking that he provide the information that was removed from the prepared testimony of the witnesses for the October 6 hearing. We have not yet received anything in response.
If espionage activities have occurred at the DOE laboratories, this subcommittee needs to be fully informed. The Military Procurement Subcommittee authorizes two-thirds of the budget of the Department of Energy. Our jurisdiction covers the targets of foreign espionage, that is, the nuclear weapons development and production facilities, as well as the program that may prevent such activity, the Department's Office of Counterintelligence. We need candor from the Department on losses that this country has suffered as a result of lax security and espionage and explanations on what is being done to remedy the situation.
Testifying before our subcommittee today are Dr. Ernest Moniz, Under Secretary of Energy; Mr. Edward Curran, Director of the Office of Counterintelligence; Mr. Notra Trulock, Acting Assistant Director of the Office of Intelligence; and Ms. Elizabeth Moler, former Deputy Secretary of Energy, who is now in private practice.
With that explanation of the history of this situation, let me now recognize the distinguished Ranking Member of the subcommittee, my good friend Mr. Sisisky, for any comments he might have.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN SISISKY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. SISISKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join with you in welcoming back our witnesses today for this hearing. I welcome the opportunity to hear their views as we build on the information we received in the hearing conducted last October on the foreign visitors program.
As a member of both this subcommittee and the House Intelligence Committee, I am aware of the number of ongoing initiatives that address our ability to ensure protection of critical national security information in the Department of Energy enterprise. I also know that the assessment of the extent and impacts of any prior loss of classified critical nuclear information has not yet been completed. From the recent briefings I have received, and my discussions with Secretary Richardson, I am confident that the ongoing initiatives are moving in the right direction. That is the good news.
But this hearing is not about any of those activities. It is my understanding that the motivation for this hearing is to get a better understanding of the accuracy and completeness of the testimony we received at the October 6, 1998, hearing.
Mr. Chairman, it is absolutely important that we understand more completely the facts surrounding the concern that critical information was withheld from the subcommittee during the October 6, 1998, hearing. I did have an opportunity to monitor some of the hearing that the Senate Armed Services Committee held on this matter this past Monday, and most of my colleagues have probably seen the media reports of what transpired at the hearing. I also know that at least ten other congressional committees, and I repeat, ten other congressional committees, have demanded time to look at this allegation of withholding information.
Mr. Chairman, I am worried that we, on this subcommittee, will become so mesmerized by what has happened in the past that we will not have sufficient time to address the critical needs of today and tomorrow, and I think that would be equally detrimental to our national security.
On the surface, this appears to me to be more of a process issue; but it is a process issue that must be addressed now because of the potential long-term implications on the credibility of testimony we receive from the Department.
I hope it is not a case of if you ask the right question, you might get the right answer. My expectations are that the appropriate congressional committees will, as a norm, be informed in a responsive manner; and I do not believe that my expectations are unreasonable.
Clarity on this process issue is critical for the subcommittee in exercising its oversight responsibilities.
There are two other questions I am interested in learning about. First, what was the basis for determining that the redacted information was or was not appropriate for the October 6, 1998, hearing; and second, what committees were informed and when. For those reasons, I look forward to this hearing and the testimony of our witnesses.
Before I close, Mr. Chairman, there are two hearing procedures that I am concerned about. The first relates to the potential for inadvertent release of sensitive or classified information in this open session. I remind my colleagues that most of the October hearing was conducted in closed session.
Second, the Secretary of the Department of Energy has directed his Inspector General to conduct an investigation into the allegation of withholding information. At the risk of compromising the investigation, it might be inappropriate for some DOE officials to answer some of our questions relating to the allegation.
With those remarks, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HUNTER. I thank you, Mr. Sisisky, for your remarks. At this time we have also the Chairman of the Full Committee with us. Mr. Spence, would you like to make any remarks?
Chairman SPENCE. No thank you. I have just come to listen.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you very much for being with us, sir. It is my intention right now to swear in all the witnesses, as we did on October 6 of last year. I would ask that all of you rise and raise your right hands, and I will administer the oath.
Mr. HUNTER. Please be seated. Mr. Trulock, I want to start out asking you a few questions. You appeared before us on March 6; and after the open session—we went into an open session, did we not?
STATEMENT OF MR. NOTRA TRULOCK, III, ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. TRULOCK. Through to a closed session, yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Was any information removed from the testimony you were going to present in the October hearing?
Mr. TRULOCK. Mr. Chairman, my first draft of my written testimony was edited and information was removed. I believe that that came about as the result of a difference of view between the Deputy Secretary and myself with regard to the subject matter of the particular hearing in question. We discussed this after she had reviewed my testimony, and I believe that she felt that your intention was to cover the foreign visits and assignments activity. I believed, based on e-mail I had received and other instructions from our congressional representatives, that you were interested in covering the facts and circumstances leading to the establishment of the Office of Counterintelligence.
Much of the information that I had included in my original draft was, in fact, edited out at that point. Under oath, however, I think, I believe I conveyed the full essence of what I had in my original draft.
Now, let me say, if I may, I also believe that I did not make full disclosure at that hearing in that I did not discuss what has become known as the Kindred Spirit Case. For that I wish to apologize.
Mr. HUNTER. You are talking about the theft at Los Alamos?
Mr. HUNTER. At that hearing, I did ask you with Ms. Moler sitting next to you to describe any espionage activities that had resulted in losses to the United States at our national laboratories, did I not?
Mr. TRULOCK. Indeed you did.
Mr. HUNTER. And yet you didn't describe that particular loss?
Mr. TRULOCK. I did not, no.
Mr. HUNTER. At the time you knew that the loss had occurred?
Mr. TRULOCK. Of course I did.
Mr. HUNTER. And Ms. Moler knew that the loss had occurred?
Mr. TRULOCK. She did.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Why didn't you tell us about that?
Mr. TRULOCK. At that point in time, my standing orders from Secretary Pena and Deputy Secretary Moler were not to discuss the Kindred Spirit Case without the explicit authorization of then Deputy Secretary Moler. Although the event is in dispute at this point, approximately two months earlier I had received a request from Chairman Goss of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for a briefing on this information. Deputy Secretary Moler denied that request.
I, frankly, felt that it would be inappropriate for me to inform this committee, without first having informed Chairman Goss, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
I would say that I received no instructions or indications from Deputy Secretary Moler that led me to believe that I would be able, or could be able, to in fact discuss the Kindred Spirit case with you.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So the Secretary had told you not to give us this information.
Mr. TRULOCK. The restriction on the briefing was not targeted at this committee specifically. It included going back into the summer of 1997 briefings for other members of the Administration, as well as Capitol Hill. I was to obtain permission from the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary by name before I was to provide this type of information.
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt for one moment. Was that written or oral?
Mr. TRULOCK. It was oral.
Mr. HUNTER. Did Secretary Moler give you any reason for not disclosing this loss to the committee or any other committees?
Mr. HUNTER. I understand. But did she give you a reason and tell you why she didn't want you to tell us about this particular loss?
Mr. TRULOCK. She did not give—I can only repeat myself, sir. We did not discuss the option of talking to this committee about Kindred Spirit.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. I am talking about Kindred Spirit loss with respect to talking to anybody, when she said I don't want you telling anybody about this, unless you talk to me first. Did she give a reason for that?
Mr. TRULOCK. As I have stated previously, we had a conversation on or about July 28 when I renewed my request to satisfy Chairman Goss' request; and she observed that they—again by ''they,'' I believe she was referring to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence—only wanted to hurt the President on his China policy.
She cannot recall that conversation.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Ms. Moler, you were side by side with Mr. Trulock when we went into executive session, and you were under oath during the October hearing, weren't you?
Ms. MOLER. Yes, sir, I was.
Mr. HUNTER. You told us you would tell us the whole truth and nothing but the truth?
Ms. MOLER. That is correct.
Mr. HUNTER. I asked two times, did I not—and you have had a chance to review this testimony—to tell us about any recent espionage activities at the national laboratories, did I not?
Ms. MOLER. That is correct.
Mr. HUNTER. You knew that this loss had occurred, did you not?
Ms. MOLER. Yes, I did.
Mr. HUNTER. Why didn't you tell us?
Ms. MOLER. You asked Mr. Trulock to review the losses that had occurred. You did not ask me, sir, to review the losses that had occurred.
Mr. HUNTER. Didn't you feel you had a duty to us to tell us the whole truth as you had been sworn to do? You had your subordinate sitting side by side with you.
Ms. MOLER. Yes, I did.
Mr. HUNTER. You realized he didn't give us an answer to it. He went over several losses, but never went over this loss we are talking about, did he? He didn't mention it?
Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, at the time that we had that hearing—and I have just today had an opportunity to review the transcript. At the time we had that hearing—I do have a few opening remarks I would like to make that explain the context of that.
Mr. HUNTER. I will tell you what, how about if you answer this question, because I wanted to leave Mr. Trulock's testimony and ask you for your position on it; then you will be free to expand and give any other testimony you want. What I want to know is you knew that this loss had taken place; you told me you took the oath, said I want to tell the whole truth. I will tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Ms. MOLER. Correct.
Mr. HUNTER. You then told us that while his written testimony had been limited to foreign lab visits—visits to the labs by foreign visitors; that you were prepared to testify fully with respect to security at the laboratories; that you were there, sitting there, available, ready to go, did you not?
Ms. MOLER. I did.
Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, I believe at the time of the hearing, in light of your direct question on that subject to Mr. Trulock, it would have been appropriate to talk about the particular Kindred Spirit Case. He chose not to.
Mr. HUNTER. You didn't feel that you had an obligation?
Ms. MOLER. The questions were directed to him, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask you something, Ms. Moler. We set Mr. Trulock as the witness in this hearing. We told your Department we didn't need you for this testimony because we thought he had the information that we needed. Your office called up and insisted that you be present. You were allowed to be present, and you came into the hearing room and sat right next to your subordinate.
Now you are telling me you didn't feel you had any testimony obligation at the hearing. Then why were you there, because we didn't tell you you had to come to it?
Ms. MOLER. As I said at the time, both in the open session and the closed session, I thought it was important for the subcommittee to hear about the progress that we had been making in the Department with respect to the counterintelligence program.
Ms. MOLER. Which I acknowledged.
Mr. HUNTER. You then said, however, we certainly are here to testify fully.
Ms. MOLER. That is correct.
Mr. HUNTER. Well, then when I asked the question about this most recent loss and was given no information on it, said what losses have occurred at the national labs, why didn't you testify fully? You said ''we.'' You didn't say Mr. Trulock. You said ''we''.
Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, I believe that a careful reading of the transcript will show that Mr. Trulock was asked those questions. I was not asked for my view, nor am I particularly expert in the particular losses that had occurred.
Mr. HUNTER. But you knew that that loss had occurred?
Ms. MOLER. That is correct.
Mr. HUNTER. And you didn't tell us anything about it?
Mr. HUNTER. Yes, I think that is true. But you did say we certainly are here to testify fully.
Ms. MOLER. As I just said, sir, I think under the circumstance of that hearing, it would have been appropriate for Mr. Trulock to share that information. We did not have an opportunity to talk about it at the time. We were both there. I was surprised at the tone and the tenor of your questions. I cannot explain to you today the particular reason that Mr. Trulock chose not to discuss that issue.
Mr. HUNTER. Why didn't you choose—obviously you said we are here to testify fully; you had been sworn in; you said you wanted to attend and sat at the witness table with Mr. Trulock. Why didn't you tell us about it? You are his boss. You knew about it.
Ms. MOLER. You did not ask me that question, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. I know. I want to know why you didn't say here is a loss that we have and give it to the committee? You certainly were at license to testify to the committee. Even though the question wasn't directed to you, it was directed to your subordinate. Your subordinate did not answer the question. We have all acknowledged that. Why didn't you say here is the loss and tell us about it? Why didn't you inform us?
Ms. MOLER. Sir, I have answered your question the best I can. I have said that that question was not asked of me. That is the only answer I am capable of giving.
Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask you this question.
Mr. TRULOCK. Mr. Chairman, if I may?
Mr. HUNTER. Yes?
Mr. TRULOCK. I am willing to take the responsibility for my failure in this case. I apologize to you, Mr. Chairman, to Chairman Spence, and this committee. I did not make full disclosure.
However, I was under explicit instructions from Acting Secretary Moler, then Deputy Secretary Moler, not to discuss this case without her explicit permission. I do not offer that as a defense. I was under oath. I should have responded in full. I did not. I am willing to accept my responsibility for my failure.
Mr. HUNTER. After you left the hearing, did you and Ms. Moler have any conversations about the failure to inform us about this loss when we asked the question?
Mr. TRULOCK. We did not. I was taken to task by senior members of the Department who believed that I had informed you that Deputy Secretary Moler and others were editing my testimony. I deny then and I vehemently deny today having had any conversations with you to that effect.
There was one reference from Mr. Richenbach, who I believe was at the hearing; who, my recollection is, he said well, at least they didn't get the W–88 out of us at that point. That is my recollection of the conversation.
Mr. HUNTER. That was a meeting that was with Ms. Moler?
Mr. TRULOCK. It was, I believe, in passing. I had no further meetings with Deputy Secretary Moler after that October 6 testimony.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Mr. Sisisky, I am going to let them make their statements; but I want to get a few basics down first before we continue, because we are reviewing what was said and what was done at our last hearing. When we lay this groundwork, we will pursue the testimony.
Mr. Trulock, you were taken to task by members of the DOE for revealing to us that your testimony had been edited by Ms. Moler?
Mr. TRULOCK. I was accused of tipping off the committee that Deputy Secretary Moler was editing my testimony before it came up here.
Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask you this: In your estimation, did the failure to disclose to us when we asked about losses at the national labs, did that harm our ability to respond to this crisis and to take care of it?
Mr. TRULOCK. My failure clearly did not give you a full picture of the scope and magnitude of the threat to the national laboratories.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Okay, Mr. Trulock. Thank you. Now, Ms. Moler, if you want to present your testimony, go right ahead. Ms. Moler, we are going to allow you to go ahead and then go back to Mr. Trulock and Dr. Moniz and Mr. Curran.
STATEMENT OF MS. ELIZABETH MOLER, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Ms. MOLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have a lengthy formal prepared statement. I do think it is appropriate to put the circumstance of the subcommittee's hearing in particular context.
As the Chairman has indicated, I have appeared before this committee—subcommittee, once before, on October 6, 1998. On that date, the written request of the subcommittee was to provide testimony with respect to the Department of Energy's foreign visitors and assignments programs at our three national weapons laboratories.
At that time, I assured the Members of the subcommittee that the Department of Energy is as committed to protecting classified and sensitive information as they are to maintaining the scientific excellence of the laboratories. We all agreed, subcommittee Members and the Department of Energy representatives alike, that DOE must have a robust system for tracking foreign visitors and assignees to our weapons laboratories, and for ensuring the security of classified and sensitive information during their visits.
I outlined at the time the Department's efforts to develop a comprehensive counterintelligence program for the laboratories. Secretary Richardson has implemented a comprehensive counterintelligence program that was developed while I was Deputy Secretary and Acting Secretary. That program has my full support.
I think it is important to remember that the Department has two different needs that must be balanced. First, the Department's world-class scientific institutions require extensive interactions with leading scientists and institutions from around the world. The open exchange of information is central to maintaining scientific leadership in pursuit of critical national security missions.
Mr. HUNTER. If you can suspend for a minute, we need to take a vote to give us the authorization to close the committee while we still have enough committee Members here. I will now recognize Mr. Sisisky for the purpose of a motion.
Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to House Rule 10(g) and Committee Rule 9(a), I move that the subcommittee be authorized to close today's hearing at the appropriate point for reasons of national security, and which closing does not apply to appropriately cleared members' staff.
Mr. HUNTER. The House and committee rules require a roll call vote. The Clerk will call the roll.
Mr. HUNTER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Hunter votes aye.
Mr. SISISKY. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Sisisky votes aye.
Mr. SPENCE. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Spence votes aye.
Mr. SKELTON. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Skelton votes aye.
Mr. STUMP. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Stump votes aye.
Mr. SPRATT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Spratt votes aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Evans.
The CLERK. Mr. Saxton.
The CLERK. Mr. Blagojevich.
The CLERK. Mr. Talent.
The CLERK. Mr. Allen.
Mr. ALLEN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Allen votes aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Turner.
Mr. TURNER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Turner votes aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Smith votes aye.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Thornberry votes aye.
Mr. MALONEY. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Maloney votes aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Graham.
Mr. GRAHAM. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Graham votes aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Ryun.
Mr. RYUN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Ryun votes aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. GIBBONS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Gibbons votes aye.
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mrs. Tauscher votes aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Brady.
The CLERK. Mr. Pitts.
Mr. PITTS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Pitts votes aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Hansen.
The CLERK. Mr. Evans.
The CLERK. Mr. Saxton.
The CLERK. Mr. Blagojevich.
The CLERK. Mr. Talent.
The CLERK. Mr. Everett.
The CLERK. Mr. Watts.
The CLERK. Mr. McIntyre.
The CLERK. Ms. McKinney.
The CLERK. Ms. Bono.
The CLERK. Mr. Brady.
The CLERK. Mr. Hayes.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, 16 in favor.
Mr. HUNTER. The motion passes. And, Ms. Moler, you may continue. I want to just admonish the witnesses that the purpose for the hearing today is not to restate the DOE's policy with respect to the foreign visitor program or the counterintelligence program. The main purpose of the hearing is to ascertain why we weren't told the whole truth in the hearing that we had on October 6, why that didn't occur, and what the motivation for that was.
Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, I do not have a lengthy statement, but I do think it is only fair that I set the context for the Department of Energy's laboratories, also how some of our Nation's most sensitive secrets—balancing the need for openness with the need for protecting vital secrets—is a difficult challenge.
Mr. HUNTER. Let me just hold you up on that point. The question that we asked you was a question that was asked you in closed session, so there was no reason in terms of confidentiality for you not to give us the answer about this loss at Los Alamos, was there?
Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me, I would appreciate it if I could have an opportunity to do one more paragraph and then get directly to the question you are asking me.
Mr. HUNTER. I would like you to answer that question right now, Ms. Moler. You have made a statement to the effect that you have to balance the need for confidentiality with disclosure. The implication is that there was some justification for not telling this subcommittee the truth when you were under oath in a classified session. There was no disclosure danger at that time. This is the subcommittee that oversees your operations and funds the national laboratories and the security apparatus at the national laboratories. So there was no confidentiality requirement at that time not to give us the full information on these losses, was there?
Ms. MOLER. At that time, I agree with you. That is correct.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Trulock, was there any reason in your estimation not to tell us the full truth from a confidentiality standpoint?
Mr. TRULOCK. Since the session was closed, there was no reason not to tell you the full truth.
Mr. HUNTER. Go ahead.
Ms. MOLER. As we have discussed, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Trulock prepared testimony for the subcommittee's closed session on the foreign visitors and assignments program. Mr. Trulock's prepared testimony also included highly classified information that was to be shared only through restricted channels. The testimony had not been cleared by the National Security Council or the Central Intelligence Agency.
When I first reviewed his testimony, it included information that was not relevant, as we discussed, to the foreign visitors and assignments program. I directed Mr. Trulock to limit his prepared testimony to the subject matter of the hearing, that is, the foreign visitors and assignments program.
I did not edit his testimony; I requested him, directed him, to revise the testimony. He did the revisions.
Mr. HUNTER. On that point, did you tell him to extract anything in particular? Without telling us what it was, did you tell him to extract any portions of the testimony?
Ms. MOLER. At the time, as I acknowledged to the subcommittee, I directed him to limit his testimony to the foreign visitors and assignments program.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay.
Ms. MOLER. That was my testimony then; it is my testimony today.
Mr. HUNTER. My question is, did you tell him to extract any particular thing from the testimony?
Ms. MOLER. No, I did not.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Please proceed.
Ms. MOLER. I believe that his prepared testimony unfairly impuned a very important international scientific exchange program. I also said that we would answer any of the subcommittee's questions in both open and closed sessions.
Mr. HUNTER. On that point, Ms. Moler, you said you thought that his testimony impuned the scientific exchange program. The loss we are talking about of the nuclear weapons secrets at Los Alamos had nothing to do with the scientific exchange program, did they?
Ms. MOLER. That is correct.
Mr. HUNTER. So there was no reason to extract information about that from the record.
Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, your request to testify that I saw asked the Department to prepare testimony on the foreign visitors and assignments program. I was never told of e-mail traffic between your staff and Mr. Trulock that he broaden his testimony. I believed then that the subject matter was the foreign visitors and assignments program.
Mr. HUNTER. But my question to you is this: You just stated that you thought that Mr. Trulock's testimony impuned the scientific exchange program. You just said that. But the loss we are talking about of nuclear weapons secrets has nothing to do with the scientific exchange program. I am trying to figure out what was extracted from this testimony. Did you extract some portions that had to do with the scientific exchange program? Were some of those revised out?
Ms. MOLER. I do not now have access to the prepared testimony. My recollection is that I told Mr. Trulock to limit his testimony to the foreign visitors and assignments program. That is all I told him.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Then you have stated just a minute ago that you thought his testimony impuned the scientific exchange program. The implication that I got was that in some way you edited part of his testimony or he revised part of his testimony with respect to the scientific exchange program. Why did you just tell us that, if there is no reason for that?
Ms. MOLER. The reason I thought it impuned a very important scientific international exchange program is because by mixing discussions of intelligence-gathering at our laboratories that do not involve the foreign visitors and assignments program I believe that you are mixing up the picture that you present.
Mr. HUNTER. My only question is, Ms. Moler—I want to save you time—my only question is did you extract or revise from Mr. Trulock's statement—and I wish we had the statement—I wouldn't have to ask you these questions—but DOE has not yet given us the statement and won't give it to us until certain things happen. Did you extract from his testimony anything with respect to the foreign visitors exchange program?
Ms. MOLER. All—
Mr. HUNTER.—that you can recall?
I did not edit his testimony. He chose what he included and what he excluded at that point. To my knowledge, he did not exclude any discussion of the foreign visitors and exchange program.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Please proceed.
Ms. MOLER. As I said, Mr. Chairman, it is important to stress that the recent reports of espionage at the Los Alamos national laboratory do not involve the foreign visitors program, nor does an earlier espionage case. I hope that the hysteria over the recent case does not result in putting up fences around the laboratories that say ''No foreign visitors allowed.'' Doing so would hurt our national security, rather than enhance it.
Finally, let me state categorically to the members of the subcommittee that I never withheld information from the Congress because of a concern that providing information would undermine the Clinton Administration's China policy. I have been accused of doing so. Those accusations are false.
Mr. HUNTER. But you did sit in a hearing under oath when I asked the question, have any losses occurred at our national nuclear laboratories, and you said nothing about the loss that we are talking about.
Ms. MOLER. Neither Mr. Trulock nor I said anything about that. With the benefit of hindsight, that was a mistake, sir; and I apologize for that.
Mr. HUNTER. Did you ever tell Mr. Trulock not to tell us about this loss?
Ms. MOLER. No, I did not. The Secretary of Energy at the time, Federico Pena, and I believe it was originally his decision, that information about the particular loss be limited and held as provided through restricted channels. That is a common practice when one is dealing with highly sensitive and highly classified information. Information about the particular loss was shared on numerous occasions, as Mr. Sisisky has indicated, with the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. That is, in my estimation, the proper channel for sharing this information.
Mr. HUNTER. It is your testimony then that you never told Mr. Trulock not to tell us about this loss? You never instructed him not to tell us about this loss?
Ms. MOLER. I instructed him, as I have said, as clearly as I am capable of saying it, to limit his prepared testimony to the foreign visitors and assignments program. I did that because those are the words I read on paper in the subcommittee's letter of request, invitation. That was the announced scope of the hearing. I did not specifically instruct him—
Mr. HUNTER. My question is not referring solely to the preparation of written testimony by Mr. Trulock. I am referring to his statement that you instructed him not to tell anyone in the Congress about this loss of nuclear weapons secrets. Did you ever instruct him not to tell us about that loss? That is what I want to know about.
Ms. MOLER. Perhaps I misunderstood your question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay.
Ms. MOLER. Maybe it would be best if we restate it—if you could, please. I will listen to it very carefully.
Mr. HUNTER. Did you ever instruct Mr. Trulock not to tell Congress about the loss of the nuclear weapons secrets at Los Alamos?
Ms. MOLER. Mr. Trulock was under the direct instruction that information about this program should be handled through appropriate channels. I was never aware of a request from a committee of Congress for Mr. Trulock to discuss this information with the Congress.
Mr. HUNTER. So you never gave him a general admonishment, ''Don't tell anybody about this loss?''
Ms. MOLER. He was under very specific instructions to limit dissemination about this program; that is correct. But he never received a request to my knowledge that he shared with—
Mr. HUNTER. Who gave the instructions?
Mr. HUNTER. What did you tell him, as close to verbatim as you can describe? I want to know what you said to him. You said he was under instructions. What did you say to him?
Ms. MOLER. When we first learned of Mr. Trulock's theory about intelligence gathering at the laboratories, the Secretary made a decision that dissemination of that information should be handled through restricted channels in the classified sense.
Mr. HUNTER. So what did you tell him? What did you tell Mr. Trulock?
Ms. MOLER. Handle it as SCI information.
Mr. HUNTER. What did you say to him?
Ms. MOLER. We were all present in the Department's security classified area. He was told at the time that we should limit access to this information, as is typically the case with highly classified information.
Mr. HUNTER. So you told him to limit the information.
Ms. MOLER. I believe that Secretary Pena told him that.
Ms. MOLER. I do not recall giving him any specific instructions, but it is entirely possible I did. I well understood this was restricted data.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Mr. Trulock—
Ms. MOLER. And is today restricted data.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Trulock, you have heard Ms. Moler's statement.
Mr. TRULOCK. I have.
Mr. HUNTER. Do you agree with it?
Mr. TRULOCK. No. Let me make three points.
Mr. HUNTER. Why not?
Mr. TRULOCK. First of all, Ms. Moler says that the testimony was not reviewed by the National Security Council, nor the Central Intelligence Agency.
Ms. MOLER. I did not say that, sir. I said it was not cleared.
Mr. HUNTER. Go right ahead.
Mr. TRULOCK. In fact, the Central Intelligence Agency reviewed and approved that testimony. My original draft of the testimony was forwarded to CIA by Deputy Secretary Moler's office. I had a discussion with a special assistant, the deputy DCI, General Gordon, who told me the testimony had been reviewed by CIA's counterintelligence center. They were delighted that someone at DOE was finally going to tell the Hill what was going on out at the national laboratories.
Despite this, my testimony was edited by Deputy Secretary Moler. Her specific instructions were to remove any and all references about successful espionage activities against the national laboratories.
Mr. HUNTER. So it is your testimony that she didn't give you a general statement to the effect that you should limit this to foreign visitors, but that you should in fact remove specific parts of your testimony?
Mr. TRULOCK. The conversation opened with an instruction to limit myself to foreign visitors and assignments. I replied to her that my instructions from our congressional representatives were to discuss the facts and circumstances that led to the creation of the Office of Counterintelligence.
In my view, limiting my testimony to the foreign visitors and assignments program would not be responsive to your request since, in fact, there was much more that led to the establishment of that office.
She then replied to me, you have got stuff in this testimony that talks about successful espionage. Get it out.
However, at no point in my original draft did I make any reference to the Kindred Spirit Case itself. She has implied that I was willing to compromise information of a higher classification nature. I will tell you the only person at the Department authorized to make judgments about the classification of intelligence information are the Secretary, who is the senior officer of the intelligence community, and myself, the Senior Intelligence Officer of the Department. Nothing in my testimony exceeded the classification which the paper bore.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Sisisky.
Mr. SISISKY. Dr. Moniz, I have talked about process before, but if you don't mind, and Ms. Moler too, the question I am going to ask, what is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Department of Energy for notifying the Congress and congressional jurisdictional issues associated with providing information to congressional committees on potential espionage or counterintelligence issues?
STATEMENT OF DR. ERNEST J. MONIZ, UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Dr. MONIZ. The Department—
Mr. SISISKY. I think this is what this is all about, I believe.
Dr. MONIZ. Well, the Department's understanding of Mr. Trulock's responsibilities to notify Congress of intelligence information flows particularly from section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 and section 303A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Mr. SISISKY. Push that microphone closer to you, please. Thank you.
Dr. MONIZ. And, of course, the Department of Energy is a member of the intelligence community. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981, and again in 1991, amended the National Security Act to require that agency heads ''keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities.'' The intelligence committees defined in the National Security Act are the SISCI and the HPSCI. The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, in essence, mandates the atomic energy defense matters that comprise intelligence activities, which includes counterintelligence, be reported to the House and Senate intelligence committees.
The provision of legislation requires that the Secretary of Energy inform SISCI and HPSCI related to ongoing foreign intelligence and counterintelligence matters related to atomic defense activities at an appropriate level of detail.
Mr. SISISKY. The word is inform there?
Dr. MONIZ. Correct. And provide the same intelligence committees with information requested needed to carry out their responsibilities. In short, the legal analysis of the Department of Energy applied to intelligence and counterintelligence matters concludes the Department fulfill its statutory obligations upon briefing the HPSCI and SISCI. In addition, the National Security Act leaves some room for the exercise of judgment by the Secretary in order to meet the statutory obligation to keep those committees fully and currently informed.
Discussion here does not address, of course, the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence or the FBI in informing the Congress, nor does it reflect the procedures of the SISCI or the HPSCI, which have evolved over the years to make information available within the Congress on sensitive intelligence matters.
Nor does it speak to what other committees the Secretary of Energy could inform. It simply reports in the first instance the statutory responsibilities of the Department of Energy.
However, moving forward, the Secretary is very committed to working, to having the Administration and the Congress work together to revisit these guidelines on the matter of future briefings. The Secretary is committed to improving the briefings we can give you specifically on national security matters. The Secretary, in fact, recently insisted that your staff, the Chair's staff and your staff, Mr. Sisisky, be briefed on new developments and to receive regular briefings on sensitive intelligence matters.
The Secretary is concerned that in the past, briefings on these matters were limited to only, in fact, this one committee in each chamber. The Department of Energy, in fact, has over nine oversight committees in the House and Senate; and we intend to review whether it is appropriate, and how it is appropriate, to broaden briefings to additional committees on matters such as this.
Finally, the Secretary also recently directed that the Department will write an annual report to Congress on the status of our counterintelligence and foreign visitors programs to improve our ability to inform you.
Mr. SISISKY. Just to get that on the record, all right. Ms. Moler, are you still convinced after you heard questions back and forth that you followed the spirit and intent of the law in informing Congress regarding the espionage case initially and specifically in your review of the testimony prepared for the October 6, 1998, Procurement Subcommittee hearing?
Ms. MOLER. Mr. Sisisky, the particular intent of the existing law as I understood it at the time is to have the Department inform the Congress, as Dr. Moniz has outlined, of significant espionage activities. The National Security Act applies, as he has outlined, as does the Intelligence Authorization Act for 1998.
The creation of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees was, as I understand it and recall it, was to have a proper repository within the Congress for particularly sensitive information. There is, of course, a nexus between Members of this committee and those who serve on the Intelligence Committee, so that there will be cross-pollination, if you will, between the two committees, just as there is in the Senate between the Armed Services Committee and the Senate Intelligence Committee.
The Chairman and Ranking Member of those committees are briefed routinely about particularly sensitive information, including law enforcement information. I believe that it was entirely consistent with the practice that the FBI has followed and the DOD has followed for those committees to be briefed about the particular case.
I would respectfully suggest that if the Congress no longer believes that is appropriate, that the law should be changed so that those who are in agencies and departments have a more specific directive to share information of that nature, if you want that to be done.
Mr. SISISKY. What worries me, and I serve on both of those committees—
Ms. MOLER. I know you do, sir.
Mr. SISISKY.—is that if you did not clear something with the NSC or the CIA, and somebody asked you a direct question, you cannot answer it? Is that what I heard a little while ago? That was testimony; there are direct questions too. Is that a prevailing thing in this government?
Ms. MOLER. As I said earlier, I believed it was appropriate to limit the scope of the testimony to the subject matter that the Department was in its letter of invitation directed to address. When we were then in closed hearing, in closed session, when asked a direct question on the subject, I believe with benefit of hindsight that we should have been more responsive in this area. But I believe it was appropriate at the time to limit the testimony, answer the question asked, if you will.
This is highly, highly sensitive information.
Mr. HUNTER. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. SISISKY. Yes.
Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Ms. Moler, I am going to give you a letter in a couple of seconds. I want to have it walked down to you. This is the invitation letter. The invitation letter says the testimony of Mr. Curran and Mr. Trulock will be received in closed session, as it will pertain to counterintelligence and intelligence matters.
That is what is in the letter of invitation. Certainly the loss of a nuclear weapons secret at Los Alamos pertains to intelligence and counterintelligence matters.
Did you read this letter of invitation?
Ms. MOLER. I recall reading it at the time, yes, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. And didn't we say we were going to talk about counterintelligence and intelligence matters when we went into closed session?
Ms. MOLER. Yes, I believe you did.
Mr. HUNTER. Then why would you not tell us about this major loss at our laboratory when we asked a direct question on that, and you said in your testimony that we certainly are here to testify fully? We said in the letter of invitation that it was counterintelligence and intelligence matters, did we not?
Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, I have explained as clearly as I am capable of doing it.
Mr. HUNTER. Well, I want to make sure you understand what the letter said, because perhaps you didn't read it. The letter of invitation, I am quoting the letter, ''The testimony of Mr. Curran and Mr. Trulock will be received in a closed session as it will pertain to counterintelligence and intelligence matters.''
Do you consider that making this major loss of an intelligence secret not relevant to that hearing?
Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, I believe, with the benefit of hindsight, which is obviously much more clear than it is at the time, that it would have been appropriate when asked—when Mr. Trulock was asked that question, or perhaps I should have jumped in, though I was not personally asked that question, to discuss the particular case that was omitted from his prepared testimony.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay.
Mr. SISISKY. Let me reclaim my time. Mr. Trulock, I have got to ask you this question.
Mr. TRULOCK. Yes, sir.
Mr. SISISKY. You had stated—and I have heard, and you have heard it also—that in some way you have been able to talk to Members about what was happening. I think you have heard the rumor that that was happening.
Mr. TRULOCK. Let me make sure I understand. You are referring to the allegation that I had tipped off the committee that Deputy Secretary Moler was editing my testimony before we came up here?
Mr. TRULOCK. I heard about it after the fact. I was not aware when I walked in the room.
Mr. SISISKY. Of course, you denied you had done that?
Mr. TRULOCK. Absolutely.
Mr. SISISKY. I appreciate that. I wrote down something. I don't know if it was you saying it or somebody else, something about e-mail. Did you mention e-mail?
Mr. TRULOCK. Well, in the sense that I have both the letter from Chairman Hunter, which is dated September 30, 1998. On the 29th of September, I had a tip off from an individual in our congressional office, who told me about the hearing, when it would begin, who would testify in open session, a DOE witness has been requested to testify—this is an unclassified e-mail by the way—been requested to testify after the lab directors on the Department's role in managing and overseeing.
''The hearing will then convene in closed session in room 2212 Rayburn. The subcommittee has requested that Notra Trulock testify about the facts and circumstances which led ultimately to the creation of the new Office of Counterintelligence. That testimony will be followed by that of Ed Curran. The subcommittee expects his testimony to address the role of the office, the relationship to the labs, recommendations from the recent study, and resource requirements.''
I believe that reference was with regard to—
Mr. SISISKY. That e-mail was to you?
Mr. TRULOCK. The e-mail is addressed to me and says I sent this to you and a cast of thousands. But the specific address, it is one of these forwarded—
Mr. SISISKY. You are identified then.
Mr. TRULOCK. Yes, sir.
Mr. SISISKY. And you didn't talk to Members. I have to ask this question. Did you talk to staff?
Mr. TRULOCK. No. I received repeated phone calls—let me just be candid. Mr. Berry pestered me to death for the testimony. Finally, I did the sort of bureaucratic dodge and let him speak to my executive assistant who, I believe, continued to tell him that the testimony was in review.
Mr. SISISKY. I had to ask you that question.
Mr. HUNTER. Let me just give kudos to Mr. Berry, because we certainly didn't get the information from you folks about this loss.
Mr. HUNTER. Let me just follow that up. Ms. Moler, is there any law that you think prohibited you from telling the National Security Committee in a secret session that oversees three-quarters of the DOE's budget, including all the nuclear weapons labs, about the loss of a nuclear weapons secret? Was there any law that prohibited you, in your estimation, from doing that?
Ms. MOLER. No.
Mr. HUNTER. Did any intelligence agency instruct you not to tell us about this loss?
Ms. MOLER. No.
Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Moniz, you mentioned you have a mandatory statutory duty to inform the intelligence committees on such things. That doesn't preclude you from informing the then National Security Committee about national security losses, does it?
Dr. MONIZ. The Secretary has discretion on that.
Mr. HUNTER. Had discretion to do what?
Dr. MONIZ. Has discretion to inform other oversight committees.
Dr. MONIZ. That is correct.
Mr. HUNTER. That doesn't bar him if he is requested or ultimately subpoenaed to testify about national security losses to the National Security Committee, does it?
Dr. MONIZ. That is correct.
Mr. HUNTER. So there is no exclusion of the National Security Committee, now Armed Services Committee, from that information, is there?
Dr. MONIZ. It is not an exclusion, with the one qualifier that I will add—
Mr. HUNTER. My point is this: we are not getting after the Department of Energy or the Secretary or Ms. Moler or Mr. Trulock for failing to exercise proactive discretion to tell us about something they thought we should know about. We are very upset because we put them under oath, asked them a specific question about a nuclear weapons loss, and they sat there and didn't tell us. That is what we are upset about.
Now, while we are at it, Dr. Moniz, when was the individual who was the subject of this thing moved from his job? Can you talk about that without going into classified session?
STATEMENT OF MR. EDWARD J. CURRAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. CURRAN. The most recent one?
Mr. HUNTER. Yes.
Mr. CURRAN. In December of last year.
Dr. MONIZ. Can you say that?
Mr. CURRAN. Yes.
Mr. HUNTER. Obviously we held this hearing months earlier than that, did we not?
Mr. CURRAN. Yes.
Mr. HUNTER. So we might have had some interest in whether or not an individual who was thought perhaps to be stealing nuclear secrets might stay in his position and perhaps do some more damage to the United States, if we had known about it, mightn't we?
Mr. CURRAN. Are you referring that to me, sir?
Mr. HUNTER. Yes. Anybody.
Mr. CURRAN. Yes, you might have known it. But I also feel at that hearing Mr. Berry, your staff assistant, asked me for additional details of other cases that the FBI was currently working. I think I arranged for the FBI to come up and brief Mr. Berry. I think that did occur.
I am not sure how many or what cases were briefed. But Mr. Berry did ask for a more detailed briefing, and I arranged for that to happen.
Mr. HUNTER. That is on other cases.
Mr. CURRAN. I don't want to be too specific, but I don't know what cases were briefed to Mr. Berry by the FBI. I was not present during that briefing.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Ryun.
Mr. RYUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to thank our panelists for coming today. I do have a specific question for Ms. Moler, but I want to ensure that Mr. Curran, Dr. Moniz, and Mr. Trulock have an opportunity to respond as well.
Ms. Moler, earlier you said that one of the reasons that you support the foreign visitors program is because it brings great strategic and national security gains to the United States. I would like, if you could, to explain for example how letting in—we have had 46 Iraq and Iran visitors that went through Los Alamos and Sandia in a two-year period of time—just what kind of gains we have from that. We have a number of us with questions in that regard. What do we actually gain in that regard? Could you begin by explaining—and anybody else who would like to contribute to this. I appreciate that.
Ms. MOLER. Congressman, I am, at this point, a private citizen. I have a general appreciation of the scientific collaboration that goes on in a multiplicity of different programs within the national laboratories.
I have some appreciation for some of the particular scientific programs that are undertaken in an international collaborative way at the laboratories.
It is the consensus, as I testified on October 6, of the scientific community, the lab directors and the broader scientific community, that our national interest is well served by the foreign visitors and assignments program and the international scientific collaboration. I cannot answer your specific question.
Mr. RYUN. Let me say, though, those two countries which have foreign visitors are from sensitive nations. My concern is if you are talking about the advantages of the program and saying there are great gains, you know, maybe you would have specifics. Doctor? I see you are interested.
Dr. MONIZ. Yes, Congressman. May I expand briefly on that? First, I think it is important to distinguish two different types of foreign visitor and assignment programs, those that are in specifically national security areas, never involving classified information, but nevertheless national security; and second, those programs that are in the areas of what you might call basic science. Both unclassified and basic science are going on at a laboratory like Los Alamos and others.
Then there are the questions of the unclassified basic science programs. It is in those areas where there may be, for example, a scientist from Iran, either visiting or on assignment at the laboratories. Typically, a very common pathway for such a visit would be that, let's say, take an example, an Iranian physicist might be a graduate student at an American university, be in this country for five years, working on a Ph.D., open stuff. Perhaps his advisor, his or her advisor, works in collaboration with someone in the national laboratory arranges for a postdoctoral stay of a year, for example, to work on a basic research program of interest to our scientists. Those positions are typically awarded on a competitive basis for good young scientists.
May I also add one last footnote, and that is I mentioned the major national security programs with the Russians, which we view as in our national security interests. I would just note that unclassified science collaborations went on with Russia for decades during the Cold War; and, in fact, that scientific exchange as the Iron Curtain fell proved to be a very important method of our communicating with them and advancing international arms control goals.
Mr. RYUN. Actually I have a follow-up question with that. Mr. Curran or Mr. Trulock, does anyone wish to contribute to that?
Our point never has been to prohibit or to halt these visits. We supported fully the programs that Dr. Moniz has discussed; and, in fact, my office provided the road map for many of the efforts, particularly in the area of material control and protection activities when Mr. Curtis was there. Our concern was always that the labs were refusing to adequately address the risks associated with this presence.
A GAO study sponsored, I believe, by this committee found that in fact the simple, most fundamental procedures to safeguard the conduct of indices checks and so forth, was only capturing about two percent of the actual visitors.
But the point that we wanted to make, and we made to Mr. Curtis, is that we were always far more concerned about the assignee program, foreign visitors and assignments. Assignees were individuals who were at the laboratories from 30 days to, in some cases, several years. So in 1997, Mr. Curtis directed us to conduct a study of the foreign visitors and assignments program at the five major laboratories. Let me relate to you the conclusions of that study.
One, we found that the oversight of, particularly, assignees was lax and that security plans that had been developed to protect the laboratories were essentially unenforceable.
Three, we found that assignees regularly accessed export controlled equipment.
Four, we found that assignees participated in laboratory research and development projects without the governmental sponsor's knowledge. In fact, we found a number of projects in which these individuals were working on which had—while unclassified, had direct applicability to what we had assessed to be major gaps in the nuclear weapons expertise of the country of their origin.
Mr. RYUN. Mr. Trulock, you bring up a really good point, and I will just add to it and then go to my next question, that is the countries I mentioned made 46 visits by the Iraqis and Iranians that according to DOE records during that period of 1994 to '96, there were no background checks taken. Recognizing those are sensitive countries, I take your comments quite seriously.
I would like to get a reaction, really, from any one of the panel to another particular point. Actually, Doctor, you had mentioned the number of visits perhaps from past times that had been helped in terms of the Cold War being brought to an end. I know there had been comments by this Administration that there have been a number of visitations under other administrations. However, I would like to turn to a GAO report between January 1993 and 1996 that indicates there were an average of 6,000 visitors that visit our national labs at that point. That is a 55 percent increase from 1986 to 1987. I would like to ask, does that concern you? It seems like that is an enormous number of increases in visitations, and it was a very lax system. Does that not create some concern for you?
Dr. MONIZ. First of all, Congressman, I must say I don't fully endorse the—I forgot your exact words, very lax system. There are some problems—Notra pointed out some of them—and Ed is working very hard to shore them up. Nevertheless, to go to your question—
Mr. RYUN. Let me say this: it is a lax system. When you have 1,107 Russian scientists who can go through the Los Alamos lab and only 116 are given a background check of any kind, I think that qualifies as a lax system.
Dr. MONIZ. I accept your statement. I would, however, add to it that, first of all, getting the indices checks done—we are committed to—they are at 100 percent indices checks today. It is correct, as Notra indicated, that in a period earlier in the nineties, a waiver was granted to the directors, particularly of Los Alamos and Sandia, that was exercised with regard to many foreign visitors.
Mr. RYUN. For the record, would you indicate who authored the waivers, who provided the waivers?
Dr. MONIZ. The waivers were exercised by the laboratory directors. The waiver permission was granted in a process that involved the laboratories, the Albuquerque field office, and DOE headquarters. But I wanted to stress that the indices checks are by far not the only means of controlling security of the visitors. Quite the contrary, I would say by far, the most important aspect is the layered system of security at the laboratories. These visitors, the Russian visitors, let's say, do not have access to classified areas unless there is a very specific reason for an escorted visit briefly in those areas.
With regard to the large increase in the numbers, I believe by far the biggest number in that increase is in fact the Russian visitors. So I will focus on that.
When the Soviet Union, and then Russia earlier in this decade, began to experience rather severe problems in the 1992–93 time frame when our government became very alarmed at the possibilities of loss of control of nuclear materials or of nuclear knowledge, it was precisely the fact that our laboratories and their institutes could interact strongly that led to us being able to wrap up very quickly and get in there. Now we are in over 50 sites controlling nuclear materials.
That large increase in Russian visitors is almost entirely due to these programs in terms of materials control and other nonproliferation goals. So that large increase in Russians, which is the biggest increase, is very strongly focused on our national security programs.
Mr. RYUN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one more question? Mr. Curran, I would like to ask you, because I know yesterday we listened to Secretary Richardson talking about the changes he is making with regard to the counterintelligence program, do you think that if we had this in place that the leaks of the late 1980s and the ones that have taken place most recently with the neutron bombs, that we could have offset all of that through the counterintelligence program?
Mr. CURRAN. In my opinion, the recommendations and the procedures that are now in effect, if they were in effect back then, that is the whole purpose of putting these in, is to identify problems, such as the problem we are having now. If you don't have these procedures in effect, you are never going to identify the problem.
Hopefully, and I feel very strongly that this type of activity will be uncovered. If it is not, then this is obviously not a good plan either.
Mr. RYUN. Thank you.
Mr. TRULOCK. Congressman, I wonder if I could briefly respond to that. I think the short answer to your question is yes. And I say that because you think Secretary Richardson's commitment to this plan is evident in his acceptance of the requirements to polygraph individuals in sensitive positions.
We made that suggestion repeatedly and we were laughed out of the room by Secretary Richardson's predecessors and senior officials at the laboratories in particular. Secretary Richardson has stepped up and accepted that commitment.
Mr. RYUN. While I appreciate that, one thing he did say yesterday is as a result of the polygraphing. He was finding it increasingly difficult to find people who would come. So I hope he remains true to that commitment.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Mr. Spratt.
Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TRULOCK. I had no further discussions with Deputy Secretary Moler. I was questioned by the new chief of staff of the Department who told me that Secretary Richardson was interested in finding out what had happened. But we had no conversation or discussion whatsoever about providing to the committee unedited, in effect, testimony.
Mr. SPRATT. To the best of our recollection on the Cox Committee, the first occasion when the staff itself was made aware of the espionage losses was at a staff briefing on October 12, but a month before the hearing of the Cox Committee itself.
Mr. TRULOCK. Right.
Mr. SPRATT. At that staff briefing, the espionage losses were disclosed. That was a week after this particular hearing. Was there a connection between the two?
Mr. TRULOCK. I believe that I provided that information due to two things: my understanding of the charter of the Cox Committee and the types of activities specifically with regard to China that the Cox Committee was looking into, A; and, B, because Chairman Goss, the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and his staff were key Members of the Cox Committee.
Mr. SPRATT. So are you saying then you thought the Cox Committee's charter and its composition weren't in full disclosure than the disclosure given to this committee?
Mr. TRULOCK. That sounds like what I was saying.
Mr. CURRAN. Was that the meeting where the FBI, CIA and we were all there together? I think the FBI—
Mr. SPRATT. This was a staff briefing, so my professional staff member, Hugh Brady, was at that meeting with others, and that is his recollection. He also tells me about a week or two later, approximately two weeks later, there was a subsequent briefing. Do you recall that?
Mr. TRULOCK. Yes, I do. I will also tell you that by that time, in the aftermath of the October 6 testimony to this committee, my instructions from Secretary Richardson changed. His instructions to me were you go up there and tell people what they need to know. At that point I felt that—
Mr. SPRATT. When did you receive this instruction? Was it directly from the Secretary?
Mr. TRULOCK. Yes, it was.
Mr. SPRATT. In a meeting in his office? Oral or written?
Mr. TRULOCK. Oral. Intelligence people try to keep things off of paper.
Mr. SPRATT. I understand. You don't have to tell that to us. He told you sometime after this meeting—
Mr. TRULOCK. You go up to the Hill and tell people what they need to know.
Mr. SPRATT. Did you complain to him you had been prevented from making full disclosure?
Mr. TRULOCK. I did not. I did not feel that. Deputy Secretary Moler had departed the Department at that point. I considered that to be history. I believed that Secretary Richardson's chief of staff—I don't want to use the word investigated, that is too formal, but—had made inquiries, and as he told me, would report back to the Secretary. I assumed at that point the matter was closed and that his direction to me to be full and open with people up here who needed to know was all the latitude I thought I needed.
Mr. SPRATT. Did you then initiate the contact with the professional staff of the Cox Committee?
Mr. TRULOCK. No. I don't recall doing that. Perhaps your staffer—no, I believe I was asked—we had already provided testimony on Chinese acquisition of high performance computers, and I believe this was a follow-up to that. I can also tell you that it was always my suspicion that Chairman Goss knew about—not a suspicion, Chairman Goss knew about this case, and I assumed that part of the request may have come out of Chairman Goss' interest in pursuing what, in truth, he had been denied earlier that summer.
Mr. SPRATT. But up until that time, you had not informed the Intelligence Committee—
Mr. TRULOCK. There were two briefings by the Department of Energy to the Permanent Select—let me back up. There were two briefings to the Congress on this subject, one to the SSCI and one to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Those briefings were given in July and August of 1996, respectively. We did not return to the Hill to discuss the Kindred Spirit issue until the staff meeting with Mr. Brady and others, and I believe you cited the date as being October 12, 1998, I think. That was the next time I personally discussed the case with any Member or staff on the Hill.
Mr. SPRATT. But you had in 1996 on two occasions informed both of the intelligence committees?
Mr. TRULOCK. In the exercise of our obligations to inform the intelligence oversight committees on both sides, yes, I had.
Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman would yield so he can make that clear. Mr. Spratt, is that with respect to the case you are talking about, Kindred Spirit?
Mr. TRULOCK. Yes.
Mr. HUNTER. Which at that time had not been developed.
Mr. SPRATT. Did these disclosures initially to the Intelligence Committee concern both the W–88 and the neutron bomb?
Mr. TRULOCK. I would prefer to discuss that in closed session, please.
Mr. SPRATT. Ms. Moler, did you have anything to do with the disclosure to the intelligence committees in 1996?
Ms. MOLER. I was not at the Department in 1996.
Mr. SPRATT. Were you aware the Intelligence Committee had been informed?
Ms. MOLER. Yes, sir. And they were informed on numerous occasions after that time. The FBI assumed the lead role in briefing, because at that time it was principally viewed as a law enforcement case. I believe they briefed somewhere between 19 and 22 times.
Mr. SPRATT. Would you care to make any further comment upon Mr. Trulock's testimony?
Ms. MOLER. Not at this time.
Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Trulock, other than the instance that we have already heard about where there was a concern expressed about the motives of some people on the Hill to attack the Administration's China policy, were there any other instances where a concern about congressional or public reaction related to the Administration's China policy played any role in a decision, in a recommendation, in information that you shared in carrying out your intelligence responsibility?
Mr. TRULOCK. No, there was not.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.
Mr. HUNTER. Would you elaborate on that and tell us about any time that the Administration's, or the President's, China policy was related with respect to disclosure of these incidents?
Mr. TRULOCK. Let me be clear. As I stated in my testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, at one point in August of 1997, in a discussion with a NSC official, he relayed to me that it was Administration policy to use the laboratories to engage the Chinese and that this compromise was not going to interfere with that policy.
But he did not use that instance to, in any way, shape, or form, deny the requirement to put into place meaningful counterintelligence reforms or to undertake to manage the foreign visitors and assignments program effectively.
Mr. HUNTER. So he didn't say ''Don't make the reforms that are necessary to secure the labs;'' but he stated something to the effect that this would damage our China policy if these revelations were made?
Mr. TRULOCK. My recollection is he simply said that it was U.S. policy to use the laboratories in this case and would not interfere with this policy. But by all means, you guys have got to take the steps necessary to implement meaningful counterintelligence reforms out there.
Mr. HUNTER. I understand that. But was there any connection given preserving this Administration's policy with respect to China and not releasing or disclosing this latest loss?
Mr. TRULOCK. None whatsoever.
Mr. HUNTER. Mrs. Tauscher.
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Curran, can I ask you a couple of questions just for clarification. Is there any evidence that there has been any espionage specifically at our national laboratories by foreign visitors, specific to these issues?
Mr. CURRAN. I would prefer to answer that in another hearing, or a closed hearing.
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Let me be more specific. The issues that we are specifically talking about, W–88 and other things, is there any evidence that foreign visitors were involved or the foreign visitors program were involved in any of this potential espionage?
Mr. TRULOCK. Don't answer.
Mr. CURRAN. I would have to say no.
Mr. TRULOCK. I disagree. But I believe we should have this discussion in a closed session.
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Trulock, isn't it true that the espionage was performed by American citizens?
Mr. TRULOCK. Exactly. Your question was were foreign visitors involved in this in any way, shape or form. I believe we should have any further discussions about this in closed session. But let the record show that I disagree with Mr. Curran's answer.
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Let the record show that my question was specific to the visitors program.
Mr. TRULOCK. Let the record show that my answer is also specific to the foreign visitors program.
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Curran, can you talk to me about the counterintelligence program at the Livermore lab?
Mr. CURRAN. Livermore lab was one of the laboratories that we visited in the initial 90-day study. Obviously, Livermore is a very important lab in DOE. It is one of the weapons labs.
We looked at Livermore in perhaps a little bit more detail than we have looked at the others only because of the fact that they had hired a former FBI agent there several years ago to run their counterintelligence program. What we found we were very, very satisfied with. We believed that they had a very competent CI program manager. He had extensive experience previously with the FBI. That program manager had direct access to the lab director. The lab director was very, very supportive of counterintelligence issues. The CI person was directly involved in management-type issues.
That CI person also had a very, very competent staff that had hired former professional CI people. They seemed to have a great deal of control over the activity that was taking place in the laboratory. They also seemed to have a great deal of credibility with the scientists, our own scientists, who were traveling to sensitive countries. There seemed to be a feeling of trust between the two of them. The information that was being provided, the pre-briefs being provided to our people going overseas, were exceptional.
In short, in closing, without saying too much further, I would like to see what we have in Livermore or what we are doing in Livermore emulated in the other laboratories. We are very, very pleased with Livermore's operation.
Mr. TRULOCK. I would just add if every laboratory had the counterintelligence program that Lawrence Livermore has, we would not be having this discussion, in my judgment.
Dr. MONIZ. May I just add one additional piece.
Mr. HUNTER. You are getting some pretty good commercials there.
Dr. MONIZ. At the Secretary's request, I led a group to Livermore on Tuesday to look at various aspects of security, physical security, cybersecurity and counterintelligence. Ed already described the counterintelligence program. The cybersecurity response has been outstanding. On physical security, there was one problem, and the good news was that they have aggressively addressed that problem. We expect it to be fixed very shortly.
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to the panel, welcome.
Ms. Moler, during your period as acting Secretary or Undersecretary, why didn't you implement the programs now being implemented today when you knew about the losses?
Mr. CURRAN. Sir, could you repeat that question?
Mr. GIBBONS. This is for Secretary Moler.
Ms. MOLER. The program was being developed while I was Deputy Secretary and Acting Secretary. We were fully supportive of the program.
Mr. GIBBONS. How come it wasn't implemented until 1999?
Ms. MOLER. It wasn't ready to be implemented. Mr. Curran came April 1. He had 90 days to make a recommendation under the presidential decision directive. He did so on July 1. It was then reviewed in the Department, and it was ready to be implemented at the time that Secretary Richardson was nominated.
He specifically wanted to review the program and did so very quickly, very early in his administration.
Mr. GIBBONS. So it took two years before you got to implementing this program, in other words, before you started developing it on April 1, 1998.
Ms. MOLER. Improvements were being made during the period of time when both prior to and particularly after Mr. Curran's arrival. It wasn't that we were doing nothing.
For example, he was recruiting competent individuals who had counterintelligence background, and they were beginning to work at the laboratories. We were seeking and received additional funding. We met with the laboratory directors and stressed to them the importance of making further improvements during that time. Clearly there was a much heightened awareness of the importance of the issue during that time.
Mr. GIBBONS. Let me go back to the testimony of Mr. Trulock over here. With regard to your discussions about his testimony about this loss to this committee during that time frame that is under the subject matter of this committee, what discussions did you have with the Secretary regarding Mr. Trulock's testimony?
Ms. MOLER. I do not believe I had any discussions with the Secretary at that time regarding Mr. Trulock's testimony.
Mr. GIBBONS. And that time would include prior to the delivery, any time prior to the delivery of Mr. Trulock and your testimony at that hearing?
Ms. MOLER. I do not recall any discussions with him, sir.
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Trulock, have there been any personal actions taken against you in the recent years?
Mr. TRULOCK. From May of 1994 to May of 1998, I was the Director of Intelligence. From May of 1998 to today, I have successively held the title as Special Assistant, Special Adviser, and now I am a Special Adviser and I am also an Acting Deputy for the office.
Mr. GIBBONS. Is that a demotion?
Mr. TRULOCK. I don't know how else to portray it.
Mr. GIBBONS. So your answer is yes?
Mr. TRULOCK. Yes.
Mr. GIBBONS. Why do you feel you were demoted?
Mr. TRULOCK. Well, I believe the bureaucratic answer is that—
Mr. GIBBONS. Just give me your honest answer. I don't want a bureaucratic answer.
Mr. TRULOCK. I understand. Yes. In the most straightforward fashion, I believe that I was overly vigorous in the exercise of my oversight and management responsibilities for intelligence activities within the Department on this issue, as well as on several other issues, in which I found classified information to have been compromised, and my efforts to bring that forward to the attention of responsible officials, including the Inspector General of the Department went unheeded, unappreciated, and eventually unrewarded.
Mr. GIBBONS. Will you provide this committee at the closed committee hearing with examples of those recommendations and losses that you have mentioned?
Mr. TRULOCK. I would be happy to.
Mr. GIBBONS. My question to you would be has anyone made claims disparaging your character, while you were employed at any time at the lab as the Director of Counterintelligence?
Mr. TRULOCK. Yes, they have. I am not willing to discuss any of that in open testimony. I am not willing to give up my rights under the Privacy Act.
Mr. GIBBONS. All right. Has there been a continuing investigation ongoing into those?
Mr. TRULOCK. There is no investigation at this point, nor has there ever been an investigation.
Mr. GIBBONS. Has there been a resolution of the claims?
Mr. TRULOCK. One specific claim has not yet been resolved.
Mr. GIBBONS. Do you feel that these claims are part and parcel of the reason why you were demoted?
Mr. TRULOCK. I believe they were a contributing factor.
Mr. TRULOCK. I do not. Let me back up. I do, yes, sir. Specifically.
Mr. GIBBONS. Secretary Moler, are you aware of these claims?
Ms. MOLER. I do not know what particular claim he is talking about at the present time.
Mr. GIBBONS. Once we go into closed session, Mr. Chairman, we will look into this.
Ms. MOLER. Mr. Gibbons, may I clarify one thing?
Mr. GIBBONS. Yes.
Ms. MOLER. I have been reprimanded for not having volunteered information to this committee. I do want to clarify my understanding of Mr. Trulock's status at the Department. He served under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act. He was a Los Alamos employee serving at the Department of Energy under the IPA, as it is known. There is a finite period of time, a limit on the amount of time, that one can serve as an IPA employee, and that is four years. He served as an IPA employee from May of 1994 until May of 1998. At that time, we could no longer at the Department keep him under the IPA. He had to have an appointment from the Department in order to stay in the Office of Intelligence.
He was given, at my direction, an accepted service appointment, that is special appointment authority that the Secretary of Energy has to employ individuals. He could no longer serve as an office director as an accepted service employee.
I realize you may think that is a bureaucratic answer, but it is entirely consistent with the legal requirements pertaining to government employees and the Intergovernmental Personnel Act. I do not believe he was demoted as a result of his very vigorous efforts. I do not believe that reprisals were taken against him as a result of his very vigorous efforts. Indeed, I believe that it was entirely appropriate for the Department to arrange to continue him in his service after his IPA period expired, and I did so.
Mr. GIBBONS. At any time, in your honest opinion, did you feel that Mr. Trulock didn't perform his job satisfactorily?
Ms. MOLER. No.
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Curran, let me ask you a question with your assignee program or even the foreign visitors program. Are you aware of any information that would allow you to form a conclusion with regard to whether or not any of those individuals, either under the assignee program or the foreign visitors program, attempted to recruit a U.S. lab employee for purposes of espionage?
Mr. CURRAN. No.
Dr. MONIZ. May I add one clarifying remark as well, Mr. Chairman? On the issue of the demotion, as Notra referred to it, again I want to stress the Secretary certainly does not share the view of demotion. In early '98, when it was announced in response to the presidential directive that the intelligence and counterintelligence offices would be recreated as independent offices with direct reporting lines to the Secretary as opposed to being in this context, shall we say, buried in the nonproliferation program, then at the time of the announcement, it was announced that there would be a search for the head of the intelligence office, with Notra certainly having the opportunity to be part of that search.
When Secretary Richardson came in, he elected to bring with him an experienced CIA professional with whom he worked directly at the U.N., Larry Sanchez, and the Secretary, who has on numerous occasions specifically noted his appreciation for Notra's work, then asked Notra to stay on as the deputy. I believe that is accurate.
Mr. TRULOCK. That is an accurate statement. I would only add the following, that I have also, however—the Department wishes me to compete for the deputy's position. I find that to be distasteful, frankly. I will stop there.
Ms. MOLER. There is no other way one can hire a career SES employee, other than to compete for that position. That is what the law requires.
Mr. TRULOCK. Since we are on the subject, let me note that successive and a prospective Director of Intelligence, new Director of Intelligence, has not competed for the position. Twice in the past three years competitions were actually opened. I did apply. In both cases, the competitions were canceled prior to any selection being made. The most recent one was opened after the PDD was announced in February of 1998, I believe. The competition was put out. It closed. My application was made. I can provide the facts for the record. Sometime in March, Deputy Secretary Moler, as the selecting official, allowed the competition to languish through the summer and into the fall, at which point Secretary Richardson, of course, came on board and brought his own man with him. I have the highest respect for Larry Sanchez. It is my belief if it were not for Larry Sanchez, I would have been removed from the Department some time ago.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Gibbons. We are going to go into classified session here in just a minute. But just based on one of the last statements, Ms. Moler and Mr. Trulock, we have established that you were under oath on October 6 of last year; you were asked to tell us about any espionage activities that occurred at our national laboratories; you knew obviously about this major loss and you did not tell us.
Mr. TRULOCK. That is correct.
Ms. MOLER. Mr. Chairman, I was not asked that direct question.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. That is a point I am about ready to get to. Mr. Trulock was asked that question. You did not tell us.
Mr. TRULOCK. That is correct.
Mr. HUNTER. Ms. Moler, did you feel that in Mr. Trulock's not telling us that, that he had followed his obligations or his directions from you?
Ms. MOLER. I don't know what was in Mr. Trulock's mind at the time he—
Mr. HUNTER. I am not asking about his mind. I am talking about his actions. He did not tell us about the latest major loss. Did you feel that he was following your instructions in not telling us?
Ms. MOLER. No, I don't.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay.
Ms. MOLER. No, I didn't and don't.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Trulock, did you feel you were following instructions in not telling us?
Mr. TRULOCK. Yes, I do.
Mr. HUNTER. We will go into—I guess we will ask you in classified session; but, Mr. Trulock, one thing we would like to get from you is, because we are putting together this apparatus for security—the Secretary with Mr. Curran is putting that thing into place right now—I would like to get, and I think the committee would appreciate and consider the question to be asked in following testimony, written testimony subsequent to this hearing, for you to describe to us any changes that are not taking place under the present program that you think are necessary for national security. Could you do that?
Mr. TRULOCK. I can do it. I will tell you that in order to respond fully—
Mr. HUNTER. We want your personal opinion on this.
Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Moniz and Mr. Curran, can we access Mr. Trulock to this?
Dr. MONIZ. Certainly.
Mr. CURRAN. Yes.
Mr. HUNTER. To this program?
Dr. MONIZ. Certainly.
Mr. HUNTER. Consider that will be done. Hopefully we will receive your recommendations. Just one last thing, I wanted Dr. Moniz to finish up before we go into closed session on the written statement that Mr. Trulock had prepared initially for the October 6 hearing which was revised. We have asked for the unrevised transcript. What is the status of that transcript now?
Dr. MONIZ. Following your discussion yesterday with the Secretary, he did—reemphasize to the IG the importance of moving quickly on the investigation. The investigation should be completed within days. The Secretary may be briefed as early as Tuesday on this. Then, as he said to you, he intends to move forward and provide you the transcript.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Norm, anything else?
Mr. SISISKY. No.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Spratt.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, as we go into executive session, I would ask unanimous consent that my staffer, Hugh Brady, who does not have 9(c) status because he is on the Budget Committee staff doing Defense now, be allowed to attend. He has a Q clearance and a top secret clearance. He was a professional staffer on the Cox Committee. It would be useful to me and possibly useful to the committee if he could remain here.
Mr. HUNTER. Without objection. We will reconvene in Room 2212 for a classified session. Thank you to all the witnesses for appearing before us. We will reconvene in 15 minutes.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene in executive session.]
A P P E N D I X
April 15, 1999
[This information is pending.]
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