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INVESTIGATION OF
ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH 1996 FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS FINAL REPORT of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS SENATE Rept. 105-167 - 105th Congress 2d Session - March 10, 1998 |
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
When the Committee began its investigation into campaign
finance abuses last year, some of us said that the real
problems with the 1996 campaign were not, for the most part,
what was illegal, but what was legal. The Committee
investigation proved that to be true. While illegal foreign
contributions and contributions made in the name of another
found their way into both political parties, the bulk of the
activity which came under public scrutiny involved candidate
and party conduct that was legal, including the solicitation
and receipt of soft money contributions in massive amounts
clearly violating the intent of legislated contribution limits;
the intentional misuse of so-called issue advocacy commercials
to elect or defeat a particular candidate; and the blatant
offers of access in exchange for contributions.
Yet back in March of 1997, we had to fight to have these
activities included in the scope of the Committee's
investigation. The Republican leadership at that time was
committed to limiting the scope of the Committee's
investigation to activities that were already illegal and
excluding activities that should be illegal. In the end,
Members on both sides of the aisle fought to defeat that
limitation and to include ``improper,'' as well as illegal,
activities within the jurisdiction of the Committee's work.
The significance of that issue becomes apparent when we
look at what we learned from this investigation: the driving
force behind most of the conduct we investigated in the 1996
federal elections is the currently legal chase for large
donations of money--soft or unrestricted money--which could be
used to pay for the activities of the national parties on
behalf of their candidates, outside the contribution and
expenditure limits of the federal election laws.
Restrictions that apply to contributions of hard money--for
example, prohibitions on contributions in the name of another
and solicitations of persons on federal property--don't even
apply to soft money. And the various uses of soft money--issue
ads designed and used to support or defeat specific candidates;
contributions of soft money to non-profit organizations; and
coordination of the expenditure of soft money between
candidates and their parties--slip under and between the
current prohibitions in federal election laws.
The Republican leadership did not want to face the reality
of the role of soft money in the 1996 elections, because the
Republican leadership did not want to fuel the fire for
campaign finance reform. But the reality of our campaign
finance system could not be avoided, and, in the end the real
message of the 1996 elections has been the evasion of our
campaign finance laws through the solicitation and use of large
amounts of soft money.
Tamraz is a bipartisan problem
Roger Tamraz, a large contributor to both parties, became
the bipartisan symbol for what's wrong with the current system.
Roger Tamraz served as a Republican Eagle in the 1980s during
Republican Administrations and a Democratic Trustee in the
1990s during Democratic Administrations. Tamraz's political
contributions were not guided by his personal support for or
against the person in office; Tamraz was unabashed in admitting
his political contributions were made for the purpose of
getting access to people in power. Tamraz showed us in stark
terms the all-too-common product of the current campaign
finance system--using unlimited soft money contributions to buy
access. And despite the condemnation by the Committee and the
press of Tamraz's activities, when asked at the hearing to
reflect on his $300,000 contribution in 1996, Tamraz spoke
plainly when he said, ``I think next time, I'll give
$600,000.'' He spoke plainly, because he knows selling access
is legal and he told us as much. He said, ``[Y]ou set the
rules, and we are following the rules. . . . this is politics
as usual. What is new?''
Ironically and poignantly, while Republican Committee
members criticized the access Tamraz obtained to the Clinton
White House in the face of the opposition of the National
Security Council, we learned that the Republican Party was
simultaneously soliciting Tamraz to be a special donor to
Republican campaign efforts.
Tamraz received the solicitation in early 1997 from the
National Republican Senatorial Committee to join the
``exclusive Republican Senatorial Inner Circle.'' The
invitation was signed by Majority Leader Trent Lott, and stated
at the end, ``I look forward to meeting you personally and
formally welcoming you to the Inner Circle in the near
future.'' The letter said Tamraz was being nominated to fill
one of the ``28 Inner Circle nominations open in New York.'' On
February 18th, Tamraz got a follow-up letter from Senator Mitch
McConnell, Chairman of the Republican Senatorial Inner Circle.
Senator McConnell, referring to the earlier letter from
Majority Leader Lott, wrote:
The Inner Circle Leadership Committee placed your
name in nomination to receive this honor at our last
meeting based on the fact that your personal
accomplishments and your proven commitment to our Party
will make you a perfect Inner Circle Member.
The letter promised Tamraz that once he ``signs on'' to
become a member of the Inner Circle, he will receive
invitations ``twice a year to attend high-level Washington
policy briefings, receptions and special dinners'' with
Republican Senators ``as well as the top leaders of the
Republican Party.'' Included, according to the letter, would be
``the entire Republican Senate leadership of Senate Chairmen
and Subcommittee Chairmen who are driving the national
Republican agenda.'' The letter also promised ``an exclusive
dinner where the Republican Senate leadership will honor you as
a new Inner Circle member.''
These offers of special access to leading Republican
officials in return for contributions to the Republican Party
were made to the very same man Republican Committee Members
were saying should not have been allowed in the White House.
Lack of balance
The failure to acknowledge the Republican side of the
Tamraz problem was symptomatic of the Committee's entire
investigation. Throughout the investigation, the Majority was
unwilling to see or to admit that the problems caused by the
chase for soft money under our current campaign finance system
are problems of both parties. The curse of soft money has
caused good people in both parties to push the limits, not
because the persons involved have an insatiable ``thirst for
money,'' but because, to succeed, the current campaign finance
system leads to an unending chase for money. While few
candidates or party officials would knowingly risk defeat by
engaging in illegal campaign conduct, many candidates and party
officials from both parties are willing to use available, legal
loopholes to raise the huge sums of money needed to stay
competitive.
In the same way that the Majority loudly condemned Tamraz's
relationship to the Democratic Party, while treating his
relationship to the Republican Party with silence, the entire
investigation lacked balance. It lacked a balanced presentation
of the evidence, a balanced presentation of the issues, a
balanced presentation of the involvement of both parties.
Republican campaign conduct
Despite evidence that some campaign practices by the
Republican National Committee took loopholes in the law even
further than the Democratic National Committee, the Committee
chose not to examine such information in public hearings, other
than with respect to the National Policy Forum. One example is
the open offer of access for contributions.
Harold Ickes, White House deputy chief of staff, testified
that the Democrats learned about offering access in exchange
for campaign contributions from longstanding Republican
practice. The most blatant example of this Republican practice
was a fundraising document prepared and issued by the
Republican Party in connection with the 1992 Republican
President's Dinner, an event attended by President Bush. It
lists so-called ``benefits'' available to persons who
contribute or raise certain amounts of money for the Republican
Party by buying or selling tickets to the Dinner. Top
contributors and fundraisers get a private reception hosted by
President Bush at the White House. They get a reception hosted
by the President's Cabinet. They get a luncheon at the Vice
President's residence hosted by Vice President Quayle. At the
end of the invitation are these words: ``Note: Attendance at
all events is limited. Benefits based on receipts.'' In other
words, it's only when the Republican Party gets the
contributions in hand, that the benefits become available.
That's how far this system went before President Clinton became
President--the direct sale of access to President Bush, Vice
President Quayle, and top government officials in exchange for
large campaign contributions.
This fundraising tactic is not, of course, unique to 1992.
In 1995, an invitation to join the Republican Congressional
Forum states that contributors who pay a $25,000 membership fee
get a host of ``membership benefits,'' including ``monthly
private dinners with the Chairmen and Republican Members of key
Congressional Committees.''
In 1997, in the midst of the Committee's investigation and
public criticism of fundraising excesses, the Republican Party
issued a RNC Annual Gala invitation listing the same types of
``benefits'' for contributors and fundraisers. The invitation
offers persons who contribute or raise at least $250,000, for
example, a future breakfast with Senate Majority Leader Trent
Lott and House Speaker Newt Gingrich, and a future lunch with
the House or Senate Committee Chairman of the contributor's
choice.
Such offers of access, like the DNC's excessive use of the
White House, are not illegal, but they do create an appearance
that access to elected officials is for sale. Making such
offers of access illegal would be constitutionally difficult,
since elected leaders must have access to their constituents
and the public, whether or not they have contributed to their
campaign. It would also defy common sense to bar elected
officials from speaking to or meeting with their financial
supporters. But like so much else in public life, there are
appropriate limits to conduct that should or could be self-
regulated, requiring the use of good judgment and common sense.
The problem is a bipartisan one, and although the Majority
shrinks from acknowledging that the Republican Party also sold
access in exchange for campaign contributions, the public knows
both parties did it. By ignoring that reality, the Majority
diminishes the value and credibility of both the Committee
hearings and the Majority Report.
Another practice of concern during the 1996 elections was
the degree to which the RNC coordinated campaign activities
with outside organizations which held themselves out as
independent and, in many cases, nonpartisan. As described in
the Minority Report, but never examined in a Committee hearing,
the Republican National Committee spent millions of dollars
financing the election-related activities of some key groups.
The RNC gave over $4.6 million to Americans for Tax Reform, an
allegedly independent, nonpartisan tax-exempt organization,
which then used the money to advance the Republican agenda and
Republican candidates, in coordination with the RNC. If the DNC
had given $4.6 million to a labor union or environmental group
in the month before the 1996 election--an unprecedented
transfer of funds by a political party--I have no doubt that
there would have been a searching investigation of the facts,
if not full scale public hearings, which would have been
appropriate. But here--where the money was paid by the RNC to a
pro-Republican tax-exempt organization--not a single hearing
witness was called. Worse, the Committee never interviewed a
single person from either the RNC or Americans for Tax Reform
about the $4.6 million.
Internal RNC documents show that the RNC also explicitly
planned to raise millions of dollars from third parties for
outside pro-Republican groups, analyzed whether contributions
would be tax deductible and whether they would have to be
publicly disclosed, then actually collected and delivered
specific checks from third parties to such organizations as
Americans for Tax Reform, the American Defense Institute and
National Right to Life Committee. The Minority Report also
describes specific instances in which the RNC itself
coordinated election-related activities with particular
organizations, as well as instances in which pro-Republican
entities, such as Triad Management, Coalition for Our
Children's Future and the Christian Coalition, engaged in
election-related activities in possible violation of federal
election laws. Not one of these activities was examined in a
Committee hearing.
The Majority ignored these serious evasions of the law and
focused, instead, on one instance in which Harold Ickes
identified three possible non-profit organizations to which a
potential contributor could make a tax deductible contribution.
The Committee called a witness of questionable credibility to
lay out the incident, without calling Mr. Ickes at the same
hearing to provide his side of the story. Instead of looking at
the extensive activities of the RNC in orchestrating support
for Republican candidates among non-profit organizations in
which millions of dollars changed hands, the Majority focused
its fire on one incident involving proposed contributions that
never actually took place. The Committee held an entire day of
hearings on the Ickes' incident; it refused to call even one
witness to testify about the RNC's systematic efforts to
finance tax-exempt organizations supporting Republican
candidates.
The Committee's kid-glove treatment of RNC and Dole
campaign officials further demonstrates the imbalance. In the
nine months of the investigation, only 2 RNC officials were
deposed and they answered questions only on the National Policy
Forum. The Committee never deposed or took hearing testimony
from a single RNC official on RNC policies or practices. The
finance director of the DNC was deposed and testified publicly
at length; the finance director of the RNC did neither. The
general counsel for the DNC was deposed and testified publicly
at length; the general counsel for the RNC did neither. Top
officials of the Clinton campaign answered hundreds of
questions at sworn depositions; not a single official from the
Dole campaign ever answered a single question from this
Committee.
Thus, when the Majority Report states that, ``Based on the
available evidence, the Committee finds no basis for concluding
that any illegal coordination between the RNC and Dole campaign
took place,'' the ``available evidence'' conveniently did not
include any interviews of RNC or Dole campaign officials about
these topics. This Committee has, in fact, concluded its
investigation into the 1996 elections without ever asking the
RNC or Dole campaign about soft money, coordination, issue ads,
tax-exempt organizations, contribution laundering or any other
campaign matter, other than the National Policy Forum.
Having won the battle to conduct a broad investigation into
both illegal and improper campaign activity, those of us who
thought the result would be a bipartisan investigation, in the
end, lost the war. The Majority focused its investigative power
almost exclusively on the Democratic Party, providing the
American people with a one-sided view that failed to
communicate the whole truth--a campaign finance breakdown taken
advantage of by both parties.
Democratic campaign conduct
Even the Committee's examination of Democratic campaign
conduct was, all too often, one-sided. On several occasions,
Democratic Committee Members requested specific witnesses to
provide a more balanced presentation of the facts, but our
requests were denied. For example, for the hearing on the Hsi
Lai Temple, we asked that Ladan Manteghi, the key scheduler on
the staff of the Vice President, be called as a witness. She
would have testified unequivocally and convincingly that she,
the Vice President's office and the Vice President himself
understood the Temple event to be a community outreach event
and not a fundraiser. Manteghi was not called. Her testimony is
quoted at length in the Minority Report, but was never
presented to the American people during the key hearing on this
event.
On other occasions, the Majority failed to call key
witnesses with important information. For example, a key issue
associated with John Huang involved his use of the Stephens
office. Vernon Weaver, head of the Stephens' Washington office
and the person responsible for giving Huang permission to use
it, was interviewed by the Committee but never called as a
witness to answer questions about Huang's conduct. According to
his interview, Weaver would have testified that he had known
Huang for years from Arkansas, Huang routinely used the
Stephens' Washington office well before becoming a Commerce
Department employee, and Huang never did anything that made
Weaver concerned that he might be engaging in wrongdoing.
Still another example of imbalance involves videotapes of
President Bush's fundraising events in the White House. Despite
claims by some Committee Members that the Clinton
Administration's use of the White House for fundraising
purposes was ``unprecedented,'' the Majority refused repeated
requests by the Minority to join in a request to the Bush
Library for copies of those tapes. The Majority's failure to
pursue or to allow the examination of information that might
demonstrate both parties using the White House in the same
manner is another glaring instance in which the Committee
declined to present the whole truth about campaign conduct in
this country.
The China Plan
The Majority's investigation into the China Plan is one of
the most disturbing examples of partisanship overwhelming the
treatment of an important issue that should have been handled
in a careful, bipartisan manner and presented in a balanced way
to the American public. The origin of this plan was the Chinese
Government's perception, following the 1995 congressional
resolution advocating that Taiwanese President Lee be permitted
to visit the United States, as well as President Lee's
subsequent visit, that Congress and state officials were more
influential in foreign policy decisions than the Chinese
Government had previously determined. Consequently, the China
Plan was designed to increase the Chinese Government's
influence with the United States Congress and state
legislatures; it was not designed to affect the 1996
presidential race.
The Majority Report mischaracterizes existing evidence
regarding the focus and intent of the China Plan when it speaks
of the China Plan in the context of the 1996 presidential
election. None of the information the Committee obtained
suggests that the China Plan targeted the presidential
campaign. While there is direct evidence that the China Plan
targeted state and congressional races, there is, again, no
such direct evidence regarding the presidential elections. Yet,
the Majority takes the China Plan, mixes it with evidence of
contributions from foreign sources to the Democratic National
Committee, and then improperly concludes that the two are
linked, stating that the Committee's investigation suggests
that ``China's efforts involved the 1996 Presidential race.''
The Majority Report begins its description of the China
Plan by citing early 1997 newspaper articles based on unnamed
sources. The only evidence cited in the Majority's Chapter to
substantiate the allegation that China's effort involved the
1996 presidential race is a reference to ``fragmentary
reporting'' by a ``U.S. agency'' that relates to ``China's
efforts to influence the U.S. Presidential election.'' The
Majority Report states that, because the information--which is
``fragmentary''--is ``part of a criminal investigation,'' it
``cannot be discussed'' further.
In the absence of direct evidence supporting the allegation
that the China Plan targeted the presidential election, the
Majority Report tries to connect six DNC contributors to the
People's Republic of China (PRC). To do so, because the six
individuals have links to Taiwan, Macao or Hong Kong, the
Majority states that some of their DNC contributions used funds
from ``bank accounts in the Greater China area.'' The Majority
Report defines ``Greater China'' as ``territories claimed or
recently acquired by the PRC, including Hong Kong, Macao, and
the Republic of China on Taiwan.'' While in the context of
economic, cultural or other common interests, it may be
acceptable to use the term ``Greater China'' to refer in one
phrase to all four areas, in the context of allegations that
individuals are acting as agents of the Government of the
People's Republic of China, the use of this phrase is
inappropriate, unfair and misleading.
The Majority claims, for example, that contributions to the
DNC using funds from bank accounts in Taiwan, Macao or Hong
Kong are evidence of possible ties to the China Plan. Following
that logic, why not put Haley Barbour on the list of possible
PRC agents, since he solicited $2 million in collateral from
Ambrous Young of Hong Kong; and why not add Simon Fireman, a
national vice chair of the Dole campaign, who funded employee
contributions using a company he owned in Hong Kong. After all,
it is undisputed that Ambrous Young accompanied Haley Barbour
on a trip to China in late 1995, in which they met with Chinese
officials, including the Chinese Foreign Minister. Simon
Fireman wired funds from Hong Kong to the United States for the
express purpose of funding illegal contributions to the Dole
campaign. By the Majority's standard, such actions are equally
likely to be part of the China Plan.
Aside from bank account information and without going into
the Majority's evidence with respect to each of the six
individuals, a few items are worth noting. With respect to
Maria Hsia, the Majority Report states that Hsia ``has been an
agent of the Chinese government . . . [and] has attempted to
conceal her relationship.'' Substantiation for that serious
charge consists of the words, ``The Committee has learned.''
The Majority Report makes no mention of Hsia's sworn affidavit
denying the charge, and explaining that her family's support
for Taiwan is longstanding and deep, and that her immigration
work has put her in contact with the PRC government only on
behalf of her immigration clients. Nor does the Majority Report
offer any explanation why a person with strong ties to Taiwan
and who has worked to introduce Taiwanese leaders to U.S.
officials would act as an agent of the Chinese Government to
influence U.S. elections.
The Majority Report links Huang to the PRC by the following
sentence: ``A single piece of unverified information shared
with the Committee indicates that Huang himself may possibly
have had a direct financial relationship with the PRC
government.'' The thinness of the evidence and the tenuousness
of the statement itself demonstrate how little may responsibly
be drawn from the information before the Committee.
The Majority freely uses speculation and innuendo to make
numerous serious charges throughout the Chapter, unaccompanied
by documentation or support. Take for example: ``The source of
the Temple's money is believed to be Buddhist devotees and may
derive from overseas.'' ``Many of these activities may or may
not have been part of a single, coordinated effort. Regardless,
a coordinated approach may have evolved over time.'' ``Other
efforts, though undertaken by PRC government entities, have
been characterized as rogue activities.'' ``It appears that the
PRC money was in fact used to make or reimburse a contribution
to Wong in the amount of $5,000.'' ``Huang himself may possibly
have had a direct financial relationship with the PRC
government.'' ``It is likely that the PRC used intermediaries,
particularly with regard to political contributions.''
Weaving together this web of possibilities, the Majority
attempts to create a conspiracy by the six individuals it has
identified and the PRC. The Report's analysis is strewn with
words like ``suggest,'' ``seemingly,'' ``possible,'' ``possibly
related,'' ``suspected,'' ``alleged,'' with conjecture layered
upon conjecture. The unsubstantiated claims in the Majority
Report do not meet the standards of proof and responsibility
expected of a U.S. Senate Committee. Nor does it serve the
Senate or the American people to be so loose with facts and
conclusions, particularly when it comes to suggesting political
activity by United States citizens against the interests of the
United States.
The Majority Report's analysis is further undermined by
lapses in its examination of key figures. To establish a link
between the China Plan and campaign contributions, the Majority
used public hearings to get at the facts regarding campaign
contributions and fundraising efforts by John Huang, the
Riadys, Maria Hsia and Charlie Trie. But with respect to the
key figure of Ted Sioeng, a person linked to campaign
contributions made to both Republicans and Democrats, the
Majority balked--it held no public hearing.
The Committee had important information, for example,
establishing that Matt Fong, the Republican Treasurer of the
State of California, solicited and received contributions
totalling $100,000 from Ted Sioeng. There is also evidence that
Fong was involved in a solicitation of a $50,000 contribution
for the National Policy Forum, an arm of the Republican
National Committee, along with Joseph Gaylord and Steve Kinney,
aides to the Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich. Fong arranged
for Sioeng to meet and have his picture taken with Speaker
Gingrich in Washington, D.C., and Fong accompanied Sioeng to
that meeting with the Speaker. The Committee also was in
possession of a photograph that appeared in a Chinese-American
newspaper in California of a luncheon attended by Speaker
Gingrich, Sioeng and other Asian Americans shortly after the
$50,000 contribution to the National Policy Forum. Yet the
Committee never called Fong as a witness at a hearing to learn
more about Sioeng and any possible connection to the China
Plan. Nor did the Committee call Gaylord or Kinney as hearing
witnesses. Nor did the Majority ever hint in any public hearing
that the China Plan had a Republican component. Conspicuously
missing from the Majority's Chapter on the China Plan, despite
its relevance, is any mention of Fong, who is now running for
the Republican nomination to be a U.S. Senator from California.
What is particularly disturbing about the Majority's
failure is the fact that we know the China Plan explicitly
focused on state candidates. As the Majority itself says in its
Report, one of the ``several activities China undertook to
influence our political processes during the 1996 election
cycle'' was that a ``PRC government official devised a seeding
strategy, under which PRC officials would organize Chinese
communities in the U.S. to encourage them to promote persons
from their communities to run in certain state and local
elections.'' So despite a major contribution to a state
candidate by the person most closely identified as having a
financial connection to the PRC, the Committee didn't pursue
it. The glaring omission from the Majority's China Plan Chapter
of any mention of Sioeng's contributions to Fong or meetings
with Speaker Gingrich speaks volumes about the Majority's
partisan approach to the China Plan.
The China Plan Chapter in the Majority Report makes a
partisan stretch, using innuendo and hypothesis, to connect the
China Plan to campaign misconduct in the presidential election,
yet ducks discussing evidence connecting the China Plan with
state and congressional campaigns because that evidence would
involve Republicans. The Majority Report concocts a place
called the ``Greater China area,'' lumping together the
People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Macao and Hong Kong as
though they had the same interests, to try to link the China
Plan to DNC contributions. The China Plan did not receive the
careful, bipartisan, balanced treatment warranted.
Need for reform
In the end, despite all the efforts of the Republican
Majority to focus on illegalities, one message from the 1996
campaign dominates--the need to reform the federal campaign
finance system. The system is broken and in desperate need of
repair.
The first priority should be to eliminate the raising and
spending of soft money by both parties. As the Supreme Court
said in Buckley v. Valeo when it upheld contribution limits:
Under a system of private financing of elections, a
candidate lacking immense personal or family wealth
must depend on financial contributions from others to
provide the resources necessary to conduct a successful
cam paign. . . . To the extent that large contributions
are given to secure political quid pro quo's from
current and potential office holders, the integrity of
our system of representative democracy is undermined. .
. . Of almost equal concern is . . . the impact of the
appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness
of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of
large individual financial contributions. . . .
Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance
of the appearance of improper influence ``is also
critical . . . if confidence in the system of
representative government is not to be eroded to a
disastrous extent.''
As enacted, the campaign finance laws' contribution limits
never contemplated individual, corporate or union contributions
of $100,000, $1 million or more, creating the expectation,
actual or perceived, that these enormous sums were being repaid
with something more than a thank-you note or attendance at a
large banquet.
In tandem with a ban on soft money, we must also tackle the
problem of so-called issue ads. The most vicious combination in
the 1996 election season was the use of huge contributions
unregulated by federal election laws to pay for candidate
attack ads mislabelled as issue ads. This combination
encapsulates for me, more than any other single image, the
collapse of our campaign finance system and the rock-bottom
need for reform.
We identified numerous examples of political advertisements
which attacked candidates by name, but claimed to be issue
discussions outside the law's limits on contributions. These
candidate attacks ads were broadcast by parties, companies,
unions and interest groups of all kinds on behalf of both
parties. The Annenberg Public Policy Center estimates that
parties and outside groups spent at least $135 million
broadcasting these ads, almost 90 percent of which named
candidates while sidestepping the contribution limits and
disclosure requirements that are the bedrock of our campaign
laws.
Issue ads have been compared to drive-by shootings in which
the sponsor of the attack is neither known nor held
accountable. And they are using unlimited and unregulated money
to pay for it.
Congress cannot get off the hook by using its investigative
powers to point fingers at campaign improprieties, while
avoiding its share of the blame for failing to close the
loopholes and reinvigorate federal campaign finance laws.
Congress alone writes the laws, and we have no one to blame but
ourselves for the sorry state of the federal election laws. It
is not enough to know that the system is broken and lament that
condition; Congress must also fix it. That is our legislative
responsibility. Without legislative reform, we will be haunted
by the words of Roger Tamraz that in the next election, he will
give $600,000 to buy access to a candidate and will do so
legally.
Carl Levin.
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