THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S FOREIGN VISITOR PROGRAM
Hearing of the Subcommittee on Military Procurement
Committee on National Security
U.S. House of Representatives
October 6, 1998
C. Bruce Tarter, Director
University of California
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am the Director of the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL). Our Laboratory was founded in 1952 as a nuclear weapons
laboratory, and national security continues to be our central mission.
As a Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratory, our work is at the forefront of
science and technology and we are responsible for staying at the leading edge in areas
central to our programs. We depend on interactions with the international science and
technology community to be cognizant of major advances and to acquire special expertise
needed to accomplish mission goals. We also engage foreign nationals as part of our
national security mission through participation in international efforts to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons, materials, and know-how. Both sorts of interactions include
visits to the Laboratory by foreign nationals and, in some cases, more extensive technical
discussions and even participation in specific research projects.
When we interact with foreign nationals on site or off site, we take the issue of
protecting sensitive information extremely seriously. While we derive considerable
benefits from the presence of foreign visitors and assignees at the Laboratory, we fully
appreciate that there is the risk of compromise of sensitive information if effective
steps are not taken to understand the potential threat and ensure security control.
Because ensuring information security is not a simple task, we are employing increasingly
sophisticated measures in the way we process and manage visits by foreign nationals and
their longer-term presence as assignees to the Laboratory.
As I will discuss, I believe we have an effective set of procedures and controls in place
for managing security for foreign national visits and assignments to the Laboratory.
Central to the our efforts is Livermoreís counterintelligence (CI) program. The program
manager was hired from the ranks of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to place
our CI program in close coordination with the lead agency for foreign counterintelligence
in the U.S. Two additional former FBI Special Agents have been hired into the program,
bringing to the Laboratory three professionals each of whom have had over twenty-two years
of FBI foreign CI experience. Our objective was to enlist the help of the FBI in
identifying threats posed by hostile intelligence services to the Laboratory and its
employees. The CI program and the FBI have established a very close and effective working
relationship, of great benefit to the Laboratory, to DOE, and to the Bureau.
The Laboratory's CI program was reviewed as part of field research conducted to prepare
the 90 Day Report requirement outlined in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD/NSC)-61.
Concepts that derive from foreign visitor procedures and security controls in place at
Livermore figure into the action plan that was developed, (SNSI/US ONLY) Mapping the
Future of the Department of Energy's Counterintelligence Program (U). I broadly agree
with the thrust of the report, which includes actions that should lead to improved
performance. We will work with the DOE's ironing out details to most effectively implement
the report's recommendations.
IMPROVING CONTROLS OVER FOREIGN VISITORS TO LIVERMORE
We have taken significant steps to improve the effectiveness of controls over foreign
national visits to the Laboratory since the time of the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO), Nuclear Nonproliferation: Major Weakness in Foreign Visitor Controls at Weapons
Laboratories (GAO/RCED-89-31, October 11, 1988). We responded to the report's call to
action and the subsequent issuance of DOE Order 1240.2b Unclassified Visits and
Assignments by Foreign Nationals (September 3, 1992), which establishes responsibilities
and policies and proscribes administrative procedures for controlling unclassified visits
and assignments to DOE's facilities.
Some of the improvements we have made are reported in the more recent GAO report, Department
of Energy Actions Needed to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories
(GAO/RCED-97-229, September 25, 1997). Other actions were in progress at the time of GAO's
audit of our program or have been instituted since. I shall use the main DOE-wide issues
raised in the more recent GAO report to discuss important aspects of Livermore's efforts
in this area.
Implementation of Foreign Visitor Procedures. We have established formal procedures within
the Laboratory for approval of foreign national visits that include counterproliferation
and counterintelligence review. The process routinely includes a background check, an
expert review of proposed topics in view of classification, nonproliferation, and export
control issues, and prebriefing and debriefings of the Laboratory scientist host of the
visitors.
Security Controls. We have developed and implemented a standard security
plan for all foreign visitors to controlled areas. In addition, we prepare detailed
visit-specific plans when warranted. Furthermore, we conducted two operations security
(OPSEC) assessments: one focusing on a building at the Laboratory where many foreign
national assignees work and the other a multi-building survey to identify and address
potential OPSEC issues.
Counterintelligence Efforts. As mentioned, Livermore has a
counterintelligence program with a highly experienced staff that works closely with the
FBI. The program reviews visits and assignments, conducts host briefings, runs a vigorous
Laboratory-wide counter-espionage awareness program, develops a threat assessment for the
Laboratory, and carries out an annual review of the assignments and access of foreign
nationals at Livermore to assure that they do not pose risks to protected information.
IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN VISITOR PROCEDURES
The 1997 GAO report Department of Energy Actions Needed to Improve Controls Over
Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories expressed concern that foreign visitor
procedures have not been effectively implemented. The concerns stem from a
deficiency of advance knowledge about the backgrounds of many sensitive-country visitors
and inadequate efforts to ensure that the visits do not involve sensitive subjects.
At Livermore, we are addressing these concerns through formal procedures we have
established for approval of foreign national visits. Of course, a central consideration is
the benefit to Laboratory and DOE programs from the interaction. The process requires
review and signature by the Director's Office, the host Program or Directorate, the
counterintelligence program, and Proliferation Prevention and Arms Control Program. The
counterintelligence program works closely with the FBI to conduct background checks.
Background checks are required for all assignees to the Laboratory from sensitive
countries and we routinely conduct background checks for sensitive-country short-term
visitors all visitors are checked that are citizens of China or Russia. At the time of the
GAO review we had a documented audit trail of the background check for 44% of the
sensitive-country visitors (the figure cited in the report). We are certain that the
actual percentage was much higher. We have since upgraded our record keeping procedures
and we are installing an electronic system, the Visitor Tracking System, which will
facilitate processing, performance auditing, and detailed analysis of patterns and
statistics.
It is principally the responsibility of the Laboratory scientist host and the host
organization to ensure that sensitive information is not compromised. At our Laboratory,
for assurance, an expert from our Proliferation Prevention and Arms Control Program
reviews the content of the planned interactions giving consideration to sensitive
technology and export control issues, classification issues, proliferation concerns, and
U.S. policy concerns. In addition, the counterintelligence program prebriefs and debriefs
the host of the visit.
Fundamentally, however, it remains the case that effective protection of sensitive
information requires sound technical judgment on the part of participating Laboratory
employees and a clear understanding of sensitivities and the topics and context of the
discussions. We need to continue to work with DOE to find a more effective way of
characterizing sensitive information topics so that the visit review procedures followed
are appropriate for the circumstances.
Two examples highlight other mechanisms in place at the Laboratory to prevent compromise
of sensitive information through visits and/or foreign national assignments. The
Laboratory has, on its own initiative, established a policy prohibiting all
sensitive-country foreign nationals from participating in national security projects,
especially the Stockpile Stewardship Program and related internally-funded (e.g.,
Laboratory Directed Research and Development) projects. To ensure that this is properly
enforced, the CI program reviews any requests for waivers of the policy. Additionally,
within the Lasers Directorate at the Laboratory, which engages in a large number of
projects with industrial partners, a senior person has recently been named to lead a
concerted effort to ensure that intellectual property policies, procedures, and practices
are clearly understood and uniformly followed.
SECURITY CONTROLS
A second major concern raised in the 1997 GAO report was that security controls may not be
adequate. Security controls vary among the laboratories, there have been instances of
compromise of information, and the controls over unclassified, but sensitive, information
have not been fully assessed.
As do Los Alamos and Sandia national laboratories, Livermore uses a multilevel, graded
security approach to limit access and protect information. There are open areas,
controlled areas (areas with valuable property but no classified work) that receive a
higher level of protection, and areas where classified work is performed that receive even
greater protection. Except under special circumstances and tightly controlled, escorted
short visits, foreign nationals only have access to the open and controlled areas of the
Laboratory. On a case by case basis, some foreign national assignees to the Laboratory
have been granted unescorted after-hours access to controlled areas. With very rare
exceptions, unescorted after-hours access is not approved for sensitive-country nationals.
In addition to the Laboratory's physical security systems, we have developed and
implemented a standard security plan for all foreign visitors and assignees in controlled
areas. Detailed visit-specific plans are prepared when warranted. Furthermore, the staff
is very aware of espionage dangers and the need for information security. Our
counterintelligence program, known throughout the Laboratory as SAFE, for Security
Awareness For Employees, presents talks to groups of employees, arranges presentations on
espionage-related topics by guest speakers from the intelligence community, and keeps a
lending library of videotapes on counterintelligence subjects.
Operations security assessments are conducted at the Laboratory on an annual basis. One of
our most recent assessments focused on one of the buildings at the Laboratory where many
foreign national assignees work. Another assessment was a multi-building survey to
identify and bring to the attention of Laboratory programs and hosts potential OPSEC
issues in their area. In addition, since 1996, I have tasked the CI program to carry out
an annual review of the assignments and access of foreign nationals at the Laboratory to
assure that they do not pose risks to protected information.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EFFORTS
The 1997 GAO report also concluded that DOE's counterintelligence efforts can be improved.
Two specific concerns were related to DOE oversight of the laboratorie's CI programs and
the lack of a comprehensive assessment of the foreign espionage threat to the DOE and its
laboratories.
As I noted, we have taken steps to put in place an expertly staffed CI program at
Livermore with strong working relationships with the FBI. We wanted to be in position to
obtain the most current and relevant threat information in a timely manner, and to be able
to share with the FBI and other agencies such information of CI relevance that they might
need in order to carry out their missions. In addition to the members of our staff with
FBI experience, two FBI Special Agents are assigned to Livermore on a part-time basis to
work closely with the CI office. Accordingly, between the Laboratory and the FBI, there is
an almost daily flow of information which might bear on intelligence threats posed by
foreign nationals. This level of cooperation is key to our success.
I have highlighted many of the activities of our CI program: reviewing foreign national
visits and assignments, conducting Laboratory scientist host briefings, running a vigorous
Laboratory-wide counter-espionage awareness program, and carrying out an annual review of
the assignments and access of foreign nationals at Livermore to assure that they do not
pose risks to protected information. In addition, the CI program contributes to the
ìlocal threat study, a biennial threat assessment of the Laboratory conducted by the
OPSEC program.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We derive considerable benefits from the presence of foreign visitors and assignees at the
Laboratory and we take very seriously the foreign espionage risks involved. We balance the
benefits and risks through well-established procedures for managing the review of foreign
visitor requests and assignments, approved plans and attention to security controls, and
an expertly staffed counterintelligence program. I believe we have effective procedures
and controls in place, but as circumstances change we must continue to examine them for
opportunities to make needed improvements.
We are encouraged by the positive feedback we received from DOE after their review of our
program as part of field research conducted to prepare the 90 Day Report. I think it is
fair to say that steps Livermore has taken have helped point the way for some of the
actions recommended in the report. As I have said, I broadly agree with the thrust of the
report and we will work with the Department to effectively implement the 90 Day Report's
recommendations.
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