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H.L.C.
104th Congress Rept. 104-18
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session Part 3
_______________________________________________________________________
NATIONAL SECURITY REVITALIZATION ACT
_______________________________________________________________________
February 6, 1995.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Combest, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 7]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred title V of the bill (H.R. 7) to revitalize the
national security of the United States, having considered the
same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend
that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendments (stated in terms of the page and line numbers
of the introduced bill) are as follows:
Page 34, line 10, strike ``intelligence,''.
Page 34, line 11, insert ``, but not including intelligence
activities reportable under title V of the National Security
Act of 1947'' after ``support''.
Page 34, line 19, insert ``, but not including intelligence
activities reportable under title V of the National Security
Act of 1947'' after ``support''.
Page 39, beginning on line 5, strike ``control,
communications or intelligence'' and insert ``control or
communications''.
Page 39, line 14, insert ``or intelligence activities
reportable under title V of the National Security Act of 1947''
after ``contributions''.
Page 50, strike line 17 and all that follows through line 11
on page 53 and insert in lieu thereof the following:
SEC. 512. CONDITIONS ON PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE TO THE UNITED
NATIONS.
(a) In General.--The United Nations Participation Act of 1945
(22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.) is further amended by adding the
following new section:
``Sec. 12. (a) Provision of Intelligence Information to the
United Nations.--Before intelligence information is provided by
the United States to the United Nations, the President shall
ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense, has established guidelines governing the provision of
intelligence information to the United Nations which shall
protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure in accordance with section 103(c)(5) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)).
``(b) Periodic and Special Reports.--(1) The President shall
periodically report, but not less frequently than semiannually,
to the Committee on International Relations and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House and the Committee
on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate on the types of intelligence provided to the
United Nations and the purposes for which it was provided
during the period covered by the report. The President shall
also report to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate, within 15 days after it becomes
known to him, any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
provided to the United Nations.
``(2) The requirement for periodic reports under the first
sentence of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to
the provision of intelligence that is provided only to, and for
the use of, United States Government personnel serving with the
United Nations.
``(c) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate
or assign the duties of the President under this section.
``(d) Improved Handling of Intelligence Information by the
United Nations.--The Secretary of State (or the designee of the
Secretary), in consultation with the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall work with the
United Nations to improve the handling, processing,
dissemination, and management of all intelligence information
provided to it by its members.
``(e) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to--
``(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5));
or
``(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of
title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
413-415).''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall take effect 45 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
Purpose
The principal purpose of H.R. 7, as amended, is to
revitalize the national security of the United States.
Items of Special Interest
The Committee reviewed Sections 502, 504, and 512 of H.R.
7, the National Security Revitalization Act. As introduced,
Section 502 requires monthly written reporting under Section 4
of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 on any
assistance or support for ongoing or new United Nations
peacekeeping operations, including intelligence support. The
reports are to be submitted by the 10th of each month to the
House International Relations Committee, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, and the Appropriations Committees of the
House and Senate. Section 504 of H.R. 7 requires 15 days prior
notification under Section 7 of the United Nations
Participation Act of 1945, to the designated congressional
committees, before any agency or entity of the United States
Government makes available to the United Nations any assistance
(valued at $1 million or more, $5 million or more if
reimbursable) or facility to support or facilitate its
peacekeeping activities. In emergency situations, notification
may be provided within 48 hours after such assistance or
facility is made available. The definition of ``assistance'' is
broad and covers the provision of ``support * * * or
services.'' The definition includes ``intelligence
assistance.''
As introduced, Section 512 requires that the United States
may provide intelligence to the United Nations only pursuant to
a written agreement between the President and the Secretary
General of the United Nations. The agreement must specify:
The types of intelligence to be provided to the U.N.;
The circumstances under which intelligence may be
provided; and
The procedures to be observed by the U.N. concerning
persons who shall have access and the procedures to be
observed by the U.N. to protect the intelligence
against disclosure not authorized by the agreement.
Section 512 would require notification to Congress of not
less than 30 days prior to the entry into force of the
agreement. The agreement itself is not to be effective for a
period exceeding one year. Section 512 provides that the
President may delegate the authority and assign the duties of
the President under this section only to the Secretary of
Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence. Finally,
Section 512 excepts from these requirements the provision of
intelligence that is provided only to and for the use of United
States Government personnel serving with the United Nations. It
also excepts from its requirements the provision of
intelligence that is essential for the protection of U.S.
nationals, including members of the United States Armed Forces
and civilian personnel of the United States Government.
background
With the collapse of the Cold War order, worldwide
strategic balances shifted, with the result being the demise of
power structures that had for along time held political and
ethnic rivalries in check. Thus, in recent years, the world has
witnessed increased regional tensions, and innumerable
conflicts, that while generally small in scale, are of concern
due to their potential to escalate and because they often
jeopardize large numbers of civilians.
From 1988 to the present, the United Nations has undertaken
21 new peacekeeping operations. This is almost double the
number it pursued from 1947-1988. Besides the sheer numbers,
the U.N. has discovered that the nature of its peacekeeping
missions has changed as well. Many more now involve ongoing
hostilities between opposing sides rather than armistices and
truces, as well as deep-seated, seemingly intractable ethnic
disputes. The increased danger to U.N. personnel operating
under such circumstances has led some within the U.N. to call
for more efficient use of tactical information or intelligence
to better protect peacekeepers.
For its part, the United States has shared this view. In a
1992 speech before the United Nations, President Bush pledged
that the United States would, `` * * * work with the United
Nations to best employ our considerable lift, logistics,
communications and intelligence capabilities to support
peacekeeping operations.'' United States involvement in U.N.
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and related activities has
increased markedly in the past several years, but not without
significant controversy. The intractability of the conflicts
and poor management by the U.N. have led many to question U.N.
capabilities in this area. Then, too, the initial success in
Somalia was later overshadowed by the deaths of 18 U.S.
servicemen in Mogadishu in October 1993. The loss of these
soldiers led many to question even more intensely the extent of
U.S. national security interests in these matters, and the
wisdom of burdening the U.S. military with these activities, at
a time when the military is experiencing sharp downsizing and
funding reductions.
In May 1994, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 25, which established more stringent guidelines
for U.S. support to and participation in peace operations.
Although intelligence support to the U.N. has previously been
authorized by presidential decisions, in PDD-25, President
Clinton emphasized the importance of being as responsive as
possible to multilateral peacekeeping and humanitarian
activities where these activities advance U.S. foreign policy
goals and national security interests. PDD-25 states that
providing intelligence information should be considered one
ingredient of this responsiveness, provided a determination is
made that intelligence sources and methods will be protected.
Overview
The Committee's goal in examining Section 512 of the
National Security Revitalization Act was not to question
whether nor not or to what degree it is in the United States'
interest to become involved in U.N. peacekeeping activities.
Rather, the Committee recognized that, in order to best assess
the merits of Section 512, the Committee should first review
what U.S./U.N. intelligence sharing was already taking place.
Having established what ``intelligence sharing with the U.N.''
encompassed, the Committee would then review the procedures by
which intelligence is shared with the U.N. and the purposes for
which intelligence is provided. Lastly, the Committee would
consider the effect of Section 512 on intelligence support for
U.S. diplomatic and policymaking activities.
On Thursday, January 19, 1995, the Committee held a hearing
on ``Intelligence Sharing with the U.N.'' The hearing was held initially in open session, but was later closed so that more
sensitive issues pertaining to intelligence community
procedures for providing intelligence information would be
discussed.
The witnesses for the hearing were: Toby T. Gati, Assistant
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; Ambassador
K.F. Inderfurth of the United States Mission to the United
Nations; Ambassador Hugh Montgomery, Special Assistant to the
Director of Central Intelligence for Foreign Intelligence
Relationships; and Major General Patrick M. Hughes, United
States Army, Director of Intelligence, J-2, Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Testimony during the hearing clarified for the Committee
exactly what intelligence sharing with the U.N. involves. U.S.
policymakers working with the U.N. use intelligence information
as part of their broader diplomatic efforts to advance U.S.
foreign policy interests with other governments and U.N.
agencies. This may include support to peacekeeping activities,
humanitarian missions, sanctions enforcement, nonproliferation,
opposition to ethnic cleansing and other issues clearly of
importance to U.S. foreign policy.
Specific criteria must be met before the United States
Government may share intelligence with the United Nations.
First, a decision must be reached among senior policymakers
that the U.N. mission in question is an activity the U.S.
Government wishes to support in this way. The State
Department's Bureau for Intelligence and Research (INR) plays a
central role in coordinating foreign policy objectives with
intelligence capabilities. If the decision is made to support a
U.N. activity with intelligence, intelligence community
representatives meet to determine the kinds of information that
may be provided without compromising any sources and methods.
The National Security Act of 1947 requires that the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) protect sensitive intelligence
sources and methods.
Once these concerns have been satisfied, the Joint Staff is
normally tasked to transmit the intelligence information. The
U.N. Support Desk in the U.S. National Military Joint
Intelligence Center in the Pentagon supports the U.N. with
sanitized intelligence on both a daily and ad hoc basis.
Intelligence information can be transferred from the Pentagon
to the U.S./U.N. mission in New York, and ultimately to the
Situation Center in the U.N. The Joint Staff Intelligence
Center also provides U.S. Unified Commanders overseas with
sanitize Intelligence to augment their support to U.N.
operations in their areas of responsibility.
Witnesses described to the Committee several instances in
which the current intelligence sharing arrangement with the
U.N. has yielded specific foreign policy successes. Information
was shared with Security Council members on Iraqi troop build-
ups, in support of a multilateral effort to prevent a repeat of
Iraq's 1991 invasion of Kuwait. Intelligence has also assisted
United Nations Special Commission in Iraq (UNSCOM) inspectors
in their attempts to enforce U.N. sanctions calling for the
dismantling of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs.
U.S. imagery has helped U.N. relief agencies determine the
magnitude and direction of refugee flows within and from
Rwanda. Timely intelligence sharing has also helped save the
lives of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
peacekeeping troops in Bosnia by locating threatening
artillery.
Some Members expressed concern with providing intelligence
information to the U.N. A multinational organization, the U.N.
is not known for following security procedures, either for its
personnel or for the information it acquires. thus, when
intelligence is provided to the U.N., it is handed over with
these institutional shortcomings in mind. There have been
instances of unauthorized disclosures of information, but no
evidence was presented to the Committee suggesting that
intelligence sources and methods have at any time been
compromised.
section 512
Section 512, as introduced, was opposed by the
Administration on the grounds that it would severely undercut
U.S. foreign policy initiatives, would not improve the security
interests of the United States, and would unconstitutionally
restrict the President's ability to conduct foreign policy. In
fact, it was argued that requiring a written agreement between
the President of the United States and the U.N. Security
General before any intelligence sharing could take place would,
as a practical matter, stop intelligence from being shared. It
was judged that because of sensitivities relating to possible
public disclosure of the details of such an agreement to share
intelligence, executing a high-level, formal, written agreement
would be unacceptable to both the United Nations and the United
States.
Moreover, U.S. policymakers believe that the current system
allows intelligence to be provided on a case-by-case basis,
when and how the U.S. wishes to make that information
available. A written agreement would make this process less
flexible. In fact, testimony was given asserting that an
agreement executed by the President and Secretary General would
create an obligation on the part of the U.S. to provide
intelligence to the U.N. when requested. The flexibility of the
current system allows the U.S. to provide information at a
moment's notice, if need be, to make rapid decisions about what
should be conveyed, and work the process through a U.S.-
controlled system of safeguards.
Concerns was expressed that Section 512 would intrude upon
the power of the President and the statutory prerogatives of
the DCI, who is responsible for protecting sources and methods.
Witnesses argued that the provisions of Section 512 conflict
with the President's sole authority to negotiate and enter into
executive agreements with the content and timing of his
choosing. Section 512 would impinge on the President's role in
determining what will or will not be communicated in diplomatic
conversations. Finally, the argument was made that Section 512
would limit the President's ability to delegate his authority,
thus impinging on two core Executive Branch functions--the
collection and dissemination of intelligence.
Committee Amendments to Title V of H.R. 7
The Committee considered and adopted three amendments to
Title V of the bill.
After considering the testimony and responses to Members'
questions on Section 512, as introduced, the Committee adopted
a substitute. The amendment modifies the United Nations
Participation Act of 1945 to add a new Section 12 regarding
conditions on the provision of intelligence to the United
Nations. The amendment sets out two non-delegable
responsibilities for the President:
Before intelligence is provided by the United States to the
United Nations, the President must ensure that the Director of
Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretaries of
State and Defense, has established guidelines governing the
provision of intelligence to the United Nations that protect
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Periodic and special reports by the President regarding
intelligence provided to the United Nations are required.
Periodic reports must be made not less frequently than
semiannually to the Intelligence and International Relations
Committees of the House and to the Intelligence and Foreign
Relations Committees of the Senate specifying the types of
intelligence provided to the United Nations and the purposes
for which the intelligence was provided. This requirement does
not apply to intelligence provided only to, and for the use of,
United States Government personnel serving with the United
Nations. The President must also report to the two intelligence
committees any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence provided
to the United Nations within 15 days after the disclosure becomes known to the President.
The amendment requires the Secretary of State, or the
Secretary's designee, in consultation with the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, to work with
the United Nations to improve its handling, processing,
dissemination, and management of all intelligence information
provided to it by its members.
The amendment makes clear that its provisions shall not be
construed to impair or otherwise affect the existing authority
of the Director of Central Intelligence under the National
Security Act of 1947 to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure or to supersede or
otherwise affect the congressional intelligence oversight
provisions of that act.
The amendment would take effect 45 days after the date of
enactment.
The Administration expressed separation of powers concerns
over the non-delegability provision in the Committee
substitute. Some members also expressed reservations on this
point. In view of the expanding number of circumstances in
which U.S. participation in or support for U.N. activities may
involve considerations of providing intelligence to the U.N., a
majority of Committee Members believe it is important to have
the President ensure that, before the U.S. provides
intelligence to the U.N., U.S. officials have established
guidelines to protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure. Moreover, the specific duties required
of the President are not onerous. The Committee notes that
guidelines already are in place that will satisfy the
requirements of the Committee's substitute.
The Committee also adopted parallel amendments to the
reporting requirements in Section 502 and Section 504, as
introduced. The amendments simply substitute the existing
requirements of Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 on
reporting intelligence activities to the two intelligence
committees instead of reporting to other committees as proposed
in these sections of the bill.
Additional Concerns
One of the intentions of the Committee amendment to Section
512 is to improve Committee oversight regarding the provision
of intelligence information to the United Nations. The
reporting requirements set forth in the amendment apply only to
this process. In fact, in absolutely no way is the amendment
intended to monitor, control, impede or seek periodic reporting
on intelligence provided directly to U.S. forces involved with
U.N. peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. The Committee does
not intend for any provision of H.R. 7 to impede the free flow
of intelligence to and for U.S. personnel serving with a United
Nations force.
Committee Action
On January 27, 1995, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, a quorum being present, met to consider Title V
of the bill H.R. 7, the ``National Security Revitalization
Act''. Amendments were offered to the bill to:
(1) Substitute the existing intelligence oversight
reporting requirements of Title V of the National Security Act
of 1947 on reporting intelligence activities to the two
intelligence committees instead of lumping intelligence in with
the definition of ``assistance'' in the reporting provisions of
sections 502 and 504 of the bill.
(2) Substitute for existing section 512 a provision
containing--
(A) non-delegable requirements that (i) before the
United States provides intelligence to the United
Nations, the President must ensure that the Director of
Central Intelligence (in consultation with the
Secretaries of State and Defense) has established
guidelines governing the provision of intelligence to
the United Nations that protect intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure, and (ii) the
President report to the House International Relations
and Intelligence Committees and the Senate Foreign
Relations and Intelligence Committees at least
semiannually on the types of intelligence provided to
the U.N. and the purposes for which it was provided and
that the President report to the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees within 15 days after becoming
aware of the occurrence of any unauthorized disclosure
of intelligence information provided to the U.N.;
(B) a requirement that the Secretary of State (or the
Secretary's designee), in consultation with the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of
Defense, work with the United Nations to improve its
handling, processing, dissemination, and management of
all intelligence information provided to it by its
members;
The amendments were adopted by voice vote. The bill, as
amended, was ordered reported by a recorded vote of 11 ayes to
0 noes. On that recorded vote, Members voted as follows: the
Chairman (Mr. Combest)--aye, Mr. Dornan--aye, Mr. Young--aye,
Mr. Lewis--aye, Mr. Castle--aye, Mr. Dicks--aye, Mr. Dixon--
aye, Mr. Coleman--aye, Ms. Pelosi--aye, Mr. Laughlin--aye, and
Mr. Goss--aye.
Findings and Recommendations of the Committee on government Reform and
Oversight
With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the House
of Representatives, the Committee has not received a report
from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
pertaining to the subject of this bill.
Congressional Budget Office Estimate
In compliance with clause (2)(l)(3)(B) and (C) of rule XI
of the Rules of the House of Representatives, an estimate
prepared by the Congressional Budget Office submitted pursuant
to sections 308 and 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974
is as follows:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, February 3, 1995.
Hon. Larry Combest,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
reviewed the amendments to H.R. 7, National Security
Revitalization Act, as ordered reported by the House Select
Committee on Intelligence on January 27, 1995. Neither the
Committee's amendments nor the bill as introduced would have
pay-as-you-go implications. They would not explicitly authorize
appropriations nor would they have an impact on the budgets of
state and local governments.
A few provisions of H.R. 7 could imply changes in the
authorization of discretionary appropriations--particularly,
Title II (Missile Defense), Title V (United Nations), and Title
VI (expansion of NATO). The attachment discusses these
implications of H.R. 7 as introduced. The costs discussed in
the attachment would come to bear only if subsequent
legislation explicitly authorizes appropriations.
If you would like further details on this estimate, we will
be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Kent
Christensen, Raymond Hall, and Michael Miller.
Sincerely,
Robert D. Reischauer, Director.
Attachment.
Budgetary Implications of H.R. 7, National Security Revitalization Act
This document considers the budgetary implications of H.R.
7 as introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on January
4, 1995. It serves as a basis for understanding the budgetary
impacts of any Committee or floor amendments.
Strictly speaking, H.R. 7 has no direct budgetary impact.
It has no pay-as-you-go implications nor does it explicitly
authorize appropriations Nevertheless, some provisions of H.R.
7 could imply changes in the authorization of discretionary
appropriations--particularly, Title II (Missile Defense), Title
V (United Nations), and Title VI (Revitalization and Expansion
of NATO.) These implications would come to bear only if
subsequent legislation explicitly authorizes appropriations.
Title II--Missile Defense. H.R. 7 calls on the Secretary of
Defense to develop national and theater missile defenses, but
it is silent on how much funding would be available for this
purpose. The cost of such a system could total $29 billion to
$30 billion over the next five years, or about $10 billion to
$11 billion more than is currently programmed for missile
defense.
In 1992, the Department of Defense planned to deploy a
national missile defense (NMD) system at an initial site by
2004 and at multiple sites soon thereafter. This plan called
for deploying both ground-based systems and space-based sensors
commonly referred to as Brilliant Eyes. These two components of
the 1992 plan are the basis for our current estimate for the
costs of a NMD system. The current estimate does not, however,
embrace the component of the 1992 plan calling for space-based
interceptors (commonly known as Brilliant Pebbles.) An
enhancement to NMD, Brilliant Pebbles raises more concerns
about violating the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Defense Treaty
than do other elements of NMD.
Deploying a ground-based system of radars, interceptors,
and command and control at an initial site by 2006 would cost
about $10 billion. This sum would also support eventual
deployment at multiple sites. Finally, the additional funding
would support research and development into technologies that
would enable the system to counter emerging threats.
For about $1 billion more this system could be expanded to
accelerate the deployment of space-based sensors. With this
additional funding, some sensors could be deployed by 2002 to
provide cuing and initial targeting data. This sensor
capability is supposed to permit the ground-based interceptors
at the initial site to protect the entire continental United
States against limited missile attacks from the north.
As for theater missile defense, this estimate assumes that
the current plan for theater missile defense is consistent with
the aims of H.R. 7. That plan would deploy groundbased radars
and missiles with forward-deployed elements of the Army and
Marine Corps by the end of the century. Eventually more capable
systems such as the Navy's sea-based vertical launch systems,
the Air Force's boost-phase interceptors, or the Army's mobile
air and missile defenses would be deployed.
Under these assumptions H.R. 7 would add $10 billion to $11
billion to missile defense costs and bring the total budget for
these capabilities to $29 billion or $30 billion. But the
ultimate costs are quite uncertain. These estimates assume that
the 1992 plan is technically feasible, that the financial plan
matched the real components of the system, and that the plan
could be resumed after a two-year hiatus with costs rising only
for inflation.
Title III--Revitalization of National Security Commission.
The bill would establish a commission to conduct a
comprehensive review of defense strategy, force structure,
modernization, readiness, infrastructure, and funding. Of the
funds otherwise available to DoD, $1.5 million would be
available to carry out the provisions of the title.
Title IV--Command of United States Forces. H.R. 7 would
amend title 10 of the U.S. Code and the United Nations
Participation Act to prohibit a foreign national from
commanding U.S. forces unless the President makes certain
certifications. Neither change would have a significant
budgetary impact.
Title IV would also require the Congress to approve in law
any agreement between the President and the U.N. Security
Council for the use of U.S. forces in maintaining international
peace and security. CBO cannot predict the extent of U.S.
involvement in peacekeeping activities. Nevertheless, if
Congress denied U.S. participation in some peacekeeping
activities the budgetary savings would likely be no more than a
few hundred million dollars per year based on recent
experience. For example, if the United States had not used
forces in Bosnia it would not have incurred expenses of about
$300 million a year in 1994 and 1995. Similarly for U.S.
expenses in Somalia, the average savings would have been about
$700 million a year in 1993 and 1994. Aside from deployment to
Southwest Asia, the deployments to Bosnia and Somalia have been
the most costly contingencies of recent years.
Title V--United Nations. Title V addresses U.S. financial
responsibilities to the U.N. in support of international
peacekeeping. Enactment of Title V could:
Lower payments of assessed and voluntary
contributions that help fund U.N. peacekeeping
activities;
Lower payments of assessed contributions that help
fund the U.N. operating budget; and
Limit DoD's involvement in U.N.-sponsored
peacekeeping activities.
Certain sections of Title V would the overlapping effects.
For example, sections 501 and 507 could reduce assessed
payments to the United Nations for peacekeeping--currently
about $1.0 billion a year--for fiscal years after 1995.
Similarly sections 507 and 511 could reduce the assessments and
voluntary contributions totalling about $0.1 billion a year.
Thus, the potential budgetary effects of these sections are not
additive.
Section 501 would probably lower or eliminate the payment
of assessed peacekeeping contributions, which will total about
$1.0 billion in 1995 if the President's supplemental request is
fully funded by the Congress. Under section 501, payments would
be lowered by the total cost of using U.S. forces in
peacekeeping activities that are authorized by the U.N. unless
the U.N. has reimbursed DoD for those costs.
DoD currently is incurring incremental peacekeeping costs
from U.N. authorized operations in Haiti, the former
Yugoslavia, and elsewhere that will total about $2 billion in
1995. Total costs could be much higher. If DoD continues its
current level of peacekeeping activity, section 501 would
eliminate the payment of U.S. contributions because DoD's total
costs could far exceed peacekeeping assessments. If, however,
DoD dramatically scales back its peacekeeping activities, and
if payments for assessed contributions remain at about $1.0
billion annually, section 501 could lower U.S. contributions by
hundreds of millions of dollars.
Similarly, section 507 would deny assessed and voluntary
contributions for unreimbursed costs, but section 507 focuses
more on noncombat operations while section 501 would affect all
types of U.N.-authorized peacekeeping operations. The Secretary
of Defense however, may waive this provision if he determines
that an emergency exists. This provision could lower annual
payments for assessments by the same $1.0 billion targeted by
section 501, and voluntary payments by about $0.1 billion
annually.
Section 511 would reduce payments to the U.N. unless the
U.N. has appointed an Inspector General (IG) and has
established an operational IG office that could investigate the
U.N. and its specialized agencies. Under section 511, 50
percent of the peacekeeping assessments, 20 percent of the
payments in support of the U.N. operating budget, and all
payments from voluntary contributions would be withheld unless
the President certifies that the IG provisions have been met.
Thus, section 511 could reduce payments for peacekeeping
assessments (like section 501 and 507) by about $0.5 billion,
payments for the U.N. operating budget by about $0.05 billion,
and voluntary payments (like section 507) by $0.1 billion
unless the President makes the certification.
Section 508 would prohibit DoD from participating in
peacekeeping activities sponsored by the U.N. unless Congress
has authorized it to use funds for such purposes. Peacekeeping
activities sponsored by the U.N. typically have far less US.
involvement than activities authorized by the U.N. The
incremental cost to the United States of a large U.N.-sponsored
peacekeeping operation historically has been less than $50
million annually. Thus, if the Congress denied U.S.
participation in any one operation, savings could total up to
$50 million a year.
Section 508 would also prohibit DoD funds from being used
to pay U.N. peacekeeping assessments. Compared with current
law, this provision would not have any budget impact because
DoD is not authorized to use funds for such purposes
Title VI--Revitalization and Expansion of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. H.R. 7 would reaffirm the United
States' commitment to NATO and support the expansion of NATO to
include Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and
other countries designated by the President. The bill would
authorize the use of economic support assistance and
nonproliferation and disarmament assistance to facilitate the
transition to NATO membership. Any implicit authorization of
appropriations is open-ended. For 1995, the Economic Support
Fund (ESF) is funded at roughly $2.4, billion with about $4.0
billion of that going to Egypt and Israel and about $0.4
billion going to about 20 other countries, Nonproliferation and
Disarmament funding is now $10 million.
Title VII--Budget Firewalls. This title expresses a sense
of Congress that there should be firewalls between defense and
nondefense discretionary spending for 1996, 1997, 1998. This
title would affect only the distribution, not the level, of
spending under the caps on discretionary spending that were
established under the Budget Enforcement Act.
Committee Cost Estimate
The Committee agrees with the estimate of the Congressional
Budget Office.
Inflationary Impact Statement
Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee estimates that
enactment of the provisions of the bill within its jurisdiction
will have no significant impact on prices and costs in the
operation of the national economy.
Oversight Findings
With respect to clause 2(l)(3)(A) of the rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, as indicated in the
Overview section of this report, the Committee held a hearing
on intelligence issues raised in H.R. 7. In the 103rd Congress,
the Committee also had hearings and briefings involving various
aspects of intelligence support for U.S. forces involved in
U.N. sponsored missions. The amendments to H.R. 7 adopted by
the Committee reflect conclusions reached by the Committee in
light of that oversight activity.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by title
V of the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 20--HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER I--HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
Sec.
401. Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with
military operations.
* * * * * * *
406. Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share of
costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities: limitation.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 406. Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share of
costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities:
limitation
(a) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Payment of Assessment.--
No funds available to the Department of Defense shall be
available for payment of any United States assessed or
voluntary contribution for United Nations peacekeeping
activities.
(b) Limitation on Use of Funds for Participation in
Peacekeeping Activities.--Funds available to the Department of
Defense may be used for payment of the incremental costs
associated with the participation of elements of the armed
forces in United Nations peacekeeping activities only to the
extent that Congress has by law specifically authorized the use
of those funds for such purposes.
* * * * * * *
----------
UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1945
* * * * * * *
Sec. 4. (a) Periodic Reports.--The President shall, from time
to time as occasion may require, but not less than once each
year, make reports to the Congress of the activities of the
United Nations and of the participation of the United States
therein. [He shall make special current reports on decisions of
the Security Council to take enforcement measures under the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and on the
participation therein, under his instructions, of the
representative of the United States.]
* * * * * * *
(d) Annual Report.--In addition to the report required by
subsection (a), the President, at the time of submission of the
annual budget request to the Congress, shall submit to the
designated congressional committees a report that includes the
following:
(1) Costs of peacekeeping operations.--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(D) A description of the anticipated budget
for the next fiscal year for United States
participation in United Nations peacekeeping
activities, including a statement of--
(i) the aggregate amount of funds
available to the United Nations for
that fiscal year, including assessed
and voluntary contributions, which may
be made available for United Nations
peacekeeping activities; and
(ii) the aggregate amount of funds
(from all accounts) and the aggregate
costs of in-kind contributions that the
United States proposes to make
available to the United Nations for
that fiscal year for United Nations
peacekeeping activities.
[(D)] (E) In the case of the first 2 reports
submitted pursuant to this subsection, a
projection of all United States costs for
United Nations peacekeeping operations during
each of the next 2 fiscal years, including
assessed and voluntary contributions.
* * * * * * *
(e) Consultations and Reports on U.N. Peacekeeping
Operations.--
(1) Consultations.--Each month the President shall
consult with the Congress on the status of United
Nations peacekeeping operations.
(2) Information to be provided.--In connection with
these consultations, the following information shall be
provided in written form not later than the 10th day of
each month to the designated congressional committees:
(A) With respect to ongoing United Nations
peacekeeping operations, the following:
(i) A list of all resolutions of the
United Nations Security Council
anticipated to be voted on during such
month that would extend or change the
mandate of any United Nations
peacekeeping operation.
(ii) For each such operation, any
changes in the duration, mandate, and
command and control arrangements that
are anticipated as a result of the
adoption of the resolution.
(iii) An estimate of the total cost
to the United Nations of each such
operation for the period covered by the
resolution, and an estimate of the
amount of that cost that will be
assessed to the United States.
(iv) Any anticipated significant
changes in United States participation
in or support for each such operation
during the period covered by the
resolution (including facilities,
training, transportation,
communication, and logistical support,
but not including intelligence
activities reportable under title V of
the National Security Act of 1947), and
the estimated costs to the United
States of such changes.
(B) With respect to each new United Nations
peacekeeping operation that is anticipated to
be authorized by a Security Council resolution
during such month, the following information
for the period covered by the resolution:
(i) The anticipated duration,
mandate, and command and control
arrangements of such operation.
(ii) An estimate of the total cost to
the United Nations of the operation,
and an estimate of the amount of that
cost that will be assessed to the
United States.
(iii) A description of the functions
that would be performed by any United
States Armed Forces participating in or
otherwise operating in support of the
operation, an estimate of the number of
members of the Armed Forces that will
participate in or otherwise operate in
support of the operation, and an
estimate of the cost to the United
States of such participation or
support.
(iv) A description of any other
United States assistance to or support
for the operation (including
facilities, training, transportation,
communication, intelligence, and
logistical support, but not including
intelligence activities reportable
under title V of the National Security
Act of 1947), and an estimate of the
cost to the United States of such
assistance or support.
(3) Interim information.--(A) The President shall
submit to the designated congressional committees a
written interim report if, during the period between
the monthly consultations required by paragraph (1),
the United States learns that the United Nations
Security Council is likely, before the next such
consultation, to vote on a resolution that would
authorize a new United Nations peacekeeping operation
and that resolution was not previously reported on
pursuant to paragraph (2)(B). Each interim report shall
include the information described in clauses (i)
through (iv) of paragraph (2)(B).
(B) Any such interim report shall be submitted not
less than 5 days before the vote of the United Nations
Security Council, unless the President determines that
exceptional circumstances prevented compliance with the
requirement to report 5 days in advance. If the
President makes such a determination, the interim
report shall be submitted promptly (but in no case
later than 3 days after the vote) and shall include a
copy of the determination and a description of the
exceptional circumstances which were the basis for that
determination.
(4) New united nations peacekeeping operation
defined.--As used in paragraphs (2) (B) and (3), the
term `new United Nations peacekeeping operation'
includes any existing or otherwise ongoing United
Nations peacekeeping operation--
(A) that is to be expanded by more than 25
percent during the period covered by the
Security Council resolution, as measured by
either the number of personnel participating
(or authorized to participate) in the operation
or the budget of the operation; or
(B) that is to be authorized to operate in a
country in which it was not previously
authorized to operate.
(5) Quarterly reports.--The President shall submit
quarterly reports to the designated congressional
committees on all assistance provided by the United
States during the preceding calendar quarter to the
United Nations to support peacekeeping operations. Each
report shall describe the assistance provided for each
such operation, listed by category of assistance. The
report for the fourth calendar quarter of each year
shall be submitted as part of the annual report
required by subsection (d) and shall include cumulative
information for the preceding calendar year.
[(e) Designated Congressional Committees.--As used in this
section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' has
the meaning given that term by section 415 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995.]
(f) Designated Congressional Committees.--As used in this
section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' has
the meaning given such term in section 10(f).
* * * * * * *
Sec. 7. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law
other than subsection (e)(1), the President, upon the request
by the United Nations for cooperative action, and to the extent
that he finds that it is consistent with the national interest
to comply with such request, may authorize, in support of such
activities of the United Nations as are specifically directed
to the peaceful settlement of disputes and not involving the
employment of armed forces contemplated by chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(b)(1) Whenever personnel or assistance is made available
pursuant to the authority contained in subsection (a) (1) and
(2) of this section, the President shall require reimbursement
from the United Nations for the expense thereby incurred by the
[United States: Provided, That in exceptional circumstances, or
when the President finds it to be in the national interest, he
may waive, in whole or in part, the requirement of such
reimbursement: Provided further, That when] United States. When
any such reimbursement is made, it shall be credited, at the
option of the appropriate department of the Department of
Defense, either to the appropriation, fund, or account utilized
in incurring the obligation, or to an appropriate
appropriation, fund, or account currently available for the
purposes for which expenditures were made.
(2) The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement for
reimbursement under paragraph (1) if the Secretary, after
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, determines that an
emergency exists which justifies waiver of that requirement.
Any such waiver shall be submitted to the designated
congressional committees, as defined in section 10(a)(3)(B), at
least 15 days before it takes effect, except that if the
President determines that an emergency exists which prevents
compliance with the requirement that the notification be
provided 15 days in advance and that the provision under
subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of personnel or assistance on a
nonreimbursable basis is in the national security interests of
the United States, such notification shall be provided in a
timely manner but no later than 48 hours after such waiver
takes effect.
* * * * * * *
(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), at least
15 days before any agency or entity of the United States
Government makes available to the United Nations any assistance
or facility to support or facilitate United Nations
peacekeeping activities, the President shall so notify the
designated congressional committees.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to--
(A) assistance having a value of less than $1,000,000
in the case of nonreimbursable assistance or less than
$5,000,000 in the case of reimbursable assistance; or
(B) assistance provided under the emergency drawdown
authority contained in sections 506(a)(1) and 552(c)(2)
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2318(a)(1), 2348a(c)(2)).
(3) If the President determines that an emergency exists
which prevents compliance with the requirement in paragraph (1)
that notification be provided 15 days in advance and that the
contribution of any such assistance or facility is in the
national security interests of the United States, such
notification shall be provided in a timely manner but not later
than 48 hours after such assistance or facility is made
available to the United Nations.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term
``assistance''--
(A) means assistance of any kind, including
logistical support, supplies, goods, or services
(including command, control or communications
assistance and training), and the grant of rights of
passage; and
(B) includes assistance provided through in-kind
contributions or through the provision of support,
supplies, goods, or services on any terms, including on
a grant, lease, loan, or reimbursable basis; but
(C) does not include the payment of assessed or
voluntary contributions or intelligence activities
reportable under title V of the National Security Act
of 1947.
(f) The Secretary of State shall ensure that goods and
services provided on a reimbursable basis by the Department of
Defense to the United Nations for United Nations peacekeeping
operations under this section or any other provision of law are
reimbursed at the appropriate value, as determined by the
Secretary of Defense.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 10. (a) Credit Against Assessment for Expenditures in
Support of Peacekeeping Operations.--
(1) Limitation.--Funds may be obligated for payment
to the United Nations of the United States assessed
share of peacekeeping operations for a fiscal year only
to the extent that--
(A) the amount of such assessed share
exceeds--
(B) the amount equal to--
(i) the total amount identified in
the report submitted pursuant to
paragraph (2) for the preceding fiscal
year, reduced by
(ii) the amount of any reimbursement
or credit to the United States by the
United Nations for the costs of United
States support for, or participation
in, United Nations peacekeeping
activities for that preceding fiscal
year.
(2) Annual report.--The President shall, at the time
of submission of the budget to the Congress for any
fiscal year, submit to the designated congressional
committees a report on the total amount of funds
appropriated for national defense purposes for any
fiscal year that were expended during the preceding
fiscal year to support or participate in, directly or
indirectly, United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Such report shall include a separate listing by United
Nations peacekeeping operation of the amount of funds
expended to support or participate in each such
operation.
(3) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection:
(A) United nations peacekeeping activities.--
The term ``United Nations peacekeeping
activities'' means any international
peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or
similar activity that is authorized by the
United Nations Security Council under chapter
VI or VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
(B) Designated congressional committees.--The
term ``designated congressional committees''
includes the Committee on National Security of
the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Armed Services of the Senate.
(b) Notice to Congress Regarding Contributions for
Peacekeeping Activities.--
(1) Notice regarding united nations billing
request.--Not later than 15 days after the date on
which the United States receives from the United
Nations a billing requesting a payment by the United
States of any contribution for United Nations
peacekeeping activities, the President shall so notify
the designated congressional committees.
(2) Notice regarding proposed obligation of funds.--
The President shall notify the designated congressional
committees at least 15 days before the United States
obligates funds for any assessed or voluntary
contribution for United Nations peacekeeping
activities, except that if the President determines
that an emergency exists which prevents compliance with
the requirement that such notification be provided 15
days in advance and that such contribution is in the
national security interests of the United States, such
notification shall be provided in a timely manner but
no later than 48 hours after such obligation.
(c) Prohibition on Use of Funds To Pay Assessed or Voluntary
Contributions for Peacekeeping Activities Unless Department of
Defense Reimbursed for Certain Goods and Services.--
Appropriated funds may not be used to pay any United States
assessed or voluntary contribution during any fiscal year for
United Nations peacekeeping activities until the Secretary of
Defense certifies to the Congress that the United Nations has
reimbursed the Department of Defense directly for all goods and
services that were provided to the United Nations by the
Department of Defense on a reimbursable basis during the
preceding fiscal year for United Nations peacekeeping
activities, including personnel and assistance provided under
section 7 (except to the extent that the authority of
subsection (b)(2) of such section to waive the reimbursement
requirement was exercised with respect to such personnel or
assistance).
(d) Limitation on Assessed Contribution With Respect to a
Peacekeeping Operation.--Funds authorized to be appropriated
for ``Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities''
for any fiscal year shall not be available for the payment of
the United States assessed contribution for a United Nations
peacekeeping operation in an amount which is greater than 25
percent of the total amount of all assessed contributions for
that operation.
(e) Buy American Requirement.--No funds may be obligated or
expended to pay any United States assessed or voluntary
contribution for United Nations peacekeeping activities unless
the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the
designated congressional committees that United States
manufacturers and suppliers are being given opportunities to
provide equipment, services, and material for such activities
equal to those being given to foreign manufacturers and
suppliers.
(f) Designated Congressional Committees Defined.--As used in
this section, the term ``designated congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on International Relations and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
Sec. 11. (a) Withholding of Contributions.--
(1) Assessed contributions for regular united nations
budget.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 20
percent of the amount of funds made available for that
fiscal year for United States assessed contributions
for the regular United Nations budget shall be withheld
from obligation and expenditure unless a certification
for that fiscal year has been made under subsection
(b).
(2) Assessed contributions for united nations
peacekeeping.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 50
percent of the amount of funds made available for that
fiscal year for United States assessed contributions
for United Nations peacekeeping activities shall be
withheld from obligation and expenditure unless a
certification for that fiscal year has been made under
subsection (b).
(3) Voluntary contributions for united nations
peacekeeping.--The United States may not during any
fiscal year pay any voluntary contribution to the
United Nations for international peacekeeping
activities unless a certification for that fiscal year
has been made under subsection (b).
(b) Certification.--The certification referred to in
subsection (a) for any fiscal year is a certification by the
President to the Congress, submitted on or after the beginning
of that fiscal year, of each of the following:
(1) The United Nations has an independent office of
Inspector General to conduct and supervise objective
audits, inspections, and investigations relating to
programs and operations of the United Nations.
(2) The United Nations has an Inspector General who
was appointed by the Secretary General with the
approval of the General Assembly and whose appointment
was made principally on the basis of the appointee's
integrity and demonstrated
ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law,
management analysis, public administration, or investigation.
(3) The Inspector General is authorized to--
(A) make investigations and reports relating
to the administration of the programs and
operations of the United Nations;
(B) have access to all records, documents,
and other available materials relating to those
programs and operations;
(C) have direct and prompt access to any
official of the United Nations; and
(D) have access to all records and officials
of the specialized agencies of the United
Nations.
(4) The United Nations has fully implemented, and
made available to all member states, procedures that
effectively protect the identity of, and prevent
reprisals against, any staff member of the United
Nations making a complaint or disclosing information
to, or cooperating in any investigation or inspection
by, the United Nations Inspector General.
(5) The United Nations has fully implemented
procedures that ensure compliance with recommendations
of the United Nations Inspector General.
(6) The United Nations has required the United
Nations Inspector General to issue an annual report and
has ensured that the annual report and all other
reports of the Inspector General are made available to
the General Assembly without modification.
(7) The United Nations has provided, and is committed
to providing, sufficient budgetary resources to ensure
the effective operation of the United Nations Inspector
General.
Sec. 12. (a) Provision of Intelligence Information to the
United Nations.--Before intelligence information is provided by
the United States to the United Nations, the President shall
ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense, has established guidelines governing the provision of
intelligence information to the United Nations which shall
protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure in accordance with section 103(c)(5) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)).
(b) Periodic and Special Reports.--(1) The President shall
periodically report, but not less frequently than semiannually,
to the Committee on International Relations and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House and the Committee
on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate on the types of intelligence provided to the
United Nations and the purposes for which it was provided
during the period covered by the report. The President shall
also report to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate, within 15 days after it becomes
known to him, any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
provided to the United Nations.
(2) The requirement for periodic reports under the first
sentence of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to
the provision of intelligence that is provided only to, and for
the use of, United States Government personnel serving with the
United Nations.
(c) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate or
assign the duties of the President under this section.
(d) Improved Handling of Intelligence Information by the
United Nations.--The Secretary of State (or the designee of the
Secretary), in consultation with the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall work with the
United Nations to improve the handling, processing,
dissemination, and management of all intelligence information
provided to it by its members.
(e) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to--
(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5));
or
(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of
title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
413-415).
----------
FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION
ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1994 AND 1995
* * * * * * *
TITLE IV--INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
PART A--UNITED NATIONS REFORM AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 404. ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS.
(a) * * *
(b) Limitation on United States Contributions.--
(1) * * *
[(2) Subsequent fiscal years.--Funds authorized to be
appropriated for ``Contributions for International
Peacekeeping Activities'' for any fiscal year after
fiscal year 1995 shall not be available for the payment
of the United States assessed contribution for a United
Nations peacekeeping operation in an amount which is
greater than 25 percent of the total of all assessed
contributions for that operation.]
* * * * * * *
SEC. 407. CONSULTATIONS AND REPORTS.
[(a) Consultations and Reports on U.N. Peacekeeping
Operations.--
[(1) Consultations.--Each month the President shall
consult with the Congress on the status of United
Nations peacekeeping operations.
[(2) Information to be provided.--In connection with
these consultations, the following information shall be
provided each month to the designated congressional
committees:
[(A) With respect to ongoing United Nations
peacekeeping operations, the following:
[(i) A list of all resolutions of the
United Nations Security Council
anticipated to be voted on during such
month that would extend or change the
mandate of any United Nations
peacekeeping operation.
[(ii) For each such operation, any
changes in the duration, mandate, and
command and control arrangements that
are anticipated as a result of the
adoption of the resolution.
[(iii) An estimate of the total cost
to the United Nations of each such
operation for the period covered by the
resolution, and an estimate of the
amount of that cost that will be
assessed to the United States.
[(iv) Any anticipated significant
changes in United States participation
in or support for each such operation
during the period covered by the
resolution, and the estimated costs to
the United States of such changes.
[(B) With respect to each new United Nations
peacekeeping operation that is anticipated to
be authorized by a Security Council resolution
during such month, the following information
for the period covered by the resolution:
[(i) The anticipated duration,
mandate, and command and control
arrangements of such operation.
[(ii) An estimate of the total cost
to the United Nations of the operation,
and an estimate of the amount of that
cost that will be assessed to the
United States.
[(iii) A description of the functions
that would be performed by any United
States Armed Forces participating in or
otherwise operating in support of the
operation, an estimate of the number of
members of the Armed Forces that will
participate in or otherwise operate in
support of the operation, and an
estimate of the cost to the United
States of such participation or
support.
[(3) Written information.--The information described
in clauses (i) and (iii) of paragraph (2)(A) and the
information described in clauses (i) and (ii) of
paragraph (2)(B) shall be provided each month to the
designated congressional committees in written form not
later than the 10th day of that month.
[(4) Interim information.--(A) The President shall
submit to the designated congressional committees a
written interim report if, during the period between
the monthly consultations required by paragraph (1),
the United States learns that the United Nations
Security Council is likely, before the next such
consultation, to vote on a resolution that would
authorize a new United Nations peacekeeping operation
and that resolution was not previously reported on
pursuant to paragraph (2)(B). Each interim report shall
include the information described in clauses (i) and
(ii) of paragraph (2)(B).
[(B) Any such interim report shall be submitted not
less than 5 days before the vote of the United Nations
Security Council, unless the President determines that
exceptional circumstances prevented compliance with the
requirement to report 5 days in advance. If the
President makes such a determination, the interim
report shall be submitted promptly (but in no case
later than 3 days after the vote) and shall include a
copy of the determination and a description of the
exceptional circumstances which were the basis for that
determination.
[(5) Notification and quarterly reports regarding
united states assistance.--(A) The President shall
notify the designated congressional committees at least
15 days before the United States provides any
assistance to the United Nations to support
peacekeeping operations. This subparagraph does not
apply to--
[(i) assistance having a value of less than
$3,000,000 in the case of nonreimburseable
assistance or less than $14,000,000 in the case
of reimburseable assistance, or
[(ii) assistance provided under the emergency
drawdown authority of sections 506(a)(1) and
552(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2318(a)(1) and 2348a(c)(2)).
[(B) The President shall submit quarterly reports to
the designated congressional committees on all
assistance provided by the United States during the
preceding calendar quarter to the United Nations to
support peacekeeping operations. Each report shall
describe the assistance provided for each such
operation, listed by category of assistance. The report
for the fourth calendar quarter of each year shall be
submitted as part of the annual report required by
section 4(d) of the United Nations Participation Act of
1945 (as added by subsection (b) of this section) and
shall include cumulative information for the preceding
calendar year.]
* * * * * * *
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