1998 Congressional Hearings
Intelligence and Security
Testimony of
John C. Browne
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Sensitive Countries |
Nonsensitive |
||||||
Area | China |
Russia |
India |
Other |
Total |
Total |
TOTAL |
Open | 277 | 364 | 115 | 177 | 933 | 1,919 | 2,852 |
Secure | 1 | 86 | 1 | 0 | 88 | 40 | 128 |
TOTAL | 278 | 450 | 116 | 177 | 1,021 | 1,959 | 2,980 |
Foreign visitor entry to secure areas requires DOE/HQ approval and implementation of special controls, and does not imply access to classified information, as I will discuss below.
Numbers for total foreign visitors show an upward trend over the last four years. Table 2 provides a summary of this trend. I will address our response to this trend later in this testimony.
Table 2. FY95-98 Foreign Visitors by Year from Sensitive and Nonsensitive Countries
Fiscal | Sensitive Countries |
Nonsensitive | |||||
Year | China | Russia | India | Other | Total | Total | TOTAL |
1998 | 278 | 450 | 116 | 177 | 1021 | 1,959 | 2,980 |
1997 | 259 | 424 | 148 | 139 | 970 | 2,047 | 3,017 |
1996 | 208 | 395 | 125 | 150 | 878 | 1,615 | 2,493 |
1995 | 220 | 287 | 114 | 114 | 735 | 1,396 | 2,131 |
Controls
Los Alamos National Laboratory occupies approximately 43 square miles containing over 2,200 structures. During the Manhattan Project, all of Los Alamos was a secure area. In February 1957, the city and some Laboratory areas were opened and made accessible to the public. Today, much of Los Alamos National Laboratory is relatively accessible for unclassified research; however, there are still many tightly controlled secure areas in the Laboratory where national security work is performed.
Simply stated, our basic policy, consistent with U.S. laws, is that access to classified information by foreign nationals is not allowed. Any exception requires DOE/HQ approval for an overriding programmatic requirement such as government-to-government agreements.
All foreign visits and assignments at the Laboratory are governed by DOE requirements. From these requirements, the Lab develops the protection methodology and procedures. Our methodology uses a multi-layer protection approach consisting of combinations of administrative and physical controls. The number of security layers is higher for foreign visitors from sensitive countries and foreign visitors to secure areas.
Visits to Open Areas
In the many square miles of Laboratory land and the hundreds of Laboratory buildings that have no classified materials, only administrative controls are used for visitor entries. The universal requirement is that the visitor has a responsible host, is positively identified, and is badged (with a photo badge for foreign visitors). If the visitor is from a sensitive country, a security plan is also required. The data on foreign visitors are collected in databases and are reported to the appropriate government agencies and Laboratory organizations.
Visits to Secure Areas
For visits to secure areas, additional layers of physical and administrative controls are employed to protect classified information. These layers include additional management review by both DOE and the Laboratory, site-specific and visitor-specific security plans, more stringent escort requirements, removal of classified materials before entry, ìuncleared visitorî signs, continuous physical control over the visitorís movements, and comprehensive counterintelligence briefings for all personnel involved in the visit. These requirements are in addition to the existing physical security controls (enclosures and armed protective forces) for classified materials.
Sensitive Unclassified Information
There are several kinds of sensitive unclassified information for which we provide various levels of required administrative and physical protection. Limiting each visitorís access to specific buildings and to open computer systems provides additional protection of this information from unauthorized access by foreign nationals. Implementation of administrative controls is through the hostís supervision of the visitor, but can also include physical entry controls where required.
Cyber Security
Access to classified information on computers by foreign nationals is prevented by several methods. Our classified and unclassified computing environments are kept physically separate. Data transfer of classified information is both administratively and technically protected.
In the sensitive unclassified environment, both technical and administrative controls are placed on sensitive unclassified information residing on computers.
Network security is undergoing continuous evaluation, and necessary enhancements are implemented regularly. For example, in response to changing threats to Laboratory information resources from Internet users, we recently made a management decision to place the entire unclassified computing environment behind a restrictive firewall. This change means, for example, the replacement of static passwords with dynamic one-time passwords from a ìsmart cardî to provide another layer of protection. Other significant security enhancements are provided with this change as well, including enhanced hacker monitoring, and use of encryption. When a new Laboratory network server is installed, the institutional default will be that the system be behind this firewall to prevent unauthorized access unless the Laboratory owner can establish that the system will not handle sensitive information and is required to be truly ìopenî for programmatic reasons.
Enhancements
In recent years, Los Alamos National Laboratory
has made a number of improvements in our handling of foreign visits. Let me highlight a
few of the measures that the Laboratory has implemented to deal with the trend of
increasing foreign visitors: Concluding Remarks Visits by foreign scientists are an important
part of creating the kind of Laboratory I believe is needed. I recognize, however, that a
special responsibility is attached to hosting such visitors at a nuclear weapons
laboratory. The U.S. has led the world in science for many
decades. In many areas, we still do. But we are a small fraction of the worldís
population. Other nations are investing in science and technology and are producing
excellent results. Our national security depends significantly on ensuring that U.S.
technology is at the forefront. To do that, we must interact with the international
scientific community to identify those advances that could impact national security. We
must avoid technological surprises that might compromise our national security. We cannot
do that if we work in isolation or under unnecessarily restricted interactions with other
scientists. While working with foreign scientists and
engineers, we must protect classified and sensitive information. The GAO reports and the
DOE reviews have sharpened our attention to the need for improvements in the way we handle
foreign visitors. Although we have made many improvements, we see the need for more, and
we are continuing to work on them. In summary, Los Alamos National Laboratory will
handle foreign visitors with controls that will allow us to receive the benefits of their
visits while avoiding the problems that have been identified by the reviews of the GAO and
DOE. Some of the steps planned will take increased resources, and we look forward to the
support of the Congress as the DOE and Labs put in place the planned improvements.
I am extremely enthusiastic about the opportunity to lead our great Laboratory as we move
into the next century. My personal goal as Director is to create an atmosphere of
innovation and productivity that attracts and retains the best people and leads to the
successful accomplishment of our mission while still protecting national security and
other sensitive information. Success will leave a legacy that can serve as the basis for
future contributions to the nation in the next century.
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