INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1993 (House of Representatives - June 25, 1992)
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 495 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 495
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 5095) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1993 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and the first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and the amendments made in order by this resolution and which shall not exceed one hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule, by title instead of by section and each title shall be considered as having been read. All points of order against said substitute are hereby waived. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and any member may demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted in the House to the bill or the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] is recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McEwen], pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 495 is the rule providing for consideration of H.R. 5095, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1993. I am happy to report that this is an open rule, with 1 hour of general debate to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
The rule makes in order the Committee on Intelligence Amendment in the nature of a substitute as the original text for purposes of amendment. Finally, the rule waives all points of order against the substitute and provides for 1 motion to recommit, with or without instructions.
Mr. Speaker, the bill this rule makes in order, H.R. 5095, authorizes funds for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government for fiscal year 1993.
The bill also contains several legislative provisions, including a clarification of the authority of the inspector general; a requirement that the Intelligence Committees receive notification about real property transactions; and limited postemployment assistance to former employees. The legislation also contains language dealing with the CIA's retirement and disability system.
The Congressional Budget Office identified that section of H.R. 5095 as having the potential to cause direct spending; however, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee testified to the Committee on Rules that the likelihood of the provision resulting in even minimal cost is extremely small.
The chairman requested a budget waiver for this provision, a request that the Committee on the Budget does not oppose.
Mr. Speaker, to repeat, House Resolution 495 is an open rule giving Members who are in disagreement with any part of the bill to chance to offer amendments. I urge my colleagues to adopt the resolution so that we may proceed with the consideration of these amendments and this important legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
(Mr. COMBEST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule and the bill.
- Mr. Speaker, I rise today to oppose additional damaging cuts in our intelligence capabilities. I want the Members of the House to understand the implications of those cuts for some of the most vital parts of our Nation's industrial base.
- Mr. Speaker, I reveal no secret in reminding this body that a substantial portion of the funds we authorize here today supports production of the world's most technologically advanced intelligence collection systems. The unique requirements of the intelligence community have driven American industry to develop an extraordinary range of new technologies, new materials, and new production methods.
- Thirty years ago, our aerospace industry was called on to produce a long-range high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft to collect intelligence from the Soviet Union. Lockheed rose to that challenge and produced the U-2, an aircraft still in use today.
- The U-2 was followed by the SR-71, another technological marvel that seved this Nation well.
- American industry responded to the need for collection from space with the extraordinary technologies we incorporate into our satellite collection systems.
- Each of those efforts--and many more we cannot discuss in an open session--helped keep our industry on the cutting edge of aerospace technology, computer technology, and communications technology.
- Mr. Speaker, we understand that spending for intelligence programs will decline. What we determine today is whether we will provide the resources for a well planned, well-managed transition to the intelligence capabilities we require for the future. The alternative is to close our eyes and our ears to the very real dangers that remain in this post-cold-war world.
Mr. McEwen. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise in support of the rule for the consideration of H.R. 5095, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1993. House Resolution 495 is an open rule. That means it's fair, and good for the legislative process in this House.
I would like to thank the chairman of the Rules Committee, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Moakley], along with the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], the ranking member, for reporting this open rule.
I would also like to pay strong tribute to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], the chairman of the Select Intelligence Committee, as well as my friend, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, for requesting this open rule which we have before us. Each does an outstanding job directing our congressional efforts regarding these vital national security concerns.
As the Members know, there is no position of greater responsibility or importance to our Nation than service on the Select Committee on Intelligence. These two gentlemen, the chairman and the ranking member, are performing a special service to our Nation and to the cause of freedom.
It is a pleasure to have the committee chairman and ranking member come before the committee asking for this rule.
The gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson], who also himself served with distinction as chairman of the Intelligence Committee during a period of my service on that committee, has thoroughly explained the rule.
It establishes an hour of general debate for H.R. 5095, allows amendments to be considered under the 5-minute rule, and then permits one motion to recommit with or without instructions.
The intelligence authorization bill is one of the most important measures that the House of Representatives considers each year. Our intelligence services are a cornerstone of our national security system.
While some loud voices would like to think that threats to our security are a thing of the past, that the history of man's inhumanity to man will never again threaten America or her freedom, in reality, the world does remain a dangerous place. History tells us this. Wise people learn and do not repeat history.
A capable intelligence system is not something that can be built and stockpiled like tanks and missiles. You can shut down the assembly line when you think you have enough tanks. Later on, you can turn it back on if you need some more.
On the other hand, an intelligence system must be nurtured and supported at all times. In fact, the foundation of the system, the worldwide network of people dedicated to helping keep our country free, is most susceptible to harm and can wither and die by even a temporary lack of support.
Today, some people want to slash the intelligence budget. `Peace dividend! Peace dividend,' they chant. They are shortsighted. Some never understood the value of our intelligence services. In fact, some genuinely detested them. Now many want to use the changes in the world to accomplish what they have always desired, to destroy America's intelligence services.
Let us not follow their shortsighted advice. Remember, it is very difficult, expensive, time-consuming, and often impossible to correct intelligence mistakes. During the late 1970's the Congress stripped away the heart of our Nation's intelligence services. We paid for that during foreign policy crises, such as Iran in 1980. We sought during the 1980's to improve the deficiencies of the 1970's.
Today, with the threats facing the United States, we cannot abandon our intelligence network. In fact, as we reduce our defense spending, we should improve our intelligence capabilities. The Members will hear the term `force multiplier' used to describe good intelligence. That means it makes our defenses much more effective. We use them where they should be applied at the time they should be applied with only the minimum amount of force. It helps ensure that our forces are deployed, equipped, and used in the most effective manner possible. This comes only from intelligence.
There are concerns that the committee bill already goes too far in reducing the intelligence budget. Therefore, I urge Members to defeat any effort to cut further the committee recommendations.
If we let our intelligence capabilities slip in order to claim a short-term political peace dividend scalp, we will pay a steep price. The price might not be paid tomorrow or today or even next month. It may come due years down the road, but the price will be paid, and often it is paid in blood.
While the chairman and ranking member of the Intelligence Committee are to be commended for requesting an open rule, they have placed a deep responsibility on every Member who comes to the floor to discuss these matters. I assure the Members, saying the wrong thing or saying too much costs America.
The importance of maintaining an appropriate level of debate cannot be overemphasized. I implore every Member to be cautious today. Please think twice during this debate. Err on the side of safety, national security, and our freedom.
Mr. Speaker, I would again like to thank the chairman, the gentleman from Oklahoma, and my friend, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], for their dedication and their leadership. They certainly have our Nation's best interests at heart. It is a pleasure to join with the former chairman, the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] in calling for unanimous support for this open rule.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I would advise my friend, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McEwen] that we have no requests for time on this side.
Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], the ranking member of the Committee on Rules.
(Mr. SOLOMON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.)
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McEwen], my colleague on the Committee on Rules and a Member who has served most admirably on the Select Committee on Intelligence, for yielding to me.
Mr. Speaker, I highly commend the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] and the ranking member, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], for the really outstanding job that we all know they do on that terribly important committee. I certainly thank them for requesting an open rule. We have not had one of those for a while, and it is good to have one out here. I thank my colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson], a member of our Committee on Rules, for helping us get this open rule out here to the floor. I know he believes in them.
Mr. Speaker, in rising to support this rule that will provide the Members of the House a chance to offer amendments to this very important bill, let me just state that I have, I think, two major concerns.
First, I want to remind Members that we should do all we can to avoid the disclosure of sensitive, classified information in the course of our debate on this bill and on related amendments.
The cold war may be behind us, but we must remain concerned for our national security--and for the safety of our intelligence personnel and sources around the world--in a time when new challenges really face us.
Second, Mr. Speaker, I want to remind my colleagues that these challenges to our national security and to our intelligence-gathering capabilities do exist.
They are not myths. They are facts. That is why I am so concerned that some members of this body reportedly want to take a simplistic, percentage-based approach to cutting our intelligence budget, which has already been cut.
I share the view of the chairman of the Intelligence Committee that the budget must be scrubbed, but not if the baby is going to be thrown out with the bathwater. That is wrong.
As the administration has stated about this bill as it now stands, and I quote what they have to say,
The administration strongly objects to H.R. 5095, as reported by the Select Committee on Intelligence. The bill would authorize--levels substantially below those requested--these reduced levels would seriously impede the administration's ability to meet the President's new intelligence priorities and to cope effectively with an uncertain future.
At this point, Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the administration's statement:
Executive Office of the President,
Washington, DC, June 18, 1992.
Statement of Administration Policy--H.R. 5095--Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1993
The Administration strongly objects to H.R. 5095, as reported by the Select Committee on Intelligence. The bill would authorize appropriations and personnel at levels substantially below those requested in the President's Budget. These reduced levels would seriously impede the Administration's ability to meet the President's new intelligence priorities and to cope effectively with an uncertain future. The Administration would also strongly object to any amendments that would further reduce the President's budget request for intelligence activities.
Specifically, the Administration objects to the:
Substantial reductions in funding and personnel throughout the National Foreign Intelligence Program;
34 percent reduction in funding for the FBI's foreign counter-intelligence activities;
Cancellation of important technical collections systems; and
Elimination of certain key analytic centers.
The Administration urges the House to adopt the Administration's proposal, which the Central Intelligence Agency transmitted to Congress on March 16, 1992, rather than enact H.R. 5095. The Administration's proposal would authorize appropriations consistent with the President's request and provide other essential intelligence-related authorities. During further congressional consideration of H.R. 5095, the Administration will seek to restore the requested authorization levels and other general authorities.
SCORING FOR THE PURPOSES OF PAYGO AND DISCRETIONARY CAPS
H.R. 5095 would increase direct spending; it is, therefore, subject to the pay-as-you-go requirement of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA). No offsets to the direct spending increase are provided in the bill. A budget point of order applies in the House against any bill that is not fully offset under CBO scoring. If, contrary to the Administration's recommendation, the House waives any such point of order that applies against H.R. 5095, the effects of enactment of this legislation would be included in the look back pay-as-you-go sequester report at the end of the congressional session.
OMB preliminary scoring estimates of this bill are presented in the table below. Final scoring of this legislation may deviate from these estimates. If H.R. 5095 is enacted, final OMB scoring estimates will be published within five days of enactment, as required by OBRA. The cumulative effects of all enacted legislation on direct spending will be issued in monthly reports transmitted to Congress.
Estimates for Pay-As-You-Go
( 1 )
( 1 )
( 1 )
( 1 )
( 1 )
1 Less than $500,000.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I was one of the first Members of this body to voice support for former President Reagan's treaty on intermediate nuclear forces back in 1987. I was one of those conservatives who saw at that time that the INF treaty was a step forward as long as there was adequate verification of Soviet action.
We saw in that case just how important verification is when we discovered that the former Soviet Union had not been completely honest with us about its SS-20 mobile missiles aimed at this country. Today the Soviet Union is no more, but the challenge of properly verifying strategic arms reductions with its successor, the Russian Republic or whatever it is called, I believe is just as great.
Do we know, for example, whether President Yeltsin has the full support of his military? There are still 4 million men under arms. Who controls those soldiers?
His new strategic arms treaty with us is a treaty that will radically reduce warheads on both sides over the next decade. Only time and good intelligence will tell us if the Russians live up to it, Mr. Speaker. I repeat, good intelligence. And certainly, Mr. Speaker, all of us here are familiar with the problems we face as ballistic missile technology and nuclear technology spread throughout the world. And, yes, these technologies are spreading.
These problems go far beyond Iraq and the Middle East, Mr. Speaker. Not many, I would wager, would expect our intelligence community to stay on top of such developments.
Finally, let me just point out to my colleagues three recent news articles that I think underline just how vital good intelligence will be to our future security and prosperity. In one it is reported that research by American companies is often the focus of espionage from a major European country, and not one of those that belonged to the former Warsaw Pact. In another of these articles it is surmised that the Communist Chinese may have concocted a nuclear neutron bomb using secrets stolen from a laboratory right here in the United States. Yet here we are contemplating cuts in our country's intelligence budget. Finally, the third article underlines the reemergence of a country called Japan on the international scene in describing that country's plan to expand its intelligence operations. What do Members think Japan is going to do with those intelligence operations? They are going to spy on American companies and it is going to cost American jobs.
The articles referred to follow:
From Time Magazine, May 28, 1990
When `Friends' Become Moles--American Companies Wake Up to a New Spy Threat: U.S. Allies
The dangers of Soviet military espionage may be receding, but U.S. security officials are awakening to a spy threat from a different quarter: America's allies. According to U.S. officials, several foreign government are employing their spy networks to purloin business secrets and give them to private industry. In a case brought to light last week in the French newsmagazine L'Express, U.S. agents found evidence late last year that the French intelligence service Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure had recruited spies in the European branches of IBM, Texas electronics companies. American officials say DGSE was passing along secrets involving research and marketing to Compagnie des Machines Bull, the struggling computer maker largely owned by the French government.
A joint team of FBI and CIA officials journeyed to Paris to inform the French government that the scheme had been uncovered, and the Gallic moles were promptly fired from the U.S. companies. Bull, which is competing desperately with American rival for market share in Europe, denies any relationship with DGSE. Last year the company made a legitimate acquisition of U.S. technology when it agreed to purchase Zenith's computer division for $496 million.
U.S. officials say the spy ring was part of a major espionage program run against foreign business executives since the late 1960s by Service 7 of French intelligence. Besides infiltrating American companies, the operation routinely intercepts electronic messages sent by foreign firms. `There's no question that they have been spying on IBM's transatlantic communications and handing the information to Bull for years,' charges Robert Courtney, a former IBM security official who advises companies on counterespionage techniques.
Service 7 also conducts an estimated ten to 15 break-ins every day at large hotels in Paris to copy documents left in the rooms by visiting businessmen, journalists and diplomats. These `bag operations' first came to the attention of the U.S. Government in the mid-1980s. One U.S. executive
told officials about a trip to Paris during which he had made handwritten notes in the margin of one of his memos. While negotiating a deal with a French businessman, he noticed that the Frenchman had a photocopy of the memo, handwritten notes and all. Asked how he got it, the Parisian sheepishly admitted that a French government official had given it to him. Because of such incidents, U.S. officials began a quiet effort to warn American companies about the need to take special precautions when operating in France.
While France can be blatant, it is by no means unique. `A number of nations friendly to the U.S. have engaged in industrial espionage, collecting information with their intelligence services to support private industry,' says Oliver Revell, the FBI's associate deputy director in charge of investigations. Those countries include Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, according to Courtney. The consultant has developed a few tricks for gauging whether foreign spies are eavesdropping on his corporate clients. In one scheme, he instructs his client to transmit a fake cable informing its European office of a price increase. If the client's competitor in that country boosts its price to the level mentioned in the cable, the jig is up. `You just spoof `em,' Courtney says.
Most U.S. corporations could protect their sensitive communications simply by sending them in code. But many companies are reluctant to do this, even though the cost and inconvenience might be minor. One reason may be that the effects of spying are largely invisible. All the company sees is that it has failed to win a contract or two. Meanwhile, its competitor may have clandestinely learned all about its marketing plans, its negotiating strategies and its manufacturing secrets. `American businesses are not really up against some little competitor,' observes Noel Machette, a former National Security Agency official who heads a private security firm near Washington. `They're up against the whole intelligence apparatus of other countries. And they're getting their clocks cleaned.'
As U.S. national-security planners increasingly focus on American competitiveness, many of them fear that U.S. corporations are operating at a severe disadvantage. America's tradition of keeping Government and business separate tends to minimize opportunities for the kind of intelligence sharing that often occurs in Europe, `I made a big effort to get the intelligence community to support U.S. businesses,' recalls Admiral Stansfield Turner, who headed the CIA in the late 1970s. `I was told by CIA professionals that this was not national security.' Moreover, it would be hard for the Government to provide information to one U.S. firm and not to another. Yet if sensitive intelligence is shared too widely, it cannot be protected.
One thing the U.S. Government can do is make sure business leaders understand the threat. When the late Walter Deeley was a deputy director at NSA in the early 1980s, he began a hush-hush program in which executives were given clearances and told when foreign intelligence agencies were stealing their secrets. `He considered it a real crusade,' a former intelligence official says. `If American business leaders could see some of these intelligence reports, I think they would go bananas and put a lot more effort into protecting their communications.'
`It may not be possible to level the playing field [with foreign companies] by sharing intelligence directly' with their U.S. rivals, observes deputy White House science adviser Michelle Van Cleave. `But it should be possible to button up our secrets.' That argues for much more use of secret-keeping techniques and far less naivete on the part of American business as it enters the spy-vs.-spy era of the 1990s.
Chinese Neutron Bomb Came From U.S. Secrets
Livermore. Calif: Chinese scientists have built and tested a nuclear `neutron bomb' using secrets stolen from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, according to sources familiar with an FBI espionage investigation.
The Chinese exploded a neutron bomb--a battlefield weapon designed to kill soldiers with lethal doses of radiation without destroying nearby villages--on Sept. 29, 1988, according to published reports.
Details of how the Chinese government acquired secret information about neutron weapons from Livermore are classified. But an official familiar with the case said lax security at the Livermore nuclear weapons lab where U.S. neutron bombs were designed, was partially to blame.
The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said `the total, complete lack of management oversight' was `absolutely devastating.'
`Anything you've ever heard or read about the lab pales by comparison.'
Ed Appel, the head of counterintelligence in the FBI's San Francisco office, confirmed that the bureau has conducted an espionage investigation at the lab and that no arrests have been made. He wouldn't discuss the probe's subject matter.
Appel did say, however, that `the Rosenbergs weren't the last ones' to have stolen nuclear weapons secrets.
`You could make the logical assumption that there have been successful espionage attempts against the (Livermore) lab since its inception,' Appel said.
George Carver, a former deputy director of the CIA, said publicly last month that the Chinese success was based on U.S. nuclear research.
`In 1988 * * * the Chinese blossomed forth with the neutron bomb, which was made from data stolen from U.S. research centers,' he said in a speech to Lawrence Livermore employees.
`That's what a number of people think, including my friends in the bureau (the FBI),' Carver added in a later telephone interview from his office at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
The espionage, according to lab sources, took place sometime before 1987.
China has the most aggressive espionage program now in operation against the United States, according to Appel. The Chinese government has targeted commercial technology, as well as military and political secrets.
The espionage is conducted not only by professional spies but by visiting Chinese students and scientists who may play on the sympathies of their Chinese-American hosts, he said.
The Americans are told that `Mother China needs assistance to become modern' and that nuclear weapons offer the Chinese a chance to stave off a Soviet threat while they develop, Appel said.
Lawrence Livermore has not been completely closed to Chinese scientists, in part because the lab conducts research on a wide spectrum of non-classified subjects.
`A lot of (non-weapon) nuclear physics is done at the lab * * * and they do host foreign scientists, including Chinese. And they do visit the People's Republic of China,' Appel said.
`I'm more afraid of a visiting physicist than I am an intelligence agent. I worry about the scientist who shares his formula with the other guy because they have a wink, a smile and a handshake, or they're going to save the world together.'
In 1988, the General Accounting Office, an investigative arm of Congress, reported that foreign intelligence agents posing as visiting scientists had gained access to Lawrence Livermore and America's other two nuclear weapons design laboratories.
The GAO said dozens of Chinese had visited Lawrence Livermore without a required background check, and some were later found to have links to Chinese intelligence services.
Besides the FBI, the Livermore data theft has been investigated by the lab itself, the U.S. Department of Energy (the lab is managed for the Energy Department by the University of California) and Congress.
The House Energy and Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations has been quietly gathering information about the espionage case since 1988. The committee has sought `damage assessments' detailing the impact on national security.
`The information that we have received so far from the DOE and the FBI indicates that an extremely serious situation has occurred,' Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich., the committee chairman, wrote last year in a letter to James Watkins, the secretary of energy.
From the New York Times, Jan. 1, 1992
Tired of Relying on U.S., Japan Seeks To Expand Its Own Intelligence Efforts
Tokyo: Japan is quietly moving to reshape and expand its intelligence operations in an effort to wean itself from its dependence on American analysis of threats to its economic and military security.
Officials here say they are not hiring spies and would steer clear of creating a single, large intelligence agency. Their biggest concern, they say, is to avoid rekindling memories of the Japanese secret police of half a century ago.
But over the last several months, officials of both the Foreign Ministry and the Japan Self-Defense Agency have described, in deliberately vague terms, plans to train hundreds of new intelligence analysts and spend a large amount of money to improve human and electronic information-gathering.
In part, the effort seems spurred by Japan's feelings of acute insecurity over the quality of its intelligence during the collapse of the Soviet Union, whose Far East bases have been the focus of Japanese concern for more than four decades, and about North Korea's effort to build nuclear weapons.
50 YEARS BEHIND
`Japan is behind by half a century in its ability to collect and utilize information compared to other countries,' said Seiki Nishihiro, a former Deputy Minister of Defense and one of the architects of the new intelligence effort. `In the cold war era the world moved in teams, and as a member of the American-led team, our judgment was not so important. Now Japan needs its own ability.'
Over the next year, the Foreign Ministry says it will create an International Information Bureau, and hire 100 to 200 new analysts, mostly regional specialists.
The Japan Self-Defense Agency is putting up a new headquarters in Tokyo, including one large building that officials say will house an intelligence unit patterned after the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency. An official of the agency, insisting on anonymity, described the new unit's task as `tactical information gathering,' focusing particularly on North Korea, the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, and the Persian Gulf.
`The whole structure will not be in place for another 10 years,' the official said. `But ideally, we need our own sources of information. If we had to contribute to a peacekeeping force in Cambodia, right now we would not know what we are getting into.' The defense agency is also increasing its ability to intercept signals, a task that it has slowly been taking over from some American units here.
NO SPY IN JAPAN'S SKY
Domestic political sensitivity, however, has prevented agency officials from building a piece of equipment they desperately want--a Japanese-made, Japanese-operated intelligence satellite. To their chagrin, they are entirely dependent on satellite images from the United States.
For example, when Japan begins importing huge quantities of near-weapons-grade plutonium from Europe next year for its nuclear-power plants, it will find itself in the situation of again having to rely on American satellites to warn against any hijacking attempts.
The delicacy of the satellite issue among Japan's Asian neighbors, who are extremely sensitive to suggestions that Tokyo may be watching them, helps explain why most efforts to increase the country's intelligence capabilities go undiscussed. In a nation with a 20th-century history of gathering intelligence to support the use of aggressive military force, many people prefer to avoid even an expression of interest in intelligence or in broad military matters.
As an aide to Prime Minister Miyazawa noted: `If you ask the public if Japan needs more information about world events, everyone says yes. If you ask whether it needs intelligence gathering, well, no one even wants to hear the phrase.'
Japan's tightly linked businesses and sophisticated trading companies, with personnel everywhere from the oil-fields of Kuwait to the laboratories of the Silicon Valley, are renowned for their comprehensive reports of political and economic trends. But they can also be politically obtuse, officials say, and as they have grown more independent, less of that data is funneled to the Government.
Japanese officials complain frequently about the quality of the analysis available to them on a day-to-day basis. When the abortive coup in the Soviet Union occurred in August, Mr. Miyazawa, still maneuvering to become Prime Minister, was widely quoted in the Japanese press as saying that the `information Japan had was different in depth compared to the information the U.S. had.' In the case of the North Korean nuclear project, Government officials say they have limited capability to interpret the satellite evidence provided by the United States.
SOMETHING MONEY CAN'T BUY
No one knows how much Japan spends on intelligence gathering, because the effort is spread across so many parts of the bureaucracy--from the defense agency to the national police, which keeps track of suspected North Korean agents. The governing Liberal Democratic Party has agreed that big budget increases are needed, but that may not be enough.
As a result, some senior officials have been arguing for is a strong coordinating office just outside Mr. Miyazawa's door, able to sort and assess data quickly, much as National Security Council staff members do at the White House.
A little-known group called the Cabinet Security Bureau is now supposed to serve that function. But like the Prime Ministers it serves, it is considered weak and easily outmaneuvered by the bureaucracy.
A few years ago, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Makasone tried to build a well-equipped situation room in the Prime Minister's residence. But the effort failed, partly for lack of money and partly because no one was quite sure what kind of situation it might be needed for.
From the Washington Post, Apr. 30, 1992
CIA, FBI, Chiefs Warn Panel Over Economic Espionage--U.S. Advanced Technology Is a Target
Nearly 20 foreign governments are carrying out economic intelligence-gathering that harms U.S. interests, CIA Director Robert Gates told a congressional subcommittee yesterday. But he said there was no firm evidence of a rise in such operations by industrialized countries, which are the United States' main economic competitors.
Gates said that, with the end of the Cold War, some spy agencies of the former Soviet Bloc were putting increasing emphasis on ferretting out foreign commercial secrets.
`The economic distress that former communist countries are experiencing in some cases gives impetus to intelligence efforts to acquire information and advanced technology of commercial value to them,' he said in a written statement to the House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee on economic and commercial law.
Moreover, he suggested that many of the intelligence agents in those former communist countries who have been thrown out of their government jobs might turn to private commercial spying. `the reservoir of professionally trained intelligence mercenaries is growing,' he said in his statement.
Some foreign intelligence agencies want data about U.S. government policy deliberations on foreign trade, Gates said, and about confidential bids by U.S. companies for contracts.
Though he did not name the 20 countries, he said they included some in Asia, Europe, the Middle East and, to a lesser degree, Latin America. He said the countries include U.S. allies.
Gates, FBI Director William Sessions and other intelligence experts testified at a time when the subcommittee is examining proposals by the United States' main code-breaking agency, the National Security Agency, to limit the sophistication of commercially available equipment for encrypting communications.
U.S. companies want access to the best gear available, saying they need this to combat stepped-up surveillance by foreign governments and companies.
But the NSA, critics say, wants a technology that it can continue to monitor.
Though economic espionage has been a fact of life for years, U.S. intelligence agencies are paying more attention to it with the end of the Cold War. Last month, the federal government completed a lengthy reevaluation of the agencies' mission and issued a directive in which 40 percent of the objectives are economic, Gates said.
Sessions and other witnesses yesterday said that espionage aimed at U.S. companies was on the rise or would rise.
But they offered no firm numbers or examples that have not already been reported in the press.
Earlier this month, French authorities said they had broken up a Russian spy ring that was seeking industrial information.
Other reports include separate efforts by Hitachi Ltd. of Japan and French government intelligence agents to steal computer secrets from International Business Machines Corp.
Gates said it would be `prudent' for U.S. business executives traveling overseas to carry sensitive corporate documents with them to prevent theft from their hotel rooms.
Some members of the panel pressed Gates to help U.S. companies by seeking out commercial secrets of foreign competitors. But in his testimony Gates ruled that out, saying the CIA would limit itself to helping U.S. companies safeguard themselves against foreign intelligence operations.
Vincent Cannistraro, a former U.S. intelligence official, said in an interview after the hearing that intelligence agencies believe it would be impossible to distribute such data fairly among U.S. companies and that it might lead foreign intelligence agencies to retaliate by stepping up their spying on U.S. companies abroad.
Mr. Speaker, we do not live in a simple world, and we should beware of simplistic approaches toward cutting our intelligence budget. I urge support for this open rule that could lead to changes that will make this bill acceptable to the administration, and I would hope that that happens. I certainly thank again the gentlemen from both sides of the aisle.
Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I applaud the wise and thoughtful comments and remarks made by my friends, both the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] and the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McEwen].
Mr. Speaker, I have no requests for time, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 495 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 5095.
IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 5095) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1993 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Ms. Slaughter in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5095, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1993.
H.R. 5095 authorizes all of the funds for the coming fiscal year for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government. Both national and tactical intelligence programs are authorized. National intelligence activities, referred to collectively as the National Foreign Intelligence Program [NFIP], include those undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency, as well as by other intelligence elements within the Department of Defense and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The NFIP also includes activities of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and intelligence components within the Departments of Treasury and Energy and the Drug Enforcement Administration. The purpose of the NFIP is to provide intelligence to national policymakers such as the President, the Cabinet, the National Security Council, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Tactical intelligence programs are the responsibility of the Department of Defense. While they are primarily focused on the provision of intelligence to military commanders, they may be used, especially in peacetime, for national intelligence purposes. The difficulty in separating the functions of national and tactical programs is one reason why the budgets for both are reviewed by the Intelligence Committee. The consideration on sequential referral of the intelligence authorization by the Committee on Armed Services ensures that particular attention is paid to the effects of Intelligence Committee decisions on the military. Our committee, Madam Chairman, greatly appreciates the counsel and assistance provided to us by the members and staff of the Committee on Armed Services.
The secrecy which, of necessity, surrounds intelligence activities makes it very difficult to discuss them, even in general terms. All of the programs and activities authorized by H.R. 5095 are, however, set forth in a classified schedule of authorizations which is incorporated into the bill by reference, and discussed in detail in a classified annex to the committee's report. Those documents have been available in the committee's offices since June 3. I urge Members who have not done so to review this material.
Madam Chairman, since January 1991, when I became chairman, I have encouraged the administration to undertake a review of the intelligence community and, where appropriate, institute organizational changes. After the gulf war and the collapse of communism, and with the recent appointment of Mr. Gates as the Director of Central Intelligence, the administration has taken steps to shift focus, emphasis, and make organizational changes.
Madam Chairman, this has been an unusual year from the standpoint of the committee's consideration of the budget request for intelligence. Prior to the submission of the budget in February, the administration had begun an internal review of intelligence requirements. We were informed that the results of the review would be reflected in an adjusted budget to be submitted in April. Concurrent with the administration's review, the committee held a series of public hearings on legislation recommending changes in the structure of the intelligence community. As the hearings progressed, it became increasingly clear that there was widespread agreement that certain structural changes were necessary, but little agreement on whether they should be legislatively imposed or administratively implemented. To his credit, the Director of Central Intelligence Mr. Gates, has instituted some significant changes in the procedures, policies, and organization of the intelligence community. While many of these changes paralleled suggestions discussed at our hearings, I am not concerned with who gets credit for the ideas. I want to be sure, however, that the changes produce the desired result. The committee will be carefully monitoring the implementation of the organizational changes instituted by the Director, and will be recommending further changes if necessary.
These structural changes concede that the end of the cold war was a watershed event for an intelligence community created largely in response to it. Regrettably, this awareness was not reflected in the administration's adjusted budget submission. Although funds were shifted between programs, the bottom line was not changed--the same aggregate amount was requested in April, after all the internal studies, as had been sought in February. While this amount represented only marginal real growth above fiscal year 1992 appropriated levels, the fact that any growth at all was requested was a matter of substantial concern to many members of the committee. At a time when the world had undeniably changed and Federal budgetary constraints could not be ignored, the committee believed, on a bipartisan basis, that a reduction in the President's funding request was appropriate. We differed only on how much of a cut would be absorbed without impacting essential intelligence capabilities.
We settled on a 5-percent reduction to the budget request, an amount which puts the fiscal year 1993 authorization below the fiscal year 1992 appropriated level.
This is a significant cut, more on a percentage basis than was made in the defense authorization bill. It represents, for a bipartisan majority on the committee, the outer limit on which the intelligence community can reasonably be expected to reduce spending next year. To require further cuts would be to risk severe damage to the ability of the community to provide intelligence necessary to policymakers.
The end of the cold war does not mean that we now live in a world devoid of threats to our security. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and regional conflicts among others will continue to challenge us. We need to be able to assess those threats and develop policy responses to them. Doing that successfully requires reliable intelligence which can provide timely
information on the capabilities and intentions of individuals, groups, or nations that would do us harm.
A good case can be made that, as our official presence decreases overseas, a strong intelligence effort will be even more important. In many respects the ability to prudently draw down defense resources, as we are now planning, is a function of the quality of intelligence.
Intelligence is supposed to provide the warning time that is necessary if we are to react effectively whether through diplomatic or military means. To do that, the intelligence community does not have to be as big as it once was or cost as much, but it has to have the resources necessary to do its job.
I believe the bill provides the necessary level of resources while encouraging the community to eliminate unnecessary activities and promote flexibility and efficiency.
The committee will continue to furnish this kind of encouragement so that the necessary streamlining at the agencies occurs in a fashion which is both orderly and, from the standpoint of security, safe.
I urge the House to support us in this undertaking.
In addition to trying to align the intelligence budget with the fiscal and geopolitical realities we face, the bill contains a number of important legislative provisions, including a restatement of the Central Intelligence Retirement Act of 1964 for certain persons.
The chairwoman of our Subcommittee on Legislation, the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. Kennelly], will explain these provisions in more detail. I mentioned them because they are illustrative of the fact that this bill does more than authorize the budget of the intelligence agencies.
For instance, it recognizes the importance of placing greater emphasis on collecting intelligence from open sources, improving foreign language training in the intelligence agencies, and ensuring those agencies pay proper attention to maintaining a strong human intelligence capability.
It also encourages the intelligence agencies to take an active role in the commercialization of certain technology, an initiative that is essential if the United States is to continue to be recognized as a leader in these areas.
While these and other issues, such as developing better links between intelligence and the programming data supplied to increasingly sophisticated weapons, the bill reflects an investment strategy that will pay dividends in the years ahead. This is a forward-looking legislation in ways beyond the budget reductions it contains and encourages the intelligence community to discard programs useful only in the cold war and focus on the challenges which will confront us in the future.
Madam Chairman, I urge the adoption of H.R. 5095.
Madam Chairman, at this point, I would like to pay special note of thanks to two former committee staff, as members of our Budget Subcommittee staff, Mr. Larry Pryor and Ms. Margie Sullivan, for their efforts. We wish them the best of luck in their new jobs.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. SHUSTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I rise in strong support for the legislation which we bring to the floor today. I join with the chairman in providing bipartisan support, not because this legislation is perfect, for from it, but rather because it is the best we could bring to the floor today. In fact, we had to fight some major battles to get as much as we got in this legislation that we bring to the floor today.
Indeed, there are those who would like to even more substantially cut the intelligence authorization in spite of the fact that we face great uncertainty in the world around us. Indeed, people speak of a new world order when, more accurately, it could be called a new world disorder. In Russia, nobody knows what is going to happen. We hope we are going to see democracy. In Africa, we see some of the very gains and progress that we had all hoped and worked for possibly evaporating before our very eyes. In Latin America, the democracies newly in place are very fragile. China is at a crossroads. Europe, as we speak, is a bloody place in parts of the continent and, in fact, while a rebirth is taking place there, in many countries no one can predict with certainty what the future holds.
There are over 20 countries in the world today, Madam Chairman, which have ballistic missile capability and, indeed, one can assert that more countries around the world are spying against the United States today perhaps than ever before in the history of our country. It is, indeed, a dangerous world.
Intelligence, therefore, is profoundly important. Yes, it is a force multiplier, and, yes, we did, indeed, cut 5 percent below the president's budget, and, indeed, below the appropriation for last year. Many of those cuts were very prudent. Others went entirely too far. Indeed, some were draconian, particularly in the area of FBI counterintelligence, in the area of attempting to close down two analytic centers, in the area of certain technical programs.
In fact, in several areas, this Member believes we went too far. The administration has expressed its great concern about the depth of the cuts and, in fact, we have a letter from the Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates, in which he says:
If those who favor deeper cuts prevail, I will be forced to say no to coverage of a number of substantive issues, including collection and analysis of intelligence on a number of nations, where political and economic instability abound. I fear that we could find ourselves ill-prepared to support U.S. forces, or to predict the threat posed by these and other nations, particularly in the nuclear area.
So, yes, we do face a dangerous world, and there are some inadequacies in this bill.
it is my hope, and I know the hope of several of my colleagues on the committee, that we will be able to remedy some of these problems as we go to conference. But today the choice we face is between the legislation which we brought to the committee today on a bipartisan basis or further cuts which could be catastrophic.
So I urge my colleagues to support this legislation and join with us in our efforts to improve it as we move to conference.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. Kennelly].
(Mrs. KENNELLY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Mrs. KENNELLY. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5095, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1993.
The Subcommittee on Legislation, which it is my privilege to chair, has held a number of hearings and briefings on legislative proposals either suggested by the administration or arising from other committee inquiries. The bill contains several of these initiatives and I would like to outline the major provisions:
Section 303, which amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, to clarify that the authority of the CIA's inspector general to receive and act upon information related to Agency programs, operations, and activities is not limited by the source of the information. Existing law does not make clear that information may be received by the inspector general from individuals not employed by the CIA. The clarification provided by section 303 is not intended to be an expansion of the authorities of the inspector general;
Section 304, which requires that the congressional intelligence committees receive the same title X notification concerning real property transactions and construction projects affecting defense intelligence components as is presently provided to the Armed Services Committees; and
Section 305, which provides the Secretary of Defense with discretionary authority to furnish limited post-employment assistance to former employees in those unusual circumstances when to do so is judged to be essential to reduce the chance that classified information might be unlawfully disclosed. Similar authority was previously provided to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the National Security Agency.
Additionally, title II of the bill contains a restatement of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 of certain employees. The restatement codifies executive orders now governing the CIA Retirement and Disability System [CIARDS] and reorganizes and clarifies many provisions of the act which have become outdated or inconsistent. Among other clarifications, the restatement spells out the rights of qualified former spouses under the Federal Employees' Retirement System and retains the right of a qualified former spouse under current law to a pro-rata division of the thrift savings plan account. Although the restatement is extensive, no enhancement or liberalization of existing CIARDS benefits will result, except in two minor provisions which conform CIARDS to the Civil Service Retirement System [CSRS] and which will have minimal budgetary effect, if any.
As I have said in the past, this bill is difficult to discuss on the floor because almost all program details and authorization levels are classified. While the classified schedule of authorizations and the classified annex to the public report have been available to Members of the House to review in the offices of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I fully understand the frustration of Members who are uncertain whether the intelligence community is heading in the right direction after several years of enormous change.
This is an issue the committee itself continues to wrestle with. We have been asking where the intelligence community should be going and how it should be organized in the future. We have concluded for this year that the proposals of the Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the community have merit, and should be given the chance to take effect.
We have also made clear that the intelligence community will simply have to do its job in the future with less funding. The total funding level contained in the bill is below the level appropriated in fiscal year 1992 and represents a cut on a percentage basis well below the reduction contained in the defense authorization legislation.
As I leave the Intelligence Committee, I am troubled by the ramifications of the view expressed by some, that our existing intelligence community can or should evolve into an all-purpose information center for the U.S. Government. Using intelligence assets to address questions outside the realm of traditional national security concerns may be a way of amortizing our tremendous investment in those assets, yet I am not confident we have the legal and procedural safeguard in place to bring this information into the public domain. If the intelligence community has a role to play in policy areas of increased emphasis such as health, the environment, and even counternarcotics, there must be a recognition that need-to-know is nationwide. I fear it is often forgotten in the hermetic world of intelligence that secrecy and classification must be the exception, not the rule, in a democratic government. Thus by the very nature of the means employed to do its work, the intelligence community may not be suited for missions different from those it has traditionally pursued.
Furthermore, I am concerned that intelligence is currently a free good to most consumers. Intelligence consumers are usually under no compunction to balance the cost of producing intelligence against other priorities, and, like most of us, intelligence consumers want lots of what they don't have to pay for. Intelligence, of course, is not free to the taxpayer, but cloaked in the mantle of national security, it has gotten something of a free ride up until now in the debate on Federal spending. In this new world, if the intelligence community assumes missions traditionally performed by other sectors of the Government, its budget should be treated to the same rigorous public debate as the budget of other agencies. The more nontraditional missions undertaken, the less justification exists, if any remains, for keeping the total aggregate intelligence budget secret.
Again, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 5095.
Madam Chairman, this is something we should address.
I thank the chairman for his work. I thank the ranking member, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster] for being so willing to work together. I think we have done very good work in this proposal today and I know that we can do even better in the future.
Again, Madam Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 5095.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter].
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Madam Chairman, I want to thank the ranking member for his effort and for yielding me this time, the chairman and all members of the committee for I think the excellent product that the committee has put together on a bipartisan basis, some minor differences, but really a good bipartisan effort brought to the House today.
I have one procedural matter that I want to discuss first which relates really to establishing some legislative intent.
As the members of the committee knew, before we arrived here I filed additional views. I want to say that on page 12 of the committee report, paragraph 3 in the section entitled `Joint Intelligence Centers,' I think that paragraph goes a very long way to meeting the concerns of this gentleman which I expressed in the additional views.
There is one spelling error in it. It is a GPO spelling error and it does perhaps go to confuse the issue. It is talking about personnel billets not currently filed at the Strategic Air Command.
I would ask the chairman and the ranking member to confirm my understanding that we are talking about personnel billets being filled, not filed, and I yield to the committee chairman.
Mr. McCURDY. That is correct, Madam Chairman. That is a misspelling at the Printing Office. It says billets that are not currently filled at the Strategic Air Command.
I would say, if the gentleman will yield further, that I appreciate the gentleman's concern and would like to state for the public record that the Chair intends to work with him to ensure that there is no intent to affect that level, that we just felt it was important as we look at the changes in the focus that there be a decision made of what is the appropriate level of each of these commands and centers. We did not intend to take any action that would adversely affect the Strategic Air Command or the concerns of the gentleman from Nebraska.
Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the committee chairman for that additional assurance.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, the gentleman is absolutely correct.
Mr. BEREUTER. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman.
There are two items I would like to address today which relate to the importance of Intelligence; first of all, the importance of Intelligence to monitoring our arms control treaties and then the importance of Intelligence to our multilateral peacekeeping forces. I think these are some very important reasons why we need to continue our extraordinary Intelligence capabilities that we have assembled.
First, on the matter of treaties, all of us rejoice in the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the threat of a global nuclear holocaust arising from a military confrontation between the United States and the former Soviet Union. This is a great weight that has fallen from our shoulders; but Madam Chairman, we must not forget that the huge arsenal amassed by the Soviets still exists and that while it is now under basically friendly direction, that can change all too rapidly in the former Soviet Union, and it is still capable of annihilating our country. That is why arms control treaties, and in particular the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the verification of all these treaties remains so important.
I think it is vital to both our national security and our international credibility that the Senate ratify this treaty, but the Senators will not, and indeed should not vote to ratify this extremely complex treaty unless they are convinced that our Government will be able for years to come to verify with confidence that the other side is complying with the treaty provisions.
As you know, Madam Chairman, our Government's ability to verify such compliance depends mainly on the intelligence community's capabilities to monitor the treaty-related activities of the post-Soviet states.
These capabilities are based on more than 40 years of developing sophisticated collection systems and reliable human sources, along with the analytic and processing skills needed to make sense of complex data and present relevant facts and judgments to policymakers in a meaningful way.
These sophisticated collection systems, once cut, cannot be replaced easily or quickly, should they be needed.
To be sure, this collection-system architecture was devised to cope with a closed Soviet society. Now that the U.S.S.R. has given way to more open and cooperative successors, our country has additional means of collecting relevant information. Indeed, the START Treaty requires the Commonwealth of Independent States--the major remnant of the former Soviet Union to supply data that in the past was denied to us.
Nevertheless, we cannot afford to rely solely on the continued openness of Russia or any other states. It is imperative Madam Chairman and Members, that we maintain independent collection capabilities. Even assuming continued good relations, much of what the Intelligence Community must monitor will still require sophisticated collection, processing, and analytic capabilities, if only to bolster confidence and avoid misunderstandings.
Thus, Madam Chairman, our national security requires that we preserve our ability to monitor foreign compliance with arms control treaties.
Second, when it comes to intelligence, it's importance to peacekeeping forces multilateral, whether the United Nations or whatever, we all know the United States cannot and should not be the world's peacekeeper. But U.S. support to peacekeeping will be vital whether it is direct or indirect. In my view, Madam Chairman, a key to keeping the peace is good intelligence, and the best intelligence in the world is produced by the United States.
Our intelligence has been used very, very effectively in Europe and in the Middle East in recent months, and that capability has been crucial in saving lives and helping the policymakers in the United States and among our allied countries.
Therefore, we have to be very careful about cutting back in these areas.
Good intelligence costs far less than the force that might ultimately have to be used instead. And in peacekeeping, this intelligence can be a unique, global asset.
It seems to me simply a matter of common sense and prudence: good intelligence, shared judiciously with our allies and international organizations, can be used to thwart the dangerous intentions of the world's worst dictators. And good intelligence costs far less than the force that might ultimately have to be used instead.
Where has our intelligence helped recently and where might it help in the future? Surely it was important to the IAEA as it probed the wreckage of Iraq's nuclear and missile programs. And now the IAEA is probing for evidence of a nuclear weapons program in North Korea, another country that has given us great concern. Surely the intelligence the State Department has provided has been of value to the United Nations in places as close to us as El Salvador and as far away as Cambodia, where U.N. peacekeepers have been deployed to end conflicts that have raged for more than a decade. And as U.N. peacekeeping operations move forward in the Balkans, I am sure we will help again.
We now need to look at how it has helped in Southeast Asia and what its potential is there.
With so many potential trouble spots in the world, where is the wisdom in further cutting intelligence capabilities as some of our colleagues have suggested. Cavalierly, we dismissed the importance of good intelligence after the First World War. Wisely, we built on the foundation of the intelligence organizations we established during the Second World War, and they helped us win the cold war. Now, let us not dismantle these silent guardians of our interests, but let us preserve them and use them to help the community of peace-loving nations keep the peace.
Madam Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the legislation presented to the House today, and I thank my colleague for yielding me this time.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Roemer].
(Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. ROEMER. Madam Chairman, I would first like to salute the distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], and the ranking minority member, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], for their hard work in coming up with some very difficult choices in a very, very important bill for this country and the changing world, whether, as the distinguished gentleman from Nebraska is talking about, it is the breakup of the former Soviet Union or accidental launches or whether we are talking about enhanced peacekeeping missions.
Madam Chairman, I believe we have seen the United Nations take on 9 or 10, and that equals the amount they have taken on in the last 35 years. Also, Madam Chairman, whether we look at treaties and proliferation, many, many difficult decisions are made in this bill.
Madam Chairman, I rise today in strong support of a program created in previous Intelligence authorization legislation that has potential for enormous benefit to our national security, the intelligence community, and our Nation's ability to compete on a global scale.
I am speaking about the National Security Education Program, which will provide grants and stipends to American students to study abroad, learning the cultures, languages and lifestyles of the other nations of this world.
These opportunities for foreign study could create a significantly better qualified labor pool for our intelligence establishment, our foreign service operations and our international businesses.
These benefits would be tangible gains for service in government and competitiveness in our economy. These added dividends made available to graduate students, undergraduate students, and institutions of higher learning can create a valuable asset to our Nation's educational system.
As a member of the Committee on Education and Labor, I have listened to testimony for 18 months on how the value of instruction, training and research translates to a benefit for the society as a whole.
The Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and other government agencies are in the painful process of defining and implementing their new roles in a changing post-cold-war world. The National Security Education Program has an enormous potential to provide them with a class of manpower that has been enlightened to the realities of the changing and volatile world. This possible benefit justifies the contribution they are asked to make under the act that created this program.
Madam Chairman, in closing I would like to stress my concern that this plan to educate American students abroad was created over a year ago, but remains on the drawing board. Although necessary steps have begun to accelerate recently, I would urge the Secretary of Defense to move with greater urgency to fully enact the National Security Education Program.
We need the four Presidential appointments; we need to have appropriated amounts placed in the trust fund where it can begin to draw interest; and we need final and formal rules and procedures so that a generation of students do not miss the opportunity to take advantage of this important program.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ROEMER. I yield to the distinguished chairman of the committee.
McCURDY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Madam Chairman, I wanted to state first of all that I thank the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Roemer] for his statement and his concern. He has a very long track record in support of higher education.
Madam Chairman, we have discussed this concern relative to the National Security Education Act and the delay that has occurred in providing funding. But I want to provide the following information: I believe we are close now to having or resolving the funding problem, and the $150 million made available in fiscal year 1992 defense appropriations bill will soon be in the trust fund and that will enable the $35 million approved for release to be released in short order.
Therefore, there will be sufficient funds that will run this program through the remainder of 1992 and into 1993 as well.
Madam Chairman, I agree with the gentleman that there is a need for improving our pool of educated Americans who understand foreign policy in the international arena, and also the improvement of language skills. I believe this program can go a long way to provide that.
I thank the gentleman again for his interest and his support.
Mr. ROEMER. I thank the distinguished chairman.
I have concluded, Madam Chairman, except to say that I urge the distinguished chairman to continue his hard work on these education efforts and get this off the planning board and into reality.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Young].
(Mr. YOUNG of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of the intelligence Authorization Act and also in support of the amendment that will be offered by my colleague, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks].
- Madam Chairman, I rise to urge my colleagues to use caution when considering any further reduction to our Nation's intelligence gathering operations.
- Contrary to what some in this body would have you believe, the need is as great, if not greater, than ever to have best trained intelligence officers with the most state of the art technology.
- With so much instability in the former Soviet and East Bloc states, it is essential that our Nation has the ability to gauge possible developments and events in that part of the world. Although Federal funding is tight in every agency, it would be prudent if we devoted even more resources to developing our human and electronic intelligence capabilities.
- As a Member servicing a second 6-year term on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, where virtually all of the work is conducted in secret sessions, I know it is often hard for the American public to recognize the benefits our Nation gains from our intelligence community. there are, however, many areas where intelligence really does make a difference. One of the most obvious is counterterrorism.
- During Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein set out to engulf us in a global terrorist firestorm. Airports, public buildings, and Federal, State, and local law enforcement authorities braced for potential terrorist acts here and abroad.
- In preparation, our intelligence agencies pooled their resources and identified suspected Iraqi agents and terrorist operatives in more than 40 countries. This effort led to hundreds of arrests and deportations around the world and the much anticipated terrorist attacks never occurred.
- Our Nation's continuing ability to identify and track terrorists and ultimately bring them to justice--even if it takes years--clearly intimidates many would-be terrorists and their state sponsors. Governments that sponsor or even foment terrorism, such as those of Iran, Iraq, and Libya, depend on plausible denial. Good intelligence rips away that protection, as Libya's Mu'ammar Qadhafi has discovered on more than one occasion.
- Madam Chairman, given the nature of the terrorist threat, its obvious that terrorism can never be completely eradicated.
- However, experience has proven that the most effective form of counterterrorism is anticipatory and aimed at prevention. It is protective, not reactive. Good intelligence is a vital weapon without which all efforts are to no avail.
- But Madam Chairman, developing and maintaining adequate counterterrorist intelligence capabilities requires adequate resources. We should think of these resources as an investment in our national defense and our national security. They are an investment in protecting the safety and well-being of Americans here at home and those traveling and working abroad. Report after report continues to show that Americans, American businesses, and American interests remain the primary target of terrorist attacks.
- There is no question that our investment in our Nation's intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities thwart terrorists and their state sponsors, saving us valuable resources and most importantly protecting American lives.
- No price can be placed on the loaded commercial airliners that are not blown up, on the U.S. Embassies that are not attacked, on the American diplomats, businessmen, and travelers who are not kidnaped or murdered because our intelligence capabilities scared off would-be perpetrators, provided information that made it possible to block their operations, or that led to their apprehension.
- Shortsighted attempts here tonight to further reduce our Nation's intelligence operations and capabilities will result in terrible unknown consequences in the days, months, and years ahead. Just two decades ago, our Nation shortsightedly embarked upon a campaign during which we tied the hands of our intelligence agencies and significantly reduced the resources available for their operations. We are just recovering from that serious period of retrenchment. As our experiences during Operation Desert Storm demonstrated, the United States needs an active intelligence capability to protect American lives and American interests.
- You can be sure that this Congress will be called upon to account for any effort that would compromise our abilities to provide our President and our services with the accurate and timely intelligence information they need to identify and counter any threat to our Nation.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman I yield 2 minutes to a distinguished member of the committee who will not be with us next year the gentleman from New York [Mr. Martin]. The gentleman has announced his retirement. We are going to miss not only his good humor but, more importantly, his keen intellect and dedication to our country.
Mr. MARTIN. I thank the gentleman for his kind remarks. I will only take a couple of minutes. I do want to say how much I have enjoyed this 2-year stint on the Intelligence Committee.
For the Members who think they are not busy and are on other duties, they need only serve a stint on the Intelligence Committee, where they would get the opportunity to spend hours and hours in hearings only to leave the hearing room with the certainty that there are only about 18 others within the beltway with whom they can discuss anything. But this committee more than any other committee, and here it is very important that the membership of the House in general have confidence in the members of the committee and, in particular, the chairman and ranking member.
I want to say, and I think I say this without fear of contradiction, that the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] and the gentleman from Pennsylvania, my friend [Mr. Shuster], have that kind of confidence of the body as a whole.
This bill is not to my liking. I honestly, as one member of the committee, feel that we are cutting too deep, particularly when we are going so deep as far as defense is concerned.
Madam Chairman, Henry Stimson, the former Secretary of State under Herbert Hoover, closed the Secretary of State's code-breaking office, and when he did, he said, `Gentlemen do not read other gentlemen's mail.'
Later he became the Secretary of War under President Roosevelt, and little wonder that for a time the smart betting money was on the Germans and the Japanese.
Let me tell you, for those who think it is not gentlemanly to read other people's mail, you ought to serve a term on this committee to find out what the rest of the world is trying to steal from us. It is not only those things we used to think about associated with intelligence, but for those of you who are concerned about the economy of the world and the effect of intelligence and espionage relating to technology, ought to appreciate that our intelligence budget and our intelligence assets are force multipliers in every respect.
So I am reluctantly going to support the bill notwithstanding what I think are too big a cut at the present time.
Again I salute the chairman and ranking member and thank him for his kindness to me and the education while serving in the little room upstairs.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
Madam Chairman, I just wanted to say, first of all, that we will miss the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Martin] who served admirably on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and also I have had the pleasure for 12 years now to serve with him on the Committee on Armed Services as well. He not only represented his district with distinction, Madam Chairman, but he also has continued to work in a very fair and bipartisan manner in order to provide for the overall security and interests of the United States, and he is truly a man with great experience and knowledge in the area of Armed Forces, intelligence, and defense. We will certainly miss his service.
I would also like to state, Madam Chairman, that this year we will also lose the services of the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wilson], who is a member of the Committee on Appropriations as well and has chaired the Oversight Subcommittee of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and he has done so very well.
The gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. Kennelly] will be leaving the committee as well, and, as has been indicated by her statement as well, it was a reflection of the amount of hard work and dedication that she brought to that assignment, and she truly is a marvelous professional, and we will miss her.
The gentleman from Utah [Mr. Owens] will be leaving the committee as well since he is running for the U.S. Senate.
Last, Madam Chairman, but certainly not least of all, I would like to take this last minute to recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], our ranking Republican member, and I have personally enjoyed our relationship, our friendship, our ability to discuss various controversial issues at times. In some ways, and I do not know how this will be taken, but in many ways we have had to share secrets that we could not share with our wives. As the chairman and the ranking member, we have often been charged with the responsibility of receiving information that is not disseminated to the membership as a whole, and I have never at any point ever questioned, or had reason to question, whether or not that secret would be held or that this gentleman had anything other than the national security of the United States and the interests of the United States at heart. He has truly been a pleasure to work with, and I say to the gentleman, `Bud, I thank you personally and publicly, and we will miss your service, and again let me just say that I know the country as a whole has benefited from your service.'
Madam Chairman, I yield 3 1/2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders].
(Mr. SANDERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. SANDERS. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] for yielding this time to me.
Madam Chairman, let me congratulate the chairman on the excellent work that he has done in what is clearly a very sensitive and difficult area. As it happens, I have not seen the secret files regarding this authorization, and I do not know how much money there is that will be authorized for intelligence this year.
But this I do know: I do know, as every other American knows, that the cold war is over, that the Soviet Union no longer exists, that Russia and other former Communist countries now want entrance into NATO. I do know, in my opinion, that military spending should be slashed, and I do know that in our country today we have 5 million children who are hungry, we have 2 million people who sleep out on the street. One.third of our population lacks adequate health insurance. Our industries are decapitalized, and we need to put billions of dollars into our industry so that we can provide decent jobs to our people. I do know that school system after school system in America is running out of money, and teachers are being laid off, and I do know that we have a $400 billion deficit.
So, knowing all of those things, without having to know more, it seems to me to be appropriate that we take a hard look at the intelligence budget, no matter what it may be, look at what is going on in the world today, look at the priorities of the United States of America today and make a decision as to whether we continue to fund intelligence at the high levels we have funding it or whether we pay attention to our hungry children, to our homeless people and to the other desperate needs that face this country.
Madam Chairman, I have not heard from anybody here yet today; no one got up and said that we are slashing the intelligence budget in order to conform to the new international realities. I have not heard that. And maybe I am wrong, maybe I missed that debate, and, if I have not heard that, and others have said it, I would generously yield time to anybody here now to tell me that we have made major cutbacks in intelligence spending.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SANDERS. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I wanted to state from the outset here that there has been quite a bit of criticism about the level of the cuts. As a matter of fact, the Executive Office of the President says they strongly object to this bill as reported by our committee because of the deep cuts and that they are very concerned at the level of the cuts. The 5 percent that we took out was much beyond what was desired by the administration.
Let me just say to the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders], and I respect his concern, that we have scrubbed the intelligence community. We have looked very carefully at this budget. There is a fine line between being able to report a bill that can pass and also not be subject to a Presidential veto, but also recognize the realities of today.
Madam Chairman, we not only cut the overall community by 5 percent. I will also state that our committee itself; as Chair; recommended a cut in our own committee operating budget because I believe we can do more.
As one who is a member of both the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I voted for major reductions in both programs, and I believe that they can come down. But we do not want to do so at the sacrifice of our ability to understand emerging threats and some of the new thrusts and concerns regarding the environment, economic intelligence, AIDS, demographics, areas that we will have to have information for policymakers.
So, Madam Chairman, I hope that is some response to the concern of the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders].
Mr. SANDERS. Madam Chairman, as I hear what the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] says, and please correct me if I am wrong, but what the gentleman is proposing is 5 percent of what President has requested.
Mr. McCURDY. The gentleman is correct.
Mr. SANDERS. But we all know, without understanding or the release of information about the intelligence budget, we also know that this President has brought forth a military budget which in no ways reflects current world realities. I can only assume that is what he is doing with the intelligence budget, and I would respectfully suggest that 5 percent does not reflect the needs of our country and the changing world realities.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume to further respond to the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders], my good friend, and I certainly recognize and respect the fact that he was not on the floor when we covered these points, and I recognize and respect the fact that he has not read the report, and I recognize and respect the fact that he does not know what the numbers are.
But, having said all of that, not only have we made very substantial cuts. These are real dollar cuts that are significantly below last year's funding. Not simply below what the President has requested, but very, very significantly below the real dollars that were spent in appropriations last year.
I also recognize the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] was not on the floor when we went through the dangerous world in which we live, and, although the Soviet Union no longer exist, the threats are multifarious out there today.
But I respond in that fashion to my good friend from Vermont.
Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan].
Mr. DORNAN of California. Madam Chairman, there has been much acrimony on the floor for the last few days, and many little firestorms of partisanship. I notice how quiet this distinguished and splendid Hall is when a true committee of bipartisanship, well led and served by the leaders from both parties, arrives on the floor.
I have been very fortunate in my decade and a half serving this Congress because I have served on several committees where the goals to be achieved, the work to be done, was so awesome that the bipartisanship was easily attained, and many good friendships were formed. I have spent almost 14 years on the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control under the various leaders up to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Rangel]. You get that kind of bipartisanship. We are awed by the problem of narcotics tearing apart a couple of generations of Americans.
I have felt that camaraderie on subcommittees of the Committee on armed Services, particularly the one on Asian and Pacific Affairs under the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solarz], and on the Missing in Action Task Force of that subcommittee that has ex officio members from other committees around the House. Again, the cause is so hurtful, so painful, trying to identify lost Americans now from several wars, that bipartisanship and friendship is the rule of the day.
Certainly on this committee, I am unable to identify the staff belonging to which side of the aisle until we come to the floor.
Madam Chairman, I think that the cuts are too severe for this Member's belief in the importance of intelligence, but I think the work product of the committee is excellent and I support it.
The sad thing about the cut is, and I would say this to the distinguished gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders], that intelligence is generally a bargain at any price.
This month is the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Midway, where, by breaking the Japanese code, we were able to pull off a miracle with no battleships and only three carriers. We faced an overwhelming force of destroyers, cruisers, 11 Japanese battleships, and 4 carriers.
We achieved a massive naval victory that changed the whole course of the war in the Pacific against Japan, all by breaking the Japanese code and knowing that their target for invasion and occupation was the top island in the Hawaiian chain, the island of Midway.
We may save in the future thousands of American
lives by some intelligence development before us.
Madam Chairman, let me just say a few words about how important I think the developments in the Middle East are. We can rest assured, I am sorry, that Plato is probably right in general, that only the dead have seen the war, and in specific, that this applies to the Middle East.
We can also be assured our country will be involved because of our vital interests there.
What is most certain, however, is that our country is never again going to have 5 months to lay the groundwork, in military parlance, to prepare the battlefields, quote-unquote. Most likely it will be a sudden crisis. It will affect our vital--the root Latin word there is life, vitae--our life, our vital interest. And it may involve great danger to American citizens.
As we all know, Madam Chairman, the Middle East sits on top of the world's proven oil reserves. Many of our allies in Europe are dependent in too great measure on their supply of petroleum from that region. If it is ever interrupted again, it is going to have an immediate and significant effect.
We do not seem to learn any lessons from all these struggles and the loss of life. The United States has strong allies in the Middle East. We have just fought a hard-fought foreign operations bill that comes up again and again, wherein the two major recipients of U.S. taxpayer aid are in that region.
A large portion of foreign investment in our economy is from the Middle East. But on the dark side of that economic coin, hashish and heroin find their way into the United States through the Middle East.
Our citizens are still at risk in that region. Most of the worst terrorist incidents to befall our citizens have taken place there or have been perpetrated by terrorists from there.
Several Middle Eastern countries are acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and, judging by Iraq's insane experience, they are not afraid to use them.
Religious and ethnic animosity rend the Middle Eastern social fabric and make stability unlikely in the near future.
Islam, one of the world's three great religions, in its most radical form is stridently anti-Western, and is still increasing in influence in the region.
Given these challenges, our Nation's intelligence capability must be equipped to monitor developments carefully and precisely throughout that whole region. While many people are looking to the overall defense budget for nonexistent peace dividends, I think the best investment we could make in our Nation's national security, which I repeat, might end up saving thousands of our citizens' lives, would be to augment our intelligence capability to track developments in the volatile Middle East, not to mention the Balkans and all of the people trying to steal our industrial secrets.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman], a member of the committee.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of this bill and compliment the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy] for his excellent work in being an active player at the vanguard of change during the great change which is happening in Eastern Europe and around the world.
I renew my personal interest in a lot of things that have been discussed earlier, but particularly in the area of economic intelligence. I have raised this issue each year that we have brought this bill to the floor, and there is no exception this year. The great challenge to the United States of America and our ability to compete in the world is the competitive issues that are now raised in the world of new global economic challenges.
Madam Chairman, there are great threats to the United States of America from foes and allies alike that want to dominate economically in a lot of key industries, whether it is in the computer industry, the aviation industry, or even in agriculture.
Our committee has done an excellent job of encouraging the appropriate use of economic intelligence throughout the world in order for us to meet those threats, whether they are in the public sector or by government, or whether they are in the private sector encouraged by government.
Madam Chairman, I just want to compliment the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy]. I also want to compliment Mr. Gates, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, for this interest in this area, and encourage the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies to continue to focus their efforts on these issues, because they will affect the economic livelihood of Americans, particularly the jobs of Americans, every bit as much as a lot of other economic issues facing this country.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chairman, before we wrap up the debate, I want to be sure to acknowledge the tremendous effort and support of our staff, of our bipartisan staff. Not only are they dedicated, but enormously capable. We who serve on the committee are blessed to have such capable staff. Indeed, the Nation is blessed to have such an outstanding staff.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Hoagland].
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Hoagland] is recognized for 30 seconds.
Mr. HOAGLAND. Madam Chairman, the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] has expressed concern, as have I, about the potential transfer of intelligence slots from the new Strategic Command in Omaha elsewhere in the country.
Things are very unsettled in the world, of course. But in the Air Force today, as reorganizations are being effectuated, I think it is extremely important that we not prejudice or cripple the intelligence capability of the Strategic Command, which has overall responsibility for the deployment of nuclear weapons, land, sea, and air. Clearly it is very important that sufficient positions be kept in Omaha so they can do their job.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute now printed in the reported bill shall be considered by title as an original bill for the purpose of amendment, and each title is considered as read.
The Clerk will designate section 1.
The text of section 1 is as follows:
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chairman, this amendment will authorize funds for an advanced airborne reconnaissance program. This is a matter on which the committee has had a longstanding interest.
The authorization of funds will provide flexibility sufficient to ensure that such a program would begin in fiscal year 1993, if a decision is made to institute it.
Madam Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
Mr. McCURDY. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.
Madam Chairman, as the gentleman from Washington noted, the committee has been active on this matter for a long time. The amendment does not add to the total of the authorizations provided by the bill, but will preserve the issue of an advanced airborne reconnaissance program for further consideration in the coming weeks.
We are pleased to accept the amendment.
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished ranking Member, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Shuster], who has done an outstanding job.
Mr. SHUSTER. Madam Chairman, I understand that various options on airborne reconnaissance are being reviewed by the administration. We should, indeed, be prepared to take whatever action the results of that review might indicate.
This amendment will ensure our ability to do just that, and I support and this side supports the gentleman's amendment.
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I, too, want to compliment the staff of the committee, the chairman, and the ranking member for the great job they have done on this bill.
Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks].
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other amendments to the bill?
If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. McNulty) having assumed the chair, Ms. Slaughter, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that the Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 5095) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1993 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 495, she reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on the amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the Whole? If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed.
The title of the bill was amended so as to read: `A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1993 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, to revise and restate the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees, and for other purposes.'.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
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