FY 1995 BUDGET - DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL,
03/15/1994, Question and Answer
- Basis Date:
- 19950213
- Chairperson:
- T. Bevill
- Committee:
- House Appropriations
- Docfile Number:
- Q94AN301
- Hearing Date:
- 19940315
- DOE Lead Office:
- DP/NN SUB
- Committee:
- Energy and Water Development
- Hearing Subject:
- FY 1995 BUDGET - DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND INTELLIGENCE AND
NATIONAL
- Witness Name:
- V. Reis/J. Keliher
- Hearing Text:
...........
STATE OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES
Mr. Bevill. Can you describe the state of the Russian nuclear
weapons laboratories?
Dr. Keliher. Deleted
Deleted Deleted
DIVERSION OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS
Mr. Bevill. How concerned should we be about the possible
diversion of Russian nuclear weapons scientists to other countries?
What can be done to mitigate the danger?
Dr. Keliher. Observations to date by the DOE's National
Laboratory scientists, as they interact on a project working level with
their counterparts in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), indicate that this
is not presently a major concern. However, economic conditions are
rapidly deteriorating and the desire of FSU weapons scientists to feed
themselves and their families will increase the probability that some
will leave.
Since early 1992, the Department of Energy has strongly
encouraged technical collaborations between its laboratories and FSU
weapons institutes. As of this date, initial technical exchange visits
in March 1992 have led to over $5,000,000 in direct contracts between
DOE and FSU weapons institutes. This contracting is employing thousands
of scientists, engineers and technicians in non-weapons related work
that maintains their professional integrity. Professional relationships
are being established that provide a continuing basis for education in
market economics. The success of direct laboratory-to-institute
contracting is now leading to other programs that include U.S.
industrial and academic participation, which will foster long- term
commercial enterprises. This direct contracting for goods and services
benefits Newly Independent States (NIS) institutes with employment and
education in western business practices and provides the U.S. access to
a large highly talented scientific pool of knowledge. These activities
should be strengthened and given long-term support so as to minimize
the developing proliferation risk and establish lasting economic
benefits.
In addition to these laboratory-to-institute exchanges, the DOE
is supporting the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in
Moscow. The Director of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
is the U.S. representative to the board of governors and two National
Laboratory scientists are providing technical support to the center.
The DOE strongly supports the nonproliferation goals of the ISTC and we
encourage enhanced support to the center.
.....................
NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS
Mr. Bevill. Dr. Smith, what is the current DOD thinking on the
most likely national security threat this Nation faces?
Dr. Smith. We believe that there are four new post-cold war
dangers faced by the Nation. These are: regional threats to U.S.
interests, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and possible
failure of democratic reforms (both in Russia and elsewhere in the
world,). The fourth, although not a traditional military threat, but
one that could have significant impact, is negative national economic
trends.
..........
Nuclear Safeguards and Security
COORDINATION WITH DOD ON DECLASSIFICATION
Mr. Bevill. How is DOE coordinating with DOD in its current
efforts to declassify information? Are there any instances of
disagreement between the two organizations on how the declassification
effort should proceed?
Dr. Keliher. DOE coordinates its declassification efforts with
two primary offices in the DOD: The Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Atomic Energy, and the Assistant Deputy to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Security Policy. DOE has notified DOD of
current declassification efforts thorough DOE's Defense Program Office.
DOD was also invited and participated in DOE's internal review of
declassification proposals on March 3, 1994. A formal memorandum of
recommended declassifications will be sent to DOD by April 1, 1994. We
anticipate a response from DOD by the end of April 1994. There have
been no disagreements between the two organizations on how the
declassification effort should proceed; however, there have been
disagreements on certain declassification proposals in the past.
..............
COUNTRIES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Mr. Bevill. Please identify all countries known or suspected to
have nuclear weapons and include the number of strategic and tactical
nuclear weapons held by each.
Dr. Keliher. The countries known to have nuclear weapons are the
Former Soviet Union, China, France and the United Kingdom, as well as
the United States. Countries suspected of having nuclear weapons are
Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea. Estimates 'on the numbers of
weapons are classified.
..........
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
Mr. Bevill. Describe the nonproliferation activities funded in
this program and explain why they are not included in the Department's
arms control and nonproliferation budget.
Dr. Reis: As part of our effort to make the Research and
Development budget justification more accurately descriptive of the
work performed by the laboratories in support of the weapons program,
certain high priority, high visibility programs were broken out as
separate activities within Research and Development. Among these
Programs and Initiatives is N-PACTA, Nonproliferation, Arms Control,
and Threat Assessment.
N-PACTA is a relatively small activity, $11.7 million in FY 1994
and $6.4 million in FY 1995, but because of the high priority the
Congress and the President are placing on nonproliferation activities
we have chosen to highlight it. The activities collected within this
category are not duplicative of the activities funded within the
Materials Support and Other Defense Programs account. Rather, they are
concentrated around nuclear weapons design-specific engineering and
technology concepts and issues, and therefore a part of the R&D budget.
In general, these activities are activities which are captured by
the Department's Nonproliferation crosscut but which do not fall under
the purview of the Office of NonProliferation and National Security
because the requirement for these activities is driven by the.needs of
the U.S. stockpile, as opposed to the need to monitor non-U.S. weapons
activities.
Specifically, the activities within the N-PACTA category either
are activities that are necessary for the Weapons Research and
Development program to meet its responsibilities and fit under a broad
definition of nonproliferation, such as international device design
assessments, military implication assessments, and limited R&D efforts
to guard against technology surprise; or they are efforts in support of
the Department's treaty negotiation efforts which utilize the weapons
program's unique talents and capabilities, such as technical support
for the nuclear test talks.
In no case does this category support activities which should be,
or are, funded through the Materials Support and Other Defense Programs
account which is primarily involved in the monitoring of non-U.S.
weapons stockpile activities.
..................
CHANGE IN FOCUS OF VERIFICATION AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
SINCE THE BREAKUP OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
Mr. Bevill. How has the focus of this program changed since the
breakup of the former Soviet Union?
Dr. Keliher. As a result of the dissolution of the former Soviet
Union, the Verification and Control Technology Program has shifted its
focus from the verification of arms control agreements primarily with
the USSR to activities to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction on a global scale. The threat of proliferation had always
existed, but events of the past few years have brought the subject to
the top of the arms control agenda. With the collapse of Communism and
the break-up of the former Soviet bloc, we can confront the ambitions
which fuel proliferation not through the prism of Cold War alliances,
but through the examination of regional tensions which cause such
ambitions.
The program has adapted significantly to confront the
proliferation threat from successor states of the former Soviet Union
themselves, which has resulted from decades of militarized economies
and is worsened now by economic hard times. As a result, the program
has extended its training programs to encourage consolidation of
residual nuclear weapons and materials in Russia and to help selected
states of the former Soviet Union develop improved nuclear material
control and accountability and export control systems. These new types
of assistance were initiated through intensive diplomatic bilateral
dialogue in 1992, approximately one year after the dissolution of the
U.S.S.R.. As such, the focus of this assistance program to enhance or
establish national export control and nuclear material and
accountability systems in all of the former republics has remained
constant, with workplan adjustments found primarily in funding levels
and project priorities as articulated by each recipient country,
(Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan).
In addition, since the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., the program
has been active in the effort to establish the International Science
and Technology Center (ISTC) in Russia and the Science and Technology
Center in Ukraine (STCU) and to facilitate direct U.S.-Russian
Laboratory-to-Laboratory interactions. The purpose of these three
activities is to provide non-weapons collaborative research projects to
former Soviet weapons scientists to prevent "brain drain" to
proliferant states.
It should be mentioned that technical support for negotiations to
verify arms control agreements with the primary successor state of the
former Soviet nuclear arsenal, Russia, remains a high priority in the
Verification and Control Technology Program. Partly a nonproliferation
and partly an arms control measure, the U.S. purchase of 500 metric
tons of Russia highly-enriched uranium and its corresponding
revenue-sharing agreement with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan continue
to be subject for negotiation and supported by the program.
Transparency measures between the U.S. and the Russians have been
agreed upon to ensure that HEU being purchased is actually derived
from dismantled nuclear weapons. The program also supports negotiation
of transparency measures relating to the entire nuclear weapon
dismantlement process. The program is now exploring new technology
Which will allow our dismantlement process at Pantex to be more
transparent without revealing sensitive nuclear weapon design
information. The program has supported efforts to provide more direct
assistance to the Russians on dismantlement., including assistance for
the design of a storage facility for fissile material derived from
dismantled weapons.
...................
TREATIES
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list of treaties under negotiation
and anticipated treaties through the 1990's in which DOE will be
involved.
Dr. Keliher. DOE is involved in support of treaties, agreements,
and reciprocal unilateral initiatives either under negotiation or
anticipated. Treaties that are in effect include:
- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) (awaiting Ukrainian
ratification)
- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) (awaiting both
U.S. and Russian ratification)
- Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
- Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
- Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
- Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)
- Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)
- Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
- Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
- Bilateral U.S./Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement
(awaiting both U.S. and Russian signature)
- Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
- Wyoming MOU and BOA
- Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
- Open Skies Treaty
Treaties and agreements that are under negotiation include:
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission
- African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
Treaties, agreements, and initiatives we expect to come to fruition
through the 1990's include:
- Global Ban on the Production of Fissionable Material for Nuclear
Weapons Purposes
- U.S. voluntary offer to place fissile materials no longer
needed for nuclear deterrence under international safeguards
...............
IMPACT OF PROPOSED DECLASSIFICATION
Mr. Bevill. How has the proposed declassification of some of the
U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear materials information impacted this
program?
Dr. Keliher. There have been no impacts to date.
IMPACT OF THE ARREST OF A SUSPECTED SPY
Mr. Bevill. Has the arrest of a suspected spy at the CIA impacted
this program?
Dr. Keliher. The arrest of the CIA employee and the subsequent
media coverage has made the foreign intelligence service threat message
more credible to DOE employees and contractors. While the end of the
Cold War caused many employees to become skeptical concerning the
existence of an espionage threat, employees are now more receptive to
the message of the Department's counterintelligence awareness
program. No other impacts have been observed.
INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE
AND SPECIAL ACCESS WORK-FOR-OTHERS PROJECTS
Mr. Bevill. The Inspector General issued a report criticizing the
Department's classified intelligence and special access work-for-others
projects. What steps has the Department taken to address these
concerns?
Dr. Keliher. The Office of Nonproliferation and National Security
has coordinated a Departmental position and Action Plan to implement
the Inspector General's recommendations. The Departmental position
concurs with the 46 Inspector General recommendations. All
recommendations have been accepted and assigned Target Completion
Dates. Eleven recommendations have already been implemented.
PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS
Mr. Bevill. What performance measures can be used to measure the
effectiveness of intelligence programs?
Dr. Keliher. There are four primary measures of the effectiveness
of intelligence programs: "timeliness, accuracy, impact," and the
"cost/benefit ratio." For strategic warning and finished intelligence,
the measures should be applied to the products each program produces.
For current intelligence, the measures should be applied to the
aggregated function. "Timeliness" addresses the receipt by the customer
in time to influence a targeted decision. "Accuracy" examines whether
the correct issue was addressed in the analysis; if the appropriate
analytic approach was applied; if the research appears to be
exhaustive and if appropriate data was located and incorporated; and,
if the answer was correct (if validated by events). "Impact" measures
the level of influence the product had on a customer's decision, asking
if actions were taken that otherwise would not have been and assessing
the outcomes of those actions. "Cost to benefit ratio" addresses
whether or not the impact (benefit) justifies the cost.
...........
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY THREAT POLICY
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current threat assessment. Have
any DOE facilities experienced any threat in the past five years that
approaches the threat guidance now in effect?
Dr. Keliher. The current Department of Energy (DOE) threat policy
is founded on a January 31, 1992, DOE/Department of Defense, (DOD)
"Memorandum of Agreement on the Security Threats to DOE and DOD Nuclear
Weapons Programs and Facilities." The Memorandum of Agreement was based
on a Defense Intelligence Agency review of worldwide threats to United
States Government interests. The 'Design Basis Threat Policy for
Department of Energy Programs and Facilities" dated July 28, 1993
describes a spectrum of threats to DOE Programs and activities ranging
from terrorist threats to Departmental nuclear weapons and production
programs to the threats posed by criminals, psychotics, radical
environmentalists, foreign agents, and other insiders. The Design Basis
Threat Policy, classified Confidential, National Security Information,
provides guidance on the characteristics of the various threats types
and describes the capabilities of the adversary. The Design Basis
Threat Policy also describes Safeguards and Security Program strategies
for addressing the threat spectrum. It requires the development of site
specific considerations in mitigating threats. The Office of Security
Affairs performs an annual review of the threat policy for validity and
currency. The current policy replaces an April 1, 1992 version. These
revisions replaced the 1983 Generic Threat Statement. Both the April
1992 and July 1993 versions are consistent with the January 1992
interagency Memorandum of Agreement. Currently, the Office of Security
Affairs is working with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to draft a
document similar to the 1992 agreement with the Department of Defense.
A review of incidents at DOE facilities since 1990 indicates that
several events categorized as insider threat activity have occurred.
These incidents vary from tampering with systems, vandalism and threats
directed against other personnel. A series of incidents at one facility
were believed to have been caused by disgruntled employees resulting
from labor/management disputes. Because of the significant insider
controls, these incidents were quickly identified, investigated and
resolved with no significant negative or adverse impact to the
safeguard and security systems of the facility or the public's health
and safety. These incidents were referred to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for further action.
Threats of violence to individuals have occurred at several DOE
facilities. To the best of our knowledge, however, none have been
carried out.
There are also clear indications that the Department continues
to be actively targeted by foreign interests in the areas of nuclear
proliferation and advance technology.- The Department maintains active
security and counter intelligence programs that protect against such
threats. There have been no incidents of terrorism directed at DOE
facilities. There is a growing concern for terrorism in the United
States, particularly in light of the World Trade Center terrorist
bombing. The ability and readiness of safeguards and security programs
at field and Headquarters facilities to detect and respond to terrorist
events continues to be frequently tested and certainly provides a
deterrence to any group considering such an act. One of the objective's
of the program is to provide a high degree of assurance of the
programs' ability to successfully respond to the spectrum of threats to
include terrorism.
The strategy to guard against threats to facilities emphasizes
providing a high degree of assurance of a capability to detect, assess,
delay, and inhibit unauthorized access to nuclear materials, nuclear
weapons, and nuclear weapons design information. Safeguards and
security measures are also designed to prevent acts of sabotage.
THREATS TO DOE FACILITIES
Mr. Bevill. What is the most likely threat to DOE facilities and
what is the least likely?
Dr. Keliher. Notwithstanding the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
attack, terrorist acts directed against DOE programs and facilities,
while potentially resulting in catastrophic consequences, are the least
likely to occur partly due to the,deterrence in place. The threat posed
by cleared and authorized insiders is perhaps the most likely and
includes theft of material and equipment, espionage and sabotage. The
threat posed by insiders is also potentially exacerbated by the current
downsizing of some Departmental programs, as well as other major
changes in our programs. Some Departmental locations have also been
targeted by anti-nuclear and/or radical environmental extremist groups.
Those actions have resulted in demonstrations, acts of civil
disobedience and trespass.
DECLASSIFICATION EFFORT
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current effort to declassify
information including the funding for each year and milestones.
Dr. Keliher. As a followup to the Secretary's December 7, 1993
press conference, the Office of Declassification issued a second call
for information declassification proposals at the end of December 1993.
The first joint DOE/DOD meeting to discuss these new proposed
declassifications was completed on March 3. A new call will be issued
for additional information declassification proposals by July 1994.
Additionally, we are involved in a comprehensive, fundamental
review of DOE classification policy to determine what information is
still truly sensitive and requires protection. This review is scheduled
to be completed within 12 months after initiation. To assist in
accomplishing this review, four additional full-time employees and four
additional contractor support personnel have been selected and should
be on the job within the next 45 days. This policy review will be
followed by a review and revision of DOE classification guidance,
scheduled to be completed at the end of one additional year. This
classification guidance consists of detailed instructions describing
what is classified and is used as the basis for the declassification
review of documents.
To accelerate the review and declassification of documents,
additional derivative declassifies must be trained. Therefore, a
substantial increase in the number of authorized derivative
declassifies required to support this initiative in the field are in
the process of being trained (as many as 300 more). Each authorized
derivative declassifier must attend a training course conducted by DOE
Headquarters. Funding for the declassifies is not included in this
budget request; they are funded by the program offices. In addition,
there will be a substantial increase in the number of Headquarters
Office of Declassification Federal positions as well as support
contractors who will require training as derivative declassifies.
Current program expectations for declassifying documents in the
following areas are as follows:
Responses to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Requests - At the
end of FY 1993, the backlog in FOIA classified documents was
approximately 2 years. By the end of FY 1994, provided the public
demand for access does not increase, the backlog should be reduced to
18 months, and by the end of FY 1995 and future years the backlog
should be less than 1 year.
Support to Declassify Historical Documents at the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) - In FY 1994, we will hire
and train six qualified document reviewers. By mid-March 1994, we plan
to have an average of three document reviewers to directly support NARA
in the review of DOE and predecessor agency documents. During FY 1995,
the target is to support NARA with six fully qualified and trained
document reviewers.
Other Document Reviews (includes documents involved in litigation,
congressional testimony, draft documents intended for public release,
etc.) Maintain the close support of operational needs of our clients.
Funding to support the information declassification initiative is
as follows: FY 1994 - $5,900,000 and FY 1995 $6,536,000.
CENTRAL TRAINING ACADEMY OPERATING COSTS
Mr. Bevill. What is the total cost of operating the Central.
Training Academy and the FTEs in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995? Are
funds provided from any sources other than this budget?
Dr. Keliher. The costs for the Central Training Academy (CTA) are
as follows:
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
(In Thousands of Dollars)
Program $ 7,323 $ 7,933 $ 8,867
Program Direction/Other Services 393* 700 709
Total Central Training Academy $ 7,716 $ 8,633 $ 9,576
FTEs 5 5 5
*In FY 1993, the funding for Program Direction was provided by the
Weapons Production and Surveillance budget. In FY 1994, Program
Direction funding increases due to the funding of janitorial services
and costs associated with replacement of mechanical systems.
In addition to the above funding, CTA receives approximately
$200,000 annually from other Departmental programs to cover CTA staff
travel and adjunct costs related to specially requested Mobile Training
Team activities. These Mobile Training Teams are in addition to
normally scheduled and budgeted CTA classes.
Since the establishment of the CTA, the Albuquerque Operations
Office has provided funding for CTA's rent, electricity, etc. (it is
estimated that approximately $500,000 is expended annually).
In FY 1993, the CTA received $2,000,000 in General Plant Project
funding. The CTA in FY 1994 and FY 1995 has zero General Plant Project
funding.
GUARD OVERTIME COSTS
Mr. Bevill. There have been reports of excessive overtime costs
for guards at several facilities. Can you discuss this issue?
Dr. Keliher. Based upon data from the Rocky Flats Operations
Office, there are indications that protective force personnel at this
location are working excessive overtime hours based upon existing
protective force contract allowances. Based on Fiscal Year 1992 data,
in some instances, the annual wage of an armed guard is supplemented in
excess of 90 percent by overtime compensation.
Based upon data compilation, information analysis, and research by
Department of Energy Headquarters staff personnel and an independent
research group, the following working hour guidelines are being
examined to help standardize duty hour application:
- No more than 12 total hours worked per continuous 24 hour period,
inclusive of shift change briefings and uniform and equipment
outfitting.
- No more than 60 total hours worked per seven day week.
These guidelines are intended as a tool that can assist managers
and contract officers in future negotiations dealing with protective
forces. It is believed that cost savings can be realized from the
enactment of these guidelines.
RESOURCE REVIEW INITIATIVES
Mr. Bevill. Describe the actions taken to date to reduce
Department-wide Safeguards and Security (S&S) costs.
Dr. Keliher. In fiscal year 1993, DOE mandated a complex-wide
S&S resource review designed to identify opportunities for program
savings while ensuring appropriate and effective security for DOE
assets and personnel. This effort was coordinated by the Office
of Security Affairs.
This effort identified over 400 cost saving initiatives. These
initiatives offer a potential estimated cost-savings of approximately
$200M in FY 1995 when compared to the original FY 1992 cost estimate
for complex-wide expenditures of $1.2B. Estimated complex-wide S&S
expenditures for FY 1995 are approximately $62M below actual FY 1993
expenditures.
In addition to the 400 specific initiatives submitted by the
Operations Offices, the Office of Security Affairs resource review
identified consolidation of special nuclear materials as a significant
opportunity for resource savings. Examples are:
- fewer hardened storage facilities.
- reduced equipment and accountability requirements.
- smaller number of protective force personnel.
The Office of Security Affairs has instituted measures to
assure the continuation of an ongoing system to identify and pursue
cost saving activities.
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY CROSSCUT
Mr. Bevill. Provide a crosscut by location of all Safeguards and
Security funding throughout the Department for FY 1993, FY 1994 and FY
1995. Dr. Keliher. The following information is provided:
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
FY 1995 Congressional Budget
Safeguards and Security Crosscut Estimates
BY FACILITY
(in thousands)
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
Organization/Facility Actuals Estimate Request
---------------------------------------- --------- --------- --------
Albuquerque
Albuquerque Direct 83,911 86,676 85,954
Allied (Kansas City) 6,994 7,516 6,203
Central Training Academy 9,186 8,857 9,639
Grand Junction Project Off. 932 1,055 1,091
Los Alamos Natl. Lab. 66,934 74,385 74,677
Mound 8,603 6,885 5,673
Pantex 34,356 56,284 54,858
Pinellas 4,974 4,450 1,523
Rocky Flats 76,661 75,129 65,820
Sandia Natl. Lab. 52,768 64,443 63,452
--------- -------- ---------
Total, Albuquerque 344,629 385,680 368,890
Chicago
Chicago Direct 1,493 1,445 1,532
Ames Natl. Lab. 448 215 223
Argonne Natl. Lab. 13,390 14,098 14,839
Brookhaven Natl. Lab. 7,016 7,518 7,766
Fermi National Lab. 2,065 2,365 3,351
New Brunswick Lab. 4,253 4,215 4,295
Princeton Plasma Physics Lab. 1,213 1,212 1,291
--------- -------- ---------
Total, Chicago 29,878 31,068 33,297
National Renewable Energy Laboratory 675 1,000 1,049
Superconducting Super Collider 1,300 1,400 1,446
Idaho 40,093 39,141 43,148
Nevada 68,434 73,083 67,081
Naval Petroleum Reserves 1,180 1,245 1,269
Oak Ridge
Oak Ridge 24,271 25,975 25,952
Cont. Electron Beam Accelerator Fac. 330 345 355
FERMCO 3,025 2,788 2,644
Oak Ridge Institute for Sci. & Ed. 851 714 925
Oak Ridge Natl. Lab. 6,950 7,726 7,304
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion 11,560 3,888 1,323
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion 22,532 22,059 10,463
Y- 12 40,905 27,921 29,344
--------- -------- --------
Total Oak Ridge 110,424 91,416 78,310
Pittsburgh Naval Reactors 12,342 12,223 10,774
File Name: BYSITE95.WK3
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
FY 1995 Congressional Budget
Safeguards and Security Crosscut Estimates
BY FACILITY
(in thousands)
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
Organization/Facility Actuals Estimate Request
-------------------------------------- --------- ---------- ---------
Richland 60,865 56,311 39,693
San Francisco
San Francisco (Oakland Ops Office) 8,014 7,617 8,158
Lawrence Livermore Natl, Lab. 37,370 34,842 35,177
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 1,137 1,033 1,062
Stanford Linear Accelerator 834 812 852
--------- --------- ---------
Total, San Francisco 47,355 44,304 45,249
Savannah River 140,331 110,781 125,567
Schenectady Naval Reactors 13,208 13,534 14,182
Bartlesville Project Office 61 232 239
Office of Scientific & Tech. Infor. 635 725 760
Strategic Petroleum Reserve Off. 19,468 16,801 16,250
Western Area Power Admin. 870 870 890
Morgantown Energy Tech. Ctr. 499 725 529
Pittsburgh Energy Tech. Ctr. 1,600 1,600 1,515
Headquarters 101,640 93,629 83,012
--------- -------- -------
Total DOE Safeguards & Security 995,487 975,768 933,150
File Name:BYSITE95.WK3
GUARD FORCE SIZE AND EXPENDITURE
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing the size of guard
forces and expenditures for guard forces by location for FY 1993, FY
1994 and FY 1995.
Dr. Keliher. The following information is provided:
****PROTECTIVE FORCES LEVELS AND OPERATING BUDGETS chart is attached to
original document****
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT DETAIL
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a breakdown of the specific tasks and
funding associated with the "Additional Support" activity in FY 1993,
FY 1994, and FY 1995.
Dr. Keliher. The "Additional Support" breakdown is as follows:
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT TASKS AND FUNDING
(In Thousands of Dollars)
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
Chicago Field Office S&S Staff $ 1,445 $ 1,503 $ 1,532
Headquarters Physical Security Upgrade
Technical Assistance 313 313 313
Technical Support to Headquarters and
Field Assistance 2,825 3,054 2,946
Support Services Contracts 7,174 9,165 7,695
AOSS Modernization 0 900 1,200
Maintenance of HQ Security Alarm 0 290 350
Total Additional Support $11,757 $15,225 $14,036
Security Investigations
SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS
Mr. Bevill. What attempts are being made to reduce the number and
level of clearances throughout the Department?
Dr. Keliher. As a result of the general downsizing of classified
activities within the Department, particularly in the nuclear weapons
program, the number of active security clearances were reduced during
the interval of April 1993 to March 1994 from about 166,000 to about
154,000. Additional reductions will be realized again this year
consistent with the national laboratories' direction to eliminate
corporate policies that require all employees to be cleared as a
condition of employment at a Department of Energy owned site. As in the
past year, the Department's contractor employees will be processed for
a DOE clearance only when such an action can be justified based upon
the duties of the employee's position. Efforts continue at DOE
contractor sites to consolidate classified and special nuclear material
inventories, which will result in the need for fewer clearances by
their employees.
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - STATISTICS
Mr. Bevill. Provide by field office and facility the number and
types of clearances held by DOE employees, contractors, and other
Federal employees in FY 1993 and FY 1994.
Dr. Keliher. There are just under 154,000 clearances currently
held by DOE Employees, contractors, and other Federal employees.
Current information will be provided for the record.
****CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1994 chart is attached to original
document****
PERSONNEL CLEARANCE PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. How will the change in mission at Rocky Flats, Mound
and Pinellas impact the number of security clearances in FY 1995?
Dr. Keliher. I would like to submit the following information
for the record.
- Rocky Flats. Mission change will have very little impact in FY
1995 due to the continued need to consolidate material and
classified matter.
- Mound. Mission change will result in the downgrading of a
significant portion of the work force from "Q" to "L" but current
estimates do not indicate that the total number of security
clearances will be affected.
- Pinellas. Mission changes will result in a 25 percent reduction in
the number of security clearances in FY 1995 (400 clearances).
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET
Mr. Bevill. What were the number, by type and performing agency,
of investigations and reinvestigations performed for FY 1993, FY 1994,
and FY 1995? Describe the reasons for the increases or decreases.
Dr. Keliher. The following data on investigations and
reinvestigations is inserted for the record: (The information
follows:)
INVESTIGATIONS AND REINVESTIGATIONS
FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995
ACTUAL ESTIMATED REQUEST
FBI Initial Investigations 21 18 15
OPM Initial Investigations
Single Scope Background 9,456 7,144 4,600
Background 45 50 50
Limited Background 936 550 300
OPM Reinvestigations
Periodic - Single Scope 13,517 16,978 13,345
Limited Background 7,809 0 0
OPM National Agency Checks
Initial 3,551 5,210 5,500
Reinvestigations 5,460 7,635 7,900
TOTAL INVESTIGATIONS 40,895 37,585 31,710
FBI investigations have decreased as that agency is now being
used strictly for initial investigations for individuals who occupy
positions of a high degree of importance or sensitivity (150 positions
have such designations within the Department).
The number of Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBI's)
continues to decline as the Department emphasizes the need to reduce
the number and levels of DOE access authorizations to a minimum
consistent with operating requirements.
OPM Background Investigations (BI's) decreased beginning in FY
1993 when the SSBI became available. Currently a BI is only conducted
on DOE employees who occupy critical sensitive positions, but do not
require access to classified material in order to perform their
official duties.
OPM Limited Background Investigations (LBI's) conducted for
reinvestigations have been discontinued as a result of the adoption of
the Periodic Reinvestigation - Single Scope Background Investigation
(PRIS) in December 1992. LBI's are currently used only for initial L
and Secret clearances for DOE employees or if the PRIS must be expanded
due to special circumstances.
OPM National Agency Checks with Credit (NACC) will increase as the
need for the number of initial Q clearances is reduced.
PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. Describe the effort to develop an electronic transfer
program for security clearances, including the timetable for completion
and cost by year.
Dr. Keliher. The current time between the DOE request for a
background investigation and receipt of the completed product from the
investigative agency (Office of Personnel Management (OPM)) is
approximately 75 days. However, depending on the geographic location,
it takes another 15 to 30 days in mail time to send and receive the
case papers and completed investigation.
This project will implement an electronic transfer system
(including appropriate safeguards of data) between each of the DOE
Operations Offices and the OPM's Office of Federal Investigations in
Boyers, Pennsylvania, which will allow DOE to electronically
transfer the paperwork requesting a background investigation (including
fingerprints) to OPM, and when the background investigation is
completed, to have it electronically transferred to the appropriate DOE
Operations Office for adjudication. This will also allow transfer of
security files between DOE Operations Offices. The electronic transfer
system will eliminate the mail time between DOE and OPM.
The FY 1995 Security Investigations budget includes $2,200,000
for this project.
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET,
Mr. Bevill. Provide an analysis of security investigation programs
showing the funds for defense and other than defense programs.
Dr. Keliher. There is approximately a 50/50 split of the FY 1995
Security Investigations budget allocation between defense and other
than defense activities, as shown below in the table which I would like
to insert into the record. (The information follows:)
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
FY 1995
Defense/Environmental Activities $19,801,770
Other than Defense/Environmental 19,025,230
Total SI Budget 38,827,000
Use of Prior-Year-Funds -4,000,000
FY 1995 REQUEST $34,827,000
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET
Mr. Bevill. Provide a breakout, by activity, of the $3.6 million
requested for Related Security Investigations Activities.
Dr. Keliher. The breakout of our request for Related Security
Investigations Activities is shown on a table which I would like to
insert in the record. (The information follows:)
RELATED SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITIES
FY 1995
Electronic Transfer Program $2,200,000
Implementation of Accelerated Access
Authorization Program (AAAP) 1,300,000
National Industrial Security Program
(NISP) support 50,000
TOTAL - Related SI Activities $3,550,000
...............
ABILITY TO CARRY OUT MISSION
Mr. Myers. Dr. Keliher, your request for intelligence activities
is decreased by $2.3 million from the 1994 level of $45.4 million. What
impact will this decrease have on your ability to carry out your
mission?
Dr. Keliher. The FY 1995 Request will enable the Office of
Nonproliferation and National Security to meet its intelligence
responsibilities to the Department in its objectives of ensuring the
continued credibility of the Nation's nuclear deterrent, assessing
conditions that pose a nuclear threat, and executing its
responsibilities for nonproliferation., Although the FY 1995 Request is
about five percent below our current year funding level, I am confident
that we can fulfill our intelligence responsibilities within expected
fiscal constraints by satisfying high priority Departmental
intelligence needs through effective interaction with the intelligence
Community.
SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS/CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Mr. Myers. Is your decrease in requested funding for security
clearances due to less information needing to be.classified? Are you
still doing updates on existing clearances?
Dr. Keliher. No, the FY 1995 request is not lower due to less
information being classified. Information declassification involves
declassifying the facts, data, or knowledge itself. We are involved in
a comprehensive, fundamental review of the Department of Energy's
classification policy. The decrease is a result of reduced numbers of
clearance requirements, facility consolidation efforts, low turnover
rates, and elimination of the reinvestigations backlog. The Department
is continuing to do updates (reinvestigations) on existing clearances.
DECLASSIFICATION FUNDING
Mr. Myers: Is any of the funding for nuclear safeguards and
security activities being used to declassify material? If so, how much?
Dr. Keliher: Funds within the nuclear safeguards and security
budget which directly support the declassification of material are as
follows: FY 1994 $5,900,000 and FY 1995 $6,536,000.
