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Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise today to bring to the attention of the Senate an article that appeared in the January issue of the Armed Forces Journal entitled `Mix 'n' Match Solutions to Crisis Response.' This excellent article by John G. Roos describes the increasingly important role being played by the U.S. European Command [EUCOM] in the management of crises around the world.

The changing role of EUCOM from a headquarters dedicated to the cold war confrontation in Europe to a more flexible and dynamic headquarters dedicated to a wide range of missions from peacekeeping to force projection is a model for other military commands to follow. I believe that EUCOM has demonstrated that it is dedicated to the kind of joint operations that are essential in the complex national security environment that has developed in the wake of the cold war.

We are all proud of the Americans who are stationed in EUCOM. From their commander to the young recruits on their first tour of duty, these men and women are protecting America's interests in a world that is, in many aspects, more complex than the cold war that emerged after World War II. I recommend this excellent article and ask consent that it be placed in the record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Mix 'n' Match Solutions to Crisis Response


Long before the Pentagon received the 4 December go-ahead to send a 28,000-member joint-Service task force to famine-ravaged Somalia, military planners in the US and Europe were fine tuning details for Operation Restore Hope, the latest in a recent string of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. The fact that nearly 1,800 US Marines--the lead element of an 18,000-man Marine contingent taking part in the operation--were 35 miles off the coast of the northeast African nation when the order was received reflects weeks of intense planning for the venture and draws on years of experience in similar humanitarian and crisis management undertakings.

The initial Marine landing in the predawn hours of 9 December in Somalia was followed the next day by the arrival of lead elements of the 16,000-strong 1st Marine Expeditionary Force from Camp Pendleton, CA, and the first of about 10,000 soldiers from the US Army's 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY. For its part, by 15 December the US Air Force had flown 120 transport missions into Mogadishu, ferrying the US-based troops and the 2,800 tons of supplies needed to get the operation under way. Some international military support was also quick to materialize, most notably Foreign Legionnaires from France.

All US military personnel assigned to the multi-Service US force operating in and around Somalia are under the command of Marine Lt. Gen. Robert Johnston, Commanding General, I MEF (1st Marine Expeditionary Force). As commander of JTF Restore Hope, Johnston reports to US Central Command, MacDill AFB, Fl. Somalia, along with a few other nations in the Horn of Africa (essentially those bordering the Arabian Sea), falls within CENTCOM's area of regional responsibility.

This latest appointment of a senior, on-site military officer to head a multi-Service operation draws upon experience gained during Operations Desert Shield/Storm and in subsequent humanitarian and relief endeavors in Eastern Europe, Southwest Asia, and other African countries. Johnston's appointment to head the Marine-heavy contingent is the first time a Marine Corps officer has led a four-Service joint task force (JTF)--two or more Services operating under the command of a single commander--bringing to the Corps the JTF leadership experience and prestige already enjoyed by senior officers in the other Services. This point is not insignificant. After a gestation period of nearly a decade, a fundamental shift in military thinking has finally taken hold: in the post-Cold War world, the JTF has become the hallmark of US military operations.

US military officials have long paid lip service to the utility of joint military operations, but the idea was repeatedly short circuited by inter-Service rivalries. It took nothing less than the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact threat, in combination with a series of crises in Africa, northern Iraq, and the former Soviet Union, to get leaders wearing different US uniforms genuinely interested in the unique capabilities each Service could lay on a planning table. The JTF concept is now embedded in the military planning process, not least among US forces in Europe. US European Command (USEUCOM) has recently responded to more JTF contingencies than any other unified command.


Even as the greatly diminished prospect of a war in Central Europe sent US military leaders there on a quest for a new raison d'eAE3tre, a series of unique challenges landed on their doorstep. With each tasking order from Washington, USEUCOM became ever more deeply immersed in a petri dish for JTF experiments, ultimately becoming the US' principal repository for joint-Service expertise. The lessons learned during USEUCOM experiences were drawn on, and merged with, those of Pentagon Joint Staff and USCENTCOM planners in orchestrating Operation Restore Hope.

About 900 USEUCOM personnel have a direct hand in supporting operations in Somalia. The European Command sent Black Hawk air ambulance and medium transport helicopters, heavy Chinook transport helicopters, and an Army aviation maintenance company-size unit to assist in Operation Restore Hope. Other assistance from US Europe-based forces includes about 200 members of a Navy Seabee engineer maintenance battalion and an air refueling operation being run out of Spain.


USEUCOM made its initial foray into the JTF arena in April 1990 with Operation Sharp Edge, a noncombatant evaluation mission in Liberia. JTF Proven Force followed during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, when USEUCOM threatened Iraq with a second front Turkey. Subsequent missions included: Combined Task Force Provide Comfort (carried out in conjunction with allied forces) to protect Kurdish refugees; Operation Provide Hope, bringing humanitarian assistance to the republics of the former Soviet Union; a noncombatant evacuation from Sierra Leone; Provide Promise, supporting UN operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina; Provide Transition, facilitating free elections in Angola; and (in support of US Central Command) Operation Provide Relief--the precursor of the greatly expanded Operation Restore Hope now under way in Somalia.

Recognizing the perishable nature of military experience, particularly the inevitable loss of firsthand knowledge due to rotations, USEUCOM officials began institutionalizing the JTF planning process. Drawing upon experiences gained during far-flung contingencies, the command first issued a series of executive lessons learned and after-action reports. These were followed by the introduction of scheduled (once a year) JTF symposia for senior USEUCOM leaders from all Services; twice-yearly JTF staff-designee orientations; command post exercises (one each year); JTF field training exercises (twice a year); and computerized JTF `gaming' exercises (one a year).

The frequency of the planning and exercise schedule means JTF considerations remain at the top of senior leaders' agendas. In November, for example, about 60 officers from all Services converged on USEUCOM headquarters for a `Joint Warrior' seminar. Last month the command conducted `African Eagle '93,' during which a Navy officer, with a Marine Corps deputy worked through details of a mission to a North African nation. This month, a Marine Corps major general, assisted by a Reserve Component brigadier general from one of the other Services, will put a 60-member staff through the latest JTF planning exercise.

Senior officers and staff members participating in these exercises are those most likely to be called upon to deploy during JTF contingencies. The very real possibility that they might have to draw upon the experiences acquired during the training sessions `really pumps their blood,' a senior USEUCOM JTF planner told AFJI. Because USEUCOM and the other unified commands are literally writing the book about how JTF's should be run, he said, exercise participants are quick to devour the growing body of JTF experience now captured in a series of classified and unclassified training publications printed by the command. One of the unclassified documents, an 80-page `JTF Help List,' lists functional area deployment considerations ranging from a cautionary note about the appropriateness of indirect fire illumination during peacekeeping operations to making sure that disbursing officers in the forward area have enough cash on hand to support local contracting requirements.

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Army Lt. Gen. Robert D. Chelberg, USEUCOM Chief of Staff, is one of the principals charged with fashioning the future composition of the US military presence in Europe. Insights gathered from force reduction deliberations, coupled with his unique perspective of past multi-Service operations, make him a strong supporter of the JTF concept. With the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, he said, his focus is on retaining force flexibility--balancing the demands of anticipated near-term missions against the most likely long-term threats. The 82 countries now in USEUCOM's area of operational responsibility, and the one-million US citizens in Europe on any given day, give him abundant reason's to ponder potential JTF requirements. Training, and the right force mix, he says, are keys to managing the challenge. `Right after [the first phase of] Operation Provide Comfort we really needed to try to capture the experiences gained by a number of people, so we ran our first task force symposium,' Chelberg told AFJI. `We then started to put together a capability of having exercises and symposiums with our components so we could continue to learn from these experiences.' An obvious practical advantage accrues during extended mission: `We're now on our sixth commander in Provide Comfort,' he said. That open-ended commitment to protecting Kurdish refugees parallels one of the principal concerns lingering over Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.

`One of the things that you always have to bear in mind,' Chelberg said, `is, How do you terminate the mission? What's the end state? How do we get out of it? When we pulled the ground forces out of northern Iraq on the 15th of July, the military wanted to pull out of that whole operation right then. We had done what we were supposed to do, in providing humanitarian relief assistance, but we're still enforcing the `no-fly' zone above the 36th parallel and we're still involved in contracting supplies needed in northern Iraq.' The US Congress recently authorized the expenditure of $43-million for materiel needed by the Kurds, such as machinery that bends sheets of tin into roofing strips. `I suspect that we'll be building some prefab tin buildings shortly in northern Iraq,' he said.

Chelberg feels that `as far as this theater is concerned, for probably the next five to 10 years, the wave of the future will be putting together task forces that will be able to respond to crisis management or humanitarian missions.' That prediction, he emphasized, is based on the assumption that there will not be `any tremendous change in intentions on the part of the Russians or other republics that were part of the former Soviet Union, or any major eruption in the Middle East.'

As an example of the rapidity and unpredictability with which crisis management requirements surface, Chelberg recalled a recent weekend during which USEUCOM carried out two noncombatant evacuation missions--one in Dushanbe (formerly Stalinabad), Tajikistan, and the other in Monrovia, Liberia. (In mid-December, street fighting was taking place in Dushanbe.) The flexibility needed to respond to such far-flung events, he said, calls for mobile, light, fast-reacting conventional forces, sometimes complemented by special operations assets and specialized communications gear.

Even when standard military radio equipment measures up to one Service's operational requirements, Chelberg told AFJI, communications interoperability among US forces in JTFs remains a problem. `It isn't all compatible today. We're trying to get the Services, on a day-to-day basis, to procure items that will interface and to have hardware and software that works together.' But the problem of communications interoperability (along with several other equipment issues) can't be solved simply by putting aside a set of equipment for JTF use because of the ad hoc nature of each mission. `You could have a situation where the predominance of forces will be naval, and we're going to have a naval JTF commander,' he said. `Another situation might dictate that the predominance of forces be air. Again, if most of a mission will be ground-related, you'll have an Army commander. Other commands can have standing JTFs, but ours can't.'


Finding ways for JTFs to work around the communications conundrum and the related problems of collecting and sharing intelligence data are high on the list of interoperability priorities for the USEUCOM staff. At the command's Stuttgart headquarters, R. Adm. David E. Frost, USEUCOM J-3 (Operations Officer), told AFJI that `there are a lot of interoperability issues' under consideration by USEUCOM. `Most of them have to do either with communications or things that are directly related to communications, like intelligence. But we're working out those procedural issues very quickly.'

Frost said that JTF flied training exercises--sometimes involving thousands of forces--are the best way to familiarize principals with the capabilities and limitations of various Services' intelligence-gathering and communications equipment. `FTXs are expensive, but they're important,' he said. `Only during FTXs can you actually put in the field and exercise the joint intelligence architecture so we can make, for example, an imagery transfer from an image that's taken by an F-14 from a carrier and get it into the hands of the ground component commander. You've got to put that kind of mechanism in the field and try it out. You've also got to put the joint communications architecture in the field and try that out every now and then.'

When USEUCOM forms a JTF staff, whether for an FTX, command post exercise (CPX), or an actual mission, each involved Service gets an equal share of spaces on the staff. Some positions on all JTF staffs are filled by officers from USEUCOM headquarters, which brings a degree of familiarity and continuity to operations. Early on, the lead component had been expected to fill just more than half of all staff positions, but that was found burdensome for the lead Service and a hindrance to interoperability. Now, Frost said, the composition of JTF staffs is driven by mission demands. `There are two things you have to form,' he said. `There's the immediate staff for the commander, and there's the architecture for his subordinate commands. We have big debates over this, and there's no single answer.'

Generally, he told AFJI, the designated commander plays a key role in selecting particular persons to serve on the command staff and also is instrumental in selecting forces which comprise the JTF. But, he said, `We also have debates over what's inside a joint task force, what the structure should look like. For example, should you just have an Army component, a Navy component, an Air Force component, and so forth? That's one way to do it. Or should we have sub-JTFs, like we had in Provide Comfort? In Provide Comfort we had a JTF Alfa and a JTF Bravo. Alfa was basically a Marine Corps-Army combination; JTF Bravo was primarily special operations. There are different ways to organize these things. There's also the issue of the commander's immediate staff. Generally, that's going to be along [standard joint-staff lines], but issues such as whether the JFAC [Joint Forward Air Controller] should automatically fall under the air component commander or be a separate function, slightly aside from that [officer's direct control] is the type of issue that gets played out in training.'

Frost acknowledged that equipment shortages exist but doesn't consider them the most significant limiting factors in organizing JTFs. `There are a lot of equipment-related issues, but I think that a more important dimension is more training and capturing the wonderful experience we're getting in the `real world' of JTFs that we're constantly doing out here. In other words, institutionalizing those lessons. I can see a day, 10 or 15 years from now, for example, when this is fully institutionalized, and the scheduling procedures for naval air are identical to those for Army Apache helicopters, Air Force Tactical Air, and Marine Air. So when they come together for joint operations, it's just seamless. Right now, we still have to make adjustments for Service procedures, and that's what we're working our way through now. We're learning lessons so fast, that this is the biggest growth industry in the military today. We're trying hard to capture that experience for our own sake, and then will advertise what we've learned in the wider world of the US military and, probably, even allied militaries.'

USEUCOM's most ambitious FTX took place last summer and involved a large special operations contingent operating under the command of V.Adm. William Owens, former Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet, and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe. `He ran the exercise from his flagship, the carrier Saratoga, and we fielded a full JTF headquarters aboard the carrier--essentially displacing the existing staff. We put a JTF staff of about 100 aboard the carrier and forces all over the field for them to actually control,' Frost said. `It was one of the biggest JTF FTXs we've done, and we learned the most from it. He left part of his headquarters ashore, for a lot of good reasons. One was simply space and communications limitations aboard the carrier, another was because some aspects of the operation were better served by having some of his staff ashore. One obvious example was the Joint Visitors' Bureau: In any operation, it's important that you have a first-class JVB and public affairs operation.' One of the fundamental lessons the military has learned, he said, is that comprehensive media coverage has changed the way the Services approach operations.


V.Adm. Owens is now the Navy's deputy chief of naval operations for resources, warfare requirements, and assessment. Reflecting on his experiences during joint and combined operations while in Europe, Owens told AFJI that the Navy--to a greater degree than the other U.S. Services--operates alongside forces from allied nations. `In Sixth Fleet we thought a lot about communications, both in terms of intra-U.S. comms issues--how we communicate between Navy ships, first of all, and then between Navy ships and Air Force aircraft. You think about it in terms of how to communicate with very important surveillance aircraft in the area, be they P-3s or EP-3s, or Air Force RC-135s, or AWACS. We also thought a lot about how to communicate with forces from other countries, if you're out there as part of a NATO task force, or if the WEU [Western European Union] is out there as a task force and you want to communicate with them. The navies,' he said, `have always been blessed with having the mandate to be out operating or exercising together.'

Traditionally, the U.S. Navy has relied on either line-of-sight UHF communications or HF voice/teletype transmissions, which, in some cases, can provide over-the-horizon capability. Some exceptions occur, particularly when dealing with allies. U.S. ships communicate with British vessels (and those of the French, to a lesser degree) via satellite links. But recent leaps in fielded U.S. communications systems--high-data-rate, antijam transmissions--threaten to create a technology gap which would leave some allied navies out of the loop. `We're very aware of this, and somewhat concerned that we make sure we maintain that interoperability,' Owens said, `We don't want to make a quick jump and end up being out there by ourselves.'

Dramatic changes in technology are also affecting the ability of U.S. forces to communicate with each other, particularly when Navy battle groups are part of the JTF equation. `Essentially, every battle group that has left Norfolk [VA] or San Diego [CA] over the past two or three years to head to a forward deployment has been better equipped, from a communications stand-point, than the previous one,' Owens said. `The comms suite on a deploying carrier is much more capable than its predecessor was on a carrier that deployed only six months before.'

When Owns commanded the JTF FTX from aboard the carrier Saratoga, he recalled, `It was very interesting for me, because it was my last exercise in the Mediterranean. We had worked a lot on joint operations--how you get it together with the Army and Air Force and how you develop the ability to be mobile, high-tech, and quick. In that exercise, we had about 20,000-plus people involved, from the Army, Air Force, Marines, and Navy. There were a lot of Air Force planes involved. The air platforms, all of them--the shore-based ones and the carrier-based air wing--were all controlled by a two-star Air Force general, from the carrier. He ran an ATO [air tasking order] from the carrier--the entire air picture and the entire air plan--for about 200 aircraft. At the same time, we had an Army two-star general who was on board the carrier as the commander of the ground forces. He was in charge not only of the large number of Army troops, but also had some Army helicopters flying off the aircraft carrier. He was also in charge of the Marines--about 2,500 of them--in amphibious ships that were in an area about 400 miles away.'

Owens had a joint staff of about 40 on the Saratoga. `It was really a remarkable demonstration, I thought, of how the four Services can operate together. We had an exercise one evening where we had four different objectives, one at sea and three ashore, where we used all four Services in a coordinated operation to assault three areas, plus the sea-based target, within 30 seconds of each other. And this was done several hundred miles apart. We feel those carriers are out there not just for the navy. They are a capital investment in American defense and, therefore, are there for an Army-led JTF or an Air Force-led JTF.'

During this FTX, Owens said, `A lot of portable communications gear was brought aboard the Saratoga. What surprised me was that you could do it, and you would be able to work it so there was not too much electromagnetic interference. Also, there was a communications upgrade on that carrier that gave it SHF capability and high-data-rate comms.'

Owens sees unique JTF potential for the Navy's new, 41,000-ton LHDs. `It's a big ship. It's capable of controlling a limited landing force ashore, and it has a very good capability for handling up to about 20 Harrier aircraft, as well as a lot of Cobras and a lot of other helicopters. The capability of that ship to be in support of a ground campaign and to be a command ship should be there,' Although it's not quite there today.

In the final analysis, Owens said, the Navy is well equipped for its anticipated role in future JTFs. `With the commitment to the communications upgrades--they're not all there in the data quantity that we really need--and the data links for the surveillance assets, I think we're in pretty good shape to be the enabling force for JTFs. We need to have our aircraft carriers directly linked to the marines and Army ashore, and practice that mission of close air support and battlefield interdiction.'

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Joint and combined task forces, like the crises that bring them into being, are creatures of fluctuating dynamics. For example, in the case of CTF Provide Comfort, the operations initial objective called for airdropping relief supplies to Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. That phase of the operation saw Air Force Lt. Gen. James L. Jamerson, Vice CinC, USAFE (who was a major general at the time), in charge of the joint-Service effort. The operation then shifted focus to food distribution and resettlement activities on the ground, with the concomitant appointment of then Lt. Gen. John M. Shalikashivili (now CinC, US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, or SACEUR) as JTF commander. After completion of the ground phase of the operation, the mission again shifted--this time to enforcing the `no-fly' zone which still blankets the resettlement area--and Jamerson again took charge.

But several months before Operation Provide Comfort--as allied coalition forces were staging in Saudi Arabia to force Iraq's Army from Kuwait--the concept for another JTF took hold at USAFE.

The idea for what would eventually become JTF Proven Force first surfaced in August 1990, when a group of officers said, `Well, we could go down there and do a short-term sort of `hit a lick' from Turkey into Iraq and help our guys,' Jamerson told AFTJI. For three months, as the concept developed, `it went from a very small, one- or two--day operation originally envisioned' only for the Air Force into a potential JTF mission with special operations forces. This idea was merged with related efforts by USEUCOM and Special Operations Command involving combat search and rescue missions. `We merged those two ideas and, finally, in November we said, `Why don't we talk about a JTF if we ever do this? We got great support from the USEUCOM folks. If I appear to be overly enthusiastic about `joint' and USEUCOM, it's because my experience with them has been extremely positive.'

After the plan was developed, General John Alvin, former SACEUR, offered the idea to USCENTCOM, which was responsible for orchestrating all aspects of Desert Shield/Storm. In January 1991, JTF Proven Force was formed.

`Admittedly, the JTF was heavily Air Force, but we brought the Navy into it just in case they ever needed [its help]. But the Navy was committed so far down south that we didn't feel there was too much we really could do for them. There was, however, a lot of Army-Air Force play. Our vision was that our special ops guys would not just do combat search and rescue--that there would be other missions open to them. And we always approached it with that in mind.' As it turned out, Jamerson said, the special operations role in Desert Storm ended up primarily a search and rescue operation, but the task force was prepared to take on other combat missions. At the same time, the Navy launched cruise missile attacks from the Mediterranean in support of the JTF.

Concurrent with operational planning, discussions with Turkish authorities took place to obtain permission for the JTF to operate from Incirlik Air Base. `When the Turkish decision was made [on the first day of Desert Storm] that we could, in fact, go across the border and participate, the JTF operated out of Incirlik with an Air Force component--a composite wing, with everything there except the bombers, which operated from other bases in Europe--an Army component, from the 10th Special Forces Group, which operated with the Air Force's 39th Special Operations Wing, plus a Patriot antiair unit from the Army and much smaller involvement from the Navy and Marine Corps.'

Since the purpose of this particular JTF was to support the campaign against Iraq, Prove Force was designed to continue until the broader war-fighting effort terminated, Jamerson said. As it turned out, part of USAFE's contribution to JTF Proven Force metamorphosed into the ongoing second phase of JTF Provide Comfort, keeping Iraqi aircraft out of airspace over the Kurds. That job began 24 July 1991 with 129 aircraft; 77 aircraft and 1,862 personnel continue that mission today.

Jamerson was quick to counter comments from those who suggest that the US' recent relief missions throughout the world seem to be altering the military's short-term focus from war-fighting to humanitarian pursuits. `Most of us who were involved in Provide Comfort, who see the potential demands from Yugoslavia, and who consider the worldwide challenges in these type missions realize that the humanitarian conditions that got you there are so volatile that there's a security element involved in all of them. I worry that people may forget that. We remind people not to look upon us only that way, because we have to keep our combat skills honed. If you don't, you could fail at the humanitarian job.'

Reflecting on tomorrow's likely increased demands for joint and coalition operations, Jamerson says US forces in Europe are up to the challenge. `If there's still a worry about how well the Services can conduct joint operations, from my perspective, over here, it's not warranted.'


Lt. Gen. Jerry R. Rutherford, commanding general of the Army's V Corps, in Frankfurt, commands USEUCOM's sole remaining Army corps in Europe. Its former counterpart, the VII Corps, disbanded last April. Rutherford was quick to point out that, V Corps units' involvement in JTFs notwithstanding, the defense of NATO's Central Region remains the Corps' primary mission. Today, however, when he considers what's going on within some of the former Warsaw Pact nations he sees `what everybody sees in the papers every day--a lot of instability. We now have, in the Corps, besides the mission of deterrence and defense of the Central Region, the mission of providing the stability that's needed over here. We're now also a regional response force. That is, I could be given a mission to take part of this Corps out of [Germany] to react to events in another region. As a good example of the regional response concept, we just deployed Task Force 212 MASH [Mobile Army Surgical Hospital], a 60-bed MASH, to Croatia to support UN forces. That is the type of expansion we're starting to do now, and shows how we look at the capabilities of the forward deployed force that's here.'

Even as NATO's military lineup shifts from a line of national corps facing east to a series of multinational organizations, Rutherford said, his focus has expanded to include out-of-area deployments. A few years ago, he said, `We never talked about deploying out of here. The Corps didn't have to have load plans for ships. We now have them, and have to consider how we'd use the rail system that flows out of this country. These deployment aspects are the biggest change,' he said, from how V Corps planners used to spend their time.

rutherford says that while there can be no single solution for deciding how best to terminate US involvement in various humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, `the US has to decide when we go into them what the end state will be, and determine that before the forces are projected. That, of course, is done by our civilian government. We, the military, implement it.' Still, he said, the military is giving far more consideration to this issue than previously, and even `gave thought to conflict termination' during the recent REFORGER '92 (Return of Forces to Germany) series. `Once the battle is over, there's thought being put into what this is going to look like in the end state. Do we restore the border? Do we get into handling the regufee situation? Are we going to put the government back on its feet?'

When Desert Storm ended, Rutherford took command of the 3rd Armored Division in Southwest Asia, along with the job of protecting refugees along the Iraq-Kuwait border. `Dealing with the refugees, and handling this with the people from the State Department, and turning the buffer zone over to the United Nations,' hadn't been given enough prior consideration. `Therefore, we've taken on that a lot more now, from a military aspect, asking: `What do you do when this thing's all over?' From the end of the conflict to the time the division left the area, he said, its medical personnel treated more than 25,000 refugees and the troops had distributed over one-million meals.

Rutherford says that these types of considerations will receive increasing play during future military exercises in Europe, as will deployability issues. The most striking example of the shift in emphasis will be seen next May during US Army Europe's annual REFORGER exercise, which will be combined with NATO's Dragon Hammer in Italy. The combined activity will find V Corps troops in Livorno exercising via computer simulation on terrain in Italy's Po Valey, near Milan--the first time REFORGER has been conducted outside the Central Region. No less significantly, it also will mark the first time in the 24-year history of REFORGER that the commander-in-chief of US Army forces in Europe will not direct the `fight.' Once the V Corps soldiers arrive in Italy, their marching orders will come from NATO's Allied Forces Southern Command, headed by US Admiral Mike Boorda.

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`We do a lot of Joint Task Force training,' Boorda told AFJI. `All of our US exercises of any magnitude, in Europe, include a JTF. The JTF commander is generally the officer whose Service has the preponderance of forces in the exercise, or he's the person who can exercise the best command and control, depending on where the activity will take place.'

To keep the commander constantly apprised of far-flung developments, Boorda said, `We work very hard to get the right intelligence flow to wherever the task force commander is going to be, and on down to his forces. Specific operations require different kinds of intelligence,' he said, which argues against a standard intelligence architecture to handle the demands of diverse JTFs. `I think we're doing pretty well, to be quite honest. In the exercises we have run--some of which I can't talk about--we have been able to get the intelligence we need. And we learned a lot from Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Because of that, for example, in the Navy we have beefed up the ability of the carrier to accept that type of information. We also have teams that come aboard with the JTF commander to process information and make it available to him and his components. We've learned the lessons, and we are now upgrading the capability, when it's a Navy JTF commander at sea, of his platform to accept and process that information.'

Boorda sees `wonderful capabilities' in the Navy's new LHDs for future JTFs. `They are command and control platforms par excellence,' he said. `Again [as in the case of carriers], we are now upgrading them, based upon lessons learned. This is a communications intensive business, and the communications are of all types.'

DOD's present approach to JTFs--relying on forward-deployed forces for the bulk of the JTF, with augmentations as necessary, from the US--is the most effective way to respond to contingencies, Boorda says. `I don't see that changing and, personally, I don't think it should change. The reason, I believe, why we have unified CinCs in each theater is so they can focus on their theater and know that theater better than anyone else. They can work with the allies in that theater, in the event that we do a combined operation in some alliance, like NATO, or in a coalition. The CinC better knows the participants; he knows their personalities: he has worked with them on a day-to-day basis. So he is the one who ought to put together the team. He doesn't want to do that on an ad hoc basis--it's the kind of thing that we practice all the time.'

When AFJI spoke with Boorda last month, a multinational naval force from his command had just begun enforcing a UN-ordered blockade against Serbia and Montenegro, vestiges of the former Yugoslavia. NATO's six-vessel Standing Naval Force, Mediterranean, which includes one US warship, has been patrolling the Adriatic for several months--first monitoring an embargo and, since November, enforcing the blockade.


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