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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)


Hwasong 5 / Scud-B

By © Charles P. Vick 2006 All Rights Reserved

March 1, 2007

Disclaimer

The opinions and evaluations stated here in are only the author = s and cannot be construed to reflect those of any Government agency, company, institute or association. It is based on public information, circumstantial evidence, informed speculation, declassified U.S. intelligence community documents, official Iranian, Pakistani and North Korean government documents and histories, oral histories, interviews and engineering analysis. As with all data regarding the Iranian, Pakistani and North Korean strategic space and ballistic missile programs, this analysis is subject to revision--and represents a work in progress.

Hwasong 5 / Scud-B 

The Pyongyang government received Frog-7s and 60-km range Frog-5 tactical rockets from the Soviet Union in 1969. When the Soviets furnished the North with rockets, they also provided high-explosive shell warheads, but North Korea developed chemical projectile warheads for the Frog-5 and Frog-7A.

Reportedly, Scud-B missiles were received from Egypt in mid-1976-1981, in return for North Korean assistance to Egypt in the Yom Kippur War. North Korea is now thought to be producing Scuds indigenously and to have exported their own version to Iran during the Gulf War. North Korea provided some assistance to Egypt in establishing indigenous production of a Scud clone. Chemical and bacteriological missile warhead development is also being pursued in the Scud-B missile [production] program. The DPRK arsenal is believed to have at least 400 Scud-B's and Scud-C launchers through the summer of 2006.(3, 4) The first successful Scud-B flight test was not conducted until April 1984. Through the April - September 1984 there were a total of three flight test of the Scud-B conducted with and additional three successful flight test conducted between May 29th and May 30th, 1993 by North Korea. Limited pilot production is believed to have commenced in 1985 while full scale production was believed to have started in 1987. (1) The production rate at its high point for the Scud-B's is believed to be on the order of between four and eight launchers a month or between 50-100 launchers per year.



References

 1. Greg Gerardi and Joseph Bermudez Jr. An Analysis of the North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 7 , number 4, 1995, pp. 184-190.

2. Kugbanggwa Kisul, No. 127, Sept 89, FBIS-EAS 29 Nov 89 .

3. http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200607/200607050025.html, N. Korea ’s Missiles Right on Target, The Chosun Ilbo, July 5, 2006

4. http://times.hankooki.com/service/print/Print.php?po=times.hankooki.com/lpage/200609/k..., Seoul Confirms Failure of Taep’o-dong-2 missile test by Jung Sung-ki, Staff Reporter, The Korean Times, September 17, 2006 .




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