- Basis Date:
- 19920529
- Chairperson:
- T. Bevill
- Committee:
- House Appropriations
- Docfile Number:
- Q92AF105
- Hearing Date:
- 19920311
- DOE Lead Office:
- AN, IN, SA, EH SUB
- Committee:
- Energy and Water Development
- Hearing Subject:
- NAVAL REACTORS, ARMS CONTROL, OFFICE OF INTELIGENCE
- Witness Name:
- V. Alessi, R. Daniel, G. McFadden, G. Podonsky
- Hearing Text:
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. Bevill. Describe the activities of DOE in arms control
negotiations. Are these activities planned to increase in FY 1993?
Dr. Czajkowski. At the policy level, DOE sits on the President's
Nuclear Initiative Steering Group and on the Arms Control and
Nonproliferation Policy Coordinating Committees, which oversee a
myriad of bilateral and multilateral discussions, negotiations and
commissions.
Accordingly, at the working level, DOE provides both policy and
technical support for the following arms control and nonproliferation
activities, among others:
- International Atomic Energy Agency
- Nuclear Suppliers Group
- Bilateral Nuclear Cooperative Agreements
- Australia Group (chemical exports)
- Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM)
- Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (START implementation)
- Bilateral Consultative Commission (TTBT implementation)
- Chemical Weapons Convention negotiations
- Bilateral Chemical Weapons Talks with the former Soviet Union (FSU)
- Special Verification Commission (INF implementation)
- Iraq Nuclear Inspections/UN Special Commission
- Biological Weapons Review Conference and follow-on technical
meetings
- Special Consultative Commission (ABM compliance)
- UN General Assembly First Committee (disarmament)
- NATO High Level Group
- NATO Disarmament Experts Group
In view of the dynamic changes in the political and military
environment, DOE's participation in these activities is expected to
increase in FY 1993. This is particularly the case in those activities
associated with U.S. nonproliferation efforts.
In addition, DOE is deeply involved in the detailed discussions
with the former Soviet Union on the safety, security, storage and
dismantlement (SSD) of its nuclear weapons. These talks began pursuant
to the President's Nuclear Initiative of September 27, 1991 and are
among the most important bilateral efforts underway today. Once active
assistance is agreed upon, DOE will provide most of the technical
expertise and equipment needed to accomplish the task.,
Finally, we are engaged in preparations for the watershed 1995 Non-
Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference. DOE will play a major role
in developing policy and strategy to insure that the Treaty is
extended indefinitely or for a series of long periods. Such an outcome
is very important for both the Department and the U.S. Government.
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. Bevill. Why are arms control negotiations needed when the
President has unilaterally reduced nuclear weapons far beyond anything
contemplated by arms control negotiators?
Dr. Czajkowski. Events clearly dictate that the traditional arms
control agenda be broadened to incorporate new approaches and new
concerns of a changing international landscape.
Before addressing these, it is important to note that the
"traditional arms control" agenda has not been completed. Chemical
weapons and CFE IA negotiations continue in Geneva and Vienna
respectively; and the implementation commissions established for
existing treaties (e.g., the Bilateral Consultative Commission for the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty) continue to meet periodically. In addition,
conferences are called to review operation of the treaties agreed to
during the heyday of traditional arms control: the Third Review
Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (September 1991) is the
most recent example. Finally, 1995 is the year for the very important
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference.
The arms control agenda of the future is rich with possibilities
for promoting confidence, preventing crises, and fostering
regional/global stability. It will be characterized not by greater or
less complexity, but by complexity of a different kind: less East-West
centered and more multilateral; less emphasis on strict verification and
more on monitoring and consultation; fewer prolonged negotiations and
formal treaties and more unilateral steps and confidence building
measures. The primary focus will be on preventing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Hence we will
witness increased emphasis on the NPT and IAEA, the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group
(chemical exports), and nuclear weapon safety, security and dismantlement
(SSD) assistance to the former Soviet Union.
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. Bevill: How have the President's announcements on nuclear arms
reductions impacted ongoing verification missions in FY 1992 and
planned for FY 1993?
Dr. Czajkowski: Two aspects of the President's recent
announcements on nuclear arms control have significantly impacted the
ongoing V&CT missions: 1) the unprecedented scope and pace for the
reduction of nuclear weapons themselves, and 2) the more unilateral
approach in accomplishing these reductions, but in ways which are
transparent and build confidence. The use of technologies to effect
verification is being de-emphasized, but not eliminated (for example,
negotiated agreements for the purpose of de-MIRVing U.S. and Russian
ICBMs may ultimately require verification procedures utilizing special
purpose technology). Technology and methods once associated more
closely with verification, are being made available to support
transparency and confidence building measures being considered under
the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991.
Finally, the new emphasis on the detection of proliferation
activities by weapons states, as well as non-weapon states, will
require new technologies to improve the ability of the U.S. to detect
and locate illicit weapons, materials production, diversion, and
warhead manufacture and testing. In the near term, technologies developed
under the nuclear arms reduction treaties and in support of the Chemical
Weapon Convention and Conventional Forces in Europe treaties will be the
technical base to respond to increasing proliferation requirements.
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. Bevill: Please describe the roles performed by each DOE
laboratory or facility for arms control activities. Who has the lead
in each programmatic area?
Dr. Czajkowski: The Office of Arms Control has, with intent,
expanded its verification technology activities outside the Defense
Programs weapon laboratories, while still retaining the majority of
technology activities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and Sandia National
Laboratories (SNL). The laboratories which have been added in
verification technologies development are Argonne National Laboratory
(ANL), Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory (INEL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL),
Pacific. Northwest Laboratory (PNL), and Savannah River Laboratory
(SRL).
There are some programmatic activities which are shared at all of
the laboratories such as the Radiation Detection Program, membership on
the Laboratory Advisory Group on Effluent Research, and the Advanced
Concepts Program. Under the Advanced Concepts Program, each laboratory
has the opportunity to independently explore new and innovative ideas
with relatively few restrictions. The ideas must have a verification
technology association, have a specific length of time for proof of
concept, and have no specific prior work performed on the concept.
Individual projects are generally funded at the laboratory which has
known expertise or capability, or where an advanced concept was
originated and has passed the feasibility phase.
Detection technology has a limited number of major programs where
the majority of work is associated with only one or a few laboratories.
For example:
o The largest fiscal program is satellite instrumentation for
verification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. This program is
shared by SNL and LANL.
o The seismic program exists almost exclusively at LLNL, while
the Hydrodynamic Yield Measurement program is centered primarily
at LANL.
o Directed Energy Weapons detection technology development is
shared at LLNL, LANL, and SNL.
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a lead table as shown in the budget
which includes only arms control funding, excluding intelligence
activities.
Dr. Czajkowski. I would be pleased to provide a lead table which
includes only arms control activities for the record (the information
follows).
***NOTE: LEAD TABLE ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT****
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. Bevill. In the treaty implementation activity, how many U.S.
and Soviet tests were monitored in FY 1992 and how many planned for FY
1993?
Dr. Czajkowski. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) will
exercise its monitoring rights on two U.S. tests during FY 1992. For
planning purposes, our FY 1992 budget includes funds to monitor up to
four CIS tests, however, given its moratorium, the CIS will not test in
FY 1992. The 1993 budget incorporates funding to accommodate CIS
monitoring for two U.S. tests and, for planning purposes, assumes that
the U.S. will exercise its rights to monitor at least two CIS tests. By
way of explanation, the TTBT Protocol allows the verifying party to
monitor up to two tests of any yield per year, even if there are not
two tests that exceed the "trigger" level of 35 kt.
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. Bevill: Are arms control negotiations requirements increasing
the need for technologies? Provide examples of verification needs
where the technology is not available.
Dr. Czajkowski: The arms control treaty verification environment is
in a highly dynamic state. Verification requirements range from the
decades-old Limited Test Ban Treaty to the confidence building,
unilateral requirements of the President's nuclear weapon initiative.
The recent confirmation of the clandestine production of chemical
warfare agents and the nuclear weapon program in Iraq has dramatically
highlighted the need for verification technologies for proliferation
detection. This has further been underscored by the concerns regarding
the acquisition of military delivery systems (i.e., missile
technologies) by historical adversaries. The dissolution of the Soviet
Union with the concomitant changes in control over nuclear weapons has
greatly exacerbated the world concern over the potential transfer of
nuclear weapons or special nuclear material to aspiring nuclear weapon
states.
All of the above circumstances are strong indications of expanded
technology requirements. Deleted
The above technology shortfalls for proliferation detection are by
no means exhaustive, and can be expanded under the appropriate
security conditions.
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. Bevill: What are the treaty verification assumptions on which
the budget is based?
Dr. Czajkowski: At present our treaty verification assumptions
are: that the requirements will continue for those treaties in force;
that additional requirements will surface with respect to the reduction
of nuclear weapon inventories; that requirements will increase for
bilateral and multilateral chemical weapon treaties or conventions; and
that proliferation detection of weapons of mass destruction will
continue to be a growing and high level international concern.
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. Bevill: Please provide a list of treaties in effect; treaties
under negotiation; and anticipated treaties through the 1990's in
which DOE will be involved.
Dr. Czajkowski: Treaties and agreements in each of the categories
in which DOE is and is likely to be involved through the 1990's are
listed below. The level and form of DOE involvement customarily depends
on a number of factors including the extent to which DOE equities
(e.g., nuclear weapon production and testing, advanced concepts
research, technical aspects of non-proliferation, potential that DOE
facilities will be subject to on-site inspections under a prospective
treaty, etc.) are involved, the analytical and verification technology
research and development support that DOE and its national laboratories
provide to the negotiation and implementation processes, etc.
In effect:
1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM)
1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT, ratified 1990)
1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET, ratified 1990)
1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)
1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)
1990 US/USSR Bilateral Chemical Weapons Agreement
1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START, unratified)
Under negotiation/prospective:
- Safe, secure transportation, storage, dismantlement of nuclear
weapons (President's September 27, 1991 Nuclear Initiative and
Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, SNTRA)
- Further Strategic Offensive Force limitations (mutual
bilateral, START II)
- Further Conventional Force Europe limitations (CFE-IA,
manpower; CFE II, Aerial Overflight)
- Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
- Open Skies
- Defense and Space Talks (DST, and/or ABM Treaty revision)
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. Bevill. Provide the total funding by program activity included
in the budget for implementation of the TTBT and PNET in FY 1992 and
FY 1993. How many FTEs support each activity?
Dr. Czajkowski. The following planned funding by program activity
is provided in Treaty Implementation activities in FY 1992 and FY 1993.
The estimated FTEs to support each activity is also provided. (The
information follows.)
FUNDING FOR TREATY IMPLEMENTATION
($ in Millions) FTEs
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1992 FY 1993
Base Support
Maintenance Capability 7.5 7.0 42 40
Nevada Test Site 2.0 2.0 13 13
Foreign Deployments* $ 5.5 $ 6.0 33 35
Total $15.0 $15.0
This is an estimate due to uncertainty in the Russian Federation
nuclear testing program. Deployment for at least two tests are
planned for FY 1993 with preparation for the deployments beginning in
the last quarter of FY 1992.
Due to the Russian testing moratorium, the DOE had reduced
manpower requirements in FY 1992 to monitor foreign explosions under
the TTBT/PNET and requisite funds planned for foreign deployment were
not required. Should the moratorium continue, portions of the treaty
implementation funding will again be used to support other treaties and
agreements. Included in this additional support would be: nuclear,
missile, chemical, and biological weapons non-proliferation efforts;
United States Security Council Resolution No. 687 (IRAQ); and the
President's September 27, 1991 Nuclear Initiative pertaining to former
Soviet Union weapon transportation, storage and dismantlement, as
consistent with DOE mission responsibilities and capabilities.
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Bevill. Now have the President's announcements on nuclear
arms reductions impacted your ongoing mission?
Mr. Daniel. Since the mission of the Office of Foreign
Intelligence is related to foreign rather than U.S. activities, the
immediate answer is that the President's announcement on U.S. nuclear
arms reduction does not directly influence our mission.
On the other hand, announcements by the former Soviet Union
(FSU), combined with the tumultuous changes taking place there, have
affected our mission significantly. OFI and the policymakers it
supports now find themselves confronting an array of new issues
relating to command, control, and security of tactical and strategic
nuclear weapons in the FSU; .,dismantlement of the nuclear weapons the
FSU has agreed to eliminate; disposition of the nuclear materials
removed from those weapons; and the proliferation potential of the
former republics of the Soviet Union (the so- called "brain drain"
issue). These new intelligence problems require us to maintain our
technical knowledge of FSU nuclear weaponry. Moreover, we do not
discount the possibility that problems may surface that would result in
the U.S. having to confront a former Soviet state that has become an
unfriendly nuclear weapons power.
Deleted
Mr. Bevill. Have there been any discussion within the
Intelligence Community on the appropriate size and focus of DOE's
intelligence,program now that the national security needs have
changed?
Mr. Daniel. Deleted
Mr. Bevill. Now does the size and funding for this activity
within the Department of Energy compare to that of other Cabinet-level
agencies in FY 1993?
Mr. Daniel. The following table provided by the Intelligence
Community Staff reflects the size and funding for the Department of
Energy activities in comparison with other Cabinet-level agencies.
FY 1993 Congressional Budget Request
(Dollars in Thousands)
Deleted
Mr. Bevill. Have the Department and the Intelligence Community
agreed that economic competitiveness is a valid mission requiring DOE
intelligence support? Please justify.
Mr. Daniel. Deleted
Mr. Bevill. What DOE policy statement defines which science and
technology areas should be explored?
Mr. Daniel. Deleted
Mr. Bevill. Please justify funding for science and technology
activities when several of the areas identified for study are
themselves the subject of international scientific collaborations which
include the former Soviet Union.
Mr. Daniel. Deleted
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the roles performed by each DOE
laboratory or facility for intelligence activities. Who has the lead in
each programmatic area?
Mr. Daniel. Deleted
Mr. Bevill. Now many resources (people and funding) did your
office have examining Iraq's nuclear weapons program in FY 1990, FY
1991, and FY 1992?
Mr. Daniel. Deleted
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the Department of Energy's role in
examining Iraq's nuclear weapons program prior to the revelations
highlighting the extent of the program.
Mr. Daniel. Deleted
Mr. Bevill. What lessons were learned from this experience?
Mr. Daniel.
Deleted
Mr. Bevill. In FY 1991, what percent of your resources were
focused on the Soviet threat? Has this changed in FY 1992 or FY 1993?
Mr. Daniel.
Deleted
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list and brief description of all
classified work for others being performed at any DOE laboratory or
facility.
Mr. Daniel.
Deleted
ABBREVIATIONS:
AL Albuquerque Field Office
CH Chicago Field Office
EG&G Edgerton, Germeshausen and Greer
INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory
MM/GDP Martin Marietta/Gaseous Diffusion Plant (OR)
MM/NL Martin Marietta/National Laboratory (OR)
NV Nevada Field Office
OR Oak Ridge Field Office
PNL Pacific Northwest Laboratory
RL Richland Field Office
SNLA Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque
SRL Savannah River Laboratory
Mr. Bevill. Please identify all Special Access Required (SAR) work
for others programs and the location within DOE where the work is being
performed.
Mr. Daniel.
Deleted
ABBREVIATIONS:
AL Albuquerque Field Office
CH Chicago Field Office
EG&G Edgerton, Germeshausen and Greer
INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory
MM/GDP Martin Marietta/Gaseous Diffusion Plant (OR)
MM/NL Martin Marietta/National Laboratory (OR)
NV Nevada Field Office
OR Oak Ridge Field Office
PNL Pacific Northwest Laboratory
RL Richland Field Office
SNLA Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque
SRL Savannah River Laboratory
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the process for transferring
technical support costs to other program organizations. Why is this
necessary? What funding is to be transferred?
Mr. Daniel. The Office of Intelligence does not. transfer
technical support costs to other program organizations. The technical
support budget states, 'In an effort to more closely manage
administrative costs, the PSO/Office Directors share of FTE-dependent
costs for space, supplies, and telecommunications are contained in this
budget and will be transferred during the execution year.' This
statement is consistent with the Department's plans to transfer funds
from all DOE organizations to Departmental Administration for
administrative support costs.
Traditionally, DOE's budget has been developed so that essentially
all Headquarters FTE-dependent administrative support costs (e.g.,
rent, telecommunications, and supplies), are centrally budgeted for all
Headquarters staff regardless of which appropriation (e.g., Defense
Programs, New Production Reactor, Nuclear Energy, etc.), funded the
FTES. Over the past several years the staffing levels, driven by the
programs, have been growing to levels that cannot be adequately
supported with the amount of funding available for administrative
costs. One of the solutions to this dilemma is to have each program pay
for its fair share of these administrative costs. It forces those
programs which are expanding to pay for additional associated costs and
thus forces them to consider ways to minimize administrative -costs as
part of their expansion plans.
The FY 1993 budget was written to disclose to the Congress that
the Department was considering this approach. We planned to submit a
budget amendment when a final decision was made and the specific
details developed. The Department is still assessing this option. We
have received considerable expressions of concern from several
Congressional Committee staffs. Given these concerns and the numerous
other related issues, we are now considering retaining the traditional
funding approach for FY 1993. This will allow the Department to make a
more deliberate review of this option as well as other options and
propose a change in a future budget if appropriate. Retaining our
traditional approach would also require a FY 1993 budget amendment to
provide adequate funding to Departmental Administration. We expect a
decision in the near future.
Mr. Bevill. Now much funding will be provided to the
Nonproliferation Center in FY 1992 and FY 1993?
Mr. Daniel.
Deleted
FERNALD AND HANFORD
Mr. Bevill. Why do the costs for nuclear safeguards and security
activities continue to increase when the Department has eliminated all
production activities at Fernald and Hanford, and reduced production
activities at several other sites?
Maj Gen McFadden. As production activities cease or are reduced
there is little initial impact on the amount of safeguards and security
activities required at the affected sites. Some immediate savings will
be realized by reducing the level and number of clearances. However,
until the special nuclear materials (SNM) present at those sites are
consolidated or eliminated, the present level of security is required
to protect SNM against theft, sabotage, or terrorist activity.
We continue to work closely with the various program offices to
assure that all appropriate reductions are achieved at the affected
facilities.
ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS WITHIN NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY BUDGET
Mr. Bevill. The Nuclear Safeguards and Security program is now
managed by two separate organizations. Please explain fully which
activities and funding are associated with each.
Maj Gen McFadden. The mission of the Nuclear Safeguards and
Security program is to develop measures to assure effective protection
of the DOE's nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and facilities against
theft, sabotage, espionage, and terrorist activity and to identify
classified and unclassified sensitive information critical to the
national security. This portion of the mission is managed by the Office
of Security Affairs and totals $92.2 million in Fiscal Year 1993. The
mission also includes providing technical support to international
activities designed to minimize the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
and to control nuclear energy-related exports. This portion of the
mission is managed by the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
and totals $12.0 million in Fiscal Year 1993.
Current funding Information for the program will be submitted for
the record.
Mr. Bevill. Please describe how duplication of effort can be
avoided with two organizations conducting similar activities.
Maj Gen McFadden. If this question is in reference to the Office of
Arms Control and Nonproliferation, and the Office of Security Affairs,
there is no duplication of effort. Each organization has separate
missions. However, we work closely to coordinate projects which
interface within programs.
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS PRIOR TO NEW SECURITY MEASURES
Mr. Bevill. Is there a cost-benefit analysis performed before
recommending new security measures? If so, please describe.
Maj Gen McFadden. Cost-benefit analyses are performed before new
security measures are recommended. DOE Order 5630.11, "Safeguards and
Security Program', dated January 22, 1988, requires that safeguards
and security programs be supported by appropriate cost/benefit analyses
in order to reduce programmatic risks to an acceptable level.
Furthermore, DOE Order 5632.8, 'Protection Program Operations: Systems
Performance Tests', dated February 4, 1988 requires the evaluation of
protection system capabilities through system performance testing, both
initially and on an ongoing basis.
THREAT POLICY STATEMENT
Mr. Bevill. Has the 1983 Threat Policy Statement been updated? Is
there a need to modify this guidance?
Maj Gen McFadden. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the
Department of Defense (DOD) on January 31, 1992 completed a Joint
Threat Polity Statement for nuclear weapons facilities. The Joint
Threat Statement represents a new initiative.
Based upon this Joint Statement, which was supported by
intelligence community study and input, DOE is now in the process of
revising the 1983 Generic Threat Guidance. Traditional threats will be
described and additional emphasis placed on the protection of
classified, sensitive, technological and proliferation related
information, which may represent the gravest threat to DOE programs and
resources in a continually changing world geo-political environment.
The updated threat guidance will be utilized by each facility to
evaluate the appropriateness and adequacy of current installation
defense posture.
Mr. Bevill. Have any DOE facilities experienced any threat in the
past five years that approaches the threat guidance now in effect?
Maj Gen McFadden. There have been no cases of direct terrorist
threats on DOE facilities possibly because the security in place makes
our facilities difficult targets. However, evidence exists of internal
and external sources acting against DOE programs for reasons of
financial gain (theft of government property), entertainment (computer
hacking), unauthorized access (computer system modification for
convenience), and revenge/malicious mischief (disgruntled employees).
In addition, DOE facilities are regularly subject to demonstrations,
which may include civil disobedience.
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a breakdown by each organization of
the elements identified in the Fiscal Year 1993 budget request and the
FTE'S.
Maj Gen McFadden. The information will be submitted for the
record.
***NOTE NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY CHARTS ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL
DOCUMENT***
SECURITY CLEARANCES
Mr. Bevill. Now that several former nuclear materials production
sites have been deactivated and transferred to the waste cleanup
program, how has this impacted the number of security clearances? What
steps are being taken to reduce the numbers of clearances? Are there
any impediments to a quick reduction?
Maj Gen McFadden. The Department's Fiscal Year 1993 Security
Investigations budget request of $58.3 million, a reduction of $4.3
million below Fiscal Year 1992, reflected the Department's efforts to
reduce the number of security clearances. The deactivation and transfer
of nuclear materials production sites to the waste cleanup program have
contributed to the reduced funding request. It is expected that as more
facilities are transferred we will make further reductions to the
levels and numbers of clearances. However, as long as nuclear material
remains at the sites and until such time as classified document
inventory levels are reduced or eliminated, we must ensure that
appropriate clearances are in place.
The DOE Hanford Field Office began over 18 months ago to
consolidate classified data and nuclear materials into protective zones
which resulted in reduced numbers and levels of clearances. At Hanford,
"Q" clearances were reduced by 28 percent during Fiscal Years 1991 and
1992 and will continue to be reduced between Fiscal Year 1991 and
Fiscal Year 1993. We are working aggressively throughout the DOE
complex to ensure that as older sites are reconfigured and new sites
are constructed, that clearance levels and numbers are reduced as
quickly as possible without endangering the National Security.
The only impediment to a quick reduction will be our self
assessment to ensure that in the interest of reducing levels and
numbers of security clearances that we do not jeopardize our current
level of protection.
Mr. Bevill. What is the Department's current security clearance
policy? When was this policy developed and when was it last updated?
Maj Gen McFadden. DOE Personnel Security Program policies and
procedures are stipulated in DOE Order 5631.2, last reissued on May 18,
1988. This Order is currently being updated. The Department's security
clearance policy conforms to pertinent provisions of the Atomic Energy
Act and Executive Orders that require an individual's eligibility for
access to classified matter or special nuclear material to be based
upon review and adjudication of investigative reports provided by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or Office of Personnel Management
(OPM). The Department may also use investigative reports completed by
other agencies or departments provided the investigative scope and
extent meets the standards set by the Department. Individuals
adjudicated as acceptable security risks are granted access
authorization. Individuals adjudicated as unacceptable security risks
are processed under administrative review procedures to determine
whether access authorization should be denied or revoked. Individuals
with DOE access authorization are reinvestigated at 5 year intervals.
SECURITY REINVESTIGATIONS
Mr. Bevill. What is the current backlog of reinvestigations? Is
it increasing? What efforts are being taken to reduce the backlog?
Maj Gen McFadden. At the end of Calendar Year 1991, we had reduced
the number of overdue reinvestigations from about 132,000 in 1985 to
19,340. We anticipate meting the goal of eliminating this backlog by
Fiscal Year 1993, and in fact several of our Field Offices -- Chicago,
Idaho, Richland, Nevada, and Schenectady Naval Reactors Office -- have
either already eliminated their backlogs, or will do so by the end of
Fiscal Year 1992.
SECURITY CLEARANCES
Mr. Bevill. Does DOE currently have a backlog of security
investigations pending with any agency?
Maj Gen McFadden. DOE does not have a backlog of security
investigations with any agency. However, there are a number of
investigations of various types in process with the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM). I would like to insert into the record a breakdown of
the current DOE caseload at OPM. (The information follows:)
CURRENT DOE CASES ON HAND AT OPM
(AS OF FEBRUARY 22, 1992)
TYPE CASE NUMBER ON HAND MEDIAN
AGE SBI-35 3 63 days
SBI-75 42 91 days
SBI-120 12 157 days
BI-35 161 38 days
BI-75 1,675 55 days
BI-120 737 77 days
LBI-35 4 35 days
LBI-75 174 71 days
LBI-120 3,386 59 days
NACC-35 930 14 days
Total OPM Cases 7124
Mr. Bevill. What were the number, by type and performing agency,
of investigations and reinvestigations performed for Fiscal Year 1991,
Fiscal Year 1992, and Fiscal Year 1993? Describe the reasons for
increases or decreases.
Maj Gen McFadden. I would like to insert into the record relevant
data on investigations and reinvestigations. (The information
follows:)
INVESTIGATIONS AND REINVESTIGATIONS
FY 1991 (ACTUAL) FY 1992 (EST) FY
1993(EST)
FBI
Initial 150 49 49
OPM
Initial
SBI 776 371 0
BI 10,254 13,488 12,103
Reinvestigation
LBI 28,442 21,716 18,031
NACC Used for
both Initial and
Reinvestigations 209000 21,309 26,886
FBI investigations decreased in Fiscal Year 1992 as that
agency is now being used strictly for initial investigations for
individuals who occupy positions of a high degree of importance or
sensitivity (about 150 positions in the DOE).
OPM SBIs decreased in Fiscal Year 1992 and will be "zeroed" out
in Fiscal Year 1993. The DOE has adopted the Single Scope Background
Investigation (SSBI) which negates the need for the SBI. The SBIs were
used primarily for individuals who require Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) access approval.
OPM background investigations decreased in Fiscal Year 1992. The
decrease is attributable to decreased program activity at Rocky Flats,
Richland's effort to decrease the number of "Q" clearances, the
downgrading of classified technology in the Uranium Enrichment Program
(from Secret to Confidential), and the general recession that has
resulted in decreased turnover at DOE sites. The same trend is forecast
for Fiscal Year 1993.
OPM LBIs decreased in Fiscal Year 1992 and will continue to
decrease in Fiscal Year 1993 as the DOE realizes its goal to eliminate
the backlog of reinvestigations by the end of Fiscal Year 1993. Once
the backlog has been eliminated, LBIs will be conducted as
appropriate.
OPM National Agency Checks with Credit (NACCS) will increase as
the need for the number of initial "Q" clearances is reduced. This
increase will also be a result of using NACCs to meet reinvestigation
program requirements.
Mr. Bevill. Provide an analysis of security investigation
programs showing the funds for defense and other than defense
programs?
MaJ Gen McFadden. Approximately 69 percent of the Fiscal Year
1993 Security Investigations budget will be allocated for Defense
Programs activities as shown below in the table which I would like to
insert into the record. (The information follows:)
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
FY 1993
Defense Programs Activities $40,510,855
Other than Defense Programs 17,778,145
TOTAL $58,289,000
Mr. Bevill. What was the average cost by type and performing
agency of investigations and reinvestigations performed in Fiscal Year
1991, Fiscal Year 1992, and Fiscal Year 1993? What is the average
completion time?
Maj Gen McFadden. The breakout of security investigation funding
by performing agency is shown in the table below which I would like to
insert in the record. (The information follows:)
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
FY 1991 - FY 1993
ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED COSTS
BY AGENCY AND TYPE
(IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
FY 1992
FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 Completion
Agency/Investigation Actual Actual Estimated Time(Days)
Type
OPM Special Background $ 2,750 $ 2,725* N/A 0
OPM Background 2,500 2,475 $ 2,673 88
OPM Limited Background 1,250 1,250 1,350 121
OPM National Agency
Check with Credit 40 42 45 34
FBI Background 4,089 3,715 4,012 90
*for 75 day service
Mr. Bevill. The ending uncosted balance for the security
investigations tripled from Fiscal Year 1990 to Fiscal Year 1991.
Please explain.
Maj Gen McFadden. The uncosted balance for the security
investigations budget for the year ending September 30, 1991, reflected
$10,511,000 of costs not billed to DOE from the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) until after October 1, 1991. This resulted in the
Fiscal Year 1991 uncosted balance being inflated by the $10M late
billing.
Uncosted balances will fluctuate from year to year due to the fact
that OPM does not submit bills for the entire fiscal year's activities
until after September 30th. In review of Fiscal Year 1991, it should be
noted that all but $515,311 of the OPM portion of the Fiscal Year 1991
security investigations budget was spent, which represents less than I
percent carryover from Fiscal Year 1991 to Fiscal Year 1992.
Mr. Bevill. How many security clearances by year, by federal and
non-federal employees, are held at Fernald? How many at Hanford? Provide
the costs in Fiscal Year 1991, Fiscal Year 1992 and Fiscal Year 1993
associated with these clearances.
Maj Gen McFadden. I will provide this data for the record. (The
information follows:)
SECURITY CLEARANCES
FY 1991 - FY 1993 FOR HANFORD AND FERNALD
(Numbers of Persons)
FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993
LOCATION/CLEARANCE TYPE ACTUAL ACTUAL ESTIMATED
HANFORD-Q
Federal 190 161 100
Non-Federal 5,031 3,598 1,500
Subtotal 5,221 3,759 1,600
HANFORD-L
Federal 126 202 200
Non-Federal 5,190 6,429 7,500
Subtotal 5,316 6,631 7,700
TOTAL-HANFORD 10,537 10,390 9,300
FERNALD-Q
Federal 7 7 7
Non-Federal 135 21 21
Subtotal 142 28 28
FERNALD-L
Federal 0 0 0
Non-Federal 110 5 5
Subtotal 110 5 5
TOTAL-FERNALD 252 33 33
GRAND TOTAL
10,789 10,423 9,333
SECURITY CLEARANCES
FY 1991 - FY 1993 COSTS FOR HANFORD AND FERNALD,
(IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993
LOCATION/CLEARANCE TYPE ACTUAL ACTUAL ESTIMATED
HANFORD-Q
Federal $ 368 $ 312 $ 194
Non-Federal 19,355 6,962 2,903
Subtotal 19,723 7,274 3,097
HANFORD-L
Federal 5 8 8
Non-Federal 218 270 315
Subtotal 223 278 323
TOTAL-HANFORD 19,946 7,552 3,420
FERNALD-Q
Federal 14 14 14
Non-Federal 261 41 41
Subtotal 275 55 55
FERNALD-L
Federal 0 0 0
Non-Federal -5 .0 0
Subtotal 5 0 0
TOTAL-FERNALD 280 55 55
GRAND TOTAL $20,226 $7,607 $3,475
INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT WR-B-91-8
Mr. Bevill. In a September 27, 1991 report (No. WR-8-91-8), the
Inspector General (IG) identified 1,058 "Q" clearances which had been
granted to employees by the Albuquerque Operations Office even though
these employees did not need access to classified information. By each
category identified in the report, please note the number of
unnecessary clearances which have been terminated.
Maj Gen McFadden. Albuquerque has done an assessment of this
situation with the following results:
Mason & Hanger, Pantex - Agreed that 79 of the 85 clearances
could be downgraded to "L" based on physical separation and change of
duties. To date about half have been accomplished.
The Rocky Flats Office (RFO) has not tracked individual
reductions but I understand that reductions have taken place in areas
such as the protective force support staff and cafeteria personnel. My
staff is working with RFO to specifically identify numbers of positions
at this time.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) - Submitted clearance
justification forms supporting "Q" for all the positions identified by
the IG. LANL has an "employment policy" requiring "Q" but they
recognize the inconsistency with the DOE order. LANL management is
reviewing its position and will internally evaluate a new plan for "L"
clearances. A briefing to LANL senior management is scheduled for March
1992.
Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNLA) - Submitted
clearance Justification forms supporting "Q" for all the positions
identified by the IG. SNLA also has an 'employment policy" requiring
"Q". Based on physical configuration of SNLA with all employees needing
access to Tech Area I (Secret Restricted Data access area) it will be
very difficult to change general clearance level to "l". Albuquerque is
actively working the problem with SNLA management.
Further, I understand that Albuquerque Personnel will review and
reevaluate all security clearances under the Jurisdiction of the DOE
Field Office, AL; specifically, contractor employees located at the
Amarillo Area Office (AAO), Kirtland Area Office (KAO) and Los Alamos
Area Office (LAAO).
I am fully committed to having employees cleared only at the
level necessary to perform their duties and will work towards
implementation of such a situation across the DOE complex.
U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION
Mr. Dwyer: The Office of Arms Control and Non-proliferation is
playing an increasing role in coordinating the Department's efforts to
encourage scientists from Russia and other states in the commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) to direct their talents toward peaceful
ends. Recently, the Department announced a $90,000 contract agreement
for 116 scientists from the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in
Moscow to work on magnetic fusion. How will the Russian scientists be
able to complete our fusion research effort?
Dr. Czajkowski: The technical services subcontract between
General Atomics and the Kurchatov Institute is for an investigation of
the use of high power microwaves for magnetic fusion heating and
current drive. The Moscow group will be using the T-10 tokamak system
which is in place at the Kurchatov Institute.. This group of
scientists and technicians has been working in this area for some time
and there have been many close working connections between these two
groups in recent years under the auspices of the U.S.-USSR Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy Agreement. The Russian group has the special
skills and equipment required to carry out this investigation. This
work will be carried out in a collaborative and interactive manner with
the task supervisors in General Atomics. There will be exchanges of
scientific personnel and frequent, direct communications by facsimile,
electronic mail and telephone. The financial arrangements in the
contract are based on fulfillment of clearly identified milestones and
associated fixed price progress payments due upon completion of the
milestones.
Mr. Dwyer: How does this contract impact the Russian participation
in the ITER program?
Dr. Czajkowski: This subcontract is specifically developed to
support ongoing, high priority tasks supporting the U.S. fusion
research program on the Department's DIII-D tokamak facility, operated
by its contractor, General Atomics, in La Jolla, CA. This subcontract
does not deal with the Russian Federation's contributions or
participation in the ITER Engineering Design Activities (EDA). All four
ITER Parties, i.e., the European Community. Japan, the Russian
Federation and the U.S., are expected to make equal contributions to
the ITER EDA work program when it is approved. We understand from
Russian Federation officials that their domestic support of the ITER
EDA responsibilities is a high priority within their system and is
unrelated to this sub-contract.
Mr. Dwyer: Were the scientists at the Kurchatov Institute engaged
in defense-related research?
Dr. Czajkowski: To the best of our knowledge. the answer is "no". Our
scientists have worked with the leaders of this group for some time and
know many of the individuals as working colleagues. This particular
facility has been one of the mainstays in the Soviet fusion program
and, indeed, in the world fusion program. Therefore, while we do not
know the background of every individual member of the T-10 team, the
overall record of the team is one of long-standing, high achievement in
the magnetic fusion energy field, including many well respected
publications in the open scientific literature.
U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION
Mr. Dwyer. How is this agreement different from other U.S. efforts
to redirect Russian nuclear scientists?
Dr. Czajkowski. As I explained on the last question, we do not
know that any of the scientists on this project have been involved in
nuclear weapons development. It is a joint project between U.S. and
CIS scientists which will benefit the effort of both countries to
develop fusion energy for peaceful purposes. In addition, this will be
funded out of an existing DOE program budget which means a clear source
of funds is identified and available. Finally, this agreement was
worked out directly with the CIS on the basis of an existing Agreement
for Cooperation on Fusion Energy. It was reviewed by the interagency
Group on Soviet Science and Technology which is led by the State
Department.
U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION
Mr. Dwyer. What other national laboratories may soon have
Department-sponsored Russian scientists working on peaceful research
initiatives?
Dr. Czajkowski. That is hard to say specifically. Several national
laboratories, have submitted ideas for joint non-weapons activities
with former Soviet Union nuclear weapons institutes which have been
forwarded to Amb. Gullucci's office for consideration. In the
meantime, the Department continues to explore opportunities for further
peaceful joint ventures, some of which could be carried out under
existing Agreements for Cooperation.
U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION
Mr. Dwyer. When negotiating these arrangements, how does the
Department work to insure against a "brain drain" in the former Soviet
Union'?
Dr. Czajkowski. We have had many discussions with the CIS on the
subject of the potential for a "brain drain." What we have heard most
consistently, especially from CIS scientists whether involved in
weapons development or peaceful scientific research, is that most CIS
scientists and engineers prefer to stay in their homeland. Their
primary interest is in having meaningful scientific work. Thus, joint
projects which benefit both the United States and the CIS, such as the
fusion project with the Kurchatov Institute, are the most effective
counter we can provide to reduce the potential "brain drain."
VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Dwyer. In your written statement you discuss the evolution of
the DOE national laboratories from nuclear weapons programs to
nonproliferation verification technology development. To what do you
attribute this successful transition?
Dr. Czajkowski: In the written statement, we did not mean to
suggest that the DOE National Laboratories weapons programs have
evolved into nonproliferation verification technology development
programs, as the question might suggest. Instead, we wished to
emphasize the considerable technical expertise of the national
laboratories in the nonproliferation and verification areas.
VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Dwyer. How will efforts to modernize and reconfigure the
weapons complex impact this transition.
Mr. Claytor. Reconfiguration of the weapons complex will not be
designed to affect the considerable technical expertise of the national
laboratories in the nonproliferation and verification areas.
VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Dwyer: Will the development of verification be assigned to one
laboratory?
Dr. Czajkowski: It has been and will remain the strategy of DOE to
develop a broad technical base among the national laboratories to
support arms control initiations. This approach promotes a vital
exchange of ideas and concepts between weapon and non-weapon programs.
In some technology areas (i.e., seismic, hydrodynamic yield and
satellite instrumentation), the investment is too costly to duplicate,
therefore, we have maintained the expertise, skills and facilities at
those laboratories having historically been the core programs.
VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Dwyer. It would seem that some of the technologies developed
for verification may have some value to the private sector, such as
earthquake detection. What role does your office play in Department
efforts to transfer technology, if that technology could be considered
to be under the jurisdiction of national security?
Mr. Claytor. The technologies for the verification technology
program are developed at the Defense Programs laboratories, such as
Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories.
Because these laboratories are the primary responsibility of Defense
Programs, DP, the Technology Transfer Division is the Headquarters
office that oversees the transfer of technology from these
laboratories, including the management of the Technology
Commercialization program to fund dual-use technology development
projects that are cost-shared with private sector partners. Under the
DP Technology Commercialization program, the laboratories and
interested private sector partners propose cost-shared, collaborative
research and development, R&D, designed to benefit both the weapons R&D
program and United States economic competitiveness. The laboratories
are required to review all such dual-use technology development
projects to assure they are not classified and that national security
interests are protected.
MODERNIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX
Mr. Dwyer. In 1988, the Reagan administration released an
unclassified version of the 'Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization
Report," which outlines the reshaping of the weapons complex for the
years FY 1990 through FY 2010. The report envisions $81 billion in
cumulative additional spending. The report recommended the building of
two new production reactors, a Special Isotope Separation plant,
relocating operations now at Rocky Flats Plant, termination of
materials production work at Hanford and Fernald, and the transfer of
nuclear materials activities from the Mound Plant to other facilities.
What is the status of the Departments reevaluation of the
modernization report?
Mr. Claytor. In September 1989, Secretary Watkins ordered the
establishment of a Modernization Review Committee, chaired by the then
Under Secretary John Tuck, to reexamine the modernization issue. The
Committee was directed to review the assumptions and recommendations of
the original Modernization Report; assess the capacity and capability
requirements of the Nuclear Weapons Complex; and to review the process
by which the immediate and future requirements for maintaining,
updating, and cleaning up the Complex are developed.
In August 1990, the Secretary reviewed the progress of the study
and issued additional guidance to focus the analysis more sharply on
the realities of the emerging international security environment. This
ensured flexibility to accommodate the likely range of deterrent
contingencies and emphasized the objective of achieving a Complex which
is smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operate than today's.
Subsequently, the Modernization Review Committee was redesignated the
Complex Reconfiguration Committee. The Committee's product, the "Nuclear
Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study" was, released to Congress in
February 1991 and replaced the January 1989 Modernization Report.
The Study's scope was extensive and covered all activities:
nuclear, nonnuclear, and research, development, and testing. Among the
options presented in the Study were two which the Secretary designated
as "preferred options": to relocate the Rocky Flats Plant and to
consolidate the nonnuclear element of the Complex at a single,
dedicated site. A Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,
PEIS, is now being developed for a reasonable range of options for the
Complex including the relocation of Rocky Flats. The consolidation of
nonnuclear activities is being considered in a separate Environmental
Assessment. In the announced preferred alternative for nonnuclear
consolidation, all activities at the Mound Plant and at the Pinellas
Plant would be transferred to other facilities.
On November 1, 1991, Secretary Watkins directed that the
environmental impact analyses which was being prepared for the New
Production Reactor, NPR, be incorporated into the Reconfiguration PEIS.
The Secretary indicated that the President's initiatives announced
September 27, "1991, had created both an opportunity" and a necessity
to conduct an integrated examination. In February 1991, the Secretary had
already directed that the NPR Project be downsized from two reactors at
two sites to one reactor at one site. Subsequently, -in August 1991, the
Hanford N-Reactor was terminated as a back-up production source for
tritium. Both the Hanford and the Fernald facilities have been
transitioned to an environmental restoration and waste management
mission. The Special Isotope Separation Plant has been canceled.
As a result of the significant reductions in the nuclear weapons
stockpile, resulting both from the President's initiative last
September and his State of the Union Address on January 28, 1992,
near-term tritium needs can be met with tritium recovered from returned
weapons. Thus, the Secretary recently authorized the restart of
Savannah River's K-Reactor to demonstrate, over an approximate I year
period devoted to significant testing, that it is a viable contingency
production source of tritium. The Department then plans to shut it
down and place it in a low-cost standby mode until long-term tritium
availability from a New Production Reactor or other source is assured.
The Savannah River L- Reactor's status has been changed to a
minimum maintenance condition so that it can be safely restarted three
or more years after a restart decision is made. The third reactor at
Savannah River, the P-Reactor, has be-en defueled and placed in cold
standby.
Mr. Dwyer. When will the environmental impact statement (EIS)
for the complex be completed?
Mr. Claytor. As required by the National Environmental Policy
Act, a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, PEIS, is being
developed to analyze the consequences of alternative configuration for
the Nuclear Weapons Complex. The PEIS is scheduled for completion in
July 1993. After considering the analysis in the PEIS, the Department
will decide how to configure the Complex and how to achieve that
configuration. These decisions will be set forth in a Record of
Decision, ROD, scheduled for August 1993 following completion of the
PEIS. the Department anticipates that subsequent project-specific EIS's
will be tiered from the reconfiguration PEIS for projects identified in
the ROD. A separate Environmental Assessment, -scheduled for
completion prior to the end of this calendar year, is being done for
the nonnuclear manufacturing activities.
Mr. Dwyer. How will the results of the EIS impact the
Department's reevaluation?
Mr. Claytor. The Department's reevaluation of the "Nuclear
Weapons Complex Modernization Report.' culminated in the publication of
the "Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study.' Based on the
analysis in the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, PEIS, now
under development to analyze the consequences of alternative
configurations of the Complex, the .Record of Decision following the
PEIS will set forth the configuration of the Complex and how to achieve
that configuration.
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY CROSSCUT
Mr. Bevill. Provide a crosscut by location of all Safeguards and
Security funding throughout the Department for Fiscal Year 1991, Fiscal
Year 1992, and Fiscal Year 1993.
Maj Gen McFadden. I will provide the information for the record. (The
information follows:)
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
FY 1991 - FY 1993 CROSSCUT BY FACILITY
(IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993
ORGANIZATION/FACILITY ACTUAL APPROPRIATION REQUEST
ALBUQUERQUE OPERATIONS OFFICE
Albuquerque Direct $103,813 $98,143 $98,322
Allied 11,598 11,692 10,381
Los Alamos National Laboratory 67,062 79,072 74,876
Mound Plant 11,532 10,408 10,319
Pantex Plant 43,602 57,764 31,478
Pinellas Plant 7,306 7,600 7,650
Rocky Flats Plant 126,352 81,546 85,483
Sandia National Laboratory 46,568 51,284 54,880
Total-Albuquerque 417,833 388,509 373,389
CHICAGO OPERATIONS OFFICE
Chicago Direct 3,962 4,108 4,260
Ames Laboratory 688 712 689
Argonne National Laboratory 11,856 12,524 13,457
Brookhaven National Laboratory 7,493 8,111 8,689
New Brunswick Laboratory 4,033 4,246 4,289
National
Renewable Energy Laboratory 396 452 620
Superconducting Super Collider 200 589 781
Total-Chicago 28,628 30,742 32,785
IDAHO OPERATIONS OFFICE 28,399 36,584 40,074
NAVAL PETROLEUM RESERVES 1,034 1,065 1,098
NEVADA OPERATIONS OFFICE 71,374 79,348 75,504
OAK RIDGE OPERATIONS OFFICE
Oak Ridge National Laboratory 6,109 6,072 6,439
Oak Ridge Direct 155,090 172.466 182,942
Total-Oak Ridge 161,199 178,538 189,381
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL INFORMATION 200 230 250
PITTSBURGH NAVAL REACTORS 10,565 13,158 11,797
RICHLAND OPERATIONS OFFICE 65,600 45,583 47,825
SAN FRANCISCO OPERATIONS OFFICE
San Francisco Direct 5,810 7,216 7,546
Lawrence Livermore National Lab 34,963 42,744 39,231
Total-San Francisco 40,773 49,960 46,777
SAVANNAH RIVER OPERATIONS OFFICE 164,802 191,362 173,253
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
FY 1991 - FY 1993 CROSSCUT BY FACILITY
(IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)
(Continued)
FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993
ORGANIZATION/FACILITY ACTUAL APPROPRIATION REQUEST
SCHENECTADY NAVAL REACTORS 13,463 17,862 20,131
STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE
OFFICE 35,742 27,866 36,801
WESTERN AREA POWER ADMINISTRATION 611 715 870
MORGANTOWN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY
CENTER 411 475 496
PITTSBURGH ENERGY TECHNOLOGY
CENTER 1,300 1,400 1,600
HEADQUARTERS 101,094 100,993 102,949
GRAND TOTAL $1,143,028 $1,164,390 $1,154,980
DOE-WIDE PROFORCE SIZE
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing the size of guard
forces and expenditures for guard forces by location for Fiscal Year
1991, Fiscal Year 1992, and Fiscal Year 1993.
Maj Gen. McFadden. I will provide the information for the record.
*** NOTE PROTECTIVE FORCE SIZE AND EXPENDITURES ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL
DOCUMENT***
CLASSIFICATION
Mr. Bevill. How has the disintegration of the Soviet Union
impacted the workload in the classification and technology policy
programs?
Maj Gen McFadden. In April 1991, the Department of Energy (DOE)
reorganized the classification and the technology policy functions.
The latter, comprising export control and technology commercialization,
are no longer organizationally coupled with the classification
office's responsibilities.
With regard to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the
resulting effect on the workload of the Office of Classification, the
net effect has been workload expansion due to the radical changes in
political direction and the need to support new national security
objectives. For example, new classification guidance is needed for
nuclear weapons disassembly and reuse, arms control verification
technology, and the reconfiguration of the U.S. weapons complex.
The breakup of the Soviet Union poses many other interesting
classification issues. An example of such an interesting issue now
before the Office of Classification is if the DOE is to give
denuclearization help to the former Soviet Union, the potential
exchange of Restricted Data (RD) and Unclassified Controlled Nuclear
information (UCNI) may be involved. Many changes are occurring in
today's dynamic world and a vigorous reevaluation of many long
established classification policies and procedures is necessary. This
evaluation is underway.
Even before the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Office of
Classification was involved in nonproliferation matters. However,
evidence of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program caused us to be even more
concerned about the nonproliferation aspects of classification policy.
For example, the need to issue new classification guidance on new
subjects having a foundation both in nonproliferation and arms control
policy, such as guidance for the New Production Reactor.
In addition to making sure RD and UCNI guides are up to date, we
are insuring that the hundreds of requests the DOE receives for
classified information do not result in the inadvertent release of
classified information. Requests come from a number of sources
including Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests which have nearly
doubled in each of the last three years. Requests under the FOIA for
documents containing highly classified information relevant to the
design and manufacture of nuclear weapons can come from many sources,
including foreign nationals.
BONNEVILLE PROFORCE
Mr. Bevill. Why does DOE pay for guards at the Bonneville Power
Administration?
Maj Gen McFadden. DOE does not pay for the guards at the
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA). The BPA has 37 Security Officer
positions located at the BPA Headquarters in Portland, OR and Ross
station. The BPA is a self financed organization (by law) and Security
Officer salaries are funded through consumer base rate revenues generated
by the BPA, and not financed by DOE. However, we have chosen to show total
protective force size at all DOE facilities-on our Protective Force Size
and Expenditures Chart.
HEADQUARTERS PROFORCE CONTRACT
Mr. Bevill. Why has the headquarters guard force contract
increased in Fiscal Year 1993?
Maj Gen McFadden. The projected increases are due to the
following:
1. The contract will change over in Fiscal Year 1993. It is
expected that additional costs will be required for a transition
to a new contract.
2. The current contract was bid in 1987. The new estimate
includes adjustments over five (5) years for inflation.
3. Wage and benefit increases were anticipated for employee
retention.
4. Additional requirements were implemented to improve performance.
These new requirements increased basic security inspector
training, enhanced safety requirements and established higher
physical fitness standards.
Expenditures for Fiscal Year 1993 are estimated to be $11.5
million to include the transition cost.
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT BREAKDOWN
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a breakdown of the specific tasks and
funding associated with the "Additional Support" activity in Fiscal
Year 1991, Fiscal Year 1992 and Fiscal Year 1993.
Maj Gen McFadden. The "Additional Support" breakdown is as
follows:
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT TASKS AND FUNDING
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
FY 91 FY 92 FY 93
Support Services Contract 5.7 7.4 8.5
Chicago Field Office S&S Staff 1.2 1.2 1.2
Headquarters Physical Security
Upgrade Technical Assistance .4 . 4 . 3
Technical Support to Headquarters
and Field Assistance 4.5 3.7 2.9
Information Security Research Center -0- .3 .4
Technical Security Research Center .6 .7 .7
12.4 13.7 14.0
ANNUAL REPORT OF SECURITY EVALUATIONS
Mr. Bevill. Please characterize the results of security evaluations
conducted at DOE sites during the last year.
Mr. Podonsky. During FY 1991 the Office of Security Evaluations
completed seven comprehensive inspections, six safeguards and security
readiness reviews, and six special studies across the DOE complex.
Noteworthy improvements were made this year in the DOE safeguards
and security posture. Substantial progress has been made in the areas
of personnel security, special nuclear material control and
accountability documentation, and resolution of outstanding policy
issues. In other areas such as the reinvestigation program, document
control and inventory, and overall program management and oversight,
much progress is still required.
While special nuclear material is being protected at all inspected
facilities, protection is often provided by costly measures requiring
additional protective force positions. -The degree of protection
assurance provided for classified matter is inconsistent. Some sites
conduct programs that fully satisfy protection requirements while other
programs provide limited assurance that security interests are
adequately protected.
Noticeably absent in the overall improvement in safeguards and
security posture is an improvement in safeguards and security
management and oversight. The system lacks an integrated approach to
planning and implementation of the total program. The lack of
integration is reflected in the inconsistent quality of the programs and
the persistence of costly, manpower-intensive solutions. The underlying
cause of these weaknesses is inadequate program management and oversight
at all-levels.
In summary, some specific findings across the complex included:
The planning required to implement and maintain comprehensive,
cost-effective programs has not been completed. Policy issues continue
to be identified, however, a process is in place to resolve these
issues as they are discovered. The survey program suffers from a lack
of technical expertise and management commitment. Excessive processing
times still exist in the personnel security program, especially in. the
reinvestigation area. Effective Safeguards and Security Management and
Oversight is not consistently provided. Inspected facilities maintained
a viable protection posture against diversion or theft of special
nuclear material b outsiders and some have substantially improved y
their protection against the insider. Physical security systems had
deficiencies in quality assurance, training and maintenance. Material
control and accountability documentation has improved, but some program
shortcomings remain. Balanced, consistent, cost-efficient protection of
special nuclear material is not provided at all facilities.
Shortcomings were observed in document accountability. Computer
security policy weaknesses have been identified, although current
procedures are functional. Protective forces perform well in protecting
special nuclear material from the outsider threat. Assurance that
protection needs are met across the DOE is not provided by the current
program for protection of classified matter.
SITE IMPLEMENTATION
Mr. Bevill. What system is used to determine that sites have
implemented the recommendations provided by the Office of Security
Evaluations?
Mr. Podonsky. The Office of Security Evaluations does not make
recommendations. We identify strengthens and weaknesses of safeguards
and security programs at Headquarters and the various field sites.
These findings, which are referenced to specific DOE Orders and
Standards and Criteria, are shared with the Office of Security Affairs,
which is responsible for safeguards and security policy promulgation
for the Department of Energy.
A Memorandum of Understanding exists between the Office of
Security Evaluations and the Office of Safeguards and Security
providing coordination of inspection activities, including the tracking
and resolution of all deficiencies identified in our inspection results
and assessment efforts.
To further elaborate on our procedures to follow what is happening
across the DOE complex, the Office of Security Evaluations, through
utilization of various databases and the facility officer program,
track the life-cycle and resolution of findings and policy issues.
Where additional oversight of the resolution of findings is
appropriate, the Office of Security Evaluations performs a Safeguards
and Security Readiness Review (short-notice, limited scope inspection).
This review mechanism enables complete follow-up for resolution of
findings and issues.
The Facility Officer Program tracks trends and patterns at specific
DOE sites by having staff members informed of all safeguards and
security related activities at assigned sites. Facility Officers' reports
detail changes in the site's program, any potential problem areas, and
significant documents or activities which would affect safeguards and
security.
The Office of Security Evaluations tracks trends and patterns of
DOE-wide safeguards and security deficiencies using the Safeguards and
Security Issues Information System. This system maintains the status of
all our inspection findings and is utilized for the office program
planning activities.
The Policy Issues Tracking System is a computerized system which
is designed to track the resolution of policy and/or management issues
identified during inspection and evaluation activities. The system
retains a history of resolution activities and correspondence
concerning each policy issue. All issues are tracked through final
resolution.
As I have described, the Office of Security Evaluations has
several mechanisms, whose functions when combined, effectively track
trends and patterns in safeguards and security. When these trends and
patterns are studied and analyzed, reports are issued which
comprehensively delineate deficiencies and/or exemplary practices
across the Department.
QUANTIFYING RESULTS
Mr. Bevill. Please quantify the number of recommendations made and
implemented by each site investigated in FY 1990, FY 1991 and FY 1992.
Mr. Podonsky. The Office of Security Evaluations does not make
recommendations. We identify strengthens and weaknesses of safeguards
and security programs at Headquarters and the various field sites.
These findings, which are referenced to specific DOE Orders and
Standards and Criteria, are shared with the Office of Security Affairs,
which is responsible for safeguards and security policy promulgation
for the Department of Energy.
Through the various databases utilized and the facility officer
program, findings and policy issues are tracked through to resolution.
Where and when appropriate, the Office of Security Evaluations performs
a Safeguard s and Security Readiness Review (short-notice, limited
scope inspection). This review mechanism enables complete follow-up for
resolution of findings and issues.
Since October 1, 1989, the Office of Security Evaluations has
conducted nineteen comprehensive inspections, with four more planned
this year,.eleven Safeguards and Security Readiness Reviews, with six
more planned this year.
Inspections during this time-frame have resulted in 588 findings in
the following topical areas: Computer Security, 94 findings;
Information Security, 205 findings; Material Control and
Accountability, 73 findings; Physical Security Systems, 78 findings;
Protective Forces, 43 findings; Personnel Security, 34 findings;
Safeguards and Security Survey Program, 35 findings; and Protection
Program Planning, 26 findings.
By DOE Orders and Memoranda of Understanding, the Office of
Security Affairs has the responsibility to ensure that recommendations
required to address findings are brought to closure. Follow-up on the
closure of findings is accomplished through contractor self-assessment,
field office surveys, and the Office of Safeguards and Security's
program surveys. Program Secretarial Officers are also responsible for
self-assessments; and the Office of Security Evaluations provides
independent follow-up through Comprehensive Inspections and Safeguards
and Security Readiness Reviews.
SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Mr. Bevill. Describe the most significant accomplishments of the
Office in FY 1990 and FY 1991. How has the security of the Department
been-improved?
Mr. Podonsky. The most significant accomplishment of Office of
Security Evaluations is the increase in the attention the complex is
paying to safeguards and security and not simply to "getting ready" for
an inspection.
With the perspective gained by studying our inspections and field
surveys covering the-past four or five years, I believe that the
security of the Department has improved. Under Admiral Watkins,
managers now understand that safeguards and security need attention and
follow through at all sites.
However, there are many areas which still require improvement,
especially in the overall DOE management of safeguards and security
programs. Many of the specific findings on inspections and surveys are
symptoms of poor management at higher levels of the program rather than
failures of local implementation. Secretary Watkins has moved strongly
to emphasize the responsibility of his Program Secretarial Officers for
safeguards and security matters in SEN 6D-91. The Office of Security
Evaluations has begun to see some of the fruit of this emphasis, and we
believe that such efforts will produce needed improvements in
management practices at the field offices and at DOE Headquarters.
During FY 1990 and 1991 the Office of Security Evaluations
completed fifteen Comprehensive Inspections and seven Safeguards and
Security Readiness Reviews. There were six special studies which
examined the classified Work For Others Program, radiological sabotage,
intrusion detection systems, technical surveillance countermeasures, use
of tamper-indicating devices, and inventory verification/confirmation
programs. These special studies resulted in the Department of Energy
revising existing policy and writing new policies in order to
facilitate field implementation.
In the case of radiological sabotage and the classified Work For
Others Program, the Under Secretary directed the formulation of task
groups comprised of numerous program offices in order to rapidly
address the policy void in these areas.
PERSONNEL SECURITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. How many positions are included in the Personnel
Security Assurance Program? How often are these positions
reinvestigated?
Maj Gen McFadden. Currently, 10,493 positions have been identified
as Personnel Security Assurance Program (PSAP) positions. The
reinvestigation program for these individuals consists of an Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) Limited Background Investigation after 5
years, a National Agency Check with Credit (NACC) after 10 and 15
years, and a Limited Background Investigation after 20 years followed
by an NACC conducted every 5 years thereafter. Individuals in PSAP
positions will also complete an SF-86 and have a credit check and
medical assessment conducted annually.
SECURITY CLEARANCES
Mr. Bevill. What attempts are being made to reduce the number and
levels of clearances throughout the Department?
Maj Gen McFadden. We are in the process of reviewing the level of
access to classified information that an "L" access authorization will
allow. Under consideration is allowing such an access authorization to
permit access up to and including Secret Restricted Data. This change
will result in a significant reduction in the number of "Q" access
authorizations that are required to meet program needs, with a
concomitant reduction in the numbers of background investigations that
will be needed.
It is also anticipated that the decrease in funding for Defense
Programs activities for Fiscal Year 1993 will result in lowered numbers
of requests for security clearances. Programmatic changes that have
taken place at the Richland Operations Office have resulted in the
downgrading of many "Q" access authorizations to "L" access
authorizations. This will not only reduce the number of background
investigations required for the initial clearance, but will eliminate
the need for Limited Background Investigation which we use for
reinvestigations. The Limited Background Investigations will be
substituted by the less costly National Agency Check with Credit.
Mr. Bevill. Provide by field office and facility the number and
types of clearances held by DOE employees, contractors, and other
Federal employees for Fiscal Year 1991 and Fiscal Year 1992.
Maj Gen McFadden. There are approximately 174,000 clearances
currently held by DOE employees, contractors, and other Federal
employees. Current information will be provided for the record.
*****NOTE: CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1991
CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1992
NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
***** CHARTS ARE ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
