Uranium Program
In an announcement that shocked the world, Washington said on 16 October 2002 that North Korea had admitted to secretly developing nuclear weapons, in violation of a 1994 agreement with the US. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly told the North that they must immediately and visibly dismantle this covert nuclear weapons program. After initial denials, North Korean officials acknowledged that they have such a program [though during the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in August 2003 the North Korean delagate denied that North Korea had a program to produce highly enriched uranium]. Washington has offered the North Koreans no deal in return for a dismantling of the program. Kelly said North Korean officials told him they now considered that the 1994 Agreed Framework was nullified. The US stated that Pyongyang must first show good faith by abandoning all nuclear weaponization before any consideration of potential US action.
With the uranium program, North Korea was in violation of Article IV-1 of the Agreed Framework, and its actions clearly ran counter to the spirit of the agreement, though not explicitly against it in any other regard. Pyongyang countered by saying the US has not normalize relations and the LWR promised under the agreement have gone through numerous delays and will not be remotely close to completion by the initial 2003 date. The North Koreans stated that the failure of the international consortium to meet deadlines in building the two promised light-water reactors and the US treatment of North Korea nullified the agreement.
Secretary of State Colin Powel stated that the accord was nullified by North Korea’s admission of violating the 1994 accord. Powell added that the US was not anxious to take immediate action. US officials cited the DPRK's admission of continuing nuclear weapons programs as the cause of the accord’s demise.
US officials in both the White House and the Department of State were initially cautious when discussing the current status of the Agreed Framework. The US was fearful that Department of Energy monitoring of North Korea’s plutonium production could be halted and Pyongyang would be free to reestablish a plutonium based weapons program.
Japan and South Korea were reluctant to officially end the Agreed Framework. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stated that continued engagement with North Korea is the best hope for disarmament. South Korean officials have stated a desire to keep the aid programs running. The South Korean government said it will try to dissuade North Korea from building nuclear weapons during coming ministerial talks. However, mounting public anger over Pyongyang's weapons program may make it difficult for Seoul to continue its policy of engaging the North. There is a real fear that ending the program could exacerbate instability in North Korea and worsen the current crisis.
Uranium Program History
While the current interest is centered around a uranium enrichment program based upon technology apparently received from Pakistan, there was a time in North Korea's nuclear weapons program -- in the late 1970s and early 1980s -- when it was possible that North Korea engaged in uranium enrichment. If that were the case, then American estimates of their program and their potential weapons capability could be significantly off.
Shortly after the signing of the 1994 accord, it is believed that North Korea began another clandestine program to enrich uranium and develop a uranium-based nuclear program. The evidence at first was faint and circumstantial. Western intelligence had "shards of evidence" of the North Korea-Pakistan nuclear relationship going back to 1997. These developed into clear suspicions by 1998, and by 1999 the North Koreans committed to this program.
It was clear in 1998 that construction of the first Light Water Reactor under the Agreed Framework would be at least three years behind schedule, because of US reservations and hesitancy.
North Korea secretly brought equipment needed for its nuclear weapons program into the country in June 1998 from Pakistan. The nuclear equipment, which included a sample gas centrifuge used to enrich uranium and its blueprints, were transported on a special flight from Islamabad to Pyongyang.
The United States identified at least three sites where the North Korean’s were suspected of possibly conducting enrichment tests. These locations are the Academy of Sciences near Pyongyang, and sites in the Hagap region and Yehong-dong. North Korea likely shifted to uranium based systems because uranium programs are generally easier to hide and more reliable than their plutonium counterparts.
In the December 2002 issue of the Japanese magazine Tokyo Gendai, an article titled "North Korea Has Completed Arming Itself With Nuclear Weapons" was written by Kenki Aoyama. The author was born in Japan to Korean parents in 1939, returned to North Korea in 1961, and defected in 1998 to Japan. He claims to know first-hand that Nodong missiles are deployed in deep tunnels near the Chinese border. Aoyama calls Yongbyon "a gigantic nuclear complex" with about 20,000 researchers [and family dependents] working on nuclear plants. Only a few buildings are above ground, while "all other facilities lie underground." Aoyama claims that a successful underground nuclear test was conducted at Yongbyon in 1993. He claims that North Korea's nuclear weapons program is now at Pakchon, not far from Yongbyon. Another more recent defector, who is a nuclear scientist claims, it has been moved farther south to North Hwanghae Province.
The complex at Hagap was first identified in the press in 1998 citing a classified Defense Intelligence Agency report titled "Outyear Threat Report". The DIA was unable to identify the purpose of the Hagap facility but speculated that it could be used for nuclear production and/or storage. The facility, located three miles north of Hyangsan, P'yongan-Pukto Province, consists of three main areas. The operations area is said to have 30 buildings and 5 additional buildings that are under construction. The location is at the foot of the Myohyangsan mountains that has at least four tunnel entrances and 11 support buildings. Reports indicate that four tunnels connect to dozens of building. This facility is said to be unique as it is the only one of several potential nuclear facilities that has been built underground.
For a number of years, possibly back as far as 1999, there were reports that the US and the South Korean intelligence community had gotten indications that the DPRK was attempting to acquire equipment related to centrifuges, which could be used for uranium enrichment.
According to senior US officials, equipment Pakistan exported to North Korea may have included gas centrifuges used in creating weapons-grade uranium. The the shipment took place as part of a barter deal between the two countries in the late 1990s. In return, North Korea provided Pakistan with medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Russia and China are also said to have supplied equipment for the North Korean secret nuclear weapons program.
North Korea secretly supplied Libya with almost two tons of uranium in early 2001. Libya turned over a large quantity of uranium hexafluoride to the United States in early 2004, as part of an agreement to give up its nuclear program. US officials initially identified Pakistan as the likely source of the material. The uranium amounted to 1.7 metric tons (or 1.87 American tons) of uranium hexafluoride, the standard feed stock for centrifuges. The uranium was slightly enriched to about 1 percent U-235, above the 0.7 percent concentration in natural uranium. Libya could have enriched the urainium to make one small atomic bomb.
Pakistan's assistance to North Korea's covert nuclear weapons program may have continued through the summer of 2002. What was termed "highly suspicious shipping trade" indicated that Pakistan continued to trade nuclear technical knowledge, designs and possibly material in exchange for missile parts.
Evidence continued to accumulate, to the point that by August 2002 year administration officials felt the case was compelling enough to be grounds for cutting off talks aimed at improving relations with the isolated state. Prompted by North Korean attempts to acquire quantities of high-strength aluminum from a source in Russia, US officials decided to confront the North Koreans about the state of their program. Assistant Secretary of State James A, Kelly took the evidence to Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. After initially denying the program, the North Koreans admitted to developing the program in direct violation of the ’94 accord.
Scale and Schedule
The scale and schedule of the North Korean Uranium program are impossible to bound from open sources. However, the participation of the DPRK in the A.Q. Khan network provides some indication of the possible scope of the North Korean program.
- Libya began purchasing components for a relatively simple gas centrifuge made mostly of aluminum beginning in the late 1990s. After acquiring parts for about 100 machines, Libya instead began to focus on a more sophisticated maraging steel centrifuge design. Libya had arranged to purchase 10,000 of the maraging steel centrifuges, sufficient to produce about ten bombs a year.
- At Iran's Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) in Natanz, workers were assembling parts for 1,000 more centrifuges as of February 2003. Eventually a total of 5,000 centrifuges will be used in the uranium enrichment plant, sufficient to produce about five bombs a year. The project was originally planned for completion in 2005. According to some estimates, the advanced centrifuge complex might eventually house as many as 50,000 centrifuges, capable of producing enough weapons-grade uranium for dozens of weapons per year if/when completed at the end of the decade.
Publicly available evidence does not permit an assessment of the extent of this uranium program, and there is a considerable range of uncertainty. The North mines uranium by the thousands of tons – offering plenty of raw material for the secret uranium enrichment program. It is generally agreed that North Korea has attempted to acquire technology related to uranium enrichment from sources in several countries, including China, Russia and Pakistan. It is also generally agreed that, compared to the plutonium program, the precise status of the uranium program would be difficult to assess using sources such as satellite imagery. In contrast to the large and distinctive plutonium production reactors, a uranium enrichment program could be dispersed and hidden underground.
In the summer of 2001 the US Government concluded that Pyongyang had moved from R&D to construction of a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational -- which could be as soon as mid-decade, ie, 2005.
As of late 2002 the uranium enrichment program was believed to be at least two years away from generating enough material for even a single weapon, that is, sometime during 2004. Some sources claimed at that time that North Korean may possess up to 2,000 to 3,000 centrifuges and was already enriching uranium. US intelligence agencies were reported to have evidence that North Korea obtained at least some gas centrifuges from Pakistan, and was trying to acquire large amounts of high-strength aluminum to make more gas centrifuges from Japan.
According to a CIA estimate in 2002, North Korean could begin producing highly enriched uranium within three years. "We recently learned that the North is constructing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational — which could be as soon as mid-decade," the CIA said. According to this estimate, Pyongyang's covert uranium-enrichment program, which could begin producing enough fuel for one to two uranium bombs per year beginning in 2005. According to the CIA analysis, " ... we did not obtain clear evidence indicating the North had begun constructing a centrifuge facility until recently ... We assess that North Korea embarked on the effort to develop a centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program about two years ago." In 2001 procurement agents for North Korea "began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities," and North Korean "also obtained equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal systems." ["North Korea Can Build Nukes Right Now," By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times, November 22, 2002 Pg. 1].
Senior Bush Administration officials have said [on background] that a gas centrifuge plant to enrich uranium could be ready as early as 2003. The facility is being built with equipment acquired from Pakistan, Russia and other sources, but US intelligence does not know where the plant — most likely underground — is located. By early 2004 estimates of when the program would be capable of making fissile material ranged from the end of 2004 to 2007.
As of February 2005 Defense Intelligence Agency analysts were reported to believe that North Korea may already have produced as many as 12 to 15 nuclear weapons. This would imply that by the end of 2004 North Korea had produced somewhere between four and eight uranium bombs [on top of the seven or eight plutonium bombs already on hand]. The DIA's estimate was at the high end of an intelligence community-wide assessment of North Korea's nuclear arsenal completed in early 2005. The CIA lowballed the estimate at two to three bombs, which would suggest an assessment that the DPRK either had not reprocessed a significant amount of plutonium from the 8,000 spent fuel rods removed from storage in early 2003, or had not fabricated a significant number of weapons from whatever amount of plutonium had been reprocessed. The Department of Energy's analysis put North Korea's stockpile somewhere in between, which would be consistent with the roughly 7 or 8 plutonium bombs that could be produced from all existing plutonium stocks, with no uranium bombs.
Korean Motivations
The sudden admission by DPRK officials of an active nuclear program came as a great surprise to the rest of the world, and the rationale for the disclosure is open for speculation. The North Korean argument that delays in the building of the light-water reactors and the US grouping of it as part the “axis of evil” released it from any obligation to the ’94 accord is inconsistent with the fact that the uranium program had apparently been in progress for some considerable time prior to disclosure.
An active and operational North Korean nuclear weapons capability in the hands of the often-unpredictable Kim Jong-Il threatens regional security. The admission seems to be a continuation of North Korean “brinkmanship” diplomacy last seen during the 1994 crisis. The exact reason for the admission remains unclear, and there are several possible explanations.
According to one school of thought there was a decision among the North Korean leadership that admitting the existence of the uranium program would give them more leverage in negotiations with the United States in terms of demonstrating the agreed framework had not been successful. In order to get the DPRK to actually comply, the US would have to provide more incentives.
The other view is that, in addition to recent revelations about Korean abduction of Japanese citizens, this was part of a significant rethink in foreign policy on the part of the DPRK and a move towards towards a more open foreign policy that allows for some compromises. An overt denial by officials in the face of real and compelling evidence would have seriously damaged North Korean attempts to normalize relations with South Korea and Japan. Recent overtures and admissions of wrongdoing faced becoming meaningless gestures if it refused to openly acknowledge the pursuit of nuclear weapons and the active attempt to acquire components necessary to sustain nuclear development.
The DPRK may be exercising a strategy of 'divide' and 'rule' toward the US-Japan-South Korean alliance formed in dealing with the North. While demonstrating moves to improve relations with Japan and South Korea, the North is creating a critical situation with the US.
According to a third school of thought, this was a defiant reaction. The admissions were a way of saying "you can't push us around. With your rhetoric that you may be intending to come after us, but don't think you can do that. We have powerful weapons."
Kim Jong-il may have concluded that, following Saddam Hussein's demise, Washington would soon turn to regime change in North Korea. Pyongyang says that it is willing to negotiate with the United States over its covert nuclear weapons program, but first Washington must agree to a non-aggression pact. Pyongyang says it has the right to hold nuclear and other weapons if it feels its existence is threatened.
The North Korean admission came at a time when the US was in a difficult bargaining position. The situation in Iraq seriously diminished the potential for immediate US military intervention. Any threatened military action would be counter to current regional desires to normalize relations with Pyongyang. North Korea likely recognizes the unique position it is in vis-à-vis the United States and other regional powers.
North Korea could be exploiting the current geopolitical situation. By admitting the program’s existence, North Korea forces the US to confront the issue now, as likely preferred by Washington, rather than following any action in Iraq. Direct support of military action would threaten to split US support in the region and damage US foreign policy actions on a number of issues, including Iraq and the war on terrorism.
Pyongyang has made it clear that it is seeking negotiations with Washington. Kim Young-Nam, President of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly Presidium since 1998, has stated that North Korea would be willing to abandon its nuclear program in return for greater foreign assistance and a change in US policy toward DPRK. The North Koreans have openly objected to being portrayed as part of the “axis of evil” and any negotiation would likely need to include a reversal by Washington. Specifically the North Koreas reportedly offered to United States officials to:
- End their efforts to develop a uranium-based weapons system
- Continue to abide by the guidelines established within the ’94 agreed framework in regard to plutonium systems.
- Accept US inspection and verification measures.
In return, the United States would have to make a public pledge not to stage a pre-emptive attack against the DPRK, sign a peace treaty and restore the 1953 armistice, and normalize diplomatic relations. Some analysts see North Korea's confession as sending out a signal that it does not want a military confrontation with the United States and prefers to reopen dialog.
International Response
The consensus worldwide was that regardless of where negotiations with Pyongyang went, North Korea must accept international inspections of its nuclear and missile facilities. From the left to the right, some criticized the US for the perceived inconsistencies in threatening the "sword" against Iraq while applying "wise diplomacy" to North Korea.
South Korean President Kim Dae-jung -- who won the Nobel Peace Prize for engaging the communist North -- said there were three possible responses. He said war would be horrible. Economic sanctions might only leave North Korea more isolated and therefore free to continue building nuclear weapons. So the only choice he saw was to pursue dialogue. But in South Korea, the news that North Korea had been violating its commitment to give up its nuclear ambitions, sparked a backlash against further engagement known as the Sunshine policy. Most of the confidence-building projects have gotten nowhere.
The 24 October 2002 inter-Korean joint statement included Pyongyang’s nuclear development program. In particular, the issue of the North’s highly-enriched uranium program was included among other issues in the statement. The two Koreas pledged to actively cooperate to solve the nuclear and other issues, through discussion. With this, the South virtually accepted the North’s demand that all issues be comprehensively resolved, in contrast to the US position that the North’s nuclear program must be dismantled before any dialogue is held to resolve any issues.
President Bush, Republic of Korea President Kim Dae-Jung, and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi agree that North Korea's program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons is a violation of several agreements and called on North Korea in a statement 26 October 2002 to dismantle the program in a prompt and verifiable manner. The three leaders agreed that North Korea's program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons is a violation of the Agreed Framework, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, North Korea's IAEA safeguards agreement, and the South-North Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The three leaders called upon North Korea to dismantle this program in a prompt and verifiable manner and to come into full compliance with all its international commitments in conformity with North Korea's recent commitment in the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration.
Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi said her government, unlike the United States, will continue to keep open a diplomatic channel with North Korea for talks on normalizing relations. But she said there was no difference in U-S and Japanese policy on North Korea's nuclear programs. A joint U-S-Japanese statement said North Korea's relations with the outside world will "hinge" on its willingness to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. It also said the two governments urge North Korea to cease all ballistic missile activities, including the export of missiles and related technology.
On 08 June 2004 Zhou Wenzhong, China's deputy foreign minister, said in an interview with the New York Times that the US had not persuaded China that North Korea had both uranium and plutonium bomb programs. "We know nothing about the uranium program ... We don't know whether it exists. So far the U.S. has not presented convincing evidence of this program."
American Courses of Action
President George W. Bush said, "This program undermines regional and international security and the international nonproliferation regime." The United States said the issue of North Korea dismantling the nuclear program is not negotiable. Since the surprise DPRK admission, the United States has clearly and repeatedly stated a desire to resolve the crisis through negotiation rather than force. North Korea poses a severe challenge to the Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive use of military force. The fact that the Adminstration has not focused on Korea demonstrated that there are some flaws and logical inconsistencies in their policy. Instead, Washington immediately sought regional support to place pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. Washington officials have frequently stated their confidence that this approach will be successful.
President Bush had backed away from Washington's previous policy of tentative engagement with North Korea, saying it is part of an "axis of evil" along with Iraq and Iran. But most observers agree that the Bush administration is not likely to wage war on the Korean peninsula, because any such conflict could result in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of South Koreans.
Secretary of State Colin Powell said the United States is not going to buy an end to North Korea's nuclear program a second time. He said the only way for North Korea to get the wider diplomatic recognition it wants, and the outside aid it desperately needs, is to first give up its nuclear weapons ambitions. Powell said, "The United States will not enter into dialogue in response to threats or broken commitments and we will not bargain or offer inducements for North Korea to live up to the treaties and agreements it has signed."
Given both Pyongyang and Washington’s stated preference for a diplomatic solution to the present crisis, this is likely the first course of action to be pursued. This by no means guarantees a successful resolution through diplomacy especially given North Korea’s failure to follow the guidelines of the ’94 accord. Negotiations would revolve around US demands of a cessation of all North Korean nuclear programs, full and unfettered inspection and monitoring of such sites. North Korean’s would likely seek normalized relations with the US and its Asian neighbors, increased economic assistance, and timely assistance in developing atomic energy.
The United States could promote a policy of containment in regard to North Korea. By isolating and containing North Korea the US could, in theory, prevent any real continuation of North Korean WMD programs through the use of sanctions and embargos. However, this policy could be problematic given that all regional powers must be on board and the US would need to first secure the approval of the United Nations.
The US could also pursue military action to disarm North Korea. This course of action would likely not be considered until after any action in Iraq would be resolved. Currently there are approximately 37,000 US troops stationed in South Korea. Potential military action would first necessitate a build up of troops beyond those currently stationed in Korea. This build-up would include substantial increases in air and naval forces in the region.
Brent Scowcroft and Daniel Poneman argued that " ... loose talk denigrating our military options is a serious mistake, undermining a half-century investment -- sealed in American blood -- in standing up to North Korean aggression. As President Bush has made clear, the U.S. must reserve the right to take military action to confront a nuclear-armed threat rather than run the risk of enduring a nuclear attack." ["Charting A New Course In North Korea," Wall Street Journal November 14, 2002]
Some US hawks suggested going to war with the North, arguing that the communist country is more dangerous than Iraq, and South Korean conservatives continue to utter hard-line remarks inciting crisis and confrontation. Although some have suggested that a military response was obviously out of the question, given the difficulty of threatening regime-change in Iraq and fighting North Korea. But this is precisely the two nearly simultaneous major theater war scenario that has formed the basis for American military planning since the Gulf War.
Iran, Iraq and North Korea make up what President Bush has called an "axis of evil." But how the United States handles Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong Il differ, even though both are thought to be developing weapons of mass destruction. Because of their economic ties, North Korea's neighbors have the potential for greater influence with Pyongyang than countries in the Middle East have with Baghdad.
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has defended the differing approaches the United States has taken with regards to Iraq and North Korea over their respective weapons of mass destruction programs. Armitage said the differences in the two situations are "fundamental."
The deputy secretary pointed out that Iraq has attacked and invaded both Kuwait and Iran, and used weapons of mass destruction during its eight-year conflict with Iran. Such weapons were also used against its own citizens, said Armitage, in reference to Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological attack on Halabja, northern Iraq in 1988. Lastly, Iraq has "a well-known affection for terrorism and identification with terrorist groups," he said.
By contrast, said Armitage, North Korea has maintained "a rough equilibrium or stability on the [Korean] peninsula for about 50 years," and has been normalizing its relations with the neighboring Republic of Korea. Also, he said, "we have not had a North Korea which has been associated with terrorism," since the 1987 bombing of a Korean Airlines flight.
On 13 November 2002 President Bush decided to halt future shipments of heavy fuel oil to North Korea, pending verifiable steps to dismantle the newly disclosed uranium enrichment program. North Korea said it was lifting the freeze on facilities frozen under the agreed framework between the United States and North Korea, including a nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Furthermore, North Korea asked the International Atomic Energy Agency to remove its cameras from the Yongbyon facility.
Post-2002 Developments
In June 2003 Bolton announced that the United States had, within the previous two months, intercepted aluminum tubes likely bound for North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
The most important task at hand is to ascertain the facts of the North Korean uranium program. As seen in a somewhat different context in Iraq, this may prove rather difficult. The United States must suspect that the North Korean uranium effort is more extensive than the technology acquisition activities that have come to the notice of American intelligence. However, the full extent of the uranium program is known only to North Korea, which may find it difficult to convince the United States that further disclosures represent the entire extent of the program.
North Korea denied the existence of a uranium enrichment program during the first round of six-nation talks in August 2003. This denial was later picked up the support of China. During a visit in early January 2004, North Korean officials told an unofficial US delegation that they did not have a nuclear warhead or a program to secretly enrich uranium for such a weapon. DPRK Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Gye Gwan told the delegation that the DPRK had no HEU program. Upon further questioning he stated that the DRPK had chosen the plutonium path to a deterrent. It had no facilities, equipment or scientists dedicated to an HEU program, adding, “We can be very serious when we talk about this. We are fully open to technical talks.” [Hecker testimony]
