Union Calendar No. 235
104th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - House Report 104-486
NATIONAL DRUG POLICY: A REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE DRUG WAR
__________
SEVENTH REPORT
by the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
March 19, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr.,
Pennsylvania, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
DAN BURTON, Indiana
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New
Hampshire
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana
JON D. FOX, Pennsylvania
RANDY TATE, Washington
DICK CHRYSLER, Michigan
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, New Jersey
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
MICHAEL PATRICK FLANAGAN, Illinois
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South
Carolina
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GARY A. CONDIT, California
COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota
KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, Michigan
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
GENE GREEN, Texas
CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
BILL BREWSTER, Oklahoma
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
------ ------
------
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont (Independent)
James L. Clarke, Staff Director
Kevin Sabo, General Counsel
Jane Cobb, Professional Staff
Member
Judith McCoy, Chief Clerk
Bud Myers, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal
Justice
WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New
Hampshire, Chairman
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
TOM LANTOS, California
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York
GARY A. CONDIT, California
BILL K. BREWSTER, Oklahoma
------ ------
Ex Officio
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr.,
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois Pennsylvania
Robert Charles, Staff Director
Sean Littlefield, Professional
Staff Member
Robert Shea, Professional Staff
Member
Sally Dionne, Clerk
Cherri Branson, Minority
Professional Staff
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, March 19, 1996.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, I submit herewith the
committee's seventh report to the 104th Congress.
William F. Clinger, Jr., Chairman.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
I. Summary, Oversight Findings and Recommendations..................1
A. Introduction.......................................... 1
B. Overview of Investigation............................. 3
C. Committee Findings.................................... 5
D. Committee Recommendations............................. 7
II. Report on the Committee's Oversight Review......................11
A. Background............................................ 11
B. Proceedings of the Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs, and Criminal Justice.......... 15
1. March 9, 1995, Hearing.......................... 15
a. Purpose and Panels.......................... 15
b. Summary of Findings......................... 15
c. Subcommittee Chairman's Introduction........ 16
d. Testimony of First Lady Nancy Reagan........ 16
e. Testimony of John P. Walters................ 18
f. Testimony of William J. Bennett............. 22
g. Testimony of Robert C. Bonner............... 23
h. Testimony of Dr. Lee P. Brown............... 26
i. Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost.............. 31
j. Testimony of Thomas Hedrick, Jr............. 32
k. Testimony of G. Bridget Ryan................ 34
l. Testimony of James Copple................... 35
m. Testimony of Charles Robert Heard, III...... 35
2. April 6, 1995, Hearing.......................... 36
a. Subcommittee Chairman's Introduction........ 36
b. Interdiction: The Kramek Letter Revisited... 37
c. Interdiction In General..................... 38
d. Source Country Programs..................... 40
e. Prevention In General....................... 41
f. Prevention and Accountability............... 41
g. Shift to Treatment.......................... 43
h. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network........ 44
i. White House Drug Use........................ 44
j. Surgeon General and Legalization............ 44
k. Subcommittee Chairman's Closing Remarks..... 45
3. June 27, 1995, Hearing.......................... 45
a. Testimony of DEA Administrator Thomas A.
Constantine................................ 46
b. Testimony of GAO's Director-in-Charge of
International Affairs, Joseph Kelley, and
GAO Investigators, Allan Fleener and Ron
Noyes...................................... 47
c. Testimony of Acting Assistant Secretary of
State for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, Jane E. Becker........ 49
d. Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Drug Enforcement and Support
Brian Sheridan............................. 49
4. June 28, 1995, Hearing.......................... 50
a. Testimony of U.S. Interdiction Coordinator
and U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral
Robert E. Kramek........................... 50
b. Testimony of the Commissioner of U.S.
Customs George Weise....................... 51
5. September 25, 1995, Hearing..................... 52
a. Background on the Problem, How Community
United, and the Interagency Task Force..... 52
b. State Attorney General Jeff Howard Credits
Effective Coordination, Drug Task Force,
and Byrne Grants........................... 53
c. Director of State Office of Alcohol and Drug
Abuse Prevention Geraldine Sylvester Urged
Prevention, Treatment, Student Assistance,
Parental Training and Peer Counseling...... 53
d. Commissioner of the State Department of
Corrections Paul Brodeur Urged Support for
Byrne Grants, Correctional Pathways Program 53
e. State Narcotics Investigation Unit's
Assistant Commander Neal Scott Explained
Usage Breakdown, Urged Local Flexibility... 54
f. DEA Special-Agent-In-Charge Billy Yout
Explained Recent Trends, Concurred in
Support for Prevention, Law Enforcement.... 54
g. Manchester Mayor Ray Wieczorek Testified on
the Importance of Public Sector-Private
Sector Cooperation......................... 54
h. Manchester Police Chief Peter Favreau
Explained Multi-Agency Effort and How
Operation Streetsweeper Succeeded.......... 54
i. United States Attorney Paul Gagnon Discussed
Cooperation and Funding.................... 55
j. Citizen Groups Represented by Alice Sutphen
Urged Community Action..................... 55
k. Dover Police Captain Dana Mitchell Urged
support for D.A.R.E. and Law Enforcement's
Role in Prevention......................... 55
l. Executive Director of Nashua Youth Council
Michael Plourde Urged Community Need
Assessment Prior to Receipt of Federal
Funds...................................... 56
m. Marathon House Regional Director John Ahman
Urged Support for Effective Treatment...... 56
n. Manchester Police Sergeant Dick Tracy Urged
Strong Support for D.A.R.E. Program........ 56
C. Fact-Finding Trip to Transit Zone..................... 56
1. OPBAT Operations Need Resources................. 57
2. Aerostat Radars Were Deterrent.................. 57
3. Cuba Creates Overflight and Maritime Constraints 57
4. Puerto Rico: Drug Gateway, Assets Needed........ 58
5. Joint Interagency Task Force--East.............. 58
D. Interdiction Policy Oversight......................... 59
1. Interdiction From 1984-1990..................... 59
2. Clinton's Cuts In Drug Interdiction............. 60
a. ONDCP Interdiction Budget Cuts.............. 60
b. Assets Lost According to Admiral Yost....... 60
c. ONDCP Strategy Confirms Specific Reductions. 61
d. Field Representatives Confirm Assets Lost
and Explain Impact......................... 61
e. USIC Memorandum Confirms Assets Lost........ 62
f. Additional Expert Testimony Confirms Assets
Lost....................................... 62
g. Admiral Kramek's December 1994 Letter to
Drug Czar Lee Brown Confirms Assets Lost,
And Interdiction Coordinator's Unsuccessful
Efforts to Restore......................... 64
h. Admiral Kramek's June 1995 Testimony
Underscore's Interdiction's Importance and
the Missing Priority....................... 64
i. Testimony Of Drug Czar Lee Brown Confirms
Low Priority on Interdiction............... 65
j. No Heroin Strategy Until November 1995...... 65
k. GAO Reports Serious Deficiencies in Clinton
Administration Source Country Programs..... 66
l. Bottom National Security Priority........... 66
m. Only Six Staff for Nation's Interdiction
Coordinator, and No Supply Side Deputy
Director of ONDCP.......................... 66
n. ONDCP Has No Deputy for Supply Reduction.... 66
o. ONDCP Staff And Budget Gutted--Not Restored. 67
p. Conclusions on Interdiction Policy.......... 67
3. The Implications of Reduced Interdiction........ 67
a. Lower Prices, Higher Availability and Purity 67
b. Exploding Casual Use by Youth............... 68
c. Increasing Drug Related Juvenile Crime...... 69
d. Nature of Juvenile Drug Use Changing Toward
Addiction.................................. 70
e. Drug Emergencies At Record Level............ 70
f. Foreign Perceptions of U.S. Commitment
Altered By Clinton Reductions.............. 70
E. Source Country Programs Oversight..................... 71
1. The ``Controlled Shift''........................ 71
2. GAO Study of Clinton's Source Country Programs.. 72
3. Admiral Kramek's View in December 1994 of the
Source Country Programs........................ 72
4. Invitations Rejected By the President's National
Security Advisor and By the President.......... 72
5. Conclusions on Source Country Programs.......... 73
F. Prevention Programs Oversight......................... 74
1. Prevention is Central to Drug War............... 75
a. Interdiction Experts Agree.................. 75
b. The Partnership For a Drug-Free America
Explains Broad Effectiveness of Drug
Prevention................................. 75
c. The BEST Foundation Describes Differences
Between Validated and Unvalidated
Prevention Programs........................ 76
d. Community Antidrug Coalitions of America
(CADCA) Favors Renewed National Leadership
And Accountable, Well-Funded Drug
Prevention................................. 77
e. Texans' War on Drugs Program Favors Renewed
Presidential Leadership, Possible
Separation of Prevention and Treatment, And
Block Grant of Unified Agency for
Prevention Programs........................ 77
f. New Hampshire Experts Urge Support for Byrne
Grants, Attention to Prevention, Treatment,
Correctional Programs...................... 78
2. Media Have a Key Role........................... 78
3. Accountability Concerns Are Serious,
Specifically In Safe and Drug Free Schools Act
Monies......................................... 78
4. Presidential Leadership Missing................. 81
5. Fact-Finding Trip With Director of ONDCP........ 81
6. Conclusions on Prevention Policy................ 81
G. Treatment Programs Oversight.......................... 82
1. Background: Treatment Needed in Drug War........ 82
2. Administration Shift to Treatment............... 82
3. Contrary to ONDCP Assertions, Treatment Funding
Grew in Past Strategies........................ 83
4. Treatment Limitations: Bureaucracy.............. 83
5. Treatment Limitations: Effectiveness............ 83
6. The June 1994 RAND Treatment Study: A Poor Basis
For National Drug Policy....................... 84
7. Treatment Conclusions........................... 86
III. Conclusions and Recommendations.................................87
A. Conclusions........................................... 87
B. Recommendations....................................... 89
VIEWS
Additional views of Hon. Karen L. Thurman, Hon. Henry A. Waxman,
Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon. Robert E. Wise, Jr., Hon. Major R. Owens,
Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon. Louise McIntosh Slaughter, Hon. Paul
E. Kanjorski, Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. Thomas M. Barrett,
Hon. Barbara-Rose Collins, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Hon.
James P. Moran, Hon. Carrie P. Meek, Hon. Chaka Fattah, and
Hon. Tim Holden................................................ 94
Additional views of Hon. William H. Zeliff, Jr................... 107
Additional views of Hon. Mark Souder............................. 111
Union Calendar No. 235
104th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 104-486
_______________________________________________________________________
NATIONAL DRUG POLICY: A REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE DRUG WAR
_______
March 19, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Clinger, from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,
submitted the following
SEVENTH REPORT
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
based on a study by the national security, international affairs, and
criminal justice subcommittee
On March 7, 1996, the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight approved and adopted a report entitled ``National
Drug Policy: A Review of the Status of the Drug War.'' The
chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the
House.
I. Summary, Oversight Findings and Recommendations
a. introduction
The Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (``the
Committee'') has primary legislative and oversight jurisdiction
for the ``overall economy, efficiency and management of
[G]overnment operations and activities . . . and for
``[r]eorganizations in the Executive Branch of the
government.'' [Rules of the House of Representatives, 104th
Congress, X,1(g)(6) and (12).]
In addition, the Committee has primary oversight
responsibility to ``review and study, on a continuing basis,
the operation of government activities at all levels with a
view to determining their economy and efficiency.'' [Rules of
the House of Representatives, 104th Congress, X,2(b)(2).]
Finally, the Committee ``may at any time conduct investigations
of any matter without regard to the provisions . . . conferring
jurisdiction over such matter upon another standing
committee.'' [Rules of the House of Representatives, 104th
Congress, X,4(c)(2).]
Pursuant to the foregoing grants of jurisdiction, the
Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and
Criminal Justice convened five oversight hearings during 1995
to assess the status of the Nation's Federal drug control
strategy and its implementation. Specifically, the Subcommittee
examined the status of Federal interdiction, source country,
prevention and treatment programs.
Advice and recommendations were sought from top
Administration officials and preeminent outside experts. The
Subcommittee's twin aims were (a) identifying strategic and
implementation issues requiring improvement, and (b)
identifying sound recommendations for achieving measurable
improvement in combating illegal drug importation and illegal
drug use.
The Subcommittee's inquiry was driven by seven background
facts, discussed in more detail in the ``Background'' section
below. In brief, these facts are as follows.
First, drug use has been rising markedly across American
society over the past three to four years, especially among the
Nation's juvenile population. The statistics are deeply
troubling.
Second, drug use fell markedly between 1981 and at least
early 1992, following what most agree was concerted federal,
state, community and parental counter narcotics activity, as
well as strong national leadership on the issue by Presidents
Reagan and Bush, and First Lady Nancy Reagan.
Third, rising juvenile drug use and rising violent juvenile
crime are integrally related, and have tended to feed upon each
other.
Fourth, objective indicators of the overall attention being
devoted to the antidrug message by the media, national leaders,
and the President have been lower during the past several years
than at any time in recent history.
Fifth, objective indicators of Federal support for the
counter narcotics effort or the Drug War, particularly for drug
interdiction, show a substantial reduction in resources
committed to key areas. In early 1995, key budget numbers were
already clearly below the prior high water marks deemed
necessary for an effective strategy.
Sixth, the Administration's 1994 and 1995 Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Strategies represent two
conscious shifts in policy, one toward greater drug treatment
emphasis within the demand reduction component of the strategy
and one toward greater source country program emphasis within
the supply-reduction component.
Seventh, the 1994 and 1995 White House Strategies depart
from prior White House Strategies and from the statutory
requirement of ``quantifiable goals,'' offering instead broad,
prescriptive goals, such as ``[r]educe the number of drug users
in America.'' \1\
\1\ Office of National Drug Control Strategy, National Drug Control
Strategy, February 1995, p. 53.
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These seven facts compelled oversight and review of the
status of the Nation's Federal counter narcotics effort, the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, the National Drug
Control Strategy and its implementation.
b. overview of investigation
The Nation's anti-drug effort has been a long and evolving
one, spanning at least six Presidents and involving continuous
reassessments. In fact, the impact of illegal drugs on our
society has been a growing concern since the early 1970s. In
June 1971, President Nixon told Congress that a national
response to drug addiction was needed since ``the problem has
assumed the dimensions of a national emergency.'' \2\
\2\ Musto, David F., The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic
Control, p. 256 (1987).
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By 1980, illegal drug use was so widespread that antidrug
parent groups such as Pride and National Family Partnership
began to form. That year, more than half of all minors surveyed
acknowledged illegal drug use.\3\
\3\ In 1979, 54 percent of youth respondents to the Monitoring the
Future Survey indicated drug use. See the 1995 Pride Report, Executive
Summary, p. 1.
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During the early 1980's, then-First Lady Nancy Reagan
became a leader in the anti-drug, or drug abuse prevention,
movement. Nancy Reagan effectively led the campaign to educate
our Nation's youth and stem rising youth drug abuse. Her most
famous statement, ``Just Say No,'' the answer to a child's
question about how to respond if pressed to take drugs, became
the guiding phrase of the prevention movement. Unrivaled in her
energy and commitment, Nancy Reagan became the movement's chief
spokesperson. During the mid-1980's, President Reagan showed
unprecedented leadership in what soon became known as a war
against illegal drug use and those who trafficked in illegal
drugs.\4\
\4\ See ``Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost,'' supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act,
effectively establishing the first Federal framework of
mandatory minimum sentences for drug trafficking.\5\ The 1986
Act created ``two tiers of mandatory prison terms for first-
time drug traffickers: a five-year and ten-year minimum
sentence. Under the statute, these prison terms are triggered
exclusively by the quantity and type of drug involved in the
offense. For example, the ten-year penalty is triggered if the
offense involved at least one kilogram of heroin or five
kilograms of powder cocaine or 50 grams of cocaine base.'' \6\
\5\ See P.L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
\6\ Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing
Policy, United States Sentencing Commission, February 1995, p. 116.
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In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
(P.L. 100-690, Title I, Subtitle A), which established the
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and created the
new position of ``White House Drug Czar'' or ONDCP Director.
The Act also required the White House ONDCP Director to present
an annual strategy with measurable goals and a Federal drug
control budget to the President and Congress.\7\
\7\ P.L. 100-690, Title I, Subtitle A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1994, pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322, Title X), the ``drug
czar'' was authorized to make recommendations to agencies
during budget formulation. The aim of this Act was to improve
resource targeting and policy consistency at Federal agencies
involved in implementing the National Drug Control Strategy, as
well as to heighten overall counter narcotics coordination
throughout the Federal Government. In addition, the ``drug
czar'' was authorized under the 1994 Act to exercise discretion
over two percent of the overall drug budget; the ``drug czar''
could theoretically transfer up to two percent of the budget
among National Drug Control Program accounts, upon approval by
the appropriations committees.\8\
\8\ In fact, this two percent measure has proved more theoretical
than actual, as particular agency heads have resisted the transfers and
prevailed in those efforts. For example, FBI Director Louis Freeh
reportedly blocked resource allocations by ONDCP in 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During recent prior sessions of Congress, legislative and
oversight hearings have been held on various aspects of
national drug policy. The Subcommittee's 1995 oversight
hearings, proposed and supported by both minority and majority
Subcommittee members, were the result of recent developments,
including the steep rise in juvenile and overall drug use
(including both rising casual drug use, and increasing
regularity of use); the growing awareness that increased
juvenile drug use is linked to rising juvenile crime; \9\ the
absence of a long-promised White House Heroin Strategy; \10\ an
objective reduction in interdiction efforts; \11\ an apparent
lack of progress in source countries toward goals set forth for
so-called source country programs; \12\ reports of lagging
accountability in certain drug prevention programs; \13\ the
deemphasis by the media on drug abuse; \14\ the overall rise in
drug related juvenile violence; \15\ and general concerns about
interagency coordination of the Federal counter narcotics
effort.\16\
\9\ 1995 OJJDP Report, pp. 58-65.
\10\ The President promised a Heroin Strategy within 120 days of
taking office. Without any White House announcement, he signed a Heroin
Strategy in late November 1995. The signed Strategy offers little
detail, and was promulgated without implementing guidelines, which has
so far made it a nullity.
\11\ See ``Interdiction Policy Oversight'' section, below.
\12\ See ``Source Country Program Oversight'' section, below.
\13\ In particular, reports of waste and misapplication of funds
have been associated with certain states' administration of Safe and
Drug Free Schools monies, and these allegations are under investigation
by the Department of Education Inspector General's Office and the
United States General Accounting Office.
\14\ See ``Prevention Policy Oversight'' section, below.
\15\ See ``Background'' section, below.
\16\ See, e.g., Yost Testimony, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The intent to examine National Drug Control Strategy was
set forth in the February 6, 1995 Subcommittee Strategic Plan,
in accord with the minority and majority view that the area
required oversight.\17\
\17\ The topic was discussed at a meeting of the full Subcommittee
in early February, views were solicited by the Chairman, and both
minority and majority members indicated a desire to conduct oversight
in this area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the course of investigating the status of the National
Drug Control Strategy, the Strategy's implementation and the
need for improvement, the Subcommittee engaged in extensive
correspondence with the Administration, including direct
correspondence with the President; the Vice President; the
President's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake; the
Director of ONDCP, Dr. Lee P. Brown; the United States
Interdiction Coordinator and Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral
Robert E. Kramek; the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, Thomas A. Constantine; the Commissioner of the
U.S. Customs Service, George Weise; the Department of Defense
Deputy Assistant for Drug Enforcement Policy, Brian Sheridan;
the Department of State Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Ambassador Jane E.
Becker; and others at the Departments of Justice, Defense,
State, ONDCP and elsewhere in the Administration.
The Subcommittee investigation included one fact finding
trip. Subcommittee members, the United States Coast Guard and
staff, traveled to the Seventh Coast Guard District in the
Caribbean transit zone. There, they attended briefings at
Seventh District Headquarters in Miami, Coast Guard
interdiction initiatives at sea, Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) activities in the Greater Antilles, high
level interagency briefings in Puerto Rico by the FBI, DEA,
Customs, Border Patrol, and local authorities, and received in
depth briefings by Admiral Granuzo and others at Joint Task
Force Six in Key West, dedicated to Eastern Caribbean Drug
Interdiction. This interdiction trip was arranged in
coordination with the United States Coast Guard, and
invitations were extended to minority and majority members. The
trip occurred on June 16 through 19, 1995. Additionally, in
coordination with ONDCP, the Subcommittee Chairman traveled
with the White House Director of ONDCP to see prevention and
treatment programs first-hand in Massachusetts.
Throughout 1995, the Chairman, Members and Subcommittee
staff met extensively with the agencies involved in the counter
narcotics effort, and endeavored to collect directly and
indirectly both statistical and anecdotal evidence on the
effectiveness and accountability of the current National Drug
Control Strategy and programs. These efforts spanned the key
areas of interdiction, law enforcement, prevention, treatment,
and source country initiatives. The Subcommittees sought
further insight from GAO investigators, agents in the field,
and departmental inspectors general.
c. committee findings
The Committee's 1995 examination of the National Drug
Control Strategy, its implementation and overall effectiveness
resulted in the following findings:
(1) Casual teenage drug use trends have suffered a marked
reversal over the past three years, and are dramatically up in
virtually every age group and for every illicit drug, including
heroin, crack, cocaine, hydrochloride, LSD, non-LSD
hallucinogens, methamphetamine, inhalants, stimulants, and
marijuana.
(2) Rising casual teenage drug use is closely correlated
with rising juvenile violent crime.
(3) If rising teenage drug use and the close correlation
with violent juvenile crime continue to rise on their current
path, the Nation will experience a doubling of violent crime by
2010.\18\
\18\ See Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report, OJJDP,
Department of Justice, September 1995.
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(4) The nature of casual teenage drug use is changing.
Annual or infrequent teenage experimentation with illegal drugs
is being replaced by regular, monthly or addictive teenage drug
use.\19\
\19\ See 1995 surveys conducted by PRIDE, The National Household
Survey, and The University of Michigan's Monitoring the Future Survey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(5) The nationwide street price for most illicit drugs is
lower than at any time in recent years, and the potency of
those same drugs, particularly heroin and crack, is higher.\20\
\20\ See ``Interdiction Policy Oversight'' section, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(6) Nationwide, drug related emergencies are at an all time
high.\21\
\21\ See ``Background'' section, below.
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(7) The 1994 and 1995 White House ONDCP strategies
consciously endeavored to shift resources away from priorities
set in the late 1980's, namely from the prior emphasis on
prevention and interdiction to a post-1993 increase emphasis on
treatment of ``hardcore addicts'' and a ``controlled shift'' to
source country programs.
(8) During 1993, 1994 and the early part of 1995, the
President put little emphasis on, and manifested little
interest in, either the demand side war against illegal drug
use or the supply side war against international narcotics
traffickers; an objective look at the President's public
addresses and his actions regarding gutting the ONDCP when he
became President, interactions with Congress, and discussions
with foreign leaders reveals that attention to the rising tide
of illegal drug use was a low presidential priority.\22\
\22\ See ``Background,'' ``Interdiction Policy Oversight'' and
``Prevention Policy Oversight'' sections, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(9) The President's actual attention to this problem,
measured by other than the paucity of speeches and proposed
budget cuts, has been uniformly low. In addition to the absence
of direct presidential involvement in the drug war, the
President produced no 1993 Annual Strategy, despite a statutory
duty to do so under the 1988 Antidrug Abuse Act; delayed
appointment of a White House Drug Czar, or ONDCP Director,
until half way through 1993; and produced only a terse
``interim'' strategy in 1993.
(10) The Drug War appears also to have been expressly
reduced to a low national security priority early in the
Administration, and not to have been formally elevated at any
time since.\23\
\23\ See ``Interdiction Policy Oversight'' section, below.
Reportedly, the drug war's national security priority during the first
3 years of the Clinton Administration was number 29 out of 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(11) While the position is contested by the
Administration's ONDCP Director, a wide cross section of drug
policy experts inside and outside of the Administration concur
that the absence of direct presidential involvement in foreign
and domestic counter narcotics efforts has contributed to
recent reversals in youth drug use trends, reduced street
prices for most narcotics, and increased potency of most
illicit drugs.
(12) Prevention programs that teach a right-wrong
distinction in drug use, or ``no use,'' such as D.A.R.E.,
G.R.E.A.T., the Nancy Reagan After School Program, community-
based efforts run by groups such as C.A.D.C.A., PRIDE, the
National Parents Foundation, and Texans War on Drugs, as well
as other local school and workplace programs, have proven both
successful and popular where they have been well-managed and
accountable--despite the 1995 White House ONDCP Strategy
statement that ``[a]ntidrug messages are losing their potency
among the Nation's youth''; \24\ while some of these programs,
for accountability reasons, have come under increased scrutiny,
such as Federal monies disbursed under the Safe and Drug Free
Schools Act, others have received increased funding, such as
the Byrne Grants, which help to finance the D.A.R.E. program.
\24\ See ``Prevention Oversight'' section, below.
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(13) Federal drug prevention programs, such as Safe and
Drug Free Schools, while supporting successful prevention
programs in many parts of the country, are of two types; some
have been widely lauded, such as D.A.R.E., while others have
been subject to continuing concerns about misapplication, waste
and abuse of funds.\25\
\25\ See ``Prevention Oversight'' section, below.
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(14) The Nation's law enforcement community needs greater
flexibility and support from the Federal Government in
addressing the rise in juvenile and drug related crime. While
certain developments are promising, such as the $25 million
increase in Byrne Grant funding in fiscal 1996, a law
enforcement block grant to supersede the COPS program, and
increased reliance on joint interagency task forces, valuable
time has been lost in addressing this need; renewed attention
to strengthening local, county, state and Federal law
enforcement's counter narcotics efforts are required.
(15) The Nation's interdiction effort has been dramatically
curtailed over the past three years, due to lack of White House
support for interdiction needs, reduced funding, a tiny staff
at the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator's Office, the absence of
an ONDCP Deputy for Supply Reduction, reduced support for
National Guard container search days, the elimination of
certain cost effective assets in the Eastern Caribbean,
reassignment or absence of key intelligence gathering assets,
reluctance by the Department of State to elevate counter
narcotics to a top priority in certain source and transit
countries, unnecessary interagency quarreling over asset
management and personnel issues, and the apparent inability or
unwillingness of the White House Drug Czar to bring essential
interdiction community concerns to the attention of the
President or to aid the President's Interdiction Coordinator in
doing so; and
(16) Poor management and interagency coordination in source
countries has been discovered and was described in detail by
the General Accounting Office (GAO).
d. committee recommendations
Upon review of the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy and
an assessment of the status of the Drug War through expert
testimony at oversight hearings, receipt of reliable
documentary evidence, reference to General Accounting Office
studies commissioned by the Subcommittee, and contacts with
experts inside and outside the Federal government, the
Subcommittee advances the following recommendations for
improvement of the Nation's national drug control strategy:
(1) To assure that the Drug War becomes a top national
priority, the President should, in close consultation with
Congress, establish an overall budget that places counter
narcotics high among national priorities.
(2) To reverse the rise in casual drug use by juveniles,
the President should, in close consultation with Congress,
establish a National Drug Control Strategy which returns
accountable prevention programs to highest priority among
Federal demand reduction programs, and does not
disproportionately favor increased drug treatment funding at
the expense of accountable prevention.
(3) To reverse the rise in illegal drug importation, high
drug availability, high drug purities, and low street prices,
the President should, in close consultation with Congress,
establish a National Drug Control Strategy which returns well-
coordinated interdiction programs to highest priority among
Federal supply reduction programs, and does not embrace further
cuts in interdiction assets or funding, or otherwise shift
interdiction assets or funding to source country programs.
(4) To restore accountability to ONDCP and the national
drug policy, the President should return to promulgating, in
compliance with the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988, a clear set of
measurable and quantifiable annual goals as part of the annual
National Drug Control Strategy.
(5) To restore accountability, the overall National Drug
Control Strategy should be more than descriptive, and more than
a collection of laudable goals to which agencies aspire; the
Strategy should become the standard against which success or
failure of all agencies' antidrug programs are measured; the
Strategy should also be the basic document against which future
justification for antidrug funding at each agency is measured.
(6) To restore accountability to Federal demand reduction
programs, the President, in close consultation with Congress,
should establish workable accountability mechanisms and clear
measures of effectiveness, either by statute or regulation.
Prevention programs that have no means for assuring
accountability, that cannot demonstrate achievement of any
measurable goals, or that do not fund ``no use'' messages
should be unfunded in subsequent budget cycles; similarly,
treatment programs unable to assure accountability and
effectiveness should be unfunded.
(7) To restore accountability to supply reduction programs
(e.g. source country programs), the President, in close
consultation with Congress, should establish workable
accountability mechanisms; while effectiveness may be more
difficult to measure on the supply side, programs that have no
means for assuring accountable expenditures or fail to meet
previously established goals should be unfunded in subsequent
budget cycles.
(8) To restore accountability, coordination and meaningful
ONDCP guidance of the overall Federal antidrug efforts,
antidrug programs that receive their justification in the
annual ONDCP Drug Strategy Budget should be identified with
greater specificity, and the 50-plus agencies that receive
funding through these programs should be required to place the
details of each program before the ONDCP Director prior to the
production of succeeding annual budgets.
(9) To restore accountability and coordination of the
Nation's overall drug strategy, the White House Drug Czar
should become the chief voice within the Administration on
whether programs continue to be funded or not and at what
levels, in consultation with OMB and the authorizing and the
appropriations committees. However, in all antidrug efforts,
the Drug Czar--and not individual agency heads--should then be
viewed by the President, OMB and Congress as the primary
decision-maker on national drug policy;
(10) The President should be encouraged to be unequivocal,
vocal and constant in his support of the Drug Czar, and to
delegate to him or her the fullest authority possible on all
issues relating to the Nation's counter narcotics efforts.
(11) In support of the Drug Czar and heightened interagency
coordination, the President should insist that all relevant
agency heads coordinate antidrug activities directly through
that person, and insist that all major counter narcotics
decisions be approved by that person. Moreover, the one
document that should govern all coordination efforts should be
the National Drug Control Strategy.
(12) The President should maximize the Drug Czar's
authority by:
<bullet> Funding ONDCP itself back to late 1980's levels,
including a complement of 150 ONDCP staff and a substantial
increase in the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator's staff
(currently six);
<bullet> Expressly delegating all authority for program
prioritization and, in consultation with OMB, selected budget
matters to ONDCP;
<bullet> Expressly giving ONDCP the authority to evaluate
antidrug program effectiveness across all agencies of the
Federal Government, and the authority to offer the primary
recommendation to the President and Congress on program
continuation, enhancement, reduction or elimination;
<bullet> Insisting that all agency heads meet personally
with the ONDCP Director at least quarterly, following a format
similar to the never-repeated October 1994 drug interdiction
agency head conference.
<bullet> Confirming that the White House Drug Czar's
priorities are the President's priorities in all contacts with
agency heads.
<bullet> Publicly supporting efforts of the White House
Drug Czar and ONDCP through regular discussion in the media,
with Cabinet Officials, and in periodic addresses to the Nation
or other public speeches.
(13) To demonstrate the President's constant concern,
awareness and consistent support for the Nation's Drug Control
Strategy, and the many public and private sector advocates and
implementors of policies within or consistent with that
Strategy, the President should speak out regularly on the
topic, utilizing the presidential ``bully pulpit'' to elevate
the issue and build public support for demand and supply
reduction efforts.
(14) To bring the issue immediately back to the forefront
of the Nation's agenda, the President should consider one or
all of the following: An address to the Nation from the Oval
Office or to a Joint Session of Congress on the topic of
exploding teenage drug use; a series of White House Drug Policy
Conferences, including one each on prevention, narcotics-
related law enforcement, interdiction, source country programs,
treatment programs, and the role of the media; meeting
personally with congressional leaders on this issue at least
once or twice annually, notably the Bi-Partisan Drug Policy
Group (currently co-chaired by Congressman Bill Zeliff, R-NH,
and Congressman Charles Rangel, D-NY) or a similar counter
narcotics leadership group; and appoint a bipartisan White
House Commission on ``Winning the Drug War,'' to study the
evolving options in depth and report new policy ideas and
findings to the President and Congress for swift action.
(15) In specific support of supply reduction, the National
Drug Control Strategy should:
<bullet> Elevate the Drug War threat on the National
Security Council's list of national security priorities to a
top position;
<bullet> Restore funding for interdiction efforts, as
recommended by the current U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, to
``1992-1993 levels;''
<bullet> Restore funding to ONDCP for staff and policy
support lost in 1993 Administration cuts;
<bullet> Restore funding for intelligence gathering lost
between 1993 and 1995;
<bullet> Restore lost Ship Days, National Guard Container
Search Works Days, and Flight Hours lost in 1993, 1994 and 1995
Administration cuts;
<bullet> Restore to the Transit Zone the lost airborne and
stationary radars, Jayhawk helicopters, Coast Guard Cutters and
SES Patrol Boats, HU-25 Falcon Interceptor aircraft (five
lost), E2-C Hawkeye AEW aircraft (4 lost), EC130-V AEW aircraft
with rotodome (transferred to DoD), modernized sea-based
aerostats (all lost), and personnel, including Transit Zone
personnel and personnel formerly assigned to C3I East,
subsequently consolidated into the Customs Domestic Air
Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC) and suffering
``serious manning shortages;''
<bullet> Establish a process for direct, regular
communications between the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC)
and the National Security Advisor, if not also between the USIC
and the President;
<bullet> Issue the missing agency implementation guidelines
that should have accompanied the November 1995 Heroin Strategy;
<bullet> Provide sufficient staff to the USIC (who now
coordinates the Nation's interdiction policy with a staff of
6);
<bullet> Rescind or modify PDD-14 to reflect either a
slower shift of resources or no shift at all toward source
country programs.
<bullet> Insist on accountability mechanisms in source
country programs that assure improved management, interagency
coordination, clarity and targeting.
<bullet> Restore support for law enforcement's counter
narcotics mission through a combination of greater flexibility
by block grants, increasing the Byrne Grant and similar
programs, heightened drug prosecutions in the Federal courts,
and encouraging increased cross over of high technologies
available to the military but not yet economically to law
enforcement;
<bullet> Encourage wider use of joint interagency task
forces, by reducing jurisdictional conflicts, bureaucratic
impediments, and restrictive regulations, as well as
rechannelling funds to these joint efforts.
(16) In specific support of demand reduction efforts, the
National Drug Control Strategy should:
<bullet> Reaffirm the central place of drug use prevention
in the overall national drug strategy;
<bullet> Respond to recommendations that develop out of the
GAO and Department of Education investigations of prevention
program accountability, including the accountability of the
Safe and Drug Free Schools Program;
<bullet> Encourage greater private sector and media support
for drug prevention efforts nationwide;
<bullet> Offer greater flexibility to States and
localities, through mechanisms such as a separate prevention
block grant (independent of treatment), while clearly
supporting only ``no use'' messages and ``no use'' curricula;
<bullet> Encourage greater cooperation among the prevention
and law enforcement communities, while increasing support for
such overlapping programs as the Byrne Grants, D.A.R.E. and
G.R.E.A.T. programs;
<bullet> Fund only ``validated'' prevention programs, as
suggested by national prevention efforts in the March 1995
Subcommittee hearings;
<bullet> Encourage the establishment of accepted criteria
for effective drug treatment and the creation of programs that
are likely to meet these criteria;
<bullet> Encourage greater application of effective
treatment programs in correctional institutions;
<bullet> Provide opportunities for the President to
regularly and forcefully speak out on the issue;
<bullet> Explore means for establishing a larger number of
overall treatment ``slots,'' so long as the treatment programs
under consideration are effective;
<bullet> Reducing the Federal ``treatment bureaucracy'' to
allow a greater flow of treatment funds to the states and
localities outside Washington, D.C.
<bullet> Consider increased funding for research into
potentially more effective drug treatment.
II. Report on the Committee's Oversight Review
a. background
The Nation's Drug Control Policy must be evaluated against
the backdrop of seven incontrovertible facts. First, drug use
has been rising markedly across American society over the past
three years, especially among the Nation's juvenile population.
The statistics are alarming.
In 1994, for the third consecutive year, reputable
nationwide surveys, including the National Household Survey
\26\ and Michigan University's Monitoring the Future Study,\27\
measured disturbing increases in drug use and acceptability,
especially among the Nation's youth.
\26\ Substance Abuse Mental Health Services Administration,
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Population Estimates 1994,
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service,
September 1995.
\27\ Johnston, L., O'Malley, P. and Bachman, J., Monitoring the
Future Study, University of Michigan (1994).
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According to the 1994 Michigan University study, 13 percent
of 8th-graders experimented with marijuana in 1993, about twice
the 1991 level. Experimentation among 10th-graders increased
about two-thirds the previous three years, and daily use among
high school seniors was up by half over 1993 levels.
Increasing use was also reported in 1994 by the Drug Abuse
Warning Network Data, which collected data from emergency rooms
around the country on drug related emergencies in 1993. That
data showed an 8 percent increase in drug related emergency
room cases between 1992 and 1993, with 45 percent being heroin
overdoses. Cocaine was also at an all-time high, having more
than doubled since 1988, and marijuana emergencies increased 22
percent between 1992 and 1993.
1995 data is worse: The National Household Survey released
in September 1995 shows that overall drug use among kids ages
12 to 17 jumped 50 percent in 1994, from 6.6 percent to 9.5
percent. The National Pride Survey of 200,000 students shows
that one in three American high school seniors now smokes
marijuana; there has been a 36 percent increase in cocaine use
among students in grades 9 through 12 since 1991-92; and
hallucinogen use by high schoolers has risen 75 percent since
1988-89.
Finally, October 1995 DAWN data shows that, in 1994,
``Cocaine-related episodes reached their highest level in
history'' and registered a ``15 percent increase from 1993 and
40 percent increase from 1988.'' On top of this, marijuana or
hashish-related emergencies rose 39 percent from 1993 to 1994,
and total drug related emergency cases rose 10 percent between
1993 and 1994.
Not surprisingly, a significant quantity of the narcotics
producing the foregoing statistics come from a foreign source;
for example, from mid-1993 to early 1995, Mexican traffickers
reportedly produced at least 150 tons of methamphetamine, or
speed; not surprisingly, Mexico also imported an estimated 170
tons of ephedrine, a precurser chemical in production of
methamphetamine. Similarly, the Drug Enforcement Administration
confirms that approximately 70 percent of the estimated 400
tons of cocaine was smuggled into the United States annually
comes across Mexico's border with the United States. Other
leading source countries include, not surprisingly, Colombia,
Bolivia, Peru and Burma.\28\
\28\ See, e.g., February 22, 1996 letter from the President to the
Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Affairs, The Senate Committee on Appropriations, The House Committee on
Appropriations and the House Committee on International Relations. This
letter lists as ``major illicit drug producing or drug transit
countries,'' the following: Afgahanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia,
Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Guatamala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Jamaica, Laos, Lebanon,
Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Syria,
Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela and Vietnam.
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The second incontrovertible fact is that overall drug use
fell markedly between 1981 and 1992, during a period of
concerted Federal, State, community and parental counter
narcotics activity, and vocal national leadership by Presidents
Reagan and Bush, as well as First Lady Nancy Reagan.
In combination with nationwide grassroots parent groups,
such as Pride and the National Family Partnership, Mrs.
Reagan's ``Just Say No'' prevention program began the push to
reduce drug use through education in the early 1980s. Mrs.
Reagan's effort was supplemented by Federal drug prevention
monies in 1987, and coordinated with the first concerted drug
interdiction program in the late 1980s.
Aided by new programs at the Departments of Defense and
Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Customs
Service, Border Patrol, and State and local law enforcement
agencies, then-Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Paul Yost
coordinated and implemented a drug interdiction effort based on
the increased flow or ``pulsing'' of resources into the transit
zone at high-drug trafficking times.
Together, these prevention, law enforcement and
interdiction efforts demonstrated results. Monthly cocaine use
dropped from 2.9 million users in 1988 to 1.3 million in 1990.
Overall drug abuse dropped from 14.5 million users in 1991 to
11.4 million in 1992. The perceived risk of drug use rose, as
did prices, while availability and purity fell.
The third incontrovertible fact is that juvenile drug use
and violent juvenile crime are closely related, and predictably
feed upon each other. In September 1995, the Justice
Department's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (OJJDP) reported that, ``[a]fter years of relative
stability, juvenile involvement in violent crime known to law
enforcement has been increasing,'' and ``juveniles were
responsible for about 1 in 5 violent crimes.'' \29\
\29\ DOJ, OJJDP, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report
(1995), Overview.
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OJJDP also confirmed 1994 National Institutes of Justice
Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) data showing that ``1 in 3 juvenile
detainees were under the influence of drugs at the time of
their offense.'' \30\ For example, the level of marijuana use
in 1993 varied from 14 percent to 51 percent of juveniles
tested at 12 sites, making an average value of 26 percent,
which was substantially above the 1992 average value of 16
percent.\31\
\30\ 1995 OJJDP Report, p. 64; NIJ Study (1994), Drug Use
Forecasting: 1993 annual report on juvenile arrestees/detainees.
Research in Brief.
\31\ Id.
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A fourth central fact is that objective indicators of
overall attention being devoted to the antidrug effort by the
media, national leaders and the President in particular is
lower than at any time in recent history. Media coverage of the
Drug War, which peaked in 1989, has been anemic since. The
Partnership for a Drug Free America was able to afford in 1990
and 1991, with media financing, roughly one antidrug message
per household per day; Tom Hedrick of the Partnership testified
that ``support for these messages has declined 20 percent in
the past three years . . . because the media is not as
convinced that the drug issue is as important as it was.''
Moreover, media coverage is also down--from 600 antidrug
stories on the three major networks in 1989 to 65 last year, a
free-fall.
Presidential leadership has been equally weak. In 1993 and
1994, President Clinton made seven addresses to the Nation;
none mentioned illegal drugs. The President's 1993 presidential
papers reveal 13 references to illegal drugs in a total 1,628
presidential statements, addresses, and interviews. Of 1,742
presidential statements and other utterances in 1994, illegal
drugs were mentioned only 11 times.\32\
\32\ Presidential Papers of President William Jefferson Clinton,
1993 and 1994.
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The fifth fact: Objective indicators of Federal support for
the counter narcotics effort, or Drug War, particularly for
drug interdiction, show a substantial reduction in resources
committed to key areas. In early 1995, key budget numbers were
already clearly below prior high water marks, lines formerly
defined as the minimum necessary for effective conduct of the
Drug War.\33\
\33\ The term ``Drug War'' is employed throughout this report to
denote not just interdiction and international source country programs,
but the entire gamut of Federal counter narcotics efforts, including
prevention and treatment programs, law enforcement, and various Federal
support efforts. For specific budget request and appropriation numbers,
see below.
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While the total antidrug budget rose from $1.5 billion in
fiscal 1981 to $13.2 billion in fiscal 1995,\34\ ONDCP reports
a drop in both drug interdiction and international program
funding,\35\ and concedes a significant shift among demand
reduction programs to treatment efforts.
\34\ Teasley, David, Congressional Research Service Report 95-943,
September 6, 1995, p. 1.
\35\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February
1995, p. 113.
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Notably, drug interdiction's budget authority fell from
$1.511 billion in fiscal 1993 to $1.312 billion in fiscal 1994;
President Clinton's fiscal 1994 budget slashed the interdiction
budget by $200 million, again by $18 million to $1.293 billion
in fiscal 1995, and finally by another $15 million to $1.278
billion in fiscal 1996.\36\
\36\ Id. p. 113.
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At the same time, international or source country counter
narcotics funding fell from a high of $523 million in fiscal
1993 to $329 million in fiscal 1994 to $309 million in fiscal
1995, recovering only slightly to $399 million in fiscal
1996.\37\
\37\ Id. p. 113.
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A sixth key fact is that the Administration's 1994 and 1995
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Strategies
represent several conscious shifts. First, they represent a
conscious shift of available resources toward treatment
programs for hardcore drug users, and away from prevention
programs for casual and non users.
The 1995 White House National Drug Control Strategy
identifies first on its list of ``National Funding Priorities
for FY's 1997-99'' the ``[s]upport programs that expand drug
treatment capacity and services so that those who need
treatment can receive it.'' \38\ In support of this shift to
drug treatment, the President has markedly increased treatment
resources. In fiscal 1993, treatment resources stood at $2.339
billion. But the figure increased to $2.398 billion in fiscal
1994, increased to $2.646 billion for fiscal 1995, and the
President's request for fiscal 1996 was at the all-time high of
$2.826 billion.\39\ With respect to rising casual use, the
President's 1995 Drug Control Strategy acknowledges that
``casual drug use is increasing among our youth,'' \40\ but
instead of focusing on casual use, states: ``Antidrug messages
are losing their potency among the Nation's youth.'' \41\
\38\ Id. p. 119.
\39\ Id. p. 113.
\40\ Id. p. 9.
\41\ Id. p. 20.
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Additionally, the 1994 and 1995 White House Strategies
represent a conscious shift of resources away from interdiction
or transit zone counter narcotics programs.
Finally, seventh, the Clinton White House Drug Strategies
depart from prior White House Strategies and from the statutory
requirement of ``quantifiable goals,'' \42\ and offer instead
broad, prescriptive goals, such as: ``Reduce the number of drug
users in America.'' \43\
\42\ 1988 Antidrug Abuse Act.
\43\ Id. p. 53.
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These seven facts, already becoming apparent in early 1995,
strongly implied the need for continuing oversight and
investigation into the status of the Nation's Federal counter
narcotics effort, as well as review of the Office of National
Drug Control Policy, the National Drug Control Strategy and its
implementation.
b. proceedings of the subcommittee on national security, international
affairs, and criminal justice
1. March 9, 1995, Hearing
a. Purpose and Panels
The purpose of this hearing was to examine President
Clinton's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy, and to begin an
assessment of how effectively the Nation is fighting illegal
drug abuse, domestically and internationally. Acknowledged
components of the Drug War under review include prevention,
treatment, interdiction, law enforcement, and source country
programs.
At this hearing, testimony was received from four panels.
The Subcommittee heard first from former First Lady of the
United States, Nancy Reagan.
Second, testimony was received from former Director of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) William J.
Bennett, former Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration Robert C. Bonner, and former Acting Director of
ONDCP John Walters.
Third, the Subcommittee received testimony from the current
Director of ONDCP, Dr. Lee P. Brown. Finally, the Subcommittee
heard from former Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Paul A. Yost,
Jr. and several nationally-recognized drug abuse prevention
experts, including Senior Representative of the Partnership for
a Drug-Free America, Thomas Hedrick, Jr.; Executive Director of
California's BEST Foundation, G. Bridget Ryan; National
Director of the Community Antidrug Coalitions of America
(CADCA), James Copple; and Director of Program Services for
Texans' War on Drugs, Charles Robert Heard, III.
b. Summary of Findings
With varying degrees of emphasis, all panels acknowledged
that current Federal efforts are under strain from reduced
emphasis on certain components of the Drug War, budgetary
pressure, and in some cases accountability.
The panels also acknowledged that, over the past several
years, there has been a marked reversal in several important
national trend lines, including most notably a rise in casual
drug use by juveniles, but also reaching to perceived drug
availability (up), perceived risk of use (down), average street
price (down), drug related medical emergencies (up), drug
related violent juvenile crime (up), total Federal drug
prosecutions (down), and parental attention to the drug issue
(down).\44\
\44\ Press Release, The University of Michigan, ``Drug Use Rises
Again in 1995 Among American Teens:'' December 15, 1995; Press Release,
PRIDE, ``Teen Drug Use Rises for Fourth Straight Year,'' November 2,
1995; Preliminary Estimates from the Drug Abuse Warning Network, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, September 1995; James E.
Burke, ``Presentation: An Overview of Illegal Drugs in America,''
Partnership for a Drug-Free America, Fall 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Subcommittee found that these reversals have continued
through the period 1993 to 1995, although certain trend lines,
including a shift from falling to rising casual use, typically
among juveniles, began in 1992. In addition, a shift of certain
interdiction resources, which were earlier a part of the
counter narcotics force structure, began in late 1991 with the
advent of the Persian Gulf War.
All panels agreed, albeit with differing emphases, that
renewed national leadership, including both Presidential and
Congressional leadership, will be necessary to combat these
recent trend reversals, especially the rise in juvenile drug
abuse and drug related violent juvenile crime.
c. Subcommittee Chairman's Introduction
The Subcommittee Chairman initiated the hearing by noting
that Mrs. Reagan ``woke the Nation up to this [juvenile drug
abuse] problem and its pervasiveness in the early 1980's.''
Zeliff observed that the former First Lady's ``Just Say No''
campaign effectively launched a ``national crusade'' for drug
abuse prevention.
The Chairman also noted that, in April 1985, Mrs. Reagan
held the first International Drug Conference for the world's
First Ladies; in 1988 she held the second such conference and
became the first American First Lady to speak before the United
Nations; and after leaving the White House, she founded the
Nancy Reagan Foundation, which has since ``awarded grants in
excess of $5 million to drug prevention and education programs
. . .''
d. Testimony of First Lady Nancy Reagan
Essentially, First Lady Nancy Reagan testified that America
has forgotten the dangers of drug use, that America's children
are at increased risk in 1995, that there is an absence of
national leadership on the drug issue, and that a national
strategy focused on treatment of so-called hardcore addicts
misses the largest at-risk population, namely children
participating in casual use.
Mrs. Reagan pleaded with national opinion leaders, for the
sake of the nation's children, to raise this issue to the top
of the national agenda.
Specifically, Mrs. Reagan explained that she had ``decided
to speak [before Congress on the drug issue] only after a lot
of soul searching . . . because my husband and everything he
stands for calls for me to be here.''
She then explained that the Nation ``is forgetting how
endangered our children are by drugs,'' that societal
``tolerance for drugs'' is up, and that ``the psychological
momentum we had against drug use [in the late 1980's and early
1990's] has been lost.'' In short, she asked, ``How could we
have forgotten so quickly?''
Mrs. Reagan detailed that, in eight years as First Lady,
she had traveled ``hundreds of thousands of miles'' to stem
drug abuse among young people and highlight its ``tragic human
consequences.'' To illustrate the misery left in its wake, she
read aloud a letter received from a 16-year-old girl.
The letter poignantly described how this girl of low self-
esteem got caught in the ``vicious cycle'' of drug use,
prostitution to buy more drugs, the death of her deformed and
premature baby, and her heart-rending reaction to these events.
The letter ended with a plea, which Mrs. Reagan repeated:
``Please reach kids my age and younger. Don't let what has
happened to me and what destroyed my life happen to them.''
Mrs. Reagan also testified that, ``[b]efore the drug use
increases of 1993 and 1994, we really had seen marked
progress,'' and that ``[juvenile] attitudes were being
changed.''
In support of these statements, Mrs. Reagan offered that
``monthly cocaine use dropped from nearly 3 million users in
1988 to 1.3 million users in 1990,'' and ``[b]etween 1991 and
1992, overall drug use dropped from 14.5 million users to 11.4
million.'' She credited many elements of society, including
``athletes and entertainers,'' ``many CEO's of large
companies,'' and political leaders.
She also explained the origins of her ``Just Say No''
message; it came in answer to a child's question about what to
do if pressured to buy or use drugs. As she explained, it was
an intentionally simple answer, and was never intended to be a
``total answer.'' In short, Mrs. Reagan said, it is ``important
for children to appreciate that `no' is in the vocabulary . .
.''
Directing herself to national policy, Mrs. Reagan quoted
from President Clinton's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy,
which states that ``[a]nti-drug messages have lost their
potency.'' Mrs. Reagan disagreed, testifying: ``That's not my
experience. If there's a clear and forceful no use message
coming from strong, outspoken leadership, it is potent . . .
Half-hearted commitment doesn't work. This drift, this
complacency, is what led me to accept your invitation to be in
Washington today . . . [W]e have lost a sense of priority on
this problem, we have lost all sense of national urgency and
leadership.''
Elaborating, Mrs. Reagan noted that the current national
strategy seems to shift resources toward treatment and away
from prevention and education. While she stated that treatment
is important in the overall mix of antidrug measures, it cannot
supplant prevention as the nation's demand side priority. Mrs.
Reagan pointed toward a more effective antidrug strategy when
she observed simply that ``treatment can't begin to replace the
overwhelming importance of education and prevention,'' since
``tomorrow's hardcore users are today's children.''
As she explained to the Subcommittee, ``[r]oughly 80
percent of drug users are casual users. Only 20 percent are
hardcore, and most of the casual users are children and
adolescents. They are the ones whose lives are changed by
prevention and education.''
Overall, Mrs. Reagan argued for greater attention to demand
reduction, although she testified that ``many outstanding
prevention programs across the country'' were ``started and
funded privately,'' including her own foundation, which
recently ``merged with the BEST Foundation for a Drug-Free
Tomorrow'' and ``has trained over 13,000 teachers and others.''
Beyond the private sector, she said, the antidrug effort
``requires leadership here in Washington.'' Rhetorically, she
asked, ``[w]here has it gone?,'' and in closing, she called for
renewed leadership on this issue. ``Today, the antidrug message
just seems to be fading away. Children need to hear it and hear
it often, just like they need to hear that they're loved.''
Missing is ``our common national purpose'' in combating drugs
and teaching young Americans to ``live in the world that God
made, not the nightmare world of drugs.''
e. Testimony of John P. Walters
John P. Walters, president of the New Citizenship Project
and former Acting Director of ONDCP, testified essentially that
President Clinton has promoted policies that reversed or
accelerated the reversal of nearly a decade of falling drug
use.
Walters also tagged President Clinton as the source of
major reversals in: the cultural aversion to drug use, falling
drug availability, falling drug purities and rising drug
prices. Walters sees these trends as significant and dangerous.
Specifically, Walters testified that, between 1977 and
1992, America's culture underwent a significant transformation.
``The moral injunction not to use drugs swept over the Nation''
and ``[b]etween 1985 and 1992 alone, monthly cocaine use
declined by 78 percent.''
However, this ``sea change'' in attitudes was undone by the
Clinton Administration, said Walters, noting that the Clinton
Administration is ``undermining existing antidrug efforts on
almost all fronts.''
Walters pointed to the President's 80 percent reduction in
ONDCP staff,\45\ the Attorney General's stated goal of reducing
mandatory minimum sentences for drug trafficking,\46\ a
presidential directive reducing Department of Defense support
to drug interdiction efforts, the reduction in resources to
transit and source countries by 33 percent (from $523.4 million
in FY 1993 to $351.4 million in FY 1994),\47\ a reduction in
Federal domestic marijuana eradication efforts, a call by the
President's Surgeon General for study of drug legalization,\48\
and ``no moral leadership or encouragement'' from President
Clinton himself.
\45\ On February 9, 1993, the White House announced that ONDCP
would have its personnel cut from 146 to 25.
\46\ See also Isikoff, The Washington Post (November 26, 1993), pp.
A1, A10-A11.
\47\ See also, ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy: Budget
Summary (February 1994, p. 184.)
\48\ See also, Reuters, ``Elders Reiterates Her Support For Study
of Drug Legalization,'' The Washington Post (January 15, 1994), p. A8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Walters testified that the impact of President Clinton's
deemphasis on the Drug War was palpable, as illustrated by
recent nationwide studies of youth use and attitudes towards
illegal drug use. Again turning to hard numbers, Walters noted
that the December 1994 University of Michigan study of 8th,
10th and 12th graders showed that marijuana use ``rose sharply
in 1994, as it did in 1993, after virtually a decade of steady
decline'' and that ``student attitudes were becoming
significantly less hostile toward illegal drug use.'' \49\
\49\ See also University of Michigan, Monitoring the Future Study,
December 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Walters saw this reversal as alarming, and testified that
recent projections by the non-partisan Center on Addiction and
Substance Abuse at Colombia University, show: ``If historical
trends continue, the jump in marijuana use among America's
children (age 12-18) from 1992 to 1994 signals that 820,000
more of these children will try cocaine in their lifetime . . .
Of that number, about 58,000 will become regular cocaine users
and addicts.''
Arguing that the Clinton Administration has oversold drug
treatment, Walters also contended that the Administration has
failed to create the number of treatment ``slots'' necessary to
accommodate its own stated treatment priority.
First, turning to hard numbers, Walters noted that the
current strategy's success cannot be found in chronic, hardcore
drug user numbers--since these are also rising.
Despite the stated aim of the Clinton strategy, namely
reduction of hardcore use by heightened emphasis on treatment,
data gathered by the non-partisan Drug Abuse Warning Network
from emergency rooms around the country shows that ``drug
related emergency room cases . . . have reached the highest
levels ever, in reporting going back to 1978'' and ``[c]ocaine,
heroin, and marijuana cases all increased sharply to record
levels [in 1994].''
Second, while Walters explained the value of effective
treatment, he testified that today's Federal ``government
[drug] treatment bureaucracy is manifestly ineffective.'' He
said the Clinton Administration has, on the one hand, sought
increased treatment funding, yet on the other, failed to
provide sufficient treatment slots to effectuate the policy:
``Although Federal drug treatment spending almost tripled
between FY 1988 and FY 1994, the number of treatment slots
remained virtually unchanged and the estimated number of
persons treated declined--from 1,557,000 in 1989 to 1,412,000
in 1994,'' Walters testified.
Walters also offered statistics to support his view that
the current Administration has eroded the effectiveness of
international programs, ``destroyed'' intelligence support for
the Drug War, and abandoned ``presidential leadership'' on the
issue.
On international counter narcotics efforts, Walters rings
an alarm bell. He testified that, while the President's FY 1995
request for international antidrug programs was $428 million,
or $76 million above FY 1994, it is still $96 million below the
Administration's FY 1993 funding and $233 million below FY
1992. In addition, the President failed last year to secure the
request from a Democratically-controlled Congress.
In short, Walters testified, ``the drug problem is simply
not a part of the foreign policy agenda of the United States
under President Clinton--there is no carrot and no stick facing
countries from which the poison destroying American lives every
day comes.'' Walters noted, finally, that this deemphasis on
international efforts ``fuels calls in other countries for
abandoning antidrug cooperation.'' \50\
\50\ See also The New York Times (February 20, 1994), p. A6; The
New York Times (February 27, 1994), Section 4, p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Walters further testified that President Clinton's policies
are ``destroying the intelligence support to the drug war'' by,
for example, last year cutting $600,000 in intelligence funding
for FY 1995, and taking other measures to redirect resources
away from this key priority.
As a result, citing the Clinton Administration's own
documentation, Walters noted that ONDCP itself admits more
teenagers nationwide are using heroin and marijuana, that
cocaine use is stable but high,\51\ and that heroin, cocaine
and marijuana are now available at lower prices and higher
purities than at any time in recent years.\52\
\51\ See ONDCP, ``Pulse Check: National Trends in Drug Abuse,''
December, 1994, pp. 5, 8 and 10.
\52\ See ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy: Strengthening
Communities' Response to Drugs and Crime, February, 1995, pp. 45-48,
146 (Table B-16).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Walter's view, ``if these trends continue, by 1996, the
Clinton Administration will have presided over the greatest
increase in drug use in modern American history.''
Looking forward, Walters advocated several policies for
getting the drug war ``back on track,'' including direct
presidential leadership or use of ``the bully pulpit,''
limited-duration antidrug block grants for states, putting the
military ``in charge'' of all international counter narcotics
efforts, using trade and diplomatic sanctions against source
countries, establishing clear no-use prevention programs,
closing open-air drug markets nationwide, drug testing where
constitutionally permissible, and calling on local media to
tackle the drug issue in a new wave of public service
announcements.
Walters concluded by noting that ``most Americans have
never used illegal drugs and have always been strongly opposed
to their use.'' Nevertheless, the Nation is on a collision
course with devastating extrapolations, and a swift change of
policy and return to effective implementation is required.
On questioning, Walters affirmed that pursuing the so-
called kingpin strategy for apprehension of cocaine cartel
leaders was a ``Federal responsibility.'' For that reason, the
FBI and DEA should return to ``the long, hard, crafted effort
to go after kingpins [that] has been dismantled by the
Administration in favor of . . . helping street-level local law
enforcement . . . for political reasons.'' Walters described
that, at present, ``there is no plan by Federal law enforcement
to dismantle . . . organizations that are moving hundreds of
millions of dollars a month out of the United States.''
Again upon questioning, Walters testified that ``the
military and other interdiction agencies have received a 50
percent force reduction in 1994, that has caused over a 50
percent reduction in their ability to interdict drugs . . .
[in] the transit zone.''
Walters took issue with the Clinton Administration's
granting of a national security waiver to Colombia, which was
this year technically de-certified. He indicated that the
national security waiver obviated the decertification.
Asked about the efficacy of drug testing, Walters suggested
that ``pre-employment testing ought to be able to be done
everywhere, Congress, the Judiciary, the Executive Branch,''
and that the Federal employees should also be subject to
``random testing,'' although he also noted that he was not a
lawyer and that testing is subject to legal limits.
Both Bennett and Bonner concurred with Walter's
recommendation for wider drug testing, although Judge Bonner
noted that there are legal limits on employee drug testing
which generally require that a job be ``potentially dangerous''
to the public or involve ``security.'' Bonner noted
countervailing concerns of citizen privacy, yet added that
``drug testing has proved effective in deterring drug use,''
especially ``in the military.'' Walters concluded the
discussion of drug testing by noting that the Federal work
force is only part of the problem, and that drug testing in the
larger private sector is key.
Congressman Robert E. Wise, Jr. questioned whether the
Andean initiative had not already been failing, leading to
increased cocaine availability, during the Bush Administration.
In response, Walters testified that a shift of military
assets to the Persian Gulf War toward the end of the Bush
Administration affected the Andean initiative. However, Walters
drew a distinction between the Bush and Clinton
Administrations, noting that ``the [Clinton] administration
intentionally and vocally changed policy, shifting out of
interdiction into hardcore treatment . . . ,'' and that the
Clinton administration never returned military assets to the
pre-Gulf War interdiction force structure.
Judge Bonner contested Congressman Wise's cocaine
availability numbers, stating that ``throughout most of 1990
[there was] a substantial and sharp increase in the price of
cocaine that was being marketed on a wholesale basis in the
United States, and we again saw through about half of 1992 that
kind of increase.'' Judge Bonner attributed this progress to
the DEA, United States agencies and the Colombian Government,
which were effectively ``destroying the Medellin cartel.''
Bonner also noted that the Mexican Government was, at that
time, closely cooperating with the United States.
Finally, on questioning, Walters closely linked drug use to
crime. Walters testified that, in his experience, the ``biggest
single contributor'' to drug related crime was not trafficker
violence, but violence by people using drugs--who ``abuse
children, abuse their spouses, be[come] violent with other
people, be[come] disinhibited and paranoid and more proned to
violence.''
Surprisingly, Walters cited a study by ONDCP, conducted in
New York City, Chicago and San Diego, which found that ``public
assistance is the major and perhaps the single largest source
of income for heroin users,'' noting that it is the poorest
Americans who are most often devastated by heroin. Walters
called it a ``national disgrace that in inner city
neighborhoods, it is accepted as a fact of life that we are
going to allow open air drug markets to exist without
harassment.''
Walters concluded that ``the Clinton administration has
turned its back on the drug problem and taken actions that
undermine achievements in prevention, interdiction and
enforcement.''
f. Testimony of William J. Bennett
William J. Bennett, current Co-Director of Empower America
and former Director of ONDCP, testified that there has been a
``sharp rise in drug use,'' citing many of the same studies
cited by Zeliff, Reagan, Walters and others.
According to Bennett, this rise should have ``mobilized the
Federal Government to forcefully state the case against drug
use, enforce the law and provide safety and security to its
citizens.'' Instead, ``the Clinton administration has abdicated
its responsibility'' and ``has been AWOL in the War on Drugs,''
said the former White House Drug Czar.
Widely regarded as the most effective White House Drug Czar
to date, Bennett denounced the 80 percent cut by President
Clinton in the ONDCP staff, and the willingness of Clinton's
Attorney General to endorse reductions in mandatory minimum
sentences for drug traffickers.
Strikingly, Bennett noted that the Administration's 1995
strategy would ``cut . . . more than 600 positions from drug
enforcement divisions of the Drug Enforcement Administration,''
cut ``more than 100 drug prosecution positions in United States
Attorney's offices,'' cut ``drug interdiction and drug
intelligence programs from fiscal 1994 levels,'' and was ``an
unfocused, wasteful drug treatment strategy that will do little
to target hardcore users.''
Bennett introduced new facts into the national dialogue
when he observed that, ``last year, the Clinton administration
directed the U.S. Military to stop providing radar tracking of
cocaine-trafficker aircraft to Colombia and Peru,'' a policy
``Congress again had to reverse,'' and noted that ``last month,
for the first time in history, the nation's drug control
strategy was introduced without the participation of the
president.''
Bennett also believes that, if present trends continue, by
1996 the Clinton administration will have presided over the
greatest increase in drug use ``in modern American history.''
Expanding his analysis beyond the failure of public policy,
Bennett testified that ``the Clinton Administration suffers
from moral torpor on the issue'' and that, as a general matter,
``policy follows attitude.''
In support of this statement, Bennett quoted several
statements by the President on his own prior use of drugs, in
particular, Clinton's 1991 statement that he had never ``broken
any drug law,'' followed by the 1992 statement that he had used
marijuana in England but ``didn't inhale it,'' followed in
turn, when asked if he would inhale if he had it to do over,
by: ``Sure, if I could, I tried before.''
Bennett also articulated the oddity of continued
presidential support for a Surgeon General who ``had favorable
words to say about legalization,'' noting that her eventual
dismissal had nothing to do with her remarks on drug
legalization.
Citing ``massive policy failures'' by the Clinton
Administration, Bennett proposed basic remedial measures.
First, communities need to be able to ``choose their own
antidrug priorities by combining Federal antidrug support with
that from states and localities.''
Second, the U.S. Military must be clearly given a
leadership role in the international war on drugs. Third,
international trade and diplomatic sanctions must be used, and
all aid to cocaine-source countries should be eliminated if
they fail to reduce production. Fourth, the Justice Department
should make apprehension and prosecution of drug traffickers a
top priority.
Upon questioning, Bennett testified that he favored ``drug
testing'' for Federal employees, and pursued the matter as Drug
Czar until confronted by legal obstacles; ONDCP did use random
and pre-employment drug testing, premised on ``security and
safety.''
Bennett noted, on closing, that ``success in the drug war
depends above all on the efforts of parents and schools and
churches and police chiefs and judges and community leaders.''
Giving examples from more than 100 cities he visited while
President Bush's Drug Czar, Bennett urged renewed leadership.
g. Testimony of Robert C. Bonner
Robert C. Bonner, former Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) under both Presidents Bush and
Clinton, a former Federal judge, and currently a partner at
Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher, testified forcefully for renewed
leadership in the Drug War: ``The bottom line is unmistakable--
during the past two years, drug use among the youth of America
has soared in nearly every category of illegal drug . . . When
juxtaposed against the immediately preceding period and nearly
a decade of declining drug use, there can be only one
conclusion--the Clinton Administration's National Drug Strategy
has failed miserably, and indeed it is a tragedy.''
Supporting this statement, Judge Bonner offered
observations from his experience as DEA Administrator, and
referred to a number of recent studies.
Bonner testified that he was ``deeply troubled'' by the
``absence of an effective, coherent national drug strategy and
the apparent abandonment of any presidential leadership in this
area.''
Moreover, Bonner believes drugs now pose ``a serious threat
to the well-being of our nation'' and a genuine ``national
security threat.'' Bonner called for a bipartisan effort to
address this ``resurgent threat to our nation's security,''
noting that the threat ``does not distinguish among
Republicans, Democrats or Independents.''
Bonner vividly described the costs of drug use to the
Nation in the 1970's. ``Families were torn apart by drugs, more
than many realize. Child and spousal abuse, bankruptcy, and
criminal prosecutions followed . . . [h]undreds of thousands of
drug-addicted babies were born to young mothers who, more often
than not, could not support themselves, let alone children
requiring serious medical attention. Drug related health care
costs soared, draining still unacknowledged capital from our
economy. Rampant in the work place, the wide-spread use of
illegal drugs literally threatened America's ability to compete
in the global marketplace.''
Crediting Mrs. Reagan's ``Just Say No'' campaign and the
antidrug Abuse Act of 1988, Bonner noted that the onslaught of
direct and indirect damage from illegal drugs was turned back
in the mid-1980's and early 1990's. In Bonner's view, national
will, and a combination of ``strong law enforcement,'' a strong
``educational and moral message,'' and effective treatment
programs for hardcore users has made the difference. However,
he warns that drug treatment programs should not be
``oversold.''
Statistically, he reminded the Subcommittee that ``our
national drug strategy [in the 1980's and early 1990's] was
working . . .'' Citing household surveys by the National
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), Bonner added new statistics to
the record. ``[R]egular users of cocaine dropped from 5.8
million Americans in 1985 to 1.3 million in 1992 . . . a
decline of over 80 percent'' and that ``crack cocaine use
sharply declined from nearly a million in 1990 to just over
300,000 two years later in 1992,'' said Bonner.
Judge Bonner observed that ``marijuana use . . . plummeted
from about 22 million regular users in 1985 to approximately
8.5 million in 1992 . . . a decrease of an astonishing 61
percent in seven years.''
However, he confirmed that there has been a ``rollback over
the past two years of hard-fought victories achieved between
the mid-1980's and the early 1990's.'' Citing the University of
Michigan study of high school students, he noted that use of
``heroin, LSD, cocaine, and crack,'' and ``the ill-named
recreational drugs, marijuana, stimulants and inhalants'' was
up and ``ominous.''
According to Bonner, ``[w]e have seen a 100 percent
increase in the number of 8th graders who used marijuana in
just three years from 1991 to 1994; and just since last year,
we have witnessed a 50 percent increase in the daily use of
marijuana by 8th graders.'' Meanwhile, ``the perceived risks
and disapproval of drug use has declined.''
Bonner also shared the view of Joseph Califano, President
Carter's Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and current
co-director of CASA, that ``if this relaxed attitude [toward
drug use] continues, further marked increases in drug use by
children can be expected.''
This, he said, is why casual use by juveniles must not be
become peripheral or secondary to treatment of hardcore
addicts. In a nutshell, ``if you emphasize, as [the Clinton
Administration] is, . . . treatment of hardcore drug users,
you're assuming that the drug problem is a static one--that we
have a certain number of hardcore drug users here, and then we
have certain number of casual drug users, and if we just take
care of these hardcore drug users, the problem goes away.'' He
strongly contested this view.
``That's wrong,'' says Bonner, ``the drug problem is a
dynamic one, [because] as you increase the number of casual
users, you are down the pipeline going to be increasing the
number of hardcore users that [you] have to deal with.'' Bonner
drew the analogy to bailing a leaky ship while failing to patch
the leaks; eventually ``that's going to sink the boat.''
He called the medical impact of the recent rise in drug use
alarming. For example, the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN)
data for emergency room admissions in recent years indicates
``significant increases in hospital emergency room admissions
related to drug abuse, with the largest increases in heroin
admissions, up by 44 percent between 1992 and 1993,'' noted
Bonner.
The chief causes for recent reversals in juvenile drug use,
according to Bonner, include: ``lack of national, and
specifically, presidential leadership; lack of a clear, loud,
and persistent moral message that illegal drug use is wrong;
and a misallocation of resources that undermines drug law
enforcement and prevention efforts and overemphasizes hardcore
user treatment . . .''
Bluntly, Bonner concluded, ``there has been a near total
absence of presidential leadership by President Clinton in the
fight to turn back illegal drug use . . .'' and his Surgeon
General's remarks on legalization ``arguably encourages it'' by
further reducing perceived risk; Bonner called Surgeon General
Jocelyn Elders' statement on legalization ``dead wrong and
flagrantly irresponsible for a national public health
official.''
On treatment, Bonner testified that ``the Clinton Strategy
badly oversells the efficacy of the treatment of hardcore drug
abusers'' and fails to acknowledge that ``studies repeatedly
indicate the low success rates associated with many programs .
. .''
Specifically, Bonner cited the work of Harvard University's
Mark Kleiman, a former member of the Clinton Justice Department
Transition Team, which shows that ``even the most expensive
treatment program--long-term residential treatment programs
costing as much as $20,000/patient--have success rates as low
as 15 to 25 percent.''
Upon questioning, Bonner reminded the Subcommittee that
``with respect to crack addicts . . . after treatment programs,
less than 10 percent are free of drugs, free of crack after 24
weeks, so you don't want to put too many eggs in that
[treatment] basket.''
Addressing reversals in availability and price, Bonner
testified that ``from 1990 to 1992, the wholesale price of
cocaine in the U.S. increased substantially'' as law
enforcement involvement went up; meanwhile, demand fell. By
contrast, based on the laws of supply and demand, ``as the
resources for enforcement and interdiction have been cut, the
price of cocaine has gone down and the estimated number of
heavy users has gone up.''
Upon questioning, Judge Bonner stated that the Cali Cartel
is ``supplying between 80 and 90 percent of all of the cocaine
that reaches the United States . . .''
Contradicting later testimony by Dr. Brown, the current
ONDCP Director, Bonner stated that the Clinton administration
was ``moving away from'' the Bush Administration's ``Linear
kingpin strategy,'' which Bonner explained ``was designed to go
after the leadership, the key lieutenants, the means of
transport, the means of production . . . of the drug
trafficking organizations . . .'' Bonner called this
regrettable.
In conclusion, Bonner said, ``we are regressing in the
fight against drugs, after making significant, hard-fought and
dramatic gains.'' Quoting University of Michigan researchers,
he said, ``[d]espite substantial progress against illicit drug
use in earlier years . . . it is a problem which is getting
worse at a fairly rapid pace.''
Sadly, Bonner, President Clinton's former DEA
Administrator, observed: ``The Clinton administration has
utterly failed to appreciate the value of strong international
drug law enforcement as a major component in an effective drug
control strategy.'' He called on the President to ``reverse
this trend and start leading our Nation's antidrug efforts.''
h. Testimony of Dr. Lee P. Brown
Dr. Lee P. Brown, President Clinton's Director of the White
House Office of Drug Control Strategy, or White House Drug
Czar, testified in defense of the 1995 National Drug Control
Strategy.
(i). Overall Drug Policy Spending.--Brown testified that
President Clinton's fiscal 1996 budget sought $14.6 billion in
funding across the Federal Government for drug related Federal
programs.
For context, the President's 1995 National Drug Control
Strategy lists the total ``Drug Budget'' as $14,550.4
(million). This figure is somewhat misleading, however, since
it contains funding for a variety of programs mixed purposes,
such as the Federal Court System, Food and Drug Administration,
Social Security Administration, Department of Agriculture's
Agricultural Research Service, U.S. Forest Service, Department
of Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land
Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service,
Department of Justice's Community Policy, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, U.S. Marshal's Service and Tax
Division, an unidentified grant to the Department of Labor,
ONDCP's ``gift fund'' (zeroed out in fiscal 1996), the Small
Business Administration, the Agency for International
Development (AID), the Department of Treasury's Internal
Revenue Service, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Information Agency
(USIA), and a range of other disparate Federal initiatives.\53\
\53\ See National Drug Control Strategy, February 1995, The White
House, pp. 120-121.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A dual concern raised by some members of the Subcommittee
was how these funds are actually spent and who coordinates the
spending. The latter concern boiled down to accountability,
avoiding duplication, and assuring interagency coordination.
Dr. Brown testified that the President recognized the drug
``link to other domestic policy issues, such as individual
economic security, health care, housing, jobs, educational
opportunities, crime and violence, and family and community
stability.''
(ii). Shift To Treatment.--Seeking to justify the
Administration's acknowledged shift to treatment of hardcore
drug users and the President's request for ``$2.8 billion for
treatment'' in fiscal 1996, Dr. Brown noted that ``chronic
hardcore drug users comprise 20 percent of the drug user
population but consume two-thirds of the drugs . . .'' From
this, he argued that ``past strategy [sic] ignores this
inextricable part of the drug problem.''
In fact, while the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy does
increase the proportion of overall spending devoted to
treatment, past strategies have included--and have steadily
increased--funding for treatment. In fact, Federal treatment
funding has increased every year from 1982 to 1995.\54\
\54\ Fiscal Year 1992, Federal treatment spending stood at $505.6
million. Fiscal year 1995, Federal treatment spending stood at $ 2.65
billion. National Drug Control Strategy: Budget Summary, Office of
National Drug Control Policy, February 1995, p. 238.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Walters further testified that ``between 1988 and
1993, we roughly tripled the treatment budget of the Federal
Government,'' while the ``number of people treated per year
declined.'' The decline, according to Walters, was the result
of ``bureaucracy'' and money being channeled to effective
treatment programs.
Dr. Brown testified that ``the best way to reduce the
overall demand for drugs and the related crime and violence is
to reduce the number of hardcore drug users,'' adding that
``treatment works.''
In defense of this statement, Brown cited a June 1994 RAND
study that reportedly found that ``drug treatment is the most
cost effective drug control intervention.'' Brown asserted that
the study found that ``for every dollar invested in drug
treatment in 1992, taxpayers saved $7 in crime and health care
costs.''
Brown did not comment on the arguments raised by Walters,
Bennett, and Bonner against increasing treatment spending vis-
a-vis other programs, namely that many of the funded treatment
programs are ineffective and that the Administration has not
created enough ``slots'' to absorb increased spending.
Moreover, he did not acknowledge fundamental limitations of
the June 1994 RAND study as a guide to national policy. The
study was conducted by C. Peter Rydell and Susan S. Everingham
and entitled, ``Controlling Cocaine: Supply versus Demand
Programs.'' While the study is of value, it is also easily
misread, is subject to clear limitations, and is arguably
flawed.
Before examining methodology, two observations on substance
are worth making. First, the study properly condemns
legalization.\55\ Second, the study implies that the
Administration's ``controlled shift'' from interdiction to
source country programs is a serious misstep.\56\
\55\ On legalization, the RAND study explains the devastating
effect that drug legalization would have on overall drug use, by
applying the economic mechanism of reduced prices, or price elasticity.
In 1994, the average street or retail price for a pure gram of cocaine
was $143; if cocaine were legalized, the estimated retail price would
be $15-$20 per gram; See RAND Study, supra, pp. 11, 13.
\56\ On the ``controlled shift,'' the RAND study concludes that
dollar-for-dollar, interdiction is more effective than pumping money
into source country programs. Ironically, while the Administration
embraces the study's pro-treatment conclusion, it obviously rejects
this conclusion. As one drug policy expert noted, ``[t]his analysis
implies that the National Drug Control Strategy's `controlled shift' of
resources from interdiction to source-country control might be a
misstep.'' See Schnaubelt, Christopher, ``Drug treatment Versus Supply
Reduction: Which Is Cheaper?,'' National Interagency Counterdrug
Institute, May 1995, p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed below, in the ``Treatment Policy Oversight''
section, the RAND study has serious limitations, including
omission of prevention as an effective demand reduction
tool,\57\ failure to follow up assessments of active
residential and outpatient treatment programs for long-term
effectiveness,\58\ a disfavoring of supply side programs
because they yield only ``indirect'' benefits and are further
removed from the user population, and the employment of a
flawed measure of effectiveness, namely reduced overall cocaine
consumption rather than a reduced number of users.
\57\ See, e.g., Gleason, Thomas J., Hall, Douglas J., Oliver,
William D., The Executive Summary of PRIDE Communities: A Grassroots
Drug Prevention Effort for Healthy Teens, PRIDE, August, 1995; Burke,
James, E., An Overview of Illegal Drugs in America, Partnership For A
Drug-Free America, Fall, 1995; Johnson, Dr. Lloyd G., Monitoring the
Future, December 1995, University of Michigan Institute for Social
Research.
\58\ The RAND study itself acknowledges that, once treatment ends,
only about 12 percent of out-patient and 17 percent of residential
treatment recipients stop heavy use of cocaine. See C. Peter Rydell and
Susan S. Everingham, ``Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand
Programs,'' RAND Drug Policy Research Center, Santa Monica, California,
June 1994, pp. 24-25, 88-89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iii). Prevention Programs.--Brown acknowledged that ``drug
use among adolescents is rising,'' but attributed the trend to
the final year of the Bush Administration. Brown offered the
view that Safe and Drug Free Schools monies are ``the
cornerstone of this Nation's efforts to educate our children
about drug use'' and are currently disbursed to ``94 percent of
the school districts in this country.''
After first calling for a ``non-partisan'' discussion of
antidrug measures and stating that he was ``determined not to
play politics,'' Brown proceeded to call the 1995 rescission
package, containing unspent 1994 prevention funding for the
complaint-ridden Safe and Drug Free Schools program, a
Republican ``anti-children rescission package.''
No mention was made of accountability problems in Federal
prevention programs, proposed remedies for these reported
problems, or on-going investigations into dispersement of Safe
and Drug Free Schools funds by the Federal Department of
Education or in any of the states.
Congressman Mark Souder raised documentary evidence,
including a study by the Michigan State Governor's Office,
supporting the view that the Safe and Drug Free Schools program
monies had, at least in that state, been ``misapplied,
untargeted and unaudited.''
Congressman Souder also took Brown to task for Brown's
political partisanship, noting that he ``took a direct shot and
very political shot'' at Republicans by suggesting that they
were funding ``a tax break for the wealthiest Americans by
gutting drug education in our schools.'' Souder then quoted
from Democratic Congressman Charles Rangel, who he said had
observed, ``I have been in Congress for over two decades, and I
have never, never, never found any Administration that has been
so silent on this great challenge to the American people.''
Brown responded that the rising youth use trend justified
support for ``school-based prevention programs,'' regardless of
reported accountability problems.\59\ Brown did not address the
1995 Strategy's deemphasis on prevention vis-a-vis treatment.
\59\ See, e.g., publications of Office of Drug Control Policy,
Michigan State, Robert E. Peterson Director, concerning waste, fraud
and abuse in Federal prevention funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Upon questioning, and against the backdrop of his own
favorable comments regarding Mrs. Reagan's ``Just Say No''
campaign, Brown sought to defend statements in the President's
1995 Strategy, particularly the Strategy's contentions that
``simplistic prevention messages of the past appear not to work
for today's young people'' and ``[a]nti-drug messages are
losing their potency among the Nation's youth.'' \60\
\60\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February
1995, p. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
His defense of these messages hinged on the view that ``we
have seen a substantial reduction in your non-addicted, if you
would, the casual drug user population,'' and emphasis had to
be placed, after 1993, on the ``chronic hardcore drug user
population.''
Brown did not address recent numbers indicating increases
in both the casual and hardcore user populations, numbers that
contradict both his contentions--that casual use is
sufficiently low to warrant a shift of strategy, and that the
Administration's post-1993 shift toward hardcore users has
shown results.
(iv). Interdiction Mentioned.--Brown confirmed a shift in
trafficking patterns toward greater use of container cargo and
noted that ``over 70 percent of the cocaine entering our
country crosses the border with Mexico,'' but was unable to
explain reduced emphasis in the current strategy on National
Guard Container Search Workdays along the U.S.-Mexican border.
Specifically, Brown had no answer for the question why National
Guard Container Search Workdays fell from 227,827 in 1994 to a
1996 projection of 209,000, as described in ONDCP's own 1995
Strategy at page 41.
Notably, the 1995 ONDCP Strategy also describes an
inexplicable drop in other National Guard workdays from 597,385
in 1994 to 589,000 in 1995 and 530,000 projected for 1996; a
drop in Ship Days devoted to drug interdiction from 2,268 in
1994 to 1,545 in 1995 and projected for 1996; and a reduction
in Department of Defense flight hours from 50,624 in 1994 to
50,000 in 1995 and projected for 1996.\61\
\61\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February
1995, p. 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congressman Gene Taylor (D-Miss), citing ``serious flaws in
the policy'' and noting his own recent trip to Colombia, asked
Dr. Brown why more Customs agents were not available for border
inspections of containers coming out of Colombia.
Brown responded that he had been on the U.S.-Mexican border
himself, that he was ``committed to make sure that we do all
that's humanly possible,'' and that ``it becomes the
responsibility of the Mexican Government to do what they can .
. .''
Pressed again by Taylor to provide an answer on U.S.
Customs resources, Dr. Brown offered that the Administration
had a source country policy. Finally, in frustration, Taylor
stated: ``We're in the same political party. I'm not here to
beat up on you. But I'm asking you to rethink the strategy . .
.'' Dr. Brown never answered Congressman Taylor's Customs
question.
Dr. Brown testified that, at the Department of Justice, the
original Bush administration ``kingpin strategy'' was still
being pursued, and on a different topic, Brown testified that
he had no evidence that Haitian President Aristide was
``involved in any drug trafficking.''
Generally, Brown condemned ``Congress'' for having ``failed
to fulfill [the President's] budget request.'' However, Brown
made no attempt to provide specific answers to members'
questions concerning (1) the President's own proposed deep cuts
in interdiction and international program funding, (2)
accountability, (3) shifting interdiction resources to source
countries, (4) a reduction of Customs agents at the Southwest
border, or (5) the shift in resources from prevention of casual
use (80 percent of total users) by juveniles to treatment for
older, chronic, hardcore users (20 percent of total).
(v). Interdiction and the Kramek Letter.--Subcommittee
Chairman Bill Zeliff (R-NH) introduced an unclassified piece of
correspondence dated December 1994 between the Interdiction
Coordinator, Admiral Kramek, and the Director of ONDCP, Dr.
Brown, which stated that a consensus of agency heads believed
``we need to restore assets to the interdiction force structure
. . .'' and ``we must return to the 1992-1993 levels of
effort.''
The Kramek letter also indicated that the source country
programs were not yet ``producing necessary results.''
Addressing drugs as a national security threat, the Kramek
letter specifically asked for a meeting with the President. The
letter read, ``I believe it appropriate that we meet with the
President and National Security Advisor as soon as possible to
brief them on the results of our conference and discuss the
current state of implementation and national strategy . . . Of
key importance to this meeting is the determination of priority
of counting narcotics trafficking as a threat to national
security of the United States as evaluated against other
threats to our security that compete for resources.''
The Subcommittee Chairman asked Brown if he had followed
the Interdiction Coordinator's and agency heads' consensus that
drug interdiction resources be returned to the ``1992-1993
levels.'' Brown indicated that he held a view different from
that of the Interdiction Coordinator and had, apparently, not
followed that recommendation. Similarly, the Subcommittee
Chairman asked Brown if he had taken the Interdiction
Coordinator's request to the President or National Security
Advisor. Brown indicated that he had not, and apparently also
had not set up the requested meetings between Kramek and the
President, or between Kramek and the National Security Advisor
to ``determin[e] [the] priority of counting narcotics
trafficking as a threat to national security . . .''
(vi). Shift to Source Countries.--Brown conceded a shift of
resources from interdiction to ``international efforts in
source countries,'' but was unable to offer results of the
shift or details about how the source country programs were
being implemented or managed.
As an addenda, hearings held by the Subcommittee in June
1995 (see below) revealed serious mismanagement and
misdirection of the source country programs, according to
General Accounting Office investigators.
(vii). No Measurable Goals.--Brown extolled the President's
Strategy as ``new'' and ``action-oriented'', and testified that
it offered ``specific targets and steps to achieve these
targets.''
As a matter of record, however, the Clinton Strategies have
arguably failed even to meet the clear statutory obligation
that specific goals and measurable objectives be set forth--
goals against which progress or a lack thereof can meaningfully
be gauged.
Section 1005 of the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988 sets forth
the requirement that every National Drug Control Strategy
present both ``long-range goals for reducing drug abuse in the
United States'' and ``short-term measurable objectives'' for
completion in two years from the date of the strategy's
submission. These are statutory requirements.
Thus, between 1989 and 1992, the Bush Administration set
forth clear and quantifiable goals and objectives, each one
susceptible to evaluation on an ``achieved'' or ``did not
achieve'' basis. In the language of the 1992 Strategy, the
President laid out ``10 detailed goals and objectives with
specific numerical and proportional targets,'' and expressly
stated that ``if levels and rates of national drug use do not
fall, the Strategy is a failure--a test this document continues
to invite.''
By example, the Bush strategy set the goal to ``reduce
current overall drug use by 15 percent,'' but then stated in
1992: ``Goal not met. Current overall drug use declined 13
percent from 1988 to 1991.'' The same 1992 strategy, projecting
long-range goals, sought a 1994 goal of ``25 percent reduction
below the 1988 level in the number of people reporting any
illegal use of drugs in the past month'' and a 2002 objective
of ``65 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of
people reporting any illegal use of drugs in the past month.''
Each of the prior Bush Drug Control Strategies, and the
remaining 1992 goals, were similarly specific. Each met the
requirements of the statute, and permitted accountability.
The Clinton Strategies have been a stark contrast. Contrary
to Dr. Brown's assertions of specificity, the statutory
requirement has likely not been met.
For example, the first stated goal of the 1995 Drug Control
Strategy is simply ``reduce the number of drug users in
America.'' The second goal is to ``expand treatment capacity
and services and increase treatment effectiveness so that those
who need treatment can receive it.'' The third goal is ``reduce
the burden on the health care system by reducing the spread of
infectious diseases related to drug use.''
All the remaining goals are similarly open-ended,
essentially unmeasurable, and lacking the statutorily required
``objectives with specific numerical and proportional
targets.'' In short, contrary to Dr. Brown's assertions before
the Subcommittee, the goals were neither specific nor
measurable in terms prescribed by the 1988 Antidrug Abuse Act.
(viii). No Heroin Strategy.--Brown testified that the
Nation faced ``growing availability of cheap and high purity
heroin,'' and acknowledged ``concern about the possibility of
another heroin epidemic.''
He assured the Subcommittee that ``the Clinton
administration was responding . . . with a new heroin strategy
which reaffirms that heroin control is one of our major foreign
policy objectives.''
In fact, as later conceded, President Clinton had promised
the Nation a heroin strategy within 120 days of taking office.
As of March 1995, he had not yet signed a heroin strategy.
The President finally signed a heroin strategy on November
29, 1995, according to internal reports. The Strategy, however,
apparently has no implementing guidelines.
Brown concluded his testimony by agreeing to return to
testify before the Subcommittee within one month.
i. Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost
Admiral Paul Yost, former 18th Commandant of the United
States Coast Guard and presently President of the non-partisan
James Madison Fellowship Foundation, testified on the topics of
interdiction and interagency coordination.
He testified that the Nation witnessed a ``major build-up
in drug interdiction in the at-sea war on drugs from 1984
through 1990,'' with the result that this interdiction effort
``successfully interrupted the flow of bulk marijuana by sea
and cocaine by air over the water routes [of the Caribbean].''
In Admiral Yost's view, ``strong interdiction and law
enforcement were providing a climate [from 1984 through 1990]
that made it clear to the [drug] trafficker that `this is
wrong, and your chances of being intercepted are very high.' ''
Since that time, he testified, there has been a ``tragic
dismantling'' of the at-sea interdiction effort, so that today
``there are several orders of magnitude less effort spent on
drug interdiction.''
Specifically, Yost testified that ``ship days and aircraft
hours are drastically reduced [from 1990],'' and ``[a]ll of the
Coast Guard jet aircraft, the Falcons with the f-16 intercept
radars, were taken away from interdiction . . .'' ``The three
Coast Guard E-2C airborne early warning aircraft have been
turned back to the Navy and used for other purposes,'' and
``the Coast Guard Air Station at St. Augustine, Florida, which
was established to support these three multimillion dollar
aircraft, is now closed.'' On questioning, Yost indicated that
he believed some of the E-2Cs were even being
``decommissioned.''
Moreover, Yost testified, ``the Coast Guard C-130 airborne
early warning aircraft has been turned over to the Air Force,
stripped of its equipment, including a dome-mounted radar, and
is now used for transportation of cargo.'' ``In addition, the
new Command Control Communications and Intelligence Center has
been closed, and its duties performed elsewhere.''
Calling the resultant increase in drug availability and
drug use predictable, Yost testified that the Nation ``will
never stop drug use without a solid interdiction foundation for
. . . education and treatment programs.''
Accordingly, Yost favored a return to ``emphasiz[ing] the
interdiction prong of the drug strategy'' and increased budget
authority for the Coast Guard.
Finally, Yost discussed the need for better interagency
coordination. He supports greater ``authority'' for the White
House Drug Czar and President's Interdiction Coordinator.
Without the ability, specifically, to ``direct cabinet-level
officers regarding budget allocation, personnel allocation, or
forced deployments'' on this issue, both positions are
``largely ceremonial,'' he said.
Yost believes that ``a priority on drug interdiction . . .
would have to be imposed on Cabinet departments by the
President himself.'' An effective interdiction policy would
require that one person be ``in charge,'' and able to ``lay
force requirements on other agency heads for specific filed
operations,'' as well as receiving ``authority to direct both
strategy and tactics . . .'' A ``theater commander'' is needed,
according to Yost, and ``a totally committed Congress and
Administration.'' Yost concluded by observing that, ``up to
now, we have been unable to select a theater commander and to
delegate to him the authority he needs to win.''
Responding to a question from the Subcommittee Chairman,
Admiral Yost noted that his successful at-sea weapons
interdiction program in Vietnam had ``three or four times the
drug interdiction assets per mile of coast,'' ``a dedicated
commander,'' a ``chain of command,'' and mechanisms for
assuring ``responsibility and accountability,'' all of which
are missing from the current drug war.
Yost emphasized that interdiction, alone, will not win the
drug war; interdiction must be the foundation for prevention,
education, and treatment--and ``that's what'll win the war.''
j. Testimony of Thomas Hedrick, Jr.
Thomas Hedrick, Jr., Vice Chairman of the Partnership for a
Drug-Free America, testified that prevention and interdiction
advocates must begin to work together, and that ``preventing
drug use by young people'' is essential ``if we are to have a
prayer of building safe and healthy families and communities.''
(i). Removing Barriers to Winning the Drug War.--As a
prevention expert with ten years of experience, Hedrick
testified that, ``quite frankly, I am frightened because after
nearly a decade of progress, drug use is rapidly increasing.''
Hedrick testified that drug abuse is a ``process'' that
begins with the first use decision, and that ``any use'' of
illegal drugs should be defined as ``abuse.''
Hedrick testified that the Partnership sees three major
barriers, each a public misperception, to winning the drug war.
The first misperception is that ``we have lost the so-
called `war on drugs.' '' In fact, since the height of drug
use, we have seen an ``enormous decrease'' in drug use,
according to Hedrick. We have to recognize this progress, and
see that ``solving the drug problem'' is not ``hopeless,''
despite recent slippages.
Second, drug use is not primarily ``a problem of inner city
ethnic kids.'' This ``terrible stereotype'' causes inner city
kids, incorrectly, to think that their peers are all using
drugs; and it also incorrectly leads ``the rest of America'' to
think that their kids do not have drug problem. In fact, ``75
percent of all drug users are white . . .,'' according to
Hedrick.
Third, there is a misperception that drugs are a stand-
alone issue. They are not, says Hedrick. They have ``become
severely imbedded [over] the last 30 years in every major
social issue we face in this nation.'' For example, drug abuse
is ``inextricably linked to crime and violence,'' but also
``contributes to the breakdown of our families, the abuse of
children and adults . . . the spread of the AIDS virus, school
drop-outs and declining quality of education, homelessness,
urban decay, high health care costs, and even economic
productivity and competitiveness.''
(ii). Needed: Parents and Media.--The issue has
``overarching importance.'' `` `Crisis' is not an overly
dramatic or inappropriate description, particularly when you
consider that drug use among our youngest kids, 13 and 14, has
more than doubled in the last three years,'' observed Hedrick.
Hedrick favors increased parent involvement in setting a
``clear expectation of no use,'' better in-school education,
and reduced exposure of children to ``pro-drug information,''
especially exposure to the ``recent re-glamorization of drug
use in some of the media.''
Significantly, Hedrick reported that the Partnership has
received, since inception, ``over $2 billion in time and
space'' from the media. In 1990 and 1991, this produced roughly
one antidrug message per household per day.
However, Hedrick testified that ``support for these
messages has declined 20 percent in the past three years,''
apparently ``because the media is not as convinced that the
drug issue is as important as it was.''
Media coverage is also down, from 600 antidrug stories on
the three major networks in 1989 to 65 last year, which Hedrick
said is tantamount to ``zero'' from a communications point of
view.
Hedrick expressed the view that ``Federal support and
Federal leadership in making drugs a critical national priority
is essential, if we are to help convince the media that this is
an important issue.'' National leaders must also tell those
community leaders involved in this fight that what they are
doing is important.
Hedrick also strongly supported continuing public and
private funding of drug prevention initiatives, since drug
abuse is ``preventable.''
Hedrick's 14-year-old son, Todd, testified briefly that his
generation is surrounded by drugs. He said that ``parents need
a serious wake-up call'' and that all kids now know where to
get drugs in their schools. ``This entire country needs a huge
turn-around in how it deals with drugs,'' since ``the fact that
drugs aren't a prominent issue anymore tells kids that adults
don't care about it.'' The younger Hedrick said, ``that's
suicide to my generation . . .'' He proposed starting
prevention earlier, in elementary school, having parents talk
more with their kids, increasing media attention to the
problem, and stopping the legalization movement.
k. Testimony of G. Bridget Ryan
Bridget Ryan, former Program Director for the Charles
Stuart Mott Foundation and presently Executive Director of the
BEST Foundation for a Drug-Free Tomorrow, testified that a
recent RAND study advocated drug prevention as ``the first
priority'' in curbing drug abuse. Ryan distinguished between
``validated'' and ``unvalidated'' drug prevention programs, and
urged that the former be adequately funded.
(i). Validated Prevention Works.--The best ``validated''
prevention programs build, Ryan testified, on three
propositions--first, ``target[ing] substances used first and
most widely by young people;'' second, ``helping students
develop the motivation to resist using drugs;'' and third,
teaching effectively.
Ryan described a recent RAND study on the effectiveness of
prevention as one ``conducted with methodological exactitude''
and ``one of the most rigorous ever undertaken.''
Ryan testified that the RAND prevention study disproves
three common criticisms of prevention: ``first, that it works
only for middle class, largely white, suburban situations;
second, that the programs work only for kids who need them
least; and finally, that prevention programs prevent only
trivial levels of use.''
RAND found that a properly designed prevention program,
such as Project Alert, ``works well in urban, suburban, and
rural areas, in middle- and low-income communities, and in
schools with high and low minority populations.'' Project Alert
is one of the prevention programs made available to ``schools
across America'' by the BEST Foundation.
According to Ryan, who described herself as ``on the front
line of the implementation process,'' there should be no
question that ``prevention can and does work, but our educators
and policy makers must be selective in funding and implementing
validated programs.'' Ryan noted that, ``it is estimated that
more than 2,000 non-validated programs are in use.''
(ii). Policy Ideas.--On policy, Ryan finds that ``we need
to make information about valid [prevention] approaches more
widely available and provide incentives for educators to choose
programs that have demonstrated results.'' In particular,
prevention programs ``must be specific;'' ``motivating children
to avoid drugs is not the same thing as motivating them to
avoid violence.''
In addition, programs should provide ``continued
reinforcement during high school'' and ``funding to develop and
validate high school programs is critical,'' since ``education
and school-based programs should be at the core of
prevention.'' Ryan notes that another successful prevention
program has been the BEST Foundation's ``Nancy Reagan After
School Program.''
Ryan notes, in closing, that influences outside the
classroom, namely family and community, are also very important
in stemming childhood drug abuse.
l. Testimony of James Copple
James Copple, National Director of the Community Anti-Drug
Coalitions of America (CADCA), testified that CADCA is a non-
partisan group with approximately 2,500 community coalition
members in every State and two U.S. territories. He noted that
CADCA was founded in 1992 by the President's Drug Advisory
Council, a creation of President Bush, and is privately funded.
(i). Prevention Favored.--Expressing support for the Safe
and Drug Free Schools Program, Copple retold a moving story of
a young child that ``made her stand'' against drugs, while
forced to live in a crack house. During a law enforcement raid
of the house, this child was found in her room, surrounded by
antidrug posters and ``a workbook on drug refusal skills;'' the
posters and workbook were funded by Safe and Drug Free Schools
monies.
(ii). Leadership Needed.--In general, Copple testified that
``CADCA members have been more than a little frustrated with
the failure of the nation's leadership to keep the
pervasiveness of drug abuse before the American people.'' He
described recent increases in marijuana, cocaine and heroin use
as ``alarming.'' CADCA has found it frustrating that their
``messages of the dangers associated with drug abuse are
getting lost in the clutter of other messages, such as
legalization . . .''
Copple stated that ``there is a growing fear among CADCA
members that any national drug strategy is only words on paper
and visions vanishing in clouds of hopelessness.'' In
particular, referring to the 1995 White House ONDCP Strategy,
Copple testified that ``a strategy . . . is only as good as the
resources that follow it and the visible leadership that
advances it.'' More pointedly, he held that ``there must be a
national voice advocating for substance abuse prevention, and
that voice should be loudest from the White House and the
Congress.''
In closing, Copple cited Peter Drucker's recommendation
that budget cutting be conducted without imperiling the Federal
Government's ability to conduct some ``national crusades.''
Copple noted that Drucker identified the war on drugs as one
such crusade, and Copple urged the Congress to ``embrace a
national strategy that is comprehensive, balanced and directs
the majority of the resources to local communities to address
local problems.''
m. Testimony of Charles Robert Heard, III
Charles Robert (``Bobby'') Heard, III, Director of Program
Services at the Texans' War on Drugs, testified that ``parents,
community leaders, and elected officials don't realize how easy
it is for kids to get involved in drugs.'' He credited the
precipitous drop in drug use ``between 1979 and 1992'' to
substance abuse prevention, and noted that ``no other social
issue can claim that kind of success.''
Heard sees the primary solution to drug abuse as demand
reduction. He testified that ``prisons alone will not break the
cycle,'' and ``we can't treat our way out of this problem.'' He
also noted that prevention is not a one-time mission, but a
continuing duty that must continue ``from generation to
generation.''
(i). Missing National Leadership.--Heard testified that
``national leadership'' is missing in the drug war, and without
it, renewed success will continue to elude us. Heard believes
success is possible. ``As we proved in the 1980's, with
national focus and attention . . . we can make a tremendous
difference in reducing demand,'' stated Heard. He also voiced
his concern about possible disinterest in the drug problem by
Congress, which he felt could signal a movement toward
``dismantl[ing] our entire prevention structure.'' He cautioned
against such a movement. Heard also cautioned against a Senate
youth development proposal, to be administered by local
officials, since that particular proposal omitted ``substance
abuse prevention specialists.''
Turning to an absence of presidential leadership, Heard
testified that it was ``equally disheartening'' to see ``in the
President's budget a proposal to consolidate the demonstration
programs for the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention and the
Center for Substance Abuse Treatment under SAMSA, the Substance
Abuse Mental Health Services Administration,'' since
``prevention and treatment are two very different approaches to
dealing with the drug problem.'' Pointedly, Heard expressed
concern that the President is under-emphasizing prevention, in
favor of treatment.
(ii). Policy Ideas.--Heard did note that, ``in this time of
consolidation and cost savings, what might make sense is to
consolidate all Federal substance abuse prevention programs
under one agency or create a separate drug abuse prevention
block grant'' for the States. These ideas would not pit
prevention against treatment, but would preserve and target
prevention monies.
2. April 6, 1995, Hearing
Testimony at this hearing was received from Dr. Lee P.
Brown, the Director of ONDCP, and continued testimony he gave
the Subcommittee on March 9, 1995. Brown testified on a range
of topics, including treatment, prevention, law enforcement,
interdiction and source country programs.
The purpose of this hearing was to continue an evaluation
of President Clinton's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy, and
assess the status of the nation's fight against illegal drug
trafficking and drug abuse.
a. Subcommittee Chairman's Introduction
The Subcommittee Chairman opened with an observation. He
noted that the Subcommittee's March 9 hearing may have jump-
started media interest in the drug war, since a series of
articles appeared after the hearing. Zeliff credited the
Washington Post with ``an excellent series of articles
describing the brutal infiltration by Colombia's Cali drug
cartel in our own society.'' The series included the assessment
that, ``[t]he Cali cartel is increasingly using violence to
protect its lucrative U.S. cocaine market . . . [a]nd they are
trying to do things in this country similar to what they do in
Colombia.'' Zeliff also noted that the newly powerful Mexican
drug cartels present a looming challenges to U.S. law
enforcement, and credited the media with writing about this
development.
b. Interdiction: The Kramek Letter Revisited
The Subcommittee Chairman initiated questioning. Zeliff
returned to the December 1, 1994 letter from Admiral Kramek,
U.S. Coast Guard Commandant and Interdiction Coordinator, to
Dr. Brown containing Kramek's views that drugs constituted a
national security priority, that funding of drug interdiction
must be returned to the 1992-1993 levels, and that Kramek
wanted a meeting with the President and National Security
Advisor to discuss this issue.
The Subcommittee Chairman and others were disturbed by the
Director's failure to divulge the existence of the December 1,
1994 Kramek letter, despite clear oral and written requests for
it.
Zeliff noted that he had personally asked Dr. Brown on
March 3, 1995, four days before they met in Zeliff's
congressional office and six days before the March 9, 1995
hearing, for ``any communications received by you from the
Administration's Interdiction Coordinator regarding the
adequacy of interdiction resources.'' Brown had provided
several letters, but the key December 1, 1994 letter was
conspicuous by its absence.
The Subcommittee Chairman asked Dr. Brown, who subsequently
acknowledged having received the Chairman's requests, why he
had failed to include this unclassified and critical letter.
Dr. Brown conceded that Zeliff had been denied the
document, but explained that this was because ``this letter was
attached to a classified document.'' Brown's answer struck many
as non-responsive, since the letter itself was unclassified.
Indeed, it was secured by the Subcommittee through other
sources independent of attachments. Moreover, it was obvious to
all present that there was no legitimate reason for a Federal
agency to hide or refuse disclosure of such a material document
to a Member of Congress, whether classified or not. The issue
was thereafter dropped.
On the substance of the Kramek letter, Brown stated that
Kramek's recommendation for returning interdiction funding to
``1992-1993 levels'' did not ``provide [Brown] with the
appropriate information upon which to make decisions.''
Although he did not elaborate, Brown indicated he was
``working with the Interdiction Coordinator,'' and ``once we
come to a conclusion about what we need, then we can make some
decisions . . .'' Brown did not address the then-existing lapse
of six months from October 1994 to April 1995, and why the
relevant interdiction decisions had not been made during that
period.
Referring again to the Kramek letter, Zeliff asked Brown if
he had taken the October, 1994 interdiction conference
findings, and Admiral Kramek's specific requests to meet with
the President and National Security Advisor to the President.
Brown conceded that ``the specific request was never given to
the President . . .''
The Subcommittee Chairman closed the discussion by
observing that the Admiral Kramek's letter represented not only
the Interdiction Coordinator's views, but an ``agency head
consensus.'' Brown responded that he was a co-sponsor of the
conference, and was ``working with the Interdiction
Coordinator,'' which struck many as non-responsive.
c. Interdiction In General
Brown testified that the Bush Administration's ``linear
kingpin strategy'' was still being pursued, contradicting
testimony on March 9, 1995 by former Clinton DEA Administrator
Bonner, but stressed that the Clinton administration had
shifted resources to source country programs and away from the
``less than effective interdiction efforts.'' Brown offered no
statistical support for his view that interdiction was ``less
than effective.''
(i). Deep Cuts.--Questioned about the President's fiscal
1993, 1994 and 1995 requests for reduced interdiction spending;
collectively, a 12.3 percent cut, Brown responded that it was
Congress which had cut the Defense and State Department budgets
in 1993, and further that the President's interdiction cuts
were part of the Administration's ``controlled shift'' to the
source countries.
Brown did not deny falling sequential requests by the
President for interdiction spending, and neglected to mention
that the 1993 Congress which he condemned was held by the
President's own party.
(ii). Customs and National Guard.--Asked by Congresswoman
Thurman (D-Florida) to address ``allegations of corruption
among Customs inspectors,'' Brown offered this statement: ``As
could be expected, any allegation alleging misconduct is being
investigated and the investigation is designed to determine if
there is validity to any allegation made against a Customs
official. That is the normal course of business. You know I
come from a police background.'' No further details were
provided.
Congressman and Subcommittee Vice Chairman Robert Ehrlich
(R-MD) directed Dr. Brown's attention to the U.S. Customs
Service and apparent failures in stopping the free flow of
drugs across the Southwest U.S. border. Citing a recent report
on the issue, Ehrlich noted that, ``not a single pound of
cocaine was confiscated from more than two million trucks that
passed through three of the busiest entry points along the
Southwest border where Federal officials say most of the drugs
enter this country.''
Ehrlich then quoted the President's ONDCP budget request to
back Dr. Brown, and asked why, in view of these disturbing
border search numbers, the President ``requested that U.S.
Customs funding be cut from $573 million to $500 million.''
Brown responded that the U.S. Customs Service was ``working
very hard,'' and that he had ``visited the border myself.''
Brown also mentioned Operation Hardline, which will place more
Customs agents on the Southwest border, and the formation of a
new Border Technology Center. Brown avoided discussion of the
President's proposed cuts in Customs funding.
Referring again to the National Guard, Congressman Mica
cited the 1995 Drug Strategy and asked why the President was
recommending cuts, in particular, from 227,827 estimated
container search days in 1994 to an estimated 209,000 in 1996,
and from 2,268 ship days to 1,545 over this same period. ``Is
part of your strategy to have reduced . . . container searches
and ship days?,'' Mica asked. Brown would not respond directly
to this question.
Subsequently, the Subcommittee Vice Chairman re-asked the
question, noting that 70 percent of the cocaine entering the
United States comes across the Southwest border. Brown said
only that the Administration was ``making some realignments in
their overall budget'' and blamed the prior Congress for
interdiction cuts, despite the President's own requests for
reduced interdiction in 1993, 1994, and 1995 and a publicly
acknowledged strategy shift away from interdiction.
(iii). Mexico and Cooperation.--Presented specific evidence
by Congressman Shadegg (R-Arizona) that Mexican authorities had
not cooperated with U.S. counter narcotics efforts, and asked
whether this was of concern to the Director, Brown responded:
``Well, I am concerned with the totality of the drug problem,''
adding that he had ``had numerous meetings with the Mexican
officials . . .,'' was ``engaging Mexico in a very aggressive
way,'' and hoped for change by the new Mexican President.
Questioned again about the specifics of any commitment from
Mexico, Brown explained that ``we have a new strategy, we want
to place greater emphasis in the source countries, that relates
to what we think must be done.'' While this answer confirmed
earlier testimony and the strategy itself, Mexico is not
classified by the Administration as a ``source country,'' so
the answer was non-responsive.
Pressed by Congressman Shadegg for ``evidence . . . hard
numbers in your budget'' to support the assertion that the
Clinton administration is committed to interdiction, source
country programs and continuing the Bush administration kingpin
strategy, Brown asked Shadegg if he was requesting ``evidence .
. . that we have a strategy.''
Shadegg explained that he was simply seeking back up for
Brown's public assertion that these were Administration
priorities. Brown responded: ``I can tell you that the kingpin
strategy, or linear strategy, has not changed. Contrary to what
anyone else may tell you, I sit in this position. I know what's
going on day after day after day. Someone who may have sat in
this chair some years ago do not know what's going on day after
day after day. Now, what evidence you're asking for I'll be
delighted to provide any information you want to tell you what
our strategy is.''
Further support, however, for the assertion that these were
Administration priorities was not provided, and Congressman
Shadegg eventually concluded his questioning. Brown offered
only that ``the President has corresponded with the President
of Mexico,'' and other country presidents, on the issue.
Congressman Blute, targeting the Mexico bailout, asked Dr.
Brown pointedly: ``Why didn't the President expressly and
publicly tie the Mexican financial aid package to a Mexican
Government promise to crack down on their increased drug
trade?''
Brown testified that ``there was a great deal of debate on
this issue,'' and a ``general understanding'' that Mexico would
work more closely with the United States. He did not otherwise
have an answer for whether the topic was addressed with Mexican
leaders by the President during bailout discussions, or why a
reduction in drug trafficking was not made a condition of the
bailout.
Under questioning by Congressman John Mica (R-Florida),
Brown conceded that, during the arrangement of the $20 billion
``bailout of Mexico,'' Brown never communicated to the Mexican
Government or to anyone else the view that conditions,
including specific counter narcotics efforts, should be
attached to that money.
Congressman Souder (R-Indiana) also pressed Dr. Brown to
explain why the Administration did not put more pressure on
Mexico to arrest drug trafficking on the Southwest border as a
condition to receiving U.S. funds in the recent bailout so
strongly advocated by President Clinton. The President's
Director of the Office of Drug Control Policy responded--
somewhat surprisingly--that ``the peso and economic stability''
was ``a bigger issue than the drug issue,'' and protested that
the Administration was not ``rewarding Mexico for shipping
drugs into this country.''
The Subcommittee Chairman concurred with Souder, noting
that the Administration's decision not to tie the Mexican bail-
out to conditions on drug interdiction was ``a lost
opportunity,'' although the Subcommittee Chairman acknowledged
that Dr. Brown ``probably didn't make that decision.'' \62\
\62\ During the early Summer of 1995, Congressman Souder and the
Subcommittee Chairman jointly introduced an amendment to the foreign
operations appropriations bill. That amendment conditioned release of
funds to Mexico on a verifiable 10 percent reduction in drug
trafficking over the Southwest U.S. border. The amendment passed the
House of Representatives with strong bipartisan support, but was struck
in conference with the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Mexico, Congressman Condit suggested that many of the
bailout questions should be put to the U.S. Trade
Representative, Mr. Kantor, directly. Condit noted that the
``bail-out . . . was the perfect time to demand reciprocal
policies when it comes to drug policy,'' and was concerned that
this linkage was not made. He called the decision to grant aid
without ``get[ting] something in return'' was ``unwise.''
(iv). Former ``Soviet Bloc'' Countries.--Brown stressed
that he was ``concerned about the former Soviet Bloc nations
and the drug trafficking that comes through those countries.''
Although he offered no statistics or details on trafficking in
any ``former Soviet bloc nation,'' he argued for stronger
``bilateral relationships.''
(v). No Heroin Strategy.--Discussing heroin, Brown said it
was a ``major concern.'' He suggested that ``the United Nations
also play a very important part'' in addressing the issue with
Asian nations. He confirmed that the President had not yet
signed the long-promised heroin strategy. The National Heroin
Strategy was promised by President Clinton to the Nation in
November 1993 and was to issue within 120 days.\63\
\63\ See, e.g., Testimony of Joseph Kelly before the Subcommittee,
General Accounting Office, June 27, 1995, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Source Country Programs
Pressed to explain the source country programs, Brown
stated only that the Administration was pursuing alternative
means of economic development, and that he hoped these would
supplant the coca industry. In support of this view, he
observed that on a recent visit to a Bolivian banana
plantation, he found farmers ``much more pleased to be able to
be farming bananas than coca leaf.'' Stress was placed on the
need for a long-term commitment.
Asked whether source country programs were working, Brown
provided this answer: It is ``inaccurate to characterize it as
not working because we know that about 1,000 metric tons of
cocaine is produced annually,'' and one-third is consumed, one-
third interdicted and one-third lost in transit. No direct
answer was given and no further mention was made of
effectiveness or measures of effectiveness for source country
programs.
e. Prevention In General
Virtually all members of the Subcommittee expressed strong
support for effective and accountable prevention programs.
Those who took issue with existing programs, did so on the
basis of specific instances of misapplication, waste, abuse,
ineffectiveness or an overall lack of accountability in the
programs (see below).
Referring to the rescission of unspent Safe and Drug Free
Schools monies, Brown called it ``outrageous'' and stated that
Safe and Drug Free Schools was ``the only program we have in
this Nation to educate our young people.''
This bold ``only program'' statement contradicted testimony
by prevention experts on March 9, 1995, and the public record,
both of which suggest there are actually thousands of privately
funded, State funded and community funded prevention programs
across the Nation, and that there are also Federal funds
supporting substance abuse prevention in the Health and Human
Services (HHS) and Justice Departments, if not other agencies.
The inaccuracy of this bold ``only program'' statement became
apparent when Brown later observed that HHS had at least $430
million in funding targeted at prevention, including ``block
grant monies'' and ``demonstration funds.''
Congresswoman and Ranking minority member Thurman (D-
Florida) echoed a position shared by Dr. Brown, the
Subcommittee Chairman, and others on the Subcommittee, that
some programs funded by Safe and Drug Free Schools money have
been highly successful. Thurman observed that several programs
in Florida, for example, which are administered by local school
boards with advisory councils, have been well received, and
Zeliff voiced support for the D.A.R.E. program.
f. Prevention and Accountability
Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen focused on accountability
problems in current Federal drug prevention programs, such as
the Safe and Drug Free Schools program. In particular, she
stressed that ``there is a growing concern that Federal
prevention monies have not only been wasted, mismanaged and
been ineffective, but . . . have been spent on educational
programs that teach value relativity and they decline to teach
that illegal drug use is wrong, just plain and simple wrong.''
Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen identified specific problem
programs, and sought an explanation for Federal financing of
so-called ``values clarification'' curricula, including
``Quest,'' ``Here's Looking At You Too,'' and other programs
that did not deliver a clear no-use message. A series of
letters confirming these concerns from around the Nation were
read, and a study released by Michigan State Office of Drug
Control Policy documenting abuses in the Safe and Drug Free
Schools monies was read.
While Ros-Lehtinen made clear that she favored accountable
prevention programs, she also explained that ``in Michigan,
more than $10 million in Federal funds intended to provide our
children a front line defense against drugs was utilized for
the following: Over $81,000 for large teeth and giant
toothbrushes; over $1.5 million on a human torso model used in
one lesson of one grade, not even in the drug section of the
curriculum; wooden cars with ping pong balls, over $12,300;
hokey pokey song, over $18,000; over $7000 on sheep eyes,
whatever that is; dog bone kits, $3,700; bicycle pumps,
$11,000; latex gloves, $122,000; over $300,000 was spent on how
we feel about sound.''
Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen concluded her question of Dr.
Brown by reading from an Indiana constituent's letter, quoting:
``These nondirective programs are often funded through Federal
Drug Free School grants, yet they do not usually comply with
Federal law requiring that students be taught that drug use is
wrong and harmful.'' The Congresswoman also read from the
curriculum material itself, which failed to admonish against
underage drinking or drug use, and in fact stated ``don't begin
negatively with admonishments . . .''
Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen asked Dr. Brown to justify these
programs or, if he disagreed with them, to say so. Brown
testified that he believed that the ``foundation upon which we
start must be that drug use is wrong,'' that ``one should not
be teaching responsible drug use to our children,'' and that
``if that is being done . . . it should be stopped.''
Asked what Brown would do about reported abuses in
Michigan, Massachusetts, Texas, Washington State, Kansas,
Indiana, and West Virginia, the ONDCP Director responded that
``the Department of Education administers the Safe and Drug
Free Schools Program . . . [and] we . . . have been working
with [them] in looking at how to set up standards for
addressing the problem.'' Brown added that the Department was
working ``to alleviate and hopefully eliminate all the abuses
in the program that takes [sic] place,'' and testified that ``I
would be the first to admit that there are abuses of the [Safe
and Drug Free Schools] program.''
Revealingly, Brown's testimony implied a prior awareness by
ONDCP and the Department of Education of accountability
problems in one of the programs, Safe and Drug Free Schools,
that Brown was condemning Congress for not more fully funding.
Brown did note that he knew of ``many success stories''
stemming from effective use of Safe and Drug Free Schools
monies. Brown also testified that ``there are routine audits of
State and local programs that are channeled through the
Education Department's Office of Inspector General.'' Brown
neglected to mention that the Safe and Drug Free Schools
Program, according to the Inspector General's Office of the
Education Department, is not large enough to require state
audits of its spending.\64\
\64\ In fact, at the request of Congress, both the Department of
Education's Inspector General's Office and the General Accounting
Office are currently conducting investigations, begun in late 1995,
into the Safe and Drug Free Schools program, controls on its spending,
assessment of spending priorities and overall accountability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When Congresswoman Thurman noted that attempts were made to
instill greater accountability in the Safe and Drug Free
Schools program during its last reauthorization, Congresswoman
Ros-Lehtinen conceded that this might be true but added that,
``these letters are dated March [1995], just a few weeks ago
when we announced that we were going to continue with these
hearings, and these teaching modules are still going out [to
schools],'' suggesting that accountability remained a serious
concern.
Finally, Ros-Lehtinen introduced a July 15, 1994 letter
into the record from Dr. Brown to the Assistant Secretary of
the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education concerning the
Safe and Drug Free Schools Program. Ros-Lehtinen noted for Dr.
Brown that, ``you, yourself, pointed out seven accountability
issues'' in this letter, adding ``I believe it's hypocritical--
excuse me, sir--but for you to attack some of us who are
pointing out the ineffectiveness of the programs when you saw
and wrote on it yourself.''
Brown's only reply was that he was ``far from
hypocritical'' and that it was his ``responsibility'' to
address ``areas where we need improvement.'' While conceding
that ``we have some abuses in the program,'' he continued to
view deep cuts in the program as ``outrageous,'' since the
funds went to ``94 percent'' of the school districts in the
nation.
Congresswoman Thurman noted that, since accountability by
States may be a problem in the Safe and Drug Free Schools
program, the advent of more block grants may call for a broader
review of how to assure accountability. Responding to
Congresswoman Thurman's observation, Dr. Brown added that the
funds are used for many different programs, and ``go to more
than just drug education.''
On balance, the difference of opinion between those who
favored deep 1995 cuts in programs which appear subject to
abuse, such as Safe and Drug Free Schools, and those who did
not favor such cuts was relatively straight forward: whether to
fund programs that are highly successful in some locations, but
have been subject to waste and abuse in others, and do not yet
have adequate accountability mechanisms.
The aim shared by all Subcommittee members and Dr. Brown
appeared to be strong encouragement for effective and
accountable drug prevention programs, as well as adequate
funding for such programs, once accountability and the no-use
message could be assured.
g. Shift to Treatment
On treatment programs, responding to questions from
Congressman Condit (D-CA), Brown repeated that the
Administration was turning away from strategies of ``previous
administrations [which] placed a greater emphasis on casual
drug [use] reduction,'' in favor of more treatment of the
``hardcore drug user population, which comprises about 20
percent of the drug users.''
Brown again cited the RAND study advocating treatment, gave
his own opinion that ``treatment works,'' stressed that he had
visited treatment programs, indicated that there were ``one
million people in this country'' in need of treatment, and
reiterated his view that ``treatment is underfunded.''
h. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
On another issue, Congressman Steve Schiff (R-NM) asked
Brown to explain contradictory correspondence which seemed to
indicate that Brown had known about, and acquiesced in, a shift
away from counter narcotics by the Treasury Department's
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN).
Schiff pointed out that Brown was, by law, required under
the 1988 Antidrug Abuse Act to ``sign off'' on whether FINCEN's
antidrug funds are sufficient.
Schiff asked why, on December 6, 1994, Brown had signed
off, stating ``I certify that your request is adequate to
implement the goals, priorities and objectives of the National
Drug Control Strategy''--yet on September 28th, 1994, by
contrast, Brown had cautioned the FINCEN Director, Stanley
Morris, that FINCEN's ``budget submission seems to reflect a
serious shift of resources away from the drug program . . .,''
adding that Brown was ``seriously concerned whether the level
of drug related resources is adequate . . .'' Schiff wanted to
know if the two statements were not contradictory, and what had
changed Brown's mind.
Brown responded that FINCEN serves other agencies and,
while their drug related funding shifted from 80 percent to 50
percent of the total FINCEN budget, he was satisfied that this
was warranted by ``other criminal matters.'' Brown testified
that FINCEN was ``getting more requests now for things that are
not drug related'' from the Justice and Treasury Departments,
thus reducing their drug related work.
Brown could not explain why Justice or Treasury would now
be requesting less information on drug related crime, at a time
when drug related crime was increasing. Brown noted the
incremental increase in FINCEN's overall requested funding for
1996.
i. White House Drug Use
Subcommittee Vice Chairman Ehrlich asked Brown if, in view
of reports that eleven White House staffers were now subject to
random drug tests based on ``recent drug use,'' what more was
being done. Brown responded that he favored pre-employment and
random drug testing for senior positions and staff, Executive
and Congressional. He added nothing further on the White House
staff's reported ``recent drug use,'' an account based on
recent testimony be Patsy Thomasson, Director of the White
House Office of Administration before a Senate Subcommittee.
j. Surgeon General and Legalization
Questioned by Congressman Souder about the Surgeon
General's remarks supporting the study of drug legalization,
Brown stated that he disagreed with her and took a ``very, very
strong stand against legalization.'' Three times, Congressman
Souder asked Dr. Brown if he had requested from Surgeon General
Elders the ``worldwide studies'' she referred to as supporting
legalization. To the third question, Brown responded, ``yes, I
did request any studies she was aware of about where
legalization took the crime out of drugs,'' adding ``she did
not send me any studies [and] I don't think any such studies
exist.''
k. Subcommittee Chairman's Closing Remarks
The Subcommittee Chairman closed the hearing by applauding
Dr. Brown's participation, noting that the drug war and drug
abuse is ``probably the number one issue facing our country,''
and pledging to work with the Administration if the
Administration will re-focus on this issue. The Subcommittee
Chairman also asked Dr. Brown to seek a meeting between key
congressional leaders concerned about this issue and the
President.
3. June 27, 1995, Hearing
In the first of two back-to-back interdiction hearings held
on June 27, 1995 and June 28, 1995, entitled ``Illicit Drug
Availability: Are Interdiction Efforts Hampered by a Lack of
Agency Resources?,'' the Subcommittee received testimony from a
variety of witnesses, beginning with a technology and K-9
demonstration,\65\ proceeding through testimony from student
witnesses, and concluding with testimony from the Administrator
of the Drug Enforcement Administration and three investigators
into the effectiveness of the Clinton Administration's source
country programs from the General Accounting Office (GAO).
\65\ The U.S. Customs Service Canine Training Center provided a
demonstration on the utilization of drug sniffing dogs in illicit
narcotic interdiction. Also, a representative from the U.S. Coast
Guard's Miami Law Enforcement Division demonstrated how an Ionscan and
the Compact Integrated Narcotic Detection Instrument (CINDI) operate to
detect and locate illicit narcotics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Subcommittee first heard from four students affected by
drugs in their schools, including Michael Taylor of Browne
Junior High School, Natasha Surles of Roper Junior High School,
Willie Brown of McFarland Middle School, and Lan Bui of Bell
Multicultural School.
Subsequently, the Subcommittee heard testimony by Thomas A.
Constantine, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, and expert witnesses Joseph Kelley, Allan
Fleener and Ron Noyes of the General Accounting Office; Kelley
was Director-In-Charge of the International Affairs Section and
Fleener and Noyes are investigators who principally assisted in
producing the June 1995 GAO report on Source Country Programs.
Finally, the Subcommittee also heard testimony from Jane E.
Becker, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of
State; and Brian Sheridan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Drug
Enforcement Policy and Support at the Department of Defense.
During this hearing, the Subcommittee examined the current
drug interdiction efforts of the major Federal agencies engaged
in the national drug control strategy, namely DEA, the U.S.
Coast Guard, U.S. Customs, and the Departments of Defense and
State.
Collectively, the expert witnesses confirmed that on
November 3, 1993, President Clinton signed a Presidential
Decision Directive for Counternarcotics (PDD-14), which
instructed Federal agencies to shift the emphasis in U.S.
international antidrug programs from the transit zones such as
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean to the source
countries such as Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. PDD-14 provided
that the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) should appoint a Coordinator for Drug Interdiction ``to
ensure that assets dedicated by the Federal drug program
agencies for interdiction are sufficient and that their use is
properly integrated and optimized.'' [PDD-14, November 3,
1993.]
The aim of this hearing was to offer the Administration's
principals on interdiction, those whose mission was affected by
PDD-14, an opportunity broadly assess their own efforts and
explain the impact on their agencies of PDD-14 and its
concomitant ``controlled shift'' of resources.
The opening panel, which consisted of local students
Michael Taylor of Browne Junior High School, Natasha Surles of
Roper Junior High School, Willie Brown of McFarland Middle
School, and Lan Bui of Bell Multicultural School offered
testimony on the availability of illegal drugs in their
schools. Summing up their collective testimony, Lan Bui stated
that ``[drugs] are really cheap to buy . . . I have seen them
everywhere, from the streets which we use to get to school
every day to right in front of my building.'' The students
focused on the importance of role models, antidrug programs in
their schools, student drug testing, and the need for national
leadership.
a. Testimony of DEA Administrator Thomas A. Constantine
Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), testified on the role that
the DEA, as the lead Federal agency in enforcing narcotics and
controlled substances laws and regulations, plays in the
interdiction of illicit narcotics. He noted that DEA has
offices throughout the United States and in more than 50
countries.
Emphasizing the importance of interdiction Constantine
stated, ``[w]hat happens in the source country often affects
what happens on the streets of Boston or Schenectady or Tulsa
or Savannah, Georgia,'' adding that those in charge of
interdiction efforts must ``strike a balance between our
domestic and our international role.''
Constantine addressed the ``controlled shift'' to source
countries by stressing that it is imperative that we ``destroy
some of these organizations [drug trafficking cartels] rather
than merely disrupt them,'' but he also testified that he was
``concerned that if we relent on any of our efforts to control
the drug problem in this country [the United States] . . .
we're going to be facing immense problems in the future . . .
[so] we have to address this problem effectively and
dramatically in the present.''
Constantine collapsed his testimony into three main areas
of concern: the recent ``resurgence of heroin,'' the prevalence
of methamphetamine production in the United States and Mexico,
and the growth of Mexican drug trafficking cartels.
On methamphetamine, he observed that ``[m]ethamphetamine .
. . is becoming a drug of choice throughout the entire West
Coast of America [and] there is enough amphedrine [precursor
chemical utilized in the creation of methamphetamine] being
shipped into Mexico that would lead you to believe all of North
America suffers from asthma.''
Constantine testified that the Nation's Southwest border
with Mexico is the biggest transit zone, and a major focus of
the DEA. In his view, the Southwest Border ``is going to be our
problem for the [next] five or ten years [and] [a]ny resources
that I get additional, I am funneling to the Southwest
Border.'' Echoing the testimony of others, he said ``Mexico
trafficking groups have become huge.''
Constantine also emphasized that DEA headquarters attempts
to allow each DEA office to have a role in focusing on their
local needs. He further stated that DEA's efforts to
decentralize include allocation of funds rather than central
control, since decentralization enables the local offices to
react to local trends faster.
On the importance of having a consistent and long range
strategy, he stated, ``what I think we have to be careful about
is changing the strategy every year.''
Constantine, in response to a question, asserted that the
source country strategy is ``starting to show results,'' and
noted hopefully that ``[i]n a few short years drug trends can
change significantly.'' Constantine also called the jump in
teenage drug use a ``time bomb'' and stressed the ``national
security'' significance of the drug war.
b. Testimony of GAO's Director-in-Charge of International
Affairs, Joseph Kelley, and GAO Investigators,
Allan Fleener and Ron Noyes
Joseph Kelley, Director-In-Charge of International Affairs
Issues at the General Accounting Office (GAO), testified on the
GAO's review of the source country programs, including sub-
strategies and Federal efforts to stop production and
trafficking of cocaine and heroin.
As part of GAO's review, investigators traveled to
Colombia, Mexico, and other nations to observe counternarcotics
programs in those countries. GAO discussed these programs with
U.S. officials at in-country headquarters and field locations.
Mr. Kelley offered five general observations, each corroborated
by the investigators themselves.
First, in response to the shift in strategy from the
transit zone to the source countries, the executive branch has
had difficulty implementing key elements of their strategy. In
fact, ``resources applied to the transit zone [have] been
significantly reduced,'' said Kelly. At the same time, we have
not seen a shift in resources to the source countries.'' This
observation troubled GAO, and Kelly confirmed that
counternarcotics assistance to each of the three primary source
countries [Colombia, Bolivia and Peru] was less in 1995 than it
was in 1991 and 1992. Kelley also emphasized that ``a plan for
a country as well as a region [is necessary].''
Second, GAO found that there is high intensity competition
for attention and resources with other foreign policy
objectives deemed important by the Department of State. As
Kelley noted, ``[t]hese decisions may result in
counternarcotics objectives receiving less U.S. attention than
other objectives,'' for example, ``In Mexico . . . countering
the drug trade is the fourth highest priority in what the [U.S.
Department of State] call[s] the U.S. Mission Program Plan.''
Incredibly, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico told the GAO that he
had focused his attention during the last year and a half on
other issues.
Notably, also, Kelley pointed out that $45 million that was
originally intended for counternarcotics assistance was
suddenly reprogrammed by the Clinton administration to assist
Haiti's democratic transition.
Third, GAO found that more coordination and leadership are
needed in this effort. Kelley, in his testimony, stated that
they found that U.S. officials generally agreed that ``no
single organization was in charge of antidrug activities in the
cocaine source countries of the transit zone.''
Moreover, GAO reported that ``there was a lack of
coordination and a clear statement of responsibilities in
certain source countries' embassies. Kelley testified that
``[s]everal U.S. officials in Colombia told [GAO] that they
were unsure who had operational control over their activities
and questioned who would be the best agency to provide that
control.'' \66\
\66\ The Subcommittee has received some reports that conflicting
assertions of authority emanated from the Southern Command and the
State Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As disturbing, GAO reported ``confusion over the role of
the offices responsible for intelligence analysis and related
operational plans for interdiction.''
Compounding the problem, according to GAO, ``the Drug
Enforcement Administration is reducing its presence in Colombia
[and] the Southern Command is flying fewer sorties per month in
support of source country interdiction.''
Fourth, GAO reports that United States funds are ``not
always well managed.'' While end-use monitoring requirements
have been established in the source countries, oversight is
limited. Kelley testified that, ``[i]n Colombia, the Narcotics
Affairs Section of the Embassy conducts reviews of how the
national police uses counternarcotics assistance,'' but ``they
lacked reports from the Colombian Air Force on how U.S.-
provided equipment is being used--and this is some of the big
ticket items . . . C-130s and things like that.''
Finally, GAO found that our dependence on the willingness
and ability of the foreign governments to combat the drug trade
leaves us vulnerable in our counternarcotics efforts. This is
especially apparent in countries such as Colombia and Mexico,
where extensive corruption is prevalent, according to GAO. As
the Ambassador in Mexico emphasized to the GAO review team, in
Mexico, the key lies with the Mexicans, who must be committed
and involved if counternarcotics efforts are to take hold.
On balance, GAO delivered a stinging condemnation of the
way in which the Clinton Administration's source country
programs are organized, coordinated, prioritized and managed.
c. Testimony of Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, Jane E. Becker
Jane E. Becker, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, testified
on what she sees as her two missions.
Becker testified that the office of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) ``provide[s] counternarcotics
support to those countries that demonstrate a commitment to
narcotics control,'' adding the self-evident observation that
``the goal is for those countries to use this assistance to
reduce the supply of illicit drugs destined for the United
States.'' She noted also that ``INL leads bilateral and
multilateral diplomatic efforts to advance our international
narcotics control policies.''
Becker noted, somewhat surprisingly and contrary to other
testimony on this topic, that ``cooperation [with Mexico and
Colombia] has been good.'' She highlighted the source country
focus of the Administration when she stated that ``transit
interdiction is important to our overall counterdrug effort,
[but] it is not the sole solution.'' For the record, no member
of the Subcommittee had suggested that interdiction alone could
serve as a ``sole solution.'' Becker drove the point home when
she stated that ``the heart [of the Administration's
counterdrug] policy lies in the source countries.''
Becker had no response to the GAO study, and seemed
strangely unfamiliar with essential facts surrounding the
source countries, for example, she seemed unable to identify
major cities in Colombia.
Becker was questioned extensively on the Mexican
Government's alleged cooperation in counterdrug operations. She
was asked if Mexico, in order to allow more money to be
allocated to it, should be re-defined as a source country.
Becker answered that she does not think that a re-
classification is necessary, but testified that ``we need to
fiddle with the resource allocation.''
Becker retrenched in her essential defense of Mexican
cooperation by testifying that ``[t]he Mexican Government under
a new leader has shown very promising signs of being much more
serious in this are than his predecessors,'' and asserting that
the State Department has ``gotten good cooperation from the
Zedillo Administration.''
When directly questioned on the performance of the Clinton
Administration's National Drug Control Strategy, Becker
asserted that she could not quantify results accurately since
the Strategy ``has never been fully funded.'' On balance,
Becker's testimony added little to the Subcommittee's
understanding of essential facts, Administration priorities, or
program management.
d. Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Drug Enforcement and Support Brian Sheridan
Brian Sheridan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Drug
Enforcement Policy and Support at the Department of Defense
(DoD), focused on DoD's five-point counterdrug program.
DoD offers support to the following efforts: source
nations, transit zone, domestic law enforcement, demand
reduction and dismantling drug cartels.
Sheridan emphasized DoD's objectives in the source nations,
testifying that these efforts were threefold: They were,
``first, to support the host nation interdiction efforts and
help them disrupt the flow of semi-finished cocaine from Peru
and Bolivia up to Colombia . . . second . . . support for our
law enforcement and for host nation C4I programs,
communications, equipment, [and] intelligence support . . .
[and third,] ``provid[ing] a significant amount of training for
host nation police and for some military units that are engaged
in counternarcotics work.''
Assessing programs in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, Sheridan
testified that Colombia gets a ``C'' for their counterdrug
performance, but their efforts of late have been much better.
One area that he highlighted is the Colombian military's
occupation of San Adreas Island and denial of it to the drug
traffickers a transshipment point.
Sheridan is also pleased with Peru's recent results. He
pointed out that Peruvian President Fujimori has declared drug
trafficking as the number one threat to Peruvian security, and
embraced the force-down, shoot-down policy. Sheridan stated
that ``you will find [Peru is] very engaged in counterdrug
operations.''
On Bolivia, DoD is disappointed, however, said Sheridan,
there have been recent indications ``that they are going to
eradicate cocoa in a more serious way.'' He did not elaborate.
Sheridan noted that, in the transit zone, the use of
general aviation aircraft by drug traffickers continues to
decrease. He offered no clear support for this asserted
development, although he observed that smuggling of drugs is
now more common via maritime and ground transport.
On DoD demand reduction, Sheridan again rolled out three
points. First, DoD employs rigorous military drug testing;
second, prevention and education are part of DoD's plan; and
third, community outreach is conducted. Details of these
programs and who they reach were not discussed.
4. June 28, 1995, Hearing
On June 28, 1995, the Subcommittee received testimony on
interdiction policy from additional Administration witnesses,
including Admiral Robert E. Kramek, Commandant of U.S. Coast
Guard and U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, as well as George
Weise, Commissioner of U.S. Customs. This hearing, was a
continuation of the June 27 hearing, ``Illicit Drug
Availability: Are Interdiction Efforts Hampered by a Lack of
Agency Resources?''
a. Testimony of U.S. Interdiction Coordinator and U.S.
Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert E. Kramek
Admiral Robert E. Kramek, U.S. Interdiction Coordinator and
Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, serves a dual role in the
Nation's interdiction efforts. He testified before the
Subcommittee in both capacities.
Initially, he explained that the U.S. Coast Guard serves as
the lead agency for maritime interdiction and as co-lead with
Customs for air interdiction, adding that drug interdiction
takes only 9 percent of the Coast Guard budget and emphasizing
the important role intelligence plays in drug interdiction. On
this topic, he testified that ``70 percent of our operations
are based on intelligence.''
Kramek, in his role as Interdiction Coordinator, does not
have command or control of the affected agencies, nor does he
have any authority over their budgets. Rather, he works with
the agencies ``in a collegial atmosphere'' and ``coordinates]''
them. By the Interdiction Coordinator's testimony, the
Interdiction Coordinator holds quarterly conferences that bring
agency heads together.
Kramek took particular note of the importance of national
leadership on this issue. Offering implicit criticism of a
reduced interdiction effort in the Clinton Administration, he
testified that, ``[w]hen the [smugglers] see our foreign policy
priorities chang[e] and making drug interdiction much lower on
the list than other things, they're quick to take advantage of
that.''
More pointedly still, he testified that ``[w]hen they see
it doesn't rate number one on our national security priority
list, they're quick to take advantage of that.'' He stressed
that, in his view, the issue stands ``number one'' with the
American people.
Kramek, in an effort to emphasize the importance of
interdiction efforts, noted that interdiction ``returns 25-1 on
the dollar in benefits to the public for every dollar spent,''
a new statistic in the national dialogue.
In response to questions from the Subcommittee, he stated
that he currently has just ``six people'' assigned to him as
Interdiction Coordinator and that he ``brief[s] [ONDCP
Director] Dr. Brown monthly.''
Kramek commented further on the shift from a transit zone
strategy to a source country strategy, saying that ``the source
country strategy . . . is starting to take hold, [but it] is
not robust enough, for us to reduce assets in the transit zone
yet.'' Since many of these assets have already been reduced,
this was a clear critique of current strategy. He did not
mention his December 1994 letter at this time or hereafter, and
he was not questioned further on the topic.
On Puerto Rico, he did note that Puerto Rico has become a
target for smugglers, for the simple reason that trafficking
into Puerto Rico is as good as being in the United States.
b. Testimony of the Commissioner of U.S. Customs George
Weise
George Weise, Commissioner, U.S. Customs, testified on
Customs' interdiction of drugs at the Nation's borders.
Weise reiterated the importance of knocking out smuggling
by private plane into this country, and attributes the
increased shift to ground smuggling along the Southwest border
to the efforts against air transport,'' whether throughout the
transit zone or into the United States was unclear. Weise
testified that ``the [2,000 miles of the] Southwest border has
now emerged as the primary entry point for cocaine, although he
did not contradict Admiral Kramek's assessment that Puerto Rico
has recently taken on new significance as a port of entry into
the United States.
Said Weise, ``our big load strategy is causing traffickers
to . . . reduce the load size,'' although support for this
assertion was thin. Reckless and aggressive driving along the
border, or ``port running,'' has increased in the last few
years, Weise stated.
To assist in the inspection of containers, Customs now
utilizes a cargo examination facility and full container x-ray
machines. This ``allows [Customs] to examine whole tractors and
trailers at one time.'' According to Weise, Customs has shifted
50 agents to the Southwest border to assist this effort, adding
that Customs' goal is to ``stop smuggling rather than to arrest
more smugglers.''
Weise was questioned on the North American Free Trade
Agreement's (NAFTA's) impact on drug interdiction efforts. He
asserted that Customs has ``maintained systems that [they] had
prior to NAFTA pretty much in the same way in terms of the
number, frequency of examinations,'' although he called it a
``difficult balancing act.'' Weise testified that Customs has
allocated resources to the Southwest border such that the
effort remains at the same level. Weise could offer little
evidence other than loads seized that interdiction at the
Southwest border are proving effective, did not speak about the
Customs air wing, and did not address the overall reduction in
interdiction assets in 1993, 1994 and 1995.
Weise's testimony concluded this second day of interdiction
hearings.
5. September 25, 1995, Hearing
At the Subcommittee's September 25, 1995, hearing on the
drug problem in New Hampshire, entitled ``The Drug Problem in
New Hampshire: A Microcosm of America,'' Members received
testimony from an array of highly qualified witnesses.
The purpose of the hearing was to continue an examination
of national drug control policy, focusing on successful drug
fighting efforts of Manchester, New Hampshire, which had
recently participated in a joint interagency task force called
Operation Streetsweeper.
a. Background on the Problem, How Community United, and the
Interagency Task Force
Testimony was received from State and local law enforcement
officials, local elected officials, representatives of the U.S.
Department of Justice, leaders of New Hampshire grass roots
antidrug groups and individuals involved in the attempt to
rehabilitate drug users.
Collectively, the expert testimony confirmed the following
facts. Early in 1995, statistics showed that the overall crime
rate in Manchester, which is New Hampshire's largest city, had
declined. However, these statistics also showed that arrests
for drug offenses had increased dramatically, as they had for
other drug related crimes. After a number of murders were
linked to drug distribution and usage, the community ``came
together to rid their city of this scourge.''
Manchester Police Chief Peter Favreau received a $100,000
grant to help pay for State Police Officers to patrol city
streets with city police, and a short time later Manchester
Police were joined by the Sheriff's Department, the State
Attorney General's Drug Task Force, the State Police Special
Investigations Unit, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). This Federal-
State-local interagency task force put jurisdictional; issues
aside and singularly pursued the aim of getting drug dealers
off the streets of Manchester.
As various panelists and community representatives
testified, the change on the streets of Manchester could be
felt immediately. As Chief Favreau testified, ``With as much
coverage as we have out there, I honestly feel [the criminals]
are going elsewhere. It's almost impossible not to have that
happen.''
In an effort to understand how the interagency task force
worked and what made it so effective, the principals in this
successful antidrug effort testified before the Subcommittee.
Since illegal drugs and associated violent crime plague
virtually every city in America, the accounts these witnesses
told offer valuable insights into how best to tackle drugs and
violent crime in other cities around this country.
b. State Attorney General Jeff Howard Credits Effective
Coordination, Drug Task Force, and Byrne Grants
First, Jeff Howard, Attorney General for the State of New
Hampshire, offered testimony regarding the value of effective
coordination between local, State and Federal law enforcement
in the fight against drugs.
The Attorney General specifically credited the creation of
the New Hampshire Drug Task Force with ``keep[ing] pressure on
all areas of the problems, going from what we have identified
as kingpins to mid-level dealers to street dealers, and putting
as much of the resources as we can into treatment programs to
include treatment of State prisoners, and prevention
particularly through educational efforts.''
The Attorney General also singled out the Byrne grant
programs as an effective means of funding law enforcement,
since it offers needed flexibility in how valuable law
enforcement funds are utilized. In New Hampshire's case, as
Howard noted, ``[the State] has committed less than one-quarter
of the funds to State agencies . . . The rest of it has all
gone back to the communities.''
c. Director of State Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Prevention Geraldine Sylvester Urged Prevention,
Treatment, Student Assistance, Parental Training
and Peer Counseling
The Subcommittee then heard from Geraldine Sylvester, the
Director of New Hampshire's Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Prevention. Sylvester, in her testimony, emphasized the
importance of ``giv[ing] equal attention to the battle fronts
of treatment and prevention.'' She also noted the important
role that student assistance programs, parental training and
peer leadership groups play in preventing or abating drug usage
among young people.
d. Commissioner of the State Department of Corrections Paul
Brodeur Urged Support for Byrne Grants,
Correctional Pathways Program
Paul Brodeur, Commissioner of New Hampshire Department of
Corrections, offered testimony on the Byrne grant funded
correctional options program called ``Pathways,'' utilized by
the New Hampshire Department of Corrections. Brodeur noted that
``Pathways'' emphasizes education, substance abuse treatment
and employment counseling. Brodeur illustrated the importance
of programs like ``Pathways,'' by pointing out that in New
Hampshire 20 percent of the State's inmates are incarcerated
for drug related offenses, and 80 percent or more of the
inmates have substance abuse problems.
e. State Narcotics Investigation Unit's Assistant Commander
Neal Scott Explained Usage Breakdown, Urged Local
Flexibility
Neal Scott, Assistant Unit Commander of the Narcotics
Investigation Unit at the New Hampshire State Police, offered
testimony regarding the status of current drug usage in New
Hampshire. Statewide, he testified, the number one problem is
marijuana; cocaine in powder form is number two; crack, LSD and
heroin run third. Scott quantified drug usage according to
regions of New Hampshire, further emphasizing the importance of
localities being able to set their own priorities according to
local need.
f. DEA Special-Agent-In-Charge Billy Yout Explained Recent
Trends, Concurred in Support for Prevention, Law
Enforcement
Billy Yout, Special Agent in Charge at Drug Enforcement
Administration, concurred with Commander Scott, stating the
``marijuana . . . is by far the biggest problem [because it is]
easily accessible to children.'' Yout also testified on how
traffickers are moving their bases of operation into New
Hampshire from Massachusetts and other New England States,
although he noted that New Hampshire remains predominantly a
consumer State.
g. Manchester Mayor Ray Wieczorek Testified on the
Importance of Public Sector-Private Sector
Cooperation
Ray Wieczorek, the Mayor of Manchester, in his testimony,
focused on the important role that a public sector-private
sector relationship plays in the war against illegal drugs.
Wieczorek encouraged other communities to follow Manchester's
model on how to establish a public-private partnership. Mayor
Wieczorek explained how the city has effectively tapped all
available resources, including cooperation from financial
institutions, citizens and the business community, in uniting
to fight this battle.
h. Manchester Police Chief Peter Favreau Explained Multi-
Agency Effort and How Operation Streetsweeper
Succeeded
Peter Favreau, Chief of the Manchester Police Department
(MPD), reviewed the creation of Operation Streetsweeper and its
importance as a model for future multi-agency efforts. Early in
1995, Favreau and United States Attorney Gagnon, planned a
``round-up of crack dealers.'' Favreau testified that ``[MPD's]
undercover people, along with the state drug task force
[arranged to] make a lot of buys from [crack dealers], and make
[the] round-up all at one time.'' This round-up occurred in
June, 1995. As a result, 55 of the dealers were picked up by
more than 150 law enforcement officers; most of the dealers are
now behind bars. This was Phase I of Operation Streetsweeper.
Favreau testified that Phase II included cooperation
between the MPD and the New Hampshire State Police in
dismantling street gangs and getting them off Manchester's
streets. Phase III was a continuation of the anti-gang
component of the Operation, Phase II, but included Federal law
enforcement agencies.
i. United States Attorney Paul Gagnon Discussed Cooperation
and Funding
Paul Gagnon, the U.S. Attorney for New Hampshire, focused
on the role interagency cooperation, indicating that Operation
Streetsweeper's success was as dependant upon cooperation as
upon the institutional framework that made it possible. Gagnon
also noted the importance of Federal funding in the success of
Operation Streetsweeper, and urged continued funding. Finally,
Gagnon recommended a similar marshaling of law enforcement
resources and key agencies in the future.
j. Citizen Groups Represented by Alice Sutphen Urged
Community Action
Alice Sutphen, a representative from the citizen group Take
Back Our Neighborhoods, delivered testimony to the Subcommittee
on the importance of citizens working with law enforcement and
local authorities, as well as mobilizing on their own, to take
back their neighborhoods. She described how a coordinated and
dedicated citizenry can make a difference, and can genuinely
assist law enforcement. Law enforcement representatives, such
as Chief Favreau, and political leaders, such as Mayor
Wieczorek, credited Sutphen and the local citizenry with making
Operation Streetsweeper such a success and echoed her
sentiments about citizen participation.
k. Dover Police Captain Dana Mitchell Urged support for
D.A.R.E. and Law Enforcement's Role in Prevention
Dana Mitchell, Captain, Dover Police, offered testimony on
the success and overall utilization of Dover's Drug Free
program. He testified that this program includes an expansive
D.A.R.E. program beginning in elementary school, and continuing
through junior high and high school. Mitchell also stressed the
importance of law enforcement's role in prevention, focusing on
Dover's Youth Outreach Program. Mitchell noted that this
program represented a successful initiative to ``bring the
young people of [their] community into the prevention effort in
the form of organized student groups.''
Mitchell also testified that congressional leaders look at
allowing greater creativity and flexibility as they authorize
Federal drug prevention programs. By way of example, Mitchell
noted that the Dover Police Department recently approached the
director of a 180-unit low-income Dover Housing Authority,
which is a Department of Housing and Urban Development
facility, about mandating that all parents receiving the
housing subsidy receive a D.A.R.E. seminar. The Housing
Authority's director stated that Federal regulations bar that
kind of condition on a housing subsidy. Greater flexibility in
the hands of local authorities would allow them to cooperate
more fully and adapt Federal programs to community needs.
l. Executive Director of Nashua Youth Council Michael
Plourde Urged Community Need Assessment Prior to
Receipt of Federal Funds
Michael Plourde, Executive Director of the Nashua Youth
Council, offered testimony on how community coalitions assist
in assessing the priorities that are needed for a locality.
Plourde recommended that ``any Federal money that comes down to
localities should require that those coalitions exist prior to
the money being received, and that those coalitions assess the
community needs prior to the money being distributed to those
communities.''
m. Marathon House Regional Director John Ahman Urged
Support for Effective Treatment
John Ahman, Regional Program Director for Marathon House,
testified that is a definite link between crime and drug use,
and emphasized the importance of effective drug treatment in
breaking this link. Effective treatment, Ahman testified, means
that ``after treatment, recovering addicts are less likely to
be involved in crime and more likely to be employed.'' Ahman
also stated that, in the case of drugs, treatment is often more
appropriate and less expensive than incarceration.
n. Manchester Police Sergeant Dick Tracy Urged Strong
Support for D.A.R.E. Program
Dick Tracy, Sergeant, Crime Prevention Division, Manchester
Police Department, offered testimony on the effectiveness of
the 17-week D.A.R.E. program for Manchester students. Tracy
went on to testify that, ``having a police officer in the
school to teach the kids about the dangers of drugs is more
effective because the officer can relate firsthand experience
of cases he has dealt with.'' Tracy's testimony concluded the
expert witness testimony received by the Subcommittee at the
hearing.
c. fact-finding trip to transit zone
As indicated above, the Subcommittee's 1995 investigation
included one Subcommittee fact finding trip to the Drug War's
front line. Subcommittee Members, the United States Coast Guard
and staff, travelled to the Seventh Coast Guard District in the
Caribbean transit zone between June 16 and June 19, 1995.
In the transit zone, they attended briefings at Seventh
District Headquarters in Miami, Coast Guard interdiction
initiatives at sea, DEA activities in the Greater Antilles,
high level interagency briefings in Puerto Rico by the FBI,
DEA, Customs, Border Patrol, and local authorities, and
received indepth briefings by Admiral Granuzo and others at
Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF East) in Key West,
dedicated to drug interdiction in the transit zone.
This interdiction trip was arranged in coordination with
the United States Coast Guard, and invitations were extended to
minority and majority members. Additionally, in coordination
with ONDCP, the Subcommittee Chairman also travelled with the
White House Director of ONDCP to prevention and treatment
programs in Massachusetts.
In the transit zone, the Subcommittee learned a number of
important facts. In addition to traveling on HU-25 interdiction
aircraft as they demonstrated interceptions, witnessing FLIR or
forward-looking infrared radar tracking during interceptions,
and travelling to the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Mellon on the
heels of that cutter's successful interdiction of 5,000 pounds
of marijuana, the Subcommittee received demonstrations of the
ion scanner and CINDI technologies, received briefings by
agents participating in Operation OPBAT on the remote island of
Great Inagua, and toured OPBAT assets by HH-60 helicopter.
Before receiving briefings at JIATF East, the Subcommittee also
visited the interdiction cutters Ocracoke and Spenser.
1. OPBAT Operations Need Resources
In briefings, a number of interdiction facts became more
clear. Agents participating in OBAT (Operation Bahamas, Turks
and Caicos), a multi-agency, international operation based in
Nassua, Bahamas, made clear that they have lost major assets
over the past two years.
OPBAT's mission is to halt the flow of cocaine and
marijuana through the 700-island Bahamian region to the United
States. To do so, OPBAT operates three widely dispersed
helicopter bases, from which U.S. Coast Guard and DEA
helicopters are dispatched on cue from tracking by the Joint
Interagency Task Force (JIATF) or Domestic Air Interdiction
Coordination Center (DAICC) aircraft. Since the helicopters
must operate in foreign waters, they are piloted by personnel
from either the Government of the Bahamas or Turks and Caicos
Island police, who are in turn responsible for making arrests
and seizures. A United States DEA agent is, however, on every
flight to coordinate intelligence and provide additional
advice.
2. Aerostat Radars Were Deterrent
The Clinton Administration's decision to remove and destroy
the aerostats based in the Bahamas has also had a perceived
impact on interdiction capability. The Nassau DEA Office of
OPBAT reported that, ``while no specific intel source indicates
that traffickers perceive the removal of the aerostats [radars]
from the Bahamas as a weakness in law enforcement detection
capability, it stands to reason that a reduction in visible
detection resources would equate to `safe' illicit activity.''
Privately, agents confirm that trafficking patterns are
changing to reflect the knowledge that aerostats are no longer
monitoring certain areas. In fact, OPBAT agents report that
there has been a measurable increase in ``trafficking events
per month'' since the same period in 1994, which they attribute
to a rise in maritime and air activity via the Atlantic, the
removal of the aerostat radars, and the rise of trafficking
from or through Jamaica.
3. Cuba Creates Overflight and Maritime Constraints
Beyond loss of interdiction assets, interdiction in the
region operates under other constraints. Cuban territorial
waters are an obstacle to effective interdiction, since they
offer legal shelter to traffickers. This tactic was used
extensively in February 1995.
The inability of U.S. aircraft to overfly Cuba is also a
barrier to effective interdiction, since traffickers can
overfly the island at altitudes radar is otherwise unable to
track, and easily blend with ground cover. This is especially
so for aircraft originating out of Jamaica and the West
Caribbean.
4. Puerto Rico: Drug Gateway, Assets Needed
At the Greater Antilles Section Coast Guard Base (GANTSEC)
in Puerto Rico, which covers 1.3 million square miles, multi-
agency briefers expressed the view that, if 70 percent of the
cocaine coming into the United States comes over the Southwest
border, the rest comes through Puerto Rico, which has seen as
much as $40 million in money laundering in recent years.
In attendance at the briefing were representatives of the
FBI, DEA, Border Patrol, Coast Guard, INS, Customs, Department
of Defense and Puerto Rico.
In Puerto Rico, members of the interagency group reported
that approximately 84 metric tons of cocaine make it into
Puerto Rico annually, of which ``we interdict 10 to 15
percent.'' The missing variable, in the eyes of many present,
was a stronger Federal interdiction commitment, both in terms
of assets and personnel.
There was a strong indication that assets lost in the last
three years need to be replaced; needed are more 378-foot
cutters and intelligence gathering radars to replace the
aerostats. Also expressed was the need for more agents,
presumably FBI and DEA, to support the denotation of San Juan
as a HIDTA (High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area). An
additional detection concern is that there is no money in the
relevant budgets to pay for overtime in support of nighttime
detection.
Summarizing the candid counsel received at this briefing,
the assets most needed are: more radars (including a suggested
radar in Belize), more Jayhawk helicopters, more 378-foot Coast
Guard Cutters, ion scanners and CINDI's, air rights agreements
with more Caribbean nations (perhaps one day Cuba), and more
top people. The Coast Guard also indicated that they have
recently lost ``four of ten'' HU-25 intercepter aircraft by re-
deployment or demobilization.
5. Joint Interagency Task Force--East
At JIATF East, briefers included Rear Admiral Andrew A.
Granuzo, who bluntly admitted that the central obstacle to
waging a more effective drug war, particularly in interdiction,
is that ``there is no one in charge.'' This assessment mirrored
the views of Admiral Yost, Bill Bennett, John Walters, Robert
Bonner, and a host of others inside and outside the
Administration.
JIATF East was created by Presidential Decision Directive
14 (PDD 14), which ordered a review of the Nation's
counternarcotics command and control intelligence centers.
Creation of three joint interagency task forces and a domestic
air interdiction center was authorized by the White House Drug
Czar in April 1994. Accordingly, JIATF East is joined in its
interdiction mission by JIATF West in Almeda, California; JIATF
South in Panama; the DAICC at March Air Force Base, California;
and JTF-6 in El Paso, Texas.
JIATF East is dedicated to ``deconfliction of all non-
detection and monitoring counter drug activities in the transit
zone.'' The command integrates intelligence with operations,
and ``coordinates the employment of the U.S. Navy and U.S.
Coast Guard ships and aircraft, U.S. Air Force aircraft, and
aircraft and ships from allied nations, such as Great Britain
and the Netherlands.'' The command's mission boils down to
``maximiz[ing] the disruption of drug transhipment,''
collecting, integrating and disseminating intelligence, and
guiding detection and monitoring forces for tactical action.
Just as importantly, JIATF East integrates law enforcement
personnel, primarily from Customs, into the international
interdiction effort. For that reason, the command includes FBI,
DEA, DIA and State Department, in addition to the Department of
Defense.
d. interdiction policy oversight
Drawing on expert hearing testimony, information learned
during the Subcommittee's transit zone fact finding trip, and
reliable documentary evidence on the status of the Nation's
interdiction effort, the Subcommittee reviewed current
interdiction policy and force structure.
Importantly, the Subcommittee found that, as with drug
prevention and law enforcement, there is a broad, bipartisan
consensus supporting effective interdiction as a central
component of the drug war. Just as interdiction and law
enforcement experts seem to recognize the central role played
by parental, community, State and Federal drug prevention
efforts, prevention experts acknowledged the importance of law
enforcement and interdiction efforts in any effective use
reduction strategy.
The Subcommittee also found that interdiction assets,
funding and Administration emphasis on drug interdiction have
been substantially reduced over the past three years. This
finding is in stark contrast to the concerted interdiction
effort launched between 1984 and 1990, and the interdiction
strategy pursued through the final year of the Bush
Administration.
1. Interdiction From 1984-1990
Admiral Paul Yost, former United States Coast Guard
Commandant, headed the Nation's interdiction effort between
1984 and 1990.
Before the Subcommittee, Yost testified that the Nation
experienced a ``major build-up in drug interdiction . . . from
1984 through 1990'' \67\ Yost testified that this interdiction
effort ``successfully interrupted the flow of bulk marijuana by
sea and cocaine by air over the water routes [of the
Caribbean].''
\67\ Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost, Hearings of Subcommittee on
National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, March
9, 1995.
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Yost also testified that ``strong interdiction and law
enforcement [during the period 1984 to 1990] were providing a
climate that made it clear to the [drug] trafficker that `this
is wrong, and your chances of being intercepted are very high.'
''
2. Clinton's Cuts In Drug Interdiction
While the Subcommittee heard testimony that selected
interdiction assets were redeployed to the Persian Gulf in
1991, the overwhelming reduction in the interdiction force
structure has occurred between 1993 and 1995.
Objective indicators of Federal support for the counter
narcotics effort show a substantial reduction in resources
committed to key areas; in early 1995, key budget numbers were
already clearly below prior highwater marks, lines formerly
defined as the minimum necessary for effective conduct of the
Drug War.
This general conclusion is supported by facts contained in
the President's 1995 drug interdiction budget, documentary
evidence originating with the Office of the United States
Interdiction Coordinator, interviews with agency field
representatives, 1995 reports and testimony by the General
Accounting Office, and hearing testimony provided by Admiral
Yost, former Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, John Walters,
former Acting Director of ONDCP, Bill Bennett, former Director
of ONDCP, Robert Bonner, former Administrator of DEA in the
Clinton and Bush Administrations, and Dr. Lee Brown, the then-
current Director of ONDCP.
a. ONDCP Interdiction Budget Cuts
While the total antidrug budget rose from $1.5 billion in
fiscal 1981 to $13.2 billion in fiscal 1995,\68\ ONDCP itself
reports a drop in both drug interdiction and international
program funding.\69\
\68\ Teasley, David, Congressional Research Service Report 95-943,
September 6, 1995, p. 1.
\69\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February
1995, p. 113.
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Unmistakably, drug interdiction's budget authority fell
from $1.511 billion in fiscal 1993 to $1.312 billion in fiscal
1994, a $200 million reduction by President Clinton in the
fiscal 1994 budget. In fiscal 1995, the interdiction budget was
cut by another $18 million to $1.293 billion. In fiscal 1996,
the President's request for drug interdiction funding fell
another $15 million to $1.278 billion.\70\ Whatever else is
said about a concurrence in these numbers by the 103rd
Congress, they must stand alone as indicators of the
President's reduced emphasis on and commitment to drug
interdiction.
\70\ Id. p. 113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the same time, international or source country counter
narcotics funding fell from a highwater mark of $523 million in
1992 to $329 million in fiscal 1994, and then to $309 million
in fiscal 1995, recovering only slightly to $399 million in the
Presidential request for fiscal 1996.\71\
\71\ Id. p. 113.
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b. Assets Lost According to Admiral Yost
According to Yost, the Nation has recently experienced a
``tragic dismantling'' of the Nation's interdiction efforts,
such that today ``there are several orders of magnitude less
effort spent on drug interdiction.'' \72\
\72\ Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost, Hearing of Subcommittee on
National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, March
9, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specifically, ``ship days and aircraft hours are
drastically reduced,'' and ``[a]ll of the Coast Guard jet
aircraft, the Falcons with the f-16 intercept radars, were
taken away from interdiction . . .,'' said Yost.\73\
\73\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, Yost detailed that ``three Coast Guard E-2C
airborne early warning aircraft have been turned back to the
Navy and used for other purposes,'' and that ``the Coast Guard
Air Station at St. Augustine, Florida, which was established to
support these three multi-million dollar aircraft, is now
closed.'' Yost indicated that he believed some of the E-2Cs
were even being ``decommissioned.'' \74\
\74\ Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost, Hearing of Subcommittee on
National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, March
9, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yost testified that ``the Coast Guard C-130 airborne early
warning aircraft has been turned over to the Air Force,
stripped of its equipment, including a dome-mounted radar, and
is now used for transportation of cargo.'' ``In addition,''
Yost reported that ``the new Command Control Communications and
Intelligence Center has been closed, and its duties performed
elsewhere.''
c. ONDCP Strategy Confirms Specific Reductions
The Yost assessment of lost ``ship days'' and ``aircraft
hours'' is confirmed by the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy
Budget Summary. The Summary shows, for example, reports a drop
in Department of Defense Flight Hours from 50,624 in 1994 to
50,000 in 1995, with the same number projected for 1996. It
also shows Ship Days down from 2,268 in 1994 to 1,545 in 1995,
with the same number projected for 1996.\75\ Finally, although
Yost did discuss National Guard, the Summary shows that
National Guard Container Search Workdays dropped from 227,827
in 1994 to 209,000 projected for 1996, while other [drug
interdiction] National Guard Workdays fell from 597,385 in 1994
to a 1996 projection of 530,000.\76\
\75\ National Drug Control Strategy Budget Summary, The White
House, February 1995, p. 41.
\76\ Id. p. 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Field Representatives Confirm Assets Lost and Explain
Impact
Yost's testimony is corroborated by agency field
representatives interviewed in four locations during the
Subcommittee's fact finding trip in June 1995. Field agents
collectively confirmed the recent loss of key assets and
personnel, including deficiencies in radars (airborne and
stationary), Jayhawk helicopters, 378-foot Coast Guard Cutters,
high technology, HU-25 Falcon interceptor aircraft (``four
lost''), and agency personnel.
The impact of interdiction assets lost was described in
different ways. The Nassau DEA Office of OPBAT, for example,
reported that, ``while no specific intel source indicates that
traffickers perceive the removal of the aerostats [radars] from
the Bahamas as a weakness in law enforcement detection
capability, it stands to reason that a reduction in visible
detection resources would equate to `safe' illicit activity,''
and they attributed the recent shift in trafficking patterns
and increase in ``trafficking events per month'' partially to
aerostat removal.
In Puerto Rico, members of the interagency group explained
that approximately 84 metric tons of cocaine now gets into
Puerto Rico annually, of which ``we interdict 10 to 15
percent.'' They noted that the missing component was a stronger
Federal interdiction commitment, in assets and personnel,
including such fundamentals as overtime pay in support of
nighttime detection.
At JIATF East, briefers admitted that there had been recent
asset losses and noted that these losses were compounded by the
fact that ``there is no one in charge.''
e. USIC Memorandum Confirms Assets Lost
An unclassified memorandum originating in the Office of the
United States Interdiction Coordinator (USIC), dated June 1995
offered additional details on the Clinton reductions.
This USIC memorandum lists two sets of assets removed by
the Clinton administration from the interdiction effort:
``counterdrug assets removed from USCG [the United States Coast
Guard] inventory to comply with FY 94 budget reductions,'' and
``other assets removed prior to 1994.'' \77\
\77\ Unclassified Memorandum from Office of United States
Interdiction Coordinator, entitled ``Summary of USCG FY-94 Budget
Reduction of $9M, Directed at Drug Interdiction Funding, Mandated by
Congress,'' June 9, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the first group, USIC lists: five ``HU-25 Falcon jet
interceptors,'' one ``Medium Endurance Cutter,'' three
``Surface Effect Ship (SES) patrol boats,'' 49 personnel due to
an ``end of participation in C3I East, Miami,'' and 24 more
personnel due to the ``[d]isestablished . . . Caribbean
Squadron Staff.'' Overall, USCG interdiction assets removed
amounted to a reduction of ``$9,337,915,'' 306 total personnel,
and ``21,151,338'' in ``recurring costs.'' \78\
\78\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This USIC memorandum also notes that, although ``Customs
has now consolidated the former functions of C3I East and C3I
West into the Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center
(DAICC) located at March AFB in California,'' the ``DAICC
facility faces serious manning shortages.'' \79\
\79\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the second group, assets removed ``prior to 1994,'' USIC
lists: four ``E2-C Hawkeye AEW aircraft (1 lost to a crash; 3
returned to the Navy),'' and one ``EC130-V AEW aircraft
(delivered to USCG in FY92, Transferred to DoD in 1993 for lack
of operations and maintenance funding).'' Additionally, the
memorandum observes, in discussing the EC130-V AEW
(intelligence gathering) aircraft transferred from USCG
interdiction to DoD: ``The rotodome was removed from the
airframe. Last we heard, the airframe was in storage,'' and
adds that ``DoD retired all of the [sic] sea-based aerostats.''
\80\
\80\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
f. Additional Expert Testimony Confirms Assets Lost
In addition, the reports from Yost, field agents and USIC
confirming lost or decommissioned interdiction assets during
the Clinton Administration were supported by expert testimony
from former Acting Director of ONDCP John Walters, former White
House Drug Czar Bill Bennett, and former Bush and Clinton DEA
Administrator Robert Bonner.
Walters testified that ``the drug problem is simply not a
part of the foreign policy agenda of the United States under
President Clinton--there is no carrot and no stick facing
countries from which the poison destroying American lives every
day comes.'' He noted that the Administration's deemphasis of
international counternarcotics ``fuels calls in other countries
for abandoning antidrug cooperation.'' \81\
\81\ See also The New York Times (February 20, 1994), p. A6; The
New York Times (February 27, 1994), Section 4, p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More specifically, Walters testified that President
Clinton's interdiction policy is ``destroying the intelligence
support to the drug war,'' noting that the President last year
cut $600,000 in intelligence funding and took other measures to
redirect resources away from intelligence for the drug war.
USIC confirms the loss of five key intelligence gathering AEW
aircraft, ``end of participation in C3I East, Miami,'' and DoD
retirement of ``all of the sea-based aerostats,'' facts
supporting Walter's assessment.\82\
\82\ USIC Memorandum, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Walters also testified that ``the military and other
interdiction agencies have received a 50 percent force
reduction in 1994, that has caused over a 50 percent reduction
in their ability to interdict drugs . . . [in] the transit
zone.''
Concluding and linking interdiction to rising domestic drug
use, Walters explained that ``if these trends continue, by
1996, the Clinton administration will have presided over the
greatest increase in drug use in modern American history.''
\83\
\83\ Testimony of John Walters, Hearing of Subcommittee on National
Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, March 9, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bennett and Bonner offered similar assessments. Bennett
noted that the Administration's 1995 strategy would ``cut . . .
more than 600 positions from drug enforcement divisions of the
Drug Enforcement Administration,'' cut ``more than 100 drug
prosecution positions in United States Attorney's offices, and
``cut . . . drug interdiction and drug intelligence programs
from fiscal 1994 levels.'' Bennett also testified that ``last
year, the Clinton Administration directed the U.S. Military to
stop providing radar tracking of cocaine-trafficker aircraft to
Colombia and Peru,'' a policy ``Congress again had to
reverse,'' and stressed that ``massive policy failures'' plague
the Clinton Administration.
Bonner, stressed that drugs pose ``a serious threat to the
well-being of our Nation,'' noting that ``our national drug
strategy [in the 1980's and early 1990's] was working . . .,''
and observed that, ``as the resources for enforcement and
interdiction have been cut, the price of cocaine has gone down
and the estimated number of heavy users has gone up.''
Noting also that the Cali Cartel is ``supplying between 80
and 90 percent of all of the cocaine that reaches the United
States . . .,'' Bonner testified that, ``the Clinton
Administration has utterly failed to appreciate the value of
strong international drug law enforcement as a major component
in an effective drug control strategy,'' and called on the
President to ``reverse this trend and start leading our
Nation's antidrug efforts.''
g. Admiral Kramek's December 1994 Letter to Drug Czar Lee
Brown Confirms Assets Lost, And Interdiction
Coordinator's Unsuccessful Efforts to Restore
Unclassified correspondence between the Interdiction
Coordinator, Admiral Kramek, and the Director of ONDCP, Dr.
Brown--which incidently was requested of the Drug Czar and not
provided, but was secured through other means by the
Subcommittee--revealed that an ``agency head consensus''
believed in October 1994 that ``we need to restore assets to
the interdiction force structure . . .'' and ``must return to
the 1992-1993 levels of effort.''
The December 1994 letter also states that the
administration's source country programs are not ``producing
necessary results'' yet, and addresses the drug problem as a
threat to national security. Specifically, the Interdiction
Coordinator wrote: ``I believe it appropriate that we meet with
the President and National Security Advisor as soon as possible
to brief them on the results of our conference and discuss the
current state of implementation and national strategy . . . Of
key importance to this meeting is the determination of priority
of counting narcotics trafficking as a threat to national
security of the United States as evaluated against other
threats to our security that compete for resources.''
This letter was corroborated by the essential findings of
the Subcommitee in a range of agency contacts and
corresponendence complementing the hearings, most of which were
publicly discussed in 1995 drug policy hearings on interdiction
and overall National Drug Control Policy.
What became obvious was the need for a counterdrug strategy
led from the top down. Such a strategy must embody greater
willingness to establish effective interagency review and
terminate ineffective programs; willingness to review the whole
lead agency concept and be certain that the agency or
department in charge is best suited to execute national drug
control policy; greater commitment from senior levels of the
Administration, beginning with the President himself;
development of broader and more forward-looking policy guidance
for interagency regional implementation plans; more specificity
in identifying regional planning coordinators; and thoughtful
attention to creating a more streamlined regional mechanism for
planning and executing the strategy.\84\
\84\ See generally, Members discussion during hearings on March 9,
April 6, June 27, June 28, 1995, and September 25, 1995; see also
discussion elsewhere in this report on the need for heightened
interagency coordination, agency leadership and interdiction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
h. Admiral Kramek's June 1995 Testimony Underscore's
Interdiction's Importance and the Missing Priority
In testimony before the Subcommittee on June 27, 1995,
Admiral Kramek offered implicit criticism of a reduced
interdiction effort in the Clinton Administration, when he
testified that, ``[w]hen the [smugglers] see our foreign policy
priorities chang[e] . . . making drug interdiction much lower
on the list than other things, they're quick to take advantage
of that.'' He explained that ``[w]hen they see it doesn't rate
number one on our national security priority list, they're
quick to take advantage of that,'' and he stressed that in his
view, the issue stands ``number one'' with the American people.
In a further effort to emphasize the importance of
interdiction, Kramek noted that interdiction ``returns 25-1 on
the dollar in benefits to the public for every dollar spent,''
a new statistic in the national dialogue.
Kramek commented further on the shift from a transit zone
strategy to a source country strategy, saying that ``the source
country strategy . . . is starting to take hold, [but it] is
not robust enough, for us to reduce assets in the transit zone
yet.''
Since many are already gone, Kramek's critique calls into
question the current strategy.
On Puerto Rico, Kramek also noted that Puerto Rico has
become a target for smugglers, since trafficking drugs to
Puerto Rico is as good as being in the United States.
i. Testimony Of Drug Czar Lee Brown Confirms Low Priority
on Interdiction
Testimony by White House Drug Czar Lee Brown revealed that
he held a view different from that of the Interdiction
Coordinator and, apparently, did not follow the Interdiction
Coordinator's recommendation to arrange for the Interdiction
Coordinator to present the ``agency head consensus'' to either
the President or National Security Advisor.
Brown further conceded the administration's ``controlled
shift'' of resources from interdiction to ``international
efforts in source countries,'' but was unable to offer results
of the shift or details on source country program management.
Brown justified the ``controlled shift'' to source
countries by testifying that prior interdiction efforts,
despite a precipitous drop in drug users, were ``less than
effective.''
j. No Heroin Strategy Until November 1995
In November 1993, President Clinton promised a National
Heroin Strategy within 120 days.\85\ While Brown testified that
the Nation faced ``growing availability of cheap and high
purity heroin'' and spoke of ``concern about the possibility of
another heroin epidemic,'' President Clinton did not sign a
National Heroin Strategy until November 21, 1995, and the
strategy was not accompanied by any implementing guidelines.
\85\ See, e.g., Testimony of Joseph Kelly before the Subcommittee,
General Accounting Office, June 27, 1995, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, a recent General Accounting Office Report,
commissioned by the Subcommittee Chairman, found that the
heroin policies being pursued by the Clinton Administration are
deficient. Specifically, although the United States'
relationship with the Burmese Government makes cooperation
difficult, United States reliance on the United Nations' drug
control effort has been flawed. In particular, GAO found that,
``the [drug control] projects have not significantly reduced
opium production because (1) the scope of the projects has been
too small to have a substantive impact on opium production, (2)
the Burmese Government has not provided sufficient support to
ensure project success, and (3) planning has been inadequate to
ensure project effectiveness.'' \86\
\86\ Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Program Encounters Many Obstacles in
Southeast Asia, General Accounting Office, January 1996, p. 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
k. GAO Reports Serious Deficiencies in Clinton
Administration Source Country Programs
Hearings held by the Subcommittee in June 1995 revealed
serious mismanagement and misdirection of the source country
programs, according to General Accounting Office investigators.
These deficiencies are discussed below under the Section
``Source Country Programs Oversight,'' and above in the June 27
and 28, 1995 interdiction policy hearings.
l. Bottom National Security Priority
Interdiction efforts are hampered by the reported low
national security priority placed on the drug war early in the
administration. Public reports indicate that the
counternarcotics effort was placed at priority ``Number 29'' on
a White House list of national security priorities. According
to one account, ``The White House National Security Council has
dropped the drug war from one of three top priorities to No. 29
on a list of 29, according to several sources.'' \87\ Internal
reports and interviews do not contradict this assessment, and
there is no indication that the priority has been formally or
informally elevated since February 1993. ONDCP's response to
Admiral Kramek's letter of December 1994 urging reassessment of
the ``national security'' threat is further corroboration of
this low priority ranking.\88\ Note also that Subcommittee
contacts with Administration personnel indicate an awareness of
the public reports of the low priority ranking, and there has
been no contrary documentation provided to the Subcommittee,
despite requests for the same.]
\87\ Star Tribune, Scripps Howard News Service, ``Clinton's Drug
Policy Perceived As Retreat,'' February 14, 1993, p. 1.
\88\ See December 1994 Letter, Admiral Kramek to ONDCP Director Lee
Brown, supra; Testimony of Lee Brown, responding to Letter, at
Subcommittee hearings on March 9, 1995 and April 6, 1995; Star Tribune,
Scripps Howard News Service, ``Clinton's Drug Policy Perceived As
Retreat,'' February 14, 1993, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
m. Only Six Staff for Nation's Interdiction Coordinator,
and No Supply Side Deputy Director of ONDCP
According to testimony heard from the Nation's Interdiction
Coordinator at Subcommittee hearings in June 1995, the man in
charge of the Nation's interdiction effort has been given a
total of just six persons to administer all of United States
interdiction policy. Responding to questions from the
Subcommittee, Admiral Kramek testified that he briefs ONDCP
Director Brown only monthly and has just ``six people''
assigned to him as Interdiction Coordinator.\89\
\89\ Testimony of Admiral Kramek, Subcommittee Hearings, June 28,
1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
n. ONDCP Has No Deputy for Supply Reduction
At ONDCP itself, the President has allowed the Nation's
central drug policy office, ONDCP, to remain without a Deputy
for Supply Reduction, an unprecedented act revealing
ambivalence, if not disinterest.
o. ONDCP Staff And Budget Gutted--Not Restored
Expert witnesses concurred that the sudden, unilateral 1993
cut by President Clinton in ONDCP staff by more than 80 percent
from 146 staff to 25, and a simultaneous reduction in the
fiscal 1994 ONDCP appropriations from $101.2 million to $5.8
million, has never fully been rectified, and continues to
contribute both to the perception that the administration
places a low priority on antidrug efforts, and to the reality
that ONDCP is unable to perform all previous functions,
especially on interdiction policy.
As Senator Hatch (R-Utah) recently remarked on that early
decision: ``With that staff cut, the administration ham-strung
Dr. Brown, giving him a ``paper promotion to the Cabinet, while
slashing his staff to the bone . . . He can't lead the War on
Drugs with a staff of only 25 people, I mean give me a break,''
added Hatch.\90\
\90\ See Testimony of John Walters, Subcommittee Hearing, March 9,
1995; Drug Policy Foundation, Policy Track Manual, ``The Drug War and
Clinton's Policy Shift,'' 1994, quoting Senator Hatch (R-Utah).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
p. Conclusions on Interdiction Policy
Despite an expert consensus that interdiction is vital,
there has been a reduced emphasis on drug interdiction by the
Clinton Administration. President Clinton is undeniably
responsible for a downgrading of interdiction within the
National Drug Control Strategy, and for interdiction budget
cuts in 1993, 1994 and 1995, many of which explain an absence
of previously deployed assets.
Objective indicators of Federal support for the counter
narcotics effort show a substantial reduction both in resources
committed to key areas and in overall deployment of assets to
drug interdiction. By admission of the administration, key
interdiction budget numbers are substantially below prior
highwater marks (i.e. ``1992-1993 levels''), lines formerly
defined as the minimum necessary for effective conduct of the
Drug War.
3. The Implications of Reduced Interdiction
Most experts agree that the main implications of reduced
interdiction over the past three years, in combination with
other factors, have been: (1) lower street prices for cocaine,
heroin, and marijuana, (2) higher availability of these drugs,
(3) higher purity levels for these drugs, (4) higher casual
drug use by juveniles, (5) greater juvenile addiction, (6)
rising drug related juvenile crime, (7) increasing drug related
medical emergencies, and (8) a growing international perception
of reduced U.S. commitment to the Drug War.
a. Lower Prices, Higher Availability and Purity
In general, the reduction in interdiction assets, funding
and emphasis has had a palpable effect on street prices,
availability, and purity.
Citing the Clinton Administration's own documentation,
former Acting ONDCP Director John Walters testified that
heroin, cocaine and marijuana are now available at lower prices
and higher purities than at any time in recent years.\91\
\91\ See ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy: Strengthening
Communities' Response to Drugs and Crime, February, 1995, pp. 45-48,
146 (Table B-16).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specifically, the nationwide street price for most illicit
drugs is lower and potency higher than any time in more than a
decade. Beyond the leading survey and DAWN data, one report
recently noted that, ``current price/purity data show cocaine
prices at their lowest point since data collection began in
1981.'' \92\
\92\ Losing Ground Against Drugs: A Report on Increasing Illicit
Drug Use and National Drug Policy, Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
December 1995, citing U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement
Administration and Abt Associates, Average Price and Purity of Cocaine
in the United States, Average Price and Purity of Heroin in the United
States, September 13, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explaining the change, former DEA Administrator Bonner
testified that ``from 1990 to 1992, the wholesale price of
cocaine in the U.S. increased substantially'' as law
enforcement involvement went up. As a result, demand fell.
Today, by contrast, ``as the resources for enforcement and
interdiction have been cut, the price of cocaine has gone down
and the estimated number of heavy users has gone up,'' said
Bonner.
Even the RAND study often cited by ONDCP in support of its
treatment emphasis confirms the inverse relationship between
drug supply and drug consumption. Thus, ``current supply-
control efforts cause a kilogram of cocaine priced at $4,400 in
South America to cost more than $129,000 when it reaches U.S.
streets,'' which ``results in reduced consumption.'' By the
same token, a falling off of supply reduction efforts lowers
the price and increases consumption.\93\
\93\ Schnaubelt, Christopher, ``Drug Treatment Versus Supply
Reduction: Which Is Cheaper?'', National Interagency Counterdrug
Institute, May 1995, p. 2, referring to Rydell, Peter C. and
Everingham, Susan S., ``Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand
Programs,'' RAND Drug Policy Research Center, Santa Monica, California
(June 1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Exploding Casual Use by Youth
As availability and purity have risen, and prices have
fallen, casual drug use by juveniles has skyrocketed. Downward
trendlines through the 1980's and early 1990's have suffered a
marked reversal since 1992, and are dramatically up in
virtually every age group and for every illicit drug, including
heroin, crack, cocaine hydrochloride, LSD, non-LSD
hallucinogens, methamphetamine, inhalants, stimulants, and
marijuana.\94\
\94\ Drug use was falling in the late 1980s, as indicated by all
major studies in the field; it is now markedly up and rising, according
to all available data, including the September 1995 National Household
Survey, the October 1995 PRIDE survey of 200,000 students, the December
1995, University of Michigan Monitoring the Future Study, and other
regional measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Historically, overall drug use fell from 1981 and 1992,
following concerted Federal, State, community and parental
counter narcotics action. The drive for strong interdiction,
prevention, and law enforcement produced results. Nationwide
surveys show monthly cocaine use dropped from 2.9 million users
in 1988 to 1.3 million in 1990, overall drug abuse dropped from
14.5 million users in 1991 to 11.4 million in 1992, and the
perceived risk of drug use rose, as did prices, while
availability and purity fell. In short, the strategy worked.
One reason for the success of the policy in the 1980's and
early 1990's was innovative interdiction and prevention. Aided
by the Departments of Defense and Justice, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, U.S. Customs Service, Border Patrol, and State
and local law enforcement agencies nationwide, then-Coast Guard
Commandant Admiral Paul Yost coordinated and implemented a drug
interdiction effort based on ``pulsing'' resources into the
transit zone at high-drug trafficking times. Meanwhile, of
course, grassroots parent groups, such as Pride and the
National Family Partnership, and Mrs. Reagan's ``Just Say No''
prevention program began to push reduced drug use through
education. Mrs. Reagan's effort was only supplemented by
Federal drug prevention monies in 1987.
Tragically, most of that ground has now been lost by a void
of Presidential leadership and misguided policies, including
the rollback of Federal interdiction efforts.
In 1994, for the third consecutive year, major surveys and
studies including the National Household Survey and Michigan
University's Monitoring the Future Study \95\ revealed alarming
increases in drug use and acceptability among the Nation's
youth. According to the Michigan study, 13 percent of 8th-
graders experimented with marijuana in 1993, about twice the
1991 level. Experimentation among 10th-graders increased about
two-thirds the previous three years, and daily use among high
school seniors was up by half over 1993 levels.
\95\ Johnston, L., O'Malley, P. and Bachman, J., Monitoring the
Future Study, University of Michigan (1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995 data pull the curtain back further. The National
Household Survey released in September 1995 shows that overall
drug use among kids ages 12 to 17 jumped 50 percent in 1994,
from 6.6 percent to 9.5 percent. The National Pride Study shows
that one in three American high school seniors now smokes
marijuana; that there has been a 36 percent increase in cocaine
use among students in grades 9 through 12 since 1991-92; and
that hallucinogen use by high schoolers has risen 75 percent
since 1988-89.
Notably, ONDCP itself admits more teenagers nationwide are
using heroin and marijuana, and that cocaine use is stable but
high.\96\
\96\ See ONDCP, ``Pulse Check: National Trends in Drug Abuse,''
December, 1994, pp. 5, 8 and 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Increasing Drug Related Juvenile Crime
Rising casual teenage drug use is closely correlated with
rising juvenile violent crime, as indicated by the 1995 Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP),
Department of Justice, report entitled Juvenile Offenders and
Victims: A National Report. Specifically, the OJJDP report now
indicates that ``one in three juvenile detainees were under the
influence of drugs at the time of their offense,'' based on the
National Institutes of Justice's (NIJ's) Drug Use Forecasting
program (DUF), and 81 percent of juvenile inmates admit having
used drugs at some point in their lifetime. Additionally, OJJDP
reports that the number of detainees testing positive for drugs
at the time of arrest in 1993 was ``substantially above'' the
number in 1992.
The correlation between reduced interdiction, increased
drug use and increasing juvenile crime reaches toward another
conclusion. Department of Justice projections indicate that if
rising teenage drug use and the close correlation with juvenile
crime continue, the Nation will experience a doubling of
violent crime by 2010.
According to OJJDP, ``[a]fter years of relative stability,
juvenile involvement in violent crime known to law enforcement
has been increasing,'' and ``[l]ooking to the future, the
report indicates that by the year 2010, the juvenile population
aged 10-17 is projected to grow more than 20 percent over the
1990 Census.'' \97\
\97\ U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Overview: Juvenile
Offenders and Victims: A National Report (September 1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Nature of Juvenile Drug Use Changing Toward Addiction
Also affecting this conclusion, the reported nature of
casual teenage drug use is also changing. Annual or infrequent
teenage experimentation with illegal drugs is being replaced by
regular, monthly, addictive teenage drug use. \98\
\98\ See 1995 PRIDE Study, supra; 1995 National Household Survey,
supra; and 1995 University of Michigan Monitoring the Future Study,
supra.
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e. Drug Emergencies At Record Level
As indicated earlier, another critical indication that cuts
in interdiction are having a negative impact on use and purity
of available drugs is alarming new data on drug related
emergencies.
Increasing drug related medical emergencies first became
obvious in the 1993 Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) Data,
collected from emergency rooms around the country and released
in December 1994. That data showed an 8 percent increase in
drug related emergency room cases between 1992 and 1993, with
45 percent being heroin overdoses. Cocaine was also at an all-
time high, having more than doubled since 1988, and marijuana
emergencies increased 22 percent between 1992 and 1993.
The DAWN data released in October 1995 darkens the
assessment. It shows that, in 1994, ``cocaine-related episodes
reached their highest level in history'' and registered a ``15
percent increase from 1993 and 40 percent increase from 1988.''
On top of this, marijuana or hashish-related emergencies rose
39 percent from 1993 to 1994, and total drug related emergency
cases rose 10 percent between 1993 and 1994.
f. Foreign Perceptions of U.S. Commitment Altered By
Clinton Reductions
Finally, and more broadly, testimony and interviews suggest
that the reduced commitment of the White House to interdiction
may have affected the foreign perception of the U.S. commitment
to the drug war. For example, Senator Hatch recently noted that
the White House is ``sending the wrong signals to our Latin and
Caribbean allies,'' while former DEA Administrator Bonner
testified that, for example, the ``deep cut in ONDCP has
symbolic significance not only in Washington . . . but around
the world . . . [since] [o]ur foreign allies read it as a
signal that the Clinton Administration is backing away from a
strong commitment to drug control policy.''
On interdiction specifically, Walters testified that the
Administration's deemphasis of international counternarcotics
``fuels calls in other countries for abandoning antidrug
cooperation.'' \99\
\99\ See also The New York Times (February 20, 1994), p. A6; The
New York Times (February 27, 1994), Section 4, p. 15.
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Walters also took issue with the Clinton Administration's
granting of a national security waiver to Colombia, which was
this year technically de-certified. He indicated that the
national security waiver obviated the decertification.
e. source country programs oversight
Drawing on expert hearing testimony and reliable
documentary evidence on the status of the Nation's source
country programs, including a 1995 in-country study by GAO, the
Subcommittee reviewed current source country programs.
The Subcommittee found that the Clinton Administration has
consciously authorized a ``controlled shift'' of resources from
the transit zone into the leading source countries, chiefly
Colombia, Bolivia and Peru.
The Subcommittee also found that the Clinton
Administration's source country programs have, according to GAO
and other expert testimony, been badly supervised, poorly
coordinated, given low priority by key agencies, and poorly
managed.
1. The ``Controlled Shift''
The President's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy not
only refocused demand reduction resources on drug treatment,
but theoretically refocused supply reduction resources on
source country programs. This refocusing was termed a
``controlled shift.''
The 1995 Strategy states the National Security Council
(NSC) conducted a ``lengthy review'' of drug trafficking in
1993 and concluded that ``a stronger focus on source countries
was necessary.'' Accordingly, the NSC (note: no mention is made
of any other agencies' input or ONDCP in reaching this
decision) ``determined that a controlled shift in emphasis was
required--a shift away from past efforts that focused primarily
on interdiction in the transit zones to new efforts that focus
on interdiction in and around source countries.'' \100\
\100\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February
1995, p. 44.
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Making this 1993 NSC recommendation national policy,
President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 14
(PDD-14),\101\ which called for (1) ``providing assistance to
those nations that show the political will to combat narco-
trafficking through institution building,'' (2) ``conducting
efforts to destroy narco-trafficking organizations,'' and (3)
``interdicting narcotics trafficking in both source countries
and transit zones,'' through the controlled shift of resources
from the transit zones.\102\
\101\ A Presidential Decision Directive is a written policy
declaration, signed by the President, which directs Executive branch
departments and agencies to follow a particular policy course. It is
usually issued in concert with implementing instructions.
\102\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February
1995, p. 44.
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Ironically, in view of the deep transit zone interdiction
cuts proposed and effectuated by President Clinton in 1993,
1994 and 1995 (and proposed for 1996), and the 1995 testimony
of ONDCP Director Brown that interdiction efforts are ``less
than effective,'' the 1995 Strategy states that, ``without
effective transit zone programs in place, the smooth
implementation of the new source country program will be
severely inhibited.'' \103\ The ``essential component'' of the
source country programs is ``economic development,'' or ``job
creation'' in fields other than illegal narcotics.\104\
\103\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February
1995, p. 44.
\104\ Id.
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2. GAO Study of Clinton's Source Country Programs
Through the collection of expert testimony from those
inside and outside the administration, and commissioning an in-
country GAO report on program effectiveness, the Subcommittee
learned that the Clinton Administration's source country
programs have been badly supervised, poorly coordinated,
subject to low priority by key agencies, poorly managed and, in
some cases, non-existent.
Testimony by GAO investigators, received by the
Subcommittee during an interdiction hearing on June 27, 1995,
raised serious concerns about these programs. For example, GAO
reported that:
<bullet> No one is ``in charge of antidrug activities in
the cocaine source countries;''
<bullet> There is a ``lack of coordination'' and
``confusion over the role of the offices responsible for
intelligence analysis and related operational plans;''
<bullet> ``The Drug Enforcement Administration is reducing
its presence in Colombia, [and] Southern Command is flying
fewer sorties per month in support of source country
interdiction;''
<bullet> United States funds in source countries ``are not
always well managed;''
<bullet> ``$45 million originally intended for counter
narcotics assistance to the cocaine source countries were
reprogrammed to assist Haiti's democratic transition;'' and
<bullet> Despite announcing in November 1993 that he would
``develop a separate strategy to combat the heroin trade''
within 120 days, President Clinton had not [as of June 1995]
developed or signed any heroin strategy.
3. Admiral Kramek's View in December 1994 of the Source Country
Programs
In Admiral Kramek's December 1994 letter to ONDCP Director
Lee Brown, the President's own Interdiction Coordinator
expressed the view, not only that there was an agency head
consensus that drug interdiction should ``return to the 1992-
1993 levels of effort,'' but also that this was necessary
``until such time as a viable, comprehensive source country
program is in place and producing necessary results.'' \105\ In
other words, as of December 1994, a ``viable source country
program'' was apparently neither ``in place'' nor ``producing
necessary results,'' according to the President's own
Interdiction Coordinator.
\105\ Letter of Admiral Robert Kramek to ONDCP Director Lee Brown,
December 1994, p. 1.
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4. Invitations Rejected By the President's National Security Advisor
and By the President
Since the NSC was responsible for PDD-14 which initiated
the shift of interdiction resources to the source countries,
the Subcommittee Chairman wrote to National Security Advisor
Anthony Lake in the Fall of 1995 and invited him to come before
Congress, privately if necessary, to discuss the status of the
drug war. The Subcommittee Chairman never received a response
to that invitation, suggesting disinterest on the part of the
National Security Advisor in discussing this issue with Members
of Congress concerned about the strategy shift.
Similarly, the Subcommittee Chairman has offered,
repeatedly and in writing, to discuss with the President a
bipartisan approach to restoring the drug war's effectiveness
and re-elevating the drug war as a national security issue. The
Subcommittee Chairman has further offered to coordinate a
meeting with the full National Security, International Affairs,
and Criminal Justice Subcommittee, with selected congressional
leaders, with the bipartisan drug policy group co-chaired by
Congressman Zeliff and Congressman Rangel (D-NY), or with the
newly constituted Senate-House Drug Policy Task Force.
The Subcommittee Chairman's invitations to the President to
meet with Members of Congress concerned about this issue began
in the March 9, 1995 Subcommittee hearing and continued
throughout 1995. In December 1995, after an invitation to meet
with a bipartisan group of congressional leaders on the drug
issue was physically handed to the President by one of the
Chairman's Subcommittee staffers following remarks of the
President at the national CADCA Conference, the Subcommittee
Chairman received a letter signed by a White House scheduler
indicating the President's appreciation for the Subcommittee
Chairman's ``support,'' and no interest in a meeting with
congressional leaders.
5. Conclusions on Source Country Programs
Despite the success of interdiction efforts in the late
1980's and early 1990's, including innovative efforts such as
resource ``pulses'' championed by former U.S. Coast Guard
Commandant and Admiral Paul Yost, the Clinton Administration
has abandoned the earlier transit zone strategy in favor of an
NSC strategy focused on the source countries, and ``economic
development'' in those countries.
In December 1994, the President's own Interdiction
Coordinator concluded that the source country programs were not
yet ``viable,'' and were neither ``in place'' nor ``producing
necessary results.'' \106\ No testimony given during 1995 by
ONDCP Director Lee Brown offered any concrete evidence that
this was not so.\107\
\106\ Id.
\107\ See. e.g. Testimony of Lee P. Brown, Subcommittee Hearings,
March 9, 1995 and April 6, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In June 1995, the General Accounting Office conducted a
comprehensive, in-country investigation of the source country
programs and found that no one was ``in charge of antidrug
activities in the cocaine source countries,'' there was a
``lack of coordination'' and ``confusion over the role of the
offices responsible for intelligence analysis and related
operational plans,'' ``the Drug Enforcement Administration
[was] reducing its presence in Colombia, [and] Southern Command
[was] flying fewer sorties per month in support of source
country interdiction,''
United States funds in source countries ``are not always
well managed,'' ``$45 million originally intended for counter
narcotics assistance to the cocaine source countries were
reprogrammed to assist Haiti's democratic transition,'' and
despite a November 1993 promise that he would ``develop a
separate strategy to combat the heroin trade'' within 120 days,
President Clinton had not developed or signed any heroin
strategy.
These findings point up serious flaws in the source country
shift strategy, and strongly suggest the need to rethink the
1993 shift. The seeming unwillingness of the National Security
Advisor to discuss with congressional leaders PDD-14 and its
implications gives rise to added concern.
f. prevention programs oversight
Drawing on expert hearing testimony from those inside and
outside the Administration, information learned during a
Chairman's visit to treatment and prevention programs with the
ONDCP Director, and reliable documentary evidence on the status
of the nation's prevention programs, the Subcommittee reviewed
current drug prevention policy.
Importantly, the Subcommittee found that, as with drug
interdiction and law enforcement, there is a broad, bi-partisan
consensus supporting effective and accountable drug prevention
programs as a central component of the drug war.
Encouragingly, just as prevention experts acknowledged the
importance of law enforcement and interdiction in any effective
drug use reduction strategy, interdiction and law enforcement
experts recognized the central role that must be played by
parental, community, State and Federal drug prevention efforts
if the resurgence of drug use among the nation's youth is to be
reversed.
Essentially, the Subcommittee found that, while many drug
prevention programs are ``validated'' and accountable, many are
neither validated nor accountable. In particular, the
Subcommittee received expert testimony and documentary evidence
supporting the view that the Safe and Drug Free Schools program
(SDFS), which provides seed money for some of the strongest
drug prevention programs nationwide, has also reportedly been
subject to serious misuse, waste and abuse of funding. While
this conclusion is tentative and needs further exploration, the
wide latitude in accountability is disturbing.
The Subcommittee found that documentary evidence from
several states suggests a need for tighter accountability
either in the governing statute or by the Department of
Education, as well as a clear need for further exploration of
the program's basic effectiveness. This second concern has two
parts. While a strong no-use message delivered through schools
and community programs was universally applauded, missing
financial audits and the content of some federally-funded
curricula gave rise to questions about what the SDFS funds were
actually expended on and precisely who, within the Federal
Government, was keeping track of those expenditures. The
Subcommittee, for example, received material from the
Department of Education (DoEd) indicating that DoEd recognizes
that it's current records do not allow it to identify with any
specificity either the groups that receive these funds or on
what they are expended.\108\
\108\ Documentation collected by the Department of Education from
several states indicates that a broad range of essentially undefined
groups receive SDFS monies, and there is often no description of the
purpose of the group, the purpose for which the Federal funds are
expended or the actual purchases made. These DoEd documents are on file
with the Subcommittee and are available for review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Again encouragingly, the SDFS accountability concern is
presently being addressed by investigations undertaken by the
Department of Education Inspector General's Office and
inspectors with the General Accounting Office. When specific
problems are identified through these investigations, the
Subcommittee intends to address them, again noting the strong
bipartisan support that exists for what experts testified is an
essential component of the drug war; that is, a clear ``no
use'' message and accountable drug prevention programs
targeting America's youth.
Overall, the Subcommittee found strong support for a
renewed national effort to stem rising youth drug use through
effective parental, local, State and Federal prevention
programs.
1. Prevention is Central to Drug War
Expert testimony received by the Subcommittee made it clear
that prevention is central to the Drug War.
a. Interdiction Experts Agree
Even interdiction experts, like Bennett, Bonner and Walters
agreed in Subcommittee hearings that prevention was central to
success, including parental, local, State and Federal
prevention efforts. Law enforcement experts testified that the
Byrne Grant program and prevention efforts, such as D.A.R.E.,
are effective and relied on heavily.\109\
\109\ Notably, funding for the Byrne Grant Program was increased,
against the budget cutting trend, by $25 million in the 104th Congress,
indicating that this program's effectiveness is widely recognized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After discussing the importance of interdiction and law
enforcement, Bennett noted that ``success in the drug war
depends above all on the efforts of parents and schools and
churches and police chiefs and judges and community leaders,''
and gave examples from more than 100 cities he visited as
President George Bush's White House Drug Czar.
Admiral Yost emphasized that interdiction alone will not
win the drug war, and that interdiction is just the foundation
for effective prevention, education and treatment--and ``that's
what'll win the war.''
b. The Partnership For a Drug-Free America Explains Broad
Effectiveness of Drug Prevention
Prevention experts were no less direct. Thomas Hedrick,
Jr., Vice Chairman of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America,
testified that prevention and interdiction advocates must begin
to work together, and that ``preventing drug use by young
people'' is essential ``if we are to have prayer of building
safe and healthy families and communities.''
He stressed that prevention is vital both for ethnic
minorities and ``the rest of America,'' especially since ``75
percent of all drug users are white . . .'' and drug use is not
just ``a problem of inner city ethnic kids.''
Hedrick favored increased parent involvement in setting a
``clear expectation of no use,'' as well as better in-school
education, and reduced exposure of children to ``pro-drug
information,'' especially exposure to the ``recent
reglamoraization of drug use in some of the media.''
At the Federal level, Hedrick expressed the view that
``Federal support and Federal leadership in making drugs a
critical national priority is essential, if we are to help
convince the media that this is an important issue.'' National
leaders must also tell those community leaders involved in this
fight that what they are doing is important.
c. The BEST Foundation Describes Differences Between
Validated and Unvalidated Prevention Programs
Similarly, Bridget Ryan, Executive Director of the BEST
Foundation for a Drug-Free Tomorrow, testified that a recent
RAND study [not the June 1994 treatment study] advocated drug
prevention as ``the first priority'' in curbing drug abuse.
Ryan distinguished between ``validated'' and
``unvalidated'' drug prevention programs, and urged that the
former be adequately funded, noting that the validated
prevention programs work.
According to Ryan, who described herself as ``on the front
line of the implementation process,'' there should be no
question that ``prevention can and does work, but our educators
and policy makers must be selective in funding and implementing
validated programs.'' Ryan noted that, ``it is estimated that
more than 2,000 non-validated programs are in use.''
Ryan testified that the latest RAND prevention study
disproves three common criticisms of prevention--``first, that
it works only for middle class, largely white, suburban
situations; second, that the programs work only for kids who
need them least; and finally, that prevention programs prevent
only trivial levels of use.''
RAND found that properly designed prevention programs, such
as Project Alert, ``work well in urban, suburban, and rural
areas, in middle- and low-income communities, and in schools
with high and low minority populations.'' Ryan notes that
another successful prevention program has been the BEST
Foundation's ``Nancy Reagan After School Program.''
Ryan did note that ``we need to make information about
valid [prevention] approaches more widely available and provide
incentives for educators to choose programs that have
demonstrated results,'' since drug prevention ``must be
specific.''
In addition, programs should provide ``continued
reinforcement during high school'' and ``funding to develop and
validate high school programs is critical,'' since ``education
and school-based programs should be at the core of
prevention.''
Ryan noted, in closing, that influences outside the
classroom--namely family and community--are also very important
in stemming childhood drug abuse.
d. Community Antidrug Coalitions of America (CADCA) Favors
Renewed National Leadership And Accountable, Well-
Funded Drug Prevention
James Copple, National Director of the Community Antidrug
Coalitions of America (CADCA), which is privately funded and
represents approximately 2,500 community coalitions nationwide,
testified that, ``CADCA members have been more than a little
frustrated with the failure of the nation's leadership to keep
the pervasiveness of drug abuse before the American people,''
he noted, since this is part of the prevention effort.
Referring to the 1995 White House ONDCP Strategy, Copple
testified that ``a strategy . . . is only as good as the
resources that follow it and the visible leadership that
advances it.'' More pointedly, he held that ``there must be a
national voice advocating for substance abuse prevention, and
that voice should be loudest from the White House and the
Congress.''
CADCA also believes that the Safe and Drug Free Schools
program is very important and, reported abuses notwithstanding,
has often been effective. He stressed that the Federal
Government still has a role, as Peter Drucker has written, in
conducting ``national crusades,'' and this is one. CADCA urged
Congress to ``embrace a national strategy that is
comprehensive, balanced and directs the majority of the
resources to local communities to address local problems.''
e. Texans' War on Drugs Program Favors Renewed Presidential
Leadership, Possible Separation of Prevention and
Treatment, And Block Grant of Unified Agency for
Prevention Programs
Charles Robert (``Bobby'') Heard, III, Director of Program
Services at the Texans' War on Drugs, credited the precipitous
drop in drug use ``between 1979 and 1992'' to substance abuse
prevention, and noted that ``no other social issue can claim
that kind of success.'' He testified that Nancy Reagan's impact
was profound, and that her ``Just Say No' campaign was key to
success in the 1980's. ``As we proved in the 1980's, with
national focus and attention . . . we can make a tremendous
difference in reducing demand,'' noted Heard.
On Presidential leadership, Texans' War on Drugs viewed as
``disheartening'' the ``President's . . . proposal to
consolidate the demonstration programs for the Center for
Substance Abuse Prevention and the Center for Substance Abuse
Treatment under SAMSA, the Substance Abuse Mental Health
Services Administration,'' since ``prevention and treatment are
two very different approaches to dealing with the drug
problem.'' Pointedly, Heard expressed concern that the
President is under-emphasizing prevention, in favor of
treatment.
Constructively, Texans War on Drugs notes that, ``in this
time of consolidation and cost savings, what might make sense
is to consolidate all Federal substance abuse prevention
programs under one agency or create a separate drug abuse
prevention block grant'' for the states, since this would not
pit prevention against treatment, but would preserve and target
the prevention monies.
f. New Hampshire Experts Urge Support for Byrne Grants,
Attention to Prevention, Treatment, Correctional
Programs
In discussing New Hampshire's successful 1995 experience
with the joint interagency task force concept, the Director of
the Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention, Geraldine
Sylvester, testified to the importance of ``giv[ing] equal
attention to the battle fronts of treatment and prevention,''
as well as the enhancement of prevention that can come from
student assistance programs, parental training and peer
leadership groups.
Manchester, New Hampshire Police Chief Peter Favreau and
Paul Brodeur, Commissioner of New Hampshire Department of
Corrections, strongly supported the Byrne grant program.
Brodeur urged particular support for a correctional options
program called ``Pathways,'' utilized by the New Hampshire
Department of Corrections. Brodeur noted that ``Pathways'' has
effectively employed education, substance abuse treatment and
employment counseling. Brodeur illustrated the importance of
programs like ``Pathways,'' by pointing out that in New
Hampshire 20 percent of the State's inmates are incarcerated
for drug related offenses, and 80 percent or more of the
inmates have substance abuse problems.
Other experts urging support for prevention efforts
included Manchester Mayor Ray Wieczorek who praised public-
private cooperation, United States Attorney Paul Gagnon who
urged continued Federal funding for all antidrug efforts, Dover
Police Captain Dana Mitchell who praised the D.A.R.E. program,
Executive Director of Nashua's Youth Council Michael Plourde
who urged community needs assessment prior to receipt of
Federal funds, and Manchester Police Seargeant Dick Tracy who
spoke strongly for the D.A.R.E. program and the need for
greater program flexibility.
2. Media Have a Key Role
The role of the media in stemming increased juvenile drug
use, as well as contributing to the rise of increased use
through the ``re-glamorization'' of drugs was much discussed by
experts.
Significantly, expert Thomas Hedrick of the Partnership for
a Drug-Free America reported that the Partnership has
received--since its inception--``over $2 billion in time and
space'' from the media. In 1990 and 1991, this produced roughly
one antidrug message per household per day.
Yet, Hedrick testified that ``support for these messages
has declined 20 percent in the past three years,'' apparently
``because the media is not as convinced that the drug issue is
as important as it was.''
He and others noted that media coverage is also down, from
600 antidrug stories on the three major networks in 1989 to 65
last year, which Hedrick believes is tantamount to ``zero''
from a communications point of view.
3. Accountability Concerns Are Serious, Specifically In Safe and Drug
Free Schools Act Monies
Despite strong bipartisan support for ``validated'' and
accountable prevention programs, the Subcommittee discovered
that many so-called prevention programs are neither validated
nor accountable.
Testimony from prevention expert G. Bridget Ryan of the
BEST Foundation for a Drug-Free Tomorrow, who described herself
as ``on the front line of the implementation process,''
indicated that while ``prevention can and does work,'' still
``our educators and policy makers must be selective in funding
and implementing validated programs.'' Ryan testified that,
``it is estimated that more than 2,000 non-validated programs
are in use.'' She urged Congress to insist that Federal funding
flow to validated programs.
Second, the Subcommittee received expert testimony and
documentary evidence supporting the view that the Safe and Drug
Free Schools program, which provides seed money for some of the
most effective drug prevention programs nationwide, including
documented successes in New Hampshire, Florida and elsewhere,
has also reportedly been subject to serious misuse, waste and
abuse of funding. Again, while this conclusion needs further
exploration, it is corroborated by documentation from a variety
of States and sources.
The Department of Education's Inspector General and the GAO
are both conducting investigations into the program, but prior
studies strongly suggest a need for greater accountability. The
aim of these efforts is not to downgrade or reduce support for
the SDFS program, but to assure that Federal monies are
distributed only to deserving, validated and genuine no-use
drug prevention programs.
At the April 6, 1995 Subcommittee hearing, Congresswoman
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen first raised the accountability issue,
noting that ``there is a growing concern that Federal
prevention monies have not only been wasted, mismanaged and
been ineffective, but . . . have been spent on educational
programs that teach value relativity and they decline to teach
that illegal drug use is wrong, just plain and simple wrong.''
Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen identified specific problem
programs, and sought an explanation from then-ONDCP Director
Lee Brown for Federal financing of so-called ``values
clarification'' curricula, including ``Quest,'' ``Here's
Looking At You Too,'' and other programs that did not deliver a
no-use message.
Unfortunately, while Dr. Brown acknowledged the potential
for abuse and disagreed with any program not teaching no-use,
he offered no proposals for or assurance of heightened
accountability. Asked what he would do about reported abuses in
Michigan, Massachusetts, Texas, Washington State, Kansas,
Indiana, and West Virginia, the ONDCP Director responded that
``the Department of Education administers the Safe and Drug
Free Schools Program . . . [and] we . . . have been working
with [them] in looking at how to set up standards for
addressing the problem.'' Brown added that the Department was
working ``to alleviate and hopefully eliminate all the abuses
in the program,'' and testified that ``I would be the first to
admit that there are abuses of the Safe and Drug Free Schools
program.''
A series of letters confirming these concerns from around
the Nation were introduced at that hearing, along with a study
released by the Michigan State Office of Drug Control Policy
documenting abuses in the Safe and Drug Free Schools monies.
While Ros-Lehtinen made clear that she favored accountable
prevention programs, she also explained that ``in Michigan,
more than $10 million in Federal funds intended to provide our
children a front line defense against drugs was utilized for
the following: Over $81,000 for large teeth and giant
toothbrushes; over $1.5 million on a human torso model used in
one lesson of one grade, not even in the drug section of the
curriculum; wooden cars with ping pong balls, over $12,300;
hokey pokey song, over $18,000; over $7000 on sheep eyes,
whatever that is; dog bone kits, $3,700; bicycle pumps,
$11,000; latex gloves, $122,000; over $300,000 was spent on how
we feel about sound.''
Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen concluded with another
constituent complaint: ``These nondirective programs are often
funded through Federal Drug Free School grants, yet they do not
usually comply with Federal law requiring that students be
taught that drug use is wrong and harmful.''
As disturbing was the curriculum material itself, also
introduced into the record, which clearly failed to admonish
against underage drinking or drug use, and in fact stated
``don't begin negatively with admonishments . . .''
When Congresswoman Thurman noted that attempts were made to
instill greater accountability in the Safe and Drug Free
Schools program during its last reauthorization, Congresswoman
Ros-Lehtinen conceded that this might be true, but added,
``these letters are dated March [1995], just a few weeks ago
when we announced that we were going to continue with these
hearings, and these teaching modules [which Ros-Lehtinen
displayed] are still going out [to schools],'' suggesting
accountability remains a serious concern.
Finally, on April 6, 1995, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen
introduced a July 15, 1994 letter into the record from Dr.
Brown to the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Elementary
and Secondary Education concerning the Safe and Drug Free
Schools Program. Ros-Lehtinen noted for Dr. Brown that, ``you,
yourself, pointed out seven accountability issues'' in this
letter, adding ``I believe it's hypocritical--excuse me, sir--
but for you to attack some of us who are pointing out the
ineffectiveness of the programs when you saw and wrote on it
yourself.''
Brown's only reply was that he was ``far from
hypocritical'' and that it was his ``responsibility'' to
address ``areas where we need improvement.'' Conceding that
``we have some abuses in the program,'' he saw deep cuts in the
program as inappropriate. He also conceded, however, that Safe
and Drug Free Schools monies ``go to more than just drug
education.''
On balance, the difference of opinion between those who
favored 1995 cuts in programs which appear subject to abuse,
such as Safe and Drug Free Schools, and those who did not favor
such cuts was relatively straight forward; the pivotal question
was whether to fund programs that are successful in some
locations, but in which there is also documented waste and
abuse, or whether to discontinue full funding.
This question aside, the aim shared by the Subcommittee and
Dr. Brown was to encourage effective and accountable drug
prevention programs, as well as adequate funding for such
programs, once accountability and a no-use message are assured.
4. Presidential Leadership Missing
During 1993, 1994 and most of 1995, the President spoke out
rarely about either the need for demand side reduction of
illegal drug use, or the need for supply side measures to stem
the rise of international narcotics trafficking. An objective
look at the President's compiled pubic addresses,
communications with Congress, and discussions with foreign
leaders reveals that presidential use of the ``bully pulpit''
for drawing public attention to the illegal drug crisis was a
low personal priority for this President.
In addition to the frustrations expressed by agency heads
in gaining the President's attention, including Admiral Kramek,
the President hardly spoke on the topic. In 1993, President
Clinton made seven addresses to the Nation; drugs were
mentioned in none of them. His presidential papers reveal only
13 references to illegal drugs in a total of 1,628 statements,
addresses and interviews. During 1994, presidential leadership
was little better; of 1,742 presidential statements, only 11
contained any mention of illegal drugs. Experts in the
agencies, including GAO, and in the field agree that the
effectiveness of the ONDCP Director is directly affected by the
leadership and support of the President.
5. Fact-Finding Trip With Director of ONDCP
In May 1995, the Subcommittee Chairman travelled to drug
treatment and prevention programs with then-ONDCP Director Lee
Brown, including a prison treatment program at the Roxbury
Prison for Woman in Massachusetts. During that fact finding
trip, the Chairman discussed prevention programs with the
experts and the children directly affected by them; he
discussed drug treatment programs in the prison with experts
and with the prisoners affected, and discussed programs outside
the prison with those who founded them and those who benefitted
them. This information gave rise to testimony at the June 27,
1995 hearing from students affected by drugs and drug
prevention programs, as well as to testimony at the September
25, 1995 hearing from experts in all fields at the New
Hampshire field hearing.
6. Conclusions on Prevention Policy
Essentially, there was wide agreement that prevention
should be a priority, both for the National Drug Control
Strategy and for National Leaders, including individual Members
and the President. Congresswoman and Ranking minority member
Thurman (D-Florida) echoed a position shared by Dr. Brown, the
Subcommittee Chairman, and others on the Subcommittee, that
some programs funded through the Safe and Drug Free Schools Act
have been highly successful. For example, Thurman observed that
several programs in Florida, which are administered by local
school boards with qualified advisory councils, have been well
received, and the Subcommittee Chairman spoke in favor of the
D.A.R.E. program.
On the other hand, it seems clear that serious
accountability problems in the SDFS Act and its administration,
including financial accountability, program validation, and
concerns about waste, fraud and abuse require a closer
examination. While the Subcommittee supports effective programs
funded by SDFS, members believe that the SDFS Act, the
Department of Education's administrative role, and the
programs' accountability mechanisms must be reviewed. The aim,
however, is correcting deficiencies, not elimination of the
national prevention effort. To this end, the Subcommittee is
monitoring the two on-going investigations by the DoE Inspector
General and the GAO.
g. treatment programs oversight
Expert testimony and reliable documentation supported the
Subcommittee's review of national drug treatment strategy.
While this area requires further exploration, the Subcommittee
confirmed the Administration's demand reduction shift toward
treatment of chronic or hardcore addicts, and recognized the
element of treatment as one part of any effective national drug
strategy.
On the other hand, the Subcommittee was not persuaded that
the demand reduction side of the drug war should be tipped
toward treatment, particularly at the expense of prevention.
Moreover, while the Subcommittee heard expert testimony in
support of drug treatment, it also received expert testimony
severely questioning program effectiveness. Finally, since the
public rationale for the Clinton Administration's shift toward
treatment repeatedly came back to the June 1994 RAND study,
this study was reviewed and found to be a weak basis for
guiding national drug policy.
1. Background: Treatment Needed in Drug War
There was wide agreement that drug treatment, particularly
for prison inmates, must be one part of the drug war. Virtually
all qualified witnesses, from prevention experts like Charles
Robert Heard, III, of Texans' War on Drugs, to treatment
experts, such as John Ahman, of New Hampshire's Marathon House,
to interdiction experts, like Admiral Yost, former U.S. Coast
Guard Commandant, concurred that treatment is one aspect of
demand reduction.
Moreover, the Subcommittee Chairman, travelling with ONDCP
Director Lee Brown, was favorably impressed by the inmates'
treatment program utilized at the Roxbury, Massachusetts
Women's Prison.
This administration's basic rationale for treatment funding
is removal from the Nation's user population of the 20 percent
of the chronic or hardcore users, who consume upwards to 80
percent of the cocaine in the country. Another rationale was
explained by John Ahman of New Hampshire's Marathon House.
Effective treatment, Ahman testified, means that ``after
treatment, recovering addicts are less likely to be involved in
crime and more likely to be employed,'' thus they become
positive contributors to society rather than a cost or threat.
2. Administration Shift to Treatment
The Subcommittee heard evidence of the Administration's
overt shift to treatment at the expense of other demand
reduction efforts.
Accordingly, Brown testified that the President was seeking
``$2.8 billion for treatment'' in the fiscal 1996 Federal
budget for what Brown said were the ``one million drug users in
this country who need and can benefit from treatment but cannot
get it.''
Seeking to explain the Administration's shift to
proportionately greater drug treatment spending in 1995, Dr.
Brown testified that ``the best way to reduce the overall
demand for drugs and the related crime and violence is to
reduce the number of hardcore drug users,'' adding that
``treatment works.''
In defense of this statement, Brown cited a June 1994 RAND
study that reportedly found that ``drug treatment is the most
cost effective drug control intervention'' and, Brown asserted,
``for every dollar invested in drug treatment in 1992,
taxpayers saved $7 in crime and health care costs.''
In addition, Brown observed that ``chronic hardcore drug
users comprise 20 percent of the drug user population but
consume two-thirds of the drugs . . .'' From this, he argued
that past strategies ignored this important part of the drug
problem.
3. Contrary to ONDCP Assertions, Treatment Funding Grew in Past
Strategies
The record indicates that ONDCP Director Brown's assertion
that ``past strategies [sic] ignore this important
[treatment]'' is not an accurate portrait of the past.
While the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy does increase
the proportion of overall spending devoted to treatment, past
strategies have included--and have steadily increased--funding
for treatment. In fact, Federal treatment funding has increased
every year from 1982 to 1995.\110\
\110\ See, e.g., Losing Ground Against Drugs: A Report on
Increasing Illicit Drug Use and National Drug Policy, Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, December 1995, p. 6. Specifically, ONDCP's own 1995
Budget Summary accompanying the National Drug Control Strategy shows,
p. 238, that Federal treatment spending was $505.6 million in fiscal
1982, yet Federal treatment spending today tops $2.65 billion. National
Drug Control Strategy: Budget Summary, The White House, February 1995,
p. 238.
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4. Treatment Limitations: Bureaucracy
At the Subcommittee's March 9, 1995 hearing, Walters
testified that, ``between 1988 and 1993, we roughly tripled the
treatment budget of the Federal government,'' while the
``number of people treated per year declined.'' The decline,
according to Walters, was the result of ``bureaucracy'' and
money being channeled to ineffective treatment programs.
5. Treatment Limitations: Effectiveness
The Subcommittee heard testimony indicating that low
effectiveness plagues many drug treatment programs, while
others suffer from an absence of any measure of effectiveness.
Again, on March 9, 1995, Judge Bonner testified that ``the
Clinton Strategy badly oversells the efficacy of the treatment
of hardcore drug abusers'' and fails to acknowledge that
``studies repeatedly indicate the low success rates associated
with many programs . . .''
Specifically, Bonner cited the work of Harvard University's
Mark Kleiman, a former member of the Clinton Justice Department
Transition Team, which shows that, ``even the most expensive
treatment programs--long-term residential treatment programs
costing as much as $20,000/patient--have success rates as low
as 15 to 25 percent.''
On questioning, Bonner reminded the Subcommittee that,
``with respect to crack addicts . . . after treatment programs,
less than 10 percent are free of drugs, free of crack after 24
weeks, so you don't want to put too many eggs in that
[treatment] basket.''
In addition, Walters argued that the administration has
failed to create the number of treatment ``slots'' necessary to
accommodate its own stated treatment priority, and the current
strategy has also failed to reduce the number of chronic,
hardcore drug user numbers--which is rising.
Specifically, Walters explained that the Federal
``government [drug] treatment bureaucracy is manifestly
ineffective,'' as evidenced by the Clinton Administration's
increased treatment funding on one hand, and failure to provide
sufficient treatment slots to effectuate this policy on the
other; ``[a]though Federal drug treatment spending almost
tripled between FY 1988 and FY 1994, the number of treatment
slots remained virtually unchanged and the estimated number of
persons treated declined--from 1,557,000 in 1989 to 1,412,000
in 1994,'' Walters testified.
Additionally, the contention that hardcore use has been
reduced through heightened emphasis on treatment is belied by
data gathered by the non-partisan Drug Abuse Warning Network
(DAWN) from emergency rooms around the country, which shows
that ``drug related emergency room cases . . . have reached the
highest levels ever, in reporting going back to 1978'' and
``[c]ocaine, heroin, and marijuana cases all increased sharply
to record levels [in 1994].''
Responding to questions from Congressman Condit (D-CA),
Brown repeated that the Administration was turning away from
strategies of ``previous administrations [which] placed a
greater emphasis on casual drug [use] reduction,'' in favor of
more treatment.
6. The June 1994 RAND Treatment Study: A Poor Basis For National Drug
Policy
ONDCP Director Brown repeatedly sought to justify
proportionately greater funding for treatment in the national
strategy by reference to a June 1994 RAND study. The June 1994
RAND study reportedly found that ``drug treatment is the most
cost effective drug control intervention,'' according to Brown.
Brown also credited the study for concluding that, ``for every
dollar invested in drug treatment in 1992, taxpayers saved $7
in crime and health care costs.'' By all indications, this was
the centerpiece of Brown's request for ``$2.8 billion for
treatment'' in the fiscal 1996 Federal budget.
Such heavy reliance on this study, and the findings
attributed to it, are reason for concern. First, Brown did not
comment on the arguments raised by Walters, Bennett, and Bonner
against increasing treatment spending vis-a-vis other demand
reduction programs, including the arguments that treatment has
low success rates and ``slots'' are unavailable.
But the study itself also deserves special attention. The
June 1994 RAND study was conducted by C. Peter Rydell and Susan
S. Everingham and entitled ``Controlling Cocaine: Supply versus
Demand Programs.'' While the study is of value, it is readily
misinterpreted, has clear limitations, and operates from
assumptions that few would accept.
Before examining methodology, two observations on substance
are important. First, the study is sound in condemning
legalization. Second, the study implicitly condemns the
Administration's ``controlled shift'' from interdiction to
source country programs.
On legalization, the RAND study notes the devastating
effect that drug legalization would have on use, through the
economic mechanism of reduced prices, or price elasticity. In
1994, the average street or retail price for a pure gram of
cocaine was $143; if cocaine were legalized, the estimated
retail price would be $15-$20 per gram.\111\
\111\ See RAND Study, supra, pp. 11, 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On ``controlled shift,'' the RAND study concludes that
dollar-for-dollar, interdiction is more effective than pumping
money into source country programs. Ironically, the
Administration embraces the study's pro-treatment conclusion,
yet must reject this anti-source country program conclusion; to
date, Brown and the Administration have been silent on this
discontinuity.
As one drug policy expert favorably disposed to the RAND
study conceded, ``[t]his analysis implies that the National
Drug Control Strategy's `controlled shift' of resources from
interdiction to source-country control might be a misstep.''
\112\
\112\ Schnaubelt, Christopher, ``Drug treatment Versus Supply
Reduction: Which Is Cheaper?,'' National Interagency Counterdrug
Institute, May 1995, p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In any event, the RAND study has other serious limitations.
First, the RAND study gives no attention to prevention
programs; it simply does not take prevention into account as a
viable means for reducing demand for cocaine. This is a serious
omission, since prevention is widely recognized as a central
and effective means for demand reduction.\113\
\113\ See, e.g., Gleason, Thomas J., Hall, Douglas J., Oliver,
William D., The Executive Summary of PRIDE Communities: A Grassroots
Drug Prevention Effort for Healthy Teens, PRIDE, August, 1995; Burke,
James, E., An Overview of Illegal Drugs in America, Partnership For A
Drug-Free America, Fall, 1995; Johnson, Dr. Lloyd G., Monitoring the
Future, December 1995, University of Michigan Institute for Social
Research.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disturbingly, the President's 1995 Strategy is oddly
consonant with the RAND study's omission of prevention, since
it asserts that ``Anti-drug messages are losing their potency
among the Nation's youth.'' \114\
\114\ See National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February
1995, p. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the RAND study does not follow users for a
meaningful time after active treatment, but notes only that
cocaine consumption falls during residential and out-patient
treatment. The study acknowledges that once treatment ends,
only about 12 percent of out-patient and 17 percent of
residential treatment recipients stop heavy use of
cocaine.\115\ The Subcommittee finds that the Administration's
treatment policy is seriously misguided as it centers on 12 to
17 percent reductions in the smaller of the two user
populations (i.e. the 20 percent of users who are hardcore).
\115\ C. Peter Rydell and Susan S. Everingham, ``Controlling
Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs,'' RAND Drug Policy Research
Center, Santa Monica, California, June 1994, pp. 24-25, 88-89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, the RAND study favors treatment chiefly because it
has a ``direct'' impact on users, minimizing supply side
programs (e.g., interdiction, source country, domestic law
enforcement, which affect a larger number of users because they
have only an ``indirect'' impact on users. On the other hand,
the RAND study acknowledges that higher street prices,
resulting from interdiction, source country programs and
domestic law enforcement, do reduce consumption.
Finally, the RAND study uses a measure of effectiveness
that is arguably flawed. It does not measure effectiveness by a
reduction in cocaine users, but by reduction in the overall
amount of cocaine consumed in the United States. Since the
study holds that hardcore users, on average, use eight times
the cocaine that casual users do, it becomes easy to justify
treatment if this measure is employed.
On the other hand, if the aim of national drug control
policy is to reduce the number of users (not the amount of
cocaine imported), a strategy favoring treatment would likely
be catastrophic; while cocaine imports might fall, the total
user population would grow as casual use climbed (even if all
hardcore addicts at the time of initiation were cured). Experts
agree that a certain percentage of casual users become hardcore
users, thus the treatment strategy would soon become a losing
battle to reduce the growing number of hardcore users
multiplying out of the rapidly growing casual user population.
In fact, that is exactly what the current strategy is
fostering. Casual use is now rapidly growing, and with it the
number of hardcore users, even if 10 to 17 percent of the
original hardcore user population are being successfully
treated.
Most conservative extrapolations of the number of casual
users that become hardcore addicts, for example those given by
former Carter Cabinet member Joseph Califano, indicate that
such a strategy would lead to a Nation awash in young cocaine
addicts.
Califano's Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at
Colombia University recently concluded that, ``[i]f historical
trends continue, the jump in marijuana use among America's
children (age 12-18) from 1992 to 1994 signals that 820,000
more of these children will try cocaine in their lifetime . . .
of that number, about 58,000 will become regular cocaine users
and addicts.''
7. Treatment Conclusions
Essentially, all informed observers understand that
treatment programs are part of any effective drug control
strategy. On the other hand, the RAND study supporting a
priority on treatment is flawed and omits prevention
altogether. Moreover, the Administration's deliberate shift to
treatment of older, chronic, hardcore addicts has not reduced
the number of hardcore addicts. It has also come at an enormous
opportunity cost, namely the skyrocketing of casual, juvenile
use, and the associated increases in juvenile crime.\116\
\116\ The December 1994 University of Michigan study of 8th, 10th
and 12th-graders showed that marijuana use ``rose sharply in 1994, as
it did in 1993, after virtually a decade of steady decline'' and that
``student attitudes were becoming significantly less hostile toward
illegal drug use;'' See also University of Michigan, Monitoring the
Future Study, December 1994; ``Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A
National Report, OJJDP, Department of Justice, September 1995, p. 20,
which indicates that ``one in three juvenile detainees were under the
influence of drugs at the time of their offense.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even advocates of drug treatment acknowledge that many
programs are ineffective, and that long-term success rates are
seldom higher than 20 percent. There can be little question
that more research into varying drug treatment approaches and
programs is necessary; finding effective methods for employing
current treatment techniques and identifying new treatment
techniques are important objectives.
The implications of these findings are several. First,
treatment should remain part of the overall strategy, but
funding must be targeted at proven and effective programs,
which may lie more often in correctional institutions.
Second, treatment should not be raised in priority, or
increased disproportionately in funding, as has occurred in
1993, 1994 and 1995; that shift within the demand reduction mix
has unfairly reduced the emphasis on prevention--with
devastating results. Since 80 percent of drug use is casual use
by youth, the strategy must be directed toward the at-risk
population, especially since a large percentage of that
population would thereafter become addicted.
III. Conclusions and Recommendations
a. conclusions
On interdiction policy, despite an expert consensus that
interdiction is vital, there has been a reduced emphasis on
drug interdiction by the Clinton Administration. President
Clinton is undeniably responsible for a downgrading of
interdiction within the National Drug Control Strategy, and for
interdiction budget cuts in 1993, 1994 and 1995, many of which
explain an absence of previously deployed assets.
Objective indicators of Federal support for the counter
narcotics effort show a substantial reduction both in resources
committed to key areas and in overall deployment of assets to
drug interdiction. By admission of the Administration, key
interdiction budget numbers are substantially below prior
highwater marks (i.e. ``1992-1993 levels''), lines formerly
defined as the minimum necessary for effective conduct of the
Drug War.
Despite the success of interdiction efforts in the late
1980's and early 1990's, including innovative efforts such as
resource ``pulses'' championed by former U.S. Coast Guard
Commandant and Admiral Paul Yost, the Clinton administration
has abandoned the earlier transit zone strategy in favor of an
NSC strategy focused on the source countries, and ``economic
development'' in those countries.
On the source country programs, in December 1994, the
President's own Interdiction Coordinator concluded that the
source country programs were not yet ``viable,'' and were
neither ``in place'' nor ``producing necessary results.'' \117\
No testimony given during 1995 by ONDCP Director Lee Brown
offered any concrete evidence that this was not so.\118\
\117\ Id.
\118\ See. e.g. Testimony of Lee P. Brown, Subcommittee Hearings,
March 9, 1995 and April 6, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In June 1995, the General Accounting Office conducted a
comprehensive, in-country investigation of the source country
programs and found that no one was ``in charge of antidrug
activities in the cocaine source countries,'' there was a
``lack of coordination'' and ``confusion over the role of the
offices responsible for intelligence analysis and related
operational plans,'' ``the Drug Enforcement Administration
[was] reducing its presence in Colombia, [and] Southern Command
[was] flying fewer sorties per month in support of source
country interdiction,''
United States funds in source countries ``are not always
well managed,'' ``$45 million originally intended for counter
narcotics assistance to the cocaine source countries were
reprogrammed to assist Haiti's democratic transition,'' and
despite a November 1993 promise that he would ``develop a
separate strategy to combat the heroin trade'' within 120 days,
President Clinton had not developed or signed any heroin
strategy.
These findings point up serious flaws in the source country
shift strategy, and strongly suggest the need to rethink the
1993 shift. The seeming unwillingness of the National Security
Advisor to discuss with congressional leaders PDD-14 and its
implications gives rise to added concern.
On prevention, there was wide agreement that prevention
should be a priority, both for the National Drug Control
Strategy and for National leaders, including individual Members
and the President. Congresswoman and Ranking Minority Member
Thurman (D-Florida) echoed a position shared by Dr. Brown, the
Subcommittee Chairman, and others on the Subcommittee, that
some programs funded through the Safe and Drug Free Schools Act
have been highly successful. On the other hand, it seems clear
that serious accountability problems in the SDFS Act and its
administration, including financial accountability, program
validation, and concerns about waste, fraud and abuse require a
closer examination. While the Subcommittee supports effective
programs funded by SDFS, Members believe that the SDFS Act, the
Department of Education's administrative role, and the
programs' accountability mechanisms must be reviewed. The aim,
however, is correcting deficiencies, not elimination of the
national prevention effort. To this end, the Subcommittee is
monitoring the two ongoing investigations by the Department of
Education Inspector General and GAO.
On treatment, nearly all informed observers understand that
treatment programs are part of any effective drug control
strategy. On the other hand, the RAND study supporting a
priority on treatment is flawed and omits prevention
altogether. Moreover, the Administration's deliberate shift to
treatment of older, chronic, hardcore addicts has not reduced
the number of hardcore addicts. It has also come at an enormous
opportunity cost, namely the skyrocketing of casual, juvenile
use, and the associated increases in juvenile crime.\119\
\119\ The December 1994 University of Michigan study of 8th, 10th
and 12th-graders showed that marijuana use ``rose sharply in 1994, as
it did in 1993, after virtually a decade of steady decline'' and that
``student attitudes were becoming significantly less hostile toward
illegal drug use;'' See also University of Michigan, Monitoring the
Future Study, December 1994; ``Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A
National Report, OJJDP, Department of Justice, September 1995, p. 20,
which indicates that ``one in three juvenile detainees were under the
influence of drugs at the time of their offense.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even advocates of drug treatment acknowledge that many
programs are ineffective, and that long-term success rates are
seldom higher than 20 percent. More and better research into
drug treatment approaches is necessary, since finding effective
methods for employing current treatment techniques and
identifying new techniques are both worthy objectives.
The implications of these findings are several. First,
treatment should remain part of the overall strategy, but
funding must be targeted at proven and effective programs,
which may lie more often in correctional institutions.
Second, treatment should not be raised in priority, or
increased disproportionately in funding, as has occurred in
1993, 1994 and 1995; that shift within the demand reduction mix
has unfairly reduced the emphasis on prevention--with
devastating results. Since 80 percent of drug use is casual use
by youth, the strategy must be directed toward the at-risk
population, especially since a large percentage of that
population would thereafter become addicted.
b. recommendations
As indicated above, the Subcommittee arrived at its
recommendations for an improved national drug strategy after
review of the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy and an
assessment of the status of the Drug War; the Subcommittee's
review and assessment were based upon the receipt of expert
testimony and reliable documentary evidence, reference to
General Accounting Office studies commissioned by the
Subcommittee, and contacts with experts inside and outside the
Federal Government. Based on that searching inquiry, the
committee advances the following recommendations for
improvement of the Nation's national drug control strategy:
First, to assure that the drug war becomes a top national
priority, the President should, in close consultation with
Congress, establish an overall budget that places counter
narcotics high among national priorities.
Second, to reverse the rise in casual drug use by
juveniles, the President should, in close consultation with
Congress, establish a National Drug Control Strategy which
returns accountable prevention programs to highest priority
among Federal demand reduction programs, and does not
disproportionately favor increased drug treatment.
Third, to reverse the rise in illegal drug importation,
high drug availability, high drug purities, and low street
prices, the President should, in close consultation with
Congress, establish a National Drug Control Strategy which
returns well-coordinated interdiction programs to highest
priority among Federal supply reduction programs, and does not
embrace further cuts in interdiction assets or funding, or
otherwise shift interdiction assets or funding to source
country programs, other than source country interdiction
programs.
Fourth, to restore accountability to ONDCP and the national
drug policy, the President should return to promulgating, in
compliance with the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988, a clear set of
measurable and quantifiable annual goals as part of the annual
National Drug Control Strategy.
Fifth, to restore accountability, the overall National Drug
Control Strategy should be more than descriptive, and more than
a collection of laudable goals to which agencies aspire. The
Strategy should become the standard against which success or
failure of all agencies' antidrug programs are measured; the
Strategy should also be the basic document against which future
justification for antidrug funding at each agency is measured.
Sixth, to restore accountability to demand reduction
programs, the President, in close consultation with Congress,
should establish workable accountability mechanisms and clear
measures of effectiveness, either by statute or regulation.
Prevention programs that have no means for assuring
accountability, that cannot demonstrate achievement of any
measurable goals, or that do not fund ``no use'' messages
should not qualify for Federal monies and should be unfunded in
subsequent budget cycles; similarly, treatment programs unable
to assure accountability and effectiveness should be unfunded;
Seventh, to restore accountability to supply reduction
programs (e.g. source country programs), the President, in
close consultation with Congress, should establish workable
accountability mechanisms; while effectiveness may be more
difficult to measure on the supply side, programs that have no
means for assuring accountable expenditures or fail to meet
previously established goals should be unfunded in subsequent
budget cycles;
Eighth, to restore accountability, coordination and
meaningful ONDCP guidance of the overall Federal antidrug
efforts, antidrug programs that receive their justification in
the annual ONDCP Drug Strategy Budget should be identified with
greater specificity, and the 50-plus agencies that receive
funding through these programs should be required to place the
details of each program before ONDCP Director prior to the
production of succeeding annual budgets;
Ninth, to restore accountability and coordination of the
Nation's overall drug strategy, the White House Drug Czar
should become the chief voice within the Administration on
whether programs continue to be funded or not and at what
levels, in consultation with OMB and the appropriations
committees. However, in all antidrug efforts, the Drug Czar--
and not individual agency heads--should then be viewed by the
President, OMB and Congress as the primary decision-maker on
national drug policy;
Tenth, the Drug Czar should be placed ``in charge'' of
organization and coordination of the drug war (both as a
``theater commander'' and demand reduction promoter), the
President should be unequivocal, vocal and constant in his
support of the Drug Czar, and should delegate to him or her the
fullest authority possible on all issues relating to the
Nation's counter narcotics efforts;
Eleventh, in support of the Drug Czar, the President should
insist that all relevant agency heads coordinate antidrug
activities directly through that person, and insist that all
major counternarcotics decisions be approved by that person.
Moreover, the one document that should govern all coordination
efforts should be the National Drug Control Strategy;
Twelfth, the President should maximize the Drug Czar's
authority by:
<bullet> Funding ONDCP itself back to late 1980's levels;
<bullet> Expressly delegating all authority for program
prioritization and, in consultation with OMB, selected budget
matters to ONDCP;
<bullet> Expressly giving ONDCP the authority to evaluate
antidrug program effectiveness across all agencies of the
Federal Government, and the authority to offer the primary
recommendation to the President and Congress on program
continuation, enhancement, reduction or elimination;
<bullet> Insisting that all agency heads meet personally
with the ONDCP Director at least quarterly, following a format
similar to the never-repeated October 1994 drug interdiction
agency head conference
<bullet> Confirming that the White House Drug Czar's
priorities are the President's priorities in all contacts with
agency heads.
<bullet> Publicly supporting efforts of the White House
Drug Czar and ONDCP through regular discussion in the media,
with Cabinet Officials, and in periodic addresses to the Nation
or other public speeches.
Thirteenth, to demonstrate the President's constant
concern, awareness and consistent support for the Nation's Drug
Control Strategy, and the many public and private sector
advocates and implementors of policies within or consistent
with that Strategy, the President should speak out regularly on
the topic, utilizing the presidential ``bully pulpit'' to
elevate the issue and build public support for demand-and
supply reduction efforts.
Fourteenth, to bring the issue immediately back to the
forefront of the Nation's agenda, the President should consider
one or all of the following: an address to the Nation from the
Oval Office or to a Joint Session of Congress on the topic of
exploding teenage drug use; a series of White House Drug Policy
Conferences, including one each on prevention, narcotics-
related law enforcement, interdiction, source country programs,
treatment programs, and the role of the media; meeting
personally with Congressional leaders on this issue at least
once or twice annually, notably the Bi-Partisan Drug Policy
Group (currently co-chaired by Congressman Bill Zeliff, R-NH,
and Congressman Charles Rangel, D-NY) or a similar
counternarcotics leadership group; and appoint a bipartisan
White House Commission on ``Winning the Drug War,'' to study
the evolving options in depth and report new policy ideas and
findings to the President and Congress for swift action.
Fifteenth, in specific support of supply reduction, the
National Drug Control Strategy should:
<bullet> Elevate the drug war threat on the National
Security Council's list of national security priorities to a
top position;
<bullet> Restore funding for interdiction efforts, as
recommended by the current U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, to
``1992-1993 levels;''
<bullet> Restore funding to ONDCP for staff and policy
support lost in 1993 Administration cuts;
<bullet> Restore funding for intelligence gathering lost
between 1993 and 1995, including Navy P-3 AEW or additional E2-
C aircraft;
<bullet> Restore lost Ship Days, National Guard Container
Search Works Days, and Flight Hours lost in 1993, 1994 and 1995
Administration cuts;
<bullet> Restore to the Transit Zone the lost airborne and
stationary radars, Jayhawk helicopters, Coast Guard Cutters and
SES Patrol Boats, HU-25 Falcon Interceptor aircraft (five
lost), E2-C Hawkeye AEW aircraft (4 lost), EC130-V AEW aircraft
with rotodome (transferred to DoD), modernized sea-based
aerostats (all lost), and personnel, including Transit Zone
personnel and personnel formerly assigned to C3I East,
subsequently consolidated into the Customs Domestic Air
Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC) and suffering
``serious manning shortages;''
<bullet> Fund excess U.S. Navy P-3 Airframes for conversion
with AEW radars to be operated by U.S. Customs.
<bullet> Establish a process for direct, regular
communications between the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC)
and the National Security Advisor, if not also between the USIC
and the President;
<bullet> Issue the missing agency Implementation Guidelines
that should have accompanied the November 1995 Heroin Strategy;
<bullet> Provide sufficient staff to the USIC (who now
coordinates the nation's interdiction policy with a staff of
6);
<bullet> Rescind or modify PDD-14 to reflect either a
slower shift of resources or no shift at all toward source
country programs;
<bullet> Insist on accountability mechanisms in source
country programs that assure improved management, interagency
coordination, clarity and targeting;
<bullet> Restore support for law enforcement's counter
narcotics mission through a combination of greater flexibility
by block grants, increasing the Byrne Grant and similar
programs, heightened drug prosecutions in the Federal courts,
and encouraging increased cross-over of high technologies
available to the military but not yet economically to law
enforcement;
<bullet> Encourage wider use of joint interagency task
forces, by reducing jurisdictional conflicts, bureaucratic
impediments, and restrictive regulations, as well as
rechannelling funds to these joint efforts;
<bullet> Promptly replace, through efficient action by the
State Department, critical source country assets that perish or
are destroyed in pursuit of counternarcotics objectives
believed by the President to be important to the overall U.S.
counternarcotics effort, for example helicopters lost in
efforts by the Columbian National Police during efforts to
effectuate aims that are fully consistent with the U.S. source
country and counternarcotics mission; \120\
\120\ See, e.g., 14 November 1995 letter by Congressmen William H.
Zeliff, Charles Rangel, Bill Clinger, Ben Gilman, Tim Hutchinson, Gene
Green, Victor Frazer, Dan Burton, Peter Blute, Mark Souder, Robert
Ehrlich, Bob Dornan, Jon Fox, Clay Shaw, Sue Myrick, and Donald Payne
to The Honorable Robert Gelbard, Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of State.
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<bullet> Effectively utilize the Annual Certification
Procedures contained in the Foreign Assistance Act, Section
490A, 22 U.S.C. 229, et seq., to encourage counternarcotics
cooperation between the United States and drug source
countries.
Sixteenth, in specific support of demand side, the National
Drug Control Strategy should:
<bullet> Reaffirm the central place of drug prevention in
the overall national drug strategy;
<bullet> Respond to recommendations that develop out of the
GAO and Department of Education investigations of prevention
program accountability, including the accountability of the
Safe and Drug Free Schools Program;
<bullet> Encourage greater private sector and media support
for drug prevention efforts nationwide;
<bullet> Offer greater flexibility to States and
localities, through mechanisms such as a separate prevention
block grant (independent of treatment), while clearly
supporting only ``no use'' messages and ``no use'' curricula;
<bullet> Encourage greater cooperation among the prevention
and law enforcement communities, while increasing support for
such overlapping programs as the Byrne Grants, D.A.R.E. and
G.R.E.A.T. programs;
<bullet> Fund only ``validated'' prevention programs;
<bullet> Encourage the establishment of accepted criteria
for effective drug treatment and the creation of programs that
are likely to meet these criteria;
<bullet> Encourage greater application of effective
treatment programs in correctional institutions;
<bullet> Provide opportunities for the President to
regularly and forcefully speak out on the issue;
<bullet> Explore means for establishing a larger number of
overall treatment ``slots,'' so long as the treatment programs
under consideration are effective;
<bullet> Reducing the Federal ``treatment bureaucracy'' to
allow a greater flow of treatment funds to the states and
localities outside Washington, D.C;
<bullet> Consider increased funding for research into
potentially more effective drug treatment.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. KAREN L. THURMAN, HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, HON.
TOM LANTOS, HON. ROBERT E. WISE, JR., HON. MAJOR R. OWENS, HON.
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, HON. LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, HON. PAUL E. KANJORSKI,
HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY, HON. THOMAS M. BARRETT, HON. BARBARA-ROSE
COLLINS, HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, HON. JAMES P. MORAN, HON. CARRIE
P. MEEK, HON. CHAKA FATTAH, AND HON. TIM HOLDEN
In the mid-1980's casual illegal drug use reached an all
time high of 22 million Americans. Today, approximately 11
million Americans use illegal drugs. Of these 11 million
Americans, twenty percent buy and use illicit drugs more than
once per month. Total spending on this criminal activity is
estimated to be $50 to $150 billion annually. In addition,
according to the Institute for Health Policy, drug abuse costs
society $66.9 billion due to direct and indirect medical
expenses associated with illness, AIDS, death, and costs
connected to the criminal justice system.
Undeniably, drug use and abuse continue to be major
problems in all segments of American society. The drug plague
is an equal opportunity destructive force threatening the
domestic security of all Americans regardless of race, gender,
economic status, religion or political affiliation. We, in this
Congress, owe each American parent and child the assurance that
our commitment and concern for their ability to grow and mature
in a drug-free world will be matched by appropriate funding
levels and untempered by partisanship.
We commend Subcommittee Chairman Zeliff for his leadership
on the issue of drug use and abuse and urge him to continue his
efforts to build bi-partisan coalitions that seek to examine
causes and find solutions to the drug problem in America.
However, the Majority report does little to end the scourge of
drug abuse, promote responsible and effective drug policy or
dispel the national fog of denial that hampers efforts at
prevention, treatment, interdiction and eradication of drugs.
On the contrary, this report distorts the successes and
failures of the past and present. Without an honest
examination, we cannot hope to overcome the problem of illicit
narcotics use which exists in every village, town and city of
this country.
Therefore, in these Additional Views, we seek to set forth
our common ground and areas of agreement with the Majority,
provide a delineation of our areas of disagreement and promote
cooperation with the Administration in our collective goal of
eliminating the drug scourge on American shores. Hopefully,
together we can renew a bi-partisan approach to the solution of
this problem without rhetoric or distraction. These views
contain points raised by Rep. Karen Thurman, Ranking Democratic
Member of the Subcommittee and supported by Rep. Cardiss
Collins, Ranking Democratic Member of the Full Committee at the
Full Committee business meeting at which the report was
approved.
1) We agree with the Majority's concern and commitment for
continued necessity of drug prevention efforts by the
Administration and the Congress.
2) We disagree with the Majority's assertion that drug use
has ``risen markedly'' over the past three to four years.
Casual drug use among young people began to rise in 1992,
during the Bush Administration. According to the National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse, the total number of illicit
drug users has not changed since 1992. Counting marijuana,
illicit drug use peaked in 1979, though use of illicit drugs
other than marijuana peaked in 1985, during the Reagan
Administration. Use of LSD and marijuana has risen during the
past three years among high school seniors, but marijuana use
is still far below the levels of the late 1970's. Seniors use
of illicit drugs other than marijuana peaked in 1981 when 21.7
per cent of students reported drug use at some time during the
previous month, the figure was down to 10 percent in 1994.
3) We agree in part with the Majority's contention that the
overall attention being devoted to the anti-drug message by the
media has been lower in recent years. However, we disagree with
the Majority's contention that the level of anti-drug messages
shown by the media is a result of a lack of attention by
President Clinton. In particular the Majority points to the
decrease in media exposure via Public Service Announcements
(PSA's) by the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, a private
non-profit group. Two years ago, partnership campaigns were
allotted about $1 million a day in media usage. That number has
decreased to $800,000 a day in media usage. However, the
attribution of this decline to a lack of presidential attention
not only misstates the facts on the level of significant
presidential attention but evinces a serious misunderstanding
of the decision-making process which PSA's undergo to reach the
airways. Generally, PSA's are driven by social concerns and
major news stories. As other pressing social issues such as
AIDS prevention, homelessness and youth violence, began to
become front page concerns, the public service announcements
run by local stations began to reflect those concerns. In
essence, the press of other social issues contributed to the
decline of public service announcements with a singular focus
on drug prevention.
4) We disagree with the Majority's contention that the
reduction in funding for drug interdiction efforts are below
amounts necessary for an effective strategy. In 1993, the
National Security Council concluded a study of international
drug trafficking which became the basis for the Clinton
Administration's interdiction strategy. The NSC found that to
reduce cocaine availability more effectively, a stronger focus
on source countries was necessary. The NSC determined that a
controlled shift in emphasis was required--a shift away from
past efforts that focused primarily on interdiction in the
transit zones to new efforts that focus on interdiction in and
around source countries. Moreover, GAO concluded that Congress
should consider reducing DOD's detection and monitoring for
drug interdiction funding for FY 1994 by at least $72 million.
This funding level would return the services' counter drug
costs of operating aircraft and ships to the 1990 level, when
DOD first reported that it had achieved the ``full expansion''
of its drug control mission (Drug Control: Heavy Investment in
Military Surveillance is Not Paying Off, GAO/NSIAD 93-220,
September 1993).
5) We agree with the Majority's observation the current
White House strategy to reduce drug use departs from strategy
under the Bush Administration. We note that in 1993, the Office
of National Drug Control Policy convened a meeting of drug
experts to review the relevancy of the goals established by the
Bush Administration. The Strategy Goals Review Group was
unanimous in its view that the Bush Administration did not
fully address the problems of drug use and its consequences.
The Group established fourteen goals to address the full range
of issues dealing with reducing drug use among casual and
hardcore drug users, reducing the consequences of drug use,
improving the efficiency of law enforcement and goals to
monitor progress with the source country strategy. These goals
are being implemented and are the foundation of the annual
National Drug Control Strategy Report.
6) We disagree with the Majority's contention that
President Clinton manifested little emphasis or interest in the
drug issue. We note that the President delivered an address on
drug issues before the United Nations and recently taped a
Partnership for Drug Free America Public Service Announcement.
Additionally, we note instances of substantial policy
initiatives including the submission of FY 1996 budget proposal
which puts forth $14.6 billion to fight drugs, the largest
request ever made; elevation of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy to a cabinet level position; the quick and
decisive action to appoint General McCaffrey upon the
retirement of Dr. Lee Brown, former Director of the Office of
National Drug Control Policy and the proposal to increase
staffing levels of the Office of National Drug Control Policy
to 150 full time employees.
7) We disagree with the Majority's criticism of Dr. Lee
Brown's leadership as Director of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy. We note that under Brown's leadership, the
office made several important policy changes. Far from failing
to take an active role in policy development, Brown shepherded
a shift of emphasis to chronic, hardcore users; an increase in
funding for prevention efforts; a ``big picture'' approach to
the drug issue that views drug policy as a part of overall
economic and domestic policy; and a shift in the focus of
interdiction efforts away from transit zone interception to
long term efforts in source and trafficking countries.
Moreover, we note that in its report, The National Drug Policy
Board: A Failure in the War on Drugs (H. Rep. 100-184, June 25,
1987) this Committee found that President Reagan's National
Drug Policy Board had failed to resolve interagency disputes,
and had floundered in carrying out its budget responsibilities.
A subsequent report, The National Drug Policy Board: Fighting
the War Without a Battle Plan (H. Rep. 100-1063, October 1988)
found that the Reagan Administration lacked any comprehensive
strategy to set policy or allocate resources among the
different agencies. Moreover, in September 1992, the Senate
Judiciary Committee issued a report outlining several instances
of questionable activities in the office of then Drug Czar
Robert Martinez including the fact that forty percent of the
Office's 109 employees where political appointees, a percentage
far in excess of offices of similar size or policy making
ability. Several of the appointees had little or no experience
in drug policy.
8) We applaud the shift in interdiction focus from transit
zones to source countries. One could argue that to focus on
transit zones is to fight the drug war once the planes are
loaded and in mid-flight. With the ability to change flight
paths, the technology to evade radar and the ability to use
discrete landing areas, the focus on transit zones is bound to
fail. However, a focus on crop destruction and other sanctions
and incentives within source and trafficking countries is more
likely to yield long term cooperation in reducing the supply of
drugs in their countries of origin. Moreover, in combination
with domestic treatment efforts which reduce demand, this
strategy is more likely to yield long term benefits.
9) The Majority argues that the Clinton Administration's
focus on demand reduction and treatment have precluded
formation of an effective interdiction (transit zone or source
country) strategy. However, the Majority's budget cuts have
undermined the Administration's efforts to implement its
current strategy. The House Appropriation Subcommittees on
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs
passed an amendment to the FY 1996 spending bill which
effectively cuts more than half of the Administrations's
requested funds for the Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement (INL) and rejects the Administration's proposal
to consolidate all drug program funding within a single account
at the State Department. The INL budget is the core of
international drug control strategy. The State Department
programs train and equip host country counter narcotics forces
to destroy illegal coca crops, dismantle drug organizations and
interdict drug shipments.
10) We note that the Administration has used the
Certification process as a means to fight the war on drugs and
garner cooperation with source or transit countries. We note
that in the 1996 certification process, the Administration
determined that Colombia, Syria, Nigeria, Iran Burma and
Afghanistan would lose U.S. economic assistance based upon each
country's lack of efforts to combat drug trafficking within its
borders. In 1995, President Clinton denied certification to
eleven countries (including Burma, Iran, Nigeria, Syria and
Afghanistan), which produce or distribute heroin or allow it to
transit through their borders.
11) We note that the Majority's report applauds prevention
efforts such as the ``Just Say No'' programs without any
studies of its effectiveness, yet castigates the Safe and Drug
Free Schools Program using a two year old report from the
Michigan State Office of Education. There is no indication that
the Michigan experience is generalizable. Moreover, we note
that the Majority report ignores and denies the existence of a
national comprehensive study by the federal Department of
Education (``How Do We Know They Work?: An Examination of
Evidence for Effective in School Based Drug Prevention
Programs,'' July 1995) which overwhelmingly found the Safe and
Drug Free Schools programs effective.
12) We note that the Majority's report: a) relies heavily
on quotes from testimony of highly partisan witnesses, b)
submits anecdotal evidence gathered in closed meetings with
affected individuals decrying the reduction of military
hardware as objective concerns and c) embraces anecdotes or
hyperbole as fact. In quoting the testimony of Interdiction
Commander Kramek, the report states ``interdiction returns 25-1
on the dollar in benefits to the public for every dollar spent,
a new statistic in the national dialogue'' (see pg. 51 of
Majority report). There is no factual or statistical support
for such a statement.
13) We note that the Majority's report fails to draw
meaningful comparisons because of its repeated mingling of
calendar year and fiscal year figures.
DRUG POLICY
Drug policy can be divided into three different areas--
prevention, treatment and interdiction. Over the course of the
previous thirty years, different administrations have placed
varying degrees of importance on each of the three major areas.
The area of emphasis has defined the ensuing drug strategy and
the concomitant level and disbursement of resources. Generally,
Republican administrations have viewed prevention and
unilateral interdiction efforts as the most important
components of the drug war while Democrats have focused on
prevention, treatment and multilateral interdiction efforts.
I. Prevention
According to the GAO, researchers generally agree that
there is a continuum of drug use, beginning with experimental
use, moving to abuse and ending with dependence. However, they
do not agree on how the points along the continuum should be
determined. (Drug Use Among Youth, GAO December 1993, GAO/HRD
94-24).
Since the mid-eighties, casual drug use has declined
significantly. Between 1981 and 1992 regular drug use among
high school seniors declined about 2% per year. Additionally,
the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
has found essentially no change since 1985 in the number of
hard-core drug users. These hard-core users,\1\ consume the
bulk of cocaine sold each year and are believed to be
responsible for the majority of drug-related criminal activity.
\1\ Hard core drug users are defined as those who use illegal drugs
at least once a week and who exhibit drug-related behavioral problems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the decline in casual use and the stagnancy in the
number of hard core users has been the national trend for over
ten years, a recent study seems to indicate a slight increase
in casual use among youth. In February 1994, the University of
Michigan's Monitoring the Future Survey released 1993 figures
which showed that marijuana, LSD and amphetamine use had
increased slightly among high school students. The study shows
that the greatest rise is a 4% increase in marijuana and
hashish use among 10th and 12th grade students. In essence,
this brings the percentage of 10th grade students who admit to
marijuana use from 15 to 19% and the number of 12th grade
students who admit to marijuana use from 21.9 to 26%. Given
this slight rise in casual drug use, one could argue that
rescission of funding for the Safe and Drug Free Schools must
be replaced if this trend is to be reversed.
a. specific prevention efforts
The ``DARE'' Program
The most widespread school-based drug prevention program is
``Drug Abuse Resistance Education'' (DARE). DARE is primarily
funded through the Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act,
authorized under Title V of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act. Since its inception in 1987, funding for the
Drug-Free Schools program (the major Federal school-based
prevention program), increased steadily during the first 6
years before suffering a consistent decrease in funding since
FY 1992.
DARE teaches kids to resist peer pressure and forego the
use of drugs, alcohol and tobacco. According to a report
published by the Office of Technology Assessment (Technologies
for Understanding and Prevention Substance Abuse and Addiction,
Report # OTA-EHR-597, September 1994), the DARE program is
delivered in schools by uniformed police officers who have been
trained in any of five regional training centers. DARE is
delivered annually to about 5 million students in all 50 states
at a total cost of about $50 million (an average annual cost of
about $10 per student).
OTA examined 17 published and unpublished evaluations of
DARE. For the 11 studies that met minimal standards of
methodological rigor, the average reductions in substance use
were very small. Use among control schools and DARE schools was
roughly equal. The few studies that were longitudinal found
neither short-term nor long term reductions. However, OTA noted
several positive benefits of the DARE program including
favorable reactions among students; widespread political
support; substantial funding and improved school-police
relations.
Safe and Drug Free Schools Program
One of the most successful prevention programs is the Safe
and Drug Free School Program. Established by Congress, this
program was slated for rescission and de-funding by the
Republican Majority. However, despite unsubstantiated
allegations of waste, this program continues to be an effective
means of teaching drug awareness and resistance.
In a report entitled ``How Do We Know They Work: An
Examination of Evidence for Effectiveness in School-Based Drug
Prevention Programs'' (July 1995), the Department of Education,
found that Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities programs
can have a significant positive impact on children and youth.
In brief, the report found that students who participated in
drug and violence prevention activities were less likely to
abuse drugs and alcohol, less likely to resort to violence to
solve problems, less likely to be arrested and less likely to
ride with a drunk driver. Students were more likely to report
having a positive self image and more likely to seek help and
support for substance abuse and other problems when they needed
it.
Moreover, in a report requested by Subcommittee Chairman
Zelliff and released on February 8, 1996, the Department of
Education, Office of Inspector General examined nine school
districts in eight states,\2\ and found that all nine districts
had program elements that clearly discouraged drug use. In
addition to drug avoidance, districts included program aspects
designed to promote future resistance to drug use messages,
including self-esteem training, conflict resolution and
improvement of social behavior. Moreover, all nine districts,
provided teacher and counselor training. Finally, all districts
had established a system to gather input from a number of local
groups in developing their annual plans for utilizing funds.
The groups included parents, school district personnel, non-
public school personnel and community agencies.
\2\ The nine School Districts examined were Dade County, Florida;
Philadelphia School District, Pennsylvania; Long Beach Unified School
District, California; Boston Public School District, Massachusetts;
Seattle School District, Washington; St. Paul Public Schools,
Minnesota; Round Rock Independent School District, Texas; Kansas City
Unified School District, Kansas; and Elverta Joint Elementary School
District, California.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Partnership for a Drug Free America Media Program
In addition to school based programs, in the late 1980's
the Partnership for a Drug Free America began a visual and
print media campaign designed to discourage casual drug use and
reduce drug abuse. The Partnership, a non-profit organization
based in New York, produces public service announcements
(PSA's) using donated time on local and national media outlets.
Media used for Partnership ads is down 20% over the past
two years (Advertising Age, Feb. 7, 1994). Two years ago,
partnership campaigns were allotted about $1 million a day in
media usage. That number has decreased to $800,000 a day in
media usage. Despite its decline in donated air time, the
Partnership remains one of the largest producers of PSA's in
the nation. The partnership's large and extremely well
coordinated media campaign may have played a large role in
decreasing casual drug use. However, it is unlikely to have had
any effect on hard core usage.
However, the Majority's assertion that the reduction in
media usage by the Partnership is related to Presidential
concern on the drug prevention issue evinces a lack of
understanding in the way local and national media allot time
for public service announcements. Generally, PSA's are driven
by the front page stories. Unfortunately, the media has devoted
less time to drug stories. As other pressing issues such as
AIDS prevention, homelessness and youth violence, began to
become front page concerns, the public service announcements
run by local stations began to reflect those concerns. In
essence, the press of other social issues contributed to the
decline of public service announcements with a singular focus
on drug prevention.
Partnership ads and school based prevention programs began
about 10-12 years ago and have been common features in every
community and school. This period of time would coincide with
the entire academic careers of the 8th to 12th graders who are
currently engaging in casual consumption. It would seem highly
unlikely that this group would not have been exposed to one or
both of these prevention strategies. Yet, despite their
exposure, casual drug use escalates. Therefore, it would seem
that prevention messages standing alone are not enough for the
20-25% of high school students who may experiment with illegal
drugs. However, that should not deter funding for education and
prevention programs for the 75-80% of young people who seem to
benefit from those programs. It seems that the experience of
these two groups is telling. The decision to engage in casual
use of drugs for a minority of the teenage population may be
influenced by other social and economic influences including
poverty, popular culture, peer pressure, family drug use,
community attitudes, and other social and economic causes.
II. Treatment
In 1994, the RAND Corporation reported that drug treatment
is the most cost-effective drug control intervention, compared
with other potential drug strategies. At the same time, a
California study found that for every dollar invested in drug
treatment, seven dollars were saved. The savings were
attributed to decreased use of drugs, including alcohol, and
significantly reduced costs related to crime and health care.
The National Institute on Drug Abuse has reported similar cost/
benefit assessments for drug treatment.
Hard core drug users are 20% of the drug using population.
However, they account for 80% of the illicit narcotics
consumed. Moreover, because of their drug involvement, hard
core users commit the majority of drug related crimes.
According to the Sentencing Project, a national nonprofit
organization that promotes sentencing reform, of the 14 million
arrests nationwide in 1993, 1.1 million were for drug offenses.
Seventy percent of those arrests were for drug possession. As a
result of tougher sanctions, including mandatory minimum
sentences, arrests for drug possession have more than doubled
since 1980. For example, the number of people in Federal prison
on drug charges rose from 2,300 in 1980 to 13,000 in 1990, with
the average term served increasing from 20 months to 66 months.
Therefore, the long term benefits and cost savings make
treatment the last reasonable option if prevention and
interdiction fail.
III. Interdiction
Under the Reagan and Bush Administrations, the ``war on
drugs'' focused primarily on reducing the supply of illegal
drugs entering the country. Invoking a call for ``zero
tolerance'', Federal spending to combat drugs increased from
$1.5 billion in 1981 to over $11 billion in 1992. Roughly 70%
of the budget went toward law enforcement and interdiction
efforts.
Interdiction efforts under Reagan and Bush may have caused
traffickers to change routes and decrease shipments of drugs
which depend on bulk and volume to ensure profitability (e.g.
marijuana), and precipitated a higher level of smuggling of
drugs that can be easily concealed and retain high profit
margins with diminished mass and quantity (e.g. heroin and
cocaine).
Basically, interdiction involves two broad functions:
surveillance (detection and monitoring) and apprehension. The
Department of Defense's mission is generally restricted to
detection and monitoring. Although DOD is the primary agency
with control over interdiction efforts, the U.S. Customs
Service and the U.S. Coast Guard, share the overall leadership
for air and maritime interdiction. Customs, the Coast Guard and
the U.S. Border Patrol conduct the interception and
apprehension phases of the interdiction efforts. The Department
of State carries responsibility for diplomatic efforts to
encourage cooperation in source countries and the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) participates in training of
other law enforcement personnel, surveillance and domestic
apprehension.
Despite the problems inherent in the division of turf, the
efforts of these five entities may be limited even further by
the nature of drug trafficking. The capability of military
surveillance to increase drug seizures and arrests is limited.
Louis Rodrigues of the General Accounting Office, testified
before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security,
Committee on Government Operations that ``surveillance of
suspect ships and planes is not the weak link in the
interdiction process. The weak link is the inability to
apprehend suspected smugglers in transit countries and at our
borders'' . . . ``Success ultimately depends on the capability
to apprehend smugglers, arrest people and seize cargo and
equipment'', (Testimony, Hearing on Drug Control: Expanded
Military Surveillance Not Justified by Measurable Goals or
Results, October 5, 1993).
A reliable and objective measurement of the effectiveness
of an interdiction program designed to reduce supply is the
price and availability of illegal drugs on American streets. If
price increases while supply decreases, then efforts to reduce
availability have succeeded. However, if price decreases or
remains constant, while supply increases or remains constant,
then efforts to reduce supply have failed.
According to the General Accounting Office, the price,
purity and availability of cocaine has remained relatively
stable on American streets. (Testimony at hearing before the
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service
and General Government, Feb. 24, 1993).
Therefore, by 1993 it became obvious that a strategy of
transit zone interdiction with a goal of supply reduction was
not effective. In 1993, the National Security Council concluded
a study of international drug trafficking which became the
basis for the Clinton administration interdiction strategy. The
NSC found that to reduce cocaine availability more effectively,
a stronger focus on source countries was necessary. The NSC
determined that a controlled shift in emphasis was required--a
shift away from past efforts that focused primarily on
interdiction in the transit zones to new efforts that focus on
interdiction in and around source countries. Traffickers are
most visible and vulnerable at the production or distribution
source.
In order to carry out this philosophy, a three prong
strategy developed which involved (1) providing assistance to
nations that have a political will to combat narcotics
trafficking; (2) conducting efforts to destroy trafficking
organizations and (3) interdicting narcotics trafficking in
source countries and transit zones. As a practical matter,
implementation of this strategy involves eradication of
narcotic crops in source countries; training of foreign law
enforcement officers to de-stabilize trafficking networks; use
of diplomatic initiatives to encourage cooperation from
producing nations; sanctions against uncooperative drug
producing or trafficking nations; and economic assistance for
cooperative countries.
DOD's surveillance mission supports the U.S. and foreign
law enforcement agencies that apprehend suspects and seize
cargo. Posse comitatus statutes prohibit DOD from the
apprehension phase of interdiction efforts. Before 1989,
civilian law enforcement agencies conducted limited
surveillance operations of key transit areas in the Caribbean
and the eastern Pacific. However, in 1989, the National Defense
Authorization Act gave the Department of Defense the lead role
in all federal efforts to detect and monitor drugs smuggled by
air and sea. DOD's approach has been to layer ground, air and
sea based radars near the South American countries where
cocaine is produced and distributed.
Funding for DOD's detection and monitoring mission was
about $844 million at its height in FY 1993. Nearly two thirds
of the funds were allocated to procurement, projects and
related initiatives. The remainder, about $293 million was used
to pay for the costs of operating aircraft and ships. Prior to
the FY 1993 peak, DOD had spent about $212 million per year in
funding its drug surveillance missions. In 1990, prior to the
increased funding levels of the Bush Administration, the DOD
announced that it had achieved ``full expansion'' of its role
in deterring the flow of drugs. However, increases continued
despite the failure of the DOD drug coordinator or the Office
of National Drug Control to establish quantifiable goals or
effectiveness measures for the DOD's role. (Drug Control: Heavy
Investment in Military Surveillance is Not Paying Off, GAO/
NSIAD 93-220, September 1993).
GAO concluded that Congress should consider reducing DOD's
detection and monitoring for drug interdiction funding for FY
1994 by at least $72 million. This funding level would return
the services' counter drug costs of operating aircraft and
ships to the 1990 level, when DOD first reported that it had
achieved the ``full expansion'' of its drug control mission
(Drug Control: Heavy Investment in Military Surveillance is Not
Paying Off, GAO/NSIAD 93-220, September 1993).
Nature of Trafficking and Interdiction Efforts
By the late 1980's, most cocaine entering the United States
was flown directly from the producing countries of South
America into northern Mexico, where the cargo was transported
across the border by truck, tunnels and light planes. However,
in response to joint U.S.-Mexican drug interdiction efforts in
northern Mexico, traffickers began to adjust their routes and
move operation and staging areas to Southern Mexico and
neighboring Central American countries.
The price growth in cocaine occurs after the drug crosses
into the United States. It is estimated that processed cocaine
costs about $4,000 per kilogram at a South American departure
point. However, upon entering the United States, the same
kilogram costs about $100,000 (Controlling Cocaine: Supply
versus Demand Programs, Rand Corporation, 1994).
Because the greatest price growth occurs after the product
has passed beyond DOD surveillance or Coast Guard interception
and apprehension efforts, it is unlikely that interdiction will
be a cost effective deterrent to drug traffickers (Sealing the
Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in
Drug Interdiction, The Rand Corporation, 1988).
In addition to lowering the profit margin, an effective
strategy would seek to increase the personal risk to high
ranking members of the drug trafficking organizations. To raise
the personal risk, one would focus on capture of members of the
current leading cartel's hierarchy and prevent the formation of
new cartels. (For instance, the Clinton Administration's
pressure on the Colombian Government to destroy the Medellin
and Cali cartels). Obviously, these goals can only be
accomplished through the commitment of segments of society
including law enforcement agencies within drug-producing
countries.
Moreover, trafficker behavior is a major component to the
long term success of any interdiction effort. Trafficker
behavior is not static. Once a type of interdiction effort has
been identified, traffickers tend to change their routes, mode
of transportation, packaging methods and other aspects of the
operation to elude detection. (Drug Control: Interdiction
Efforts in Central America Have Had Little Impact on the Flow
of Drugs, GAO/NSIAD 94-233, August 1994). Therefore,
interdiction efforts which seek to concentrate equipment and
personnel based on current behavior are likely to reach
obsolence quickly. In essence, transit zone interdiction
efforts became akin to squeezing a balloon--the air does not
disappear, it is only redistributed.
The Department of State's 1996 International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report indicates that Mexico is a transit
country for South American cocaine destined for the United
States and a major country of origin for heroin and marijuana.
According to the report, between 50 and 70 percent of the
cocaine smuggled into the United States traveled through
Mexico, entering primarily by land across the southwest border.
In addition, about 23 percent of the heroin smuggled into the
United States originated in Mexico. Immigration and
Naturalization Service data show that Border Patrol narcotics
seizures along the southwest border have risen. Between FY
1990-93, the number of Border Patrol Narcotics seizures rose
from around 4,200 to approximately 6,400, an increase of about
50%. The amount of cocaine seized nearly doubled from about
14,000 pounds in 1990 to about 27,000 pounds in 1993,
(Testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims,
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, March 10,
1995, BORDER CONTROL: Revised Strategy is Showing Some Positive
Results).
The Office of National Drug Control Policy estimates that
the decline in cocaine availability (from an estimated maximum
of 539 metric tons in 1992 to an estimated maximum of 340
metric tons in 1993) is an indication that counter narcotic
efforts of the United States and its allies are impacting
supply.
Although use of heroin from Golden Triangle countries has
become a concern in recent years, most interdiction efforts
have been concentrated on cocaine from South America.
Designated by the Office of National Drug Control Policy as the
primary drug threat, cocaine traffickers and source countries
have received the vast majority of attention from U.S.
interdiction efforts.
Inhalants: The Other Drug Threat
Concerns about the link between drug use and drug
importation fail to consider the availability and increased use
of drugs that do not require importation. According to the 1993
Monitoring the Future study, inhalants rank as the third most
used drug after alcohol and marijuana among 8th through 12th
graders. The study found that 17% of adolescents say they have
sniffed inhalants. However, this phenomena is not limited to
young people. Approximately 1.8 million Americans abuse
inhalants compared to about 1.6 million who use cocaine. In
addition to the ``high'' from sniffing various compounds, part
of the attraction among young people is that the substances are
legal, easily available and cheap.\3\ Sniffing these substances
(called ``huffing'') can lead to long term and permanent
neurological damage. Some researchers have found that sniffing
may be more hazardous than other drug use. According to Neil
Rosenberg, M.D., a Denver neurologist, long-term sniffing leads
to irreversible brain damage, muscle incoordination and damage
to the kidneys, heart and bone marrow. Other complications
include hepatitis, jaundice, dementia, hearing and memory loss
and blindness. Additionally, because fumes of many substances
pass directly to the brain, death can result from a single
usage.
\3\ Among the easily available substances commonly sniffed are air
freshener, fabric protector (e.g. Scotch guard), nail polish remover,
paint, moth balls, butane, Freon, hair spray, and airplane glue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is estimated that national fatalities from sniffing
commonly available legal substances are about 1000 people per
year. However, no one knows the exact number of fatalities from
inhalant abuse because no national registry of inhalant-related
injuries or deaths exists. Moreover, local death registries are
often inadequate because Medical Examiners often attribute
huffing deaths to suffocation, suicide or accidents.
IV. Conclusion
Undeniably, drug use and abuse continue to be major
problems in all segments of American society. The drug plague
is an equal opportunity destructive force threatening the
domestic security of all Americans regardless of race, gender,
economic status, religion or political affiliation. We, in this
Congress owe each American parent and child the assurance that
our commitment and concern for their ability to grow and mature
in a drug-free world will be matched by appropriate funding
levels and untempered by partisanship.
Karen L. Thurman.
Henry A. Waxman.
Tom Lantos.
Robert E. Wise, Jr.
Major R. Owens.
Edolphus Towns.
Louise McIntosh Slaughter.
Paul E. Kanjorski.
Carolyn B. Maloney.
Thomas M. Barrett.
Barbara-Rose Collins.
Eleanor Holmes Norton.
James P. Moran.
Carrie P. Meek.
Chaka Fattah.
Tim Holden.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, JR.
Two additional views not contained in our original report,
because they were not available at the time, warrant a short
mention.
First, the appointment of General Barry R. McCaffrey as the
Nation's latest Director of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP), or ``Drug Czar,'' is highly promising. After
three years of poorly defined, poorly conceived and poorly
executed national drug control policy, the President has
appointed an individual of exceptional abilities and
experience, one whom both Republican and Democratic Members of
Congress should be proud to work with and vigorous in
supporting.
Second, upon confirmation by ONDCP that another distributed
ONDCP document is available for public discussion, I want to
point out the existence of the October 26 and 27, 1994 ONDCP/
SOUTHCOM Counterdrug Conference After Action Report. This
report contains valuable findings and recommendations which
have, so far, been unacted upon by the President. Among the
multi-agency conference's consensus findings, distributed by
then-Southern Command General Barry R. McCaffrey and then-ONDCP
Director Lee P. Brown, are a number of continuing needs:
<bullet> ``define the chain of command for implementing
source-country strategy and establish an overall regional
coordinator with adequate authority and responsibility to
coordinate and execute strategy in the region;''
<bullet> ``creat[e] an interagency regional mechanism for
planning and executing the strategy;''
<bullet> ``develop a coherent and consistent budget that is
objective and threat-driven rather than program-driven [and]
there needs to be an interagency willingness to terminate
ineffective programs and to promote resource-effective
programs;''
<bullet> ``regain American public awareness of the linkage
between drugs and violent crime as to generate a clear mandate
to prosecute the counterdrug effort on a continuing basis.''
The internal agency consensus memorialized in this late
1994 report continues to be instructive in 1996; with the
thoughtful appointment of General McCaffrey, this report's
ideas should again be considered seriously by the President.
Among this report's forward-looking and detailed suggestions:
<bullet> ``To define a chain of command for implementing
the source-country strategy . . . seek leadership from the top,
the President, the Secretary of State, and Assistant Secretary
of State; develop a regional coordination entity with authority
to implement a strategic plan; [and] develop an interagency
coordination process with authorities and responsibilities.''
<bullet> ``To rekindle the American public's and Congress'
interest in supporting the supply side of this nation's
counterdrug effort . . . ONDCP should develop a coherent and
consistent message to Congress and the American people
regarding the relationship of drugs to violent crime . . . ;
all departments and agencies should support the ONDCP message
and develop appropriate messages for use in their Public
Diplomacy Programs; the United States should develop an
implementation plan in Latin America tied to the reduction of
drug abuse, drug trafficking and violent crime in the United
States.''
<bullet> ``To develop a mechanism for executing the
National Drug Control Strategy . . . Provide senior
Administration leadership that has sufficient authority to
identify and delegate responsibility to a regional planning
coordinator in the field [and] support planning in the field
and coordination at all levels; create a streamlined regional
mechanism for planning and execution of the strategy with the
necessary authority and responsibility to plan and coordinate
programs; . . . review the National Drug Control Strategy to
ensure that its components remain realistic from a budgetary
perspective; develop an implementation plan that allows the
community to `stay the course,' . . . ; consider options for a
Drug Summit this fiscal year [noting] there was a consensus
that this idea had merit but could only `make a difference' if
concrete actions are identified and coordinated in advance
[and] the United States must be prepared to prime the pump.''
<bullet> ``To raise the level of consciousness of [the
American people, Congress and counterparts in foreign
governments] not directly involved in strategy execution but to
have an impact on that execution . . . develop a coherent and
consistent message to the American people that will raise the
priority of drugs on the list of public concerns [and] recouple
drugs to crime; create a better relationship with Congress
through a more consistent budget package [and] speak with a
single voice to Congress and be prepared to present a clear set
of effectiveness measurements; develop an implementation plan
that realistically can persuade our allies that the drug fight
is in their interest [and] this is not only a U.S. fight; [and]
raise the level of drug discussions and action to the forefront
. . . .''
<bullet> ``To maximize the impact of counterdrug resources
in a declining budget environment . . . review tools to avoid
high-cost resources with small payoff . . . ; determine if
resources should be spread broadly and thinly or focused on
critical nodes like the center of gravity, Peru . . . ; develop
a strategy that includes required resources; emphasize training
[and] use Special Forces as a multiplier to train host country
forces; establish a lead person in each Country Team with the
authority to coordinate all resources; [and] seek support from
other countries [and] for example, request the European
militaries to contribute material and personnel support to the
counterdrug effort.''
<bullet> ``To present a coordinated budget providing the
necessary resources to implement the National Strategy . . .
develop a budget that is threat-driven as opposed to program
driven; raise the level of senior leadership involvement in the
counterdrug budget process . . . ; develop an interagency
process that provides for a more consistent budget review . . .
; establish a process to eliminate ineffective programs early
and to reinforce effective programs; determine the department
or agency best suited to accomplish the task and allocate
resources accordingly; create an understanding with Congress
through a more consistent, coherent budget package that
reflects fiscal reality, a single voice, and implementation of
the counterdrug strategy; [and] continue the dialogue to
determine new, innovative means to develop the interagency
counterdrug budget process.''
<bullet> ``To develop approaches to Latin American drug-
producing nations that will enhance their willingness to combat
illicit production and trafficking . . . make trafficker
organizations a serious liability for host county . . . ;
illustrate the linkage between drugs and corruption or
violation of sovereignty; assist host countries economically to
fight the drug industry; separate the drug issue from other
issues in-country; . . . negotiate an investment treaty with
countries in return for stopping drugs; focus on the damage
drugs can cause each country's political structure . . . ;
assist in strengthening judicial institutions in Latin America
. . . .''
Other observations in the report that bear mentioning
include the facts that:
<bullet> ``. . . there is an explicit correlation between
the illicit use of drugs in the United States and the alarming
rise in the violent crime rate [since] over 11.4 million
Americans are using drugs today; use by children is on the
rise; heroin use is growing, with over 600,000 heroin addicts
on the streets of America; and cocaine use claims more than 2.1
million cocaine addicts. [In addition,] DEA presented national
statistics that indicated that 75 percent of the violent crime
committed in the United States is directly attributed to drug
use [and] . . . as USSOUTHCOM summarized, the annual cost of
drug abuse is approaching $70 billion dollars a year and over
10,000 lives.''
<bullet> ``The counterdrug strategy must be led from the
top down, with Washington leadership pursuing policy and budget
support and championing the need for the supply-side
counterdrug effort. There also needs to be a command and
control entity outside Washington to lead development of a
strategic plan and oversee its implementation.''
<bullet> ``The United States lacks a regional action plan
that governs the actions and resourcing of all agencies in a
coordinated and coherent fashion [and] all agreed that there
was no one person or agency in charge with a totally regional
view . . . [and] it is critical to execution of the strategy .
. . that a `source country coordinator' be identified and given
the authority to act effectively.''
<bullet> Finally, ``regardless of the reasons, a clear
conclusion of the conference was that those charged with
implementing the drug strategy have a message problem.''
Based on the Subcommittee's thorough, year-long evaluation
of the Clinton Administration's first three years of drug
policy performance, it is clear that virtually all of these
criticisms and recommendations are as valid today as they were
in October 1994. After three years of costly inaction, what has
recently changed is that the President may be recognizing the
enormous consequences that flow from poor coordination, low
emphasis and relative inaction. I continue to believe that we
can and will eventually win the drug war; we can and must
significantly reduce the number of young casualties the Nation
takes annually.
I also believe that the President has, belatedly, made the
right choice in selecting General Barry McCaffrey to lead his
national effort to get the drug war back on track. Few people
know the shortcomings of current policy as well as General
McCaffrey, and few are better suited to put the
counternarcotics and national anti-drug effort back on track.
With these additional views, we must all now look forward.
William H. Zeliff, Jr.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. MARK SOUDER
In addition to the findings and conclusions of our year-
long investigation, contained in the foregoing comprehensive
report, I would like also to offer a few statistics from Ft.
Wayne, my own home district. These terrible new numbers
illustrate, convincingly I believe, how important it is that we
refocus the Nation on the drug war, and recognize both its
direct costs and its link to rising violent juvenile crime.
In short, our Nation's future depends on meeting this
national and personal security threat head on, and doing so
immediately. We have suffered three years without presidential
leadership, and we cannot continue to prosper as a nation
without refinding our conviction on this issue.
Here is what my own district is experiencing, and why
stronger support for our efforts from the DEA and others is
vital: In just two of the last four years, LSD confiscations
from youth in Fort Wayne jumped from approximately 90 to more
than 9,000--a staggering 100-fold increase. Police reports also
indicate that, between 1994 and 1995, the total weight of drugs
confiscated more than doubled, from 10,072 grams in 1994 to
20,443 in 1995. These numbers indicate the epidemic that is in
our midst, and the need to revitalize our demand-reduction and
supply-reduction efforts, both at home and abroad. Perhaps most
importantly, we need leadership again--in our communities and
from the top, starting with the President. If the President
himself is not engaged, we cannot expect again to make the kind
of progress we were making in the late 1980's.
Mark Souder.
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