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VADM A. K. CEBROWSKI
PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
DIRECTOR, NAVY DOCTRINE COMMAND
STATEMENT BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEES ON RESERCH AND DEVELOPMENT
AND PROCUREMENT
HEARING ON
NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE AND INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
23 FEB 99
Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the Committee. Thank
you for the honor and privilege of appearing before you today on
the important subject of Information Superiority. I will
outline for you very briefly from a warfare perspective the
concepts of Network Centric Warfare and Information Superiority
and then identify where the significant payoffs are on the
battlefield and illustrate these with the results of Navy's
Fleet Battle Experiment Program.
At a time when American society is benefiting broadly from it's
great leadership position in information technology and
associated changes in organizations and processes, it is
appropriate to ask how the military is benefiting from this
position of advantage. Network Centric Warfare is the military
response to the Information Age. It is based on the principles
of information generation, a high degree of access, shared
awareness and speed. First and foremost, it is dominated by
behavioral components more than technology, just as you see in
the marketplace. A well-informed public with access to
information and the means to take advantage of that access
organizes itself for efficiency and higher performance according
to marketplace rules. So, too, Network Centric Warfare involves
a well-informed force organized around unity of effort and
commander's intent. This is not about more information or more
data; rather, it is about how one converts that information and
data into actionable knowledge. Network Centric Warfare derives
its power from the networking of well-informed but
geographically dispersed forces. The enabling elements are a
high-performance information capability, access to all
appropriate information sources, weapons reach and maneuver with
speed of response, value-adding command and control processes -
to include high speed automated assignment of resources to need
- and integrated sensors closely coupled in time to shooters and
command and control processes. Network Centric Warfare is
applicable to all levels of warfare and contributes to the
coalescence, or high-speed compression, of the strategic,
operational and tactical levels of war. It is transparent to
mission, force size and composition, and geography. Network
Centric Warfare allows us to move from an input-oriented,
attrition-based approach to warfare, to output-oriented effects-
based warfare. In this construct, forces can organize and
synchronize from the bottom up, much as the market does. Combat
is changed from a step function to a high-speed continuum. New
strategies are enabled and enemy responses are locked out. This
is not theory; we see these effects daily in business and in
other public institutions, and we have seen the antecedents in
warfare for nearly a century. The difference is that now we
have the capability to bring it to fruition as the organizing
principle for modern warfare. The great strength of technology,
which we have in weapons range and precision, is realized only
when coupled with a superior information position. A strong
caution is that we should never presume that superior technology
apart from skilled and trained warriors can lead to victory.
Information superiority results when information relevance
approaches 100 percent, accuracy approaches 100 percent, and
timeliness approaches 100 percent at a rate faster than for our
adversaries. Of course, 100 percent can never be achieved, but
it need not. Information superiority is a relative measure. In
the business world, much that is said about knowledge management
is of value to the military, but there are distinct differences.
For businesses, operational execution is the rapid exploitation
of market opportunities. For the military, operational
execution is the rapid application of force, both strike and
maneuver, and the exploitation of battlefield opportunities.
For both, the key is information superiority . . . knowing more
things which are relevant, knowing them faster and being able to
convert that knowledge into execution faster than the adversary.
The result is the phenomenon known as "speed of command." This
is the process by which a superior information position is
turned into a competitive advantage. It is characterized by the
decisive altering of initial conditions, the development of high
rates of change and locking in success while locking out
alternative enemy strategies. The phenomenon sees all elements
of the operating situation as parts of a complex adaptive
ecosystem and achieves profound effect through the impact of
closely coupled events. The critical metric is the difference
between one's own knowledge and that of the adversary. The
difference then between business and the military is that the
military must be allowed to attack and destroy their adversary's
knowledge base and knowledge processes. Thus, we in the
military have the added requirement for active knowledge
destruction and active knowledge protection.
Next, I will identify some areas where we have significant early
payoff from this approach. The information age can be
characterized by two words, access and speed. This is the age
where access to information and technologies is highly valued
and growing daily. Doctrinal, organizational and architectural
decisions which reduce or deny information access to any element
of the force deny, in effect, the great power of the American
advantage in information technology. Ask any successful
businessman. He will tell you that when his competition has
access to the same information and the same technologies, the
only way to differentiate himself and posture for a sustained
leadership position is with speed and agility: organizational
agility, doctrinal agility, the ability to assimilate
technologies at high speed, and the ability to execute faster
than the competition. The military is no different in this
regard. Those factors which act against speed must, therefore,
be reduced or limited. The graphic below illustrates the point.
The information displayed is for a very high quality weapon
system, which has a very high probability of kill against moving
targets at short range (less than ten miles). While performance
deteriorates as range to the moving target increases,
Probability of Hit (PH) is still quite high, about 0.6, so long
as command control (C2) delay time is zero. But, as command
and control time increases, performance falls off sharply to the
point that when delay time is 13 minutes or more, performance
(PH) is so low that the weapon has virtually no utility. In
short, if command and control delay is this long, buying the
weapon makes little sense. Yet, these long delay times are
common in current practice. Part of this delay may be
attributed to limited or slow access to the necessary
information. As range to target increases, performance falls in
general because the target is moving and therefore accuracy
errors are introduced. But note that the penalty from command
and control delay time is far greater than errors in accuracy.
This indicates the first and most fruitful area for improved
performance at the tactical level for these kinds of weapons.
The point is that information superiority has value only when
translated into timely action.
The second most fruitful area is the pursuit of new classes of
sensors and a highly responsive mode of control of those
sensors. A maneuver force consists not just of shooters but
also of sensors and sensor platforms as well as a command and
control capability. Without any of these three elements we
cease to have a maneuver force. The current focus on long
range weapons can lead to frustration if not accompanied by an
appropriate sensor capability: sensor capability under the
tactical control of the maneuver force commander. We already
have many weapons in the inventory which outrange our ability to
employ them. While we control the range of our weapons,
adversaries can control the range of our sensors. This is
called engagement envelope management. War is a fully two-sided
game, and potential adversaries will respond. Over time, our
focus on long-range precision strike will result in increased
expenditures by other nations on cover, deception, stealth, and
mobility. This means we must be prepared to maneuver sensors
close in, and be prepared to respond on very tight timelines.
Thus, over time we should expect to have to continually
rebalance the force.
This brings me to the last point. All of the service
experimentation programs focus on leveraging a superior
information position to achieve the promise of Network Centric
Warfare. Navy Fleet Battle Experiment "Delta" illustrates these
points. Fleet Battle Experiment Delta was conducted in October
in conjunction with exercise FOAL EAGLE '98, an annual joint and
combined exercise sponsored by Combined Forces Command, Korea.
The experiment used both real and simulated forces. The focus
of the exercise was first, on countering a North Korean
artillery and rocket attack on Seoul and other allied positions;
second, countering North Korean special operation forces, and,
third, improving the joint theater air and missile defense. The
first two of these were highly successful in that they
illustrated the power of a high level of shared awareness by
linking Army and Navy sensors and shooters. Timelines were
dramatically shortened with both operational and strategic
impact. For example, by simultaneously passing Navy sensor
information directly to Army helicopter units as well as to
higher command echelons, the tactical forces were able to
synchronize their efforts from the bottom up in dealing with
this seemingly intractable problem of countering hundreds of
North Korean special operations force boats on timelines not
thought possible. Post exercise analysis showed that unengaged
enemy units ("leakers") were reduced by a factor of 10, while
simultaneously realizing 15 percent reduction in forces required
to counter the threat. The result was that forces otherwise
held in reserve could be reassigned earlier. When reduced to
these elementary terms it sounds so simple, but it had never
been done before and the impact was profound. This seems to
characterize all great advances.
Two quick points: if information superiority is so important,
should one single person or command be made responsible for it?
Absolutely not. While one could argue for the efficiency,
speed, and security of a centralized information system, such as
a corporate Intranet, the centralized control of information
itself is a folly which will subvert the great advantage that
America has in information technology and processes. The power
of information is derived from access and speed, not from
control and management. Second, perhaps the most important help
which this committee could provide is to encourage the Services'
experimentation programs. All of these experiments have a high
component of information superiority, and all spawn innovation
from the bottom up. New knowledge is not created by the
exercise of old doctrine, but through continuous experimentation
at all levels. At the highest level, I look to USACOM's Joint
Experimentation program to help with interoperability issues as
a main effort. Again, no single person should be seen as
responsible for all experimentation and innovation. That would
foreclose the rich sources of ideas, which are available
throughout the department, at all levels. In Navy we say that
innovation is a warfighting skill, and experiments are exercises
in innovation. I doubt that any activity can have a greater
long term benefit to the force.
Again, thank you for this opportunity to discuss this important
issue with you. I am pleased to take your questions.
-USN-
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