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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Nuclear Weapons

By 1953 the Chinese, under the guise of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, had initiated research leading to the development of nuclear weapons. The decision to develop an independent strategic nuclear force was made no later than early 1956 and was to be implemented within the Twelve-Year Science Plan presented in September 1956 to the Eighth Congress of the CCP. The decision to enter into a development program designed to produce nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems was, in large part, a function of the 1953 technology transfer agreements initiated with the USSR.

In 1951 Peking signed a secret agreement with Moscow through which China provided uranium ores in exchange for Soviet assistance in the nuclear field. In mid-October 1957 the Chinese and Soviets signed an agreement on new technology for national defense that included provision for additional Soviet nuclear assistance as well as the furnishing of some surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. The USSR also agreed to supply a sample atomic bomb and to provide technical assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The Soviets provided the Chinese with assistance in building a major gaseous diffusion facility for production of enriched uranium. Subsequently the Chinese accused Moscow of having abrogated this agreement in 1959, and having "refused to supply a simple atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture."

China began developing nuclear weapons in the late 1950s with substantial Soviet assistance. Before 1960 direct Soviet military assistance had included the provision of advisors and a vast variety of equipment. Of the assistance provided, most significant to China's future strategic nuclear capability were an experimental nuclear reactor, facilities for processing uranium, a cyclotron, and some equipment for a gaseous diffusions plant.

The Soviets at one point seem to have promised China an "educational" bomb to copy; however, Soviet-Chinese cooperation, in nuclear matters as well as others, was never entirely smooth. During a summit meeting held at Beijlng, the Chinese leader horrified his Soviet counterpart with h1s facile talk about the need to destroy "Imperialism"; even at the risk of a nuclear war, and even if it should cost hundreds of millions of casualties which China at anyrate, was capable of replacing within a few generations. Now it is not necessary to take Khruschev's account literally. Not only was he trying to justify the role he played in bringing about the Sino-Soviet split, but he himself has put it on record that he never liked or trusted Mao.

Moreover, even if Mao did say something of the sort there is no need to regard him as crazy. When everything is said and done China, thanks to its enormous rural population, always has been and remained, more capable of surviving nuclear war than any other country. This is a fact which the leadership clearly understood, and would be foolish not to exploit, at least for diplomatic purposes.

Though an exact date was not given, the meeting at the poolside in Beijing cannot have taken place too long before or after the Second Taiwan Crisis in which Mao, according to the best available sources, tested American resolve and got his figers burned. In 1965, Mao is supposed to have told Andre Malraux that "all I want are six atom bombs - and then I know that nobody will attack me".

When Sino-Soviet relations cooled in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union withheld plans and data for an atomic bomb, abrogated the agreement on transferring defense technology, and began the withdrawal of Soviet advisers in 1960. Despite the termination of Soviet assistance, China committed itself to continue nuclear weapons development to break "the superpowers' monopoly on nuclear weapons," to ensure Chinese security against the Soviet and United States threats, and to increase Chinese prestige and power internationally.

When China decided in 1955 to develop atomic bombs it faced a number of technological choices as to the most appropriate route to follow. At that time China could only work on one path, and had to choose between producing Pu239 from a reactor, or developing the method of producing U235 through isotope separation. The uranium path offered two alternatives, either system, either chemical separation or physical separation. Chemical separation of Pu235 from the mixed system of U235 and U238 would have been easier than physical separation, but the separation of plutonium and uranium was difficult due to the high radioactivity of the Pu-U system, and the severe toxicity of plutonium. Therefore, the chosen path was the physical separation of U235 and U238 isotopes. The implosion method of detonating an atomic bomb was considered more technically advanced, though there were questions as to whether China was capable of producing a uranium bomb detonated by the implosion method.

China made remarkable progress in the 1960s in developing nuclear weapons. In a thirty-two-month period, China successfully exploded its first atomic bomb (October 16, 1964), launched its first nuclear missile (October 25, 1966), and detonated its first hydrogen bomb (June 14, 1967.

The first Chinese nuclear test was conducted at Lop Nor on 16 October 1964 (CHIC 1). It was a tower shot involving a fission device with a yield of 25 kilotons. Uranium 235 was used as the nuclear fuel, which indicates Beijing's choice of the path of creating high-yield nuclear weapons right away. Of the ten test shots that followed by 29 September 1969, six are believed to have been related to thermonuclear development. The others had as their goals the adaptation of CHIC 1 for bomber delivery and test of a missile warhead (CHIC 4). The third nuclear test was conducted on 9 September 1966 using a Tu-16 bomber. In addition to uranium 235, this nuclear device, with a yield around 100 KT, this time contained lithium 6, which attested to China's readiness to test a thermonuclear explosion. CHIC 6, an airdrop test on 17 June 1967, was the first full-yield, two-stage thermonuclear test.

Although the Cultural Revolution disrupted the strategic weapons program less than other scientific and educational sectors in China, there was a slowdown in succeeding years. The successes achieved in nuclear research and experimental design work permitted China to begin series production of nuclear (since 1968) and thermonuclear (since 1974) warheads.

Subsequent nuclear tests (CHIC 12, CHIC 13) were suggestive of a new phase of the PRC test programs. Both were low yield weapons. It appeared possible that CHIC 13 was delivered by an F-9 fighter aircraft and may have been a proof test of a weapon.

The PRC's nuclear weapons intelligence collection efforts began after the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, when the PRC assessed its weaknesses in physics and the deteriorating status of its nuclear weapons programs. The PRC's warhead designs of the late 1970s were large, multi-megaton thermonuclear weapons that could only be carried on large ballistic missiles and aircraft. The PRC's warheads were roughly equivalent to US warheads designed in the 1950s. The PRC may have decided as early as that time to pursue more advanced thermonuclear warheads for its new generation of ballistic missiles.

In addition to the development of a sea-based nuclear force, China began considering the development of tactical nuclear weapons. PLA exercises featured the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in offensive and defensive situations beginning in 1982. Reports of Chinese possession of tactical nuclear weapons remained unconfirmed in 1987. In 1988 Chinese specialists tested a 1-5 KT nuclear device with an enhanced radiation yield, advancing the country's development of a very low yield neutron weapon and laying the foundation for the creation of nuclear artillery.

The PRC has already begun working on smaller thermonuclear warheads. During the l990s, the PRC was working to complete testing of its modern thermonuclear weapons before it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. The PRC conducted a series of nuclear tests from 1992 to 1996. Based on what is known about PRC nuclear testing practices, combined with data on PRC warhead yield and on PRC missile development, it is clear that the purpose of the 1992 to 1996 test series was to develop small, light warheads for the PRC's new nuclear forces.

One of the objectives of the final series of Chinese nuclear tests was to miniaturize China's nuclear warheads, dropping their weight from 2200 kgs to 700 kgs in order to accommodate the next generation of solid-fueled missile systems. This series of PRC nuclear weapons test explosions from 1992 to 1996 began a debate in the US Government about whether the PRC's designs for its new generation of nuclear warheads were in fact based on stolen U.S. classified information. The apparent purpose of these PRC tests was to develop smaller, lighter thermonuclear warheads, with an increased yield-to-weight ratio.

The United States did not become fully aware of the magnitude of the counterintelligence problem at Department of Energy national weapons laboratories until 1995. In 1995, a "walk-in" approached the Central Intelligence Agency outside the PRC and provided an official PRC document classified "Secret" that contained specific design information on the W-88 Trident D-5, and technical information on other thermonuclear warheads. The CIA later determined that the "walk-in" was directed by the PRC intelligence services. Nonetheless, CIA and other Intelligence Community analysts that reviewed the document concluded that it contained US warhead design information.

Completing the development of its next-generation warhead poses challenges for the PRC. The PRC may not currently be able to match precisely the exact explosive power and other features of U.S. weapons. Nonetheless, the PRC may be working toward this goal, and the difficulties it faces are surmountable. Work-arounds exist, using processes similar to those developed or available in a modern aerospace or precision-guided munitions industry. The PRC possesses these capabilities already.

Assessing the extent to which design information losses accelerated the PRC's nuclear weapons development is complicated because so much is unknown. The full extent of U.S. information that the PRC acquired and the sophistication of the PRC's indigenous design capabilities are unclear. Moreover, there is the possibility of third country assistance to the PRC's nuclear weapons program, which could also assist the PRC's exploitation of the stolen U.S. nuclear weapons information.

There is some uncertainly in published estimates of the size of the Chinese nuclear weapons stockpile. Between January 1971 and late 1972 a second set of new nuclear facilities was been identified in the West. This included a gaseous diffusion plant at Chinkouho which was estimated to be able to produce more U-235 then the original plant at Lanchou. This new facility was predicted to begin partial production in late 1972 with full operation in late 1974. There was an additional reactor for production of plutonium at Kuangyuan and additional weapons grade material could enter the stockpile by 1974-75. Also, there was a possible new weapons fabrication facility located at Tzutung. All of these new facilities would give the PRC the capability of becoming the third largest nuclear power in the world. Based on their production capability, DIA assessed in 1972 that the Chinese could have as many as 120 thermonuclear warheads and 260 fission nuclear weapons in their stockpile.

In the late 1980s it was generally held that China was the world's third-largest nuclear power, possessing a small but credible nuclear deterrent force of 225 to 300 nuclear weapons.

Other estimates of the country's production capacities suggested that by the end of 1970 China had fabricated around 200 nuclear weapons, a number which could have increased to 875 by 1980. With an average annual production of 75 nuclear weapons during the 1980s, some estimates suggest that by the mid-1990s the Chinese nuclear industry had produced around 2,000 nuclear weapons for ballistic missiles, bombers, artillery projectiles and landmines.

The retired Russian General Viktor Yesin, former chief of staff of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, claimed that China’s HEU stockpile was actually 40 tons, and a plutonium inventory of up to 10 tons. He says that these are the best estimates of Russian experts. Based on these estimates of nuclear weapon material production, Yesin estimates that China could have 1,600 to 1,800 warheads.

Jeffrey Lewis writes that "China operated exactly two nuclear reactors for the production of military plutonium through 1991. Open-source estimates reliably band China’s production of plutonium at 2-5 metric tons. Classified Department of Energy estimates, leaked to the press, provide a narrower band of 1.7-2.8 metric tons. (Hui Zhang, a former colleague of mine at Harvard who previously worked in the Chinese nuclear weapons establishment, calculates Chinese production as being on the low end of that estimate in the most recent International Panel on Fissile Materials report.) Using a conservative estimate of 4-8 kilograms of plutonium per warhead, that yields a total force of probably no more than 375 warheads, with an extreme upper bound of no more than 700 warheads."

China's nuclear forces, in combination with the PLA's conventional forces, served to deter both nuclear and conventional attack. Chinese leaders repeatedly have pledged never to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and they have accompanied the nofirst -use pledge with a promise of certain nuclear counterattack if nuclear weapons are used against China. China envisioned retaliation against strategic and tactical attacks and would probably strike countervalue rather than counterforce targets. The combination of China's few nuclear weapons and technological factors such as range, accuracy, and response time might further limit the effectiveness of nuclear strikes against counterforce targets. China is seeking to increase the credibility of its nuclear retaliatory capability by dispersing and concealing its nuclear forces in difficult terrain, improving their mobility, and hardening its missile silos.

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