104th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 104-551
_______________________________________________________________________
ESTABLISHING A SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS TO INVESTIGATE
THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN IRANIAN ARMS TRANSFERS TO CROATIA AND BOSNIA
_______
May 2, 1996.--Referred to the House calendar and ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Solomon, from the Committee on Rules, submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H. Res. 416]
The Committee on Rules, to whom was referred the resolution
(H. Res. 416) establishing a select subcommittee of the
Committee on International Relations to investigate the United
States Role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon without
amendment and recommend that the resolution be agreed to.
purpose of the resolution
The purpose of H. Res. 416 is to establish a select
subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations to
investigate the U.S. role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia
and Bosnia.
summary of the resolution
H. Res. 416 establishes a select subcommittee of the
Committee on International Relations to investigate the U.S.
role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia. The
resolution outlines the composition of the subcommittee and the
appointment of its members. It sets forth the scope for the
select subcommittee's investigation. It deems the select
subcommittee a subcommittee of a standing committee of the
House.
The resolution further authorizes the chairman of the
select subcommittee, for purposes of its investigation, to
authorize the taking of affidavits and depositions pursuant to
notice or subpoena by a member of the select subcommittee or of
the staff of the Committee on International Relations
designated by the chairman of the select subcommittee. It
provides direction to the select subcommittee on the
transmission of its report, and sunsets the subcommittee 6
months after the date of enactment of this resolution.
committee consideration
H. Res. 416 was introduced by Rep. Ben Gilman, Chairman of
the Committee on International Relations, on April 29, 1996 and
referred to the Committee on Rules.
On Wednesday, May 1, 1996, the Committee on Rules held a
hearing on H. Res. 416 and received testimony from the Hon.
Benjamin Gilman, Chairman of the Committee on International
Relations; the Hon. Lee Hamilton, Ranking Minority Member of
the Committee on International Relations; the Hon. Steny Hoyer;
and the Hon. David Skaggs.
On Thursday, May 2, the Committee met to markup H. Res.
416. The Committee favorably reported H. Res. 416 by a record
vote of 7-4. During the markup, no amendments to H. Res. 416
were agreed to.
background on the u.s. role in iranian arms transfers to croatia and
bosnia
After Yugoslavia disintegrated and descended into factional
warfare in June 1991, one of the responses of the international
community was to impose a United Nations arms embargo on the
area comprising the entire former nation of Yugoslavia in
September of 1991. U.N. Security council resolution 713, which
imposed the embargo, passed with the support of the U.S.
government under the Bush administration.
But as the outgunned Bosnian military suffered repeated
defeats and Bosnian civilian casualties mounted, many people,
including presidential candidate Bill Clinton, came to see the
embargo as unfair to the Bosnians, as it locked in an imbalance
of arms. Upon taking office in January 1993, the Clinton
administration initially attempted to persuade our allies to
multilaterally lift the embargo. After failing to do so, the
administration ultimately elected to continue the policy and to
both support and enforce the embargo with U.S. naval forces.
In the face of increasing congressional, media and public
opposition to the embargo, the Clinton administration
repeatedly voiced its opposition to unilaterally lifting the
embargo right up until its phased termination was approved in
November 1995 in accordance with the Dayton peace accords. The
administration's rationale was that a unilateral lifting of the
embargo would antagonize our allies, endanger U.S. forces in
Yugoslavia, necessitate a U.S. military deployment to the
Balkans to facilitate a U.N. withdrawal and possibly weaken
other international sanctions against nations such as Iraq,
Libya and Serbia.
During this period, the U.S. Congress voted twice to
unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. On both
occasions, the administration strenuously opposed the measures.
The administration did, however, agree in November 1994 to
legislation that terminated U.S. enforcement of the embargo
against third parties, though it did not terminate the U.S.
arms embargo or directly or indirectly provide arms to Bosnia.
In April 1996, however, a press report suggested that the
Clinton administration had secretly given its consent to covert
arms shipments by Iran to Croatia and Bosnia. An April 5 Los
Angeles Times article by James Risen and Doyle McManus claims
that the U.S. ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, and then-
U.S. Contact Group representative, Charles Redman, responded to
an inquiry from Croatian President Tudjman about whether the
U.S. would object to the transshipment of arms through Croatia
from Iran to the government of Bosnia by saying that the U.S.
had ``no position.''
According to the story, the two U.S. diplomats were acting
on instructions from National Security Advisor Anthony Lake,
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and President Clinton
himself. The policy was known only to a small group of State
Department officials, with Congress, the CIA and even several
regional U.S. embassies kept out of the loop. When then-CIA
Director James Woolsey became aware of the Iranian shipments,
he contacted Mr. Lake and conferred with then-White House
counsel Abner Mikva. The matter was then referred to the
Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), which began an
investigation in November 1994. In May 1995, the Clinton-
appointed IOB concluded that no US laws had been broken,
despite the administration's failure to issue a presidential
finding and to notify Congress. In testimony before the House
International Relations Committee on April 23, 1996, the basic
assertions of the article were confirmed by Undersecretary of
State Peter Tarnoff.
A subsequent April 17 story in the Los Angeles Times by the
same reporters claims that Redman, soon after the inquiry from
Tudjman,requested that the Croatian government ``expedite'' a
convoy destined for Bosnia which was suspected to contain arms.
Undersecretary Tarnoff claimed in his testimony before the
House International Relations Committee on April 23 that Redman
believed the convoy to be strictly humanitarian and had no
knowledge of it containing arms.
In the meantime, Iran has skillfully exploited the opening
that the arms pipeline provided, parlaying it into an extensive
presence in Bosnia. Iran's connections to the hundreds of
``mujahideen'' fighters in Bosnia are not completely known, but
IFOR commanders and other diplomats suspect that the Iranians
can utilize some mujahideen as surrogates to attack U.S.
interests in Bosnia. In fact, two holders of Iranian diplomatic
passports were captured in the raid on the Bosnian-operated
terrorist training center in February. The Iranians have the
largest embassy in Sarajevo and they have just opened a large
``cultural center'' there as well. The Iranians are reportedly
training large numbers of Bosnian Muslim troops in Iran, thus
exploiting the tardiness of the U.S.-led equip and train
program. The Iranian presence is also cited by the Serb and
Croatian officials as a threat which necessitates the
maintenance of strong Serbian and Croatian military
capabilities, as well as a cause of friction between the
Bosnian Muslims and other groups in Bosnia. To date, the
Bosnians have only partially responded to U.S. demands that
they reduce the Iranian presence on their soil.
The Clinton administration's actions in relation to this
matter are disturbing and raise several questions. Was the
administration telling the American people, Congress, our
allies and even most of the executive branch one thing while it
was doing another? Did any of the administration's actions
violate U.S. law? Was the U.S. government's role in these arms
transfers simply passive or was it, as the April 17 Los Angeles
Times article asserts, more ``hands on? Which government
officials knew about these arms transfers, and when? How
extensive was the effort to keep Congress uninformed of the
Iranian operations? Why did the Clinton administration allow
Iran to extend its influence into Europe after the
administration had announced a policy of isolating Iran? Why
would the Clinton administration allow Iran, a State Department
``terrorist nation,'' to unilaterally violate the arms embargo
after repeatedly ignoring U.S. congressional pleas and
directives for the U.S. to do so? Did the administration's
actions increase the risk to U.S. Armed Forces deployed in
Bosnia or decrease the likelihood of a timely withdrawal of
U.S. Armed Forces from Bosnia.
need for the resolution
It is the view of the Committee on Rules that H. Res. 416
is necessary for several reasons. First, it will ensure that
the Committee on International Relations has the resources to
ascertain the answers to questions raised in response to the
Clinton administration's actions with respect to covert arms
shipments by Iran to Croatia and Bosnia. As Chairman Gilman
stated in testimony before the Rules Committee: ``The full
International Relations Committee has before it a full
legislative and oversight agenda. We expend virtually 99
percent of our funds in that. The full committee quite simply
does not have the resources to undertake that kind of extensive
review of looking into all of the documents that the executive
branch may have and all of the events that occurred.''
Second, although the Rules of the House grant investigative
and subpoena powers to standing committees and subcommittees,
H. Res. 416 is needed to allow the International Relations
Committee to thoroughly investigate this matter utilizing a
select subcommittee.
Specifically, the resolution is required to effectively
exempt the International Relations Committee from the five
subcommittee limit on a temporary basis and solely for the
purpose of establishing this select subcommittee. Clause 6(d)
of rule X limits House committees to establishing no more than
five subcommittees, except Appropriations, which is limited to
13; Government Reform and Oversight, limited to 7; and
Transportation and Infrastructure, limited to 6. H. Res. 416
states that ``this select subcommittee shall be deemed to be a
subcommittee of a standing committee for all purposes of law
and for all purposes of the Rules of the House'' except for
clause 6(d) of rule X.
Service on the select subcommittee established by H. Res.
416 is consistent with House rules. Clause 6(b)(2)(A) of rule X
limits Members to service on two full committees and four
subcommittees of the House. This rule continues in clause
6(b)(2)(B) to state that for purposes of the committee and
subcommittee assignment limit, ``the term `subcommittee'
includes any panel, task force, special subcommittee, or any
subunit of a standing committee that is established for any
cumulative period longer than six months in any Congress.''
Since H. Res. 416 specifically states that the select
subcommittee shall cease to exist 6 months after the date on
which the resolution is agreed to, service on the select
subcommittee is entirely appropriate under House rules,
including under the Member assignment limits.
Third, a resolution of this nature is necessary to limit
the scope and time frame for the select subcommittee's
investigation. The select subcommittee's scope and focus of its
investigation is clearly set forth in subsection (c) in
paragraphs (1) through (7) of the resolution. Subsection (f) of
the resolution states that the select subcommittee shall
transmit a report to the Committee on International Relations,
including a detailed statement of findings and recommendations,
not later than 6 months after the date on which this resolution
is agreed to. Subsection (g) of the resolution states that the
select subcommittee shall cease to exist 6 months after the
date on which the resolution is agreed to.
Furthermore, H. Res. 416 is necessary to authorize the
taking of depositions, pursuant to notice or subpoena, by a
Member or staff designated by the chairman. The House has, on
occasion, granted special authority to standing or select
committees to allow a single Member or designated staff to take
sworn depositions as part of a broader resolution authorizing
specified investigations. Such investigative authorization
resolutions have been necessary either because they created new
select committees to carry-out the investigations, or because
they granted existing standing committees with special
jurisdiction and/or procedures not available to them under the
standing rules of the House. Some examples of investigation
authorization resolutions that have included special deposition
authority are the following:
President Nixon Impeachment Proceedings (93rd
Congress, 1974, H. Res. 803)--This resolution gave the
Judiciary Committee full authorization to conduct an
impeachment inquiry into allegations against President
Nixon. Among other things it permitted the committee to
require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance and
testimony of any person, including the taking of
depositions by counsel to the committee.
Assassinations Investigation (95th Congress, 1977, H.
Res. 222)--This resolution created the Select Committee
on Assassinations, and provided it with various
procedural authorities, including the authority to take
testimony under oath anywhere in the United States or
abroad and authorized designated staff of the select
committee to obtain statements from any witness who is
placed under oath by an authority who is authorized to
administer oaths in accordance with the applicable laws
of the U.S.
Koreagate (95th Congress, 1977, H. Res. 252 & H. Res.
752)--The first resolution broadened the authority of
the House Standards Committee to investigate whether
family members or associates of House Members, officers
or employees had accepted anything of value from the
Government of Korea or representatives thereof. The
resolution also gave joint subpoena authority to the
chairman and ranking minority member of the committee
but permitted appeal to the committee if one objected.
It also gave special counsel the right to intervene in
any judicial proceeding relating to the inquiry. The
second resolution authorized committee employees to
take depositions, but required that an objection by a
witness to answer a question could only be ruled on by
a member of the committee.
Abscam (97th Congress, 1981, H. Res. 67)--The
resolution gave certain special authorities to the
Standards Committee, though the investigation was
confined to Members, officers and employees. Included
in the Resolution was a provision permitting any single
member of the committee to take depositions.
Iran-Contra (100th Congress, 1987, H. Res. 12)--The
resolution authorized the creation of a select
committee to investigate the covert arms transactions
with Iran and any diversion of funds from the sales.
Among other things, the resolution gave the chairman,
in consultation with the ranking minority member, the
authority to authorize any member or designated staff
to take depositions or affidavits pursuant to notice or
subpoena, which were to be deemed to have been taken in
executive session, but available for use by members of
the select committee in open session.
Judge Hastings Impeachment Proceedings (100th
Congress, 1987 H. Res. 320)--This resolution authorized
counsel to the Judiciary Committee or its Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice to take affidavits and depositions
pursuant to notice or subpoena.
Judge Nixon Impeachment Proceedings (100th Congress,
1988, H. Res. 562)--This resolution authorized
Judiciary Committee counsel to take depositions and
affidavits pursuant to notice and subpoena.
October Surprise (102nd Congress, 1991, H. Res.
258)--This resolution established a special task force
to investigate certain allegations regarding the
holding of American hostages by Iran in 1980. Among
other things the resolution authorized the chairman, in
consultation with the ranking minority member, to
authorize subpoenas and to authorize the taking of
affidavits and depositions by any member or by
designated staff, which were to be deemed to have been
taken in Washington, D.C., in executive session.
White House Travel Office (104th Congress, 1996, H.
Res. 369)--This resolution authorized the chairman of
the Government Reform and Oversight Committee, for
purposes of its investigation and study of the White
House Travel Office Matter, upon consultation with the
ranking minority member of the committee, to authorize
the taking of affidavits and depositions by a member or
designated staff, or require the furnishing of
information by interrogatory, which were to be deemed
to have been taken in Washington, D.C., in executive
session.
analysis of the resolution
H. Res. 416 establishes a select subcommittee of the
Committee on International Relations to investigate the U.S.
role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia. The
resolution authorizes the select subcommittee to sit and act
during this Congress in the United States and overseas, whether
the House is in session or has adjourned. This language is
similar to that which applies to standing committees under
clause 2(m)(1)(A) of rule XI of the Rules of the House. The
resolution also authorizes the select subcommittee to sit and
act outside the United States.
Unless otherwise provided in this resolution, the rules of
the Committee on International Relations are applicable to the
select subcommittee. The select subcommittee may adopt
additional written rules to govern its procedures provided they
are not inconsistent with the resolution, the rules of the
Committee on International Relations, or the rules of the
House.
The resolution states that the select subcommittee shall be
composed of 8 members of the Committee on International
Relations, 5 of whom shall be members of the majority party and
3 of whom shall be members of the minority party. The majority
members shall be appointed by the chairman of the Committee on
International Relations and the minority members shall be
appointed by the chairman upon recommendation of the ranking
minority party member of that committee. Unless formally
appointed to serve on the select subcommittee, the Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on International
Relations may attend the meetings and participate in the
activities of the select subcommittee, except for voting and
being counted for a quorum. This is consistent with Rules 15 of
the Rules of the Committee on International Relations.
The resolution sets forth the scope of the select
subcommittee's investigation. The select subcommittee is
authorized to investigate the policy of the U.S. government
with respect to the transfer of arms from Iran to countries or
entities within the territory of the former Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia during any period that an international arms embargo
was in effect; the nature and extent of those arms transfers;
any actions by the U.S. Government to facilitate or impede such
arms transfers; any communications to the Congress or the
American people with respect to matters described above and
with respect to the arms embargo or efforts to terminate or
modify the U.S. participation in that embargo; any implication
of the matters described above for the safety of the United
States Armed Forces deployed in and around Bosnia, for
relations between the U.S. and its allies, and for relations
between the U.S. and Iran; any actions to review, analyze,
investigate or keep from being revealed the above described
matters; all deliberations, discussions, or communications
within the U.S. government relating to the matters described
above and all communications between the U.S. government and
other governments, organizations, or individuals relating to
these matters.
The resolution deems the select subcommittee a subcommittee
of a standing committee of the House for all purposes of law
and for all purposes of the Rules of the House, including
clause 2(m) of rule XI but excluding clause 6(d) of rule X.
Clause 2(m) of rule XI provides any committee or subcommittee,
in the course of carrying out its functions and duties within
its jurisdction, the authority to sit and act whether the House
is in session, or has recessed or adjourned. Furthermore, this
rule provides the authority to issue subpoenas for attendance
of certain witnesses or documents. A subpoena may be authorized
by the subcommittee only when authorized by a majority of the
Members voting, a majority being present. The House rule
further provides that the authority to issue subpoenas may be
delegated to the chairman by the committee. Clause 6(d) of rule
X limits the number of subcommittees a committee of the House
shall have to no more than five, except the Committees on
Appropriations, Government Reform and Oversight, and
Transportation and Infrastructure.
The resolution authorizes the select subcommittee to sit
while the House is reading a measure for amendment under the
five-minute rule.
The resolution further authorizes the chairman of the
select subcommittee, for purposes of its investigation, and
upon consultation with the ranking minority member, to
authorize the taking of affidavits and depositions pursuant to
notice or subpoena by a member of the select subcommittee or of
the staff of the Committee on International Relations
designated by the chairman of the select subcommittee, or
require the furnishing of information by interrogatory, under
oath administered by a person otherwise authorized by law to
administer oaths. The resolution states that the select
subcommittee shall provide access to information and
proceedings under procedures adopted by the select subcommittee
consistent with those found in clause 7(c) of rule XLVIII
(procedures of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence).
The resolution further provides access to information and
proceedings of the select subcommittee by the Speaker, the
majority leader, the minority leader, and their appropriately
cleared and designated staff. Such access is similar to that
provided to the Speaker and the minority leader with respect to
the Permanent Select Committee on Ingelligence. H. Res. 416
only authorizes the taking of affidavits and depositions by a
member of the select subcommittee or of the staff of the
International Relations Committee designated by the chairman.
The resolution directs the select subcommittee to transmit
a report to the Committee on International Relations not later
than 6 months after the date on which this resolution is agreed
to. The select subcommittee shall cease to exist 6 months after
the date on which this resolution is agreed to.
The resolution does not authorize additional funds for the
select subcommittee to carry out its investigation. Such
funding must be provided for by a separate House resolution.
MATTERS REQUIRED UNDER THE RULES OF THE HOUSE
Committee vote
Pursuant to clause 2(l)(2)(B) of House rule XI the results
of each rollcall vote on an amendment or motion to report,
together with the names of those voting for and against, are
printed below:
Rules Committee RollCall No. 306
Date: May 2, 1996.
Measure: H. Res. 416, Establishing a select subcommittee of
the Committee on International Relations to investigate the
United States Role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and
Bosnia.
Motion By: Mr. Moakley.
Summary of Motion: Substitute amendment directing the
International Relations Committee to undertake investigation
using existing committee resources.
Results: Rejected, 4-7.
Vote By Members: Dreier--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay;
Diaz-Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay;, Greene--Nay; Moakley--Yea;
Beilenson--Yea; Frost--Yea; Hall--Yea; Solomon--Nay.
rules committee rollcall no. 307
Date: May 2, 1996.
Measure: H. Res. 416, Establishing a select subcommittee of
the Committee on International Relations to investigate the
United States Role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and
Bosnia.
Motion By: Mr. Hall.
Summary of Motion: En bloc amendments to require
``concurrence'' instead of ``consultation'' with ranking
minority member for authorizing the taking of staff depositions
and add requirement to consult with minority on staffing
decisions.
Results: Rejected 4-7.
Vote By Members: Dreier--Nay; Linder--Nay; Pryce--Nay;
Diaz-Balart--Nay; McInnis--Nay; Greene--Nay; Moakley--Yea;
Beilenson--Yea; Frost--Yea; Hall--Yea; Solomon--Nay.
rules committee rollcall no. 308
Date: May 2, 1996.
Measure: H. Res. 416, Establishing a select subcommittee of
the Committee on International Relations to investigate the
United States Role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and
Bosnia.
Motion By: Mr. Dreier.
Summary of Motion: Report the resolution favorably to the
House with the recommendation that it be adopted.
Results: Adopted 7-4.
Vote By Members: Dreier--Yea; Linder--Yea; Pryce--Yea;
Diaz-Balart--Yea; McInnis--Yea; Greene--Yea; Moakley--Nay;
Beilenson--Nay; Frost--Nay; Hall--Nay; Solomon--Yea.
Congressional Budget Office estimates
Clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI requires each Committee to
include a cost estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office, pursuant to section 403 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, if the cost estimate is
timely submitted. No cost estimate was received from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office.
Oversight findings
Clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI requires each committee report
to contain oversight findings and recommendations required
pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X. The Committee has no
oversight findings.
Oversight findings and recommendations of the Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight
Clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI requires each committee report
to contain a summary of the oversight findings and
recommendations made by the Government Reform and Oversight
Committee pursuant to clause 4(c)(2) of rule X, whenever such
findings have been timely submitted. The Committee on Rules has
received no such findings or recommendations from the Committee
on Government Reform and Oversight.
Views of committee members
Clause 2(l)(5) of rule XI requires each committee to afford
a three day opportunity for members of the committee to file
additional, minority, or dissenting views and to include the
views in its report. Although neither requirement applies to
the Committee, the Committee always makes the maximum effort to
provide its members with such an opportunity. The following
views were submitted:
MINORITY VIEWS
This unprecedented legislative procedure proposed in H.
Res. 416 was created for one purpose and one purpose only. It
is a political fishing expedition designed to embarrass the
administration by creating a perceived problem where one does
not exist. It is an expensive political ploy designed to
manufacture campaign fodder in an election year. It is a
perfect example of politics at its worse.
The incident cited as the reason for this unnecessary and
expensive special select subcommittee simply does not warrant
the implementation of this highly unusual process. No laws were
broken; there were no reporting requirements on the part of the
Administration; no government officials participated in any
prohibited activity; and no charges of wrongdoing have resulted
from this particular incident. The resolution, however, seeks
to focus attention on a situation that can be manipulated to
cause the public to believe illegal or questionable activities
took place. And, to add insult to injury, this resolution seeks
to use additional Federal funds to the tune of $1 million for
this purely political endeavor.
This measure clearly seems to be in response to a call by
the Republican leadership in the House calling upon their
Committee Chairmen to dig deep for any dirt on the
Administration. This contention is not simply a paranoid charge
on the part of the minority, but rather the result of an April
23, 1996 memorandum requesting such information. The following
is a copy of that memo:
To: All House Full and Subcommittee Chairmen.
From: Bob Walker and Jim Nussle.
Subject: Request for information--Urgent.
Date: April 23, 1996.
On behalf of the House leadership, we have been asked to
cull all committees for information that you already have on
three subjects listed below. We are compiling information for
packaging and presentation to the Leadership for determining
the agenda. You are a tremendous source for this project. The
subjects are:
Waste, Fraud and Abuse in the Clinton Administration
Influence of Washington Labor Union Bosses/Corruption
Examples of Dishonesty or ethical lapses in the
Clinton Administration
Please have your staff review pertinent GAO reports,
Inspector General reports or committee investigative materials
or newspaper articles for departments and agencies within your
jurisdiction that expose anecdotes that amplify these areas.
Send your material to Ginni Thomas at H-226, U.S. Capitol
or fax it to 6-1116. We need this information as soon as
possible--no later than close of business on Friday, April 26.
Bypassing the existing committee structure
The existing committee structure and the standing rules of
the House already empower committees to undertake this type of
investigation without the need to create a new, freestanding
investigative structure. Pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X,
committees have authority to conduct oversight hearings on
those subjects within their jurisdiction. It is one of their
functions as defined in the House Rules. We understand that
three individual House committees are currently considering
looking into this one incident. Furthermore, the Committee on
Government Reform has an oversight subcommittee, the
Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and
Criminal Justice, specifically for the purpose of investigating
activities and policies analogous to those spelled out in H.
Res. 416.
The majority could have chosen any of these avenues to
pursue their concerns with regard to the situation at hand and
done so without any additional cost to the taxpayer. Instead
they chose to take this costly and unconventional, not to
mention highly public, route seemingly for the sole purpose of
highlighting a nonevent and turning it into a new ``scandal''
to damage the President in an election year. It certainly can
be no coincidence that this resolution, if enacted within the
next few weeks, will end on or about election day.
The Republicans were adamant when they implemented their
new rule changes at the beginning of the 104th Congress. They
were going to cut committees, subcommittees, staff, and
expenses by nearly one-third. They eliminated subcommittees,
limiting them in all but a few cases to five per committee.
They cut staff and they cut committee budgets. And, in order to
allow members to develop expertise in specific areas, they
limited to four the number of subcommittees on which an
individual member may serve. They proclaimed an end to
government waste in the legislative branch. Yet they abandoned
their promises of a streamlined, efficient, and economical
committee system by proposing this additional subcommittee and
an increase in the subcommittee assignment limit simply so they
may exploit a groundless, politically driven agenda. We offered
an amendment to treat the select subcommittee as a regular
subcommittee for the purposes of the requirement that Members
sit on no more than 4 subcommittees simultaneously. It was
defeated.
This new select subcommittee carries a heavy price tag.
House Resolution 417, which would authorize the funding for H.
Res. 416 and is moving on a parallel committee track, provides
the rather substantial sum of nearly $1 million for this six-
month-in-duration subcommittee. By contrast, the entire 1995
committee budget for the International Affairs Committee and
its subcommittees was $5.074 million. To spend this much
additional money to look into an event that contained no
evidence of wrongdoing is incredibly wasteful and
irresponsible.
Furthermore, this special subcommittee will not do the
investigation exclusively. The other committees looking into
this incident will use their own funds as well and will likely
duplicate the efforts of the select subcommittee. Therefore, we
will spend an enormous amount of taxpayer money from as many as
four different committees on an investigation that goes not to
any violation of law, not to any facts in dispute, but only to
the question of the President's judgement. We offered a
substitute resolution that would have directed the
International Relations Committee to work within the existing
committee structure and with existing committee funds to pursue
this matter. Our substitute was voted down.
Danger to the peace process and to U.S. Troops in the former Yugoslavia
Even more disturbing than the wastefulness of this
situation, however, is the willingness to allow this partisan
political event to spill over into the tinderbox that was once
Yugoslavia. Has the majority, even for a moment, stopped to
consider how their actions will be read by the Bosnians, or
Serbs, or Croats, or the multitude of other forces arrayed in
that dangerous place? With U.S. troops on the ground in that
volatile, war-torn nation, have they thought what effect this
will have on the fragile peace the fractured former Yugoslavia
enjoys for now? Have they considered the potential danger that
this highly political probe might have on our soldiers in
Bosnia? We would hope that these important considerations would
cause the majority to reconsider going down this unwise path.
Minority Rights
There is very little in H. Res. 416 that outlines the
minority role in this special select subcommittee. Other than
the committee membership ratio, there are no specific minority
rights written into resolution. There is nothing in the
resolution to specify if the minority will be given staff
representation or control over any portion of the committee
funding. In subsection (7)(e)(1) of the resolution it states
that ``The Chairman * * * may, upon consultation with the
ranking minority party member'' authorize the taking of
affidavits and depositions by staff or committee members. We
are concerned that the use of the term ``consultation'' does
not ensure that the minority will be given any authority to
question or veto any decision made by the Chair. We offered an
amendment in the Rules Committee markup which would have
required the ``concurrence'' of the Ranking Minority Member
with the Chair to authorize the taking of affidavits or
depositions. We also offered an amendment stating that no
staffing decisions can be made without consultation with the
Ranking Minority member. Unfortunately both of our amendments
were defeated.
lack of clarification regarding citation of witnesses for contempt
We continue to be troubled by the lack of clarity in the
Rules Committee report with regard to the issuance of a
contempt citation against witnesses who refuse to comply with
the subpoena for staff depositions. We hope that this grant of
authority is not intended to change any of the longstanding
practices of the House in this area. A similar situation
occurred in March of this year when the Rules Committee
considered and reported H. Res. 369. Our concern was then and
continues to be now that absent clarifying language, there is a
danger that there could be a challenge to the longstanding
practice in the House which holds that there are no grounds for
a contempt citation if a witness refuses to appear before or to
answer questions in a staff deposition provided that the
witness responds fully at a duly called hearing of the
committee with a quorum of members present. We offered the
following clarifying amendment to be included in the Rules
Committee report accompanying H. Res. 416:
The procedure used in this resolution which authorizes
the deposition of witnesses by staff is meant to
augment not replace the current information gathering
function of a committee hearing. Nothing in this
resolution is intended to change the longstanding
precedent that there are no grounds for a contempt
citation if a witness refuses to appear before or to
answer questions in a staff deposition provided that
the witness responds fully at a duly called hearing of
the committee with a quorum of members present.
Regretfully, as was the case in H. Res. 369, this amendment
was defeated.
conclusion
If the majority feels this incident must be examined, then
they should do so through the existing mechanisms and committee
structures of the House. It should be deliberated in a manner
that is responsible and done out of genuine concern over the
existing policies with regard to embargoes and third country
actions. It should not be ``investigated'' as a political
agenda to be used for election year gains. The cost, both in
dollars and in public trust, is far too great to do otherwise.
Equally important is the need to consider how any action would
impact the peace process and the safety of our U.S. troops in
Bosnia and Croatia. We urge the majority to abandon the unwise
course laid out in H. Res. 416 and reconsider their approach by
utilizing the committee system that is already in place. To do
otherwise can only raise concerns over the real motive for such
actions.
Joe Moakley.
Anthony C. Beilenson.
Martin Frost.
Tony P. Hall.
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